Real Estate
Executive Summary China’s Business Cycle Has Not Bottomed Recent data showed a substantial improvement in the economy in the first two months of the year. However, the optimism is not well supported by other industry and high-frequency data. China’s exports were resilient, while infrastructure investment also rebounded sharply on the back of front-loaded fiscal stimulus. Nonetheless, domestic demand in China remains in the doldrums. Housing market indicators show a further deterioration in home sales and prices in January and February. Consumption in tourism during the Chinese New Year and service sector activities were also weaker compared with the same period last year. While we expect policymakers to roll out more measures to shore up domestic demand, China’s economy will likely have a choppy bottom in the first half of 2022. We maintain our neutral position on Chinese onshore stocks in a global portfolio. In absolute terms, we are cautious and are looking for a better price entry point in Q2. Bottom Line: Economic data in the first two months of the year sent mixed signals, which suggests that China’s economy has not reached a solid bottom. Feature Newly released economic data from January and February (i.e. industrial production, fixed-asset investment, retail sales and property investment) all generated sizable positive surprises. However, other industry and high-frequency data sent conflicting messages. The improvement in China’s total social financing (TSF) in the past few months has been due to local government (LG) bond issuance (Chart 1). Corporate credit showed little advancement, while household loans were extremely weak (Chart 2). In addition, further contracting home sales paint a bleak picture of housing demand. Soft readings in the service sector Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) and core consumer price index (CPI) suggest that consumption remains sluggish. Chart 1The Credit Impulse Continued To Trend Down (Excluding LG Bond Issuance) Chart 2No Improvement In Corporate Or Household Demand For Credit Beijing is stepping up its pro-growth stimulus, particularly on the fiscal front. However, the country will unlikely undergo a strong recovery in its business cycle without a major reversal in the housing market and an improvement in demand from the private sector. Moreover, recent lockdowns to tame surging domestic COVID-19 cases amid China’s zero-tolerance pose major downside risks to the near-term economic outlook. Chinese equities sold off in response to lockdown news despite the release of better economic data earlier this month, highlighting investors’ weak sentiment. Chart 3China's Business Cycle Has Not Bottomed We maintain our neutral view on China’s onshore stocks relative to their global peers, but we are cautious on Chinese equities in absolute terms. On a cyclical time horizon (6 to 12 months), there are increasing odds that Chinese policymakers will stimulate the economy more aggressively, particularly in the 2nd half of the year. However, it is too early to turn bullish on Chinese equities (Chart 3). The ongoing war in Ukraine and elevated oil prices, coupled with risks of further lockdowns in China and a prolonged downturn in domestic demand, present significant near-term risks to the performance of Chinese equities. Investors should closely watch for more reflationary efforts from Beijing and we believe a better entry point to upgrade Chinese stocks may emerge in Q2. Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Near-Term Outlook For The Housing Market Remains Bleak Real estate investment growth in January-February was surprisingly strong, according to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics. However, headline growth in real estate investment deviates from the continued weaknesses in other housing market indicators (Chart 4). In addition, data on the production of some key construction materials showed little improvement (Chart 5). Chart 4Conflicting Signals From The January-February Housing Market Indicators Chart 5Data On Building Materials Also Deviate From Strong Investment Growth In Real Estate Demand for housing remains lackluster. February’s medium- to long-term household loan growth, which is mainly mortgage loans and is highly correlated with home sales, plunged to an all-time low (Chart 6). Meanwhile, the deep contraction in home sales growth continued in February, and sentiment among home buyers remains downbeat (Chart 6, bottom panel) Chart 6Demand For Housing Remains In The Doldrums Chart 7Policymakers Are Trying To Avoid Further Inflating The Housing Price Bubble Although authorities have reiterated that they want to stabilize the property market, the policy measures have been only fine-tuned. Regional governments have been allowed to initiate their own housing policies and some cities have eased processes for home purchases.1 However, given that maintaining stable home prices is an overarching goal and China’s leadership is trying to avoid further inflating the home price bubble, it is doubtful that the government will allow significant re-leveraging in the property market (Chart 7). Chart 8 shows that funds to real estate developers have slowed to the lowest level since 2010, which will further dampen housing construction. Chart 8Housing Construction Activities Will Weaken Further In 1H22 Chart 9The Latest Spike In Domestic COVID Cases Will Weigh On Home Sales Moreover, high-frequency floor space sold data shows a broad-based decline in housing sales in tier-one, two and three cities through mid-March (Chart 9). The latest spike in China’s domestic COVID-19 cases and regional lockdowns will likely weigh on home sales in the short term. Property investment and construction will remain at risk without a decisive rebound in home sales. A Disrupted Recovery In Household Consumption Both retail and online sales of consumer goods held up better than expected in January and February (Chart 10). However, the subdued underlying data highlight that the strong reading in retail sales in the first two months of the year may be less than meets the eye. Chart 10Although Growth In Retail Sales Rebounded In January-February... Chart 11...Service Sector Activities Still Struggle To Return To Pre-Pandemic Levels Service sector and passenger activities are still well below their pre-pandemic levels, two years after the first COVID lockdowns in early 2020 (Chart 11). Consumption in tourism during the Chinese New Year holiday was weaker than last year. Households’ propensity to spend also showed few signs of rebounding (Chart 12 & 13). Chart 12Travel Consumption Was Weak During The Chinese New Year Chart 13Households’ Propensity To Consume Continues To Trend Down Furthermore, both core and service CPI weakened in February, reflecting lackluster demand from consumers (Chart 14). Labor market dynamics have also worsened and the unemployment rate, particularly among young workers, has risen rapidly since the beginning of the year (Chart 15). Chart 14Weak Core And Service CPIs In February Suggest Lackluster Household Demand Chart 15Labor Market Situation Is Worsening The ongoing fight against mounting new COVID cases in China will likely drag down service sector activities in the coming months (Chart 16A & 16B). Importantly, the new round of lockdowns and mobility restrictions are primarily in busier and more developed coastal metropolitans, such as Shenzhen and Shanghai. Therefore, the negative impact from social activity restrictions will be more substantive compared with previous lockdowns. Chart 16AEscalating New Cases In China Will Constrain Domestic Consumption Chart 16BEscalating New Cases In China Will Constrain Domestic Consumption Strong Rebound In Manufacturing Investment Growth In January-February Probably Not Sustainable A strong rebound in the growth of manufacturing investment helped to support overall fixed-asset investment in the first two months of the year (Chart 17). Robust external demand for China’s manufacturing goods has likely contributed to the pickup in manufacturing output and helped to sustain Chinese manufacturers’ near-maximum capacity (Chart 18). Chart 17Strong Pickup In Manufacturing Investment Growth Chart 18Robust Exports Support Chinese Manufacturing Output And Capacity Utilization While the volume of manufacturing output increased, prices that producers charge consumers have rolled over (Chart 19). Historically, prices have been more important in driving corporate profits than the volume of output. In addition, a strong RMB and sharply climbing shipping costs will also weigh on Chinese exporters’ profitability (Chart 20). Chart 19Manufacturing Output Picked Up While Prices Rolled Over Chart 20Strong RMB And Rising Shipping Costs Will Reduce Chinese Exporters' Profitability Chart 21Manufacturing Sector's Profit Margins Will Be Further Squeezed The elevated prices of oil and global industrial metals will continue to disproportionally benefit upstream industries, which are mainly composed of commodity producers. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector’s profit margins will be squeezed by rising input costs and sluggish final demand (Chart 21). Chinese manufacturers’ profit growth will likely weaken through 1H22 and the downtrend may be exacerbated by the ongoing struggle to contain COVID cases. The impact from recent lockdowns in the northern city of Jilin (an auto production center), Shenzhen (a high-tech manufacturing production and export hub), and Shanghai (a city with major ports and a key logistics provider) will disrupt China’s manufacturing production and curb investment in the near term. Infrastructure Sector Will Remain A Bright Spot Through 1H22 Related Report China Investment StrategyAiming High, Lying Low Infrastructure investment staged a strong recovery in January-February on the back of front-loaded fiscal stimulus (Chart 22). LG bond issuance started to accelerate last November and will boost both traditional and new-economy infrastructure spending at least through 1H22. Our calculations suggest that fiscal thrust will rise to more than 2% of GDP this year, a sharp reversal from last year’s negative impulse of 2% (Chart 23). Chart 22Fiscal Stimulus Is At Work Chart 23Fiscal Thrust In 2022 Could Reach More Than 2% Of GDP Chart 24Subdued Shadow Bank Activities Will Limit The Magnitude Of Rebound In Infrastructure Investment However, shadow bank activity, which historically had a tight correlation with infrastructure investment, remains downbeat (Chart 24). February’s reading of shadow bank credit was extremely weak, highlighting that local governments still face constraints in off-balance sheet leveraging through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). The trend in shadow bank loans bears close attention in the coming months because it will signal whether the central government will allow more backdoor financing to help local governments fund their infrastructure projects. A continued soft reading in shadow bank activities will likely limit the upside in infrastructure investment growth. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Footnotes 1 Guangzhou lowered its down-payment ratio from 30% to 20%, along with a 20bp cut in mortgage rates. Zhengzhou marginally relaxed home purchase restrictions by allowing families who bring elderly relatives to live in the city to buy one extra home and also lifted the “definition of second home ownership by physical unit & mortgage history”. Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations
Executive Summary Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Less Impacted By External Factors We are upgrading Chinese onshore stocks from underweight to neutral relative to global stocks. At the same time, we are closing our tactical trade of long Chinese investable stocks/short global stocks. In the near term, Russia’s armed invasion of Ukraine will spark a further selloff in global risk assets. Volatility in Chinese onshore stock prices will remain high; A-share prices in absolute terms may also drop but should fall by less than their peers in European and emerging markets. On the other hand, Chinese offshore stocks are more vulnerable to geopolitical risks compared with their onshore counterparts. There are tentative signs that home prices may be stabilizing, although demand for housing remains in deep contraction. Chinese policymakers remain vigilant in preventing the property market from overheating and credit creation from overshooting. However, the ongoing Russia/Ukraine incursion has the potential to catalyze a larger stimulus package in China. If the escalating geopolitical crisis threatens the global economy, China’s authorities will likely strengthen policy supports at home to buttress the country’s domestic political, economic and financial conditions. Bottom Line: Chinese onshore stocks will weather the ongoing geopolitical storm better than their offshore and global peers. China’s economy is also less negatively impacted by the Russia/Ukraine hostilities. If the crisis deepens, China’s leadership will likely step up measures to support its economy and ensure stable domestic financial and political dynamics. Feature The conflict between Russia and Ukraine unnerved global financial markets in the past few weeks. Chinese offshore stocks were not insulated from the geopolitical event; the MSCI China Index declined by about 4% in February, in-line with the selloff in global stocks. Chart 1Chinese Onshore Financial Markets Held Up Relatively Well Last Month The current global geopolitical environment, however, has turned us a bit more positive on Chinese onshore stocks in relative terms. In the near term, the onshore market should hold up better than its offshore and European counterparts. China’s closed capital market prevents panic capital outflows and its large current account surplus as well as favorable real interest rate differentials help to maintain strength in the RMB (Chart 1). On a cyclical basis, China’s domestic economic fundamentals will continue to drive prices in the A-share market. China’s aggregate economy is less affected by the Russia/Ukraine conflict than Europe. Energy supplies from Russia to China will likely continue and may even accelerate, mitigating the risks of energy shock-induced inflation spikes. As such, we are upgrading Chinese onshore stocks from underweight to neutral in a global portfolio, both in tactical and cyclical time horizons. We remain cautious about the size of Chinese stimulus for the year and, therefore, are neutral in our cyclical view on Chinese onshore stocks relative to global equities. Despite some nascent signs of reflation and an easing of housing policy in a few Chinese cities, aggregate property demand remains weak and overall policy easing in the sector has been marginal. Nonetheless, the situation surrounding Ukraine and the global sanctions against Russia are highly fluid and may provide some ground for Chinese policymakers to ramp up stimulus at home. If the conflict intensifies and derails the European/global economy, Beijing will be more inclined to adopt measures to ensure the stability of its domestic economy, financial markets and political dynamics. Meanwhile, we are closing our long MSCI China/short MSCI global tactical trade. Chinese offshore stocks are more vulnerable to geopolitical tensions and risk-off sentiment among global investors. The Russia Incursion Has Limited Direct Impact On China’s Economy Chinese stocks were not immune last week to the global financial market’s gyrations triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Russia’s attack on its neighbor will create short-term disruptions on the prices of global commodities and China’s A-shares, the cyclical performance of Chinese onshore stocks is tied to the country’s domestic economic fundamentals. The military conflict between Russia and Ukraine should have a limited knock-on effect on China’s business cycle dynamics for the following reasons: Russia and Ukraine together account for less than 3% of Chinese total exports as of 2021, limiting the negative impact from reduced demand in the region on China’s current account balance. Chart 2Ukraine: China’s Major Source Of Agricultural Commodity Supplies Russia’s incursion of Ukraine may have consequences on China’s food prices. Ukraine is a major agricultural commodity exporter to China, hence a prolonged military conflict may disrupt agricultural supplies and push up imported food prices in China (Chart 2). In this scenario, we expect that Beijing will provide subsidies to ease pressures on domestic food prices due to supply shocks, rather than tighten monetary policy to reduce demand. China is unlikely to experience shocks linked to possible energy disruptions. Russia is a core exporter of energy to China and supplies of crude oil, natural gas and coal have increased in recent years (Chart 3). We do not expect that Russia’s energy supply to China will be disrupted. Indeed, following the 2014 Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Russia’s crude oil exports to China increased by 40% (Chart 3, top panel). We anticipate that oil prices will fall from the current level in the second half of the year, limiting the upshot from higher oil prices on Chinese inflation. So far, the US and EU have announced tough sanctions on Russia’s non-energy sectors, but they have avoided halting Russia’s energy exports. In the unlikely scenario that energy flows from Russia to Europe are disrupted in any meaningful and long-lasting way, either through European sanctions or a Russian embargo, Russia would probably turn to China to absorb its energy exports. Given that Russia cannot easily replace Europe with any other alternative market, particularly natural gas, China would gain an upper hand in price negotiations with the Russians (Chart 4). Thus, a steady supply of cheap natural gas and other forms of energy would be a net positive for China’s economy. Chart 4Russia Cannot Easily Replace Europe With Any Alternative Consumer Other Than China Chart 3Russia's Ties With China On Energy Supplies Will Likely Strengthen Meanwhile, oil’s current price spike may widen the gap in profits between China’s upstream and downstream industrial enterprises (Chart 5). However, the effect from higher oil prices on Chinese downstream manufacturers should be temporary. Our Commodity and Energy Strategists believe that the Russian invasion will prompt increased production from core OPEC producers. These production increases would reduce prices from last week’s $105 per barrel level to $85 per barrel by the second half of 2022 and keep it at that level throughout 2023 (Chart 6). Chart 6Crude Oil Price Risk Premium Will Abate But Not Disappear Chart 5Rising Oil Prices May Temporarily Widen Profit Gaps Between China's Up- And Downstream Industries Bottom Line: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should have a limited direct impact on China’s domestic economy, inflation and monetary policy. Tentative Signs Of Home Price Stabilization Although the property market is showing some signs of improvement, the aggregate demand for homes remains very sluggish. Recently released housing data in China show some slight progress, as fewer cities reported a month-on-month drop in new home prices in January (Chart 7). The monthly average new home prices among China’s 70 cities were broadly flat last month following four consecutive months of falling prices. Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities had the largest increases in home prices, whereas prices in other regions continued to contract through January, albeit to a lesser degree (Chart 7, bottom panel). The minor improvement in home prices reflects recently implemented measures to help shore up the flagging market. Last month, the PBoC cut the policy rate by 10 bps and reduced the one- and five-year loan prime rates by 10 bps and 5 bps, respectively. Moreover, last week several regional banks lowered the down payments on mortgages for homebuyers. Chart 8...Demand For Housing Remains In Deep Contraction Chart 7Although There Are Some Early Signs Of Stabilization In Home Prices... Nonetheless, the aggregate demand for housing remains weak. China’s 100 largest developers experienced a roughly 40% year-on-year plunge in total sales in January, indicating that recent easing measures failed to revive the downbeat sentiment among homebuyers (Chart 8). Bottom Line: Policymakers will remain vigilant in not inducing another surge in house prices and will continue to target steady home prices. As such, it is too early to upgrade our cyclical view on China’s property market, stimulus and economic recovery. Investment Conclusions We are upgrading Chinese onshore stocks to neutral relative to global equities (both tactically and in the next 6 to 12 months), while closing our tactical trade of long MSCI China/short MSCI global index. Chart 9Chinese Onshore Stock Prices Are Largely Driven By Domestic Rather Than External Factors... Given the limited impact of the Russia/Ukraine conflict on China’s domestic economy and the low correlation to the global equity index, Chinese onshore stock prices may also fall in absolute terms in the coming weeks, but not by as much as their offshore and European counterparts (Chart 9). Furthermore, while we maintain a cautious cyclical outlook for China’s stimulus, the ongoing geopolitical crisis has the potential to provide a catalyst for Chinese policymakers to stimulate the domestic economy more forcefully. If the clash evolves into a real risk to the European economy and global financial markets, odds are high that Chinese policymakers will step up stimulus measures to ensure domestic stability. In this scenario, Chinese onshore stocks will likely outperform global equities. In the past, Chinese authorities refrained from a credit overshoot when the business cycle slowed in an orderly manner, but they stimulated substantially following an exogenous shock. For example, China rolled out massive stimulus packages after the 2008 Global Financial and the 2011/12 European credit crises. Beijing did not directly respond to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea with additional monetary support to China’s domestic economy. However, the Chinese authorities started to aggressively stimulate when a collapse in domestic demand coincided with a global manufacturing recession in 2015. Chart 10...Whereas Chinese Offshore Stocks Are More Vulnerable To Global Risk-Off Sentiment The PBoC’s outsized liquidity injection in the interbank system last Friday is also a sign that Beijing is willing to accelerate policy easing if the geopolitical backdrop meaningfully worsens. Regarding Chinese investable stocks, we maintain our cyclical underweight stance relative to global equities. In the near term, risk-off sentiment among global investors will undermine the performance of Chinese offshore stocks in both absolute and relative terms (Chart 10). Over a longer time horizon (6 to 12 months), growth stocks will likely underperform value stocks when global stocks recover. Thus, the tech-heavy MSCI China Index is less attractive to investors compared with other emerging and developed market equities that are more value-centric. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations Tactical Recommendations
Executive Summary Bull Markets In Malaysian Stocks Are Fully Dependent On Profit Growth The conditions for a major rally/outperformance in Malaysian equities are absent. Profits have been the primary driver of Malaysian equity prices historically, and the corporate earnings outlook is mediocre. Domestic demand is facing headwinds from tightening fiscal policy as well as from impaired credit channels. Muted wage growth and deflating house prices are sapping consumer confidence. This will dent domestic demand going forward. This backdrop is bullish for bonds. Malaysian bonds offer value, as real bond yields are among the highest in Emerging Asia. The yield curve is far too steep given the growth and inflation outlook. The Malaysian ringgit is cheap and has limited downside. Bottom Line: We recommend equity investors implement a neutral stance toward Malaysia in overall EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios. Absolute return investors should avoid this bourse for now. Fixed-income investors, on the other hand, should stay overweight Malaysia in both EM domestic (local currency) and sovereign credit portfolios. In the rate markets, investors should continue receiving 10-year swap rates or bet on yield curve flattening. Feature Chart 1Malaysian Equity Underperformance May Be Late, But It’s Not Yet Time To Overweight Malaysian stocks are still in search of a stable bottom in absolute terms. Relative to their EM and Emerging Asian counterparts however, a bottom has been forming over the past year (Chart 1). So, could Malaysia’s prolonged underperformance be coming to an end? Our analysis suggests caution. The underlying reasons behind this market’s substantial and protracted underperformance – dwindling earnings both in absolute terms and relative to its peers – are yet to show any signs of a reversal. While cheap, the ringgit is also negatively impacted by the meager corporate profits generated by Malaysian firms. Investors would do well to stay neutral on this bourse for now in EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios. Fixed income investors, however, should continue to stay overweight Malaysia in both EM domestic (local currency) and sovereign credit portfolios. Also, Malaysia’s yield curve is too steep and offers value given the sluggish cyclical growth outlook. It’s All About Profits Chart 2 shows that the bull and bear markets in Malaysian stocks have been all about the rise and fall in earnings per share (EPS). Stock multiples, the other possible driver of the equity prices, have been remarkably flat over the past two decades, with only brief periods of fluctuations around the GFC and COVID-19 pandemic. The same can be said about Malaysia’s relative performance vis-à-vis EM and Emerging Asian stocks. The trajectory of the relative stock performance was set by the relative earnings (Chart 3). Chart 3Malaysia’s Relative Performance Is Also Dictated By Relative Corporate Profits Chart 2Bull Markets In Malaysian Stocks Are Fully Dependent On Profit Growth Thus, it is reasonable to expect that for this bourse to usher in a new bull market in absolute terms, Malaysian firms need to grow their earnings sustainably. And in order to outperform the rest of the EM stocks, Malaysian earnings need to grow at a faster clip than their peers. The question therefore is, are there signs of profit recovery in Malaysian companies in absolute and relative terms? The short answer is no. Bottom-up analysts do not expect any change in the downward trend in Malaysia’s relative profits over the coming 12 months. This outlook is corroborated by our macro analysis, as is outlined below. Sluggish Growth Malaysian profits are languishing in large part because of subdued topline growth. While profit margins are returning to pre-pandemic levels – thanks to cost cutting – subdued sales are causing the corporate profits to stay low. Chart 4Malaysian Domestic Demand Is Subdued Malaysian gross output as of Q4 last year was barely at pre-pandemic levels. The weak recovery is most evident in the dismal level of capital investments. Gross fixed capital formations – in both real and nominal terms – are still a good 15% below their pre-pandemic levels (Chart 4, top two panels). Apathy among businesses in ramping up productive capacity indicates a lack of confidence in consumer demand going forward. Consumption is indeed weak: Unit sales for passenger vehicles continue to be sluggish, and commercial vehicle sales are not faring any better. Consumer sentiment has ticked down in the latest survey indicating retail sales might decelerate (Chart 4, bottom two panels) Consistently, industrial production in consumer goods-related industries is struggling to surpass previous highs, even though strong export demand has provided a fillip to sales. In more domestic-oriented industries such as construction goods, the weakness is palpable (Chart 5). Meanwhile, unemployment rates have fallen marginally, but are still higher than they were before the pandemic. As a result, wages remain subdued. The resulting weak household income is contributing to depressed consumption. With mediocre household income growth, demand for houses has also slowed meaningfully. This is reflected in dwindling property unit sales. The advent of the pandemic and the resulting loss of household income have further aggravated the situation. In fact, prices of certain types of dwelling units, such as semi-detached houses and high-rise apartments, are deflating outright (Chart 6, top panel). Falling house prices weigh on consumer sentiment and discourage future consumption. Chart 6Contracting House Prices Is Hurting Real Estate Sector And Denting Consumer Confidence Chart 5Weak Domestic Demand Is A Headwind To Industrial Production What’s more, the housing sector does not expect an early recovery in sales and prices either. This is evident in the very depressed level of new construction starts (Chart 6, bottom panel). As such, this sector is likely to remain a drag on Malaysia’s post-pandemic recovery. Fiscal And Credit Headwinds Going forward, the recovery will face other headwinds worth noting. One of them is a restrictive fiscal policy. This is because the “statutory debt” ceiling of the government – at 60% of GDP – has already been reached (Chart 7, top panel). This ceiling for statutory debts was fixed by lawmakers as part of a stimulus bill (COVID-19 Act) passed in 2020; and leaves little room for additional fiscal stimulus. Indeed, the IMF estimates that the ‘fiscal thrust’ this year will be negative at 2% of GDP (Chart 7, bottom panel). The country’s credit channel is also compromised. The reason is that Malaysian banks are still saddled with unresolved NPLs. These NPLs are a legacy of a very rapid expansion of bank loans following the GFC. In just five years (2009 -2014), bank credit doubled in nominal terms to 1500 billion ringgit or from 95% of GDP to 125% (Chart 8, top panel). Such fast deployment of credit was bound to cause significant misallocation of capital. And yet banks were averse to recognize impaired loans in any good measure. In fact, during the years of rapid credit growth, banks were recognizing ever fewer amounts in absolute terms as impaired loans. They were also setting aside ever lower amounts as loan loss provisions (Chart 8, second panel). Chart 7Fiscal Policy Will Stay Constrained As Statutory Debt Has Hit The Ceiling Chart 8Both Demand And Supply Of Bank Credit In Malaysia Remains Compromised While bad debt recognition and provisions have risen modestly over the past year, Malaysia’s reported NPL ratio remained under 1.5% of loans (Chart 8, third panel). Loan loss provisions have been equally meager. This indicates that banks’ balance sheets are far from clean. In reality, Malaysian borrowers never went through any deleveraging process following their last credit binge. The bank credit-to-GDP ratio remains at around the same level as it was in 2015 (125% of GDP). By comparison, during Malaysia’s previous deleveraging phase, bank credit was shed from 150% of GDP to 90% (1998 - 2008). Borrowers already saddled with large amounts of debt are much less likely to borrow more to invest and/or consume. This is therefore going to cap credit demand. Chart 9Banks Are Piling Up On Government Securities By Shunning Loans As for banks, an increase in impaired loans makes them reticent to engage in further lending. Instead, they seek to accumulate safer assets such as government bonds. In fact, this is what Malaysian banks have been doing. They have ramped up their holdings of government securities materially since 2015 at the expense of loans and advances (Chart 9, top panel). After the pandemic-related slowdown in the economy, banks’ loan books are now probably more encumbered with impaired loans. As such, banks are even less likely to ramp up their loan books in any major way. That will be yet another headwind to economic recovery (Chart 9, bottom panel). Value In Fixed Income The headwinds to growth do not entail a bullish outlook for Malaysian equities. The outlook for Malaysian local currency bonds, however, is promising. A tightening fiscal policy amid weak domestic demand and subdued inflation is a bullish cocktail for domestic bonds. There is a good chance that Malaysian bond yields will roll over. At a minimum, they will rise less than most other EM countries or US Treasuries. Notably, Malaysia offers one of the highest real yields (nominal yield adjusted for core inflation) in Emerging Asia (Chart 10, top panel). Given the country’s mediocre growth outlook, odds are high that Malaysian local bonds will outperform their EM / Emerging Asian peers (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10Malaysian Bonds Offer One Of The Best Values In Emerging Aisa Chart 11Steep Yield Curve Indicate Value In Bond Space; But Spell Trouble For Bank Stocks The Malaysian swap curve is also far too steep given the country’s macro backdrop. Going forward, the 10-year/1-year swap curve is set to flatten from its decade-steep level of 130 basis points (Chart 11, top panel). That means investors should continue receiving 10-year swap rates. On a related note, a fall in bond yields will not augur well for Malaysian stocks in general, and bank stocks in particular. The middle panel of Chart 11 shows that bank stocks struggle in absolute terms whenever bond yields decline. Incidentally, at 38% of total, banks are by far the largest sector in the MSCI Malaysia Index. And in recent months bank stocks have been propelling the Malaysian market (Chart 11, bottom panel). Should the bourse begin to miss the tailwind from rising bond yields, Malaysian equity performance will be hobbled. Finally, investors should stay overweight in Malaysian sovereign credit. The country’s orthodox fiscal policy has accorded a defensive nature to this market. As such, periods of global risk-off witness Malaysian sovereign spreads fall relative to their EM counterparts, as they did in 2015 and again in 2020. In the months ahead, rising US inflation and a slowdown in Chinese property markets could cause another such period. That will lead Malaysian sovereign US dollar bonds to continue outperforming their EM peers. What’s With The Ringgit? Chart 12Malaysia Has Not Been Able To Benefit From A Cheap Currency The Malaysian currency is cheap, both in nominal and real terms (Chart 12, top panel). As such, it will likely be one of the most resilient currencies in EM this year. That said, the ringgit has been cheap for a while now (since 2015), and yet the Malaysian economy does not seem to have benefitted much all these years. The inability to take advantage of a cheap currency points to a fundamental malaise in the Malaysian economy: Loss of manufacturing competitiveness, as explained in our previous report on Malaysia. Perhaps equally worryingly, the country has not been able to attract much in the way of capital inflows. What this implies is that global investors did not find Malaysian assets attractive enough despite the benefits of a significantly cheaper currency (Chart 12, bottom panel). A major reason investors have not found the country attractive is because the return on capital on Malaysian assets has continued to deteriorate relative to the rest of the world. The upshot of the above is that, should Malaysian firms be able to improve their profits going forward, Malaysian stocks’ relative performance would get a boost from both higher relative earnings and a stronger currency. However, given the sluggish business cycle outlook as explained above, a sustainable rally in Malaysian stocks or currency is not imminent. Investment Conclusions Chart 13Malaysian Relative Stock Valuations Are On The Cheaper Side Equities: Malaysian stocks have cheapened. Both in terms of P/E ratio and P/book ratio, they are at the lower end of the spectrum relative to their EM counterparts (Chart 13). Yet, given the mediocre growth outlook, we recommend that dedicated EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios stay neutral on this market for now. Absolute return investors should stay on the sidelines in view of the worsening risk outlook in global markets, and wait for a better entry point later in the year. For local asset allocators in Malaysia, it is too early to overweight stocks relative to bonds over a cyclical horizon. Even though the equity risk premium in general has been much higher since the advent of the pandemic, stocks have struggled to outperform bonds in a total return basis over the past two years. That will likely be the case for several more months given the country’s growth outlook and rising global risks. Fixed Income: Malaysian domestic bonds will outperform their overall EM / Emerging Asian peers. So will Malaysian sovereign credit. Fixed income investors should overweight them in their respective EM / Emerging Asian portfolios. In the rate markets, investors should continue receiving 10-year swap rates. Finally, Malaysian yield curves are set to flatten. Investors should position for a narrowing of the 10-year/1-year yield curve, which is at a decade-high level of 180 basis points. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com
Executive Summary Macroeconomic Backdrop Favors Defensive Consumer Staples Markets now expect five-to-six rate hikes in 2022 The rate of change in rates as opposed to their level has triggered the fast and furious repricing of long-duration assets. However, rising rates are a temporary headwind to equities The repricing of the equity market came through the P/E as opposed to the “E” Demand is clearly shifting from goods to services. Supply disruptions are clearing Earnings were strong, but investors expected more We are upgrading Consumer Staples, which is a “deep” defensive sector that offers downside protection in an environment of heightened volatility and slowing economic growth Bottom Line: While it is impossible to time the market, we believe that the worst is behind us. US equities are outright oversold, and valuations are much more reasonable. However, we recommend investors be cautious in sector selection: For now, stay away from Tech, and add to Consumer Staples to reduce portfolio volatility. Feature Performance Hit Undo 2021 January had a nasty shock in store for equity investors: At the lowest point, the S&P 500 was down 12% from its peak, and NASDAQ was down 20%, officially entering correction territory. January market moves were a partial reversal of the 2021 gains (Chart 1A), with some of the hottest investment themes, such as clean energy, fintech, and Cathie Wood's innovation ETFs hit the hardest (Chart 1B). Investors were rushing to monetize their super-charged gains before the Fed starts draining liquidity off the market. Chart 1APerformance: Sectors And Styles Chart 1BPerformance: Investment Themes Post-Mortem A post-mortem of the sell-off shows that the stocks that have pulled back most, were trading at extended valuations and had long duration, i.e., companies that are not very profitable now but expect to grow earnings at a robust pace far into the future. These companies are akin to lottery tickets – a small payment now may result in a low-probability event of a high gain in the future. Small-cap growth stocks are down 30% from their peak. Over time, the sell-off of small-cap growth has spread to other areas of the market and has hit all sectors but Energy, almost indiscriminately. Overall, the S&P 500's multiple has contracted by over 10% (Chart 1C). Chart 1CJanuary Correction Was Down To Multiple Contraction Valuations And Technicals Pullbacks are responsible for equity market hygiene, cleansing the market of overextended valuations, taking the froth off the names that got ahead of themselves, and offering a reset for a new leg of upward moves, fueled by inflows into oversold names and cash deployed by new market entrants. Forward multiples of the S&P 500 have come down from 21.7x to a more reasonable 19.5x (Chart 2A). Now, 8 out of the 11 sectors have a forward PE below 20x (Chart 2B). Chart 2AMultiples Have Come Down A lot From The Peak Chart 2BValuations Moderated Across All Sectors But Energy By many technical metrics, such as the bull/bear ratio (Chart 2C), market breadth, and RSI, the market appears oversold. Many investors may consider this a good entry point. Chart 2CRetail Investors Have Capitulated Macroeconomic Backdrop Six Is The New Four This correction was triggered by a market surprised by the grave tone of Fed officials, acknowledging their concern about the intransigent, as opposed to transient, inflation. While monetary tightening has been on the cards for a while now, what a difference a month makes! In December, the market was pricing in three rate hikes in 2022, while currently, the probability of five rate hikes stands at over 90%, and of six rate hikes at over 80% (Chart 3A). The 10-year Treasury yield moved from 1.5% at the end of December to 1.87% at its January peak. It is important to note that monetary policy is still easy and it was the rate of change in rates as opposed to their level that triggered the fast and furious repricing of long-duration assets. Chart 3AInvestors Expect Five-To-Six Hikes In 2022 Is Monetary Tightening A Death Knell For US Equities? Historically, equities wobbled two-to-three months prior to the first rate hike, and then took a breather for another couple of months for the dust to settle (Chart 3B). January and now February volatility and pullbacks are textbook behavior of equities at the cusp of a new monetary regime. However, in three of the four tightening cycles since 1990, the stock market was higher a year later. The same is true for long-term rates: In all but one of the episodes of a sharp rise in the 10-year Treasury yield since 1990, the stock market rose (Table 1). Chart 3BEquities Wobble Around The First Rate Hike Table 1Equity Performance Around Periods Of Rising Treasury Yields Economic Growth: Supply (Finally) Meets Demand Of course, the best antidote to higher rates is strong economic growth. So far, everything is in order on that front, with economists projecting solid 2022 nominal GDP growth of around 7.6%. Economic growth is slowing but off high levels. At last, global supply chains are gradually unclogging, and shipping bottlenecks are starting to clear. Even automakers are now saying that auto chips are becoming more readily available. However, part of the reason that supply and demand are getting closer to each other is that demand for goods is waning, dampened by both saturation and higher costs. The latest ISM PMI reading shows that both new orders and the backlog of orders are falling (Chart 4, top panel). Prices paid have also turned, heralding that the worst of price increases may be behind us (Chart 4, bottom panel). Will this contain inflation enough to appease the Fed? Possible, but not highly likely. Chart 4Demand Is Weakening Earnings: Good But Not Good Enough With economic growth slowing, earnings and sales growth are also rolling over (Chart 5A). As investors are trying to decipher the state of the American economy, they are increasingly focused on corporate guidance. So far 12 companies offered positive guidance vs 28 with negative guidance. The Negative/Positive ratio for Q4-2021 currently stands at 2.3, compared to 0.8 in the prior four quarters. Price action in response to projected lower growth has been brutal. And while 78% of companies have beaten earnings expectations, this is a smaller share than during the other pandemic recovery quarters. The magnitude of the earnings surprise has also fallen (Chart 5B). Chart 5AEarnings And Sales Growth Are Slowing Chart 5BThe Magnitude Of Earnings Surprises Has Fallen This earnings season has also seen some of the largest moves on the back of companies’ reports. Positive surprises by Google, Microsoft, and Amazon have soothed investors' fears and led to broad-based next-day rallies, while skimpy results from PayPal and Meta, not only have sent these companies down more than 20%, erasing billions in market capitalization, but also have dragged down their nearest competitors (Square, Snap, etc.). Also, many companies are complaining about rising input and labor costs cutting into their profitability. This is hardly a surprise. According to our analysis of the NIPA accounts, in the US labor costs constitute 55% of sales. With wages rising at the fastest pace in years, their effect on corporate profitability can be meaningful (Chart 6A). To make things worse, input costs are also soaring – the latest PPI reading is 9.7%. Chart 6AMargins Are Contracting As... However, companies are more and more constrained in their ability to pass on their cost increases to customers, although the elasticity of demand varies across industries. Many companies can no longer afford to raise prices without suppressing demand for their products. Corporate pricing power has turned decisively lower (Chart 6B). As a result, profit margins have contracted across all sectors, except Energy. Bottom-line – earnings are good so far, but they have failed to allay investor fears of waning profitability. Chart 6B...Corporate Pricing Power Is Declining Sector Positioning Revenge Of The Nerds – Be Granular While we believe that equities are poised for another leg up, as economic growth remains strong and corporate earnings are decent, we recommend that investors be granular in their sector selection: Avoid areas most adversely affected by a tighter monetary regime and slowing growth. Per our previous analysis, we recommend underweighting the Technology sector on a tactical basis, but within Tech, stay overweight more defensive Software and IT Services. We also like Banks and Insurers that benefit from rising rates and prefer Value and Small over Growth. We are also constructive on Industrials, which are the primary beneficiaries of the new Capex cycle and the US industrial renaissance. Consumer Services Are Finally Rebounding In the meantime, with Omicron finally receding, consumer spending is shifting from consumer goods to services (Chart 7A). Consumers are flush with cash, and still have $2.2 trillion in their coffers. We have been overweight the Travel complex (Hotels, Restaurants, Cruises) since October. However, performance was derailed in the late fall as many consumers chose to stay at home and wait for the variant to pass. Also, many of the industries in the Travel complex have been challenged by the sheer number of staff quarantining or on sick leave. We upgraded Airlines at the beginning of January and remain optimistic about the outperformance of the Consumer Services sector. Upgrading Consumer Staples We are also upgrading Consumer Staples, which is a “deep” defensive that offers downside protection in an environment of heightened volatility and slowing economic growth (Chart 7B). Moreover, consumer confidence is down as Americans are disheartened by prices in the supermarket and at the gas station. However, demand for consumer staples is inelastic and should be inflation-proof. The sector is trading at 21x forward multiples and is expected to grow earnings at 6% over the next 12 months, bettering the S&P 500. Chart 7AWaning Demand For Goods Is Replaced By Demand For Services Chart 7BMacroeconomic Backdrop Favors Defensive Consumer Staples Investment Implications The market correction is still running its course, and while it is impossible to time the market, we believe that the worst is behind us. US equities are outright oversold, and valuations are much more reasonable. Rising rates are a temporary headwind. However, we recommend investors be cautious in sector selection: For now, stay away from Tech, and add to Consumer Staples to reduce portfolio volatility. Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com S&P 500 Chart 8Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 9Profitability Chart 10Valuations And Technicals Chart 11Uses Of Cash Communication Services Chart 12Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 13Profitability Chart 14Valuations And Technicals Chart 15Uses Of Cash Consumer Discretionary Chart 16Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 17Profitability Chart 18Valuations And Technicals Chart 19Uses Of Cash Consumer Staples Chart 20Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 21Profitability Chart 22Valuations And Technicals Chart 23Uses Of Cash Energy Chart 24Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 25Profitability Chart 26Valuations And Technicals Chart 27Uses Of Cash Financials Chart 28Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 29Profitability Chart 30Valuations And Technicals Chart 31Uses Of Cash Health Care Chart 32Sector vs Industry Groups Chart 33Profitability Chart 34Valuations And Technicals Chart 35Uses Of Cash Industrials Chart 36Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 37Profitability Chart 38Valuations And Technicals Chart 39Uses Of Cash Information Technology Chart 40Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 41Profitability Chart 42Valuations And Technicals Chart 43Uses Of Cash Materials Chart 44Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 45Profitability Chart 46Valuations And Technicals Chart 47Uses Of Cash Real Estate Chart 48Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 49Profitability Chart 50Valuations And Technicals Chart 51Uses Of Cash Utilities Chart 52Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 53Profitability Chart 54Valuations And Technicals Chart 55Uses Of Cash Recommended Allocation Footnotes
