Developed Countries

Highlights Duration: Foreign inflows and dollar strength may give us a reason to turn bullish on US bonds at some point in the future, but not yet. For now, investor sentiment toward the dollar is more consistent with rising US bond yields than falling US bond yields. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Municipal Bonds: The economic and policy back-drop is favorable for municipal bonds, but value is not universally attractive. Investors should favor long maturity General Obligation and Revenue bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. Investors should also overweight taxable municipal bonds versus investment grade corporate credit. High-Yield Munis are fairly valued relative to High-Yield corporates. Economy: The US economy is currently suffering from a shortage of labor. That is, job openings are unusually high given the current unemployment rate. Feature The recent pullback in US bond yields continues to confound commentators. As we noted in last week’s report, the 10-year Treasury yield’s 8 basis point drop on April 15th occurred on a day when the US economic data surprised to the upside.1 Since then, bond yields have held steady even as the trend toward stronger economic data has persisted. Our explanation for the divergence between bond yields and the economic data is that the yield curve had already discounted a rapid economic recovery and the incoming data are simply confirming that narrative. But many alternative explanations have also been put forth to explain the drop in yields. One of those explanations is that the attractiveness of US bonds to foreign investors has resulted in a wave of foreign buying that has pushed US yields lower. Our view is that foreign interest might become a reason to turn bullish on bonds at some point, but it is not currently a meaningful factor weighing on US yields.    Foreign Inflows Are Not To Blame For Falling US Bond Yields Chart 1 illustrates that US bond yields are significantly higher than yields in Germany and Japan (two of the other major developed bond markets), a dynamic that has been in place since 2013. However, US yields have both risen and fallen at different times since 2013, so the fact that they are higher than yields in Germany and Japan is not a sufficient reason to expect that foreign inflows will push US bond yields lower. One potential problem with Chart 1 is that it shows local currency bond yields. That is, if a German investor buys a 10-year US Treasury note today with a plan to sell it in three months, he is exposed to both the risk that the 10-year US yield will rise during the next three months and to the risk that the US dollar will depreciate against the euro. For this reason, many global fixed income investors choose to hedge the currency risk in their portfolios, an action that significantly alters the attractiveness of foreign bonds. The second and third panels of Chart 2 show the yield advantage in the 10-year US Treasury note compared to the 10-year German bund and 10-year JGB, respectively, after hedging all yields into a common currency. We assume a 3-month investment horizon. The message is that US yields are still highly attractive to foreign investors, even after the currency risk is hedged. Chart 1Higher Yields In US Bonds Chart 2Dollar Sentiment Supports Higher Yields In common-currency terms, German investors can pick up an extra 108 bps in the 10-year US Treasury note compared to the 10-year German bund, about the same amount of extra compensation that was available in 2014 and 2003 (Chart 2, panel 2). Japanese investors can pick-up even more extra compensation (115 bps) by moving out of 10-year JGBs and into US Treasuries, though US Treasuries looked even more attractive relative to JGBs in 2014 and 2003 (Chart 2, panel 3). Whether they hedge currency risk or not, there’s no doubt that foreign investors can gain a significant yield pick-up by moving into the US bond market. The more important question, however, is whether these international yield spreads tell us anything about the future direction of US bond yields. To answer that question, we look at two other periods when US yields were very attractive to foreign investors: 2003 and 2014. Hedged US yields were elevated in 2003, but the US dollar was also near the beginning of a multi-year bear market (Chart 2, panel 4) and investor sentiment toward the US dollar was deeply bearish (Chart 2, bottom panel). In that environment, the 10-year US Treasury yield moved higher for several years, despite its attractiveness to foreign investors. The opposite occurred in 2014. US bonds once again offered an attractive yield pick-up to foreign investors, but this time the US dollar was near the beginning of a bull run (Chart 2, panel 4) and investor sentiment was tilted in favor of a stronger dollar (Chart 2, bottom panel). The result is that US bond yields fell, aided by greater foreign demand. Looking at the contrast between 2003 and 2014, it is clear the spread between US yields and foreign yields is much less predictive of future bond moves than the path of the US dollar and investor sentiment toward the dollar. At present, with dollar sentiment deep into bearish territory (Chart 2, bottom panel), it is unlikely that foreign demand is weighing on US bond yields in any meaningful way. Bottom Line: Foreign inflows and dollar strength may give us a reason to turn bullish on US bonds at some point in the future, but not yet. For now, investor sentiment toward the dollar is more consistent with rising US bond yields than falling US bond yields. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Municipal Bonds: Better Than Credit The performance of municipal bonds since US Treasury yields troughed last August has been truly remarkable (Table 1). The Bloomberg Barclays Municipal Bond Index has returned +2.02% while comparable Treasury and Credit indexes booked losses. The outperformance has extended into Taxable Munis, where returns have been less negative than in Aa-rated Credit, and to High-Yield Munis which have outperformed their corporate counterparts. Table 1Total Returns Since The Bottom In Treasury Yields Two main factors are responsible for the outperformance of municipal bonds. First, state & local government tax revenues recovered much more quickly than many anticipated at this time last year. In fact, they have already taken out their pre-COVID highs and are growing at a pace of 5.25% per year (Chart 3). Second, the federal government stepped in and delivered $350 billion of funding (~1.6% of GDP) to state & local governments as part of the recently enacted American Rescue Plan. This support comes on top of the spike in Federal Grants-In-Aid that resulted from the passage of last year’s CARES act (Chart 3, panel 3). It’s certainly true that state & local governments also faced incredibly high expenses last year as they battled the pandemic, yet they still managed to eke out positive net savings in 2020 as a whole (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3S&L Government Balance Sheets Healing Quickly The outlook for state & local government balance sheets will continue to brighten as the rapid economic recovery pushes up tax revenues and the American Rescue Plan’s transfers are doled out. This will support municipal bond returns. What’s more, President Biden’s recently announced plan to increase the income tax rate on high income individuals could bolster municipal bond performance. Granted, there is no guarantee that this proposed tax change will occur. The President will include the income tax hike in the American Families Plan, a proposal that will not hit the legislative agenda until 2022 as the government concentrates on passing the infrastructure-focused American Jobs Plan this year. There is a good chance that there won’t be enough time to pass the American Families Plan before the 2022 midterm election, after which the composition of Congress could change. Our US Political Strategy service puts the odds of the American Families Plan passing before the 2022 midterm at 50/50.2 Nevertheless, the mere threat of higher income taxes might be all it takes to drive interest toward tax-exempt municipal bonds. All in all, we see the President’s rhetoric as providing a tailwind to muni returns. Clearly, our view is that the economic landscape is positive for municipal bond performance. But value has deteriorated markedly in some parts of the sector, and investors need to be selective. The rest of this section considers where the most attractive municipal bond opportunities lie. Aaa Munis Versus Treasuries Investors should shy away from Aaa-rated municipal bonds. Aaa-rated Muni / Treasury yield ratios have already collapsed, particularly at the long-end of the curve (Chart 4). As is the case in corporate credit, investors need to move down the quality spectrum to find compelling opportunities. Chart 4Aaa Muni / Treasury Yield Ratios Investment Grade Munis Versus Credit Some of those compelling opportunities can be found in lower-rated investment grade municipals, particularly relative to investment grade credit. If we match the credit rating and duration between the Bloomberg Barclays General Obligation (GO) Municipal Index and the Bloomberg Barclays Credit Index, we find that long-maturity GOs look very attractive (Chart 5). Investors facing a tax rate of 2% or higher receive a greater after-tax yield in GO Munis than in Credit at the very long-end of the curve (17+ years to maturity). GO Munis in the 12-17 year maturity bucket also look attractive relative to Credit, with a breakeven tax rate of 10%. The after-tax yield pick-up in GO Munis is less favorable in the belly of the curve. Investors in the 8-12 year maturity bucket face a breakeven tax rate of 28% and those in the 6-8 year maturity bucket face a breakeven tax rate of 39%. Revenue bonds offer better value than GOs. In fact, revenue Munis with maturities above 12 years offer a before-tax yield pick-up compared to Credit with the same credit rating and duration (Chart 6). Even at shorter maturities, the breakeven tax rate for revenue bonds versus Credit is fairly attractive. Investors in the 6-8 year maturity bucket face a breakeven tax rate of 28% and those in the 8-12 year maturity bucket face a breakeven tax rate of 18% Chart 5GO Munis Versus Credit Chart 6Revenue Munis Versus Credit   Taxable Munis Chart 7Taxable Muni Spread Versus Credit Rating And Duration Matched Credit Even though they won’t benefit from any upcoming changes to the tax code, taxable municipal bonds are an attractively priced alternative to investment grade Credit (Chart 7). After matching the duration and credit rating, the Bloomberg Barclays Taxable Municipal Index offers a yield pick-up of 43 bps versus investment grade Credit. Shorter maturities offer a yield pick-up of 30 bps and longer maturities offer 55 bps. These seem like yield premiums worth grabbing given the favorable economic environment for state & local government balance sheets. High-Yield Munis   Chart 8High-Yield Munis Versus Corporates Finally, we look at high-yield municipal bonds and find that they are fairly valued compared to high-yield corporate bonds. The High-Yield Municipal Index offers a yield that is only 88 bps below that of the credit rating and duration matched High-Yield Corporate Index, which is relatively high compared to recent years (Chart 8). That 88 bps yield differential translates to a breakeven tax rate of 21%. That is, any investor facing a tax rate above 21% will get a greater after-tax yield in high-yield Munis than in high-yield corporates. While the yield spread is reasonably attractive, it’s important to note that the High-Yield Municipal Index is extremely negatively convex (Chart 8, bottom panel) and thus prone to extension risk if bond yields rise. This means that the appearance of attractive relative value in high-yield Munis will quickly evaporate as bond yields rise and muni yields start getting compared to a longer-duration benchmark. All in all, we judge value in high-yield Munis to be neutral relative to high-yield corporates. Bottom Line: The economic and policy back-drop is favorable for municipal bonds, but value is not universally attractive. Investors should favor long maturity General Obligation and Revenue bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. Investors should also overweight taxable municipal bonds versus investment grade corporate credit. High-Yield Munis are fairly valued relative to High-Yield corporates. Economy: The Labor Shortage Won't Last Chart 9Help Wanted! An interesting recent economic development has been increased concern about the availability of labor. The Fed’s April 2021 Beige Book noted that “hiring remained a widespread challenge” and the number of small businesses having difficulty filling vacancies has spiked (Chart 9). This seems odd given that the economy is still missing 8.4 million jobs compared to February 2020. So what exactly is going on? The Beveridge Curve – the relationship between job openings and the unemployment rate – is the classic way to track shifts in structural unemployment (Chart 10). Notice that the curve has shifted sharply to the right during the past few months. This confirms the anecdotes from the Beige Book and the NFIB survey. There are, in fact, significantly more available jobs for the same unemployment rate. Chart 10The Beveridge Curve If this rightward shift in the Beveridge Curve proves to be permanent, it would mean that the natural rate of unemployment is higher than we thought and that we should expect wage-driven inflationary pressures to emerge earlier in the recovery. However, we suspect that the recent rightward shift in the Beveridge Curve is not permanent and that it will move back toward more normal levels as COVID’s impact subsides. We see two possible reasons for the Beveridge Curve’s rightward shift. First, the combination of expanded unemployment benefits and stimulus checks on offer from the federal government may be discouraging people from going back to work, even as jobs become available. To the extent that this is a factor holding back job growth, it will soon subside. The last of the COVID stimulus checks are currently being delivered and expanded unemployment benefits will expire in September. Second, there are many other COVID-related reasons why people may be reluctant to go back to work. They could fear getting sick or may have increased responsibilities at home due to school or daycare closures. These factors too will eventually subside as the nation reaches herd immunity and slowly returns to normal. An industry breakdown of job openings provides some evidence that the rightward shift in the Beveridge Curve will prove transitory. Chart 11A shows that the ‘Leisure & Hospitality’ and ‘Education & Healthcare’ sectors have the highest rates of job openings, and Chart 11B shows that they have both seen large increases in job openings since the pandemic began. This tells us that the increase in job openings has been concentrated in those sectors most impacted by the pandemic. It stands to reason that the dynamic will reverse as COVID becomes less of a concern. Chart 11AJob Openings Rate By Industry Chart 11BChange In Job Openings Rate By Industry For bond investors, it’s worth noting that the current labor shortage means that the downward trend in the unemployment rate will not immediately be offset by a rapidly rising labor force participation rate. That is, we could see the unemployment rate reach the Fed’s target range relatively soon, but with a labor force participation rate that is well below pre-COVID levels (Chart 12). Fortunately, the Fed has told us that it wants to see both 3.5% - 4.5% unemployment and a return to pre-COVID participation rates before it will lift interest rates. Chart 12Fed Targets Both The Unemployment Rate And The Part Rate In other words, the Fed also believes that the rightward shift in the Beveridge Curve will be transitory and it will not rush to tighten policy if the labor force participation rate remains low. Our own expectation is that labor shortage issues will be resolved by next year and that the Fed will be comfortable lifting rates before the end of 2022.3   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Political Strategy Weekly Report, “Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda”, dated April 1, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 3 For more details on our outlook for Fed policy please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Stock market margin debt charts have been making the rounds on the sell-side’s research and popping in the blogosphere and social media platforms. Some pundits showed margin debt as a nine-month rate of change and others as a year-over-year percentage change. Correcting for this FINRA margin debt balance, we (and others) have shown it as a percentage of GDP, and all these iterations highlight that margin debt has gone parabolic. Our long held view remains that margin debt uptake is a coincident stock market indicator and has little to no leading properties, neither at tops nor at bottoms. However, correcting margin debt balances versus the stock market capitalization makes the most sense to us. Our data set goes back to the 1930s and the latest tick up in relative margin debt balances is just that a tick up. The chart shows that it hovers near the historical mean, and while it is picking up momentum it is nowhere near previous excesses especially the two most recent ones during the dotcom bubble and the GFC. Crudely put, in momentum terms, the rate of relative growth will have to more than double from the current print, and in level terms margin debt as a percentage of market capitalization will have to jump to near 2.5% (from 2% currently) before it is in clear overshoot territory (top panel). Bottom Line: While some near-term caution is warranted on the prospects of the broad equity market that remains fully valued, margin debt is not yet at levels that have marked previous danger zones. China’s looming slowdown, and the Fed’s taper are the two key macro risks we continue to closely monitor. ​​​​​​​  

Highlights The backdrop for global high-yield corporates remains positive, and a rebound in global GDP and earnings will help ease leverage and interest coverage concerns. With improving global growth taking over the reins from central bank liquidity as the primary driver of high-yield returns, we have decided to reassess the sources of value using some of our key indicators for junk bonds in the US and Europe. The US and euro area appear fairly evenly matched on our valuation metrics but euro area high-yield still offers good value on an absolute basis. We are therefore increasing our recommended allocation to overweight, matching our similar stance for US high-yield. Within the euro area, stay up in quality, favoring Ba-rated credit. Retail and consumer products are attractive bounce-back sectors as Europe emerges from lockdowns later this year. Feature Chart of the WeekCentral Bank Liquidity Has Driven High Yield Outperformance The past year has been excellent for global high-yield corporate bonds. Unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus in response to the COVID-19 economic shock and market rout helped rapidly lower credit spreads in the final three quarters of 2020. As the vaccine rollout picked up pace and the reopening trade began to dominate earlier this year, high-yield corporates continued to perform well despite defaults hitting a post-2008 high (Chart of the Week). An improving outlook for the global economy is highly supportive for lower-rated corporate debt from a fundamental perspective, even if that same pickup in growth will put pressure on policymakers to dial back monetary accommodation. Already, growth in major central bank balance sheets – a reliable leading indicator of high yield outperformance – is slowing, with corporate spreads approaching historically tight levels. Thus, we feel it is timely to assess valuation metrics in the largest high-yield markets of the US and Europe – and the implications for regional high-yield allocations - as economic growth takes over the reins from central bank liquidity as the primary driver of spread product performance. A Cyclical Reduction In Corporate Credit Risk In its recently published Global Financial Stability Report,1 the IMF noted that the COVID-19 shock has pushed up global nonfinancial corporate leverage, measured as debt relative to GDP, to historical highs (Chart 2). Some of that rise is due to companies ramping up debt issuance over the past year in response to supportive monetary policy and favorable financial market conditions. Yet according to the IMF, about half of the rise in global corporate debt-to-GDP ratios from Q4/2019 to Q3/2020 was attributable to sharply lower output. Now, with economic growth set to stage a strong rebound this year – the IMF is forecasting global real GDP growth of 6.0% in 2021 and 4.4% in 2022 - a rising denominator should result in corporate debt-to-GDP ratios stabilizing or even falling over the next couple of years. This will help maintain a positive backdrop for corporate spread product, even if central banks like the Fed turn less dovish later this year, as we expect Corporate interest coverage, using the Refinitiv Datastream bottom-up aggregates of individual company data, paints a similar cyclical picture (Chart 3). The absolute level of coverage ratios fell sharply in 2020, accelerating pre-pandemic downtrends that had already been in place in both the US and Europe. Since Q4/2019, however, interest expense actually fell very slightly in the US, meaning that of the 1.5 point fall in the interest coverage ratio, 1.3 points can be attributed to declining corporate earnings over that period. The picture was also lopsided in the euro area, with 2.5 points of the 2.8 point decline in interest coverage over that same period attributable to falling profits. Chart 2Rising Leverage Is Not Just A Debt Story Chart 3Falling Earnings Are Responsible For The Decline In Interest Coverage Rapid improvements in economic growth momentum, fueled by reopening economies and increased fiscal stimulus (especially in the US), should lead to a cyclical rebound interest coverage ratios in both the US and Europe in 2021 and 2022. Bottom Line: The backdrop for global high yield corporates remains positive, and a rebound in global GDP and earnings will help ease leverage and interest coverage concerns. A Trans-Atlantic Comparison Of High-Yield Bond Valuations Chart 4Our Relative Overweight On US HY Has Been A Success Since March of last year, we have maintained a recommended overweight stance on US high-yield versus European equivalents (Chart 4). That was originally a relative central bank play with the Fed including US high-yield in its corporate bond buying program, in contrast to the ECB that was only buying investment grade debt. Our relative regional allocation on high-yield corporates has worked out well, with the US outperforming the euro area by 3.9 percentage points (in excess return terms versus duration-matched government debt) since the pandemic peak in credit spreads last March. Today, with high-yield spreads back near historical tight levels and the momentum of excess returns starting to peak, a forward-looking reevaluation of our US versus Europe high-yield recommendation along value grounds is in order. To conduct our reassessment of value, we look at five key areas: default-adjusted spreads; 12-month breakeven spreads; volatility-adjusted spreads; credit quality curves; and, lastly, the relative carry offered by high-yield corporates in currency-hedged and unhedged terms. Default-Adjusted Spreads As discussed earlier in the report, fiscal and monetary support have helped stave off the worst for high-yield corporates on both sides of the Atlantic, with default rates spiking far less than the amount implied by the collapse in year-over-year GDP growth (Chart 5). Forecasts for 2021 are sanguine—Moody’s expects the trailing 12-month high yield default rate to reach 4.2% in the US and 2.6% in the euro area in 2021, in line with the IMF’s sharp upward revision to growth forecasts for both regions. The outlook for default-adjusted spreads, which look at the index option-adjusted spread (OAS) net of realized default losses, is much more positive in the euro area however, given that they have a much more attractive “starting point”. The realized default-adjusted spread in the euro area was already inching into positive territory last year, as opposed to the deeply negative spread in the US (Chart 6). This alone makes it much more likely that euro area high-yield will deliver a positive return net of default losses. Chart 5The Default Picture Is Expected To Improve Chart 6Euro Area Spreads Are More Attractive On A Default-Adjusted Basis In addition, the potential range for default-adjusted spreads (combining default rates and recovery rates, see the shaded boxes in the chart) is much narrower in the euro area given the lower post-crisis volatility in default rates in that region, making outcomes in the euro area far less uncertain than in the US. Volatility-Adjusted Spreads Chart 7Falling US Spreads Have Overshot The Level Implied By Equity Volatility Another way to evaluate the attractiveness of the level of spreads, and how much further they could fall, is to compare them to standard macro volatility gauges like the US VIX and the European VSTOXX indices. Credit spreads and equity volatility are highly correlated, as both are measures of investor uncertainty that rise during risk-off episodes and vice versa. The ratio of corporate credit spreads to equity volatility, therefore, can signal if spreads appear stretched relative to the broader risk backdrop. The global rally in riskier credit has helped push down volatility-adjusted spreads for both regions, making them expensive relative to the historic mean (Chart 7). However, the divergence between volatility and high-yield spreads is much more pronounced in the US, where the volatility-adjusted spread, currently at all-time lows and 1.8 standard deviations below the mean, appears much less attractive. In contrast, while the euro area measure is still within one standard deviation of the mean and has room to fall further, as it did in 2007. 12-Month Breakeven Spreads To look at valuations in high yield corporates relative to history, we turn to our 12-month breakeven spread metrics. These measure how much spread widening is required over a one-year horizon to eliminate the yield advantage of owning corporate bonds versus a duration-matched position in government debt. We then show those breakeven spreads as a percentile ranking versus its own history, to allow comparisons over periods with differing underlying spread volatility. On this basis, there seems to be a bit more value in US high-yield spreads, with the 12-month breakeven at the 32nd percentile compared to the 18th percentile ranking for European high-yield. Both markets are not cheap on this metric, though, with the lion’s share of cyclical spread compression having already been realized (Chart 8). This additional value in the US is concentrated in the lower-quality tiers, with B-rated US HY looking most attractive (Chart 9). Chart 8US And Euro Area High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Chart 9All Credit Tier Breakeven Valuations Are In the Bottom Half Relative To History Credit Quality Curves To further inform our decision on value across credit tiers in the US and Europe, we look at credit quality curves, which measure the incremental spread pick-up earned from moving down to lower credit tiers. For example, we look at the spread differential between B-rated and Ba-rated high-yield bonds within the US or Europe. When making the comparisons, we adjust the spreads to account for duration differences between credit tier sub-indices and the overall regional high-yield index. This adjusts for slightly lower index durations as we move down in quality.2 Our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy have pointed out that the spread pickup earned from moving out of US Baa-rated bonds into Ba-rated bonds is elevated compared to typical historical levels.3 Credit quality curves in the euro area tell a similar story (Chart 10). The spread pickup from moving into Ba-rated credit is slightly higher in the euro area on a cross-country basis while there is a more attractive pickup in the US from moving further down in quality. Chart 10US & European HY Credit Quality Curves Chart 11Euro Area Caa-Rated Spreads Have Room To Fall To Pre-COVID Lows As quality curves have compressed across the board, we can also use the pre-COVID lows in these series as an anchor for how much more narrowing we could see (Chart 11). On that basis, there seems to be a bit more value left in the top two tiers of US high yield while there is more juice left in the euro area Caa-rated minus B-rated spread. The Caa-B spread differential is now quite expensive for the US, sitting -140bps below its pre-COVID low, a reflection of yield-chasing behavior by risk-seeking investors in an easy monetary policy environment. As the Fed begins to take its foot off the monetary accelerator within the next 6-12 months, as we expect, this credit tier is also most vulnerable to a repricing of default risk. Index Yield-To-Maturity Chart 12Junk Index Yields At All Time Lows The hunt for yield by fixed income investors has driven down the index yield on lower-quality credit to all-time lows in both the US and euro area (Chart 12). This dynamic has played out at a time when falling interest rate differentials between the two regions have cut down the cost of hedging US dollar (USD) exposures into euros (or, alternatively, reduced the gain from hedging euro exposures into USD). Importantly, this reduction in the gains/losses from currency hedging allows for a more honest assessment of the relative attractiveness of yields on lower-rated corporates in the US and Europe, reflecting compensation for taking credit risk rather than currency risk. With the backdrop for spread product looking positive, it is worth considering the simple carry over a twelve-month period for holding high-yield debt, in both USD-hedged and unhedged terms (Chart 13). For the overall index and the Ba-rated tier, the US dominates completely, with investors in the euro area better off holding US credit even after paying the currency hedging cost. This dynamic is flipped at the B- and Caa-rated tiers, with euro area credit appearing dominant. Chart 13US Ba-Rated Debt Is Dominant On A Carry Basis An Additional Point On High-Yield Sectors Sector composition will also be an important driver of high-yield returns going forward. In the April 2021 Global Financial Stability report, the IMF noted that global high-yield defaults in 2020 were concentrated in sectors most affected by the pandemic. On a relative basis, the US high-yield index appears more heavily weighted towards those sectors – a picture that becomes even more focused if Energy, which is the largest industry group in US high-yield, is considered as a pandemic-stricken industry (Chart 14). However, the euro area does have a slightly larger tilt towards the hard-hit Retail sector. Chart 14Oil And Gas Was Hardest-Hit In 2020 An important implication is that the sectors that suffered the most in 2020 are also the ones most poised for a snapback this year as economies reopen and growth recovers. One way to approach this from a relative valuation perspective is to look at the relative industry-level cross-country spreads between the US and Europe, compared to the change in global defaults by sector from 2019 to 2020 (Chart 15). Chart 15Sectors That Saw Rising Defaults In 2020 Are Poised For A Rebound Sectors that saw a moderate-to-high number of defaults last year, such as Retail and Consumer products, offer higher spreads in the euro area. These will also be the sectors to benefit the most from a consumption rebound as Europe exits lockdowns. On the other hand, US spreads are more attractive than European spreads for the Media and Transportation sectors that saw a big increase in defaults in 2020. Importantly, while the US Energy sector also looks more relatively attractive on that basis, much of a post-COVID recovery has already been priced in, with US high-yield energy spreads below pre-pandemic lows. Investment Conclusions Having looked at our suite of valuation metrics, euro area and US high-yield appear quite evenly matched. On a default and volatility-adjusted basis, spreads in the euro area appear to offer more value while US high-yield largely wins out on a breakeven spread and carry basis. Thus, the case for favoring US high-yield over European equivalents is no longer as compelling as it has been for much of the past twelve months. We are therefore taking profits on our long-held recommended overweight stance on US high-yield versus European high-yield. We are implementing this change by upgrading our strategic euro area high yield allocation to overweight (4 out of 5), which matches our similar overweight recommended tilt for US high-yield (see table on page 15). Within our model bond portfolio, we are “funding” that upgrade by reducing the size of our recommended overweight exposure to core European sovereign debt in Germany and France (see the model bond portfolio tables on pages 13-14). On the margin, this decision also positions us favorably with regards to the consumption driven H2/2021 recovery in euro area economies highlighted by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy.4 Within European credit, we recommend staying up in quality, favoring the Ba-rated tier as lower quality tranches do not offer adequate compensation for the increased credit risk. Bottom Line: Rebounding global growth will help maintain a favorable backdrop for global high yield credit. The US and euro area look evenly matched on our valuation metrics, but there is still good value on offer in the euro area on an absolute basis. Increase allocations to euro area high-yield, favoring the Ba-rated credit tier and Retail and Consumer Products industries, in particular. Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2021/04/06/global-financial-stability-report-april-2021 2 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Report, "Ba- Rated Bonds Look Best", dated February 9, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Note that this adjustment is made to facilitate more accurate comparisons within the credit tiers of the high-yield universe. No such adjustment is made to the Baa-rated credit spread, which is higher-quality investment grade and therefore not part of the high-yield universe. 4 Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Special Report, "A Temporary Decoupling", dated April 5, 2021, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Highlights President Biden’s proposal to raise the capital gains tax rate from 20% to 43.4% is part of the American Families Plan, which at best has a 50% chance of passing before the 2022 midterm election. Biden will soon present the full outline of this $1 trillion bill. The legislative priority is the American Jobs Plan with infrastructure spending and corporate tax hikes. This bill has an 80% chance of passing by Christmas. If it passes by end of July, then the odds of passing the American Families Plan prior to the midterm will shoot up. But we expect it to take to November, which could render the families plan (and capital gains tax) a campaign issue for 2022. Republicans are much more likely to vote for infrastructure spending than tax hikes. Traditional infrastructure can be separated into a bipartisan bill with Republicans and passed along with a renewed highway authorization by September. This creates an alternate avenue for infrastructure. Democrats would still pass the rest of Biden’s American Jobs Plan via reconciliation, including corporate tax hikes, which will only be watered down a bit. We reiterate our recommendations in favor of the BCA Infrastructure Basket and the Biden Fiscal Advantage Equity Basket. Given the eight-year span of the US infrastructure proposals, we recommend a cyclical and structural overweight for these baskets. Feature President Joe Biden’s $2.3 trillion American Jobs Plan is shifting from the initial phase – “coordinated policy rollout” and media cheerleading – to the drawn-out process of congressional negotiation and voting. None of our core views on the bill have changed: we expect the bill to pass before the end of the year and to be similar to what Biden has proposed on both corporate tax hikes and spending. Some spending proposals can be offloaded, some tax hikes can be watered down, but the gist of the bill is known to investors. Scares over Biden’s proposed capital gains tax hike are premature as this bill must pass before Congress can turn to Biden’s second plan and individual tax hikes. In this special report with BCA’s US Equity Strategy, we update the status of the bill and then take a closer look at our BCA Infrastructure Basket. We recommend investors stick to this trade over a structural time horizon of 12 months-plus. Biden’s Bill Will Pass – Bipartisanship Is Possible But Separate Biden’s infrastructure plan will pass on a party-line vote through budget reconciliation. Republicans will reject tax increases; Democrats will muster all 50 of their caucus votes plus Vice President Kamala Harris. Procedurally, reconciliation has been cleared. The fiscal 2021 budget resolution will be revised and this will enable Democratic leaders to cram the infrastructure package into a new reconciliation bill, ostensibly to raise the debt ceiling, which is due to expire on July 31. Technical public debt default will loom in early fall to help the Democrats motivate stragglers to vote for the bill.1 Spending Compromises: The reconciliation process will keep the price tag of the bill from rising higher than the proposed $2.3 trillion, since it will mostly exclude “earmarks.” States will have to apply in a competitive bidding for funding for projects beginning sometime in 2022 rather than receive guarantees of special projects in exchange for their senator’s vote for the overall package. The headline price tag could be whittled down by about $1 trillion if a bipartisan deal is done. Biden’s proposal consists of $784 billion in traditional infrastructure, $647 billion in social welfare, $370 billion in green energy initiatives, $280 billion in tech initiatives, and $219 billion in business support (Chart 1). The Republicans might be willing to agree to most of the traditional infrastructure as well as some of the tech initiatives and business support (Chart 2). This means these measures could be removed from the bill and passed separately. This would leave the Democrats to pass the rest on their own, including corporate tax hikes, which they could do at earliest by the end of July and at latest by the end of December (Diagram 1). Or Democrats could pass the whole package alone. Chart 1American Jobs Plan Has $784Bn In Traditional Infrastructure Chart 2Republicans Support Roads And Bridges Diagram 1Timeline For Congress To Pass American Jobs Plan By End Of 2021 Tax Compromises: Much has been made of West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin’s claim that the corporate tax rate should not exceed 25%, as opposed to Biden’s preferred 28%. Manchin is not alone, however. Table 1 highlights other Senate Democrats who oppose a 28% rate. These decisive swing voters may get a reduction in the rate but we tend to doubt it will be modified much from the proposal. Corporate tax hikes are popular – including when presented as a responsible way to pay for infrastructure (Chart 3). A minimum corporate tax will play very well politically while the headline corporate rate can be toggled one or two percentage points to ensure the bill gets enough votes (Chart 4). Chart 3Independents Support Corporate Taxes For Infrastructure Chart 4Voters Favor Corporate Tax Hike And Minimum Tax Table 1Centrist Senators: Democrats Who Oppose A 28% Corporate Rate, Republicans Who Voted To Convict Trump Of Insurrection, And Others Bipartisan infrastructure spending is possible but separate. Republicans are at risk of getting steamrolled by Democrats in the coming years. Democrats have stolen back the lead on infrastructure, manufacturing, trade, and China, yet they are free of the taint of mishandling the pandemic. Most importantly they have gotten hold of the magic money tree (Modern Monetary Theory), which enables them to expand the social safety net in a historic way that could boost the fortunes of their own party and its underlying principle of Big Government for a decade or more. Thus the pressure will be high on Republicans to show that they can govern and compromise – and infrastructure is the policy on which it is least painful for the GOP to join them. Republicans could hive off traditional “roads and bridges” – as well as tech competition with China – into a separate bill that could go forward on a bipartisan basis. There is a separate opportunity to pass infrastructure spending because the federal highway funding authorization, the 2015 FAST Act, expires on September 30 (Chart 5). The need to reauthorize this law will force lawmakers to act, thus presenting an opportunity to top up funding for traditional infrastructure projects.2 But this merely highlights that infrastructure spending has multiple avenues. If partisanship prevails as usual then Democrats will drive through their bill anyway. Chart 5US Infrastructure Spending In Recent Decades The regular budget process will be gridlocked. The regular appropriations process for FY2022 will not be an avenue for increased spending. Limits on discretionary spending expire at the end of FY2021 so there are no limits on budget appropriations. But 60 votes are needed for appropriations. Republicans will be loath to assist Democrats on the normal budget while the latter achieve all their other priorities via reconciliation. The economy will not need extra spending. A continuing resolution – a stopgap measure that keeps appropriations at the same level as the previous year – is the likeliest outcome. Or a government shutdown, which might be useful for Republicans to rally their base after a demoralizing year, though it would hurt their standing among the general public. Biden’s $1 trillion American Families Plan will be presented on April 28. This bill could pass in H1 2022, if the American Jobs Plan passes by July, but it is just as likely to become the Democrats’ campaign platform for the 2022 midterms. This bill will require the House and Senate to draft a FY2022 concurrent resolution, which cannot be finalized prior to passing the FY2021 reconciliation bill for both parliamentary and budgetary reasons. The economy will be red hot and fiscal fatigue will be setting in. We stick with our subjective 50/50 odds of passage for this bill. This means that the market’s concern over the capital gains rate hike is premature. First, Democrats have been back-loading tax hikes to prioritize economic recovery – and minimize negative impacts prior to the midterm election – so there is no reason to expect the capital gains tax hike to be retroactive whenever the American Families Plan passes Congress. If Congress passes it in mid-2022 then it will most likely go into effect on January 1, 2023. Second, the capital gains rate itself will likely be watered down from Biden’s proposed 43.4% to something around 32%. The good news for investors is that Biden is proposing to keep the distinction between individual income and capital gains (thus preserving the “carried interest loophole”). The bad news is that he is also keeping the Obamacare surtax of 3.8% on capital gains for those making over $250,000 or more. The American Families Plan is not urgent for investors because it is less likely to pass than the American Jobs Plan – and Republicans could win the House in 2022. But if the latter passes by July then the odds of the former passing before the midterm will shoot up. The family plan also shows that there is an upside risk to the budget deficit outlook and inflation expectations (Chart 6). Chart 6Revised US Budget Deficit Projection Post-ARPA Investment Implications Of Biden’s Sweeping Infrastructure Package While both the CBO and IMF currently project that the fiscal impulse will turn negative in 2022 (a mid-term election year) following a modest decrease this year, government largesse has staying power (Chart 7). Chart 7Fiscal Easing… The populist shift in US politics will push government expenditures as a share of output to nose-bleed levels. Given the lack of adequate tax offsets, it will buttress government debt-to-GDP to levels last seen during WWII (Chart 8). True, debt sustainability largely depends on nominal GDP growth, but spendthrift politicians are unconcerned about paying back debt as interest rates are held low courtesy of an extremely accommodative Federal Reserve and (temporarily) well-behaved bond vigilantes. This is all welcome news for equities exposed to fiscal spending in general and for infrastructure-reliant shares in particular. Two weeks ago we matched different segments of Biden’s infrastructure proposal (Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix) to eight ETFs and one stock that now comprise our Biden Fiscal Advantage equity basket (Chart 9).3 Today we reiterate our sanguine view on this basket – especially versus the NASDAQ 100, given the high concentration of tech stocks in these ETFs. Chart 8...And Debt Uptake Bode Well For Infrastructure Stocks Chart 9Stick With The Biden Fiscal Advantage Basket Importantly, Charts 7 & 8 highlight that a rising fiscal deficit and ballooning government debt are a boon for the BCA’s infrastructure stock basket both from a cyclical and structural perspective.4 Tack on the Fed’s 6.5% real GDP growth projections for calendar 2021 that are more or less in line with the Street’s economic expectations and even the shorter-term outlook brightens for these infrastructure-laden equities (real GDP forecast shown advanced, Chart 10). Chart 10Enticing Domestic Growth Already, the US ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment is soaring following up the path of the ISM manufacturing survey, corroborating that the US economy is firing on all cylinders (top panel, Chart 11). While the recent bond market selloff has gone on hiatus, it will likely prove short-lived. The US population is on track to reach herd immunity sometime this fall and by then inflation will be rearing its ugly head (bottom panel, Chart 11). As a result, the 10-year US Treasury yield should resume its ascent (middle panel, Chart 11). Chart 11Plenty Of Upside Left Historically, all these key macro indicators have been positively correlated with the relative share price ratio of BCA’s infrastructure equity basket and the current message is positive (Chart 11). Beyond the conducive domestic backdrop, likely in the back half of the year the rest of the world will also be on the cusp of getting back to normal – with China’s pace of deceleration being the sole question mark – heralding a synchronized global growth setting. Not only will the US twin deficits weigh on the greenback, but a looming commodity up-cycle is also a boon for hypersensitive commodity-exposed currencies. This dual boost coupled with the budding rebound in EMs is music to the ears of US infrastructure-reliant US conglomerates (Chart 12). Gelling everything together, our US and global capex indicators do an excellent job in encapsulating all of these moving parts. Chart 13 shows that both of our capital expenditure indicators are in V-shaped recoveries, with our global capex one probing multi-decade highs. Chart 12Alluring EM Growth Chart 13Heed The Bullish Message From Our Capex Indicators Bottom Line: The sweeping American Jobs Plan will bolster both the BCA infrastructure and BCA Biden Fiscal Advantage equity baskets. Given the multi-year span of this looming bill, we recommend a cyclical and structural overweight in both baskets.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1 Table A2 Footnotes 1       Paul M. Krawzak, “More questions than answers in parliamentarian’s budget opinion,” Roll Call, April 8, 2021, www.rollcall.com. 2       Jinjoo Lee, “Road Is Smoother Than Expected For Infrastructure, Biden Plan Or Not,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2021, wsj.com. 3      As a reminder, the ticker symbols we included in this Equity Basket are: PAVE, PHO, QCLN, TAN, WOOD, SOXX, HAIL, GRID and SU. We choose SU as there is no pure play Canadian oil sands ETF trading in USD. 4      We first created this basket in late-2018 comprising a range of industrials and materials indexes that should see a positive reaction to a spur in infrastructure demand; Table A2 in the Appendix at the end of this report updates all the constituents in our basket.  

Highlights The sheer magnitude of US fiscal stimulus makes forecasting especially challenging, … : It is very hard to say how unprecedented stimulus will impact the economy. … and it may already have scrambled established equity market patterns: Give a bored millennial a smartphone, a brokerage account app, commission-free trades and regular infusions of cash and you just might get a bear market bounce unlike any that’s ever been seen before. We are devoted to the idea that the simplest answers are the best and we think simplicity is particularly suited to navigating through elevated uncertainty: If growth is going to be solidly above trend and the Fed is going to maintain extremely accommodative monetary policy settings despite the risk of overheating, risk assets should outperform Treasuries and cash and investors ought to overweight them. Feature We spent much of last week speaking with investors outside of the US in a series of Zoom meetings. The themes that were most persistent in our discussions were inflation (Is it going to materialize and how bad could it be if it does?), the post-pandemic landscape (How will it be different and how should an investor position for it?), the duration of the equity bull market and the interest rate outlook. We had begun preparing a report that examined each of those themes in turn through the lens of our typical analytical process. As we progressed through that report, however, we found ourselves increasingly preoccupied with other topics we touched on in the calls and observations and questions that kept us thinking after the calls had ended. We will delve thoroughly into the themes that were raised on the calls as time goes by and evidence emerges that supports or challenges our current views. Those themes are important and will impact asset-allocation and security-selection decisions into at least the intermediate term. But this week we instead turn the spotlight on some of our impressions of the current economic landscape and how investors might navigate it. At the very least, it will serve as a change of pace, but we hope it will also be a jumping-off point for ongoing discussions about asset allocation and portfolio management. Uncharted Territory, Part One The word “unprecedented” got a lot of use and loomed over our analysis and recommendations. We believe in our analytical framework and we expect that financial markets and the US economy will most likely thrive over the next twelve months, supported by a “just-right” Goldilocks backdrop of outsized growth and extremely accommodative monetary policy. We think the probability of a “too-cold” outcome, in which growth disappoints despite the Fed’s best efforts, is steadily shrinking as vaccinations continue to outpace the rate required to confer herd immunity on the US by the end of September. While we think inflation will ultimately spell the end of the bull phases in financial markets and may even lead the Fed to induce a recession, we think it will be a couple of years before it can take root and bring about the market- and business-cycle denouements. The key word in those conclusions is think; we do not know that there will be a consumption surge that extends across several quarters, powering the US economy to grow at an inflation-adjusted rate of 4 to 5% across 2021 and 2022. We expect that the immunization campaign will squelch COVID-19 in the US at some point this summer, opening the way for the release of pent-up demand as households regain the full menu of consumption options and can once again return to restaurants, bars, airplanes, hotels, stadiums, concert venues, cinemas and theaters. Households have $2 trillion of excess savings to slake that demand, but we cannot know how much of them will be directed to consumption or the rate at which they will be released. It’s not that we don’t want to do the work; it’s that there is no empirical antecedent for this magnitude of fiscal transfers to households. The US has never before injected 25% of a year’s output into the economy across just two years (Chart 1). There is no way, then, to use past history to build a model regressing consumption growth against fiscal stimulus or a sudden surge in household savings driven by sweeping temporary constraints on activity. No way, at least, to build such a model with a reasonable degree of confidence in the predictive quality of its outputs. Chart 1We've Never Seen Anything Like This Before The bottom line, then, is that no investor or researcher should attach a great deal of confidence to his/her current expectations. Everyone in investment management is paid to have an opinion, but all of us should have a healthy degree of humility about our current opinions. All of our views right now are necessarily low-conviction. We eagerly await the ongoing flow of data that will shed some light on whether the consumption surge is materializing and if so, the segments in which it will be concentrated. We are also closely monitoring vaccination progress and the ongoing efficacy of the extant vaccines because victory over COVID-19 by the summer is not assured, even if we do hold our base-case virus view with more conviction than our consumption views. Uncharted Territory, Part Two Shutting down activity to limit interactions fostering the spread of COVID-19 was an eminently logical public health measure. It also made sense to bolster the activity restrictions with direct cash transfers to households to cushion the economic blow of abiding by them. The distributions presumably encouraged compliance with the restrictions, helping to slow the spread of the virus, while also relieving economic distress. But the combination may have borne the unintended consequence of upending established stock market dynamics, a matter of little import for the overall economy but a critical issue for professional investors. Technical analysis is often derided by fundamentally-oriented investors as something akin to astrology or voodoo. We are not dogmatic and are happy to use any tool that might be of value; although we are neither skilled technical analysts nor traders, we accept that technical analysis is the most useful framework for assessing very short-term moves. Even fundamental investors with longer-term time frames may find price charts useful for selecting entry and exit points. Pattern recognition, after all, is an essential investment skill and it’s largely what forward-thinking investors are paying for when they invest in buzzy artificial intelligence applications. Something that upends typical market patterns is therefore important and the economic impact payments and federal unemployment insurance (UI) benefit supplements provided for by the CARES Act and the two rounds of follow-up legislation may have stood the relationship of retail and institutional investors to market movements on its head. The bottom four income quintiles of US households received considerably more aid from the federal government than they needed, strictly speaking. Two-thirds of all taxpayers received the full amount of all three economic impact payments and four-fifths received at least a phased-out portion of them while only 25 million people were out of work at the employment trough in April, less than 10 million were out of work when the second round of checks went out in January and just over 8 million were idled during the current round. Those who were unemployed are estimated to have received CARES Act UI benefits that exceeded their previous compensation by more than a third.1 The net effect is that many idled workers found themselves stranded for several months in 2020 with more money than they could spend. Homer Simpson would have blissfully napped his way through his furlough, with a mountain of empty Duff cans filling the space between the couch and the television, but it’s not a stretch to think that millennials in the same position turned to their phones to relieve their tedium and discovered the joys of commission-free trading in the palm of their hands. Retail investors have traditionally been viewed as being the last to arrive at the party, flooding in at market tops only to seep out at market bottoms, while the smart institutional money drove the trends that retail flows belatedly followed. Over time, institutions following the same cues and adhering to the same heuristics established recognizable bull- and bear-market patterns, like extended bottoming processes and regular backing-and-filling that aligned with Fibonacci retracement levels. The GameStop tempest earlier this year may have been a manifestation of the larger issue that the market had been swamped by newbies who didn’t know the rules and therefore wound up trampling them. A seasoned trader-turned-quantitative-investment-performance-analyst commented to us last summer that these were “not the markets we grew up in.” From his perch at a top hedge fund, he viewed retail flows as having been the catalyst for the market recovery that wiped out the entire pandemic decline with barely a pause for breath (Chart 2). Seasoned analysts and portfolio managers waiting for a consolidation of the initial bounce wound up turbo-charging it as they chased the retail flows that got there ahead of them. “They just couldn’t stand the underperformance any longer,” he said. Chart 2A Whole New Ballgame See The Ball, Hit The Ball We follow careful analytical processes at BCA and our clients do as well, but we try not to overthink our investment conclusions once we reach them. We have found that the less a Little Leaguer is thinking about when s/he steps into the batter’s box, the better off s/he will be, and we think the approach applies to investors as well. Be as still as you can, watch the baseball out of the pitcher’s hand, step towards the pitcher and throw your hands at where you judge the ball will be just before it reaches home plate. Your weight will naturally follow your front leg and your hands and everything else will take care of itself if you correctly anticipated where the ball was headed. Our colleague Peter Berezin, BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, abides by a personal Investment Golden Rule: Stay bullish unless you think a recession is just around the corner. His rule aligns perfectly with our observation that bear markets and recessions tend to coincide (Chart 3). Although we cannot know how much of households’ aggregate excess savings will be spent or when, and we therefore cannot predict quarterly GDP growth to the nearest tenth of a percent, we are confident that the economy will grow at a rate well above its real annual long-run potential of 2%, provided that the pandemic doesn’t spring a nasty surprise on the US. If the economy does grow well above its trend rate in 2021 and 2022 (Chart 4), and the Fed lives up to its pledge to remove monetary accommodation only in response to lagged measures of consumer price inflation and labor market strength, stocks should comfortably generate returns in excess of those on cash and Treasuries and multi-asset investors should overweight them (Tables 1 and 2). Chart 3Recessions And Bear Markets Tend To Travel Together Chart 4Earnings Grow When The Economy Grows, And Stocks Move With Earnings Table 1Stocks Thrive When Policy Is Easy, ... Table 2… Especially In Real Terms Steering Portfolios Through Uncertainty Acknowledging the uncertainty inherent in predictions made in the current environment, with its unprecedented fiscal stimulus, is all well and good, but professional investors have a mandate to invest regardless of their conviction levels. How should they navigate through the next twelve months aside from overweighting equities in multi-asset portfolios? The basic rule guiding our answer in this case is to stay within sight of the shore if there’s a possibility that the weather might change suddenly. Given that no one knows how the big swing factors impacting output and the balance between capacity and aggregate demand – consumer caprice, anti-vaccination sentiment, reopening timetables and labor force participation – will turn out, we think that investors’ first order of business should be to prepare to shorten holding periods. Conviction levels will evolve over time as incoming data validate or contradict investment theses but it is important to be prepared mentally to manage portfolios more dynamically in line with unprecedented conditions. Individual managers and investment committees who prepare to adjust their procedures, perhaps by setting stop levels and/or rebalancing thresholds in advance, will find it much easier to do so in real time should it turn out to be appropriate. Investors may also consider reducing deviations from their benchmarks. Increasing the frequency of portfolio rebalancing, shifting from time to level thresholds, or tightening level thresholds are ways that investors with rebalancing guidelines could narrow deviations. Investors who don't rebalance can reduce their initial position deviations and/or their portfolio concentrations. Shortening holding periods and increasing rebalancing frequencies implies harvesting gains more often and is therefore tax-inefficient, but we think it may be worth sacrificing some tax efficiency to protect overall portfolio value at a time of elevated uncertainty.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Ganong, Peter and Noel, Pascal and Vavra, Joseph, US Unemployment Insurance Replacement Rates During the Pandemic (August 24, 2020). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-62.