BCA Indicators/Model

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of September 29th, 2017. The model sharply reduced its allocation to the U.K. to a bare minimum in response to the tightening in liquidity condition as the Bank of England warned of a rate hike in "coming months." The funds are reallocated to the Spain and Germany. Other smaller changes are the reductions in Italy and Australia in favor of Sweden and Switzerland, as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed its benchmark by 44 bps in September. Both level 1 and level 2 models performed well, with level 2 outperforming its benchmark by 63 bps and level 1 outperforming its benchmark by 9 bps, as the underweight in Australia, U.S. and Japan versus the overweight in Italy, Germany and Netherland worked very well. Since going live in January 2016, the overall model has outperformed the benchmark by 341 bps, largely from the allocation among the 11 non-U.S. countries, which has outperformed its benchmark by 743 bps. Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of September 30, 2017. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Table 4Performance Since Going Live GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates The model continues to be optimistic on global growth as seen by an increasing allocation to cyclical sectors. Additionally, the model has also reduced its underweight on consumer discretionary stocks, which is currently the only cyclical sector to have a below-benchmark allocation. Finally, the biggest shift was a downgrade in utilities from overweight to underweight. This was primarily driven by momentum. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

Highlights In this report, we analyze both static and dynamic hedging strategies to hedge an identical global equity portfolio to six home currencies: the U.S. dollar, the British pound, the euro, the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar and the Australian dollar. We propose an easy to implement dynamic hedging framework based on the proprietary currency indicators from BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy (FES) service. It has outperformed all the static hedging strategies since 2001 on a risk-adjusted return basis. In addition, it levels out the playing field for all investors as the hedged returns are quite similar, no matter what their home currencies are. Among the static hedging strategies, the "least-regret" hedge ratio of 50% has lived up to its reputation, as it has reduced risk by more than 50% without severely jeopardizing returns. Over a four-year moving performance cycle (in line with how most portfolio managers are evaluated), the proposed dynamic hedging adds little career risk to portfolio managers compared to the "least regret" 50% static hedging, while provides superior returns most of the time. A global equity portfolio's currency exposure should be managed in a centralized currency overlay under the supervision of the Chief Investment Officer, so that equity and currency managers can both fully utilize their expertise in their respective field, and the organization can manage currency risk more efficiently at the total portfolio level. Feature Dynamic Hedging Outperforms Static Hedging We have received many client requests asking about currency hedging in global equity portfolios with different home currencies. This is not surprising given how currency movements have overwhelmed global equity portfolio returns of late. For example, this year the U.S. dollar's weakness against the major currencies has beefed up returns for U.S. investors who did not hedge their foreign exposure (Table I-1). Table I-1Year-To-Date Currency Movements Have Overwhelmed Equity Returns Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors GAA's equity country allocation recommendations are by default unhedged on USD basis. When a hedge is required we make the recommendation explicit. There have been many conflicting views on whether global equity investors should hedge foreign currency exposure, and if so, what proportion of the exposure should be hedged. Perold and Schulman (1988) suggest fully hedging foreign currency exposure, because significant risk reduction can be achieved without a significant loss of return.1 This is based on their famous "free lunch" claim that average currency returns are zero over the long-term. At the other extreme, Froot (1993) suggests that foreign currencies should not be hedged at all for long-term investors, because purchasing power parity holds in the long term and exchange rates are mean reverting.2 There are many other views in between, including the universal hedge ratio proposed by Black (1989), which is estimated to be 77%.3 Campbell et al (2010) classify currencies into reserve currencies (USD, EUR and CHF), commodity currencies (AUD and CAD) and neutral currencies (JPY and GBP), and suggest that risk-minimizing investors should hold reserve currencies while hedging out commodity currencies, based on the correlations between the currencies and equity markets.4 Realizing the limitations of "static hedging," which assumes constant correlation, mean and variance, many academic researchers have explored "dynamic hedging models" that allow the mean and covariance to be time-varying by using complex econometric modelling techniques.5,6,7 These academic dynamic hedging strategies have shown improvement over the 50% static hedge, but it's very difficult for investors without a strong quantitative background to understand these very complex approaches. In fact, with all these confusing academic recommendations floating around, the "least regret" hedge ratio of 50% has been quite popular among practitioners.8 To help our clients better understand the role of currency management in global equity portfolios, we have joined forces with BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy (FES) service to de-mystify the currency hedging process, and to propose a simple framework for clients with six different home currencies to dynamically hedge their foreign currency exposure based on the FES team's proprietary Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM) indicators.9 These indicators have been used in their regular weekly publications. The ITTM-based dynamic hedging strategy is back-tested from 2001 because the ITTM indicators only date back to 2001 (See methodology). We have also back-tested a simple trend-following momentum-based dynamic strategy to see how a dynamic hedging methodology works in a longer period from 1976. For comparison we have back-tested ten different static hedging strategies that employ fixed hedge ratios across currencies and time. The test results not only clarify much of the confusion about static hedging, they also demonstrate that on a risk-adjusted return basis, BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedging strategy has outperformed all static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies since 2001 (Chart I-1). Even in the very long run of 41 years from August 1976, the simple momentum-based dynamic hedging outperforms the static strategies for investors with five home currencies, with only the AUD portfolio being worse off (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Identical Investment, But Different Risk/Return Profiles (3/2001-8/2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart I-2Identical Investment, But Different Risk/Return Profiles (8/1976-8/2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Now let's clarify some of the confusion: Does static hedging reduce portfolio risk at little expense of lowering returns? The answer is yes only for USD and JPY portfolios. For both the 41-year period from 1976 and the shorter 16-year period from 2001, a higher hedge ratio results in lower risk with slightly lower return. So fully hedged would be the "optimal" strategy for risk-minimizing investors with USD and JPY as home currencies (Panel 1 and 2 on left side in both Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). For the U.K. portfolio, the answer is a partial yes, because the "optimal hedge ratio" for risk-minizing investors, around 60%-80%, does produce the lowest risk, but the paths to that "optimal" point are totally opposite when different time periods are chosen. In the short period (Chart I-1, bottom left panel), it follows the same pattern as that for U.S. and Japanese investors up to the optimal point. As the hedge ratio increases, however, return drops and risk increases! In the longer period from 1976, as the hedge ratio increases, return increases and risk decreases until the "optimal point," after which risk and returns both increase (Chart I-2, bottom left panel). In the period from 2001, the AUD, CAD and EUR portfolios share a similar pattern to that of the GBP portfolio in the period from 1976. The AUD portfolio behaved the same in both the shorter period (Chart I-1, top right) and the longer period (Chart 2, top right), while the EUR and CAD portfolios behaved differently in the longer-term period from the shorter period. Overall, the CAD portfolio's "optimal" hedge ratio is around 0-30%, the AUD portfolio around 30-60% while the EUR portfolio is around 40% in the shorter period but around 90% in the longer period (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). It is also worth noting that even though both the CAD and AUD are commodity currencies, AUD investors benefit significantly from hedging, while CAD investors' risk/return profile does not change much. This is because 1) currency returns for AUD investors do not average to zero in the long term due to positive carry, and 2) correlations between foreign currencies, foreign equities and domestic equities are not constant over time or across currencies (Appendix 2, Chart II-1 and Chart II-4) How does the "least regret" 50% static hedge do? The 50% hedge ratio fares quite well compared to the "optimal" static hedge ratio in terms of risk reduction for all portfolios in both periods, because more than half of the total risk reduction (the highest minus the lowest) occurs around the 50% hedge (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). How does BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedge do in terms of risk reduction? The ITTM produces better risk-adjusted returns for each portfolio than all the static hedges. In terms of risk, it generates the lowest risk for the EUR and GBP portfolios and is comparable to the 50% static hedge for other portfolios, while it generates a much higher return than all static hedges (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). How does the BCA Dynamic Hedge (ITTM) compare to the 50% static hedge over time? Chart I-3 shows that the dynamic hedge consistently outperformed the 50% static hedge for all six home currencies since 2001 without significantly increasing hedging transactions, compared to the fixed 50% hedge ratio for all currency pairs. The dash line in each panel of Chart I-3 corresponds to the market cap-weighted aggregate of hedge ratios of foreign currencies for each home currency. On average, they are comparable to 50%. Most portfolio managers are measured on a moving four-year performance cycle. Chart I-4 shows that the ITTM-based dynamic hedging strategy has outperformed the 50% static hedging most of the time on a moving four-year basis, with only CAD, USD and JPY managers suffering brief drawdowns. Chart I-3BCA Dynamic Hedging Adds ##br##Value For All Investors BCA Dynamic Hedging Adds Value For All Investors BCA Dynamic Hedging Adds Value For All Investors Chart I-4Little Career Risk For ##br##Portfolio Managers Little Career Risk For Portfolio Managers Little Career Risk For Portfolio Managers In theory, if hedges were effective, then an identical global equity portfolio should have similar returns for all investors, no matter what home currency they hold. While neither the static hedging strategies nor the momentum-based dynamic hedging approach could pass this criteria, BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedging approach does. It levels out the playing field for all investors globally. As shown in Chart I-5, in the period from March 2001 to August 2017, if left unhedged, the same global investment exhibits very different annualized returns for investors in different home currencies, with AUD investors at the low end at around 3.2%, and GBP investors at the high end at around 7%. With BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedge, however, returns for all investors are very similar, no matter which currency is their home currency. Chart I-5BCA Dynamic Hedging Strategy Levels Out The Playing Field Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors The BCA Dynamic Hedging Methodology To back-test all the hedging strategies, we use an identical global equity portfolio that is a market cap-weighted aggregate of nine countries/regions based on MSCI U.S., Japan, the euro area, U.K., Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway. This universe accounts for about 97% of the current MSCI World index (Chart I-6). The history of the euro area before 1987 (when MSCI data were available) is calculated as a market cap-weighted aggregate of MSCI Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. Chart I-6GAA Global Equity Universe GAA Global Equity Universe GAA Global Equity Universe We evaluate the same global portfolio for investors with six different home currencies: USD, JPY, GBP, EUR, CAD and AUD. The Measurement for Hedging Efficacy: All the academically claimed "optimal" hedge ratios, static or dynamic, are based on risk-minimizing in a mean-variance optimization framework. For practitioners, however, "not meeting return objectives" is a much higher risk priority than minimizing portfolio risk. This is why we advocate risk-adjusted return as our measurement for hedge efficacy. The Objective: We aim to find the hedging strategies that outperform the widely used 50% static hedging strategy on a risk-adjusted return basis. At BCA, our philosophy has always been not to strive to find the optimal solution, but to try our best to find a feasible solution that best meets the stated objective. Interestingly, this approach has produced superior results for the GBP and EUR portfolios, achieving the combination of "highest return - lowest risk." It also levels out the playing field for all investors by generating similar hedged returns for all investors, no matter what home currency they hold (Chart I-1 and Chart I-5). The Proprietary Currency Indicators: The indicators from Foreign Exchange Strategy service's Intermediate Term Timing Model (ITTM) are built under the assumptions that the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) holds, and the fair value of a currency pair is a function of the real rate differential (using an average of two-year and 10-year real rates), Junk OAS (a proxy for global risk appetite), commodity prices and past-year trends (52-week moving average). When a currency pair deviates from its fair value to an extreme, then the likelihood for a trend reversal is high.9 The Simple Rule-Based Dynamic Hedging: For each home currency, we evaluate the other eight foreign currencies individually based on each pair's ITTM indicator. When a foreign currency overshoots fair value above the upper band of its historical range, then the currency is a short, and the short position is kept until the foreign currency value touches the lower band of its historical range that's below the fair value. The Implementation: We use one-month forward contracts and re-balance on a monthly basis. The gain or loss of the underlying equity index during the month is not hedged, but converted back to the home currency at the month-end spot rate. For history before 2001, we use one-month interest rates to calculate hedged returns (Please see Appendix 1 hedged return calculations using forwards and also interest rates). Example: Chart I-7 illustrates how a Canadian investor uses the ITTM indicator to decide when to hedge JPY exposure when they invest in the MSCI Japan equity index. Chart I-7Canadian Investor: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Canadian Investor: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Canadian Investor: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged The top panel shows the hedging signal for JPY (solid line) versus our proprietary ITTM indicator for JPY/CAD exchange rate (dash line). The upper and lower band are set as 7% above fair value and 9% below fair value; the bottom panel shows the relative performance of the MSCI Japan hedged in CAD versus the MSCI Japan unhedged in CAD. Currently CAD investors should hedge their JPY exposure based on the ITTM indicator. Some Suggestions For Asset Allocators Use a centralized currency overlay portfolio to manage foreign currency exposure. The overlay portfolio should be managed by currency specialists (either in-house or using external managers) under the supervision of the CIO. The objective of the overlay portfolio is to manage currency exposure based on the underlying assets of the organization's Total Portfolio, such that the risk/return profile of the total portfolio is improved against its benchmark. Global equity portfolio manager performance should be measured on an unhedged basis in their respective home currency. Some have argued that a fully hedged benchmark such as the MSCI All Country Total Return Index in local currencies should be used to measure the performance of a global equity portfolio manager. We strongly disagree, even though in theory it does not really matter what benchmark is used. MSCI's "total return indexes in local currencies" for global equity aggregates are theoretical in nature. They cannot be replicated in the real world because they are calculated on a daily basis using the previous closing day's exchange rate to calculate foreign equity return10 - such that the "local return" for each foreign equity index is perfectly hedged. Unfortunately this "perfect hedge" is humanly impossible, because as shown in Formula (1) in Appendix 1, only when both the spot rate and forward rate at the time t are equal to the spot rate at time t+1, can the local returns be fully captured! Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com 1 Perold, A and E. Schulman, 1988, "The free lunch in currency hedging: Implications for investment policy and performance standards", Financial Analyst Journal 44, 45-50. 2 Froot K., 1993, "Currency hedging over long horizons", NBER working paper 4355 3 Black, F., 1989, "Universal hedging: optimizing currency risk and reward in international equity portfolios", Financial Analyst Journal 45, 16-22 4 Campbell, J., K. de Medeiros and L. Viceira, 2010, "Global currency hedging", Journal of Finance LXV, 87-122 5 Gagnon, L., T., McCurdy, and G., Lypny, 1998, " Hedging foreign currency portfolios", Journal of Empirical Finance 5, 197-220 6 Hautsch, N., and J. Inkmann, 2003, "Optimal hedging of the currency exchange risk exposure of dynamically balanced strategic asset allocations", Journal of Asset Management 4, 173-189 7 Brown, C., J., Dark, and W., Zhang, "Dynamic currency hedging for international stock portfolios", 2012, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourn 8 Michenaud, S., and B., Solnik, 2008, "Applying regret theory to investment choices: Currency hedging decisions", Journal of International Money and Finance 27, 677-694 9 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "In Search Of A Timing Model", June 22, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 10 "Note on index calculation in local currency", MSCI Bara Index Calculation Methodologies, p19, May 2010 11 MSCI uses 2 business days as described in "MSCI Index Methodology: MSCI Hedged Indexes", July 2013 Appendix 1 We use one-month forward contracts and re-balance on a monthly basis. The gain or loss of the underlying equity index during the month is not hedged, but converted back to the home currency at the month-end spot rate. Before reliable forward contract rates were available (Jan 2001), we use one-month interest rates instead to calculate hedged returns. Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Please note that for simplification we have ignored the bid-ask spread in all the quotations, and we do not take into account the time lag required to implement a hedge.11 In practice, however, these are valid considerations. Appendix 2: Dynamics Hedging For Six Home Currencies 2.1 The Australian Perspective Correlations: For Aussie investors, foreign currencies in aggregate have a negative correlation with the domestic equity index (especially in the period from 2001), and a mostly positive but low correlation to the unhedged foreign equities. (Chart II-1). So hedging away foreign currency exposure would increase total risk of the global portfolio. This is why a fully hedged portfolio has the highest risk (Chart II-2, Table II-1). Historical Performance: Since 2001, ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in AUD. The return profile looks similar to the fully hedged portfolio, but risk is much lower (Table II-1). Over the longer period, the optimal static hedge ratio is about 70%, which is actually quite close to the 50% hedge, as shown in Table II-2. On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-2, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile also prevails. Current State: Currently AUD investors should only be hedging their exposure in Swiss francs and U.S. dollars, the two "safe haven" currencies. Actually, our indicators show a close to 100% hedge of the Swiss franc, as shown in Chart II-3, which did hurt the risk/return profile during the GFC period despite an outstanding full-period performance. Table II-1Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In AUD (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-2Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In AUD (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-1Australian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Australian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Australian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-2Australian Perespective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Australian Perespective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Australian Perespective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-3Australian Perspective: Swiss Index Dynamically Hedged Australian Perspective: Swiss Index Dynamically Hedged Australian Perspective: Swiss Index Dynamically Hedged 2.2 The Canadian Perspective Correlations: For Canadian investors, foreign currencies on aggregate have a negative correlation with the country's domestic equity index, but the correlation with unhedged foreign equities has oscillated in both positive and negative territory. The correlation between Canadian equities and unhedged foreign equities has been always positive, in the range of 0.4-0.8 (Chart II-4). So hedging away foreign currency exposure will increase total risk within a global portfolio. This is why a fully hedged portfolio has the highest risk (Chart II-5, Table II-3 and Table II-4). Historical Performance: Since 2001, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest annualized return for the global portfolio in CAD without significantly increasing volatility from the unhedged scenario. In terms of risk-adjusted return, dynamic hedging has outperformed the best static hedging scenario (40% hedged) by about 46% (Table II-3). On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-5, the dynamic risk/return profile also prevails. Current State: Currently Canadian investors should be hedging all foreign currencies except for the Australian dollar. Chart II-6 shows how CAD investors dynamically hedge their exposure to the Swedish krona. Table II-3Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In CAD (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-4Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In CAD (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-4Canadian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Canadian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Canadian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-5Canadian Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Canadian Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Canadian Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-6Canadian Perspective: Swedish Index Dynamically Hedged Canadian Perspective: Swedish Index Dynamically Hedged Canadian Perspective: Swedish Index Dynamically Hedged 2.3 The Japanese Perspective Correlations: For Japanese investors, correlations among foreign currencies, foreign equities and domestic equities seem to have gone through regime changes since the GFC, as shown in Chart II-7. These regime changes in correlations explain the evolving risk/return profile of the static hedges in Chart II-8. Before the GFC, full hedge and 50% hedge had similar risk profiles, but after the GFC full hedge reduced total risk significantly due to the sharp increase in correlations. Historical Performance: Since 2001, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in JPY, with a much higher return and slightly higher risk (Table II-5). Fully hedged has the lowest risk in both periods, and 50% is close to the "optimal" static hedge in both periods as well (Table II-5 and II-6). On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-8, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile. The 50% static hedge has similar risk profile to the ITTM-based dynamic hedge, but with lower returns. Current State: Currently JPY investors should be only hedging their exposure in Swiss francs and U.S. dollars. Chart II-9 shows how Japanese investors should have hedged CAD exposure. Table II-5Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In JPY (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-6Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In JPY (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-7Japanese Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Japanese Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Japanese Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-8Japanese Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Japanese Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Japanese Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-9Japanese Perspective: Canadian Index Dynamically Hedged Japanese Perspective: Canadian Index Dynamically Hedged Japanese Perspective: Canadian Index Dynamically Hedged 2.4 The U.S. Perspective Correlations: For U.S. investors, correlations among foreign currencies, foreign equities and domestic equities seem to have gone through regime changes since the GFC, as shown in Chart II-10. These regime changes in correlation explain the evolving risk/return profile of the static hedges in Chart II-11. Before the GFC, full hedge and 50% hedge had similar risk profiles, but after the GFC full hedge exhibited significantly reduced total risk due to the sharp increase in correlations. Historical Performance: Since 2001, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in USD, with a much higher return and slightly lower risk compared to the 50%, which is the best static hedge for the period (Table II-7). Fully hedged had the lowest risk in both periods, but the return profiles of the static hedges were very similar, supporting the widely held belief that in the long run currency returns are close to zero (Table II-7 and II-8). On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-11, the dynamic risk/return profile is close to that of the 50%. Current State: Currently U.S. investors should only be hedging their exposure in euros (Chart II-12). Table II-7Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In USD (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-8Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In JPY (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-10U.S. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies U.S. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies U.S. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-11U.S. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging U.S. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging U.S. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-12U.S. Perspective: EMU Index Dynamically Hedged U.S. Perspective: EMU Index Dynamically Hedged US INVESTOR: EMU INDEX DYNAMIC HEDGE U.S. Perspective: EMU Index Dynamically Hedged US INVESTOR: EMU INDEX DYNAMIC HEDGE 2.5 The Euro Perspective Correlations: For investors that call the euro home currency, the correlation and foreign equities has been positive. The correlation between foreign currencies and domestic equity index, however, has been changing signs over time, currently sitting at near zero! (Chart II-13). This explains the shape of the risk/return profile in Chart II-14 and Table II-9. Historical Performance: Since 2001, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in euros, which has a higher return and lower risk than the best static hedge of 80% (Table II-9). Over the longer period, the optimal hedge ratio is about 50% hedge, which is actually quite close to those between 40-70%, as shown in Table II-10. On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-14, the dynamic risk/return profile definitely prevails. Current State: Currently euro investors should not be hedging any foreign exposure, based on our indicators. Chart II-15 shows how euro investors should have hedged JPY exposure over time since 2001. Table II-9Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In Euro (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-10Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In Euro (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-13Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies CHART EMU2: DOMESTIC AND UNHEDGED FOREIGN EQUITIES VS. FOREIGN CURRENCIES EURO AREA Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies CHART EMU2: DOMESTIC AND UNHEDGED FOREIGN EQUITIES VS. FOREIGN CURRENCIES EURO AREA Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-14Euro Area Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Euro Area Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Euro Area Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-15Euro area Perspective: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Euro area Perspective: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Euro area Perspective: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged 2.6 The British Perspective Correlations: For British investors, correlations between foreign currencies and domestic equities have gone through several regime changes over time in both positive and negative territory, as shown in Chart II-16. The positive correlation between foreign and domestic equities has also increased over time. This would definitely make static hedging worse off (Table II-11 and II-12). Historical Performance: Not surprisingly, since 2001, dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in pounds, which has a higher return and lower risk than the best static hedge of 20% (Table II-11). Over the longer period, the optimal hedge ratio is about 90% hedge, Table II-12. On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-17, the dynamic risk/return profile prevails, as it shares similar risk as the 50% hedge but with a higher return. Current State: Currently the British investors should not be hedging CAD and Swedish krona, while all six other currencies should be hedged. Chart II-18 shows how U.K. investors should have hedged their AUD exposure over time since 2001. Table II-11Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In GBP (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-12Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In GBP (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-16Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies CHART UK2: DOMESTIC AND UNHEDGED FOREIGN EQUITIES VS. FOREIGN CURRENCIES U.K. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies CHART UK2: DOMESTIC AND UNHEDGED FOREIGN EQUITIES VS. FOREIGN CURRENCIES U.K. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-17Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging CHART UK1: DYNAMIC VS. STATIC HEDGING U.K. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging CHART UK1: DYNAMIC VS. STATIC HEDGING U.K. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-18U.K. Perspective: Australian Index Dynamically Hedged U.K. Perspective: Australian Index Dynamically Hedged UK INVESTOR: AU INDEX DYNAMIC HEDGE U.K. Perspective: Australian Index Dynamically Hedged UK INVESTOR: AU INDEX DYNAMIC HEDGE

Dear client, I am on the road this week, attending BCA's New York Conference and teaching the BCA Academy. In lieu of a regular report, we are sending you a Special Report, a cooperation with our Global Asset Allocation service. In this piece, my colleague Xiaoli Tang tests the benefits of various currency hedging strategies for global equity portfolios. In addition to traditional hedging rules, Xiaoli deploys the Intermediate-Term Timing Models developed by the Foreign Exchange Strategy team to build dynamic hedging strategies, which result in superior risk/reward profiles. I trust you will find this report interesting and informative. Best regards, Mathieu Savary Highlights In this report, we analyze both static and dynamic hedging strategies to hedge an identical global equity portfolio to six home currencies: the U.S. dollar, the British pound, the euro, the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar and the Australian dollar. We propose an easy to implement dynamic hedging framework based on the proprietary currency indicators from BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy (FES) service. It has outperformed all the static hedging strategies since 2001 on a risk-adjusted return basis. In addition, it levels out the playing field for all investors as the hedged returns are quite similar, no matter what their home currencies are. Among the static hedging strategies, the "least-regret" hedge ratio of 50% has lived up to its reputation, as it has reduced risk by more than 50% without severely jeopardizing returns. Over a four-year moving performance cycle (in line with how most portfolio managers are evaluated), the proposed dynamic hedging adds little career risk to portfolio managers compared to the "least regret" 50% static hedging, while provides superior returns most of the time. A global equity portfolio's currency exposure should be managed in a centralized currency overlay under the supervision of the Chief Investment Officer, so that equity and currency managers can both fully utilize their expertise in their respective field, and the organization can manage currency risk more efficiently at the total portfolio level. Feature Dynamic Hedging Outperforms Static Hedging We have received many client requests asking about currency hedging in global equity portfolios with different home currencies. This is not surprising given how currency movements have overwhelmed global equity portfolio returns of late. For example, this year the U.S. dollar's weakness against the major currencies has beefed up returns for U.S. investors who did not hedge their foreign exposure (Table I-1). Table I-1Year-To-Date Currency Movements Have Overwhelmed Equity Returns Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors GAA's equity country allocation recommendations are by default unhedged on USD basis. When a hedge is required we make the recommendation explicit. There have been many conflicting views on whether global equity investors should hedge foreign currency exposure, and if so, what proportion of the exposure should be hedged. Perold and Schulman (1988) suggest fully hedging foreign currency exposure, because significant risk reduction can be achieved without a significant loss of return.1 This is based on their famous "free lunch" claim that average currency returns are zero over the long-term. At the other extreme, Froot (1993) suggests that foreign currencies should not be hedged at all for long-term investors, because purchasing power parity holds in the long term and exchange rates are mean reverting.2 There are many other views in between, including the universal hedge ratio proposed by Black (1989), which is estimated to be 77%.3 Campbell et al (2010) classify currencies into reserve currencies (USD, EUR and CHF), commodity currencies (AUD and CAD) and neutral currencies (JPY and GBP), and suggest that risk-minimizing investors should hold reserve currencies while hedging out commodity currencies, based on the correlations between the currencies and equity markets.4 Realizing the limitations of "static hedging," which assumes constant correlation, mean and variance, many academic researchers have explored "dynamic hedging models" that allow the mean and covariance to be time-varying by using complex econometric modelling techniques.5,6,7 These academic dynamic hedging strategies have shown improvement over the 50% static hedge, but it's very difficult for investors without a strong quantitative background to understand these very complex approaches. In fact, with all these confusing academic recommendations floating around, the "least regret" hedge ratio of 50% has been quite popular among practitioners.8 To help our clients better understand the role of currency management in global equity portfolios, we have joined forces with BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy (FES) service to de-mystify the currency hedging process, and to propose a simple framework for clients with six different home currencies to dynamically hedge their foreign currency exposure based on the FES team's proprietary Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM) indicators.9 These indicators have been used in their regular weekly publications. The ITTM-based dynamic hedging strategy is back-tested from 2001 because the ITTM indicators only date back to 2001 (See methodology). We have also back-tested a simple trend-following momentum-based dynamic strategy to see how a dynamic hedging methodology works in a longer period from 1976. For comparison we have back-tested ten different static hedging strategies that employ fixed hedge ratios across currencies and time. The test results not only clarify much of the confusion about static hedging, they also demonstrate that on a risk-adjusted return basis, BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedging strategy has outperformed all static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies since 2001 (Chart I-1). Even in the very long run of 41 years from August 1976, the simple momentum-based dynamic hedging outperforms the static strategies for investors with five home currencies, with only the AUD portfolio being worse off (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Identical Investment, But Different Risk/Return Profiles (3/2001-8/2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart I-2Identical Investment, But Different Risk/Return Profiles (8/1976-8/2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Now let's clarify some of the confusion: Does static hedging reduce portfolio risk at little expense of lowering returns? The answer is yes only for USD and JPY portfolios. For both the 41-year period from 1976 and the shorter 16-year period from 2001, a higher hedge ratio results in lower risk with slightly lower return. So fully hedged would be the "optimal" strategy for risk-minimizing investors with USD and JPY as home currencies (Panel 1 and 2 on left side in both Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). For the U.K. portfolio, the answer is a partial yes, because the "optimal hedge ratio" for risk-minizing investors, around 60%-80%, does produce the lowest risk, but the paths to that "optimal" point are totally opposite when different time periods are chosen. In the short period (Chart I-1, bottom left panel), it follows the same pattern as that for U.S. and Japanese investors up to the optimal point. As the hedge ratio increases, however, return drops and risk increases! In the longer period from 1976, as the hedge ratio increases, return increases and risk decreases until the "optimal point," after which risk and returns both increase (Chart I-2, bottom left panel). In the period from 2001, the AUD, CAD and EUR portfolios share a similar pattern to that of the GBP portfolio in the period from 1976. The AUD portfolio behaved the same in both the shorter period (Chart I-1, top right) and the longer period (Chart 2, top right), while the EUR and CAD portfolios behaved differently in the longer-term period from the shorter period. Overall, the CAD portfolio's "optimal" hedge ratio is around 0-30%, the AUD portfolio around 30-60% while the EUR portfolio is around 40% in the shorter period but around 90% in the longer period (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). It is also worth noting that even though both the CAD and AUD are commodity currencies, AUD investors benefit significantly from hedging, while CAD investors' risk/return profile does not change much. This is because 1) currency returns for AUD investors do not average to zero in the long term due to positive carry, and 2) correlations between foreign currencies, foreign equities and domestic equities are not constant over time or across currencies (Appendix 2, Chart II-1 and Chart II-4) How does the "least regret" 50% static hedge do? The 50% hedge ratio fares quite well compared to the "optimal" static hedge ratio in terms of risk reduction for all portfolios in both periods, because more than half of the total risk reduction (the highest minus the lowest) occurs around the 50% hedge (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). How does BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedge do in terms of risk reduction? The ITTM produces better risk-adjusted returns for each portfolio than all the static hedges. In terms of risk, it generates the lowest risk for the EUR and GBP portfolios and is comparable to the 50% static hedge for other portfolios, while it generates a much higher return than all static hedges (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). How does the BCA Dynamic Hedge (ITTM) compare to the 50% static hedge over time? Chart I-3 shows that the dynamic hedge consistently outperformed the 50% static hedge for all six home currencies since 2001 without significantly increasing hedging transactions, compared to the fixed 50% hedge ratio for all currency pairs. The dash line in each panel of Chart I-3 corresponds to the market cap-weighted aggregate of hedge ratios of foreign currencies for each home currency. On average, they are comparable to 50%. Most portfolio managers are measured on a moving four-year performance cycle. Chart I-4 shows that the ITTM-based dynamic hedging strategy has outperformed the 50% static hedging most of the time on a moving four-year basis, with only CAD, USD and JPY managers suffering brief drawdowns. Chart I-3BCA Dynamic Hedging Adds ##br##Value For All Investors BCA Dynamic Hedging Adds Value For All Investors BCA Dynamic Hedging Adds Value For All Investors Chart I-4Little Career Risk For ##br##Portfolio Managers Little Career Risk For Portfolio Managers Little Career Risk For Portfolio Managers In theory, if hedges were effective, then an identical global equity portfolio should have similar returns for all investors, no matter what home currency they hold. While neither the static hedging strategies nor the momentum-based dynamic hedging approach could pass this criteria, BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedging approach does. It levels out the playing field for all investors globally. As shown in Chart I-5, in the period from March 2001 to August 2017, if left unhedged, the same global investment exhibits very different annualized returns for investors in different home currencies, with AUD investors at the low end at around 3.2%, and GBP investors at the high end at around 7%. With BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedge, however, returns for all investors are very similar, no matter which currency is their home currency. Chart I-5BCA Dynamic Hedging Strategy Levels Out The Playing Field Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors The BCA Dynamic Hedging Methodology To back-test all the hedging strategies, we use an identical global equity portfolio that is a market cap-weighted aggregate of nine countries/regions based on MSCI U.S., Japan, the euro area, U.K., Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway. This universe accounts for about 97% of the current MSCI World index (Chart I-6). The history of the euro area before 1987 (when MSCI data were available) is calculated as a market cap-weighted aggregate of MSCI Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. Chart I-6GAA Global Equity Universe GAA Global Equity Universe GAA Global Equity Universe We evaluate the same global portfolio for investors with six different home currencies: USD, JPY, GBP, EUR, CAD and AUD. The Measurement for Hedging Efficacy: All the academically claimed "optimal" hedge ratios, static or dynamic, are based on risk-minimizing in a mean-variance optimization framework. For practitioners, however, "not meeting return objectives" is a much higher risk priority than minimizing portfolio risk. This is why we advocate risk-adjusted return as our measurement for hedge efficacy. The Objective: We aim to find the hedging strategies that outperform the widely used 50% static hedging strategy on a risk-adjusted return basis. At BCA, our philosophy has always been not to strive to find the optimal solution, but to try our best to find a feasible solution that best meets the stated objective. Interestingly, this approach has produced superior results for the GBP and EUR portfolios, achieving the combination of "highest return - lowest risk." It also levels out the playing field for all investors by generating similar hedged returns for all investors, no matter what home currency they hold (Chart I-1 and Chart I-5). The Proprietary Currency Indicators: The indicators from Foreign Exchange Strategy service's Intermediate Term Timing Model (ITTM) are built under the assumptions that the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) holds, and the fair value of a currency pair is a function of the real rate differential (using an average of two-year and 10-year real rates), Junk OAS (a proxy for global risk appetite), commodity prices and past-year trends (52-week moving average). When a currency pair deviates from its fair value to an extreme, then the likelihood for a trend reversal is high.9 The Simple Rule-Based Dynamic Hedging: For each home currency, we evaluate the other eight foreign currencies individually based on each pair's ITTM indicator. When a foreign currency overshoots fair value above the upper band of its historical range, then the currency is a short, and the short position is kept until the foreign currency value touches the lower band of its historical range that's below the fair value. The Implementation: We use one-month forward contracts and re-balance on a monthly basis. The gain or loss of the underlying equity index during the month is not hedged, but converted back to the home currency at the month-end spot rate. For history before 2001, we use one-month interest rates to calculate hedged returns (Please see Appendix 1 hedged return calculations using forwards and also interest rates). Example: Chart I-7 illustrates how a Canadian investor uses the ITTM indicator to decide when to hedge JPY exposure when they invest in the MSCI Japan equity index. Chart I-7Canadian Investor: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Canadian Investor: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Canadian Investor: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged The top panel shows the hedging signal for JPY (solid line) versus our proprietary ITTM indicator for JPY/CAD exchange rate (dash line). The upper and lower band are set as 7% above fair value and 9% below fair value; the bottom panel shows the relative performance of the MSCI Japan hedged in CAD versus the MSCI Japan unhedged in CAD. Currently CAD investors should hedge their JPY exposure based on the ITTM indicator. Some Suggestions For Asset Allocators Use a centralized currency overlay portfolio to manage foreign currency exposure. The overlay portfolio should be managed by currency specialists (either in-house or using external managers) under the supervision of the CIO. The objective of the overlay portfolio is to manage currency exposure based on the underlying assets of the organization's Total Portfolio, such that the risk/return profile of the total portfolio is improved against its benchmark. Global equity portfolio manager performance should be measured on an unhedged basis in their respective home currency. Some have argued that a fully hedged benchmark such as the MSCI All Country Total Return Index in local currencies should be used to measure the performance of a global equity portfolio manager. We strongly disagree, even though in theory it does not really matter what benchmark is used. MSCI's "total return indexes in local currencies" for global equity aggregates are theoretical in nature. They cannot be replicated in the real world because they are calculated on a daily basis using the previous closing day's exchange rate to calculate foreign equity return10 - such that the "local return" for each foreign equity index is perfectly hedged. Unfortunately this "perfect hedge" is humanly impossible, because as shown in Formula (1) in Appendix 1, only when both the spot rate and forward rate at the time t are equal to the spot rate at time t+1, can the local returns be fully captured! Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com 1 Perold, A and E. Schulman, 1988, "The free lunch in currency hedging: Implications for investment policy and performance standards", Financial Analyst Journal 44, 45-50. 2 Froot K., 1993, "Currency hedging over long horizons", NBER working paper 4355 3 Black, F., 1989, "Universal hedging: optimizing currency risk and reward in international equity portfolios", Financial Analyst Journal 45, 16-22 4 Campbell, J., K. de Medeiros and L. Viceira, 2010, "Global currency hedging", Journal of Finance LXV, 87-122 5 Gagnon, L., T., McCurdy, and G., Lypny, 1998, " Hedging foreign currency portfolios", Journal of Empirical Finance 5, 197-220 6 Hautsch, N., and J. Inkmann, 2003, "Optimal hedging of the currency exchange risk exposure of dynamically balanced strategic asset allocations", Journal of Asset Management 4, 173-189 7 Brown, C., J., Dark, and W., Zhang, "Dynamic currency hedging for international stock portfolios", 2012, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourn 8 Michenaud, S., and B., Solnik, 2008, "Applying regret theory to investment choices: Currency hedging decisions", Journal of International Money and Finance 27, 677-694 9 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "In Search Of A Timing Model", June 22, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 10 "Note on index calculation in local currency", MSCI Bara Index Calculation Methodologies, p19, May 2010 11 MSCI uses 2 business days as described in "MSCI Index Methodology: MSCI Hedged Indexes", July 2013 Appendix 1 We use one-month forward contracts and re-balance on a monthly basis. The gain or loss of the underlying equity index during the month is not hedged, but converted back to the home currency at the month-end spot rate. Before reliable forward contract rates were available (Jan 2001), we use one-month interest rates instead to calculate hedged returns. Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Please note that for simplification we have ignored the bid-ask spread in all the quotations, and we do not take into account the time lag required to implement a hedge.11 In practice, however, these are valid considerations. Appendix 2: Dynamics Hedging For Six Home Currencies 2.1 The Australian Perspective Correlations: For Aussie investors, foreign currencies in aggregate have a negative correlation with the domestic equity index (especially in the period from 2001), and a mostly positive but low correlation to the unhedged foreign equities. (Chart II-1). So hedging away foreign currency exposure would increase total risk of the global portfolio. This is why a fully hedged portfolio has the highest risk (Chart II-2, Table II-1). Historical Performance: Since 2001, ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in AUD. The return profile looks similar to the fully hedged portfolio, but risk is much lower (Table II-1). Over the longer period, the optimal static hedge ratio is about 70%, which is actually quite close to the 50% hedge, as shown in Table II-2. On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-2, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile also prevails. Current State: Currently AUD investors should only be hedging their exposure in Swiss francs and U.S. dollars, the two "safe haven" currencies. Actually, our indicators show a close to 100% hedge of the Swiss franc, as shown in Chart II-3, which did hurt the risk/return profile during the GFC period despite an outstanding full-period performance. Table II-1Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In AUD (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-2Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In AUD (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-1Australian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Australian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Australian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-2Australian Perespective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Australian Perespective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Australian Perespective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-3Australian Perspective: Swiss Index Dynamically Hedged Australian Perspective: Swiss Index Dynamically Hedged Australian Perspective: Swiss Index Dynamically Hedged 2.2 The Canadian Perspective Correlations: For Canadian investors, foreign currencies on aggregate have a negative correlation with the country's domestic equity index, but the correlation with unhedged foreign equities has oscillated in both positive and negative territory. The correlation between Canadian equities and unhedged foreign equities has been always positive, in the range of 0.4-0.8 (Chart II-4). So hedging away foreign currency exposure will increase total risk within a global portfolio. This is why a fully hedged portfolio has the highest risk (Chart II-5, Table II-3 and Table II-4). Historical Performance: Since 2001, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest annualized return for the global portfolio in CAD without significantly increasing volatility from the unhedged scenario. In terms of risk-adjusted return, dynamic hedging has outperformed the best static hedging scenario (40% hedged) by about 46% (Table II-3). On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-5, the dynamic risk/return profile also prevails. Current State: Currently Canadian investors should be hedging all foreign currencies except for the Australian dollar. Chart II-6 shows how CAD investors dynamically hedge their exposure to the Swedish krona. Table II-3Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In CAD (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-4Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In CAD (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-4Canadian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Canadian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Canadian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-5Canadian Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Canadian Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Canadian Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-6Canadian Perspective: Swedish Index Dynamically Hedged Canadian Perspective: Swedish Index Dynamically Hedged Canadian Perspective: Swedish Index Dynamically Hedged 2.3 The Japanese Perspective Correlations: For Japanese investors, correlations among foreign currencies, foreign equities and domestic equities seem to have gone through regime changes since the GFC, as shown in Chart II-7. These regime changes in correlations explain the evolving risk/return profile of the static hedges in Chart II-8. Before the GFC, full hedge and 50% hedge had similar risk profiles, but after the GFC full hedge reduced total risk significantly due to the sharp increase in correlations. Historical Performance: Since 2001, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in JPY, with a much higher return and slightly higher risk (Table II-5). Fully hedged has the lowest risk in both periods, and 50% is close to the "optimal" static hedge in both periods as well (Table II-5 and II-6). On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-8, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile. The 50% static hedge has similar risk profile to the ITTM-based dynamic hedge, but with lower returns. Current State: Currently JPY investors should be only hedging their exposure in Swiss francs and U.S. dollars. Chart II-9 shows how Japanese investors should have hedged CAD exposure. Table II-5Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In JPY (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-6Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In JPY (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-7Japanese Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Japanese Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Japanese Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-8Japanese Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Japanese Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Japanese Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-9Japanese Perspective: Canadian Index Dynamically Hedged Japanese Perspective: Canadian Index Dynamically Hedged Japanese Perspective: Canadian Index Dynamically Hedged 2.4 The U.S. Perspective Correlations: For U.S. investors, correlations among foreign currencies, foreign equities and domestic equities seem to have gone through regime changes since the GFC, as shown in Chart II-10. These regime changes in correlation explain the evolving risk/return profile of the static hedges in Chart II-11. Before the GFC, full hedge and 50% hedge had similar risk profiles, but after the GFC full hedge exhibited significantly reduced total risk due to the sharp increase in correlations. Historical Performance: Since 2001, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in USD, with a much higher return and slightly lower risk compared to the 50%, which is the best static hedge for the period (Table II-7). Fully hedged had the lowest risk in both periods, but the return profiles of the static hedges were very similar, supporting the widely held belief that in the long run currency returns are close to zero (Table II-7 and II-8). On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-11, the dynamic risk/return profile is close to that of the 50%. Current State: Currently U.S. investors should only be hedging their exposure in euros (Chart II-12). Table II-7Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In USD (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-8Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In JPY (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-10U.S. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies U.S. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies U.S. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-11U.S. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging U.S. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging U.S. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-12U.S. Perspective: EMU Index Dynamically Hedged U.S. Perspective: EMU Index Dynamically Hedged US INVESTOR: EMU INDEX DYNAMIC HEDGE U.S. Perspective: EMU Index Dynamically Hedged US INVESTOR: EMU INDEX DYNAMIC HEDGE 2.5 The Euro Perspective Correlations: For investors that call the euro home currency, the correlation and foreign equities has been positive. The correlation between foreign currencies and domestic equity index, however, has been changing signs over time, currently sitting at near zero! (Chart II-13). This explains the shape of the risk/return profile in Chart II-14 and Table II-9. Historical Performance: Since 2001, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in euros, which has a higher return and lower risk than the best static hedge of 80% (Table II-9). Over the longer period, the optimal hedge ratio is about 50% hedge, which is actually quite close to those between 40-70%, as shown in Table II-10. On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-14, the dynamic risk/return profile definitely prevails. Current State: Currently euro investors should not be hedging any foreign exposure, based on our indicators. Chart II-15 shows how euro investors should have hedged JPY exposure over time since 2001. Table II-9Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In Euro (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-10Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In Euro (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-13Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies CHART EMU2: DOMESTIC AND UNHEDGED FOREIGN EQUITIES VS. FOREIGN CURRENCIES EURO AREA Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies CHART EMU2: DOMESTIC AND UNHEDGED FOREIGN EQUITIES VS. FOREIGN CURRENCIES EURO AREA Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-14Euro Area Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Euro Area Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Euro Area Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-15Euro area Perspective: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Euro area Perspective: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Euro area Perspective: Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged 2.6 The British Perspective Correlations: For British investors, correlations between foreign currencies and domestic equities have gone through several regime changes over time in both positive and negative territory, as shown in Chart II-16. The positive correlation between foreign and domestic equities has also increased over time. This would definitely make static hedging worse off (Table II-11 and II-12). Historical Performance: Not surprisingly, since 2001, dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in pounds, which has a higher return and lower risk than the best static hedge of 20% (Table II-11). Over the longer period, the optimal hedge ratio is about 90% hedge, Table II-12. On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-17, the dynamic risk/return profile prevails, as it shares similar risk as the 50% hedge but with a higher return. Current State: Currently the British investors should not be hedging CAD and Swedish krona, while all six other currencies should be hedged. Chart II-18 shows how U.K. investors should have hedged their AUD exposure over time since 2001. Table II-11Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In GBP (2001-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Table II-12Risk/Return Profile For Global Equity In GBP (1976-2017) Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors Chart II-16Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies CHART UK2: DOMESTIC AND UNHEDGED FOREIGN EQUITIES VS. FOREIGN CURRENCIES U.K. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies CHART UK2: DOMESTIC AND UNHEDGED FOREIGN EQUITIES VS. FOREIGN CURRENCIES U.K. Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Chart II-17Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging CHART UK1: DYNAMIC VS. STATIC HEDGING U.K. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging CHART UK1: DYNAMIC VS. STATIC HEDGING U.K. Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Chart II-18U.K. Perspective: Australian Index Dynamically Hedged U.K. Perspective: Australian Index Dynamically Hedged UK INVESTOR: AU INDEX DYNAMIC HEDGE U.K. Perspective: Australian Index Dynamically Hedged UK INVESTOR: AU INDEX DYNAMIC HEDGE Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades

Liquidity is the lifeblood of the economy and financial markets, but it is a slippery concept that means different things to different people. Liquidity falls into four categories: monetary, balance sheet, financial market transaction liquidity, and funding liquidity. Overall liquidity conditions are reasonably constructive for risk assets at the moment. Financial market and balance sheet liquidity are adequate. Monetary policy is extremely easy, although the low level of money and credit growth underscores that the credit channel of monetary policy is still somewhat impaired. Funding liquidity is as important as monetary liquidity for financial markets. It has recovered from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) lows, but it is far from frothy. Unwinding the Fed's balance sheet represents a risk to investors because QE played such an important role in reducing risk premia in financial markets. The unwind should not affect transactions liquidity or balance sheet liquidity. It should not affect the broad monetary aggregates either. The bond market's reaction will be far more important than balance sheet shrinkage. As long as the Fed can limit the bond market damage via forward guidance, then funding liquidity should remain adequate and risk assets should take the Fed's unwind in stride. It will be a whole different story, however, if inflation lurches higher. The technical impact of balance sheet unwind on the inner workings of the credit market is very complicated. Asset sales could lead to a shortage of short-term high-quality assets, unless it is offset with increased T-bill issuance. However, a smaller balance sheet could, in fact, improve funding liquidity to the extent that it frees up space on banks' balance sheets. Liquidity has been an integral part of BCA's approach to financial markets going back to the early days of the company under the tutelage of Editor-in-Chief Hamilton Bolton from 1949 to 1968. Bolton was ahead of his time in terms of developing monetary indicators to forecast market trends. Back then, the focus was on bank flows such as the volume of checks cashed because capital markets were still developing and most credit flowed through the banking system. Times changed, monetary policy implementation evolved and financial markets became more important and sophisticated. When money targeting became popular among central banks in the 1970s, central bank liquidity analysis focused more on the broader monetary aggregates. These and other monetary data were used extensively by Anthony Boeckh, BCA's Editor-in-Chief from the 1968 to 2002, to forecast the economy and markets. He also highlighted the importance of balance sheet liquidity (holdings of liquid assets), and its interplay with rising debt levels. Martin Barnes continued with these themes when writing about the Debt Supercycle in the monthly Bank Credit Analyst. "Liquidity" is a slippery concept, and it means different things to different people. In this Special Report, we describe BCA's approach to liquidity and highlight its critical importance for financial markets. We provide a list of indicators to watch, and also outline how the pending shrinkage of the Fed's balance sheet could affect overall liquidity conditions. A Primer On Liquidity We believe there are four types of liquidity that are all interrelated: Central Bank Liquidity: Bank reserves lie at the heart of central bank liquidity. Reserves are under the direct control of the central bank, which are used as a tool to influence general monetary conditions in the economy. The latter are endogenous to the system and also depend on the private sector's desire to borrow, spend and hold cash. Bullish liquidity conditions are typically associated with plentiful bank reserves, low interest rates and strong growth in the monetary aggregates. Balance Sheet Liquidity: A high level of balance sheet liquidity means that plenty of short-term assets are available to meet emergencies. The desire of households, companies and institutional investors to build up balance sheet liquidity would normally increase when times are bad, and decline when confidence is high. Thus, one would expect strong economic growth to be associated with declining balance sheet liquidity, and vice versa when the economy is weak. Of course, deteriorating balance sheet liquidity during good times is a negative sign to the extent that households or business are caught in an illiquid state when the economy turns down, jobs are lost and loans are called. Financial Market Transaction Liquidity: This refers to the ability to make transactions in securities without triggering major changes in prices. Financial institutions provide market liquidity to securities markets through their trading activities. Funding Liquidity: The ability to borrow to fund positions in financial markets. Financial institutions provide funding liquidity to borrowers through their lending activities. The conditions under which these intermediaries can fund their own balance sheets, in turn, depend on the willingness of banks and the shadow banking system to interact with them. The BIS definition of funding liquidity is a broad concept that captures a wide range of channels. It includes the capacity of intermediaries that participate in the securitization chain to access the necessary funding to originate loans, to acquire loans for packaging into securities, and finance various kinds of guarantees. The availability and turnover of collateral for loans is also very important for generating funding liquidity, as we discuss below. These types of liquidity are interrelated in various ways, and can positively or negatively reinforce each other. It is the interaction of these factors that determines the economy's overall ease of financing. See Box II-1 for more details. BOX II-1 How Liquidity Is Inter-Related Central bank liquidity, which is exogenously determined, is the basis for private liquidity creation (the combination of market transaction and funding liquidity). The central bank determines the short-term risk-free rate and the official liquidity that is provided to the banking system. If the central bank hikes rates or provides less official liquidity, appetite for private lending begins to dry up. Private sector liquidity is thus heavily influenced by monetary policy, but can develop a life of its own, overshooting to the upside and downside with swings in investor confidence and risk tolerance. Financial market liquidity and funding liquidity are closely interrelated. When times are good, markets are liquid and funding liquidity is ample. But when risk tolerance takes a hit, a vicious circle between market transaction and funding liquidity develops. The BIS highlights the procyclical nature of private liquidity, which means that it tends to exhibit boom-bust cycles that generate credit excesses that are followed by busts.1 The Great Financial Crisis of 2008 is a perfect example. The Fed lifted the fed funds rate by 400 basis points between 2004 and 2006. Nonetheless, the outsized contraction in private liquidity, resulting from the plunge in asset prices related to U.S. mortgage debt, was a key driver of the crash in risk asset prices. Liquidity Indicators: What To Watch (1) Monetary Liquidity Key measures of central bank liquidity include the monetary base and the broad money aggregates, such as M1 and M2 (Chart II-1). Central banks control the amount of reserves in the banking system, which is part of base money, but they do not control the broad monetary aggregates. The latter is determined by the desire to hold cash and bank deposits, as well as the demand and supply of credit. Box II-2 provides some background on the monetary transmission process and quantitative easing. BOX II-2 The Monetary Transmission Process And Qe Before the Great Recession and Financial Crisis, the monetary authorities set the level of short-term interest rates through active management of the level of bank reserves. Reserves were drained as policy tightened, and were boosted when policies eased. The level of bank reserves affected banks' lending behavior, and shifts in interest rates affected the spending and investment decisions of consumers and businesses. Of course, it has been a different story since the financial crisis. Once short-term interest rates reached the zero bound, the Fed and some other central banks adopted "quantitative easing" programs designed to depress longer-term interest rates by aggressively buying bonds and thereby stuffing the banking system with an excessive amount of reserves. Many feared the onset of inflation when QE programs were first announced because investors worried that this would contribute to a massive increase in credit and the overall money supply. Indeed, there could have been hyper-inflation if banks had gone on a lending spree. But this never happened. Banks were constrained by insufficient capital ratios, loan losses and intense regulation, while consumers and businesses had no appetite for acquiring more debt. The result was that the money multiplier - the ratio of broad money to the monetary base - collapsed (top panel in Chart II-1). Bank lending standards eventually eased and credit demand recovered. Broad money growth has been volatile since 2007 but, despite quantitative easing, it has been roughly in line with the decade before. The broad aggregates lost much of their predictive power after the 1980s. Financial innovation, such as the use of debit cards and bank machines, changed the relationship between broad money on one hand, and the economy or financial markets on the other. Despite the structural changes in the economy, investors should still keep the monetary aggregates and the other monetary indicators discussed below in their toolbox. While the year-to-year wiggles in M2, for example, have not been good predictors of growth or inflation on a one or two year horizon, Chart II-2 shows that there is a long-term relationship between money and inflation when using decade averages. Chart II-1The Monetary Aggregates The Monetary Aggregates The Monetary Aggregates Chart II-2Long-Run Relationship Between M2 And Inflation October 2017 October 2017 Other monetary indicators to watch: M2 Divided By Nominal GDP (Chart II-3): When money growth exceeds that of nominal GDP, it could be interpreted as a signal that there is more than enough liquidity to facilitate economic activity. The excess is then available to purchase financial assets. Monetary Conditions Index (Chart II-3): This combines the level of interest rates and the change in the exchange rate into one indicator. The MCI has increased over the past year, indicating a tightening of monetary conditions, but is still very low by historical standards. Dollar Based Liquidity (Chart II-3): This includes Fed holdings of Treasurys and U.S. government securities held in custody for foreign official accounts. Foreign Exchange Reserves (Chart II-3): Central banks hold reserves in the form of gold, or cash and bonds denominated in foreign currencies. For example, when the People's Bank of China accumulates foreign exchange as part of its management of the RMB, it buys government bonds in other countries, thereby adding to liquidity globally. Interest Rates Minus Nominal GDP Growth (Chart II-4): Nominal GDP growth can be thought of as a proxy for the return on capital. If interest rates are below the return on capital, then there is an incentive for firms to borrow and invest. The opposite is true if interest rates are above GDP growth. Currently, short-term rates are well below nominal GDP, signaling that central bank liquidity is plentiful. Chart II-3Monetary Indicators (I) Monetary Indicators (I) Monetary Indicators (I) Chart II-4Monetary Indicators (II) Monetary Indicators (II) Monetary Indicators (II) (2) Balance Sheet Liquidity Chart II-5 presents the ratio of short-term assets to total liabilities for the corporate and household sectors. It is a measure of readily-available cash or cash-like instruments that make it easier to weather economic downturns and/or credit tightening phases. The non-financial corporate sector is in very good shape from this perspective. The seizure of the commercial paper market during the GFC encouraged firms to hold more liquid assets on the balance sheet. However, the uptrend began in the early 1990s and likely reflects tax avoidance efforts. Households are also highly liquid when short-term assets are compared to income. Liquidity as a share of total discretionary financial portfolios is low, but this is not surprising given extraordinarily unattractive interest rates. The banking system is being forced to hold more liquid assets under the new Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirement (Chart II-6). This is positive from the perspective of reducing systemic risk, but it has negative implications for funding liquidity, as we will discuss below. Chart II-5Balance Sheet Liquidity Balance Sheet Liquidity Balance Sheet Liquidity Chart II-6Bank Balance Sheet Liquidity Bank Balance Sheet Liquidity Bank Balance Sheet Liquidity (3) Financial Market Transaction Liquidity: Transactions volumes and bid-ask spreads are the main indicators to watch to gauge financial market transaction liquidity. There was a concern shortly after the GFC that the pullback in risk-taking by important market-makers could severely undermine market liquidity, leading to lower transaction volumes and wider bid-ask spreads. The focus of concern was largely on the corporate bond market given the sharply reduced footprint of investment banks. The Fed's data on primary dealer positioning in corporates shows a massive decline from the pre-crisis peak in 2007 (Chart II-7). This represents a decline from over 10% of market cap to only 0.3%. The smaller presence of dealers could create a liquidity problem for corporate debt, especially if market-making dealers fail to adequately match sellers with buyers during market downturns. Yet, as highlighted by BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy team, corporate bond markets have functioned well since the dark days of the Lehman crisis.2 Reduced dealer presence has not resulted in any unusual widening of typical relationships like the basis between Credit Default Swaps and corporate bond spreads. Other market participants, such as Exchange Traded Funds, have taken up the slack. Daily trading volume as a percent of market cap has returned to pre-Lehman levels in the U.S. high-yield market, although this is not quite the case for the investment-grade market (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Less Market Making Less Market Making Less Market Making Chart II-8Corporate Bond Trading Volume Corporate Bond Trading Volume Corporate Bond Trading Volume That said, it is somewhat worrying that average trade sizes in corporates are smaller now compared to pre-crisis levels - perhaps as much as 20% smaller according to estimates by the New York Fed. This is likely the result of the reduced risk-taking by the dealers and the growing share of direct electronic trading. Thus, it may feel like liquidity is impaired since it now takes longer to execute a large bond trade, even though transaction costs for individual trades have not been increasing. The bottom line is that financial market liquidity is not as good as in the pre-Lehman years. This is not a problem at the moment, but there could be some dislocations in the fixed-income space during the next period of severe market stress when funding liquidity dries up. (3) Funding Liquidity: There are few direct measures of funding liquidity. Instead, one can look for its "footprint" or confirming evidence, such as total private sector credit. If credit is growing strongly, it is a sign that funding liquidity is ample. Box II-3 explains why international credit flows are also important to watch for signs of froth in lending. BOX II-3 The Importance Of International Credit Flows The BIS highlights that swings in international borrowing amplify domestic credit trends. Cross border lending tends to display even larger boom-bust cycles than domestic credit, as can be seen in the major advanced economies in the lead up to the GFC, as well as some Asian countries just before the Asian crisis in the late 1990s (Chart II-9). When times are good, banks and the shadow banking system draw heavily on cross-border sources of funds, such that international credit expansion tends to grow faster during boom periods than the credit granted domestically by banks located in the country. Since G4 financial systems intermediate a major share of global credit, funding conditions within the G4 affect funding conditions globally, as BIS research shows.3 This research also demonstrates that financial cycles have become more highly correlated across economies due to increased financial integration. Booms in credit inflows from abroad are also associated with a low level of the VIX, which is another sign of ample funding liquidity conditions (Chart II-10). These periods of excessive funding almost always end with a financial crisis and a spike in the VIX. Chart II-9International Credit Is Highly Cyclical International Credit Is Highly Cyclical International Credit Is Highly Cyclical Chart II-10International Credit Booms Lead Spikes In The VIX International Credit Booms Lead Spikes In The VIX International Credit Booms Lead Spikes In The VIX Other measures of funding liquidity to watch include: Chart II-11Market Measures Of Funding Liquidity Market Measures Of Funding Liquidity Market Measures Of Funding Liquidity Libor-OIS Spread (Chart II-11): This is a measure of perceived credit risk of LIBOR-panel banks. The spread tends to widen during periods of banking sector stress. Spreads are currently low by historical standards. However, libor will be phased out by 2021, such that a replacement for this benchmark rate will have to be found by then. Bond-CDS Basis (Chart II-11): The basis is roughly the average difference between each bond's yield spread to Treasurys and the cost of insuring the bond in the CDS market. Arbitrage should keep these two spreads closely aligned, but increases in funding costs tied to balance sheet constraints during periods of market stress affect this arbitrage opportunity, allowing the two spreads to diverge. The U.S. high-yield or investment grade bond markets are a good bellweather, and at the moment they indicate relatively good funding liquidity. FX Basis Swap (Chart II-11): This is analogous to the bond-CDS basis. It reflects the cost of hedging currencies, which is critically important for international investors and lending institutions. The basis swap widens when there is financial stress, reflecting a pullback in funding liquidity related to currencies. The FX swap basis widened during the GFC and, unlike other spreads, has not returned to pre-Lehman levels (see below). Bank Leverage Ratios (Chart II-12): The ratio of loans to deposits is a measure of leverage in the banking system. Banks boost leverage during boom times and thereby provide more loans and funding liquidity to buy securities. In the U.S., this ratio has plunged since 2007 and shows no sign of turning up. Primary Dealers Securities Lending (Chart II-13): This is a direct measure of funding liquidity. Primary dealers make loans to other financial institutions with the purpose of buying securities, thereby providing both funding liquidity and market liquidity. Historically, shifts in dealer lending have been correlated with bid-ask spreads in the Treasury market. Securities lending is also correlated with the S&P 500, although it does not tend to lead the stock market. Dealer loans soared prior to 2007, before collapsing in 2008. Total loans have recovered, but have not reached pre-crisis highs, consistent with stricter regulations that forced the deleveraging of dealer balance sheets. Chart II-12U.S. Bank Leverage U.S. Bank Leverage U.S. Bank Leverage Chart II-13Securities Lending And Margin Debt bca.bca_mp_2017_10_01_s2_c13 bca.bca_mp_2017_10_01_s2_c13 NYSE Margin Debt (Chart II-13): Another direct measure of funding liquidity. The uptrend in recent years has been steep, although it is less impressive when expressed relative to market cap. Bank Lending Standards (Chart II-14): These surveys reflect bank lending standards for standard loans to the household or corporate sectors, but their appetite for lending for the purposes of securities purchases is no doubt highly correlated. Lending standards tightened in 2016 due to the collapse in oil prices, but they have started to ease again this year. Table II-1 provides a handy list of liquidity indicators split into our four categories. Taking all of these indicators into consideration, we would characterize liquidity conditions in the U.S. as fairly accommodative, although not nearly as abundant as the period just prior to the Lehman event. Monetary conditions are super easy, while balance sheet and financial market liquidity are reasonably constructive. In contrast, funding liquidity, while vastly improved since the GFC, is still a long way from the pre-Lehman go-go years according to several important indicators such as bank leverage. Moreover, the Fed is set to begin the process of unwinding the massive amount of monetary liquidity provided by its quantitative easing program. Chart II-14Bank Lending Standards Bank Lending Standards Bank Lending Standards Table II-1Liquidity Indicators To Watch October 2017 October 2017 Fed Balance Sheet Shrinkage: What Impact On Liquidity? Given that the era of quantitative easing has been a positive one for risk assets, it is unsurprising that investors are concerned about the looming unwind of the Fed's massive balance sheet. For example, Chart II-15 demonstrates the correlation between the change in G4 balances sheets and both the stock market and excess returns in the U.S. high-yield market. Chart II-16 presents our forecast for how quickly the Fed's balance sheet will contract. Following last week's FOMC meeting we learned that balance sheet reduction will begin October 1. For the first three months the Fed will allow a maximum of $6 billion in Treasurys and $4 billion in MBS to run off each month. Those caps will increase in steps of $6 billion and $4 billion, respectively, every three months until they level off at $30 billion per month for Treasurys and $20 billion per month for MBS. Chart II-15G4 Central Bank Balance Sheets G4 Central Bank Balance Sheets G4 Central Bank Balance Sheets Chart II-16Fed Balance Sheet Fed Balance Sheet Fed Balance Sheet We have received no official guidance on the level of bank reserves the Fed will target for the end of the run-off process. However, New York Fed President William Dudley recently recommended that this level should be higher than during the pre-QE period, and should probably fall in the $400 billion to $1 trillion range.4 In our forecasts we assume that bank reserves will level-off once they reach $650 billion. In that scenario the Fed's balance sheet will shrink by roughly $1.4 trillion by 2021. The level of excess reserves in the banking system will decline by a somewhat larger amount ($1.75 trillion). In terms of the impact of balance sheet shrinkage on overall liquidity conditions, it is useful to think about the four categories of liquidity described above. (1) Monetary Liquidity The re-absorption of excess reserves will mean that base money will contract (i.e. the sum of bank reserves held at the Fed and currency in circulation). However, we do not expect this to have a noticeable impact on the broader monetary aggregates, credit growth, the economy or inflation, outside of any effect it might have on the term premium in the bond market. The reasoning is that all those excess reserves did not have a major impact on growth and inflation when they were created in the first place. This was because the credit channel of monetary policy was blocked by a lack of demand (private sector deleveraging) and limited bank lending capacity (partly due to regulation). Banks were also less inclined to lend due to rising loan losses. Removing the excess reserves should have little effect on banks' willingness or ability to make new loans. In terms of asset prices, some investors believe that when the excess reserves were created, a portion of it found its way out of the banking system and was used to buy assets directly. That is not the case. The excess reserves were left idle, sitting on deposit at the Fed. They did not "leak" out and were not used to purchase assets. Thus, fewer excess bank reserves do not imply any forced selling. Nonetheless, the QE program certainly affected asset prices indirectly via the portfolio balance effect. Asset purchases supported both the economy and risk assets in part via a weaker dollar and to the extent that the policy lifted confidence in the system. But most importantly, QE depressed long-term interest rates, which are used to discount cash flows when valuing financial assets. QE boosted risk-seeking behavior and the search for yield, partly through the signaling mechanism that convinced investors that short-term rates would stay depressed for a long time. The result was a decline in measures of market implied volatility, such as the MOVE and VIX indexes. Could Bond Yields Spike? The risk is that the portfolio balance effect goes into reverse as the Fed unwinds the asset purchases. The negative impact on risk assets will depend importantly on the bond market's response. As highlighted in the Overview section, there will be a sharp swing in the flow of G4 government bonds available to the private sector, from a contraction of US$600 billion in 2017 to an increase of US$200 billion in 2018. Focusing on the U.S. market, empirical estimates suggest that the Fed's shedding of Treasurys could boost the 10-year yield by about 80 basis points because the private sector will require a higher term premium to absorb the higher flow of bonds. However, the impact on yields is likely to be tempered by two factors: Banks are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years in order to meet the new Liquidity Coverage Ratio. The BCA U.S. Bond Strategy service argues that growing bank demand for Treasurys in the coming years will absorb much of the net flow of Treasurys that the Fed is no longer buying.5 As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions to tighten too quickly. Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but the point is that forward guidance will help to limit the impact of the shrinking Fed balance sheet on bond yields. Indeed, the Fed is trying hard to sever the link in investors' minds between balance sheet policy and signaling about future rate hikes, as highlighted by Chair Yellen's Q&A session following the September FOMC meeting. The bottom line is that the impact on monetary liquidity of a smaller Fed balance sheet should be minimal, although long-term bond yields will be marginally higher as a result. That said, much depends on inflation. If the core PCE inflation rate were to suddenly shift up to the 2% target or above, then bond prices will be hit hard, the VIX will surge and risk assets will sustain some damage. The prospect of a more aggressive pace of monetary tightening would undermine funding liquidity, compounding the negative impact on risk assets. (2) Funding Liquidity Chart II-17Tri-Party Repo Market Has Shrunk Tri-Party Repo Market Has Shrunk Tri-Party Repo Market Has Shrunk By unwinding its balance sheet, the Fed will be supplying securities into the market and removing cash. This will be occurring at a time when transactions in the tri-party repo market have fallen to less than half of their peak in 2007 due to stricter regulation (Chart II-17). This market has historically been an important source of short-term funding, helping to meet the secular rise in demand for short-term, low-risk instruments, largely from non-financial corporations, asset managers and foreign exchange reserve funds. If the Fed drains reserves from the system and T-bill issuance does not increase substantially to compensate, a supply shortage of short-maturity instruments could develop. We can see how this might undermine the Fed's ability to shift short-term interest rates higher under its new system of interest rate management, where reverse repos and the interest rate paid on reserves set the floor for other short-term interest rates. However, at the moment we do not see the risk that fewer excess reserves on its own will negatively affect funding liquidity. Again, any impact on funding liquidity would likely be felt via a sharp rise in interest rates and pullback in the portfolio balance effect, which would occur if inflation turns up. But this has more to do with rising interest rates than the size of the Fed's balance sheet. Indeed, balance sheet shrinkage could actually improve funding liquidity provided via the bilateral repo market, securities-lending, derivatives and prime brokerage channels. These are important players in the collateral supply chain. A recent IMF working paper emphasizes that collateral flows are just as important in credit creation as money itself.6 Collateral refers to financial instruments that are used as collateral to fund positions, which can be cash or cash-like equivalents. Since pledged collateral can be reused over and over, it can generate significantly more total lending than the value of the collateral itself. The Fed's overnight reverse-repo facility includes restrictions that the collateral accessed from its balance sheet can only be used in the tri-party repo system. Thus, the Fed's presence in the collateral market has reduced the "velocity of collateral." Table II-2 shows that the reuse rate of collateral, or its velocity, has fallen from 3.0 in 2007 to 1.8 in 2015. Table II-2Collateral Velocity October 2017 October 2017 The combination of tighter capital regulations and Fed asset purchases has severely limited the available space on bank balance sheets to provide funding liquidity. Regulations force banks to carry more capital for a given level of assets. Fed asset purchases have forced a large portion of those assets to be held as reserves, limiting banks' activity in the bilateral repo market. There is much uncertainty surrounding this issue, but it appears that an unwind the Fed's balance sheet will free up some space on bank balance sheets, possibly permitting more bilateral repo activity and thus a higher rate of collateral velocity. It may also relieve concerns about a shortage of safe-haven assets. Nonetheless, we probably will not see a return of collateral velocity to 2007 levels because stricter capital regulations will still be in place. What About Currency Swaps? Some have argued that this removal of cash could also lead to an appreciation of the U.S. dollar. In particular, Zoltan Pozsar of Credit Suisse has observed a correlation between U.S. bank reserves and FX basis swap spreads.7 There is also a strong correlation between FX swap spreads and the U.S. dollar (Chart II-18). Chart II-18FX Basis Swap And Reserves FX Basis Swap And Reserves FX Basis Swap And Reserves One possible chain of events is that, as the Fed drains cash from the market, there will be less liquidity in the FX swap market. Basis swap spreads will widen as a result, and this will cause the dollar to appreciate. In this framework, the unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet will put upward pressure on the U.S. dollar. However, it is also possible that the chain of causation runs in the other direction. The BIS has proposed a model8 where a stronger dollar weakens the capital positions of bank balance sheets. This causes them to back away from providing liquidity to the FX swap market, leading to wider basis swap spreads. In this model, a strong dollar leads to wider basis swap spreads and not the reverse. If this is the correct direction of causation, then we should not expect any impact on the dollar from the unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet. At the moment it is impossible to tell which of the above two theories is correct. All we can do is monitor the correlation between reserves, FX basis swap spreads and the dollar going forward. Conclusions: Overall liquidity conditions are reasonably constructive for risk assets at the moment. Financial market and balance sheet liquidity are adequate. Monetary policy is extremely easy, although the low level of money and credit growth underscores that the credit channel of monetary policy is still somewhat impaired and/or constrained relative to the pre-Lehman years. Funding liquidity has recovered from the Great Financial Crisis lows, but it is far from frothy. More intense regulation means that funding liquidity will probably never again be as favorable for risk assets as it was before the crisis. But, hopefully, efforts by the authorities to reduce perceived systemic risk mean that funding liquidity may not be as quick to dry up as was the case in 2008, in the event of another negative shock. Unwinding the Fed's balance sheet represents a risk to investors because QE played such an important role in reducing risk premia in financial markets. However, we believe that the bond market's reaction will be far more important than balance sheet shrinkage. As long as the Fed can limit the bond market damage via forward guidance, then risk assets should take the Fed's unwind in stride. It will be a whole different story, however, if inflation lurches higher. The technical impact of balance sheet unwind on the inner workings of the credit market is very complicated and difficult to forecast. Asset sales could lead to a shortage of short-term high-quality assets. However, this is more a problem in terms of the Fed's ability to raise interest rates than for funding liquidity. A smaller balance sheet could, in fact, improve funding liquidity to the extent that it frees up space on banks' balance sheets. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Ryan Swift Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy 1 D. Domanski, I. Fender and P. McGuire, "Assessing Global Liquidity," BIS Quarterly Review (December 2011). 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Interest Rate Strategy For The Remainder Of 2017," dated July 18, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3 E. Cerutti, S. Claessens and L. Ratnovski, "A Primer on 'Global Liquidity'," CEPR Policy Portal (June 8, 2014). 4 William C. Dudley, "The U.S. Economic Outlook and the Implications for Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of New York (September 07, 2017). 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Unwind," dated September 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 M. Singh, "Collateral Reuse and Balance Sheet Space," IMF Working Paper (May 2017). 7 Alexandra Scaggs, "Where would you prefer your balance sheet: Banks, or the Federal Reserve?" Financial Times Alphaville (April 13, 2017). 8 S. Avdjiev, W. Du, C. Koch, and Hyun S.Shin, "The dollar, bank leverage and the deviation from covered interest parity," BIS Working Papers No.592 (Revised July 2017).

Highlights In this Weekly Report, we present our semi-annual chartbook of the BCA Central Bank Monitors - one of our favorite and long-standing indicators to assess the potential for monetary policy changes. The broad conclusion - the Monitors are all at or above the threshold signaling that tighter monetary policy is required, validating the recent hawkish shift by policymakers. Feature September has been an active month for central bankers. The Bank of Canada hiked rates again, the European Central Bank gave strong hints that a tapering of its asset purchase program will soon be announced, and the Bank of England warned that tighter policy might soon be required. Just last week, the Federal Reserve began the process of reducing its massive balance sheet while also making no changes to its plans to hike interest rates several times over the next year. This is setting up a potential nasty surprise for bond markets. Investors have became deeply skeptical about the possibility of policymakers shifting in a more hawkish direction without an obvious trigger from faster inflation. Yet the global economy is in a synchronized expansion with the largest share of countries operating at (or beyond) full employment since the pre-crisis years. Inflation is in the process of stabilizing, or grinding higher, in most of the major economies. In this Weekly Report, we present our semi-annual chartbook of the BCA Central Bank Monitors - one of our favorite indicators to assess the potential for monetary policy changes. The broad conclusion - the Monitors are all at or above the threshold signaling that tighter policy is required, validating the recent hawkish shift by policymakers (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekGrowing Pressures To Tighten, According To Our Central Bank Monitors Growing Pressures To Tighten, According To Our Central Bank Monitors Growing Pressures To Tighten, According To Our Central Bank Monitors An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors Chart 2Upward Pressure On Global Bond Yields Upward Pressure On Global Bond Yields Upward Pressure On Global Bond Yields The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future monetary policy decisions. The economic data series used to construct the Monitors are not the same for every country, but the list of indicators generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand strength, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc). The data series are standardized and combined to form the Monitors. Readings above the zero line for each Monitor indicate pressures for central banks to raise interest rates, and vice versa. Through the nexus between growth, inflation, and market expectations of future interest rate changes, the Monitors do exhibit broad correlations to government bond yields in the Developed Markets (Chart 2). Currently, the Monitors are all near or above the zero line, providing context for why central bankers have shifted towards a more hawkish bias of late. Actual rate hikes are still not likely over the next few months outside of the Fed and BoC (we remain skeptical on the potential for the BoE to realistically tighten policy). More importantly, the underlying growth and inflation pressures indicated by the Monitors suggest that policymakers will maintain a hawkish bias (or, at best, a neutral tone) in their communications with the markets. One new addition to the individual country sections in this Chartbook are charts showing the Monitors, broken into growth and inflation components. The conclusion from these new charts is that the current level of the overall Monitors is a reflection of strong economic growth in all countries, with the inflation components giving more mixed signals. The Fed Monitor: Neutral For Now, Likely To Head Higher Again Our Fed Monitor has drifted lower over the past several months, and now sits just slightly above the zero line, calling for no imminent need to change U.S. monetary policy (Chart 3A). FOMC members have been sending more balanced messages in their recent speeches, specifically noting the confusing mix of what appears to be a U.S. economy operating at full employment but with slowing core inflation (Chart 3B). Chart 3AU.S.: Fed Monitor U.S.: Fed Monitor U.S.: Fed Monitor Chart 3BNo Spare Capacity In The U.S. No Spare Capacity In The U.S. No Spare Capacity In The U.S. When looking at the breakdown of our Monitor into its main inputs (Chart 3C), the growth component remains in a steady grinding uptrend. The inflation component had softened since the peak earlier this year, but the latest reading shows a slight uptick. Chart 3CPressure On The Fed From U.S. Growth. Is Inflation Next? Pressure On The Fed From U.S. Growth. Is Inflation Next? Pressure On The Fed From U.S. Growth. Is Inflation Next? Looking ahead, we expect realized U.S. inflation, which looks to be stabilizing after the downturn since the spring, to grind higher alongside a steadily expanding U.S. economy. With corporate profits and household incomes expanding, and with leading indicators steadily climbing, there is little reason to expect much sustained slowing of U.S. growth in the next few quarters. The next move in our Fed Monitor will likely be upward. The historical correlations between changes in our Fed Monitor and changes in U.S. Treasury yields suggest that any renewed increase in the Monitor should put more upward pressure on the front end of the yield curve than the back end (Chart 3D). This suggests that Treasury curve would bear-flatten as the market priced in more Fed rate hikes. However, we see a greater near-term risk of a bear-steepening of the curve given the low level of market-based inflation expectations. The Fed will want to see those rise - which will require signs of realized inflation rebounding - before delivering another rate hike, perhaps as soon as December. Chart 3DThe Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To Shorter-Maturity USTs The Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To Shorter-Maturity USTs The Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To Shorter-Maturity USTs BoE Monitor: The Window Is Closing For A Rate Hike Our Bank of England (BoE) Monitor has been in the "tight money required" zone since the end of 2015 and has not signaled a need for easier monetary policy since 2012 (Chart 4A). This is unsurprising with the U.K. economy running beyond full employment for over three years alongside a steady rise in inflation (Chart 4B). Chart 4AU.K.: BoE Monitor U.K.: BoE Monitor U.K.: BoE Monitor Chart 4BTight Capacity In The U.K. Tight Capacity In The U.K. Tight Capacity In The U.K. The after-effects of the Brexit vote last year are still an issue for the U.K. economy and the BoE. The central bank eased monetary policy (rate cuts and QE) after the Brexit shock as insurance against the massive economic uncertainty. Yet that not only provided stimulus to an economy that was already operating beyond full employment, but also resulted in a 16% peak-to-trough decline in the British Pound. The result: a surge in headline U.K. inflation to 2.9%, well above the BoE's 2% target. The BoE sent a hawkish message at the policy meeting earlier this month, signaling that interest rates would have to rise if growth evolves in line with their forecasts. We are skeptical on that front: U.K. leading economic indicators have rolled over, real income growth has stagnated due the high inflation, and business confidence continues to be dragged down by Brexit uncertainties. Also, the greater stability in the trade-weighted Pound - now essentially flat versus year-ago levels - should result in some cooling off of the currency-driven surge in inflation, which the inflation component of our BoE Monitor is already signaling (Chart 4C). Chart 4CThe Inflation Component Of The BoE Monitor Has Collapsed The Inflation Component Of The BoE Monitor Has Collapsed The Inflation Component Of The BoE Monitor Has Collapsed We remain neutral on Gilts, as we expect the BoE to remain on hold and not follow through on their recent hawkish commentary (Chart 4D). Chart 4DThe Gilt/BoE Monitor Correlations Are Higher At The Long-End The Gilt/BoE Monitor Correlations Are Higher At The Long-End The Gilt/BoE Monitor Correlations Are Higher At The Long-End ECB Monitor: On Course For A 2018 Taper Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor has steadily climbed over the course of 2017 and now sits right on the zero line (Chart 5A). The solid and broad-based economic expansion in the Euro Area has soaked up spare capacity. The unemployment rate has fallen to an 8-year low of 9.1%, suggesting that the Euro Area economy is very close to full employment for the first time since the Great Recession (Chart 5B). Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BExcess Capacity In Europe Dwindling Fast Excess Capacity In Europe Dwindling Fast Excess Capacity In Europe Dwindling Fast Against that strong growth backdrop, core inflation has been grinding higher off the lows, but at 1.4% remains below the ECB 2% target for headline inflation. When looking at the components of our ECB Monitor, however, rising inflation pressures have been as important a reason behind the pickup in the Monitor as stronger growth (Chart 5C). Chart 5CGrowth Has Pushed The ECB Monitor Higher This Year Growth Has Pushed The ECB Monitor Higher This Year Growth Has Pushed The ECB Monitor Higher This Year The deflation threat that prompted the ECB to begin its own asset purchase program in 2015 has passed, and we expect the ECB to announce a tapering of the bond buying starting in January 2018. If growth and inflation evolve according to the ECB's forecasts - which is likely barring an additional major surge in the euro from current elevated levels - then there is a good chance that the asset purchase program will be wound down by the end of 2018. Interest rate hikes are still some time away, though. The market is currently discounting a first 25bp ECB rate hike around October 2019. We agree with that pricing, as the ECB will "follow the Fed playbook" and not begin rate hikes until well after the end of the asset purchase program. We remain underweight Euro Area government debt, with a bias towards bear-steepening of yield curves as inflation expectations should steadily climb higher and the ECB keeps policy rates unchanged (Chart 5D). Chart 5DStronger Bond/ECB Monitor Correlations At The Short-End Stronger Bond/ECB Monitor Correlations At The Short-End Stronger Bond/ECB Monitor Correlations At The Short-End BoJ Monitor: Creeping Higher, Surprisingly The Bank of Japan (BoJ) Monitor has steadily climbed throughout 2017 and now sits right on the zero line (Chart 6A). While overall inflation rates remain well below the 2% BoJ target, the steady economic expansion has absorbed spare economic capacity, with the unemployment rate now down to a mere 2.8% (Chart 6B). Both the growth and inflation components of our BoJ Monitor have been rising (Chart 6C). Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Japan: BoJ Monitor Japan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BTight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation While the pickup in inflation off the lows is a welcome sight for the BoJ, there is no immediate pressure to shift to a less accommodative policy stance (Chart 6D). In fact, the central bank has already done its own version of a "taper" by moving to a 0% yield target on JGBs one year ago. Maintaining that yield level has required a slower pace of asset purchases by the central bank, which are running at an annualized pace of 70 trillion yen so far in 2017, below the 80 trillion yen target for the current QE program. Chart 6CTight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation We do not see the BoJ abandoning the 0% yield target anytime soon. By depressing JGB yields, the BoJ hopes to engineer additional weakness in the yen which will feed through into faster inflation and rising inflation expectations. This appears to be the only way to generate any inflation in Japan, even with such a low unemployment rate. Chart 6DLow Correlations Between the BoJ Monitor & JGB Yields Low Correlations Between the BoJ Monitor & JGB Yields Low Correlations Between the BoJ Monitor & JGB Yields It will require a rise in Japanese core inflation back towards 2% before the BoJ will even begin to discuss any real tapering of its QE program. Thus, JGBs will remain a low-beta "safe-haven" among Developed Market government bonds, where there is greater risk of central bank tightening actions that will push yields higher. Remain overweight. BoC Monitor: More Tightening To Come The Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has been comfortably above the zero line throughout 2017 (Chart 7A). The Canadian economy has shown robust growth, which has soaked up spare capacity (Chart 7B). The BoC is projecting that the output gap in Canada will likely be fully closed before the end of this year. The surprising surge in growth is likely to continue given the strength in the leading economic indicators and the robust readings from the BoC's own Business Outlook Survey. Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Canada: BoC Monitor Canada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BStill Not Much Inflation In Canada Still Not Much Inflation In Canada Still Not Much Inflation In Canada The central bank has already responded to the faster-than-expected pace of growth with two 25bps rate hikes since July. This took place even without much of a pick-up in realized inflation or in the inflation component of our BoC Monitor (Chart 7C). Clearly, the BoC is focusing more on the rapidly accelerating economy, with real GDP growth surging to a 3.7% year-over-year pace in Q2. With the BoC Overnight Rate still at a very low level of 1%, well below the central bank's own estimate of the neutral "terminal" rate of 3%, there is room for additional rate hikes as long as growth remains robust. Chart 7CRising Growth Pressures On The BoC, Still No Inflation Rising Growth Pressures On The BoC, Still No Inflation Rising Growth Pressures On The BoC, Still No Inflation The surging Canadian dollar is not yet a concern for the BoC, as this reflects both the improving Canadian economy and the Fed taking a pause on its own rate hiking cycle. With the latter poised to resume in December and continue into 2018, the appreciation of the "Loonie" is likely to cool off, even if the BoC keeps raising rates. We have maintained an underweight stance on Canadian bonds, with a curve flattening bias, since mid-year (Chart 7D). We are sticking with that stance, even with the market now priced for nearly 70bps of additional rate hikes over the next year. If the Canadian economy continues to grow rapidly, and the Fed returns to hiking rates, the BoC can tighten to levels beyond current market pricing. Chart 7DA Rising BoC Monitor Typically Leads To A Flatter Canadian Yield Curve A Rising BoC Monitor Typically Leads To A Flatter Canadian Yield Curve A Rising BoC Monitor Typically Leads To A Flatter Canadian Yield Curve RBA Monitor: Conflicting Forces Our Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Monitor remains in "tighter policy required" territory (Chart 8A). Core inflation has picked up slightly, dragging market expectations along with it, but headline price growth has declined below 2% (Chart 8B). However, commodity prices continue to ease, survey-based measures of inflation expectations have pulled back and the inflation component of the RBA Monitor has retreated from the highs (Chart 8C). Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Australia: RBA Monitor Australia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BNo Inflation Pressures On The RBA No Inflation Pressures On The RBA No Inflation Pressures On The RBA The RBA is facing conflicting forces of an improving labor market and booming house prices, combined with high consumer indebtedness and nonexistent real wage growth. Though employment growth has recently spiked, part time employment as a percentage of total is just starting to roll over and underemployment remains elevated. Labor market conditions will need to tighten considerably for wages to rise and consumer confidence to recover. A wide output gap, mixed employment backdrop and a lack of inflation pressure will likely keep the policymakers on hold for longer than the market expects. Chart 8CRBA Facing Surging Growth Pressures & Cooling Inflation Pressures BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: The Less Dovish Rhetoric Is Justified BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: The Less Dovish Rhetoric Is Justified We are currently at a neutral stance on Australian government bonds, given the mixed economic backdrop. Instead, we prefer to maintain our 2yr/10yr yield curve flattener trade. The short end will remain anchored by an inactive RBA, with the long end facing downward pressure from soft inflation expectations and macro-prudential measures in the housing market dampening credit growth. Even if the RBA were to tighten policy as markets expect, the yield curve would flatten. Additionally, negative correlations between Australian yield curves and the RBA monitor have been more robust in the post-crisis era (Chart 8D). As labor markets continue to improve, the other components of the Monitor, such as wages, retail sales and consumer confidence, will follow. Chart 8DThe Entire Australian Curve Is Highly Correlated To Our RBA Monitor The Entire Australian Curve Is Highly Correlated To Our RBA Monitor The Entire Australian Curve Is Highly Correlated To Our RBA Monitor RBNZ Monitor: Rate Hikes Are Needed Our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Monitor has been the strongest of all our Monitors, and is currently well into "tight money required" territory" (Chart 9A). The solid New Zealand economic expansion has fully absorbed spare capacity, and both headline core inflation are accelerating towards the RBNZ target (Chart 9B). Both the inflation and growth components are surging, contributing to the overall sharp rise in the RBNZ Monitor (Chart 9C). Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor New Zealand: RBNZ Monitor New Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BFull Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Full Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Full Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ So with growth and inflation looking perkier, why has the RBNZ not delivered on rate hikes this year? They central bank has highlighted "international uncertainties" related to geopolitical risks as well as trade tensions between China and the U.S. that could spill over into New Zealand exports to Asia. The central bank has also shown caution in its own growth and inflation forecasts, despite the signs of strength. Chart 9CHow Much Longer Can The RBNZ Ignore This? How Much Longer Can The RBNZ Ignore This? How Much Longer Can The RBNZ Ignore This? More likely, the RBNZ has been actively trying to avoid an unwanted surge in the currency that could derail the economy. Given the elevated geopolitical tensions with North Korea, it is likely that the RBNZ will stick with a dovish message - especially given the recent pickup in the currency. We have been running long positions in New Zealand government debt versus U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds in our Tactical Overlay portfolio since May. We've been heeding the commentary of the central bank rather than our own RBNZ Monitor, although the divergence between the two is becoming unsustainable (Chart 9D). The Q3 CPI inflation report due in October will be critical to assess the RBNZ's next move. We are sticking with our recommended trades, for now. Chart 9DNZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Growth & Inflation Pressures NZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Growth & Inflation Pressures NZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Growth & Inflation Pressures Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: The Less Dovish Rhetoric Is Justified BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: The Less Dovish Rhetoric Is Justified Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Fed vs. BoE: U.S. inflation data is stabilizing, while financial conditions continue to ease. The market is underestimating the potential for the Fed to hike rates again, perhaps as soon as December. At the same time, markets have priced in too many rate hikes in the U.K., with the Bank of England's growth and inflation forecasts unlikely to be realized. USTs vs. Gilts: Maintain an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration tilt, while keeping an underweight stance on U.S. Treasuries and a neutral bias towards Gilts. Look to upgrade Gilts on any additional spread widening versus Treasuries or core Europe. Duration Checklists: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop for growth, inflation and investor risk appetite remains bearish for U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure to both markets on a medium-term basis. Feature Inflation: Waking Up In The U.S., Peaking Out In The U.K. The bull market in risk assets remains powerful. Investors have shrugged off the worries about U.S. hurricanes and geopolitical tensions and have returned to focusing on the global growth and inflation backdrop. The fact that the S&P 500 could close at a new all-time high just above 2500 last Friday, shortly after another North Korean missile launch and a terrorist attack on the London Underground, speaks volumes about the renewed confidence (or is it hubris?) of investors. For bond markets, two events stood out - the firming read on August U.S. CPI inflation data and the surprisingly hawkish commentary from the Bank of England (BoE). We advise that investors pay more attention to the former and fade the latter. The U.S. inflation data is far more important, as it showed a decent rise in core inflation after five months of very weak prints (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekUSTs At Risk From A Rebound In Inflation USTs At Risk From A Rebound In Inflation USTs At Risk From A Rebound In Inflation A rebound in inflation is critical to our call for U.S. bond yields to rise over the next 6-12 months, as it would bring Fed rate hikes back into play. Right now, there is still a significant gap between market expectations for the fed funds rate by the end of 2018 and the current FOMC projection ("dot"). If the latest inflation data is the beginning of a sustained period of faster monthly price increases, then there is room for investors to reprice their expectations for both inflation and the funds rate (bottom two panels). There is a risk that the median FOMC rate projection for next year comes down a bit when the new "dots" are released after this week's FOMC meeting. Although with market-based inflation expectations firming, and survey-based measures holding steady near the Fed's 2% target amid easing financial conditions, the FOMC may choose to hold steady and wait to see if the August inflation data is the beginning of a trend - especially with the Fed set to announce the timing and details of the reduction of its balance sheet at this week's meeting. Downgrading interest rate expectations while also starting the unwind of the balance sheet could send a confusing message to markets. At the same time, any shift to a more hawkish or less dovish message from the Fed would be taken negatively by the Treasury market. The experience of Gilts last week is a warning sign about how unprepared investors are for a change in tone from central bankers. The language in the statement released after last week's BoE Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting suggested that a rate hike may come within the next few months if U.K. economic growth evolves along the lines of the MPC's forecasts. That was enough to trigger a bear-flattening move in the Gilt curve, with the markets quickly pricing in one full additional rate hike by the BoE over the next year (Chart 2, second panel). A similar move could happen if the Fed were to send any new hawkish signals, although that is unlikely to occur at this week's FOMC meeting. We see a greater potential for the Fed's forecasts to be realized than the BoE's over the next year. Financial conditions have eased and leading indicators are still pointing to a reacceleration in U.S. growth in the coming months. The impact of the hurricanes in Texas and Florida will be a drag on growth in the 3rd quarter of this year, but this will not be enough to materially impact the Fed's growth forecasts for 2018. Meanwhile, the inflationary backdrop for the U.S. may finally be bottoming out, for a few reasons: 1. Our CPI diffusion index rising back above the 50 line in August (Chart 3, top panel), although additional gains will be necessary to herald a more sustained rise in core inflation. Chart 2Markets Have Bet Heavily##BR##On Central Bank Inaction Markets Have Bet Heavily On Central Bank Inaction Markets Have Bet Heavily On Central Bank Inaction Chart 3U.S. Inflation##BR##Stabilizing? U.S. Inflation Stabilizing? U.S. Inflation Stabilizing? 2. The U.S. labor market continues to tighten, with the gap between the "jobs plentiful" minus "jobs hard to get" indices from the Conference Board's consumer confidence survey widening to the widest level since 2001 (2nd panel), putting upward pressure on wage growth. 3. One of the biggest sources of the surprising downturn in core inflation seen in 2017, the plunge in wireless phone prices back in the spring, has fully stabilized (3rd panel). That decline alone represented a drag on the rate of inflation for core CPI services (excluding shelter) of 1.2 percentage points (bottom panel), and on overall core CPI inflation of around 35bps - ½ of the total decline in core CPI inflation since January. As the impact of that collapse in wireless charges falls out of the inflation data in the coming months, the drag on core CPI will fade. There is now a much better chance for the Fed's inflation forecasts to be realized next year, especially once the impact of a weaker dollar (and higher energy prices) is taken into account. While some of the doves on the FOMC may downgrade their inflation forecasts this week, a major reduction is unlikely in the absence of signs of a weakening U.S. labor market or renewed strength in the U.S. dollar. The U.S. backdrop contrasts sharply with what is going on in the U.K. While the labor market is even tighter there than in the U.S., the current upturn in U.K. inflation has also occurred alongside a sharp depreciation of the Pound since the 2016 Brexit vote (Chart 4). The currency has stabilized over the course of this year, with the year-over-year change in the BoE's trade-weighted index now nearly flat (bottom panel). Against this backdrop, inflation is more likely to peak out than reaccelerate from current levels. A similar argument can be made for the U.K. economy. Leading economic indicators have rolled over, while actual real GDP growth has decelerated (Chart 5, 3rd panel). Consumer confidence has steadily declined as the currency-driven inflation increase has eroded real income growth. This has created a very odd divergence between falling confidence and an increased market expectation for BoE rate hikes over the next year, which typically move in unison (bottom panel). Add in the ongoing uncertainties over Brexit that continue to weigh on business confidence and investment spending, and it is far more likely that the U.K. economy will lag versus the BoE's forecasts. Chart 4Currency Impact On U.K. Inflation Is Fading Currency Impact On U.K. Inflation Is Fading Currency Impact On U.K. Inflation Is Fading Chart 5Why Should The BoE Hike? Why Should The BoE Hike? Why Should The BoE Hike? For now, we are maintaining our recommended neutral allocation on Gilts in our model bond portfolio. Although we would view any additional widening in yield spreads between Gilts and U.S. Treasuries and core European yields as an opportunity to move to overweight. Simply put, the odds are far greater that the Fed's economic and inflation forecasts for the next year will be realized than those of the BoE, suggesting that there is more upside risk for yields in Treasuries than Gilts. Bottom Line: U.S. inflation data is stabilizing, while financial conditions continue to ease. The market is underestimating the potential for the Fed to hike rates again, perhaps as soon as December. At the same time, markets have priced in too many rate hikes in the U.K., with the Bank of England's growth and inflation forecasts unlikely to be realized. Maintain an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration tilt, while keeping an underweight stance on U.S. Treasuries and a neutral bias towards Gilts. Look to upgrade Gilts on any additional spread widening versus Treasuries or core Europe. Duration Checklist Update Back in February of this year, we introduced a list of indicators we need to monitor to determine if our recommended defensive duration stance on U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds was still warranted.1 These "Duration Checklists" combined data on overall global growth, as well as U.S. and Euro Area economic activity, inflation, investor risk-seeking behavior and technical positioning on government bonds. At the time, the Checklists were almost unanimous in pointing to a period of rising bond yields based on an improving growth profile and slowly rising inflation pressures. We updated the Checklists in May and, for the most part, the majority of the indicators were still flagging more upward pressures on yields, although some series on global growth and inflation had softened.2 With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that these factors - especially the pullback in U.S. inflation pressures - were enough to trigger a significant bond rally. With the U.S. inflation downdraft now in the process of stabilizing, as discussed earlier, this is now a good opportunity to revisit our Duration Checklists to assess the current backdrop for bond yields. The broad conclusion is that the majority of the indicators are still pointing to higher bond yields in the months ahead (Table 1). Table 1A Bearish Message From Our Duration Checklists Follow The Fed, Ignore The Bank Of England Follow The Fed, Ignore The Bank Of England Global economic activity indicators are mixed, but may be bottoming. The global leading economic indicator (LEI) continues to rise, heralding a continuation of the current economic uptrend (Chart 6). The breadth of that advance, however, is fading with our LEI diffusion index having fallen below the 50 line, meaning that there are more countries with a falling LEI. The global ZEW indicator of investor sentiment is also trending downward, another factor weighing on yields. The near-term dynamics on growth are starting to shift more bearishly for bonds, however, with the global data surprise index rising and the latest read on our Global Credit Impulse indicator ticking upward. We are giving a "check" to 3 of the 5 global growth elements in our Duration Checklists (LEI, data surprises, Credit Impulse), which represents a bond-bearish shift from the last update of the Checklists in May when only the LEI warranted a "check". Domestic economic growth in the U.S. and Euro Area is solid. Manufacturing PMIs in both the U.S. (the ISM index) and Europe are rising, as is consumer and business confidence (Charts 7 & 8). The latter is not surprising given the strong growth in corporate profits on both sides of the Atlantic that our models expect will continue. This bodes well for future growth momentum, as firms will not be forced to retrench on hiring and investment spending to protect profitability. We are giving a "check" to all domestic growth components of our Duration Checklists, highlighting that the economic backdrop remains bond bearish. Chart 6Yields Are Exposed To##BR##Improving Global Growth Yields Are Exposed To Improving Global Growth Yields Are Exposed To Improving Global Growth Chart 7A Solid U.S.##BR##Economic Expansion A Solid U.S. Economic Expansion A Solid U.S. Economic Expansion Chart 8European Growth Momentum##BR##Is Bearish For Bunds European Growth Momentum Is Bearish For Bunds European Growth Momentum Is Bearish For Bunds Realized inflation has dipped, but the worst looks to be over. In our Checklists, we include measures on energy prices, labor market tightness and wage inflation as the primary inflation indicators to monitor. On that front, the story still looks fairly benign for U.S. inflation given the dip in wage inflation measures like Average Hourly Earnings growth and the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker (Chart 9). The unemployment gap (unemployment rate vs. NAIRU) is still negative, and other wage measures like the wage & salaries component Employment Cost Index are steadily expanding, suggesting that the underlying wage dynamics in the U.S. may not be as slow as indicated by Average Hourly Earnings. In the Euro Area, wage growth has accelerated above 2%, occurring alongside a grinding increase in core inflation and an unemployment gap that is almost fully closed (Chart 10). Meanwhile, the downward momentum in the growth of energy prices - denominated in both dollars and euros - has bottomed out after the sharp decline since the beginning of the year, although the rebound has been tepid so far (top panel of Charts 9 & 10). Chart 9Not Much Inflationary##BR##Pressures On UST Yields Not Much Inflationary Pressures on UST Yields Not Much Inflationary Pressures on UST Yields Chart 10Core Inflation & Wages Are##BR##Grinding Higher In Europe Core Inflation & Wages Are Grinding Higher In Europe Core Inflation & Wages Are Grinding Higher In Europe The most significant divergences between the regions exist within the inflation elements of our Checklists. For wage growth, we are giving an "x" to the U.S. but a "check" to Europe. For the unemployment gap, we are giving a "check" to both regions. For energy prices, however, we are not giving any indication (a "?") until we see more decisive evidence of a sustained acceleration that is pressuring headline inflation rates even higher. Both the Fed and ECB are biased to remove monetary accommodation. The Fed is in the midst of a rate-hiking cycle that began in late 2015, and is now about to begin the long process of shrinking its swollen balance sheet. The ECB has been slowly preparing the market for a shift to a slower pace of asset purchases, although rate hikes are still at least a couple of years away. For both central banks, we are giving a "check" for having a more hawkish/less dovish policy bias that is not bullish for bonds. Investors remain in risk-seeking mode. The way that we interpret investor risk aversion in the Checklists is if growth-sensitive risk assets like equities and corporate credit are rallying, then this is bearish for government bonds. The logic here is that private investor demand for Treasuries and Bunds is diminished when risk assets are rallying, as long as equities are not stretched to a point where the risks of a correction are elevated (i.e. indices trading 10% above their 200-day moving average). Also, the easing of financial conditions stemming from rallying stock and credit markets is a boost to growth that central banks will likely respond to by becoming less accommodative. From that perspective, the persistent bull markets in equities and corporate credit on both sides of the Atlantic are bearish for Treasuries (Chart 11) and Bunds (Chart 12). With stocks not looking stretched versus the medium-term trend and with volatility remaining low, all the related elements of our Checklists earn a "check". Chart 11Still A Pro-Risk Bias##BR##Among U.S. Investors Still A Pro-Risk Bias Among U.S. Investors Still A Pro-Risk Bias Among U.S. Investors Chart 12Still A Pro-Risk Bias##BR##Among Euro Area Investors Still A Pro-Risk Bias Among Euro Area Investors Still A Pro-Risk Bias Among Euro Area Investors Bond yields do not look stretched to the upside from a technical perspective. The Treasury sell-off from the 2017 peak back in March has pushed the 10-year yield back below its 200-day moving average, while also boosting the 6-month total return into positive territory (Chart 13). There is also a persistent net long position in 10-year Treasury futures (bottom panel). Add it all up and the technical backdrop for Treasuries is stretched in a way pointing to greater near-term risks of higher yields. In Europe, momentum measures all look neutral (Chart 14) and are no impediment to rising yields. We give all technical elements of our Duration Checklists a "check". Chart 13UST Rally Since March##BR##Is Looking Stretched UST Rally Since March Is Looking Stretched UST Rally Since March Is Looking Stretched Chart 14Neutral Technical##BR##Backdrop For Bunds Neutral Technical Backdrop For Bunds Neutral Technical Backdrop For Bunds Net-net, the Checklists show that the majority of indicators are still pointing to a bond-bearish backdrop. The only bond-bullish factors are the soft inflation readings in the U.S. although that may be in the process of shifting, as discussed earlier. There is not a major difference in the number of checkmarks for both the U.S. and Euro Area Checklists, thus we see no reason to favor either market from a relative perspective - there is pressure for both Treasury and Bund yields to rise. Thus, we are maintaining our recommended below-benchmark medium-term duration stance in both the U.S. and core Europe within hedged global bond portfolios. Chart 15UST Yields Have More Near-Term Upside UST Yields Have More Near-Term Upside UST Yields Have More Near-Term Upside From a shorter-term tactical perspective, however, we see more upside for Treasury yields vs Bunds with U.S. economic data surprising to the upside at a faster pace than in Europe (Chart 15). Throw in the potential for U.S. inflation to also rise above depressed expectations and a wider Treasury-Bund spread - a trade that we currently have in our Tactical Overlay portfolio and which goes against the tightening currently priced into the forwards - is the more likely outcome in the next few months. Bottom Line: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop for growth, inflation and investor risk appetite remains bearish for U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure to both markets on a medium-term basis. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasuries & German Bunds", dated February 15th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Fade The "Trump Fade"", dated May 23rd 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Follow The Fed, Ignore The Bank Of England Follow The Fed, Ignore The Bank Of England Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Feature Valuations, whether for currencies, equities, or bonds, are always at the top of the list of the determinants of any asset's long-term performance. This means that after large FX moves like those experienced this year, it is always useful to pause and reflect on where currency valuations stand. In this context, this week we update our set of long-term valuation models for currencies that we introduced in February 2016 in a Special Report titled, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets". Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials and proxies for global risk aversion.1 The models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G10 and EM FX markets. Twice a year, we provide clients with a comprehensive update on all of these long-term models in one stop. These models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their purpose is therefore threefold. First, they provide guideposts to judge whether we are at the end, beginning, or middle of a long-term currency cycle. Second, by providing strong directional signals, the models help us judge whether any given move is more likely be a countertrend development or not, offering insight on potential longevity. Finally, they assist us and our clients in cutting through the fog and understanding the key drivers of cyclical variations in a currency's value. The U.S. Dollar Chart 1The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone After its large 7.5% fall in trade-weighted terms since the end of 2016, the real effective dollar is now trading at a 2% discount vis-à-vis its fair value based on its principal long-term drivers - real yield differentials and relative productivity between the U.S. and its trading partners (Chart 1). The U.S. dollar's equilibrium - despite having been re-estimated higher earlier this year due to upward revisions by the Conference Board to its U.S. productivity series - has flattened as of late, as real rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world have declined. While 2017 has been an execrable year for dollar bulls, glimmers of hope remain. First, the handicap created by expensive valuations has been purged. Second, the excessive bullishness toward the greenback that prevailed earlier this year has morphed into deep pessimism. Third, U.S. real interest rates have fallen as investor doubts that the Federal Reserve will be able to increase interest rates as much as it wants to in the face of paltry inflation have surged. However, the U.S. economy is strong and at full capacity, suggesting that inflation will hook back up at the end of 2017 and in the first half of 2018. This should once again lift the U.S. interest rate curve, the dollar's fair value, and the dollar itself. That being said, this story is unlikely to become fully relevant over the next three months. The Euro Chart 2The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising On a multi-year time horizon, the euro is driven by the relative productivity trend of the euro area with its trading partners, its net international investment position, terms-of-trade shocks and rate differentials. Thanks to its powerful rally this year, the euro's discount to its fair value has narrowed from 7% in February to 6% today (Chart 2). This narrowing is not as great as the rally in the trade-weighted euro itself as its fair value has also improved, mainly thanks to continued improvement in the euro area's net international position - a development driven by the euro zone's current account of 3% of GDP. Nonetheless, the EUR's current discount to fair value is still not in line with previous bottoms, such as those experienced in both early 1985 or in 2002. We do expect a new wave of weakness in the EUR to materialize toward the end of the year and in early 2018 as markets once again move to discount much more aggressive tightening by the Fed than what will be executed by the European Central Bank: U.S. inflation is set to move back towards the Fed's target, but European inflation will remain hampered by the large amount of labor market slack still prevalent in the European periphery. What's more, euro area inflation is about to suffer from the lagged effects of the tightening in financial conditions that have been created by a higher euro. However, the fact that the euro's fair value has increased implies it is now very unlikely for the EUR/USD to hit parity this cycle. The Yen Chart 3The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The yen's long-term equilibrium is a function of Japan's net international investment position, global risk aversion, and commodity prices. The JPY discount to this fair value has deepened this year, despite the fall in USD/JPY from 118 to 108 (Chart 3). This is mainly because the euro and EM as well as commodity currencies have all appreciated against the Japanese currency. Low domestic inflation has been an additional factor that has depressed the Japanese real effective exchange rate. While valuations point to a higher yen in the coming year, this will be difficult to achieve. The Bank of Japan remains committed to boosting Japanese inflation expectations. To generate such a shock to expectations, the BoJ will have to keep policy at massively accommodative levels for an extended period. As global growth remains robust, global bond yields should experience some upside over the next 12 months. With JGB yields capped by the Japanese central bank, this will create downside for the yen. However, because the yen is so cheap, it is likely to occasionally rally furiously each time a risk-off event, such as any additional North Korean provocations, puts temporary downward pressure on global yields. The British Pound Chart 4The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The pound has fallen 6% against the euro this year, the currency of its largest trading partner. This has dragged down the GBP's real effective exchange rate to a large 11% discount to its fair value, the largest since the direct aftermath of the Brexit vote (Chart 4). Because Great Britain has entered a paradigm shift - the exit from the European Union will change the nature of the U.K. relationship on 43% of its trade - assessing where the pound's fair value lies is a more nebulous exercise than normal. However, signs are present that the pound is indeed cheap. British inflation remains perky, the current account has narrowed to 4% of GDP, and despite large regulatory uncertainty, net FDI into the U.K. has hit near record highs of 7% of GDP. Movements in cable are likely to remain a function of the gyrations in the U.S. dollar. However, at this level of valuation, the pound is attractive against the euro on a long-term basis. We had a target on EUR/GBP at 0.93, which was hit two weeks ago. This cross is likely to experience downside for the next 12 months. The biggest risk for the pound remains British politics - and not Brexit itself but its aftershock. The EU has made clear the transition process will be long, leaving time for the British economy to adjust. However, the conservative party has been greatly weakened, and Jeremy Corbyn's popularity is increasing. This raises the specter that, in the not-so-distant future, a Labour government could be formed. Under Corbyn's leadership, this would be the most left-of-center administration in any G10 country since François Mitterrand became French president in 1981. The early years of the Mitterrand presidency were marked by a sharp decline in the franc as he nationalized broad swaths of the French private sector, increased taxes and implemented inflationary policies. Keep this in mind. The Canadian Dollar Chart 5The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The loonie's fair value is driven by commodity prices, relative productivity trends, and the Canadian net international position. In February, the CAD was trading in line with its fair value. However, after its blistering rally since May, when the Bank of Canada began to hint that policy could be tightened this year, the Canadian dollar is now expensive vis-à-vis its long-term fundamental drivers (Chart 5). In a Special Report two months ago, we argued that the BoC was one of the major global central banks best placed to increase interest rates.2 With the Canadian economy firing on all cylinders, and with the output gap closing faster than the BoC anticipated in its July Monetary Policy Statement, the two interest rate hikes recorded this year so far make sense, and another one is likely to materialize in December. However, while the CAD could continue to rise until then, traders have moved from being massively short the CAD to now holding very sizeable net long positions. Additionally, interest rate markets are now discounting more than two hikes in Canada over the next 12 months, while expecting less than one full hike in the U.S. over the same time frame. If this scenario were to pan out, the tightening in monetary conditions emanating from a massive CAD rally would likely choke the Canadian recovery. Instead, we expect U.S. rates to increase more than what is currently embedded in interest rate markets, thus limiting the downside in USD/CAD. We prefer to continue betting on a rising loonie over the next 12 months by buying it against the euro and the Australian dollar. The Australian Dollar Chart 6The AUD Is Very Expensive The AUD Is Very Expensive The AUD Is Very Expensive The fair value of the Aussie is driven by Australia's net international position and commodity prices. Even with the tailwind of stronger metal prices, the AUD's rallies have been beyond what fundamentals justify, leaving it at massively overvalued levels (Chart 6). This suggests the AUD is at great risk of poor performance over the next 24 months. Timing the beginning of this decline is trickier, and valuations offer limited insight. One of the key factors that has supported the AUD has been the large increase in fiscal and public infrastructure spending in China this year - a move by Beijing most likely designed to support the economy in preparation for the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, where the new members of the Politburo are designated. As this event will soon move into the rearview mirror, China may abandon its aggressive support of the industrial and construction sectors - two key consumers of Australia's exports. The other tailwind behind the AUD has been the very supportive global liquidity backdrop. Global reserves growth has increased, dollar-based liquidity has expanded and generalized risk-taking in global financial markets has generated large inflows into EM and commodity plays.3 While U.S. inflation remains low and investors continue to price in a shy Fed, these conditions are likely to stay in place. However, a pick-up in U.S. inflation at the end of the year is likely to force a violent re-pricing of U.S. interest rates and drain much of the global excess liquidity, especially as the Fed will also be shrinking its balance sheet. This is likely to be when the AUD's stretched valuations become a binding constraint. The New Zealand Dollar Chart 7No More Premium In The NZD No More Premium In The NZD No More Premium In The NZD Natural resources prices, real rate differentials and the VIX are the key determinants of the kiwi's fair value, highlighting the NZD's nature as both a commodity currency and a carry currency. Both the fall in the VIX and the rebound in commodities prices are currently causing gradual appreciation in the New Zealand's dollar equilibrium exchange rate. However, despite these improving fundamentals, the real trade-weighted NZD has fallen this year, and now trades in line with its fair value (Chart 7). Explaining this performance, the NZD began 2017 at very expensive levels, even when compared to the already-pricey AUD. Also, despite a very strong New Zealand economy, the Reserve Bank Of New Zealand has disappointed investors by refraining from increasing interest rates, as the expensive currency has tightened monetary conditions on its behalf. Going forward, the recent weakness in the real effective NZD represents a considerable easing of policy, which could warrant higher rates in New Zealand. As a result, while a tightening of global liquidity conditions could hurt the NZD in addition to the AUD, the kiwi is likely to fare better than the much more expensive Aussie, pointing to an attractive shorting opportunity in AUD/NZD over the next 12 months. The Swiss Franc Chart 8The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy Switzerland's enormous and growing net international investment position continues to be the most important factor lifting the fair value of the Swiss franc. The recent sharp rally in EUR/CHF has now pushed the Swissie into decisively cheap territory (Chart 8). The decline in political risk in the euro area along with the lagging economic and inflation performance of the Swiss economy fully justify the discount currently experienced by the Swiss franc: money has flown out of Switzerland, and the Swiss National Bank is doing its utmost to keep monetary policy as easy as it can. For a small open economy like Switzerland, this means keeping the exchange rate at very stimulative levels. The continued growth in the SNB's balance sheet is a testament to the strength of its will. For the time being, there is very little reason to bet against SNB policy; the CHF will remain cheap because the economy needs it. However, this peg contains the seeds of its own demise. The cheaper the CHF gets, the larger the economic distortions in the Swiss economy become. Already, Switzerland sports the most negative interest rates in the world. This directly reflects the large injections of liquidity required from the SNB to keep the CHF down. These low real rates are fueling bubble-like conditions in Switzerland real estate and are threatening the achievability of return targets for Swiss pension plans and insurance companies, forcing dangerous risk-taking. But until core inflation and wage growth can move and stabilize above 1%, these conditions will stay in place. The Swedish Krona Chart 9The Swedish Krona Has More Upside The Swedish Krona Has More Upside The Swedish Krona Has More Upside Even after its recent rebound, the Swedish krona continues to trade cheaply, even if its long-term fair value remains on a secular downward trajectory (Chart 9). Yet the undemanding valuations of the SEK hide a complex picture. It is approximately fairly valued against the GBP and expensive against the NOK, two of its largest trading partners. However, the SEK is cheap against the USD and the euro. We expect the SEK to continue appreciating. While Swedish PMIs have recently softened, the Swedish economy is running well above capacity, and the Riksbank resources utilization indicator suggests the recent surge in inflation has further to run. Moreover, Sweden is in the thralls of a dangerous real-estate bubble that has pushed nonfinancial private-sector debt above 228% of GDP. With many amortization periods on new mortgages now running above 100 years, the Swedish central bank is concerned that further inflating this bubble could result in a milder replay of the debt crisis experienced in the early 1990s. The shift in leadership at the Riksbank's helm at the beginning of 2018 is likely to be the key factor that prompts the beginning of the removal of policy accommodation in that country. We like buying the krona against the euro. The USD/SEK tends to be a high-beta play on the greenback, and thus is very much a call on the USD. However, EUR/SEK displays a much lower correlation, and thus tends to be a more effective medium to isolate the upcoming tightening in monetary policy we expect from the Riksbank. The Norwegian Krone Chart 10The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The Norwegian krone remains the cheapest commodity currency in the world, along with the Colombian peso (Chart 10). The slowdown in Norwegian inflation and a very negative output gap of 2% of GDP implies that the Norges Bank will remain one of the most accommodative central banks in the G10. Thus, the NOK should remain cheap. However, we continue to like buying the krone against the euro. EUR/NOK has only traded above current levels when Brent prices have been below US$40/bbl. Not only is Brent currently trading above US$50/bbl, but the outlook for oil remains bright: production is in control as the agreement between Russian and OPEC is still in place. Additionally, the recent carnage and refinery shutdowns caused by hurricane Harvey should result in large drawdowns to finished-products inventories in the coming months. This will contribute to an anticipated normalization in global excess petroleum inventories, which have been the most important headwind to oil prices. Finally, the fact that the Brent curve is now backwardated also represents a support for oil prices, as this creates a "positive carry" for oil investors. The Yuan Chart 11The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis Despite the recent strength in both the trade-weighted RMB and the yuan versus the U.S. dollar, the renminbi still trades at a discount to its long-term fair value (Chart 11). Confirming this insight, China continues to sport a sizeable current account surplus, and its share of global exports is still on an expanding path. With the RMB being cheap, now that China is once again accumulating reserves instead of spending them to create a floor under its currency, the downside risk to the CNY has decreased significantly. Thus, since the People's Bank of China targets a basket of currencies when setting the yuan's value, to legitimize any bullish view on USD/CNY one needs to have a bullish view on the USD. While we do anticipate the dollar to rally toward the end of the year, our expectation that it will remain flat until then implies that we do not see much upside for now to USD/CNY. However, our bullish medium-term USD view, along with the cheapness of the CNY, suggests that the RMB could continue to appreciate on a trade-weighted basis going forward. While Chinese policymakers have highlighted their desire to make their currency a more countercyclical tool, the recent stability in Chinese inflation implies there is no need to let the CNY depreciate to reflate China. In fact, at this point, elevated PPI readings would argue that the Chinese authorities do have a built-in incentive to let the CNY appreciate on a trade-weighted basis for the coming six to 12 months. The Brazilian Real Chart 12The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity Hampered by poor productivity trends, which weigh on the Brazilian current account balance, the fair value of the real remains quite depressed, even as commodity prices have sharply rebounded since early 2016. In fact, the violent rally in the BRL over the same timeframe has made it one of the most expensive currencies tracked by our models (Chart 12). This level of overvaluation points to poor returns for the BRL on a one-to-two-year basis, however, it gives no clue to timing. The strong sensitivity of the Brazilian real to EM asset prices implies that the BRL is unlikely to weaken significantly so long as EM bonds remain well-bid. Moreover, because the BRL still offers an elevated carry, until U.S. interest rate expectations turn the corner, U.S. market dynamics will continue to put a floor under the real. However, this combination suggests the BRL could become one of the prime casualties of any rebound in U.S. inflation. Such a development would cause global liquidity to fall, hurting EM bonds in the process and making the BRL's high-risk carry much less attractive. Confirming this danger, the fact that the USD/BRL has not been able to breakdown for more than a year despite the weakness in the USD suggests momentum under the BRL is rather weak. The Mexican Peso Chart 13Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury In the direct aftermath of Trump's electoral victory, the Mexican peso quickly became one of the cheapest currencies in the world. However, the peso's 25% rally versus the U.S. dollar since January has eradicated this valuation advantage to the point where it is now one of the most expensive major currencies in the world (Chart 13). As the peso was collapsing through 2016, the Mexican central bank fought back, increasing interest rates. The massive surge in the prime lending rate points to a protracted period of weakness in the growth of nonfinancial private credit, which should weigh on consumption and investment. Actually, the growth in retail sales volumes has already begun to weaken. This could force the Banxico to cut rates, especially as inflation will slow in the face of peso's rebound this year. Lower Mexican rates, in the face of stretched long positioning in MXN by speculators, could be the key to generating a weakening in the peso over the next 12 months. To see real fireworks in the peso, one would need to see a resumption in the U.S. dollar bull market. Mexico has external debt equivalent to 66% of GDP, the highest among large EM nations. This makes the Mexican economy especially vulnerable to a strong dollar, as such a move would imply a massive increase in debt servicing costs. Thus, while the MXN may not be as vulnerable as the BRL, it could still suffer greatly if global liquidity becomes less generous next year. The Chilean Peso Chart 14CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices The Chilean peso real effective exchange rate is driven by the country's productivity trend relative to its trading partners and the real price of copper - which proxies Chilean terms-of-trade. Thanks to the CLP's rally since the winter of 2015, the real peso is at a four-year high and is now in expensive territory (Chart 14). We expect copper to see downside from now until the end of the year, pulling down the CLP with it. Current dynamics in the Chinese real estate market and the Chinese credit cycle, which tend to be leading indicators of industrial metals prices, point to an upcoming selloff. Moreover, Chinese monetary conditions have begun to tighten, and are set to continue doing so. This will weigh on Chinese credit growth and capex, creating headwinds for copper and the peso. That being said, the CLP will likely outperform the BRL and the ZAR. M1 money growth is back in positive territory after contracting last year, while industrial activity seems to have hit a bottom and is now picking up. Moreover, since Chile's economy does not have the credit excesses of its other EM peers, we expect the CLP to show more resilience than other currencies linked to industrial metals. The Colombian Peso Chart 15COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM The real COP's fair value is driven by Colombia's relative productivity trends and the price of oil, the country's main export. The fall in oil prices since the beginning of the year have caused a small decline in the fair value of the COP. Nevertheless, the peso is still one standard deviation below fair value (Chart 15). This partly reflects the premium demanded by investors to compensate for Colombia's large current account deficit of 6.3% of GDP. Overall the COP looks attractive, particularly against other commodity currencies. Historically a discount of 20% or more, like what the peso has today, marks a bottom in the real effective exchange rate. Furthermore, our Commodity and Energy Strategy Service expects Brent prices to climb to US$60/bbl towards the end of year, as OPEC's and Russia's production controls translate into oil inventory drawdowns. This should further increase the value of the COP against the ZAR and the BRL. Domestic dynamics also point to outperformance of the peso against other EM currencies. As opposed to countries like Brazil, where private debt stands at nearly 85% of GDP, Colombia has a more modest 60% leverage ratio - the byproduct of an orthodox banking system. Thus, the peso should be able to withstand a liquidity drawdown in EM better than its peers. The South African Rand Chart 16Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand South Africa's dismal productivity trend continues to be the greatest factor pulling the rand's long-term fair value lower. Due to this adverse trend, while the ZAR has been broadly stable this year, it is now slightly more expensive than it was in February (Chart 16). Not captured by the model, the political risks in South Africa remain elevated, creating a further handicap for the rand. The story behind the ZAR is very similar to the one underpinning the gyrations in the BRL. Both currencies, thanks to their elevated carries and deep liquidity - at least by EM currency standards - will continue to be buoyed by very generous global liquidity conditions. However, global real rates seem dangerously low and could move sharply higher, especially when U.S. inflation picks up at the end of the year and in early 2018. Such a move would cause the currently very supportive reflationary conditions to dissipate. This would put the expensive ZAR in a very precarious position. An additional danger for the ZAR is the price of gold. Gold and precious metals have also benefited from these generous global liquidity conditions. This has helped the South African terms of trade. However, gold is likely to be a key victim if U.S. interest rates rise because it is negatively correlated with both real interest rates and the U.S. dollar. Thus, while we do not see much upside for the expensive ZAR for the time being, it is likely to suffer greatly once U.S. inflation turns around, suggesting the ZAR possesses a very poor risk/reward ratio. The Russian Ruble Chart 17The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The RUB is currently trading at a very large premium to fair value (Chart 17). The risk created by such an overvaluation is only likely to materialize once U.S. inflation turns the corner and U.S. interest rates pick up - a scenario we've mentioned for late 2017 and early 2018. This risk is most pronounced against DM currencies, the U.S. dollar in particular. The RUB remains one of our favorite currencies within the EM space, especially when compared to other EM commodity producers. The Russian central bank is pursuing very orthodox policy, despite the fall in realized inflation, and is maintaining very elevated real interest rates in order to fully tame inflation expectations. Moreover, oil prices are likely to experience upside in the coming months as oil inventories are drawn down. This could result in an increase in the ruble's equilibrium exchange rate, which would help correct some of the RUB's overvaluation. The Korean Won Chart 18KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions The fair value of the Korean won continues to be lifted by the combined effect of lower Asian bond spreads and Korea's current account surplus. Yet, the KRW is trading at an increasingly large discount to its equilibrium (Chart 18). At first glance, this seems highly surprising as global trade is growing at its fastest pace in six years - a situation that always benefits trading nations like South Korea. Instead, political developments are to blame. Not only is North Korea ramping up its tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear devices, but also Seoul is within range of Pyongyang's conventional artillery. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service does not expect the current standoff to result in military conflict. Ultimately, North Korea is no match for the military might of the U.S. and its allies. Moreover, the capacity for Pyongyang's actions to shock financial markets is exhibiting diminishing returns. This suggests the risk premium imbedded in the won should dissipate. However, the won will remain very exposed to dynamics in the USD, global liquidity and global trade. Instead, a lower-risk way for investors to take advantage of the KRW's cheapness is to buy it against the Singapore dollar. While just as exposed to global liquidity as the won, the SGD is currently trading at a premium to fair value. The Philippine Peso Chart 19The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The fair value of the Philippine peso is driven by the country's net international investment position and commodity prices. After falling 6% this year, the real effective PHP now trades at a 13% discount to its fair value (Chart 19). A deteriorating current account, which is now in deficit, has fueled a selloff in the peso, making the Philippine currency one of the worst performing in the EM space. Worryingly, this has occurred alongside faltering foreign exchange reserves. However, the deficit is mainly the mirror image of large capital inflows, fueled by the government's ambitious infrastructure spending. Remittances are growing again and, with a weaker peso, will support consumer spending going forward. Employment had a setback last year, but is growing again. Higher investment and consumer spending will likely push rates up. As inflation rebounded alongside commodity prices last year, it is now at its 3% target. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas will need to rein in inflationary pressures to avoid overheating the economy. While the Philippines economy should expand further, the 'Duterte Discount' remains in place. Negative net portfolio flows reflect negative investor sentiment, as policy uncertainty remains elevated. The Singapore Dollar Chart 20SGD Remains Expensive SGD Remains Expensive SGD Remains Expensive The fair value of the Singapore dollar is driven by commodity prices. This is because the exchange rate is the main policy tool used by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. As a result, when commodity prices rise, which leads to inflationary pressures, MAS tightens policy by spurring appreciation in the SGD. The opposite holds true when commodity prices weaken. Based on this metric, the SGD is currently 4.2% overvalued (Chart 20). Domestically, dynamics are quite mixed. Retail sales have picked up. However, both manufacturing and construction employment are contracting and labor market slack is increasing, pointing to continued subdued wage growth. Additionally, property prices are contracting and vacancy rates are on the rise, led by the commercial property sector. Thus, the recent pickup in inflation could soon vanish, especially as it has been driven by the rebound in oil prices in 2016. This combination suggests that Singapore still needs easy monetary conditions. USD/SGD closely follows the DXY. While the Fed will be able to increase interest rates by more than the 35 basis points priced over the next 24 months, Singapore still needs a lower exchange rate to maintain competitiveness and alleviate deflationary pressures. The Hong Kong Dollar Chart 21The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The HKD remains quite expensive. However, being pegged to the USD, its valuation premium has decreased this year (Chart 21). The fall in the greenback has driven the HKD - which itself has fallen 0.75% versus the U.S. dollar - lower against the CNY and other EM currencies. If the U.S. dollar does resume its uptrend over the next six months, the valuation improvement in the HKD will once again dissipate. However, this does not spell the end of the HKD peg. With reserves of US$414 billion, or 125% of GDP, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has the firepower to support the peg, which has been one of the cornerstones of Hong Kong economic stability since 1983. Instead, the HKMA will tolerate deep deflationary pressures that will cause a fall in the real effective exchange rate. This is the path that Hong Kong picked in the 1990s, and it will be the path followed again in the face of any broad-based USD appreciation. This suggests that Hong Kong real estate prices could experience significant downside in the coming years. The Saudi Riyal Chart 22The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Saudi riyal remains prohibitively expensive, even as its valuation premium has decreased this year (Chart 22). The SAR is afflicted by similar dynamics as the HKD: its peg with the USD means the greenback's gyrations are the main source of variation in the SAR's real effective exchange rate on a cyclical basis. However, on a structural horizon, the fair value of the riyal is dominated by Saudi Arabia's poor productivity. An economy dominated by crude extraction and processing and living on one of the most sizable economic rents in the world, Saudi Arabia has not endured the competitive pressures that are often the source of productivity enhancement in most nations. Additionally, Saudi capital expenditures are heavily skewed to the oil sector, a sector whose output growth has been limited for many decades by natural constraints. We do not believe the current valuation premium in the riyal will force the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority to devalue the SAR versus the USD. Saudi Arabia, like Hong Kong, possesses copious foreign exchange reserves, and growth has improved now that oil prices have rebounded. Additionally, the KSA is also likely to tolerate deflationary pressures. Not only has it done so in the past, but Saudi Arabia imports most of its household products, especially its food needs. A fall in the SAR would cause a large amount of food inflation, representing a massively negative price shock for a very young population. This is a recipe for disaster for the royal family of a country with no democratic outlet. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 For a more detailed discussion of the various variables incorporated in the models, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets", dated February 26, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 For a more detailed discussion on the global liquidity environment, please Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar-Bloc Currencies: More Than Just China", dated August 18, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades

Highlights Beige Book highlights disconnect between inflation words and inflation data. Peak in auto sales is not a harbinger of recession. Capital spending still trending higher. Inflation and inflation surprise will need to move higher before Fed hikes again. Big disconnect between 10-year yield and our fair value model. Feature Disconnect On Inflation Chart 1Beige Book Monitors Support##BR##Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation The Beige Book released on September 6 supports the Fed's base case outlook for the economy and inflation. It also keeps the Fed on track to begin trimming its balance sheet in September and boost rates by another 25 basis points in December if the CPI and PCE inflation readings turn higher. Our quantitative approach to the qualitative data in the Beige Book points to an acceleration in GDP and inflation, less business unease from a rising U.S. dollar, and ongoing improvement in real estate, both commercial and residential (Chart 1). At 64%, the BCA Beige Book Monitor was still near its cycle highs in September, providing further confirmation that economic growth was sturdy in the first two months of Q3. The Fed noted that "the information included in the report was primarily collected before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Gulf Coast." However, there was a mention of the storm's clout based on preliminary assessments of business and banking contacts across several districts. The U.S. dollar should not be much of an issue in the Q3 earnings season, according to the Beige Book. The greenback seems to have faded as a concern for small businesses and bankers, in sharp contrast with 2015 and early 2016 when Beige Book references to a strong dollar surged. The Q3 earnings reporting season will provide corporate managements with another forum to discuss the currency's impact on their operations. The 2% decline in the dollar over the past 12 months suggests that the dollar may even provide a small lift to Q3 results (Chart 1, panel 4). Remarkably, business uncertainty over government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) has moved lower in 2017. The implication is that the business community is largely ignoring the lack of progress by Washington policymakers on Trump's agenda (Chart 1, panel 5). Echoing the market's disagreement with the Fed on inflation, the big disconnect in the Beige Book showed up in the number of inflation words (Chart 1, panel 3). Expressions of inflation dipped between the July and September reports. That said, a wide disconnect remains between the elevated inflation mentions and the soft readings on CPI and PCE. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may soon turn up. Bottom Line: The Beige Book backs the Fed's assertion that the economy will expand around 2% this year and inflation will mount in the coming months, supporting a gradual removal of policy accommodation. Policy uncertainty in Washington and worries over the dollar seem to be fading. The divide between the quantity of inflation words in the Beige Book and measured inflation remains unresolved. Neither the soft data in the Beige Book nor the hard data on the economy suggest that an economic downturn is nigh. Recession Not Imminent Some investors have concluded that the peak in auto sales, a key component of consumer spending on durable goods, suggests that a recession is imminent (Chart 2). We take a different view. Zeniths in consumer durable goods, followed closely by consumer services, were primary harbingers of economic downturns in the post-WWII period. However, expenditures on autos, light trucks and other durables tend to peak seven quarters before the onset of recession. Consumer spending on nondurable goods and services provide less of a warning, topping out just five and four quarters out, respectively. The implication for investors is that the peak in auto sales suggests that a recession is still several years away (Chart 3, panels 1-4). Chart 2Vehicle Sales May##BR##Have Peaked Vehicle Sales May Have Peaked... Vehicle Sales May Have Peaked... Chart 3Consumer Spending And##BR##Housing Prior To Recessions Consumer Spending And Housing Prior To Recessions Consumer Spending And Housing Prior To Recessions Housing investment provides an even earlier indication that a recession is on the horizon (Chart 3, panel-panel 5). Housing peaked 17 quarters before the start of the 2007 recession and 20 quarters, on average, before the onset of the 2001 and 1991 recession. Since the early 1960s, a crest in housing provided seven quarters of warning before a downturn commenced. While housing's contribution to overall economic growth plunged in Q2, we expect housing to provide fuel for the next few years as pent up demand from the depressed household formation rate since the GFC is worked off. The implication from our upbeat view on housing is that the next recession is still several years away. Bottom Line: We expect the next recession to be triggered by an over aggressive Fed, not by imbalances in one of more segments of the economy. It is premature to say that the economy is headed into recession based on a peak in auto sales. Stay long stocks versus bonds, but we recommend that clients be prudent, paring back any overweight positions and holding some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. Business Capital Spending Still Up Elevated readings on capex in the first half of the year should persist into the second half. Corporate managements may be postponing investment decisions until they have more clarity on federal tax policy and the Trump administration's plans for infrastructure investment. In short, corporations continue to struggle with how much and when to spend, rather than whether to invest at all. The key supports for sustained corporate spending stayed in place despite the soft July factory orders report and lackluster C&I loan growth. BCA's model for capex (based on non-residential fixed investment, small business optimism and the speculative-grade default rate) suggests lending is poised to climb on a 12-month basis (Chart 4) despite the softening of C&I loan growth since November 2016. Moreover, the 3.3% month-over-month (m/m) drop in factory orders in July masked an upward revision to orders in June and a substantial 1.0% m/m gain in core orders. Core shipments, which feed directly into GDP, rose 1.2% m/m in July. Almost all of the weakness in orders and shipments in July was linked to a 71% plunge in the volatile aircraft orders segment. BCA's research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles get underway only when businesses see evidence that consumer final demand is on the upswing. Consumer expenditures averaged an above-trend 2.7% in 1H. We anticipate that household spending will continue to improve in the second half of 2017.1 Moreover, recent readings on core durable goods orders and shipments show that the uptrend that began in mid-2016 persists, despite recent monthly wiggles in the data (Chart 5). Chart 4BCA Capex Model Points##BR##To Further Improvement BCA Capex Model Points To Further Improvement BCA Capex Model Points To Further Improvement Chart 5Capital Spending##BR##Remains In An Uptrend Capital Spending Remains In An Uptrend Capital Spending Remains In An Uptrend CEO confidence, still a primary support for capex, recently soared to a 13-year high in Q1, but retreated modestly in Q2. The last reading on this survey was in mid-July, and the dip in sentiment reflects the lack of legislative progress in Washington (Chart 5, top panel). The next CEO survey is set for mid-October. The dip in CEO sentiment in Q2 stands in sharp contrast with the easing of concerns around policy in the Beige Book. Chart 6Surprising Drop In Policy##BR##Uncertainty This Year Surprising Drop In Policy Uncertainty This Year Surprising Drop In Policy Uncertainty This Year Surprisingly, the chaos in Washington during the first eight months of the Trump administration has not led to an increase in economic policy uncertainty (Chart 6). Instead, after rising sharply in the wake of the Brexit vote in mid-2016 and the U.S. presidential election in November, policy uncertainty has ebbed. While uncertainty over economic policy remains elevated relative to the past few years, the concern under Trump is surprisingly subdued. This metric is in line with the Beige Book's assessment of Trump's impact on sentiment. A series of business-friendly legislative wins for the GOP and President Trump would further reduce any qualms. Even so, a failure by Congress to boost the debt ceiling and fund the U.S. government later this month would increase business worries/fears. Late last week, Trump cut a deal with Congressional Democrats to extend the debt ceiling for three months and is in talks to do away with it altogether. Bottom Line: The fundamentals still support solid business spending. However, BCA's positive capex outlook in the U.S. could be blemished if the Republicans fail to deliver on their promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending in the next several months. Inflation Surprise And The Fed Chart 7The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise We expect inflation surprise to move higher, which could spur the Fed to resume its rate hike campaign. A disconnect has opened between economic surprise and inflation surprise.2 In the past 13 years, there have been 15 periods when economic surprise has climbed after a trough. The inflation surprise index temporarily increased in 13 of those episodes. For example, in the aftermath of the oil price peak in the U.S. in mid-2014, both economic surprise and inflation surprise diminished through early 2015 and then began climbing. However, today's inflation surprise index has rolled over while economic surprise has gained. The inflation surprise index escalated during previous tightening regimes when the economy was at full employment and the Fed funds rate was in accommodative territory (Chart 7). The last time those conditions were in place, which was in 2005, the Fed was wrapping up a rate increase campaign that began in mid-2004. Mounting inflation surprise also accompanied most of the Fed's rate increases from mid-1999 through mid-2000 under similar conditions. In late 2015, as the current set of rate hikes commenced, the inflation surprise index was on the upswing, the economy was close to full employment and the Fed funds rate was accommodative. What Does This Mean For The Fed? The above analysis underscores that economic growth is in good shape and it is likely to remain so for the next year at a minimum, barring any nasty shocks. Normally, the positive U.S. (and global) growth backdrop would place upward pressure on bond yields. It has not been the case this time. Investors appear skeptical of the ability of strong economic growth to generate higher inflation. The attitude seems to be "we will believe it when we see it". Some on the FOMC are taking a similar attitude. Lael Brainard, a FOMC governor, presented an interesting speech last week that makes this point. She speculated that inflation has been lower post-Lehman for structural reasons related partly to a drop in long-term inflation expectations. The Fed has been reluctant in the past to even hint that inflation expectations have become unmoored, because that could reinforce the trend, thus making it harder for the Fed to move inflation up to target. Brainard, a voting member of the committee with a dovish bias, argued that unemployment may have to undershoot the full employment level for longer than normal because low inflation expectations will be a persistent headwind. She also implied that the central bank should allow inflation to temporarily overshoot the 2% target. At a minimum, she wants to see evidence of rising inflation and inflation expectations before the Fed delivers the next rate hike. In the past, Brainard's speeches have sometimes heralded shifts in the FOMC's consensus. An example is her December 1, 2015 speech at Stanford.3 It is not clear if this is the case this time, but it does reinforce the view that a strong economy and a falling unemployment rate is not enough to justify another rate hike this year according to the consensus on the FOMC. Bottom Line: Our inflation indicators are pointing mildly up. Nonetheless, timing the upturn in inflation is difficult and the Fed will not hike in December without at least a modest rise in inflation (together with higher inflation expectations). We are short duration because Treasuries are overvalued and market expectations for Fed rate hikes over the next year are overly complacent (see next section). Nonetheless, a rise in yields may not be imminent. Disconnect On Duration The Global Manufacturing PMI reached a more than 6-year high in August, climbing from 52.7 in July to 53.1 last month (Chart 8, panel 3). Meanwhile, bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar continues to plunge (Chart 8, bottom panel). Together, these two factors suggest that global growth is accelerating and becoming broader based. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service4 views the improving global economic backdrop as an extremely bond-bearish development. A wide global recovery means that when U.S. data turns surprisingly positive, it is less likely that any increase in Treasury yields will be met with an influx of foreign demand and surge in the dollar. Our Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) currently places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.67% (Chart 8, top panel). Moreover, our 3-factor version of the model (which includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index), puts fair value slightly higher at 2.68% (not shown). Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. After adjusting for changes in credit rating and duration over time, the average spread offered by the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index is fairly valued relative to similar stages of past business cycles. However, the Aaa-rated portion of the market looks expensive. Further, strong Q2 profit growth likely foreshadows a decline in net leverage. This lengthens the window for corporate bond outperformance. We recommend an overweight in the high-yield market. In the early stages of the previous two Fed tightening cycles (February 1994 to July 1994 and June 2004 to December 2005), the index option-adjusted spread averaged 342 bps and traded in a range between 259 bps and 394 bps. This puts the current junk spread (378 bps) almost in line with the average achieved during other similar monetary conditions (Chart 9). We continue to favor a "buy on the dips"5 approach in the high-yield market. Chart 8Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Chart 9High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview Regarding high-yield valuation, our estimated default-adjusted spread stands at 245 bps. Historically, this level is consistent with excess returns of just under 3% versus duration-matched Treasuries over the subsequent 12 months. Our estimated default-adjusted spread is based on an expected default rate of 2.6% and recovery rate of 49% (Chart 9, bottom panel). We remain underweight MBSs; While MBS are starting to look more attractive, especially relative to Aaa credit, we think it is still too soon to buy. The Fed will announce the run-off of its balance sheet when it meets later this month. The market has been pricing in this eventuality for most of the year, leading to a significant widening in MBS OAS. More recently, the option cost component of MBS spreads has joined in, widening alongside falling mortgage rates and expectations of rising prepayments. Bottom Line: Rates have tested their post-election lows, but BCA's fair value model suggests a bounce higher, which supports our stocks-over-bonds stance. In terms of U.S. bonds, we favor short duration over long and credit over high quality. MBSs will be hurt more than Treasuries as the Fed begins to shrink its balance sheet. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy ryans@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate", July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Surprise, Surprise", August 28, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20151201a.htm 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "The Cyclical Sweet Spot Rolls On," September 5, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips," March 28, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Some caution warranted here. Hurricane Harvey's impact on the economy and markets. Tensions in North Korea will linger. NIPA and S&P now telling same story on profits, margins. Is the August employment report enough for the Fed? Feature The impact of Hurricane Harvey will ripple through the economic data in the coming months, but will not impact the overall trajectory of the economy or the Fed. However, elevated equity valuations, escalating tensions in North Korea, a widening disconnect between the bond market and the Fed and profit growth that is poised to peak in the second half of the year warrants careful attention from investors. Nonetheless, we remain slightly overweight stocks and favor stocks over bonds. Caution On Risk Assets We recommend that clients be prudent, paring back any overweight positions and holding some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. BCA research has demonstrated that U.S. Treasuries, Swiss bonds and JGBs were the best performers during a crisis (Chart 1). The same is true for the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, such that the currency exposure should not be hedged in these cases. The dollar is more nuanced. It tends to perform well during financial crises, but not in geopolitical crises or recessions. Chart 1Gold Loves Geopolitical Crises Shelter From The Storm Shelter From The Storm Gold tends to perform well in geopolitical events, although not in recessions or financial crunches. Our base case projects stocks outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months. BCA's dollar and duration positions have disappointed so far this year. Much hinges on U.S. inflation. Investors appear to have adopted the stance that structural headwinds to inflation will forever dominate the cyclical pressures. Therefore, the bond market is totally unprepared for any upside shocks on the inflation landscape. Admittedly, a rise in bond yields may not be imminent, but the risks appear to be predominantly to the upside. Harvey's Lingering Aftermath History shows that natural disasters such as Hurricane Harvey have a temporary effect on the U.S. economy, the financial markets and the Fed. Ultimately, the macro environment in place before the storm will reassert itself. Nonetheless, it may be a few months before investors determine the long-term impact of the record rainfall and flooding in Houston. Chart 2 shows the ranking of Harvey's preliminary damage estimate of $30B versus other storms of similar magnitude. We are still several weeks away from the peak of the Atlantic hurricane season (mid-September) and two of the most destructive storms in the past 25 years made landfall in mid-to-late October (Wilma and Sandy). Chart 2Economic Impact From Major Hurricanes Economic Impact From Major Hurricanes Economic Impact From Major Hurricanes Chart 3 shows the performance of key economic, inflation and financial market indicators in the past two years and also around five major hurricanes since 1992. Most of the activity-related economic statistics are volatile in the aftermath of the storms and then they recover. The Citi economic surprise index initially moves higher after a storm, and then fades (Chart 3A). There are big swings in housing starts and industrial production and employment growth slows. Inflation tends to climb post-landfall (Chart 3B). In prior episodes, core PCE and core CPI have accelerated along with gasoline prices. Consumer confidence dips initially, but then recovers. Wages are volatile, but tend to accelerate after several months. Chart 3C shows that stocks drift lower for several months following hurricanes and subsequently recoup the losses. The stock-to-bond ratio also moved lower, but regains its pre-storm heights about two months later. Treasury yields fall after storms, but we note that yields have been in a secular decline for 25 years. Chart 3AMajor Hurricane Impact##BR##On Activity Data Major Hurricane Impact On Activity Data Major Hurricane Impact On Activity Data Chart 3BMajor Hurricane Impact On##BR##Sentiment And Inflation Data Major Hurricane Impact On Sentiment And Inflation Data Major Hurricane Impact On Sentiment And Inflation Data Chart 3CMajor Hurricane Impact On##BR##Financial Markets & The Fed Major Hurricane Impact On Financial Markets & The Fed Major Hurricane Impact On Financial Markets & The Fed Hurricane Harvey will not shake the Fed. Nonetheless, the central bank will acknowledge the disaster in the FOMC statement, the FOMC minutes, and/or in Fed Chair Janet Yellen's news conference. We are unchanged in our view that policymakers will begin to pare its balance sheet later this month and bump up rates again in December, assuming that core inflation shows some signs of strength between now and then. History shows (Chart 3C) that, on average, the Fed funds rate tends to move higher in the months after storms hit, but the primary message is that the Fed just continues to do whatever it was doing before the storm. The Fed cut rates in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 in what turned out to be the final rate reduction of the cycle that began in 1989. Ivan hit in September 2004, but the monetary authority raised rates in the final three FOMC meetings of 2004, including at the meeting only a week after the hurricane made landfall. Similarly, the Fed clung to its rate hike regime after Wilma in October 2005. In 2008, Ike arrived in Texas two days before Lehman Brothers collapsed in mid-September. The Fed, which had been cutting rates since September 2007, lowered rates in the final months of 2008. The Fed announced QE3 in late summer 2012 and continued with the program after Sandy came ashore at the end of October 2012. Harvey will be a game changer in some respects: the devastation reduces the odds of a government shutdown or of failing to increase the debt ceiling. We have maintained that there were extremely low odds that the debt ceiling would not be raised. We stated that there was a 25% chance of a government shutdown between October 1, when the current funding expires, and sometime in mid-October when the debt ceiling will hit according to the Congressional Budget Office. However, it would be unfathomable to shut down the government and force the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to cease operations. The resulting outrage would damage the Republicans, especially in Texas. Bottom Line: Harvey may have a near-term impact on the economy, but the Fed will stick to its plan. The catastrophe makes it increasingly likely that the debt ceiling will be raised and a resolution will be passed to keep the government operating into the new fiscal year. Thus, equity investors can safely ignore these two risks, and focus on the key risk in the outlook: North Korea. North Korea Could Linger Over Markets BCA believes that the probability of a war on the Korean Peninsula is very low,1 but it may take a while before the uncertainty in Northeast Asia is resolved. Between now (escalating tensions) and then (a negotiated settlement), there will be more provocations and market volatility. There are long-standing constraints to war. The first is a potentially high death toll: Pyongyang can inflict massive civilian casualties in Seoul with a conventional artillery barrage. Furthermore, U.S. troops, and Japanese forces and civilians, would also suffer. Secondly, China is unlikely to remain neutral. Strategically, China will not tolerate a U.S. presence on its border with North Korea. Nevertheless, Washington must establish a credible threat of military action if it is to convince Pyongyang that negotiations offer a superior outcome. It is unclear how long it will take Trump to convince North Korea that the threat of a U.S. preemptive strike is credible. Chart 4 shows the arc of diplomacy2 that the U.S. took with Iran between 2010 and 2014. From an investor perspective, it will be difficult to gauge whether the brinkmanship and military posturing are part of this territorial threat display or evidence of real preparations for an actual attack. More market volatility may occur, but for the time being, we do not think that the tensions in the Korean peninsula will end the bull market in global equities. Positions in traditional safe-haven assets, such as gold, U.S. Treasuries, Swiss francs and (perhaps) Japanese yen, should be considered as hedges against increased market swings. Chart 4Arc Of Diplomacy: Tensions Ramp Up As Nuclear Negotiations Begin Shelter From The Storm Shelter From The Storm Update: Equity Valuations, Sentiment And Technicals U.S. equity valuations are stretched, but elevated valuations alone are not enough to prompt a sell-off in stocks. The BCA valuation indicator is in overvalued territory, where it has been since late 2013. History shows3 that stocks can stay overvalued for extended periods, even when the Fed is raising rates, but policy is still accommodative as it is today. BCA's composite valuation indicator is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that defines extremely over-valued (Chart 5). However, this is due to the components that compare equity prices with bond yields. The other three elements of the equity indicator, which are unrelated to bond yields, suggest that stock valuation is stretched (Chart 5 panels 2, 3 and 4). That said, equities are attractively priced relative to competing assets, such as corporate bonds and Treasuries (Chart 6). Chart 5U.S. Equities##BR##Are Overvalued... U.S. Equities Are Overvalued... U.S. Equities Are Overvalued... Chart 6...But Look Less Expensive##BR##Relative To Competing Assets ...But Look Less Expensive Relative To Competing Assets ...But Look Less Expensive Relative To Competing Assets Valuation is not a reliable tool to time market turning points and, absent a significant deterioration in the economic, profit and margin environment, we do not forecast a sustained pullback in stocks. Looking beyond BCA's tactical 6-12 month window, above-average market multiples alone imply below-average returns for stocks across a strategic time horizon. Chart 7No Strong Signal From##BR##Sentiment Or Technicals No Strong Signal From Sentiment Or Technicals No Strong Signal From Sentiment Or Technicals BCA's technical and sentiment indicators are not at extremes (Chart 7). The BCA technical indicator, while above zero, is not at a level that in the past has triggered a stock pullback. Similarly, the BCA investor sentiment composite index, while at the top end of its bull market range, is not at an extreme. Moreover, only 50% of the stocks in the NYSE composite are above their 10-week moving average, a level which has not been previously associated with major equity sell-offs. Bottom Line: The solid earnings backdrop remains in place for U.S. stocks as measured by either the S&P or the national accounts. We anticipate that profit growth has peaked according to S&P 500 data on a 4-quarter moving total basis due to tough comparisons although it will slip only modestly in the second half of the year. Next year will see EPS growth drop back into the mid-single digit range. The consensus estimate for 2018 EPS growth is 11%. While valuations are elevated, neither sentiment nor technical indicators are flashing red. We recommend stocks over bonds in the next 6-12 months, but acknowledge that risks to BCA's stance are climbing. A Reconnection In Q2 The Q2 data show that the NIPA and S&P earnings measures have reconnected. In our July 3, 2017 Weekly Report "Summer Stress Out"4 we highlighted the apparent disconnect between the S&P and NIPA, sales earnings and margin data through Q1 2017. The release of the Q2 corporate profits data in the national accounts and the end the Q2 S&P 500 reporting season allow us to provide an update. The year-over-year reading on the NIPA earnings measure ticked up in Q2 while the S&P-based metric ticked down. That said, while there are marked differences in annual growth rates between the two measures, the levels were close to the same point in the second quarter of 2017 (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 9 shows that a wide difference persists between corporate sales measured by S&P and the national accounts. Margins calculated on the S&P basis climbed in Q2 while NIPA margins held steady. Even so, a modest gap still remains between NIPA margins at 15.2% and S&P margins at 13.2%. Most of the divergence is related to the denominator of the calculation. The NIPA denominator is corporate sector Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a value-added concept that is different from sales. It is not clear why, but GDP has grown much faster than sales since the end of 2014. Chart 8S&P And NIPA##BR##Profit Comparison S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison Chart 9Denominator Explains##BR##S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence We believe that the S&P statistics are painting a more accurate picture because sales are easier to measure while value-added is more complicated. The slow growth of sales is not a bullish point for stocks. Nonetheless, it does not appear that financial engineering has distorted bottom-up company data to such an extent that the S&P readings are falsely signaling strong profit growth. We expect the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Nonetheless, the profit backdrop is positive for stocks for now. Is The August Jobs Report Enough For The Fed? Chart 10Labor Market Conditions##BR##Favor Risk Assets Labor Market Conditions Favor Risk Assets Labor Market Conditions Favor Risk Assets U.S. payrolls expanded by 156,000 in August. Relative to the underlying growth rate in the labor force, this is still a healthy pace of jobs growth. Nevertheless, it fell short of expectations for a 180,000 increase and the prior two months saw a cumulative downward revision of 41,000. The August data were not impacted by Hurricane Harvey. Aggregate hours worked, a measure of total labor inputs based on changes in employment and the workweek, fell by 0.2% m/m. That said, aggregate hours worked are up 1.3% at a quarterly annualized rate thus far in Q3. This is consistent with GDP growth of a bit over 2%, which has been the trend in the current economic expansion. Meanwhile, wage gains remain muted. Average hourly earnings rose just 0.1% m/m. Annual wage inflation has been steady at 2.5% for several months now (Chart 10, bottom panel). If productivity is expanding modestly around 1%, the current pace of wage gains would suggest that unit labor costs are growing around 1.5%. This will make it difficult for general price inflation to accelerate to the Fed 2% target. Nonetheless, the reacceleration in the 3-month change in average hourly earnings from 1.9% in January 2017 to 2.6% in August supports the Fed's view on inflation. Finally, the unemployment rate ticked up to 4.4% from 4.3%. This was because the separate household survey showed a 74,000 drop in employment. The participation rate held steady at 62.9% in August. Bottom Line: While falling short of expectations in August, U.S. employment growth remains solid and job gains are continuing at a pace consistent with the 2% GDP growth rate of recent years. However, muted wage gains mean that progress to the Fed's 2% inflation target is looking suspect. We anticipate that the Fed will announce the process of running down its balance sheet at the September FOMC meeting. Rate hikes are on hold at least until the December FOMC meeting, and even then only if core inflation shows some signs of strength in the next few months. U.S. risk assets should continue to benefit from moderate growth, low inflation and a "go slow" approach by the Fed. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?", August 16, 2017. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets? ,"May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Sizing Up The Second Half", July 10, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Summer Stress Out", July 3, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of August 30th, 2017. The model has continued to reduce its allocation to the U.S. driven by worsening liquidity condition, and it's the second consecutive month that the U.S. allocation is the largest underweight. Australia is downgraded to neutral on concern of valuation. Germany and Netherland continued to receive more allocation and Canada's underweight is reduced as well, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Model Updates GAA Model Updates Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) GAA Model Updates GAA Model Updates As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed its benchmark by 18 bps in August, entirely due to the 43 bps outperformance of Level 2 model where the overweight in Italy and Germany versus the underweight in Japan, Spain and Canada worked very well. Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of August 30, 2017. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations GAA Model Updates GAA Model Updates Table 4Performance Since Going Live GAA Model Updates GAA Model Updates The model is optimistic on global growth and maintains in cyclical tilt. However, the magnitude of overweight in cyclical sectors has reduced on the back of momentum indicators. The biggest change has been utilities which has moved from a 2% underweight to a 1.7% overweight. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com