Feature Chart 1Weak Economic Fundamentals Undermine Stock Performance Monetary policy easing has intensified in the past two months. The PBoC reduced one-year loan prime rate (LPR) by 10 bps and five-year by 5 bps following last week’s 10bps cut in policy rates1 and December’s 50 bps drop in the reserve requirement rate (RRR). Nonetheless, the onshore financial market’s response to the monetary policy actions has been muted. China’s A-share market price index fell by 3% in the past month. Credit growth has bottomed, but there is no sign of a strong rebound despite recent rate decreases (Chart 1, top panel). The impaired monetary policy transmission mechanism will likely delay China’s economic recovery, which normally lags the credit cycle by six to nine months. Moreover, the marginal propensity to spend among both corporates and households continues to decline, highlighting a lack of confidence among real economy participants, and will in turn dampen the positive effects of policy stimulus (Chart 2). The poor performance of Chinese onshore stocks (in absolute terms) is due to a muted improvement in credit growth and deteriorating economic fundamentals (Chart 1, bottom panel). Our model shows that China’s corporate profits are set to contract in next six months, implying that the risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks in absolute terms is not yet attractive (Chart 3). Therefore, investors should maintain an underweight allocation to Chinese equities for the time being. Chart 2Lack Of Confidence Dampens Corporate Earnings Outlook Chart 3China's Corporate Profits Set To Contract In Next Six Months Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Improving Liquidity, Weakening Credit Demand The modest uptick in December’s total social financing (TSF) growth largely reflects a significant increase in government bond issuance, while bank loan growth continued on a downward trend (Chart 4). Corporate loan demand remained sluggish, which dragged down aggregate bank credit growth (Chart 5). Downbeat business confidence suggests that corporate demand for credit will take longer to turn around, and therefore will reduce the effectiveness of current easing measures. Chart 4Monetary Easing Since Q3 Has Failed To Boost Credit Growth So Far Chart 5Corporate Demand For Loans Weaker Than Suggested By Headline Data Meanwhile, corporate bill financing has risen rapidly in recent months and now accounts for almost 40% of new bank loans, the highest level since 2010 (Chart 5, bottom panel). The high share of short-term lending to the corporate sector highlights the underlying weakness in both loan supply and demand. Banks are risk averse and reluctant to approve longer-term credit to the corporate sector, while corporates are unwilling to take on more debt. As a result, banks have had to issue short-term bills in order to meet their lending quota. Proactive Fiscal Policy Will Have A Limited Impact On Infrastructure Investments Chart 6Local Government SPBs Will Be Frontloaded In 2022 Fiscal policy will likely be frontloaded in Q1 this year, but the impact of a proactive fiscal policy on boosting infrastructural investment may be limited. According to a statement by the Ministry of Finance last December, around RMB1.46 trillion in the quota for local government special purpose bonds (SPBs) has been frontloaded for 2022. If we assume that all of the SPBs will be issued in Q1, the amount will be higher than SPBs issued during the same period in 2019, 2020 and 2021 (Chart 6). We expect a total SPBs quota of RMB 3.5 trillion for 2022, roughly the same as 2021. This implies a zero fiscal impulse on SPBs in 2022 compared with 2021. However, there were an estimated 1.2 trillion in SPB proceeds in 2021 that local governments failed to invest and this amount could be deployed in 2022. If we add last year’s SPB carryover to this year’s quota, there may be a 30% increase in the available funds to invest in infrastructure projects in 2022. Chart 7Higher LG Bond Issuance Does Not Mean Substantial Boost In Infrastructure Spending However, a 30% jump in SPB proceeds does not suggest an equal boost in infrastructure spending this year (Chart 7). As noted in previous reports, SPBs issued by local governments only account for around 15% of total funding for infrastructure spending. Bank loans, which remain in the doldrums, are a much more significant driver in supporting the sector’s investment. Secondly, infrastructure spending has structurally downshifted since 2017 due to a sweeping financial deleveraging campaign to rein in shadow banking activity by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). Shadow banking activity, which is highly correlated with infrastructure investment growth, is stuck in a deep contraction with no signs of an imminent turnaround (Chart 7, bottom panel). Thirdly, land sales play a prominent role in local government financing, accounting for more than 40% of local government aggregate revenues2 compared with about 15% from SPBs (Chart 8). Local government fiscal spending power will be constrained due to a significant and ongoing slowdown in land sales and regulatory pressures on LGFVs (Chart 8, bottom panel). Therefore, we expect that infrastructure spending will only moderately rebound in 2022. At best, it will return to its pre-pandemic rate of around 4% (year-over-year) in 2022 (Chart 9, top panel). Notably, onshore infrastructure stocks have priced in the recent favorable news about proactive fiscal policy support in 2022 (Chart 9, bottom panel). Given that infrastructure investment will likely only improve modestly this year, on a cyclical basis the sector’s stock performance upside will be capped and renewed weakness is likely. Chart 8Government Funds Face Headwinds From Falling Land Sales Chart 9Infrastructure Investment Will Likely Recover To Its Pre-Pandemic Growth Rate More Policy Fine-Tuning Is Underway, But Housing Policy Reversal Remains Doubtful Last week’s 5bp reduction in the 5-year LPR, which serves as a benchmark for mortgage loans, was positive for the housing market. However, the cut is insufficient to revive the demand for housing. Moreover, the asymmetrical rate reductions - a 10bps drop in the 1-year LPR versus a 5bps reduction in the 5-year - signals that the authorities are reluctant to decisively reverse housing policies. Sentiment in the housing sector remains downbeat. A survey conducted by the PBoC shows that the willingness to buy a home has plunged to the lowest level since 2017 (Chart 10). Medium- to long-term household loan growth, which is highly correlated with home sales, decelerated further in December (Chart 10, bottom panel). Given that home prices continue to decline, buyers may be expecting more price discounts and refrain from making purchases despite slightly cheaper mortgage rates. Although there was a modest pickup in medium- to long-term consumer loan growth in November, it was mainly driven by pent-up mortgage applications delayed by the banks in Q3. Moreover, advance payments for real estate developers remained in contraction through end-2021. The prolonged weakness in the demand for mortgages and homes highlights our view that it will take more than a minor mortgage rate cut to revive sentiment (Chart 11). Chart 10Sentiment In Housing Market Has Plummeted To A Multi-Year Low Chart 11Funding Among Real Estate Developers Has Not Improved Without a decisive improvement in home sales, real estate developers will continue to face funding constraints, which will weigh on new investment and housing projects (Chart 12). We expect the contraction in real estate investment and housing starts to be sustained through at least 1H22 (Chart 13). Chart 12Policymakers Will Have To Allow Significant Re-leveraging To Revive Housing Demand Chart 13Real Estate Investment And Housing Starts Will Remain In Contraction Through 1H22 Chinese Export Growth Will Converge To Long-Term Growth Chart 14Vigorous Exports Provided Crucial Support To China's Economy In 2021 China’s exports grew vigorously in 2021, providing critical support to the economy. Net exports contributed 1.7 percentage points to the 8.1% rate of real GDP growth in 2021, the highest growth contribution since 2006. China’s share of global exports expanded to more than 15%, about 2 percentage points higher than the pre-pandemic average from 2015 to 2019 (Chart 14). The export sector probably will not repeat last year’s strong performance. The widening divergence of exports in value and in volume suggests that the solid aggregate value of exports has been mainly buttressed by soaring export prices since July 2021 (Chart 15). The price effect will likely gradually abate in 2022 due to easing global supply chain constraints, softer global economic growth and a high base factor from 2021. Indeed, export prices from China and other industrialized countries may have already peaked (Chart 16). Chart 15Robust Exports Growth Since 2H21 Driven By Soaring Export Prices Chart 16Export Prices May Have Peaked Services spending worldwide will likely normalize and lead global demand growth in 2022. Meanwhile, goods spending will moderate, implying weaker demand for China’s manufactured goods (Chart 17). Furthermore, China’s strong exports to emerging markets (EM) since Q2 2021 reflected supply shortages due to production interruptions in the EMs (Chart 18). We expect supply chain disruptions in these economies to ease in 2H22 when Omicron-induced infections subside and antiviral treatments become available worldwide. As such, China’s exports to those regions may gradually return to pre-pandemic levels. Chart 17US Household Consumption Will Likely Rotate From Goods To Services In 2022 Chart 18Rising Exports To EMs In 2021 May Not Continue Into 2022 China’s manufacturing utilization capacity reached a historical high in 2021, supported by hardy external demand for goods. However, profit margins in the manufacturing sector have been squeezed due to surging input costs (Chart 19). Manufacturing investment growth has been falling, reflecting the reluctance by manufacturers to expand their business operations amid narrowing profit margins (Chart 20). The profit outlook for the manufacturing sector will be at risk of deterioration when the growth in both export volumes and prices moderate in 2022. Chart 19Manufacturing Sector's Profit Margins Have Been Squeezed Chart 20Manufacturing Investment Growth And Output Volume Both Rolled Over Rising Import Prices Mask The Weakness In Chinese Domestic Demand Chinese import growth in value remained resilient through December, but has increasingly been driven by rising import prices. Import growth in volume, which is a truer picture of China’s domestic demand, decelerated at a faster rate in 2H21 (Chart 21). Credit impulse, which normally leads import growth by around six months, only ticked up slightly. The minor improvement in the rate of Chinese credit expansion will provide limited support to the country’s imports in 1H 2022 (Chart 22). Chart 21Rising Import Prices Masked The Weakness In China's Domestic Demand Chart 22Modest Rebound In Credit Impulse Will Provide Limited Support To Chinese Imports Chart 23Chinese Imports Of Key Commodities Rebounded Aimed Easing In Production Constraints The volume of Chinese-imported key commodities, such as iron ore and steel, rebounded in the past three months, but its growth remains in contraction on a year-on-year basis (Chart 23). The improvement in Chinese commodity imports, in our view, reflects an easing in production constraints rather than escalating demand. Recently released economic data, ranging from manufacturing PMI, industrial production, fixed-asset investment and construction activity, all point to an imbalanced supply-demand picture in China’s economy (discussed in the next section). Sluggish Quarterly Economic Growth At End Of 2021 China’s economy expanded by 8.1% in 2021 or at a 5.1% average annual rate in the past two years. However, quarterly GDP growth on a year-over-year basis slowed further to 4% in Q4 from 4.9% in the previous quarter. On a sequential basis, seasonally adjusted GDP growth in Q4 was 1.6 percentage points above that of Q3, but slightly below its historical mean (Chart 24). Chart 24Subdued GDP Growth In Q4 Chart 25Investment And Consumption Have Been Poor Economic Links Chart 26Softness In Investment And Consumption More Than Offset Robust Exports Although industrial production accelerated somewhat in December, it reflects a catch-up phase following a period of constrained output amid last fall’s energy crisis (Chart 25). On the other hand, lackluster domestic demand and a further slowdown in the housing market significantly dragged down China’s economic expansion in Q4. Both fixed-asset investment and consumption decelerated significantly in 2021 Q4, more than offsetting an improvement in net exports (Chart 26, top panel). Notably, year-over-year growth rates in construction and real estate components of real GDP fell below zero in Q4 (Chart 26, bottom panel). In light of the subdued credit growth through end-2021, China’s economic activity will not regain its footing until mid-2022. Slow Recovery In Household Consumption Likely Through 1H22 The household consumption recovery was sluggish in 2021 and it will face strong headwinds at least through 1H22. China’s consumption recovery has been hindered by a worsening labor market situation, depressed household sentiment and renewed threats from flareups in domestic COVID-19 cases. China’s labor market situation shows a mixed picture. The urban unemployment rate has dropped to pre-pandemic levels and stabilized at 5.1% in December. It remains well within the government’s 2021 unemployment target of “around 5.5%”. However, urban new job creations plunged sharply and the number of migrant workers returning to the cities remains far below the pre-pandemic trend (Chart 27). China’s imbalanced economic recovery in the past two years led to a substantially slower pace of job creation in labor-intensive service sectors (Chart 28). Moreover, wages have been cut and the unemployment rate among younger workers have climbed rapidly in sectors suffering from last year’s regulatory crackdowns in real estate, education and internet platforms. Even though policies have recently eased at margin, it will take time for labor market dynamics (a lagging indicator) to improve. Chart 27Labor Market Situation Is Worsening Chart 28Imbalanced Economic Recovery Led To A Mixed Picture In The Labor Market Chinese household expenditures have lagged disposable incomes since the outbreak of the pandemic (Chart 29). The propensity to consume has declined since 2018 and the downward trend has been exacerbated by the pandemic since early 2020 along with a soaring preference to save (Chart 30). Chart 29Chinese Household Expenditures Have Lagged Disposable Income Growth Chart 30Poor Sentiment On Future Income Contributes To Consumers' Unwillingness To Spend Household consumption also faces renewed threats from increases in domestic COVID-19 cases. Since Q3 last year, more frequent city-wide lockdowns and inter-regional travel bans have had profound negative effects on the country’s service sector and retail sales (Chart 31 & 32). Omicron has also spread to China, triggering new waves of stringent countermeasures. China will not abandon its zero-tolerance policy towards COVID anytime soon, thus we expect the stop-and-go economic reopening to continue to weigh on the country’s service sector activity and consumption at least through 1H22. Chart 32Service Sector Activities Struggle To Return To Pre-Pandemic Trends Chart 31China's Stringent COVID Countermeasures Will Curb Service Sector Recovery In 2022 Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Footnotes 1 The 7-day reverse repo and the 1-year Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF) rates. 2 Including local government budgetary and managed funds revenues. Strategic View Cyclical Recommendations Tactical Recommendations
Dear Clients, This is the final publication for the year, in which we recap some of the key economic developments this month. Our publishing schedule will resume on January 6, 2022. The China Investment Strategy team wishes you a very happy and safe holiday season and a prosperous New Year! Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Feature Recently released data show China’s economy is weakening despite easing monetary policy and power-supply constraints. Our credit impulse – measured by the year-on-year change in total social financing as a share of GDP – inched up in November (Chart 1, top panel). Given that the indicator leads economic activity by about six to nine months, we maintain the view that China’s economy will not bottom until Q2 next year. Chinese stocks, driven by business cycle, will remain under downward pressures in the next three to six months (Chart 1, middle and bottom panels). On the policy front, the PBoC announced a 50bps cut in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) rate taking effect in mid-December. Last week’s Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) signaled that stabilizing the economy will be the government’s core policy objective for 2022. However, we believe that policymakers will be data dependent and will only allow an overshoot in credit growth when the slowdown in the economy gathers pace in early 2022. Thus, investors should maintain an underweight allocation to Chinese equities relative to global stocks, at least for the next three to six months, until credit growth significantly improves. Chart 1Downside Risks Remain High For Chinese Stocks Until The Econmomy Troughs Chart 2Chinese Internet Stocks Are Not Cheap Chinese investable stocks, particularly internet companies, will continue to face geopolitical and regulatory headwinds in the next 12 months. Chinese tech stocks sold off this year, but they are not cheap (Chart 2). Economic weakness in the onshore market in the next three to six months may trigger more selloffs and further multiples compressions in Chinese investable stocks. Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Cuts To The RRR And Relending Rates: Not Game Changers Chart 3RRR Cut Is Not A Game Changer Following the RRR cut announcement in early December, the PBoC announced a 25bps decrease in the relending rate targeting agriculture and small businesses (Chart 3). The measures sent an easing signal in response to mounting downside risks in the economy. However, their impact on credit growth will likely be limited for the following reasons: First, the PBoC indicated that the RRR cut will release around RMB1.2 trillion in liquidity to the banks. From that amount, RMB950 billion will be used to replace maturing Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF) this month, which leaves only RMB250 billion for new liquidity injection. Chart 4Business Conditions For SMEs Deteriorated Faster Than For Larger Businesses Secondly, the PBoC is trying to prevent a jump in market-based rates in the next two quarters. Demand for liquidity is usually high due to tax season by year-end plus a front-loading of local government bond (LGB) issuance. Moreover, the Chinese New Year in Q1 2022 will further boost demand for liquidity. Thirdly, the targeted relending rate drop is intended to lower the borrowing costs of small-medium enterprises (SMEs) whose profitability has been challenged by rising input costs and sluggish consumer demand (Chart 4). Loan demand from small enterprises, as shown in the PBoC survey, peaked much earlier and tumbled more rapidly than their larger peers (Chart 4, bottom panel). The rate cut has decreased the possibility of a broadly based decline in interest rates in the near-term. China’s Credit Growth May Have Bottomed, But The Rebound Is Moderate Chart 5Below-Expectation Credit Growth In November China’s aggregate credit growth ticked up slightly in November. The modest advance mainly reflects an acceleration in LGB issuance. Chart 5 highlights that excluding LGB financing, China’s credit impulse remains on a downward trend. LGBs will be frontloaded in Q1 2022 before the March National People’s Congress sets the full-year quota for LGBs. However, without a meaningful rebound in bank loan growth, the effects of LGB issuance on infrastructure investment will be limited and short-lived, as occurred in Q1 2019 (Chart 6). Shadow banking, which historically has had a tight correlation with infrastructure investment, continued to slide in November to an all-time low. Infrastructure project approval also does not show any signs of strengthening (Chart 7). Chart 6Improvement In Infrastructure Investment Will Be Limited Without An Acceleration In Loan Growth Chart 7Key Indicators Show Weak Signs Of Revival In Infrastructure Spending Weak demand for bank loans from corporations dragged down credit growth in November as evidenced by softening growth in medium- and long-term corporate loans (Chart 8). Both corporate financing needs and investment willingness continued to wane, implying that corporate demand for bank lending may not turn around soon despite recent monetary easing (Chart 8, bottom panel). In addition, marginal easing measures in the property market have not worked their way into the sector. Bank loans to real estate developers plummeted to all-time lows last month, while trust loans contracted significantly in November, which indicates that financing conditions for real estate developers have not improved (Chart 9). Chart 8Loan Demand Remains Weak And Unlikely To Turn Around Imminently Chart 9Deepening Contraction In Trust Loans Indicates Deteriorating Financing Conditions For Real Estate Developers Easing Of Property Restrictions Will Marginally Benefit The Housing Market Last week’s Politburo meeting and the CEWC both proposed to promote affordable rental housing and support reasonable housing demand. Loan growth to government-subsidized social welfare housing has been decelerating since 2018 and started to contract this year (Chart 10). It will likely strengthen next year amid policy support, but from a very low level and at a modest rate. In addition, although social welfare housing loans account for around 40% of bank loans to real estate developers, they are only about 6% of developers’ total source of funding as of 2020. We expect more policy finetuning in the coming months, which may help slow the pace of deterioration in real estate developers’ financing conditions. Real estate developers’ financing from banks may bottom on the back of government’s intervention, but the improvement in total funds to developers will be gradual without mortgage rate cuts and a pickup in home sales (Chart 11). Meanwhile, the downward trend in housing completion will be sustained in the coming months (Chart 11, top panel). Chart 10Bank Loans To Social Welfare Housing Will Likely Improve Modestly Amid Policy Support Chart 11Less Funding = Reduced Completions And Investments Housing prices in most Tier-one and Tier-two cities continued to move down through November. Data for high-frequency floor space sold show that housing demand continued to abate last month despite a modest uptick in household mortgage loans (Chart 12). Home sales will remain depressed as buyers expect more discounts in housing prices and real estate tax reforms loom. Falling prices and constraints in developers’ financing will continue to weigh on housing starts, given the strong positive correlation between property starts and housing prices (Chart 13). Chart 12Demand For Housing In November Showed Little Signs Of Revival Chart 13Housing Starts Are Highly Correlated With Prices The Rebound In November’s PMI Does Not Signal A Bottom In China’s Economy Chart 14China's PMI Rebounds Amid Supply-Side Improvement The NBS manufacturing PMI returned to above the 50-expansionary threshold in November, but the rise reflects a near-term supply-side improvement related to the power shortage rather than a demand-driven recovery (Chart 14). China’s overall business conditions and domestic demand are still worsening, indicating that the rebound in the manufacturing PMI may be short-lived. The production subindex jumped by three and half percentage points in November from October, reflecting re-started operation of heavy-industry enterprises that were halted amid electricity shortages in September and October. Robust global demand for China’s manufactured goods supported a strong reading in November’s new export orders subindex. However, domestic demand remains lackluster. A proxy for the new domestic orders derived from the PMI reached its lowest level since February 2020 (Chart 14, bottom panel). In addition, service PMI weakened last month. A sharp resurgence in domestic COVID cases curbed service sector activity last month. Given uncertainties surrounding the Omicron variant and China’s zero-tolerance policy towards COVID, the service sector’s recovery will likely remain below-trend into 1H 2022 (Chart 15 and 16). Chart 15Lingering COVID Effects Will Continue To Impede Service Sector Activity In 1H22 Chart 16Service Sector Recovery In China Has Lagged Inflation Passthroughs Ongoing Producer price index (PPI) inflation may have peaked. Meanwhile, the consumer price index (CPI) shows another upturn in November. Despite the peak in PPI inflation, it will likely remain above trend through at least 1H22, supported by elevated commodity and energy prices (Chart 17). Chart 17PPI May Have Peaked, But Will Remain Elevated In The Near Term Chart 18Ongoing Inflation Passthroughs A synchronized rise between PPI consumer goods and non-food CPI, and a narrower gap between PPI and CPI inflation, suggest an ongoing inflation passthrough from producers to consumers (Chart 18). Price increases in some key sectors of manufactured consumer goods sped up in November (Chart 19). However, we do not think China’s consumer price inflation will prevent policymakers from further policy easing. Consumer goods prices are lightly weighted in China’s CPI. An acceleration in inflation passthroughs in this component is unlikely to significantly push up the CPI aggregates. Headline CPI may gather steam next year if food prices rise while energy prices remain at current levels. Nonetheless, in recent years China’s monetary policymaking has been more tightly correlated with the PPI and core CPI, and not headline CPI (Chart 20). Chart 19Manufactured Consumer Goods Prices On The Rise Chart 20Monetary Policy Is Tightly Correlated With Core CPI And Not Headline CPI Surging Prices Underpin China’s Exports, While The Rebound In Imports Is Unsustainable Chart 21Surging Export Prices Underpinned Strong Growth In The Value Of China's Exports Chinese exports in volume tumbled in November, however, surging export prices underpinned the strong growth in the value of exports (Chart 21). Demand from the US drove Chinese exports this year and the moderation in volume growth was more than offset by escalating prices (Chart 22). China’s export prices have caught up with the global average (Chart 23). Chart 22Strong Demand From US Has Driven Up China's Exports Chart 23Chinese Export Prices Have Caught Up With The Global Average We expect China’s export growth to slow in the new year on the back of softer global growth and a rotation in US household consumption from goods to services (Chart 24). However, while slowing, global economic growth is projected to remain above trend. The low level of industrial inventories will also provide support to the demand for goods, which will help to sustain strong growth in Chinese exports (Chart 25). China’s imports surprised to the upside in November, boosted by imports of commodities such as coal and crude oil. November’s acceleration in imports reflects a higher demand for primary commodities from Chinese producers, who recovered some production capacity from the power shortages in the previous few months. Chart 24US Household Spending Will Shift From Goods To Services Chart 25Inventory Restocking In The US Will Support Chinese Exports Next Year Furthermore, the increase in import prices in November outpaced the very modest uptick in the volume of imports, indicating that domestic demand remains sluggish (Chart 26). Credit growth, which normally leads import growth by about six months, only climbed moderately in November and will provide limited support to imports in the coming months (Chart 27). Chart 26Rising Import Prices Masked Weakness In China's Domestic Demand Chart 27Modest Rebound In Credit Impulse Will Provide Little Support To Chinese Imports Chart 28Chinese Demand For Industrial Metals Remains In Deep Contraction China’s imports of industrial metals, such as copper and steel, improved a little in November, but their year-on-year growth remains in deep contraction (Chart 28). Weakening construction activity amid a continued downtrend in China’s property market will likely reduce the demand for industrial metals. Therefore, the rebound in November’s import growth may be short-lived. The RMB Faces Headwinds In 2022 Regardless Of A Rise In FX Deposit RRR The RMB has climbed about 2% against the dollar since late July despite broad-based dollar strength. In trade-weighted terms, the RMB is at its strongest level since late 2015 (Chart 29). A rapidly appreciating RMB does not bode well for China’s industrial sector profits, and thus not at the PBoC’s best interests (Chart 30). Under this backdrop, last week the PBoC announced that it will raise the banks’ foreign exchange (FX) deposit reserve requirement ratio (RRR) to 9% from 7%, effective December 15. This is the second increase this year aimed at easing the RMB’s pace of appreciation. The RMB fell slightly against the US dollar following the announcement last week. Chart 29The RMB Has Strengthened Despite A Strong USD Chart 30Strengthening RMB Does Not Bode Well For Corporate Profit Growth The RMB appreciation against dollar this year was mainly enhanced by China’s record current account surplus and favorable interest rate differentials between China and the US (Chart 31 and 32). Although the increase in the deposit RRR rate will force banks to hold more foreign currencies and lift the cost of RMB speculation, the RRR hike itself has little impact on altering the existing path in RMB exchange rate. Moreover, the balance of FX deposits stands at US$1 trillion as of November this year. The 200bps increase in the FX deposit reserve ratio will only freeze about US$20 billion in FX liquidity, which is negligible compared with the US$580 billion in China’s trade surplus so far this year. Chart 31Current Account Surplus Will Likely Shrink Next Year Chart 32Interest Rate Differentials Will Narrow Further However, looking forward the conditions favored RMB this year are at risk of reversing in 2022. China’s weaker economic fundamentals and a slower pace in trade surplus next year, as well as narrowed interest rate differentials between the US and China due to falling long-duration bond yields in China, will provide headwinds to RMB. Therefore, investors should closely follow these key factors and to be cautious to bet on continued RMB appreciation. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Footnotes Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance
Dear Clients, Next week, in addition to sending you the China Macro And Market Review, we will be presenting our 2022 outlook on China at our last webcasts of the year “China 2021 Key Views: A Challenging Balancing Act”. The webcasts will be held Wednesday, December 15 at 10:00 am EDT (English) and Thursday, December 16 at 9:00 am HKT (Mandarin). Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Highlights China’s policymakers are balancing between staying the course with structural reforms and stabilizing the economy. This carefully calibrated approach means that Beijing will only initiate piecemeal policy easing in the near term. China will ramp up investment in the new economy, which is too small to fully offset the drag on the aggregate economy from weakening old economy sectors. In the next three to six months, the economy will deteriorate further, but Beijing will only press the stimulus accelerator harder if their pressure points are breached. A zero-tolerance policy towards COVID will be maintained for the foreseeable future. Uncertainties surrounding the Omicron variant will reinforce this approach. The common prosperity policy initiative will likely accelerate ahead of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (NCCCP) in the fall of 2022. While the plan will ultimately benefit income and consumption for the majority of Chinese households, the uncertainties surrounding impending tax reforms will curb demand for housing and luxury goods in the short term. We remain underweight Chinese stocks. Prices for onshore stocks will likely fall in the next three to six months when the market starts to price in lower-than-expected economic growth and disappointing stimulus. Selloffs in the first half of 2022 may present an opportunity to turn positive on onshore stocks in absolute terms. We will turn bullish on Chinese stocks relative to global equities only when credit expansion overshoots weakness in the economy, which has a low likelihood. We continue to favor onshore stocks versus offshore within a Chinese equity portfolio. Tensions between the US and China may intensify leading up to the political events next year. Chinese offshore stocks, highly concentrated in internet companies, still face the risks of being caught in both geopolitical crossfires and domestic regulatory pressures. Feature China’s economy slowed significantly in 2H21, with the extent of policy tightening and magnitude of the decline in growth much larger than global investors expected. As we forecasted in our last year’s Key Views report, 2021 marked the beginning of a new era in which policymakers would switch gears from building a "moderately prosperous society" to becoming a "great modern socialist nation”.The pivot means that officials would tolerate slower economic growth, implement tougher financial and industry regulations, and accelerate structural reforms. On the cusp of 2022, we are cautious about the willingness of China’s top leadership to initiate large-scale policy easing. Even though policy tone has shifted to a more pro-growth bias, authorities are still trying to replace old economic drivers with the new economy sectors. Furthermore, they are struggling to maintain a delicate balance between boosting short-term growth and maintaining long-term reforms goals. As a result, their policies are sending mixed signals. As seen in 2018 and 2019, the policymakers’ reluctance to activate a full-scale stimulus does not bode well for global commodity prices. Chinese onshore stocks underperformed their global counterparts during the 2018-19 period. Chinese stocks will face nontrivial headwinds in the coming months and warrant a cautious stance until more stimulus is introduced and the macro picture begins to meaningfully improve. The main themes in our outlook for 2022 are discussed below. Key View #1: Balancing Between The Old And New Economies Despite a recent pro-growth bias in the policy tone, the speed of easing has been incremental and the magnitude piecemeal. Moreover, authorities are telegraphing policy support in new economy sectors (such as high tech and clean energy), while only somewhat loosening restrictions in old economy sectors (mainly property and infrastructure). Chart 1Current Easing Path Is Looking A Lot Like In 2018/19 China’s policy framework has shifted since late 2017 as we noted in previous reports. The top leadership is more determined to stay the course with reforms and tolerate slower growth in the old economy. Our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator highlights policymakers’ carefully calibrated policy actions to avoid a dramatic overshoot of credit growth; these actions are consistent with 2018/19 and starkly contrast with policy frameworks in 2012 and 2015. Monetary conditions have meaningfully eased, but the rebound in money supply and credit growth has lagged and is muted due to heightened regulatory oversight (Chart 1). Investors should keep low expectations about the policymakers’ willingness to boost growth in old economy sectors. The easing of restrictions in property sector – from prompting banks to resume lending to qualified homebuyers and developers, to allowing funding for developers to acquire distressed real estate assets – are steps to alleviate an escalating risk of widespread bankruptcies among real estate developers. However, regulators have not changed the direction of their structural policies. Funding constraints placed on both developers and banks since last August remain intact. Banks still need to meet the “two red lines” that set the upper limit on the portion of their lending to the property sector, while developers must bring their leverage ratios below the “three red lines” by end-2023. Maintaining these binding constraints on developers and banks will continue to weigh on the housing market in the coming years. The recent easing may reduce the intensity of funding constraints, but the banks will be extremely cautious to extend lending to a broad range of developers. Aggressive crackdowns on property market speculation in the past 12 months has fundamentally shifted both developers’ and consumers’ expectations for future home prices. Growth in home sales and new projects dropped to their 2015 lows, while current real estate inventories are comparable to 2015 highs (Chart 2). Therefore, unless regulators are willing to initiate more aggressive policy boosts, such as cutting mortgage rates and/or providing government funds to monetize inventory excesses in the housing market, the current easing measures probably will not revive sentiment in the property market. Thus, odds are that the property market downtrend will extend through 2022 (Chart 3). Chart 2Downward Momentum In Property Market Comparable To 2015 Chart 3Policymakers Will Have To Allow Significant Re-leveraging To Revive The Market Chart 4Key Indicators Show Weak Signs Of Revival In Infrastructure Spending We expect some modest increase in infrastructure spending next year from the meager 0.7% growth in 2021, but we are skeptical that policymakers will allow any substantial rebound. Shadow banking activity and infrastructure project approval, two key indicators we monitor for signs of a meaningful easing in infrastructure spending, show little improvement (Chart 4). Our outlook for infrastructure investment is based on the following: Since 2017 policymakers have assumed a much more hawkish approach toward reducing investment in the capital-intensive and unproductive old economic sectors. Next year’s 20th NCCCP will not fundamentally change this policy setting. The 19th NCCCP in late 2017 deviated from the past; infrastructure investment growth downshifted following the event, whereas significant spending boosts had followed previous NCCCPs (Chart 5). Beijing adhered to its structural downshift in infrastructure spending even during the 2018/19 US-China trade war and after last year’s pandemic-induced economic contraction. Chart 5Infrastructure Investment Shifted To A Lower Gear Following The 19th NCCCP Secondly, government spending since 2017 has tilted towards social welfare over building “bridges to nowhere”, a meaningful change from the past and in keeping with President Xi Jinping’s political priorities (Chart 6). The trend will likely continue next year because local governments need to maintain large social welfare budgets to counter the economic impact of the prolonged domestic battle against COVID. Local government revenues, on the other hand, will be reduced due to slumping land sales. Thirdly, there has been strong policy guidance by the central government to shift investment to the new economy sectors and away from traditional infrastructure projects. The PBoC in early November launched the carbon emission reduction facility (CERF) to offer low interest loans to financial institutions that help firms cut carbon emissions. China’s new economy sectors have experienced rapid growth in recent years, but in the short-term, infrastructure spending in those sectors will not fully offset a reduction in traditional infrastructure (Chart 7). The combined spending in tech infrastructure (including information transmission such as 5G technology and services) and green energy stood at RMB1.6 trillion last year, compared with the RMB19 trillion investment in traditional infrastructure and RMB14 trillion in the real estate sector. Bottom Line: Beijing will continue to push for investment in new economy sectors since the leadership is determined to reduce dependency on unproductive segments of the economy. Even as the economy slows, they will be reluctant to ramp up leverage and channel capital to the old economy sectors. Unfortunately, the small size of the new economy’s sectors versus the old economy will inhibit their ability to stabilize and accelerate economic growth via these policies. Key View #2: The Pressure Points We do not think Beijing will allow the economy to freefall past the “point of no return”. The economy still needs to grow by 4.5-5.0% per annum between 2021 and 2035 to achieve the target of doubling GDP by 2035 (Chart 8A and 8B). Chart 8AThe Structural Downshift In Chinese Growth Will Continue… Chart 8B...But A 5%+/- Rate Of Growth Will Keep China Well On Track Of Doubling Its GDP By 2035 Investors should watch the following pressure points to assess whether China’s leaders will feel the urgency to turn policy to outright reflationary: A collapse in onshore financial market prices. China’s economic fundamentals will weaken further in the next three to six months and the risks to Chinese equity prices are on the downside. However, the odds are still low that the onshore equity, bond and currency markets will plunge as in 2015. Onshore stocks are cheaper than during the height of their 2015 boom-bust cycle, margin trading remains well below its 2015 level and economic fundamentals are stronger (Chart 9). Selloffs by global investors in China’s offshore equity and high-yield bond markets have not triggered much panic in the onshore markets and, therefore, will not drive Beijing to change its macro policy (Chart 10). Chart 9Valuations In Chinese Stocks Are Not As Extreme As In 2015 Chart 10Onshore Markets Have Been Relatively Calm Chart 11China/US Growth Rates In 2022 Will Be Uncomfortably Close, Based On IMF Forecasts Narrowing growth differentials between China and the US. In the IMF’s October World Economic Outlook, economic growth in 2022 for China and the US is projected at 5.6% and 5.2%, respectively. The forecast suggests that next year the growth differential between the two largest economies will be narrowed to less than one percentage point, rarely seen in China’s post-reform history (Chart 11). Notably, the most recent Bloomberg consensus estimate for the 2022 US real GDP growth is much lower at 3.9%, whereas China is expected to grow by 5.3% and in line with the IMF forecast. We do not suggest that Beijing will make its policy decisions based on these growth projections. Rather, we expect that if China’s growth in 1H22 falls behind that in the US, Chinese policymakers will feel an urgency to stimulate the economy and show a better economic scorecard ahead of the all-important 20th NCCCP next fall. Rising unemployment. Current data shows a mixed picture. Unemployment rates have been falling in all age groups (Chart 12). Demand for labor in urban areas, on the other hand, has been shrinking (Chart 13). The employment subindex in China’s service PMIs has also been dropping. Our view is that the resilient export/manufacturing sector has provided strong support to employment this year, while the labor supply in urban areas has been sluggish due to tighter travel restrictions and frequent regional lockdowns. The combination of strong manufacturing demand for labor and a lack of supply has reduced excesses in the labor market and the urgency to stimulate the economy (Chart 13, bottom panels). However, the picture could change if China’s exports start to slow into next year. Chart 12China's Unemployment Rate Is Falling... Chart 13...But Demand For Labor Is Also Falling Bottom Line: In the coming year, investors should watch for three pressure points that may trigger more forceful growth-supporting actions from policymakers: the onshore financial markets, economic growth differentials between the US and China, and labor market dynamics. Key View #3: The Exit Strategy Chart 14Service Sector Activities Have Been Restricted By Domestic Covid Cases And Frequent Lockdowns China will not completely lift its zero-tolerance policy toward COVID in the coming year. We will likely see tightened domestic preventive measures leading to the Beijing Olympics in February and the NCCCP in October. The zero-tolerance policy cannot be sustained in the long run; China’s stringent counter-COVID measures have created a stop-and-go pattern in China’s service sector, which has taken a toll on household consumption (Chart 14). As such, Chinese policymakers will face a trade-off between hefty economic costs from its current counter-COVID measures, and the potential social costs and risks if there is a dramatic increase in domestic COVID cases. China is estimated to have fully vaccinated more than 80% of its citizens and is close to launching its own mRNA vaccine next year to be used as a booster shot. However, the inoculation rate will likely matter less to Beijing’s decision to relax its draconian approach towards COVID given the emergence of the virulent Omicron variant. Recent statement by China's top respiratory experts suggests that China will return to normalcy if fatality rate of COVID-19 drops to around 0.1%, and when R0 (the virus reproduction ratio) sits between 1 and 1.5. A more important factor that could influence Beijing’s decision is the development and effectiveness of anti-viral drug treatments. Pfizer recently announced that its anti-viral oral drug Paxlovid can reduce the hospitalization and death rates by 89% if taken within three days of the onset of symptoms. The drug-maker has announced its intention to produce enough of the medication to treat 50 million people in 2022. China’s Tsinghua University has also developed an antibody combination drug that may reduce hospitalization and mortality by 78% and is expected to be approved by Chinese regulators within this year. Beijing’s decision to abandon its zero-tolerance policy, therefore, will be based on the combined effectiveness of both vaccines and treatments. If clinical trials prove that the new antiviral drugs are effective in treating COVID patients, combined with China’s aggressive rollout of booster shots, then Beijing may incrementally relax its COVID containment measures by late 2022 or early 2023. Bottom Line: China will not loosen its zero-tolerance policy until a combination of vaccines and treatments proves to be effective against COVID. Key View #4: Common Prosperity Will Gather Steam We expect the notion of common prosperity espoused by President Xi Jinping to gain momentum ahead of the 20th NCCCP. Beijing will likely roll out measures to support consumption, particularly for low-income households. At the same time, there is a high possibility that policymakers will introduce taxes on luxury goods and accelerate the legislative process on real estate taxes. Chart 15The Slump In Property Market Will Likely Be An Extended One The property market will remain in a limbo in 2022. In the near term, potential homebuyers will likely maintain their wait-and-see attitude before details of real estate taxes are disclosed. Home sales will remain in contraction despite improved mortgage lending conditions (Chart 15). Consumption taxes are expected to increase, targeting consumer discretionary and/or luxury goods. Chinese consumption of luxury goods benefited from government pro-growth measures last year, flush liquidity in the market and global travel restrictions. Meanwhile, growth in aggregate household income and consumption has been lackluster. President Xi Jinping’s common prosperity policy initiative is intended to narrow the income and wealth gap between the rich and poor. Moreover, empirical studies show that the marginal propensity to consume among lower- and middle-income groups, which account for more than 80% of China’s total population, is significantly higher than that of high-income groups. We expect more support for lower income groups as Beijing looks to stabilize the economy and narrow the wealth gap. Bottom Line: There is a high probability that policymakers will introduce taxes on the consumption of luxury goods and initiate the legislative process on real estate taxes in the next 12 months. Investment Conclusions Chinese stocks in both the onshore and offshore markets have cheapened relative to global equities. However, in absolute terms onshore stocks are not unduly cheap and offshore stocks are cheap for a reason (Chart 16). We remain defensive in our investment strategy for Chinese stocks in the next two quarters, given the headwinds facing the onshore and offshore markets. We do not rule out the possibility that China’s authorities will stimulate more forcefully in the next 12 months. However, for Chinese policymakers to ramp up leverage again, the near-term dynamics in the country’s economic cycle will have to significantly worsen. Chinese stocks will sell off in this scenario, but the selloff will provide investors with a good buying opportunity in the expectation of a more decisive stimulus (Chart 17). Chart 16Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap, While Offshore Stocks Are Cheap For A Reason Chart 17Selloff Risks Are High Before The Economy Stabilizes Chart 18A Deja Vu Of 2018-2019? If the economy slows in an orderly and gradual manner, then there is a slim chance that policymakers will allow an overshoot in stimulus. The Politburo meeting on Monday sent a stronger pro-growth message, the PBoC cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) rate by 50bps, and regulators will likely allow a front-loading of local government special-purpose bonds in Q1 next year. However, based on the lessons learned in 2019, regulators can be quick to scale back policy support if they see there is a risk of overshooting in credit expansion (Chart 18). The measured stimulus during the 2018-2019 period did not bode well for Chinese stocks or global commodity prices (Chart 19A and 19B). Meanwhile, we do not think the recent selloff in offshore stocks provided good buying opportunities. In the next 6 to 12 months, any tactical rebound in Chinese investable stocks will present a good selling point. Chart 19AChina's Measured Stimulus In 2018-2019 Did Not Bode Well For Global Commodity Prices Chart 19BChinese Stocks Underperformed In 2018-2019 Investable stocks, highly concentrated in China’s internet companies, are caught in domestic regulatory clampdowns and geopolitical crossfires. We expect tensions between China and the US to intensify in 2022 in light of next fall’s 20th NCCCP in China and mid-term elections in the US. Furthermore, Didi Global’s decision to delist from the New York Stock Exchange last week highlights that both China and the US are unanimous in their efforts (although for different reasons) to remove Chinese firms from US bourses. Risks associated with future delisting of Chinese firms will continue to depress the valuations of Chinese technology stocks. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance