Developed Countries

Highlights This is the second part of the publication, in which we provide an in-depth overview of Hotels, Restaurants, and Airlines, or the “travel complex” as we dubbed it. In last week’s report, we provided an overview of the macroeconomic backdrop, the Delta variant trajectory, and a “deep dive” into the hotel industry. We concluded Hotels is a sound tactical and cyclical investment, and we recommended an overweight. Airlines Less profitable trip mix and excess capacity: Domestic travel has rebounded to 2019 levels, while international and corporate travel are still lagging due to government and corporate restrictions (Chart 1). Some of the excess capacity is being redirected to domestic leisure travel, which has higher volume but is far less profitable. Airline cargo growth is a saving grace. The cost side of the airline business has its own challenges. Airlines have high fixed costs as they own or lease aircraft fleets. This creates a heavy financial burden during downturns. The price of jet fuel has increased to pre-pandemic levels. Labor costs are high due to the unionized work force and rising wages. Profitability is elusive: With airline revenues down 27% YoY in August 2021, and costs on the rise, it is hard to envision profitability without a return of international and business travel. Too much debt: Airlines’ net debt has risen significantly since the pandemic. Without positive cash flow generation, it will become harder and harder for them to meet their debt obligations. We have a negative outlook for airlines and are underweight the S&P Airlines index. Restaurants Defensive: Although the S&P Restaurant Industry resides within the pro-cyclical S&P Consumer Discretionary Index, its composition is nothing but defensive as it is dominated by fast-food chains. Profitable and resilient: Despite the havoc wreaked by Covid, the restaurant industry has not stopped being profitable (Chart 2). With any new Covid variant scare, restaurants will just go back to their “drive-throughs” playbook. Over the course of 2021, restaurant spending has risen by more than 40%. We have a positive outlook for fast-food chains and are overweight the S&P Restaurant index. Feature This is the second part of the publication, in which we provide an in-depth overview of Hotels, Restaurants, and Airlines, or the “travel complex” as we dubbed it. These industries share many drivers of profitability as each provides in-person experiences. They are also highly dependent upon public sentiment regarding the potential dangers and likelihood of Covid infections. Further, consumer confidence and financial wellbeing are at the core of this group’s profitability, as the travel complex is a quintessential discretionary spending category. The recovery of the group was coming along quite well until the Delta variant derailed it in late summer, with reports pouring in about dining rooms closing, airline bookings flagging, and hotel occupancy dipping. What is next? In last week’s report, we provided an overview of the macroeconomic backdrop, the Delta variant trajectory, and a “deep dive” into the hotel industry. We concluded that the Hotels, Resorts, and Cruise Lines industry has significant potential to return to its former “glory”: Delta is cresting, financially healthy US consumers are choosing to spend their money on services and experiences, sell-side forecasts are pointing to surging sales, and hotels have substantial pricing power. The industry is a sound tactical and cyclical investment, and we recommend an overweight. This week we will continue with a deep dive into the Restaurant and Airline industries. Sneak Preview: We like restaurants (overweight) but airlines, not so much (underweight). Chart 1Airline Majors' Traffic Still Has Not Recovered To 2019 Level Chart 2Profitability Is Resilient To Downturns Airlines “To suggest that the airlines should have better prepared for this environment seems akin to suggesting Pompeii should have invested more heavily in firefighting technology.” (JP Morgan, Mar. 22, 2020) Having avoided bankruptcy in 2020 thanks to federal payout support, US passenger airlines recorded $4.3 billion more in pre-tax losses in the first half of 2021. Clearly, this industry’s woes are far from over. Unsurprisingly, airlines have had the worst performance of any industry in the travel complex, underperforming the S&P 500 by 5% over the past year (Chart 3 & Table 1). Importantly, the performance of the industry slumped at the end of the summer, triggered by the Delta variant scare: After several months of steady increases, new ticket sales have dipped. As we noted last week, several major airlines have warned in regulatory filings that their third quarter may not look as rosy as was hoped. American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and United all noted a deceleration in near-term customer bookings in August and elevated trip cancellations, even in leisure.1 All three have suggested that the Delta variant is having a dampening effect on business. We believe that the Delta variant is cresting. Our base case is that herd immunity is not far off. Of course, the travel complex is vulnerable to any new virus scare (Table 2), and this is a risk that investors need to keep in mind. However, unlike hotels, airlines face multiple other challenges. Chart 3The S&P Airline Industry Index Is Still Under the Pre-pandemic Level Table 1PerformanceTable 2Airline Industry Composition Competitive Landscape The US airline industry generated total operating revenues of $92.7 billion in 2020, down 48.3% from $179.4 billion in 2019. The industry is dominated by five majors, that are included in the S&P 500 index). Macroeconomic Backdrop For Airlines The airline industry is highly cyclical, and its wellbeing is tightly tied to economic growth. As economic activity improves, business travel tends to increase (except when Covid-related restrictions change the normal course of things). As economic growth translates into higher wages and stronger employment gains, leisure travel also takes off. So does the transportation of goods. As we discussed in Part 1 of the report, the economy is currently in a slowdown stage of the business cycle: Growth is slowing but off high levels. As such, even in the absence of Covid-19 or the Delta variant, Airline sales would continue to grow but at a slow pace. US consumers are financially healthy, and while most of the stimulus money has been spent, more and more people are returning to work. Recently, consumer confidence has soured on the back of a resurgence in Covid infections and rising prices (Chart 4, panel 2). However, domestic airline tickets are still cheap, and only fear of infection is keeping Americans grounded. With Delta cresting, people will go back to flying. Chart 4Airlines Are Highly Cyclical Key Drivers Of Profitability: Revenue Vs Expenses Revenue While many industries have been hit hard by the pandemic (brick-and-mortar retail, hotels, restaurants) most have turned the corner and are now profitable. Airlines, however, are still struggling (Chart 5). The good news is that losses have been declining, but the bad news is that the financial situation of most airlines is still precarious. Airlines rely on diverse sources of revenue, and thanks to that, business is starting to recover. The following are the key streams: Fares charged to customers In-flight entertainment, food, and beverages Sales of frequent-flyer credits to hotels, auto rental agencies, credit card issuers Auxiliary charges: Baggage checks, choice of seat, extra leg room Cargo and mail Chart 5Airlines' Revenue Remain Chart 6Airline Majors' Traffic Still Has Not Recovered To 2019 Level Traffic Recovery: Domestic Travel Has Rebounded, While International And Corporate Travel Are Still Lagging Budget airlines are pandemic winners: As of October 2021 compared to October 2019, scheduled available seat miles are down for all the airlines in the S&P 500 index (AAL, LUV, DAL, UAL, and ALK) (Chart 6). Only the budget airlines such as Allegiant, Spirit, and Frontier have a scheduled number of flights above the 2019 watermark. The underlying reason for such a dichotomy is easy to explain. The successful rollout of Covid-19 vaccines in the US has unleashed material pent-up demand for domestic leisure travel, benefiting domestic budget airlines. US domestic seat miles and load factors have recovered to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 7) as consumers have eagerly spent their stimulus checks on travel within the US. Chart 7Domestic Load Factor Has Fallen Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Major airlines are bleeding cash due to high exposure to international and business travel segments: In the meantime, many government and company-imposed restrictions on international and business flights are still in place. Companies are taking a very cautious approach to office re-openings and employee travel, and Zoom has become embedded as a viable corporate communications alternative and a cost-saving tool. As a result, the airline traffic of the majors with high exposure to international (Chart 8) and business travel (Chart 9), is still below the pre-pandemic level. Some of that capacity is being redirected to domestic leisure travel, which has higher volume but is far less profitable. Chart 8In August 2021, US-International Air Travel* Fell 54% Below 2019 Levels Chart 9Since Mid-July, Growth Of Overall And Corporate Ticket Sales Has Slowed Corporate and international travel are the most lucrative revenue segments and are significant in size: Before the pandemic, business travel constituted 30% of all trips. The industry can hardly recover without these segments rebounding. Until that happens, companies will stay unprofitable, and cash burn will continue. Business travel is projected to recover in 2022 at best and 2024 at worst: The US Travel Association projects US business travel to return to the 2019 level in 2024. The Airlines for America Association (A4A) concurs. It projects that airline passenger volumes will return to the 2019 level in 2022 in the best-case scenario and in 2024 in the worst. Airline cargo is a saving grace: With passenger revenues still lagging 2019 levels, many airlines are focusing on the capacity of their cargo units. With global supply chains clogged and shipping costs increasing five-fold over the past few months, this is a profitable niche. Air cargo demand reached its all-time high in 2020 and continues to grow in 2021: US airlines posted a 20.5% increase in demand for international air cargo in July 2021 from the July 2019 actuals (Chart 10). Chart 10For US Airlines, Growth In Air Cargo Continues To Outpace Air Travel By A Large Margin Airlines Compete On Volume: Airfares Are Low Despite the inflationary environment, the price of airfares is still 18% below its 2019 level (-10% annualized), and that is after 7% YoY price increases in 2021 (Chart 11). These are price levels not seen since the 1990s. With all the spare capacity, former international and business travel is now competing to attract domestic leisure passengers. Making things worse, due to prior commitments, airlines continued to grow their fleets throughout the pandemic closures (Chart 12), further increasing capacity and exacerbating competition for passengers as business and international travel are likely to lag, making peak ticket prices and peak revenue elusive (Chart 13). There is also another matter to consider, which is hardly minor. Airline taxes and fees constitute about a quarter of the price of a ticket. According to an example put together by A4A, the base airline fare of $236 has $64 in multiple taxes and fees, making tickets less affordable. Chart 11Airfares Have Fallen by 10% A Year Since The Beginning Of The Pandemic Chart 12Capacity Continues To Increase Chart 13Airfares Are Down 18% From 2019 And 29% From 2014 Sales Growth Analysts expect airline sales growth to stabilize at 60% over the next 12 months. The base effect certainly plays a significant role, but this rate will help the industry to recover. Expenses Airlines have high fixed costs as they own or lease aircraft fleets. This creates a heavy financial burden during downturns, as costs can hardly be cut. Other expenses such as labor and fuel are also sticky. Price Of Jet Fuel Has Increased To Pre-pandemic Levels The cost of jet fuel is one of the most significant input costs for airlines, constituting anywhere between 10% and 30% of revenue (Chart 14). The price of fuel can make a significant difference for an airline’s razor-thin margins. Airlines therefore tend to hedge their fuel exposure. Jet-fuel prices have rebounded to their pre-pandemic level and are up 49% from January 2021 (Chart 14), no longer giving the airline any slack on the cost side. According to Zach Research, at United Airlines the average aircraft fuel price per gallon increased by 66.9% year-over-year to $1.97 in the June quarter. Owing to the uptick in air travel demand witnessed in the June quarter following increased vaccinations, fuel gallons consumed were up 206.4%. Chart 14Price Of Jet Fuel Has Increased To The Pre-pandemic Levels Chart 15Labor Costs Increased Again Labor Costs Are Fixed Due To The Unionized Work Force Labor is another significant line item on the expense side of the airline’s income statement. Normally labor costs constitute 30-40% of sales. During the darkest days of the lockdowns, labor expense soared to 60% of sales (Chart 15). With a highly unionized labor force, layoffs and furloughs require significant payouts. There are also many other conditions in the labor contract that must be met. As a result, as sales tanked, labor costs did not change in the same proportion. Even so, airlines reduced their workforce from 458,000 people in 2019 to 363,000 in November 2020 (Chart 15). Now, with sales growing again, airlines have started rehiring. However, with recent wage rises, new employees are more expensive. Profitability With revenue challenged by a less profitable trip mix, excess capacity, and rising fuel and labor costs, airlines have been losing money for over a year now (Chart 16). While the increase in leisure travel and cargo units is helping, it is hard to envision profitability without a return of international and business travel. With airline revenue down 27% YoY in August 2021, and costs on the rise, profitability is still a long way off (Chart 17). Chart 16Airlines Are Unprofitable… Chart 17…And Are Burning Cash Net Debt Airlines’ net debt has risen significantly since the pandemic, driven by their need to support fixed costs (Chart 18). The increase in net debt was also stimulated by large government support and a low interest-rate environment. The problem is that since airlines are unprofitable, and are burning cash, it is becoming harder and harder for them to meet their debt obligations (Chart 19). While there have not been any high-profile bankruptcies in the US, some European and Asian carriers, such as Norwegian Air and AirAsia Japan Co., had to file for bankruptcy protection. As airlines are expected to continue to burn cash through 2022 their credit ratings have been downgraded (Table 3). We would not be surprised if more bankruptcies or industry consolidations take place in the near term. Chart 18Debt Levels Have Increased Significantly Chart 19Airlines Have Difficulty With Interest Payments Table 3All Airlines Credit Ratings Have Been Downgraded When Will Airlines Thrive Again While revenue lags, the industry will remain vulnerable to shocks and cost headwinds. However, once international and business travel recovers, sales will pick up, and companies will generate positive cash flow. Cash generation is a necessary condition for financial recovery – once airlines arrest the cash burn, they can shift their efforts towards rebuilding profitability and, eventually, repairing their balance sheets. Valuations And Technicals Airlines are trading at 36x forward earnings, which is optically high. However, the Valuations Indicator suggests that airlines are not expensive relative to their own history (Chart 20). The industry is also modestly oversold (Chart 21). Chart 20Airline Are Not Expensive Relative To Own History… Chart 21…And Are Oversold  Investment Implications Airlines are slowly recovering from a malaise induced by the pandemic lockdowns. However, the road to recovery will be long. While domestic leisure and cargo traffic has picked up, it will be another couple of years before international and business travel rebounds to the pre-pandemic levels. With fuel and labor costs on the rise, profitability is elusive without those segments. And, even when airlines return to profitability, it will take them years to repair their indebted balance sheets. What is worse, with current levels of debt burden and negative interest coverage, bankruptcies may not be out of the question for some. While airlines may rally with rates rising and cyclicals outperforming, we are negative on the industry on both a cyclical and structural basis. However, if any of our clients wish to trade this industry, there are several liquid ETFs that represent this space (Table 4). If investors chose to be granular and pick individual stocks in this space, they need to be aware of the individual challenges of each airline and their levels of indebtedness vs cash burn. In short, we have a negative outlook for airlines and are underweighting the industry. Table 4Airline ETFs Are Readily Available Restaurants: Defensive Cyclicals Industry Composition Although the S&P Restaurant Industry resides within the pro-cyclical S&P Consumer Discretionary Index, its composition is nothing but defensive. In fact, a more appropriate name would have been the S&P Fast-Food Industry, with MCD and SBUX accounting for 70%+ of the industry market cap (Table 5). Table 5Industry Composition Performance Restaurant Industry performance has been tracking the performance of the S&P 500, lagging the benchmark by only 8% since January 2020 (Chart 22) Chart 22Restaurant Performed Almost In Line With The S&P 500 Restaurants Are “Defensive Cyclicals” Since fast-food prices are generally low, fast-food restaurants tend to be what economists call “inferior” goods, i.e., goods whose sales rise when the economy is in a downward spiral. Restaurants tend to outperform in the slowdown stage of the business cycle (Chart 23), are flat during contraction, and underperform during expansions. Consistent with these expectations, fast-food restaurants also came out as winners of Covid lockdowns: Although sales initially dipped, they quickly recovered as fast-food chains reoriented their business toward drive-throughs and other forms of take-out (Chart 24). Chart 23Fast-Food Restaurants Are Defensive Chart 24Sales Growth Is Recovering Covid While the restaurant business was coming along quite well, concerns emerged at summer’s end that the Delta variant would further delay industry recovery. Chains like McDonald’s and Chick-fil-A announced that they are slowing their dining room re-openings. As data from restaurant analytics firm Black Box Intelligence demonstrates, sales that had grown steadily earlier this summer have fallen.2 We believe that the reaction to the Delta variant is transitory as new infections are cresting. And, in the worst-case scenario, fast-food restaurants in the index will just switch back to their Covid “drive-through playbook,” and will maintain their level of profitability. Restaurant Spending And Profitability Over the course of 2021, US retail sales releases reveal that restaurant spending rose by more than 40%, outpacing the headline number (13%) by a wide margin (Chart 25). While restaurant spending is likely to decelerate over the coming months as pent-up demand for services is satisfied, earnings will continue to improve. This is in line with analyst expectations (Chart 26). Chart 25Restaurant Sales Skyrocketed In 2021 Chart 26Earnings Will Continue to Grow But At A Slower Pace Despite the havoc wreaked by Covid, the restaurant industry has not stopped being profitable, and although margins dipped in the midst of the lockdown, they swiftly rebounded. The 83% YoY print in restaurants FCF is nearly an all-time high reading since the history of the data going back to the 1990s (Chart 27). Debt Is Low Net debt to total assets also echoes the upbeat message highlighting that US dining stocks remain in good financial health (Chart 28). Chart 27Free Cash Flow Is At All-Time High Chart 28Debt Is Low Valuations And Technicals Valuations are not demanding while technicals suggest that the industry is oversold (Chart 29). Chart 29Restaurants Are Oversold & Undervalued Investment Implications The current slowdown stage of the business cycle is favorable for the fast-food industry. This industry is profitable and resilient in downturns. It is also attractively valued. The industry is oversold, which represents a favorable entry point for an overweight position. In short, fast-food restaurants are a sound “cyclical defensive”: They are resilient to downturns, highly profitable, and have healthy balance sheets. We have a positive outlook on the industry and are overweight. A Quick Aside: Toast IPO Before we conclude, a brief note on the new Toast (TOST) IPO is in order. While the stock became public only last week and is not a part of the S&P 500, it is an important newcomer to the stock market. The company is a market leader in cloud-based restaurant management software. Toast’s performance is tied to the health of the overall US restaurant industry. Many of the popular restaurants and fast-food chains are among Toast’s clients. Bottom Line We have a negative outlook for Airlines: This highly cyclical industry is on a long-winding path towards recovery, profitability, and deleveraging. Airlines face multiple challenges and headwinds: Fuel and labor costs are rising, while their most profitable revenue segments, international and business travel, are missing in action. Cash burn is still acute, and profitability is elusive despite all the progress made. We are much more positive on the outlook for the Restaurant Index, which represents some of the largest fast-food chains in the nation. This industry thrives during economic slowdown, is resilient to shocks, and is highly profitable.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Travel Investors Need More Drive, WSJ, Sep 12, 2021 2     Restaurants Close Dining Rooms Again as Delta-Driven Infections Spread, WSJ, Sep 13, 2021.     Recommended Allocation

Highlights Economy – We find the leading arguments for why households’ excess savings won’t be spent to be wanting: US households do not commonly demonstrate the detached foresight that Ricardian equivalence takes as given and the trauma-will-change-behavior thesis fails to account for the absence of widespread financial trauma. Markets – Public equities account for a record portion of household wealth, but their share gains are not a sign of a budding mania: Our analysis of the Fed’s Flow of Funds data argues that much of equities’ relative share gains have been driven by structural rather than cyclical factors. Strategy – It would be premature to shift to defensive asset allocation settings if monetary policy is going to remain accommodative for another three years: The rate hike progression envisioned by FOMC participants’ dot-plot projections suggests policy won’t become tight until late 2024 at the earliest. Feature The US Investment Strategy team has been at the more bullish end of the continuum within BCA, and among the broader strategist community, since the spring of 2020. Our view was premised on the idea that the fiscal and monetary policy responses to the pandemic were (and would continue to be) so large that they would overwhelm its adverse effects on the economy and markets. That view came to pass as Congress augmented the CARES Act’s fiscal largesse with two subsequent rounds of direct payments to households earning up to $100,000 per adult and a renewed federal supplement to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. With the expiration of the UI benefit program at the beginning of the month and the Fed poised to end asset purchases by the middle of next year, clients have begun to ask if our underlying bullish premise still applies. We believe that it does, on the grounds that policy remains on an emergency footing even though the emergency has passed. The fiscal transfers may have ended, but their full effect has yet to be felt. They will support the economy on an ongoing basis as households direct their excess pandemic savings toward consumption. No one knows for sure how much of the excess savings will be spent or when, but the arguments citing Ricardian equivalence or consumer trauma as impediments to consumption are flawed. What If Today’s Income Is Taxed Tomorrow? British classical economist David Ricardo is best known to introductory economics students for comparative advantage, but he also posited that deficit spending may fail to boost aggregate demand because taxpayers, anticipating that they will be tapped in the future to repay state loans, may increase savings to cover future taxes. Despite its theoretical appeal, empirical data in support of Ricardian equivalence is elusive. Two centuries and an ocean removed from Ricardo’s England, we submit that Americans are not known for parsimony, studied caution or a tendency to see the glass as half-empty. Although American households began to rebuild savings after the global financial crisis, an additional dollar has tended to burn a hole in their pockets ever since the baby boomers began reaching adulthood (Chart 1). Chart 1The Searing Trauma Of The Depression Weighed On Consumption Decisions Even if Americans were wont to consider future tax burdens, it may be rational for the households who received the fiscal transfers to assume they will largely escape them unless their relative income surges. Per the most recent adjusted gross income (AGI) distribution data (for tax year 2018), 70% of taxpayers earn $75,000 or less (Chart 2). Single taxpayers meeting that threshold (and married taxpayers earning $150,000 or less) received the full amount of the economic impact payments authorized by the CARES Act and subsequent legislation. That bottom 70% paid just 5.1% of AGI in federal taxes (Chart 3), and the current political climate points in the direction of an increasingly progressive tax system, so they may not have to worry about being called upon to cover the expanding deficit down the road. Chart 2The Income Distribution Is Top Heavy ... Chart 3…But So Is The Tax Burden The (Not So Traumatic) Economic Trauma Of COVID-19 While we are confident that Ricardian equivalence will not act as an impediment to consumption, the ultimate disposition of households’ excess pandemic savings is unknown. Our working assumption has been that half of the savings will be spent across 2021 and 2022. Though we do not have any close antecedents for what households might do with a savings windfall equivalent to 10% of a year’s GDP amassed over a thirteen-month span, we reject the notion that those who experienced COVID-19 will behave like the many shell-shocked survivors of the Great Depression who became lifelong precautionary savers. However terrible the human cost of COVID, it did not ravage American households’ financial position; as the Fed’s latest Flow of Funds report showed, their balance sheets flourished, allowing the vast majority of them to escape any sense of financial trauma. Per the Flow of Funds, American household wealth grew by nearly $6 trillion in the second quarter, extending the last five quarters’ gains to $31 trillion since financial markets cratered when the pandemic burst forth in the first quarter of 2020. The 22% annualized five-quarter gain is nearly four standard deviations above the mean and blows away 4Q03 through 4Q04’s 14% second-place mark by two full standard deviations (Chart 4, top panel). The current run sets a record even when it’s stretched to six quarters to include 1Q20, the worst quarter in series history, and the five- and six-quarter gains are also pacesetters after adjusting for inflation (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4Recessions Aren't So Bad When Congress And The Fed Throw Everything They Have At Them Changes in household net worth lead consumption growth with a two-quarter lag (Chart 5), though the four quarters before the most recent one (the red dots with negative consumption growth) were notable outliers. 2Q21 consumption was just a little more than a percentage point below the best-fit line, however, so it is closing in on its modeled value and we expect it will overshoot it in coming quarters upon the release of pent-up demand. We do not believe that the pandemic will dampen household spending simply because the broad mass of consumers did not experience financial trauma on a scale that would alter future behavior. As household wealth and income data have shown, this recession has been a boon for most Americans. Chart 5Consumption Overshoots Are On The Way Chart 6Fiscal Shock And Awe We additionally reject the notion that households have learned a lesson that will make them want to hold more savings. The financial lesson of the pandemic seems to be that policymakers will do their utmost to shelter them from calamity. Between the economic impact payments (Chart 6, top panel) and the UI benefit supplement (Chart 6, middle panel), Congress directly sent nearly $1.5 trillion to US households to offset $300 billion of lost wages (Chart 6, bottom panel). COVID-19 inflicted terrible distress on those who lost loved ones and witnessed or experienced near fatal suffering, but it boosted the lower three quartiles of households who received transfers and the top decile of households who reveled in the financial markets’ advance. Those who experienced it will not hoard their pennies and shun debt like many of the Depression’s survivors; they are more likely to have experienced post-traumatic bliss than stress when it comes to their financial outlook. Too Much Of A Good Thing? We periodically check in on the Flow of Funds for insight into the evolution of households’ asset allocations and the share of net worth accounted for by homes. Directly owned equities and mutual funds have taken share from the other major categories throughout the pandemic run (Chart 7) and now account for a record share of household financial assets after having surpassed their 2000 highs (Chart 8, top panel). It is sensible to approach any equity milestone that invokes the dot-com bubble with some trepidation, but structural factors go a long way toward explaining the new allocation peak. The financialization of the economy has steadily advanced since the Flow of Funds data began to be compiled in 1951, promoting public equity ownership, and consolidation has supported the transfer of commercial ownership from mom-and-pop operations to corporate interests, many of which are publicly traded. Overall equity in businesses as a share of household net worth is merely in line with its ‘50s levels (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 7The Running Of The Bulls Chart 8From Mom And Pop To Broad And Wall Home price appreciation has picked up, but it is not out of the ordinary (Chart 9). Home equity gains have outstripped home price gains, relative to each series’ history, testifying to prudent behavior on the part of borrowers and lenders. The low aggregate mortgage loan-to-value ratio (Chart 10) suggests that slowing home price appreciation, or even an outright decline, would not be a source of economic instability. Chart 9Home Price Gains Are Not Out Of The Ordinary ... Chart 10... And Leverage Levels Are Not A Concern The Fed Signals That Tapering Is Near Though the FOMC did not adjust the pace of its asset purchases last week, it indicated that tapering will most likely begin after its November meeting. Chair Powell noted that the economy has made substantial further progress toward reaching the committee’s inflation goal and expressed that “many” members feel that it has made substantial progress toward achieving its full employment objective as well, going so far as to volunteer his personal view that the employment test has been “all but met.” Per the committee’s discussions, the purchases will likely end around the middle of next year if the economy progresses in line with its expectations. The committee would not be talking about reducing the accommodation it’s providing the economy if it weren’t secure in the sense that it is on solid footing. Powell expressed satisfaction with the evolution of inflation expectations (Chart 11) and although the real GDP forecast for this year was lowered in the summary of economic projections (the “dots”), next year’s forecast was raised and slightly higher inflation expectations imply that nominal GDP growth will remain quite robust. A shift in two members’ fed funds rate projections brought the median member’s liftoff date to 2022 from 2023, in line with our view. Chart 11The Fed Has Succeeded In Firming Up Inflation Expectations The chair reiterated that tapering – slowing the pace of accommodation – and hiking the fed funds rate – slowing the economy – are distinct actions subject to separate criteria. We see liftoff as a more significant action than tapering, but much will depend on the pace at which the committee lifts the fed funds rate. It is too soon to speculate on the pace, but we stress that the big move for financial markets will occur once the policy rate exceeds the neutral rate. If the latter is somewhere around 2%, the rate hike pace embedded in the dots suggests that it may take until the end of 2024 or early 2025 before monetary policy becomes restrictive. Investment Implications If monetary policy is not going to become tight for another three years, it is premature to shift a portfolio to more defensive settings, especially for anyone sharing our three-to-twelve-month cyclical timeframe. Growth will be robust in the near term, supported by the income boost that the lower three quartiles of taxpayers received from fiscal transfers and the way wealthier households cleaned up as financial asset prices soared. We expect that a hearty portion of the newly minted wealth will be spent, as Ricardian equivalence requires a longer attention span than Americans typically exhibit, and the pandemic was largely trauma-free for most households from a financial perspective. The clearest policy lesson that a citizen should have taken from COVID is that Congress and the Fed have his/her back in a big way. We are staying the course with our risk-friendly asset allocation recommendations.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The Evergrande crisis is not China’s Lehman moment. Nonetheless, Chinese construction activity will decelerate further in response to this shock. Global equities are frothy enough that a weaker-than-expected Chinese construction sector will remain a near-term risk to stocks prices. European markets are more exposed to this risk than US ones. Tactically, this creates a dangerous environment for cyclicals in general and materials in particular. Healthcare and Swiss stocks would be the winners. Despite these near-term hurdles, we maintain a pro-cyclical portfolio stance, which we will protect with some temporary hedges. We will lift these hedges if the EURO STOXX corrects into the 430-420 zone. A busy week for European central banks confirms our negative stance on EUR/GBP, EUR/SEK, and EUR/NOK. While EUR/CHF has upside, Swiss stocks should outperform Euro Area defensives. Stay underweight UK Gilts in fixed-income portfolios. Feature The collapse of property developer Evergrande creates an important risk for European markets. It threatens to slow Chinese construction activity further, which affects European assets that are heavily exposed to the Chinese real estate sector, directly and indirectly. This risk is mostly frontloaded, as Chinese authorities cannot afford a complete meltdown of the domestic property sector. Moreover, this economy has slowed significantly and more policy support is bound to take place. Additionally, forces outside China create important counterweights that will allow Europe to thrive despite the near-term clouds. While we see more short-term risk for European stocks and cyclical sectors, the 18-month cyclical outlook remains bright. Similarly, European stocks will not outperform US ones when Chinese real estate activity remains a source of downside surprise; but they will afterward. China’s Construction Slowdown Is Not Over The Evergrande crisis is not China’s Lehman moment. Beijing has the resources to prevent a systemic meltdown and understands full well what is at stake. At 160% of GDP, China’s nonfinancial corporate debt towers well above that of other major emerging markets and even that of Japan in the 1980s (Chart 1). If an Evergrande bankruptcy were allowed to topple this debt mountain, China would experience the kind of debt-deflation trap that proved so disastrous in the 1930s. A further deterioration of conditions in Chinese real estate activity is nonetheless in the cards, even if the country avoids a global systemic financial shock. First, the inevitable restructuring of Evergrande will result in losses for bond holders, especially foreign ones. Consequently, risk premia in the Chinese off-shore corporate bonds market will remain wide following the resolution of the Evergrande debacle. While Chinese banks are likely to recover a large proportion of the funds they lent to the real estate giant, they too will face higher risk premia. At the margin, the rising cost of capital will curtail the number of projects real estate developers take on over the coming two to three years. Second, the eventual liquidation of Evergrande will hurt confidence among real estate developers. This process may take many forms, but, as we go to press, the most discussed outcome is a breakup and restructuring where state-owned enterprises and large local governments absorb Evergrande’s operations. Evergrande’s employees, suppliers, and clients who have deposited funds while pre-ordering properties will be made whole one way or the other. However, shareholders and management will not. Wiping out shareholders and senior management will send a message to the operators of other developers, which will negatively affect their risk taking (Chart 2). Chart 1China Cannot Afford A Lehman Moment Chart 2Downside To Chinese Construction Activity   Third, one of President Xi Jinping’s key policy objectives is to tame rampant income inequality in the Chinese economy. Rapidly rising real estate prices and elevated unaffordability only worsen this problem. Hence, Beijing wants to avoid blind stimulus that mostly pushes house prices higher but that would have also boosted construction activity. Thus, if credit growth is pushed through the system, the regulatory tightening in real estate will not end. This process is likely to result in further contraction in floor space sold and started. Bottom Line: The Evergrande crisis is unlikely to morph into China’s Lehman moment. However, its fallout on the real estate industry means that Chinese construction activity will continue to contract in the coming six to twelve months or so. Chinese Construction Matters For European Equities The risk of further contraction in Chinese construction activity implies a significant near-term risk for European equities, especially relative to US ones. Even after the volatility of the past three weeks, global equities remain vulnerable to more corrective action. Speculative activity continues to grip the bellwether US market. Our BCA Equity Speculation Index is still around two sigma. Previous instances of high readings did not necessarily herald the end of bull markets; however, they often resulted in sideways and volatile trading, until the speculative excesses dissipated (Chart 3). The case for such volatile trading is strong. The Fed is set to begin its taper at its November meeting. Moreover, an end of the QE program by the middle of next year and the upcoming rotation of regional Fed heads on the FOMC will likely result in a first rate hike by the end of 2022. Already, the growth rate of the global money supply has declined, and the real yield impulse is not as supportive as it once was. Therefore, the deterioration in our BCA Monetary Indicator should perdure (Chart 4), which will heighten the sensitivity of global stocks to bad news out of China. Chart 3Rife With Speculation Chart 4Liquidity Deterioration At The Margin Chart 5Still Too Happy Investor sentiment is also not as washed out as many news stories ascertain. The AAII survey shows that the number of equity bulls has fallen sharply, but BCA’s Complacency-Anxiety Index, Equity Capitulation Indicator and Sentiment composite are still inconsistent with durable market bottoms. Moreover, the National Association of Active Investment Managers’ Exposure Index is still very elevated. When this gauge is combined with the AAII bulls minus bears indicator, it often detects floors in the US dollar-price of the European MSCI index (Chart 5). For now, this composite sentiment measure is flashing further vulnerability for European equities, especially if China remains a source of potential bad news in the coming months. Economic linkages reinforce the tactical risk to European stocks. Chinese construction activity affects the Euro Area industrial production because machinery and transportation goods represent 50% of Europe’s export to China (Chart 6). This category is very sensitive to Chinese real estate activity. Moreover, Europe’s exports to other nations are also indirectly affected by the demand from Chinese construction. Financial markets bear this footprint. Excavator sales in China are a leading indicator of construction activity. Historically, they correlate well with both the fluctuations of EUR/USD and the performance of Eurozone stocks relative to those of the US (Chart 7). Hence, if we anticipate that the problems Evergrande faces will weigh on excavator sales in the coming months, then the euro will suffer and Euro Area stocks could continue to underperform. Chart 6Europe's Exports To China Are Sensitive To Construction Activity Chart 7A Near-Term Risk To European Assets   Similarly, the fallout from Evergrande’s problem will extend to the performance of European equity sectors. The sideways corrective episode in cyclical relative to defensive shares is likely to continue in the near term. This sector twist remains frothy, and often declines when Chinese credit origination is soft (Chart 8). Materials stocks are the most likely to suffer due to their tight correlation with Chinese excavator sales (Chart 9); meanwhile, healthcare equities will reap the greatest benefit as a result of their appealing structural growth profile and their strong defensive property. Geographically, Swiss stocks should perform best (Chart 9, bottom panel), because they strongly overweigh healthcare and consumer staple names. Moreover, as we recently argued, the SNB’s monetary policy is an advantage for Swiss stocks compared to Eurozone defensives.1 Additionally, Dutch equities, with their 50% weighting in tech and their small 12% combined allocation to industrials and materials, could also enjoy a near-term outperformance as investors digest the sectoral impact of weaker Chinese construction activity. Chart 8The Vulnerability Of Cyclicals/Defensives Remains Chart 9Responses To Weaker Construction   Bottom Line: No matter how the Evergrande story unfolds, its consequence on Chinese construction activity may still cause market tremors. Global equity benchmarks may be rebounding right now, but, ultimately, they remain vulnerable to this slowdown. Any negative surprise out of China is likely to cause Europe to underperform because of its greater exposure to Chinese construction activity. Investment Conclusion: This Too Shall Pass The risks to the European equity market and its cyclicals sectors will prove transitory and will finish by the end of the year. Beijing will tolerate some pain to the real estate sector, but the stakes are too high to let the situation fester for long. The main problem is China’s large debt. Already sequential GDP growth in the first half of 2021 was worse than the same period in 2020, and credit accumulation is just as weak as in early 2018 (Chart 10). In this context, if real estate activity deteriorates too much, aggregate profits will contract and, in turn, will hurt the corporate sector’s ability to service its debt. Employment and social tensions create another stress point that will force Beijing’s hand. At 47, the non-manufacturing PMI employment index is already well into the contraction zone (Chart 11). Weakness in construction activity will hurt the labor market further. In an environment where protests have been springing up all over China, the Communist Party does not want to see more stress applied to workers. Chart 10In The End, Stimulus Will Come Chart 11Worsening Chinese Employment Conditions   These two constraints will force Beijing to alleviate the pain caused by a weaker construction sector. As a result, we still expect the Chinese credit and fiscal impulse to re-accelerate by Q2 2022. Developments outside of China will create another important offset that will allow risk assets to thrive once their immediate froth has receded. Strong DM capex will be an important driver of global activity next year. As Chart 12 shows, capex intentions in the US and the Euro Area are rapidly expanding, which augurs well for global investments. Moreover, re-building depleted inventories (Chart 13) will be a crucial component of the solution to global supply bottlenecks. Both activities will add to global demand. As an example, ship orders are already surging. Chart 12DM Capex Intentions Are Firming Chart 13Don't Forget About Inventories     We maintain a pro-cyclical stance in European markets after weighing the near-term negatives against the underlying positive forces. For now, hedging the tactical risk still makes sense and our long telecommunication / short consumer discretionary equities remain the appropriate vehicle – so does being long Swiss stocks versus Euro Area defensives. However, we will use any correction in the EURO STOXX (Bloomberg: SXXE Index) to the 430-420 zone to unload this protection. Bottom Line: The potential market stress created by a slowdown in Chinese construction activity will be a temporary force. Beijing will not tolerate a much larger hit to the economy, especially as tensions are rising across the country. Thus, even if the stimulus response to the Evergrande crisis will not be immediate, it will eventually come, which will support Chinese economic activity. Additionally, the capex upside and inventory rebuilding in advanced economies will create an offset for slowing Chinese growth. Consequently, while we maintain a pro-cyclical bias over the medium term, we are also keeping in place our hedges in the near term, looking to shed them if SXXE hits the 430-420 zone. A Big Week For Central Banks Chart 14The BoE's Is Listening To The UK's Economic Conditions... Last week, four European central banks held their policy meetings: The Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank, the Norges Bank, and the Bank of England. No major surprises came out of these meetings, with central banks discourses and policy evolving in line with their respective economies. The BoE veered on the hawkish side, highlighting that rates could rise before its QE program is over. This implies a small possibility of a rate hike by the end of 2021. However, our base case remains that the initial hike will be in the first half of 2022. The BoE is behaving in line with the message from our UK Central Bank Monitor (Chart 14). Moreover, the combination of rapid inflation and strong house price appreciation is incentivizing the BoE to remove monetary accommodation, especially because UK financial conditions are extremely easy (Chart 14, bottom panel). One caution advanced by the MPC is the uncertainty surrounding the impact of the end of the job furlough scheme this month. However, the global economy will be strong enough next spring to mitigate the risks to the UK. The results of last week’s MPC meeting and our view on the global and UK business cycles support the short EUR/GBP recommendation of BCA’s foreign exchange strategist,2 as well as the underweight allocation to UK Gilts of our Global Fixed Income Strategy group.3 The Norges Bank is the first central bank in the G-10 to hike rates and is likely to do so again later this year. While Norwegian core inflation remains low, house prices are strong, monetary conditions are extremely accommodative, and our Norway Central Bank Monitor is surging (Chart 15). The Norwegian central bank will continue to focus on these positives, especially in light of our Commodity and Energy team’s view that Brent will average more than $80/bbl by 2023.4 In this context, we anticipate the NOK to outperform the euro over the coming 24 months. Nonetheless, the near-term outlook for Norwegian stocks remains fraught with danger. Materials account for 17% of the MSCI Norway index and are the sector most vulnerable to a deterioration in Chinese construction activity. The Riksbank continues to disregard the strength of the Swedish economy. Relative to economic conditions, it is one of the most dovish central banks in the world. The Swedish central bank is completely ignoring the message from our Sweden Central Bank Monitor, which has never been as elevated as it is today (Chart 16). Moreover, the inexpensiveness of the SEK means that Swedish financial conditions are exceptionally accommodative. At first glance, this picture is bearish for the SEK. However, easy monetary conditions will cause Sweden’s real estate bubble to expand. Expanding real estate prices and transaction volumes will boost the profits of Swedish financials, which account for 27% of the MSCI Sweden index. Moreover, Swedish industrials remain one of our favorite sectors in Europe, and they represent 38% of the same index. As a result, equity flows into Sweden should still hurt the EUR/SEK cross. Chart 15...And The Norges Bank, To Norway's Chart 16The Riksbank Is Blowing Real Estate Bubbles Chart 17The CHF Still Worries The SNB Finally, the SNB proved reliably dovish. Our Switzerland Central Bank Monitor is rising fast as inflation and house prices improve (Chart 17). However, the SNB is rightfully worried about the expensiveness of the CHF, which generates tight Swiss financial conditions (Chart 17, bottom panel). Consequently, the SNB will keep fighting off any depreciation in EUR/CHF. Thus, the SNB will be forced to expand its balance sheet because the ECB is likely to remain active in asset markets longer than many of its peers. This process will be key to the outperformance of Swiss stocks relative to other European defensive equities.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see European Investment Strategy “The ECB’s New Groove,” dated July 19, 2021, available at eis.bcarsearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy “Why Are UK Interest Rates Still So Low?,” dated March 10, 2021, available at fes.bcarsearch.com 3 Please see European Investment Strategy “The UK Leads The Way,” dated August 11, 2021, available at eis.bcarsearch.com 4 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy “Upside Price Risk Rises For Crude,” dated September 16, 2021, available at fes.bcarsearch.com   Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Dear client, There will be no weekly bulletin next week. Instead, I will be hosting a webcast, with my colleague, Matt Gertken, titled “Currencies And Geopolitics: A Discussion.” I hope you will tune in so that we can have an interactive session. Also, we will be revamping the traditional backsections that FX has been publishing and will send a mockup in the coming weeks. Feedback on the new format will be greatly appreciated. Finally, I hosted a webcast this week with Japanese clients titled “A Guide To Currency Management For Japanese Corporates.” For those who are interested but were unable to attend, I encourage you to consult your sales representative for a replay. Kind regards, Chester Highlights The Fed will taper asset purchases this year, but it could be a non-event for the US dollar. The reason is that the Fed is lagging other G10 central banks in tapering asset purchases. Many will end QE even before the Fed begins tapering. The two big exceptions are the ECB and the BoJ. But while dovish monetary policy is well priced into both the interest rate curve and their currencies, upside surprises are not. Most global central banks will remain data dependent. So the key to gauging the move in currencies is to observe (and forecast) economic data. On that front, the current evidence is that US growth is robust, but is losing momentum to other developed markets. Volatility in currencies will be on the rise. We went long CHF/NZD on this basis last week and maintain long yen positions. But our bias is that any rally in the DXY will fizzle out at the 94-95 level. Feature This week was a busy one for central bankers. We kicked off with the Riksbank on Tuesday, the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve on Wednesday, and concluded with the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of England, and the Norges bank on Thursday. The highlight was the Fed, but the general message from most central banks is that less monetary accommodation will be forthcoming, as economic activity picks up. Most central bankers also admitted that inflation was proving a bit more sticky than initially anticipated. The key question therefore for currency strategists is whether the Federal Reserve will be more or less orthodox with monetary policy, compared to other developed market central banks, and what that means for the dollar. Our bias is that while the Fed was slightly more hawkish this week, it will continue to lag other G10 central banks in curtailing monetary accommodation. The Message From The FOMC Chart I-1The Market Has Priced Fed Hawkishness The key development from the Fed meeting this week was an upgrade to the dot plot. Half of the committee now expects at least one interest rate hike in 2022, with perhaps 7-8 hikes by the end of 2024. This is a more aggressive path of interest rate increases compared to the June FOMC meeting. The Fed also suggested tapering could begin at the next policy meeting and end towards the middle of next year, in time for rate increases. The immediate market response to the FOMC meeting did certainly suggest a hawkish undertone. The two-year US Treasury yield rose by 4 bps, which boosted the DXY index from a low of 93 to a high of 93.5 (intraday). Stocks rose and the 10-year Treasury yield edged mildly lower. The 30/2-year Treasury slope flattened by almost 10 bps. In our view, this was a rather muted response. For one, most of these moves are fading as we go to press. More importantly, going into the meeting, the market was already priced for a liftoff in 2022. This will suggest that the market was well positioned for Fed tapering at a minimum, and possibly an upgrade to the dots (Chart I-1). The Message From Other Central Banks While the Fed is still considering tapering asset purchases (and would very likely do so) by year-end, other central banks are well ahead in exiting emergency monetary settings. Just this week: The Norges bank hiked interest rates by 25 bps. We are particularly bullish on the krone, as highlighted in our Norwegian Method report; The Riskbank will end asset purchases this year. Its balance sheet is slated to be flat for 2022. It also closed all lending facilities launched during the pandemic. The offer for USD loans via the Fed’s swap facility will expire this month; The Bank of England kept monetary policy unchanged, but has already purchased £852bn of its £895bn target for government and corporate bonds. In fact, two of its members voted this week to reduce this target by £35bn, which would have effectively ended QE on a majority vote; The Swiss National Bank said in its introductory statement that it is fighting against an expensive franc, but modestly upgraded its inflation forecasts for 2022; The sole dovish central bank (aside from the SNB) was the Bank of Japan, but with elections on the horizon, and the possibility (or not) of a big fiscal package, their policy stance made sense.  Chart I-2Central Bank Holdings Of Government Bonds Elsewhere, the Bank of Canada has already cut its asset purchases in half, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has ended QE, and the Reserve Bank of Australia has already been tapering asset purchases. In a nutshell, a Fed tapering at this point is well behind the actions of other G10 central banks. This is one key reason why the DXY index has failed to punch above the 94-95 level, and is relapsing as we go to press. From a bird’s eye view, many G10 central banks already have bloated balance sheets and a strong incentive to curtail asset purchases as growth recovers. Within the G10, the US central bank has the smallest holdings of outstanding bonds (Chart I-2). This not only means that, ceteris paribus, the incentive to taper asset purchases is bigger for other central banks, but the scope for the Federal Reserve to ease monetary policy is quite substantial should another shock occur. This might explain why there is unease among other central bankers, to exit emergency settings. Admittedly, this week, traditionally dovish central banks such as the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank kept policy on hold and telegraphed a message that they will keep doing so for the foreseeable future. With a slightly more hawkish Federal Reserve, this should be a negative for these currencies. The same will apply to the ECB (Chart I-3). However, it is important to note that relatively dovish policy settings are well priced into both interest rate curves and their currencies, while upside surprises are not. The market does not expect any interest rate increases in the euro area or Japan before 2024, while it is priced for an aggressive pace of Fed rate hikes (Chart I-4). The starting point for any currency investor is an extremely dovish ECB and BoJ, relative to the Fed. Chart I-3A Pickup In US Yields Has Boosted The Dollar Chart I-4Markets Expect A More Aggressive Fed What Could Change? Global central banks are clearly focused on two goals – the outlook for growth and what that means for their maximum employment objective, and the long-run rate of inflation. These two objectives are interlinked. On the growth front, central bankers are justifiably admitting that the outlook remains clouded due to the Delta variant of COVID-19 and supply disruptions that are muddling the manufacturing outlook. However, it is important to remember that this is a global phenomenon. On a relative basis, there has been a growth rotation from the US to other economies that has historically supported the performance of DM currencies (Chart I-5). The primary reason is that many economies outside the US were in various forms of a lockdown over the last several months. As these economies reopen, so will economic activity. Chart I-5ARelative Growth And Currencies Chart I-5BRelative Growth And Currencies On the inflation front, the most acute problem has been tied to supply bottlenecks and this is not a US-centric problem. Inflation in the euro area, Sweden, the UK, Canada, or New Zealand are all above central bank targets (Table I-1). While all these central banks view the current overshoot as temporary, most have already pared back emergency monetary settings, as we highlighted above. Table I-1Inflation In The G10 The key takeaway is that most central banks view inflation risks as symmetric, while the Fed has telegraphed it is willing to tolerate an inflation overshoot following downturns (Chart I-6). During the Fed’s last two meetings, it has been clear that there is a limit to how much of an overshoot they will tolerate. However, it still suggests that the Fed remains well behind the inflation curve, with one of the most negative 2-year rates in the G10 (Chart I-7). Chart I-6The Fed And Inflation Overshoots Chart I-7Real Yields In The US Are Very Low In a nutshell, if our bias turns out to be correct that growth does recover more earnestly outside the US, and other central banks remain more orthodox than the Fed, this will be a headwind for a stronger US dollar. A Final Note On Canada Canada re-elected a Liberal minority government on September 20. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s bet on a majority government, given an astute handling of the pandemic, and massive fiscal stimulus, failed. The implication is a continuation of the status quo in Canada. The good news is that the status quo is actually bullish for the loonie. As we highlighted in our recent report, minority governments tend to be positive for the loonie, while majority governments generally nudge the CAD lower post election (Chart I-8). The rationale is that fiscal policy is slated to stay easy, but not overly so, providing gentle room for the BoC to hike interest rates. Easy fiscal but tighter monetary policy is usually bullish for a currency. Chart I-8Historically, The CAD Likes A Minority Government Given our view on the US dollar, we expect the CAD/USD to punch above the recent 82-cent high, towards 85 and eventually 90 cents. While this view might take time to play out, both rising relative interest rates in Canada (our base case) and high oil prices will be the key catalysts. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Strategtic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Global Inflation: Most central banks, led by the Fed, have stuck to the narrative that surging inflation is a temporary phenomenon that will not require an aggressive monetary policy response. However, global supply chain disruptions are lasting for much longer than originally expected, while faster realized global inflation is feeding through into higher longer-term consumer inflation expectations, most notably in the US. This raises the risk that the 2021 inflation pickup will prove to be longer lasting, leading to higher global bond yields. Real Bond Yields: Global bond markets have made a collective bet on the “transitory” inflation narrative by driving yields on government bonds, and even the riskier parts of the corporate credit universe like US and European high-yield, below actual inflation. Markets will have to reprice those negative real bond yields higher if inflation proves to be more persistent than expected - particularly with central banks likely to respond with faster tapering and, in some cases, eventual rate hikes. Feature The month of September has often not been kind to financial markets and September 2021 is already providing many reasons for investors to be nervous. Slowing global growth momentum, uncertainty over the Delta variant, yet another US Debt Ceiling debate in D.C. and worries about excessive Chinese corporate leverage and contagion risks from the looming Evergrande default are all valid reasons for market participants to become more risk averse. On top of that, the monetary policy backdrop is threatening to become less overwhelmingly supportive for markets with the Fed set to begin tapering its asset purchases. Chart of the WeekInflation Expected To Slow But Remain Above Bond Yields One other source of angst that markets seem less concerned about is inflation. Markets have generally come around to the view of most major central banks, led by the Fed, that the surge in inflation seen this year has been all pandemic related - base effect comparisons to 2020 and temporary supply chain squeezes – and will not last into 2022. Yet we have seen very strong realized global inflation readings in the August data, beyond the point of maximum base effect comparisons versus a year ago, while supply squeezes and soaring shipping costs are showing no signs of slowing as we approach the fourth quarter. Global bond markets have made a collective bet that current high rates of inflation will prove to be temporary. Developed market bond yields are all trading well below actual inflation, as are riskier fixed income asset classes like US and European high-yield (Chart of the Week). While consensus expectations are calling for some rise in government bond yields in 2022, yields are expected to remain below inflation. Those persistent negative real yield expectations remain the biggest source of vulnerability for global bond markets. If inflation turns out to be “less transitory” than expected, nominal bond yields will need to move higher to reprice both real yields and the risk of more hawkish central bank responses to sustained high inflation. A Persistent Inflation Threat From Supply Chain Disruptions Chart 2A Broad-Based Surge In Global Inflation Our base-case view remains that global inflation will slow in 2022, but not by enough to prevent the major developed market central banks from tapering asset purchases. We expect the Fed to begin buying fewer bonds in January. Central banks that have already begun to slow the pace of quantitative easing (QE) like the Bank of Canada and Bank of England will likely continue to taper as fast, if not even faster, than the Fed. Even the ECB will likely not roll the full amount of the expiring Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) into the existing pre-COVID asset purchase programs, resulting in a mild form of tapering next year. Our view on global inflation has been predicated on an expected shift away from more externally-driven inflation towards more sustainable domestic price pressures stemming from tightening labor markets and the closing of pandemic output gaps (Chart 2). So the mix of inflation in most developed market countries will be more “core” and less “non-core” inflation driven by higher commodity prices and global supply chain disruptions. Yet there is little sign that those non-core inflation pressures are slowing, particular in price gauges most exposed to supply chains like producer price indices (PPI). US PPI inflation climbed to 15-year high of 8.3% on a year-over-year basis in August, while annual growth in the euro area PPI hit 12.1% in July – the fastest pace in the 30-year history of that data series (Chart 3). Surging PPI inflation reflects global price pressures, with import prices expanding at double-digit rates in both the US and Europe. Some of that more externally driven price pressure stems from commodity markets. While the prices for some notable commodities like lumber and iron ore have seen significant retracements from pandemic-era highs over the past several months, more economically sensitive commodities like aluminum and natural gas have all seen very strong price increases (Chart 4). Copper and oil prices are also holding firm, although both are off 2021 highs. Chart 3No Sign Of Slowing Global Inflation At The Producer Level The price momentum of overall commodity price indices like the CRB Raw Industrials has clearly rolled over, but has held up much better than would be expected given signs of slowing global growth. Chart 4Commodity Markets Still More Inflationary Than Disinflationary The current depressed level of the China credit impulse, and the flat year-over-year change of the global PMI, would typically be associated with flat commodity prices rather than the current 34% annual growth rate (Chart 5). A lack of sustained upward pressure on the US dollar is likely helping keep commodity prices, which are priced in dollars, more elevated than expected. Even more important, however, are the low inventories for many commodities relative to firm demand (which largely explains the current surge in aluminum and natural gas prices). This mirrors a broader global economic trend towards companies running lower inventories relative to sales, which has been exacerbated by the economic uncertainties of the COVID-19 pandemic. The US overall business inventory-to-sales ratio is now at the lowest level in the history of the series (Chart 6). Chart 5Commodity Price Inflation Peaking, But Not Slowing Much Chart 6Supply Squeezes Are Likely To Persist Before the pandemic, firms have gotten away with running very lean inventories because of globalized supply chains that allow firms to maintain the minimum amount of inventory to meet demand. Yet “just-in-time” inventory management only works when suppliers can deliver raw materials or finished goods in a timely fashion at low cost. The pandemic has blown up that model, making it much harder to deliver products and materials from critical countries like China. Global shipping costs have exploded higher and are showing no signs of slowing (bottom panel), while supplier delivery times remain well above historical averages according to measures like the US ISM index. Those higher costs are feeding through into overall inflation measures, particularly for the components most exposed to supply chain disruption. In Chart 7, we show a breakdown of the overall CPI inflation data for the US, euro area, UK and Canada. The groupings shown in the chart are based on an analysis done by the Bank of Canada back in August to measure pandemic impacts on Canadian inflation.1 The top panel of the chart shows the contribution to overall inflation for elements most exposed to supply constraints (like autos and durable goods). The second panel of the chart shows the contribution from sectors more exposed to increased demand as economies reopen from pandemic restrictions, like dining at restaurants and travel. The remaining panels of the chart show the contributions from energy prices and all other components not covered in the top three panels. Chart 7Fed's Transitory Narrative At Risk From Lingering Supply Chain Disruption Chart 8High US Inflation May Not Prove To Be So Transitory The conclusion from our chart is that supply disruptions have added more to US and Canadian inflation so far in 2021, while reopening demand has been more meaningful for UK and US inflation. The pickup in euro area inflation has been mostly an energy price story, although reopening demand has started to contribute to the rising trend of overall inflation. The implication from this analysis is that persistent supply chain disruptions could become a bigger issue for future inflation – and monetary policy decisions – in the US and Canada. The acceleration of US realized inflation in 2021 has already begun to broaden out from the most volatile components, according to measures like the Dallas Fed Trimmed Mean PCE (Chart 8). Faster inflation is also feeding through into higher US consumer inflation expectations according to surveys from the New York Fed and the University of Michigan. Those increases are not deemed to be temporary, with longer-term inflation expectations now moving higher. The New York Fed’s survey shows that inflation is expected to be 4% over the next three years, two full percentage points above the Fed’s target, which must be ringing some alarm bells on the FOMC. Chart 9European Consumers Are Waking Up To Higher Inflation Consumer inflation expectations are also starting to perk up outside the US. The YouGov/Citigroup survey shows an expectation of UK inflation over the next 5-10 years of 3.5%, while the Bank of England/Kantar survey is at 3% over the next five years (Chart 9, top panel). Both are above the Bank of England’s 2% inflation target. The European Commission confidence surveys have shown a sharp increase in the net share of respondents expecting higher inflation in the coming months (bottom panel), while the Bundesbank’s August consumer survey shows that Germans now expect 3.5% inflation over the next 12 months, up from 2% back in March. Bottom Line: Supply chain disruptions are lasting for much longer than originally expected, while faster realized global inflation is feeding through into higher longer-term consumer inflation expectations, most notably in the US. This raises the risk that the 2021 inflation pickup will last much longer than expected and force a bond-bearish repricing of future interest rate expectations. Negative Real Yields – The Achilles Heel For Bond Markets It is clear that supply chain disruptions are having a more lasting effect on global inflation than investors, and policymakers, expected earlier this year. Yet while both market-based and survey-based measures of inflation expectations are moving higher, interest rate markets are still pricing in a very dovish future path for policy rates of the major developed market central banks. For example, our 24-month discounters, which measure the change in interest rates over the next two years discounted in overnight index swap (OIS) curves, show that only 71bps, 61bps and 13bps of rate hikes are expected in the US, UK and euro area, respectively, by September 2023 (Chart 10). This continues a trend that we have highlighted in recent reports – the persistence of negative real interest rate expectations in the developed markets that is also keeping real bond yields in sub-0% territory. In the US, the OIS forward curve shows that the first Fed rate hike is expected in early 2023 with a very slow pace of rate increases over the following 2-3 years (Chart 11). The funds rate is expected to level off at 1.75% and stay there through 2030. At the same time, the CPI swap forward curve has inflation falling steadily over the next couple of years, but leveling off around 2.35% for the rest of the upcoming decade. Combining those two forward projections comes up with an implied path for the real fed funds rate that is persistently negative for the next ten years, “settling” at -0.6% by the end of the decade. Chart 10Bond Markets Exposed To More Hawkish Central Banks Chart 11US Real Yields Priced For Extended Fed Dovishness An even more deeply negative real rate path is discounted in the euro area forward curves. The ECB is expected to begin lifting rates in 2023, eventually moving out of negative (nominal) territory in 2026 before climbing to +0.5% by 2030 (Chart 12). Euro area CPI swaps are priced for a fall in inflation back below 2% over the next two years, eventually stabilizing at 1.75% over the latter half of the next decade. The real ECB policy rate is therefore expected to settle at -1.25% by 2030. In the UK, markets are discounting much of what has been seen in the years since the 2008 financial crisis – a Bank of England that does very little with interest rates. The central bank is expected to begin lifting rates in 2023, but only a handful of rate hikes are expected in the following years with Bank Rate only climbing to 1% and settling there for most of the upcoming decade. The UK CPI swap curve is discounting relatively high inflation over the next decade, settling at 3.6% in 2030. Thus, the market is discounting a long-run real Bank of England policy rate of -2.6%. This pricing of negative real policy rates so far into the future goes a long way to explain why longer-term real government bond yields have also been consistently negative in the US, Germany, UK and elsewhere in the developed markets. That can be seen in Charts 11, 12 and 13, where we have added the 10-year inflation-linked (real) bond yield for US TIPS, French OATis and UK index-linked Gilts. In all three cases, the 10-year real yield has “gravitated” towards the realized path of the real policy rate – the nominal rate minus headline CPI inflation – over the past two decades. Chart 12Negative Real Rates Forever In Europe? Chart 13BoE Not Expected To Do Much Over The Next Decade Chart 14Nominal Yields Will Move Higher If Negative Real Yields Persist Persistent low government bond yields, both in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms, have resulted in lower yields across the global fixed income markets as investors have been forced to take on more risk to find acceptable yields. This has resulted in a situation where nominal yields on riskier assets like US high-yield corporate bonds and Italian government debt are trading below prevailing headline inflation rates in the US and Europe (Chart 14). Bond investors would likely only be comfortable accepting such negative real yields on the riskier parts of the fixed income universe if a) inflation was expected to decline, and/or b) real yields on risk-free government bonds were expected to stay negative for longer as central banks stay dovish. In either case, the “bet” made by investors is that the inflation surge seen this year will indeed prove to be transitory, as central banks are forecasting. If that benign outlook proves to be incorrect and inflation stays resilient for longer – potentially because of the risk of lingering supply chain disruptions described earlier in this report - nominal bond yields will have to reprice higher to account for faster realized inflation (and, most likely, rising inflation expectations). This process will start in government bond markets, as global central banks will be forced to respond to stubbornly high inflation by turning more hawkish, first with faster tapering of QE bond buying and, later, with interest rate hikes. We continue to see persistent negative real yields as the biggest source of risk in developed economy bond markets over the next couple of years. Those yields discount a benign path for both inflation and future monetary policy that is looking increasingly less likely – especially with tightening labor markets and rising consumer inflation expectations already forcing central banks, led by the Fed, to move incrementally towards less accommodative policy settings. Bottom Line: Global bond markets have made a collective bet on the “transitory” inflation narrative by driving yields on government bonds, and even the riskier parts of the corporate credit universe like US and European high-yield, below actual inflation. Markets will have to reprice those negative real bond yields higher if inflation proves to be more persistent than expected - particularly with central banks likely to respond with faster tapering and, in some cases, eventual rate hikes. Stay below-benchmark on overall global duration exposure in fixed income portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We have attempted to match the groupings shown in the Bank of Canada analysis as much as possible for the other countries, although there are some minor differences based on how each country’s consumer price index sub-indices are defined. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns