Currencies

Highlights We cannot predict how China will manage Evergrande precisely but we have a high conviction that it will do whatever it takes to prevent contagion across the property sector. However, China’s stimulus tools are losing their effectiveness over time. The country is due for a prolonged struggle with financial and economic instability regardless of whether Evergrande defaults. A messy default would obviously exacerbate the problem. China’s regulatory crackdowns target private companies and will continue to weigh on animal spirits in the private sector. The government will be forced to use fiscal policy to compensate. The US’s and China’s switch from engagement to confrontation poses a persistent headwind for investor sentiment toward China. The new consensus that investors should buy into China’s “strategic sectors” to avoid arbitrary regulatory crackdowns is vulnerable to its own logic and to sanctions by the US and its allies. Feature China poses a unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks and global markets are now pricing them. Property giant Evergrande could default on $120 million in onshore and offshore interest payments as early as September 23, or next month, prompting investors to run for cover. Is this crisis fleeting or part of a larger systemic failure? It is a larger systemic failure. We expect a slow-motion, Japanese-style crisis over the coming decade, marked with periodic bailouts and stimulus packages. We recommend investors stay the course: steer clear of China and stay short the renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Tactically, stick with large caps, defensive sectors, and developed markets within the global equity universe. Strategically, prefer emerging markets that benefit from forthcoming Chinese (and American) stimulus. 1. A “Minsky Moment” Cannot Be Ruled Out The chief fear is whether the approaching default of Evergrande marks China’s “Minsky Moment.” Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis held that long periods of stable revenues lead to risky financial deals and large accumulations of systemic risk that are underpriced. When revenues cannot cover interest payments, a crash ensues followed by deleveraging. Minsky’s hypothesis speaks to debt crises in an entire economy, yet nobody knows for sure whether China’s economy has reached such a breaking point. China’s national savings rate stands at 45.7% of GDP and nominal growth exceeds the long-term government bond yield. However, a sharp drop in asset prices, especially in the property sector, could change everything, as it could lead to balance sheet recession among corporates and a fall in national income. Evergrande is supposed to make an $84 million interest payment on offshore debt and a $36 million payment on onshore debt this week, and after 30 days it would default. It owes $37 billion in debt payments over the next 12 months but only has $13 billion cash on hand (as of June 30, 2021). Authorities can opt for a full bailout or a partial bailout, in which the company defaults on offshore bonds but not onshore. They could even let the company fail categorically, though that would produce exactly the kind of precipitous drop in property asset prices that would lead to wider financial contagion. State intervention to smooth the crisis is more likely – and the government can easily pressure other companies into acquiring Evergrande’s assets and business divisions. Chart 1Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Chart 1 shows that China’s corporate debt-to-GDP ratio stands head and shoulders above other countries that experienced financial crises in recent decades, courtesy of our Emerging Markets Strategy. While China can undoubtedly bear large debts due to its savings, the implication is that China has large enough financial imbalances to suffer a full-fledged financial crisis, even if the timing is hard to predict. Household credit is also elevated at 61.7% of GDP, and the household debt-to-disposable-income ratio is now higher than in the United States. About two-thirds of China’s corporate debt is held by state-owned or state-controlled entities, prompting some investors to dismiss the gravity of the risk. However, financial crises often involve the transfer of debt from the state to private sector or vice versa. 59% of bond defaults in H1 2021 have involved state companies. Total debt is the main concern. Don’t take our word for it: China’s Communist Party has warned for the past decade about the danger of “implicit guarantees” and “moral hazard” that encourage financial excesses in the corporate sector. The Xi Jinping administration has tried to induce a deleveraging process since it came to power in 2012-13. Xi’s “three red lines” for the property sector precipitated the current turmoil. Even if Evergrande’s troubles are managed, China’s systemic risks will continue to boil over as its potential growth rate slows and the government continues trying to wring out financial excesses. Chart 2Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher More broadly China is experiencing an unprecedented overlap of economic and political crises: The population is aging and labor force is shrinking; The economic model since 2009 has been changing from export-manufacturing to domestic-oriented, investment-driven growth; Indebtedness is spreading from corporates to households and ultimately the government; The governance model is shifting from “single-party rule” to “single-person rule” or autocracy; The population is reaching middle class status and demanding better quality of life; The international trade environment is turning from hyper-globalization to hypo-globalization; The geopolitical backdrop is darkening with the US and its allies attempting to contain China’s ambitions of regional supremacy. Almost all of these changes bring more risks than opportunities to China over the long haul. The need for rapid policy shifts provides the ostensible reasoning for President Xi Jinping’s decision not to step down but to remain president for the foreseeable future. He will clinch this position at the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. The implication is that policy uncertainty will continue climbing up to at least 2019 peaks while offshore equity markets will continue to trend lower, as they have done since the onset of the US trade war (Chart 2). Credit default swap rates have so far been subdued but they are showing signs of life. A sharp rise in policy uncertainty and property sector stress would pull them up. Domestic equities (A-shares) have rallied since 2019 but we would expect them to fall back given China’s historic confluence of structural and cyclical challenges, which will create further negative surprises (Chart 2, bottom panel). 2. Beijing Will Provide Bailouts And Stimulus Ad Nauseum Evergrande’s future may be in doubt but Beijing will throw all its power at stopping nationwide financial contagion. True, a policy miscalculation is possible. A tardy or failed intervention cannot be ruled out. However, investors should remember that a clear pattern of bailouts and stimulus has emerged over the course of the Xi Jinping administration whenever a “hard landing” or financial collapse loomed. The government tightens controls on bloated sectors until the financial fallout threatens to undermine general economic and social stability, at which point the government eases policy. It is often forced to stimulate the economy aggressively. Chart 3 shows these cycles in two ways: China’s control of credit through the state-controlled banks, and the frequency of news stories mentioning important terms associated with financial and economic distress: defaults, layoffs, and bankruptcies. These three terms used to be unheard of among China watchers. Under the Xi administration, a higher tolerance of creative destruction has served as the way to push forward reform. The current rise in distress is not extended, suggesting that more bad news is coming, but it also shows that the government has repeatedly been forced to provide stimulus even under the Xi administration. Chart 3Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Could this time be different? Not likely. The American experience and the pandemic will also force China’s government to ease policy: China learns from US mistakes. The US lurched from Lehman’s failure into a financial crisis, an impaired credit channel, a sluggish economic recovery, a spike in polarization, policy paralysis, a near-default on the national debt, a surge in right- and left-wing populism, the tumultuous Trump presidency, widespread social unrest, a contested leadership succession, and a mob storming the nation’s capitol (Chart 4). This is obviously the nightmare of any Chinese leader and a trajectory that the Xi administration will avoid at any cost. Chart 4Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Chinese households store their wealth in the property sector, so any attempt at policy restraint or austerity faces a massive constraint. Only a few countries are comparable to China with respect to the share of non-financial household wealth (property and land) within total household wealth. All of them are hosts of property sector bubbles, including the bubbles in Spain and Ireland back in 2007 (Chart 5). A property collapse would destroy the savings of the Chinese people over four decades of prosperity. Chart 5Property Is The Bedrock Of Chinese Households Social instability is already flaring up. Almost all China experts agree that “social stability” is the Communist Party’s bottom line. But note that the Evergrande saga has already led to protests, not only at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen but also in other cities such as Shenyang, Guangzhou, Chongqing. Protests were filmed and shown on social media (posts have been censored). Protesters demanded repayment for wealth management products gone sour and properties they are owed that have not been built. This is only a taste of the cross-regional protests that would emerge if the broader property sector suffered. The lingering COVID-19 pandemic is still relevant. Investors should not underrate the potential threat that the pandemic poses to the regime. Severe epidemics have occurred about 11% of the time over the course of China’s history and they often have major ramifications. Disease has played a role in the downfall of six out of ten dynasties – and in four cases it played a major role. It would be suicidal for any regime to add self-inflicted economic collapse to a lingering pandemic (Table 1). Table 1Disease Threatens Chinese Dynasties – Not A Time To Self-Inflict A Recession Easing policy does not necessarily mean bringing out the “bazooka” and splurging on money and credit growth, though that is increasingly likely as the crisis intensifies. Notably the July Politburo statement specifically removed language that said China would “avoid sharp turns in policy.” In other words, sharp turns might be necessary. That can only mean sharp reflationary turns, as there is very little chance of doubling down on policy tightening. A counterargument holds that the Chinese government is now exclusively focused on power consolidation to the neglect of financial and economic stability. Perhaps the leadership is misinformed, overconfident, or thinks a financial collapse will better purge its enemies – along the lines of the various political purges under Chairman Mao Zedong. Wealthy tech magnates and property owners could conceivably challenge the return of autocracy. After all, the US political establishment almost “fell” to a rich property baron – why couldn’t China’s Communist Party? Political purges should certainly be expected ahead of next year’s party congress. But not to the point of killing the economy. The government would not be trying to balance policy tightening and loosening so carefully if it sought to induce chaos. It must be admitted, however, that the change to autocracy means that the odds of irrational or idiosyncratic policy have gone up substantially and permanently. Of course, the high likelihood that Beijing will provide bailouts and stimulus should not be read as a bullish investment thesis, even though it would create a pop in oversold assets. The Chinese system is saturated with money and credit, which have been losing their effectiveness in driving growth. Financial imbalances get worse, not better, with each wave of credit stimulus. Beijing is caught between a rock and a hard place. Hence stimulus comes only reluctantly and reactively. But it does come in the end because a financial crash would threaten the life of the regime and preclude all other policy priorities, domestic and foreign. 3. Yes, China’s Regulatory Crackdown Targets The Private Sector Global growth and other emerging economies will get most of the benefit once China stimulates, since China’s own firms will still face a negative domestic political backdrop. Bullish investors argue that the government’s regulatory tightening is misunderstood and overblown. The claim is that China is not targeting the private sector generally but only isolated sectors causing social problems. Costs need to be reduced in property, education, and health to improve quality of life. China shares the US’s and EU’s desire to rein in tech giants that monopolize their markets, abuse consumer data and privacy, and benefit from distorted tax systems. Most of these arguments are misleading. China does not have a strong record on data privacy, equality, social safety nets, rule of law, or “sustainable” growth (as opposed to “unsustainable,” high-debt, high-polluting growth). China actively encourages state champions that monopolize key sectors. Many developed markets have better records in these areas, notably in Europe, yet China is eschewing these regulatory models in preference for an approach that is arbitrary and absolutist, i.e. negative for governance. As for the private sector, animal spirits have been in a long decline throughout the past decade. This is true whether judging by money velocity – i.e. the pace of economic activity relative to the increase in money supply – or by households’ and businesses’ marginal propensity to save (Chart 6). The 2015-16 period shows that even periodic bouts of government stimulus have not reversed the general trend. Regulatory whack-a-mole and financial turmoil will not improve the situation. Chart 6Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Chart 7Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Surveys of sentiment confirm that the latest developments will have a negative effect (Chart 7). Cumulatively, the changes in China’s domestic and international policy context are being interpreted as negative for business, entrepreneurship, and economic freedom – notwithstanding the government’s claims to expand opportunity in its “common prosperity” plan. 4. The Withdrawal Of US Friendship Is A Headwind For China Chart 8Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired All of the successful Asian economies – including China for most of the past forty years of prosperity – have tried to stay on the good side of the United States. By contrast, China and the US today are shifting from engagement to confrontation and breaking up their economic ties (Chart 8). This is a problem for China because the US and to some extent its allies will seek to undermine China’s economy and its autocratic model as part of this great power competition. The rise in geopolitical risk is underscored by the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) agreement, by which the US will provide Australia with nuclear submarines over the next decade. This was a clear demonstration of the US’s “pivot to Asia” and the fact that the US and China are preparing for war – if only to deter it. China’s return to autocracy and clash with the US and Asian neighbors is also leading to a deterioration of its global image, particularly over issues of transparency and information sharing. The dispute over the origins of COVID-19 is a major source of division with the US and other countries. Transparency is important for investors. The World Bank has discontinued its “Ease of Doing Business” rankings after a scandal was revealed in which China’s ranking was artificially bumped up. The last-published trend is still downward (Chart 9). Most recently China has stepped up censorship of its financial news media amid the current market turmoil, which makes it harder for investors to assess the full extent of property and financial risks.1 The US political factions agree on China-bashing if nothing else. The Biden administration has little political impetus to eschew tariffs and export controls. One important penalty will come from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is likely to ban Chinese firms from US stock exchanges unless they conform to common accounting standards. Hence the dramatic fall in the share prices of Chinese companies listed via American Depository Receipts (ADRs), in both absolute and relative terms (Chart 10, top panel). This threat prompted China’s recent crackdown on its own firms that were attempting to hold initial public offerings on US exchanges. Chart 9US Conflict Exposes China’s Global Influence Campaign The Quadrilateral Forum – the US, Japan, Australia, and India – has agreed to link the semiconductor supply chain to human rights standards, foreclosing China’s participation in that supply chain. US semiconductor firms are among the most exposed to China but they have not suffered over the course of the US-China tech war, suggesting that US vulnerabilities are limited (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down The point is not to exaggerate the strength of the US and its allies but rather the costs to China of actively opposing them. The US has a difficult enough time cobbling together a coalition of states to impose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, not to mention forming any coalition that would totally exclude and isolate China. China is far more important to US allies than Iran – it is irreplaceable in the global economy (Chart 11). The EU and China’s Asian neighbors will typically restrain the US’s more aggressive impulses so as not to upset the global recovery or end up on the front lines of a war.2 Chart 11No Substitute For China In Global Economy This diplomatic constraint on the US is probably positive for global growth but not for China per se. American allies are still able to increase the costs on China for pursuing its own state-backed development path and geopolitical sphere of influence. Japan, Australia, and others are likely to veto China’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), while the UK and eventually the US are likely to join it. Investors should view US-China ties as a headwind at least until the two powers manage to negotiate a diplomatic thaw, i.e. substantial de-escalation of tensions. A thaw is unlikely in the lead-up to Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and the US midterm elections in fall 2022. Presidents Biden and Xi are still working on a bilateral summit, not to mention a more substantial improvement in ties. We doubt a diplomatic thaw would be durable anyway but the important point is that until it happens China will face periodic bouts of negative sentiment from the emerging cold war. Other Asian economies thrived under US auspices – China is sailing in uncharted waters. 5. Global Investors Cannot Separate Civilian From State And Military Investments The word on Wall Street is that investors should align their strategies with those of China’s leaders so as not to run afoul of arbitrary and draconian regulators. For example, instead of “soft tech” or consumer-oriented companies – like those that give people rides, deliver food, or make creative video games – investors should invest in “hard tech” or strategic companies like those that make computer chips, renewable energy, biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals, and capital equipment. There is no question that the trend in China – and elsewhere – is for governments to become more active in picking winners and losers. Industrial policy is back. Investors have no choice but to include policy analysis in their toolbox. However, for global investors, an investment strategy of buying whatever the government says is far from convincing. The most basic investment strategy in keeping with the Xi administration’s goals would be to invest in state-owned enterprises in domestic equity markets. So SOEs should have outperformed the market, right? Wrong. They were in a downtrend prior to the 2015 bubble, the burst of which caused a further downtrend (Chart 12, top panel). Similarly, the preference for “hard tech” over “soft tech” is promising in theory but complicated in practice: hard tech is flat-to-down over the decade and down since COVID-19 (Chart 12, middle panel). It has underperformed its global peers (Chart 12, bottom panel). China’s policy disposition should be beneficial for industrials, health care, and renewable energy. First, China is doubling down on its manufacturing economy. Second, the population is aging and health care is a critical part of the common prosperity plan. Third, green energy is a way of diversifying from dependency on imported oil and natural gas. However, the profile of these sectors relative to their global counterparts is only unambiguously attractive in the case of industrials, which began to outperform even during the trade war (Chart 13). Chart 12State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks Chart 13Beware 'State Approved' Trades In Table 2 we outline the valuations and political risks of onshore equity sectors. Valuations are not cheap. Domestic and foreign risks are not fully priced. Table 2China Onshore Equities, Valuations, And (Geo)Political Risks There is a bigger problem for global investors, especially Americans: investing in China’s strategic sectors directly implicates investors in the Communist Party’s domestic human rights practices, state-owned enterprises, and national security goals. “Civil-military fusion” is a well-established doctrine that calls for the People’s Liberation Army to have access to the cutting-edge technology developed by civilians and vice versa. These investments will eventually be subject to punitive measures since the US policy establishment believes it can no longer afford to let US wealth buttress China’s military and technological rise. Investment Takeaways China may or may not work out a partial bailout for Evergrande but it will definitely provide state assistance and fiscal stimulus to try to prevent contagion across the property sector and financial system. Bad news in the coming weeks and months will be replaced by good news in this sense. However, the fact that China will eventually be forced to undertake traditional stimulus yet again will increase its systemic financial risks, in a well-established pattern. The best equity opportunities will lie outside of China, where companies will benefit from global recovery yet avoid suffering from China’s unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks. We prefer developed markets and select emerging markets in Latin America and Asia-ex-China. Chinese households and businesses are downbeat. This behavior cannot be separated from the historic changes in the economy, domestic politics, and foreign policy. It is hard to see an improvement until the government boosts growth and the 2022 political reshuffle is over. American opposition is a bigger problem for China than global investors realize. Not only are the two economies divorcing but other democracies will distance themselves from China as well – not because of US demands but because their own manufacturing, national security, and ideological space is threatened by China’s reversion to autocracy and assertive foreign policy. Investing in China’s “hard tech” and strategic sectors with government approval is not a simple solution. This approach will directly funnel capital into China’s state-owned enterprises, domestic security forces, and military. As such the US and West will eventually impose controls. Investments may not be liquid since China would suffer if capital ever fled these kinds of projects. Both American and Chinese stimulus is looming this winter but the short run will see more volatility. We are closing our long JPY-KRW tactical trade for a gain of 4.4%   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We have often noted in these pages over the past decade that multilateral organizations overrated improvements in China’s governance based on policy pronouncements rather than structural changes. 2 Still, tensions among the allies should not be overrated since they share a fundamental concern over China’s increasing challenge to the current global order. The EU is pursuing trade talks with Taiwan, and there are ways that the US can compensate France over the nullification of its submarine sales to Australia (most of which are detrimental to China’s security).

Highlights Global growth is peaking, but US growth is losing momentum relative to its peers. This has historically been negative for the greenback. Chinese monetary policy is no longer on a tightening path, and might ease going forward. As discounting mechanisms, cyclical currencies should outperform. Our bias is that non-US growth will outperform growth in the US over the next 12-18 months. This will lead to capital reallocation away from the US dollar. While US bond yields could rise towards 2%, real interest rates will remain low compared to history. Our recommendations remain the same: the DXY will struggle to punch above the 94-95 level, but will ultimately touch 80. Feature Chart I-1US Growth Momentum And The Dollar The DXY index is up for the year, but has twice failed to punch the 94 level. The first leg of the rally from January to March occurred within a context of rising global yields, led by the US. The second leg, starting in June was triggered by a perceived hawkish shift from the Federal Reserve. The common denominator for both legs of the rally was that US growth was outperforming growth in the rest of the world. But that is beginning to change. Bloomberg consensus forecasts show a sharp reversal in US growth momentum, relative to its peers (Chart I-1). Historically, this has put a firm ceiling on the greenback. Cycles And The US Dollar The dollar tends to fare worse early in the cycle when growth is rising but inflation is falling (Chart I-2). Admittedly, inflation prints in some developed markets like the US and Canada have been rather strong. But to the extent that these prints reflect transitory factors, it should allow global central banks to remain accommodative, supporting growth. The remarkable thing about Chart I-1 is that the rotation in growth from the US towards other countries has been broad based. Countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Brazil and Mexico are seeing a bottoming in growth momentum relative to the US (Chart I-3). Chart I-2The Dollar Fares Poorly Early In The Cycle Chart I-3A Rotation Of Growth From The US This bottoming in growth momentum is occurring at the same time as local central banks are becoming more orthodox about monetary policy. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has ended quantitative easing. The Bank of Canada has cut asset purchases in half. Brazil, Mexico and Russia, among other emerging market countries are hiking interest rates. While it is true that inflation in some developed and emerging markets like Canada, the UK, Brazil and Russia is perking up, for most developed markets as a whole, inflation is actually surprising to the upside in the US (Chart I-4). China has been tightening policy amidst very low inflation. Currencies tend to be driven by real rates. A growth rotation away from the US, in addition to more orthodox monetary policies outside the US, will be negative for the greenback. Chart I-4US Relative Inflation And The Dollar What About Chinese Growth? Chinese growth expectations are still cratering relative to the US. The fiasco around the China Evergrande Group has also led to speculation that this could become a systemic event. For developed market currencies, especially those linked to China like the Australian dollar, this is a market-relevant event. Admittedly, offshore markets have started discounting a bigger depreciation in the RMB (Chart I-5). That said, the RMB has been rather resilient against the dollar suggesting that the risk of this becoming a systemic event is rather low (Chart I-6). Chart I-5The Evergrande Risk Is Not Yet Systemic Chart I-6Chinese Equities And The RMB Have Decoupled. We believe currency markets are sending the right signal. For one, the Evergrande debacle is occurring at a time when China is no longer tightening monetary policy. Chart I-7 shows that cyclical currencies in developed markets tend to be coincident with the Chinese credit impulse. As such, any easing in monetary policy will put a bottom in these currencies. Over the years, the Chinese bond market has become more and more liberalized. This two-way risk implies that zombies companies should be allowed to fail while unicorns flourish. It is true that regulatory control has been front and center in the current Chinese equity market malaise. That said, our bias is that liberalization is a reason why portfolio inflows into China continue to accelerate, as the economy moves closer to market-determined prices (Chart I-8). This has supported the RMB, a big weight in the Fed trade-weighted dollar. Chart I-7Chinese Policy And DM Currencies Chart I-8An Unrelenting Increase In Chinese Inflows A lot of EM debt is denominated in US dollars, which could be reprised for default risk. But on this basis, the Fed is ahead of the curve. This was the very reason the Federal Reserve introduced swap lines in 2020 with foreign emerging market central banks and made swapping FX reserves for dollars a permanent facility in its toolkit for monetary policy this year. Non-US domestic authorities have ample ability to decide which entities they allow to fail, and which they bail out from their USD obligations. Cross-currency basis swaps, a proxy for the cost of obtaining dollars offshore, remain well behaved (Chart I-9). Chart I-9No USD Funding Stress So Far In Developed Markets For developed market currencies, the implication is that China risks are currently overstated, while any upside surprise has not been meaningfully discounted. Gauging Investor Positioning The dollar tends to be a momentum currency. But at turning points, it pays to be a contrarian. Let’s begin with what is priced in. First, the overnight index swap curve (OIS) suggests that markets expect the Fed to hike interest rates faster than other G10 central banks (Chart I-10). This will not occur in a world where growth is stronger outside the US, and other central banks are well ahead in their tapering of asset purchases, pursuing much more orthodox monetary policy. Chart I-10The Market Remains Bullish On Fed Rate Hikes Chart I-11Speculators Are Bullish On ##br##The Dollar Second, at the beginning of this report, we highlighted the fact that the dollar is up this year. Part of the reason has been a pilling in of speculators into long greenback positions (Chart I-11). As a trading rule, it has usually been profitable to wait for net speculative positioning and moving averages to roll over before entering fresh dollar short positions (Chart I-12). On this basis, tactical investors might be a bit early, but its is also the case that the macroeconomic environment is moving against the dollar. Once markets start paying attention to the fact that global growth will rotate from the US, pinning the Fed into a more dovish stance, the dollar will quickly depreciate.   Chart I-12A Sentiment Trading Rule Will Wait For The Dollar To Roll Over More Broadly Often forgotten is that the dollar has tended to move in long cycles, usually 10 years between bull and bear markets. The US trade deficit (excluding oil) is hitting new fresh highs this year. These deficits need to be financed by foreign purchases of US securities, either by debt issued or equity raised. Investors could demand a discount to keep financing these deficits. Should the Congressional Budget Office estimates of the current trajectory of US deficits hold true, the dollar has about 10-15% downside from current levels (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Balance Of Payments Bode Negatively For The Greenback Our geopolitical strategists assign 80% odds to the passage of a bipartisan infrastructure bill, and 65% odds to the passage of a reconciliation bill. Either way, the US fiscal picture is set to deteriorate at a time when the Fed is comtemplating scaling back Treasury purchases. Interestingly, 10-15% downside in the US dollar is exactly what is needed to realign the currency competitively (Chart I-14). Consumer prices have been rising globally, but this has been especially pronounced in the US. To the extent that we live in a globalized world with flexible exchange rates, this should allow more competitive countries to see an increase in their trade balances. This is exactly what is occurring, with the US trade deficit hitting new lows. Chart I-14The Dollar Is Expensive On A PPP Basis Risks To The View Currency forecasts are obviously fraught with risks. The biggest risk to the view is a broad-based equity market correction, that reinvigorates inflows into US safe-haven bonds. We are cognizant that this is a risk worth monitoring. For example, investors are preferring to park cash in US Treasurys over gold, two competing safe-haven assets (Chart I-15). This has usually been positive for the greenback. But it also suggests investors view the Fed is going to be orthodox in monetary settings, tightening policy faster than the market expects. This boils down to a judgment call. The US market is much more vulnerable to rate changes than other markets (Chart I-16). As such, a hawkish shift by the Federal Reserve could significantly tighten financial conditions (through a stock market correction), setting the stage for an ultimate low in the dollar equity outflows. Chart I-15Safe-Haven Dollar Flows Face Technical Resistance Chart I-16Higher Bond Yields Will Be Negative For The US Market. Given this two-way risk, we are reintroducing our long CHF/NZD position that correlates well with currency volatility (Chart I-17). We are also long the yen on this basis. In terms of housekeeping, our long AUD/NZD trade was stopped out for a loss. As we iterated in our Aussie report, a lot of pessimism is embedded in the AUD, making it a potent candidate for a powerful mean-reversion rally. We recommend reinstating this position at current levels (a nudge above our stop loss). Chart I-17Buy CHF/NZD As A Hedge Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Data out of the US this week was strong: PPI continues to accelerate in the US, rising 8.3% year on year in August while CPI also remains strong at 5.3% on the headline print. Pricing pressures remain acute in the US. The empire manufacturing survey surprised to the upside in September. The headline number was 34.2 versus expectations of a 17.9 reading. Admittedly, this was driven by an increase in selling prices. Retail sales were surprisingly strong in August, with the control group rising 2.5% month on month versus expectations of a flat number. The US dollar DXY index was relatively flat this week. The markets are at a crossroads, gauging whether strong US data will maintain momentum or revert to a lower equilibrium. Our bias is towards the latter, but admittedly, there are two-way risks to this view.  Report Links: Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - March 19, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Euro area data remains robust: Industrial production printed a solid 7.7% year-on-year growth in July. The trade surplus for July rose to €20.7 bn. The euro fell by 0.6% this week. The ECB has engineered a dovish tapering of asset purchases, but it remains the case as the interest rate expectations between the euro area and the US are at bombed out levels. This should support positive euro area surprises. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward - April 2, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent Japanese data has been on the weak side: Core machinery orders rose 11.1% year on year in July. Exports were strong in August, rising 34% while imports rose 40%. The yen was flat against the dollar this week. Currency volatility is currently depressed, and Japan has been performing poorly economically. To the extent that this is pandemic related, it sets the JPY up for a playable coil spring rebound. Report Links: The Case For Japan - June 11, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 UK data remains on the mend: Industrial production came in at 3.8% year on year, above expectations. Average weekly earnings, including bonus payments, are rising 8.3% year on year as of July. Job gains continue. The July report pushed the unemployment rate from 4.7% to 4.6%. CPI and RPI remain rather sticky around the 3-5% level. House prices rose 8% year on year in July. The pound fell by 0.4% this week. The broad trend in the pound will now be dictated by what happens to both the dollar and the euro. The BoE is more hawkish than the Fed and the ECB should support gilt yields and the pound. A slowing in US economic momentum is also bullish for the sterling. Report Links: Why Are UK Interest Rates Still So Low? - March 10, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Thoughts On The British Pound - December 18, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was slated to slow as we expected, and recent numbers highlight this: There were 146K job losses in August. This was well split between part time and full time. NAB business confidence and current conditions moderately improved in August. House price inflation is tracking the global wave, rising 16.8% year on year in Q2. The AUD fell 1% this week. We discussed the AUD at length in our report two weeks ago and believe current weakness is unwarranted. We are reinstating our long AUD/NZD trade this week. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The was scant data out of New Zealand this week: The current account deficit widened in Q2 to -3.3% of GDP. Q2 GDP was an upside surprise but will likely be torpedoed in Q3 by COVID-19. The NZD was down 0.25% this week. We continue to believe the NZD will fare well cyclically, likely touching 75 cents, but our bias remains that hawkish expectations from the RBNZ are already well priced. This will make the kiwi lag other commodity currencies like the Aussie. We are reinstating our long AUD/NZD trade. Report Links: How High Can The Kiwi Rise? - April 30, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Data out of Canada this week has been robust: The labor report was strong. Hiring came in at 90K, with a favorable tilt towards full-time work. The unemployment rate fell from 7.5% to 7.1%. The CPI report was equally robust. Core CPI was at 3.5% year on year with most measures of the BoC’s underlying gauge inching higher. Housing starts remained strong in August at 260K, a slight dip from July’s 271K. The CAD was up by 0.44% this week. Last week’s currency report was dedicated to the loonie. With strong oil prices, a relatively hawkish central bank, and easing on tightening pressures from China, the loonie should remain well bid. A minority government will also be bullish for the loonie, as we highlighted last week. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 The Outlook For The Canadian Dollar - October 9, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: PPI came in at 4.4% in August, an increase from July. The Swiss franc was down 0.22% this week. We are going long CHF/NZD as a hedge against rising currency volatility. Being long the yen also makes sense in this environment. However, given our view that risk sentiment will stay ebullient, the franc will lag the bounce in other cyclical currencies on a longer-term horizon. Report Links: An Update On The Swiss Franc - April 9, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Norwegian data is surprising to the upside: CPI was 3.4% year on year in August, above expectations. PPI rose 50% year on year in August. The trade balance posted a healthy surplus of NOK 42.6bn in August. The NOK was up 0.5% this week. We continue to be bullish Scandinavian currencies as a cyclical play on a lower US dollar. The NOK benefits from bombed-out valuations and a more orthodox central bank. Report Links: The Norwegian Method - June 4, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The most important data from Sweden this week was the CPI report: CPI rose from 1.7% to 2.1% in August. CPIF, the Riksbank’s preferred measure, accelerated to 2.4%. The SEK was flat this week. A bottoming in the Chinese credit impulse will be a positive impact on growth-sensitive Sweden. Meanwhile, this week’s positive CPI report should pare back expectations of more stimulus from the Riksbank. We are short both EUR/SEK and USD/SEK as reflation plays. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Sweden Beyond The Pandemic: Poised To Re-leverage - March 19, 2020 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Strategic Holdings Tactical Holdings Limit Orders Closed Trades

Please note that next Friday September 24 at 10am EDT, we will host a webcast featuring a debate between my colleague Peter Berezin and me. The topic of debate is whether investors should overweight EM in a global portfolio. Please join us by registering via this link.   Highlights Chinese internet companies’ ROE will drop, warranting lower equity valuations. However, their ROE and equity multiples will not fall to the levels of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Evergrande’s partial default on its liabilities will likely reinforce credit tightening that has been underway in China over the past 12 months. EM ex-TMT stocks also remain vulnerable. Continue underweighting EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Feature This is the September issue of Charts That Matter. We begin by addressing the issues concerning Chinese internet companies that have been subject to intense debate among investors. We then present key charts on overall EM and various asset classes along with brief commentary. Are Chinese Internet Stocks Investable? There is an ongoing debate in the investment community as to whether Chinese equities in general and Chinese TMT stocks in particular will remain investable. Our short answer is: they will remain investable but mind their valuations. In our opinion, “investable” means that they will from time to time offer medium- and long-term investment opportunities. Our hunch is that they may do so in the future. Nevertheless, we do not think that Chinese TMT stocks presently offer a good buying opportunity. In fact, their share prices have material downside from current levels. In our recent report and webcast, we identified the primary risks to Chinese platform companies: Higher uncertainty about their business model = a higher equity risk premium. Government regulating their profitability like those of mono- and oligopolies = low multiples. These companies performing their social duties in the form of redistributing profits from shareholders to Chinese peoples. Beijing’s involvement in their management and in the prioritization of national and geopolitical objectives over shareholder interests. Risks of delisting from US stock exchanges. Although these companies will remain investable, investors should bear these risks in mind and give careful consideration to what multiples they pay for such stocks. Going forward, Chinese platform companies’ return on equity will be considerably lower than they have been or what their current multiplies imply. A lower return on equity warrants a lower equity multiple. Chart 1Chinese Growth Stocks Are Not Cheap On the whole, the current valuations of Chinese internet stocks are still high. Chart 1 shows trailing and 12-month forward P/E ratios for Chinese MSCI Growth Investable Index at 34 and 31, respectively. A downshifting return on equity and high uncertainty around these businesses herald lower equity valuations to come. Besides, in the case of several companies, there are also political underpinnings of this regulatory crackdown. In the case of Alibaba, a mainland government official has recently noted that Alibaba’s chairman, Jack Ma, has been acquiring media companies across the country, and now owns nearly 30 provincial-level media companies, as well as the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. Beijing will not tolerate the control of or influence over domestic media from anyone outside the inner leadership circle. In this context, it is probable that Alibaba’s businesses will remain subject to severe regulatory pressures. How much lower should these companies’ multiples drop to become attractive? Meaningfully lower, but not to the level of multiples of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Here are two reasons why these platform companies will not trade at multiples of SOEs in China: First, many existing SOEs operate in cyclical industries – commodities, industrials, autos, and banks – that structurally have low equity multiples. By contrast, platform companies operate in non-cyclical sectors that structurally have lower business cycle volatility and, therefore, should trade at higher equity multiples than cyclical industries. Second, many SOEs often had losses because they operated in non-oligopolistic industries. Faced with intense competition they had to cut prices to support volumes and employment. By contrast, platform companies’ profitability will be suppressed and capped by new government policies, but they will remain profitable because they operate in oligopolistic industries. In short, platform companies’ ROEs will be higher than those of traditional/”old-economy” SOEs. All in all, our bias is that platform companies’ valuation multiples will contract further but will not be as low as Chinese, Russian, or Brazilian SOEs have been. Bottom Line: Investors should be mindful of further de-rating in Chinese TMT/platform company stocks. These stocks are not yet out of woods. On Property Market Clampdown And Evergrande's Default Evergrande will likely default on some of its liabilities but there will be a bailout or roll-over of its other debt.  Is the partial default by Evergrande, a very large Chinese property developer, a sign of a bottom in Chinese offshore equity and bond markets or will it produce a full-blown credit crisis in China? This is a valid question because both outcomes are possible: a partial bankruptcy can be a culmination of all existing negatives and can trigger policy stimulus that will produce an economic recovery and a major rally (an example of this is the LTCM crisis in the US in 1998); or  a partial bankruptcy can lead to a credit crunch escalation becoming a systemic event. An example of this is Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in 2008. We will assign the highest probability to a third scenario: the well-telegraphed Evergrande default might not create a systemic crisis or crash. However, it will likely reinforce chronic credit tightening that has been underway in China over the past 12 months. This is negative for China and EM risk assets. Predicting the trajectory and speed of market adjustments – a crisis (wholesale selloff) versus a regular bear market interrupted by short-term rebounds – is impossible. That said, investors should stay put for now. On another note, during our webcast last week, a client asked whether restrictions on property developers’ leverage will hinder their ability and willingness to build. In turn, limited property supply will likely push up property prices, which is contrary to Beijing’s goals of curbing property price inflation. So, why are authorities pursuing this clampdown on property developers? Chart 2Property Starts And Prices Are Positively Correlated This is a very good question, and we have the following observations. In our view, authorities are clamping down on property developers’ leverage because historically there was a strong positive correlation between property starts and house prices (Chart 2). The basis for this positive correlation is that when property developers start more projects, they raise expectations via aggressive marketing of higher prices in future. As a result, people become more inclined to buy houses. In fact, more supply has not precluded property prices from surging and vice versa, as shown in Chart 2. Provided housing valuations (the house price-to-income ratios) are exceptionally high in China and high-income households have been buying multiple apartments, we can argue that (speculative) expectations for higher prices in the future have often been an important driver of demand. So, authorities are probably hoping to break this speculative cycle where higher prices breed higher prices. Aggressive marketing on the part of property developers – creating an atmosphere of euphoria around new property launches – has been an essential driver for surging house price expectations. Hence, authorities’ reasoning is that curbing property developers’ relentless debt financed expansion activity is essential for both (1) to restrain excessive house prices inflation (a social stability goal) and (2) to reduce risks of a future credit crisis (a financial stability goal). Finally, with many households/investors who own multiple properties (that are vacant rather than rented out), authorities hope that diminished expectations for future house price appreciation will bring some of these vacant properties to the market. If this occurs, the supply of residential properties for sale and rent will not drop dramatically despite lower starts by property developers. It is also critical to assess the implications of the ongoing carnage in Chinese offshore corporate bonds, where the epicenter of the selloff is property companies. The fact that property developers are experiencing a credit crunch and will be forced to deleverage has implications for China’s business cycle and other EM economies. Chart 3 illustrates that the periods of rising emerging Asian USD corporate bond yields (shown inverted on the chart) coincide with lower emerging Asian ex-TMT share prices. The link is as follows: the ongoing credit stress and deleveraging by mainland property developers means less construction and diminished demand for raw materials and industrial goods as well as possibly household white goods. There are thus negative implications not only for emerging Asian non-TMT stocks but also for overall EM. Bottom Line: Property construction in China will continue contracting (Chart 4). This will weigh on raw materials and industrial goods demand in China and beyond it. Chart 3Rising Emerging Asian Corporate Bond Yields Point To Lower Asian ex-TMT Stocks Chart 4Chinese Housing: Sales And Starts Are Contracting   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Have EM Stocks Bottomed? Investor sentiment on EM equities has plunged close to its previous lows. However, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition to issue a buy recommendation. Critically, EM narrow money growth points to EPS deceleration in the next nine months. Yet, analysts’ net EPS revisions remain elevated and have not yet dropped to negative levels. Our bias is that EM net EPS revisions will be downgraded in the coming months. From a technical perspective, the EM equity index has failed to break above its 200-day moving average. This is a negative technical signal.  Chart 5 Chart 6 Chart 7 Chart 8 EM Underperformance Is Broad-Based Not only have EM TMT stocks massively underperformed their global peers, but also EM ex-TMT stocks have been underperforming their global counterparts. Besides, the EM equal-weighted stock index has failed to break above its previous highs. Failure to break above a resistance line is often a bad omen. Finally, EM ex-TMT share prices correlate with the average of AUD, NZD and CAD, and the latter remains in a corrective phase.  Chart 9 Chart 10 Chart 11 Red Flags For EM Periods of rising EM USD corporate bond yields coincide with lower EM share prices. EM corporate USD bond yields are rising (shown inverted below) and we expect more upside. Either US Treasury bond yields will rise and EM corporate spreads will stay broadly constant, or EM credit spreads will widen and US Treasury yields will stay range-bound. Either of these scenarios will produce higher EM corporate bond yields and, thereby, herald lower EM equity prices. Further, a breakdown in platinum prices is also raising a red flag for EM risk assets.  Chart 12 Chart 13 Have Chinese And Asian Stocks Hit An Air Pocket? Relative performance of emerging Asian equities versus the global stock index has broken below its previous lows. Technically, this entails a protracted period of underperformance. Neither emerging Asian ex-TMT nor Chinese investable ex-TMT share prices have been able to break above their major resistance lines. Failure to break above a resistance line is often a bad omen. Meantime, Chinese onshore stocks and corporate bonds have not sold off enough so that authorities panic and stimulate aggressively.  Chart 14 Chart 15 Chart 16 Chart 17 The US Dollar As A Litmus Test EM risk assets negatively correlate with the US dollar. The broad trade-weighted US dollar is holding above its 200-day moving average. Plus, investor sentiment on the greenback remains negative. Finally, the US dollar moves inversely with relative performance of global cyclical sectors versus global defensives (the dollar is shown inverted on chart below). The ongoing slowdown in China is bullish for the US dollar because the US economy is the least vulnerable to China’s economy. Overall, we expect the US dollar to continue firming in the coming months. Chart 18 Chart 19 Chart 20 Global Mining Stocks, Commodity Currencies And Commodity Prices The share prices of BHP and Rio Tinto have fallen dramatically in absolute terms. This reflects the plunge in iron ore prices and might also be a harbinger of a broader selloff in industrial metals. Further, the average of AUD, NZD and CAD also signals a correction in the broad commodities price index.  Chart 21 Chart 22 Chart 23 Is This Decoupling Sustainable? Industrial metals prices were historically correlated with the Chinese business cycle but have decoupled since early this year. Several commodity prices – like coal, steel and aluminum – have shot up due to production shutdowns as a part of the Chinese government’s decarbonization policies. However, it will be extraordinary if commodity prices continue advancing amid a protracted slowdown in China’s old economy.   Chart 24 Chart 25 Chinese Commodity Imports Have Contracted Reflecting a demand slowdown and the government’s willingness to dampen commodity price inflation, China has been shrinking its imports of several commodities. It has also released some of its strategic reserves for oil and certain industrial metals. High commodity prices are hurting profit margins of manufacturing and industrial companies leading them to lower output. Beijing is determined to curb and bring down key commodity prices to lessen the negative impact on overall growth and employment.  Chart 26 Chart 27 Chinese Stimulus: How Fast And How Large? In recent months, China has been injecting more liquidity into the banking system. Rising commercial banks’ excess reserves at the PBOC point to a bottom in the credit impulse in Q4 of this year. However, the credit impulse leads the business cycle by about nine months. This implies that the economy will not revive before Q2 next year at best. In fact, the aggregate building floor area started and the installation of electricity transmission lines are already contracting and will continue shrinking till Q2 next year.   Chart 28 Chart 29 Chart 30 Chart 31 An Inflation Dichotomy Between China And The US In China, consumer price inflation remains largely contained. However, in the US core consumer price inflation measures are still rising and are above 2%. An optimal exchange rate adjustment to redistribute inflation pressures from the US into China will require a stronger US dollar and a weaker RMB.  Chart 32 Chart 33 Inflation And Monetary Tightening In EM ex-China Core measures of inflation have been rising in many Eastern European and Latin American economies. Their central banks will hike interest rates further. This will hurt their domestic demand at a time when the recovery in these economies has been underwhelming. Monetary and fiscal tightening will offset benefits from reopening as their vaccination rates ameliorate.  Chart 34 Chart 35 Chart 36 Chart 37 What Drives EM Credit Markets? We downgraded our allocation to EM credit, currencies and equities from neutral to underweight on March 25, 2021. This strategy remains intact. The outlook for the key drivers of EM credit – EM/China business cycles and EM exchange rates – remains downbeat. In fact, EM credit markets – both investment grade and high-yield – have been underperforming their US counterparts and this trend will persist.  Chart 38 Chart 39 Chart 40 Chart 41 Our Relative Equity Value Strategies We have been recommending investors go long Chinese A shares / short Chinese investable stocks since March 4, 2021 and this strategy has been extremely profitable. The same is true for the short Chinese property developers / long overall index and short Chinese investable value stocks versus global value stocks strategies. Finally, our recommendation to be long global industrials / short global materials has so far been flat but we expect it to play out for the reasons elaborated in the linked report.  Chart 42 Chart 43 Chart 44 Chart 45 Retail Equity Mania In Korea And Taiwan The retail mania continues in the Korean and Taiwanese stock markets. Retail investors are the main buyers while foreign investors and domestic institutional investors have been scaling back their exposure. Surging margin loans and equity trading volumes in Korea confirm ongoing equity euphoria. We continue overweighting Korean stocks and are neutral on Taiwanese stocks within an EM equity portfolio. The difference in our strategy is due to the potential geopolitical risks that Taiwan is facing. Chart 46 Chart 47 Chart 48 Chart 49 The Semi Cycle And Risks To The Absolute Performance Of Korean And Taiwanese Stocks DRAM and NAND prices have rolled over. This is a near-term risk to the absolute performance of Korean tech stocks. However, if global industrial stocks outperform, as we expect, Korean share prices will outperform the EM equity benchmark because the KOSPI is a good proxy play on global industrials within the EM universe. Although global semiconductor shortages remain widespread, the 6-month outlook for Taiwanese technology companies has rolled over too.  Chart 50 Chart 51 Chart 52 Chart 53 Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Since June, 6 structured recommendations achieved their profit targets: short building and construction (XLB) versus healthcare (XLV); long USD/CAD; long USD/HUF; long Nike versus L’Oréal; short corn versus wheat; and short marine transport versus market. Additionally, short AMC Entertainment expired in profit, while short Australian versus Canadian 30-year bonds expired flat. Within the open trades, 3 are in profit. Against this, 2 structured recommendations hit their stop-losses: short Austria versus Chile; and short lead versus platinum. Additionally, short France versus Japan expired in loss. Within the open trades, 6 are in loss. This results in a ‘win ratio’ at a very pleasing 59 percent. Even more commendably, the 9 unstructured recommendations have all anticipated reversals or exhaustions – most notably for the ZAR, BRL, and stocks versus bonds. Feature Chart of the WeekFractal Fragility Correctly Signalled The Exhaustion Of Stocks Versus Bonds A major advance in our understanding of financial markets is that the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is only partly true. The market is efficient only when a wide spectrum of investment horizons is setting the price, signified by the market having a rich fractal structure. The market is efficient only when a wide spectrum of investment horizons is setting the price, signified by the market having a rich fractal structure. The eponymous Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) teaches us that when the fractal structure becomes extremely fragile, the information and interpretation of longer-term investors is missing from the recent price setting. Meaning that the market has become inefficient. When the longer-term investors do re-enter the price setting process, the question is: will they endorse the most recent trend as a justification of a change in the fundamentals. In which case, the trend will continue. Or will they reject it as an unjustified deviation from a fundamental anchor. In which case, the trend will reverse. In most cases, it is the latter: a rejection and a reversal. As most investors are unaware of the FMH, it gives a competitive advantage to the few investors that use it to signal a potential countertrend reversal. On this basis, we have used it – and continue to use it – to identify countertrend investment opportunities with truly excellent results. Fractal Trade Update This a brief review and update of the 29 short-term trades that we have recommended since our last update on 3rd June 2021, including recommendations that were open on that date. The 29 recommendations have comprised 20 structured trades – which include profit-targets, symmetrical stop-losses, and expiry dates – plus a further 9 recommendations without structured exit points. In summary, 6 structured recommendations achieved their profit targets: short building and construction (XLB) versus healthcare (XLV); long USD/CAD; long USD/HUF; long Nike versus L’Oréal; short corn versus wheat; and short marine transport versus market. Additionally, short AMC Entertainment expired in profit, while short Australian versus Canadian 30-year bonds expired flat. Within the open trades, 3 are in profit. Against this, 2 structured recommendations hit their stop-losses: short Austria versus Chile; and short lead versus platinum. Additionally, short France versus Japan expired in loss. Within the open trades, 6 are in loss. This results in a ‘win ratio’ at a very pleasing 59 percent – counting a win as achieving the profit target, a loss as hitting the (symmetrical) stop-loss, and pro-rata for partial wins and losses. Even more commendably, the 9 unstructured recommendations have all anticipated reversals or exhaustions. The sections below review the structured and unstructured recommendations in chronological order. The 20 Structured Trades 1.  6th May: Short Building and Construction (PKB) vs. Healthcare (XLV) Achieved its profit target of 15 percent. 2.  6th May: Short MSCI France vs. Japan Expired after three months in partial loss but went on to become very profitable – implying that a longer holding period was required (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Short France Versus Japan Became Very Profitable 3.  13th May: Long USD/CAD Achieved its profit target of 3.7 percent and went on to reach a high-water mark of 5.7 percent. 4.  20th May: Long 10-year T-bond vs. TIPS Open, in profit, having reached a high-water mark of 2.7 percent (versus a 3.6 percent target). 5.  3rd June: Short MSCI Austria vs. Chile Hit its stop-loss of 7 percent, albeit after previously reaching a high-water mark of 5.3 percent – implying that the profit target needed to be tighter. 6.  10th June: Short AMC Entertainment Expired at a 4 percent profit, having reached a high-water mark of 65.3 percent (versus a 100 percent target) (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Fractal Analysis Works Very Well For Meme Stocks 7.  10th June: Long USD/HUF Achieved its 3 percent profit target, before continuing to a high-water mark of 7.6 percent (Chart I-4). Chart I-4HUF/USD Corrected By 7.6 Percent 8.  17th June: Long Nike vs. L’Oréal Achieved its 9 percent profit target, before continuing to a high-water mark of 31.3 percent (Chart I-5). Chart I-5L’Oréal Underperformed Nike By 31 Percent 9.  24th June: Short Corn vs. Wheat  Achieved its 12 percent profit target, before continuing to a high-water mark of 38.7 percent (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Corn Underperformed Wheat By 39 Percent 10.  1st July: Short US REITs vs. Utilities  Open, in profit, having reached a high-water mark of 3 percent (versus a 5 percent target). 11.  8th July: Short Marine Transport vs. Market Achieved its profit target of 16.5 percent. 12.  15th July: Short Lead vs. Platinum Hit its stop loss of 6.4 percent. 13.  15th July: Short Australia vs. Canada 30-year T-Bonds Expired flat. 14.  5th August: Short Tin vs. Platinum Open, in loss, albeit having reached a high-water mark of 9.3 percent (versus a 16.5 percent target). 15.  12th August: Long MSCI Hong Kong vs. MSCI World Open, in loss. 16.  12th August: Long New Zealand vs. Netherlands Open, in loss. 17.  19th August: Short India vs. China Open, in loss (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Outperformance Of India Versus China Is Fractally Fragile 18.  26th August: Short Sugar vs. Soybeans Open, in loss. 19.  2nd September: Short Aluminum vs. Gold Open, in loss (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Outperformance Of Base Metals Versus Precious Metals Is Fractally Fragile 20.  9th September: Short US Medical Equipment vs. Healthcare Services Open, in profit. The 9 Unstructured Trades 1.  10th June: Short ZAR/USD ZAR/USD subsequently corrected by 12 percent. 2.  24th June: Short Copper Copper’s rally subsequently exhausted. 3.  1st July: Short MSCI ACWI vs. 30-year T-bond The rally in stocks versus bonds has subsequently exhausted (Chart of the Week). 4.  8th July: Short BRL/COP BRL/COP subsequently corrected by 4 percent. 5.  8th July: Short Saudi Tadawul All-Share vs. FTSE Malaysia All Share KLCI The rally in Saudi Arabian equities versus Malaysian equities subsequently exhausted. 6.  12th August: Long NOK/GBP        NOK/GBP has subsequently rallied by 3 percent. 7.  26th August: Short Hungary vs. EM Hungary’s outperformance is losing steam. 8.  26th August: Short USD/PLN USD/PLN subsequently corrected by 3 percent. 9.  2nd September: Short Trade Weighted US Dollar Index The dollar rally is meeting near-term resistance.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Mohamed El Shennawy Research Associate Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Canada has been a G10 leader in innoculating its population. This should allow economic activity to resume, boosting the CAD/USD. A cresting in COVID-19 infections should permit the Bank of Canada to reintroduce a hawkish bias in upcoming policy meetings. While the CAD/USD is likely to strengthen, it will underperform at the crosses. Feature The Canadian dollar has been rather resilient amid broad US dollar strength this year. While the DXY is up 2.8%, the loonie has still managed to outperform marginally. This is a remarkable feat, given that the Canadian dollar is very much a procyclical currency, and is usually held hostage by broad movements in the trade-weighted dollar. The vaccination campaign in Canada has been very successful, pinning the country as a leader in the G10. This has partly helped curtail the number of new infections from the Delta variant of COVID-19, allowing the economy to reopen faster than its peers (Chart I-1). This is important because there has been a very clear correlation between currency markets and vaccination rates. In general, the countries with higher vaccination rates (UK, Canada, US) have seen better currency performance than countries with the worst vaccination rates (Australia, Japan, Chart I-2). Chart I-1Vaccinations Have Worked For Canada Chart I-2CAD/USD An Outperformer This Year In our October 20, 2020 report, we suggested the loonie will hit 82 cents, a level around which it peaked this year. Going forward, the key question is whether Canada’s vaccination success will allow the loonie to eventually overtake these highs. The outlook hinges on two critical calls: What happens to natural resource prices, specifically crude oil; and the Bank of Canada’s (BoC) monetary policy stance relative to the Federal Reserve. Our bias is that a cresting in COVID-19 infections should allow the BoC to reintroduce a hawkish bias in upcoming policy meetings, while oil prices should stay well bid over a cyclical horizon. This will allow the loonie to strengthen in a 12-18 month timeframe. This said, we also expect the loonie to underperform other commodity currencies. Improving Domestic Conditions The latest GDP report out of Canada was surprisingly weak, but by most measures, this represents a temporary blip. Canada is adding jobs at the fastest pace in decades, an average of 102 thousand per month this year. This is leading to the quickest recovery in the unemployment rate on record (Chart I-3). A total of 18.9 million Canadians are currently employed, a smidgen away from the February 2020 high of 19.1 million. At the current pace of job additions, employment should overtake pre-pandemic levels during the next couple of job reports. There remains a sizeable deficit of jobs in service-producing industries (Chart I-4). This suggests that as mobility trends improve, job gains should accrue. The majority of job losses since the pandemic have been in the accommodation, food services, wholesale trade, and retail trade sectors. Chart I-3Canadians Are Quickly Getting Back ##br##To Work Chart I-4Pent Up Recovery In Services Jobs Still Ahead of Us Strong employment growth has spurred an improvement in consumer demand. Consumer confidence is rebounding in Canada. Retail sales are robust, having handily overtaken pre-pandemic levels. Mortgage credit has also rebounded amidst low interest rates (Chart I-5).   Chart I-5Lower Rates Are Boosting Household Borrowing It is therefore no surprise that inflationary pressures have begun to surface in the Canadian economy. In the latest Business Outlook Survey, capacity pressures were at a decade high. Firms reported that shortages in skilled and specialized labor will persist. There are obviously fewer workers with the skills needed in a post-COVID-19 world, but government support schemes have also eaten up labor supply in traditionally fluid labor demand/supply sectors such as hospitality. Meanwhile, supply bottlenecks have also led to production constraints. This is beginning to show up in the key inflation prints to which the BoC pays attention (Chart I-6). Both the trimmed-mean and median CPI are well above the midpoint of the central bank’s 1%-3% target. While the BoC maintains that some upward pressure on inflation is due to temporary factors, the Canadian unemployment rate is declining faster than that in the US, giving scope for the BoC to normalize policy before the Fed, and putting upward pressure on the CAD (Chart I-7). Asset purchases have already been cut in half from C$4 billion to C$2 billion a week. Chart I-6CPI Is Above Midpoint Of The BoC Target Range Chart I-7Canada Versus US ##br##Employment Meanwhile, house prices are rising quite strongly. The rise in prices has been very broad based, making housing unaffordable for most Canadians (Chart I-8). Residential investment represents almost 9% of Canadian GDP, a significant chunk of aggregate demand (Chart I-9). This suggests that if left unchecked, a housing market bust will deal a severe blow to the Canadian economy. Chart I-8Surging Home Prices A Headache For The BoC Chart I-9Canadian GDP Is Highly Exposed To Residential Housing In a nutshell, despite the BoC standing aside this week, the path of least resistance for Canada is towards tighter monetary policy. This dovetails with the recommendation from our Global Fixed Income Strategy colleagues, who recommend an underweight position in Canadian bonds. Elections And Fiscal Policy A snap federal election will be held in Canada on September 20. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s bet is that an astute handling of the pandemic, combined with massive fiscal stimulus, gives him a legitimate shot at a majority government. During his Throne Speech last year, he vowed to do “whatever it takes” to support people and businesses throughout the crisis. The rationale is to deliver on this promise going into 2022. The Conservatives have taken a slight lead over the Liberals in the opinion polls, even though a similar state of affairs did not secure them a victory back in the 2019 election (Chart I-10). In general, the Liberals are pushing for more fiscal spending, but are also focused on issues that Canadians care about, such as housing and climate change. The Conservatives, on the other hand, are focused on balancing the budget, which could jeopardize the nascent economic recovery that Canada currently enjoys. Historically, minority governments tend to be positive for the Canadian dollar, while majority governments generally nudge the loonie lower post-election (Chart I-11). In the current context, a Liberal minority will allow fiscal policy to stay easy, giving room for the BoC to curtail accommodative monetary conditions. Tighter monetary policy and easy fiscal policy tend to be positive for a currency in a Mundell-Fleming framework. Meanwhile, a Conservative minority might dial back a little on fiscal stimulus, but not by much due to political gridlock. Chart I-10Polling Ahead Of The ##br##Election Chart I-11Historically, The Market Likes A Minority Government In a nutshell, a Liberal minority is likely to be positive for the loonie. Should the Trudeau government win a majority, then fiscal policy might become much more profligate, which will boost inflation expectations in Canada and depress real rates. This will be negative for the loonie, unless the BoC aggressively tightens monetary policy. The Canadian Dollar And Crude Oil The above synopsis highlights that a key driver of the Canadian dollar is the BoC’s monetary policy stance, particularly vis-à-vis the Fed. The other critical variable is what happens to natural resource prices, specifically crude oil. The loonie has a strong correlation with the price of oil, chiefly the Western Canadian Select (WCS) blend (Chart I-12). Chart I-12The Loonie Tracks WCS Oil Prices Going forward, the path for oil prices will be highly dependent on the interplay between demand and supply, especially given the various waves of COVID-19. Oil demand tends to follow the ebbs and flows of the business cycle, with over 60% of global petroleum consumed by the transportation sector. A population under lockdown is negative for crude. Nonetheless, our commodity strategists expect oil prices to average $73 per barrel next year, around today’s levels for Brent, as supply dynamics adjust to the current paradigm. With the WCS blend trading at a discount to this price, there is room for upside surprises due to the following reasons: Investment in the Canadian oil sands has dropped tremendously, while the environmental efficiency (emissions per barrel) has been improving (Chart I-13). This has narrowed the spread between WCS and Brent, something that is likely to persist. Canadian producers have gained market share in the heavy crude oil market, on the back of a drop in Venezuelan production. Production cuts in Alberta have also helped mitigate the oversupply of heavy crude. Canadian oil exports remain near record highs, even though the US is rapidly becoming energy independent (Chart I-14). A lot of refining capacity in the US has been fine-tuned to handle the cheaper, heavier blend from Canada. Finally, pipeline capacity remains a major hurdle in Canada but it is slated to ease. The Trans Mountain Expansion project (590K additional barrels), connecting Alberta to the Westridge Marine Terminal and Chevron refinery in Burnaby, is slated to be competed by the end of 2022. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives support the project. This could narrow the discount between WCS and WTI crude oil. Chart I-13Will A Cleaner Oil Sector See A Bottom In Investments? Chart I-14The Energy Independent US Still Likes Canadian Oil Netting it all out, we expect crude oil prices to stay firm, in line with our colleagues at the Commodity and Energy Strategy team, and the Canadian discount not to widen by much. This should provide modest upside for the Canadian dollar, which has lagged the improvement in terms of trade (Chart I-15). It is remarkable that long-term portfolio flows into Canadian assets have started picking up, a sign of bargain hunting by international investors (Chart I-16). This should provide a modest tailwind to the Canadian dollar over the next 9-to-12 months. Chart I-15The Loonie Is Undervalued Based On Terms Of Trade Chart I-16Will The Rising Capital Inflow Provide A Support For The Loonie? Investment Implications We expect the CAD/USD to break above the recent 82-cent high, towards 85 and eventually 90 cents. The key catalysts are both favorable interest rates versus the US and a gradual recovery in WCS oil prices as global economic activity picks up. According to our fundamental models, the CAD is still very undervalued (Chart I-17). Chart I-17The Loonie Is Undervalued By 19% According To Our Model Chart I-18The NOK Will Lead The CAD ##br##For Now Relative to other commodity currencies, the CAD should lag the AUD as the green energy revolution exhibits staying power, which will benefit metals more than oil over the longer term. In the shorter term, Canadian crude is likely to remain trapped in the oil sands for now, while North Sea crude will face fewer transportation bottlenecks. This suggests that the path of least resistance for the CAD/NOK is down (Chart I-18). Rising oil prices are a terms-of-trade boost for oil exporters, but lead to demand destruction for oil importers. In general, a strategy for playing oil upside is to be long a basket of energy producers versus energy consumers. This suggests that the CAD has upside against the euro, the Indian rupee, and the Turkish lira. But given that the latter currencies are oversold, we will wait for a better buying opportunity.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

9 September 2021 at 10:00 EDT Emerging Markets Strategy/Webcast EM/China: See The Forest For The Trees 9 September 2021 at 21:00 EDT Emerging Markets Strategy/Webcast Emerging Asia: See The Forest For The Trees Highlights Structural inflation in India has abated noticeably since the mid-2010s. The cyclical inflation outlook is also benign (Chart 1). As such, the specter of inflation does not pose a material threat to this stock market. Indian stocks’ high valuation is a risk; yet this bourse’s structurally high premium relative to EM will likely continue as India’s earnings growth will stay strong and its volatility low. Investors should stay overweight Indian stocks in an EM equity portfolio, and local currency bonds in an EM domestic bond portfolio. Feature Chart 1India's Cyclical Inflation Outlook Is Benign In a recent Emerging Markets Strategy report we showed that India stands out as the only country in Asia with rather high inflation. Indeed, core CPI in India, at about 6%, is higher than all other major EM and DM countries, save Turkey and Russia. The question is, with the economy re-opening, will Indian inflation rise further and thus derail the rally in Indian equities? Our research indicates that both the structural and cyclical inflation outlook for India remains benign. Our models for headline and core CPI both point to lower inflation in the coming months (Chart 1). As such, inflation is unlikely to pose any major threat to Indian assets in the foreseeable future. Investors should remain overweight Indian stocks in an EM equity portfolio. Fixed-income investors should also continue to overweight Indian local bonds in an EM domestic bond portfolio. Currency traders should favor the rupee versus its EM peers. Inflation Outlook: Structural … The first of the two principal drivers of India’s structural inflation trend is the country’s productivity. The stronger the productivity gains, the more contained has been its structural inflation.   The second major driver is broad money supply. The higher the money growth, the steeper have been inflationary pressures – especially during those periods when productivity gains were timid. Top panel of Chart 2 shows that up until the early-2000s, India’s average productivity gains used to be rather low: of the order of 3% annually. That period was also marked by very strong broad money growth: at times, the latter would rise to 20% annually (Chart 2, bottom panel). This growth was due to chronically high fiscal deficits that were monetized, coupled with intermittent surges in bank credit. Chart 2Slower Money Supply Amid Decent Productivity Led To A Structural Decline In Inflation The consequence of persistently low productivity gains amid strong money supply was structurally high inflation, with occasional flare-ups well into double digits (Chart 2). Chart 3Steady Fall In Budget Deficits In Post-GFC Era From the early 2000s, however, that dynamic began to change. A surge in capital spending in infrastructure and other productive capacity propelled India’s productivity trend up by several notches. In the past 15 years, the productivity growth rate has averaged around 6% a year; even though more recently that rate has slowed. In the post-GFC period, both major sources of money creation were stymied. First, successive Indian governments, regardless of political affiliation, adopted a rather tight fiscal policy. They reined in fiscal outlays substantially. Non-interest expenditures of the central government fell from 14% of GDP in 2010 down to 9% by 2019, just before the pandemic (Chart 3, top panel). As a result, during that period, fiscal and primary deficits narrowed significantly: from almost 7% of GDP to 3%, and from almost 4% of GDP to nearly zero, respectively (Chart 3, bottom panel). In addition, a myriad of reasons1 caused commercial bank credit to decelerate materially – from as high as 30% before the GFC to a mere 6% by 2019. The upshot of all this was a secular decline in broad money growth. That eventually led India’s inflationary pressures to decline structurally since the mid-2010s (Chart 2, bottom panel, above). Going forward, those major drivers (both productivity and money growth) will warrant a benign inflation outlook. The country has been continuing its high capital spending for over a decade now (around 30% to 35% of GDP, a rate second only to China). This year, India’s capital spending has already revived. Other corroborating indicators such as imports of capital goods have also recovered robustly. This indicates a new capex cycle is unfolding. Therefore, odds are that the productivity growth rate will stay decent. Prudent fiscal policy, on the other hand, will keep the money growth in check. Chart 4Low Wages Will Help Keep Inflation Subdued Finally, wage pressures in India will also stay muted. In rural areas, both farm and non-farm nominal wages have been growing at a very slow pace; and are now flirting with outright contraction (Chart 4, top panel). Industrial wage expectations have also been tepid over the past several years (Chart 4, bottom panel). The broader picture is unlikely to change in the future as tens of millions of young people continue to join the work force every year. Taken together, these factors point to subdued structural inflation ahead. … And Cyclical The chance that inflation in India will flare up over a cyclical horizon (12 months) is also low: First, one of the major cyclical drivers of inflation in India, the government’s food procurement prices (called Minimum Support Price or MSP) have stayed low for the past several years. The announced MSPs for some of the crops for the 2021-22 agriculture season (July-June) have also shown no marked increase. This will surely help keep the wholesale prices for food in check, which, in turn, will keep a lid on consumer inflation expectations and ultimately on both headline and core consumer inflation (Chart 5). Second, the country’s money growth is also unlikely to witness an immediate, major boom. While the budget deficit has swelled over the past year or so, odds are that the government will revert to the tighter fiscal stance that prevailed over the past decade – as soon as the pandemic is brought under control. Chart 6 shows that government non-interest spending leads core CPI. Reduced expenditure growth will cap inflation. Chart 5Low Food Prices Will Keep A Lid On Inflation Expectations Chart 6Slowing Fiscal Spending Will Cap Core Inflation Chart 7Fuel Price Inflation Is Set To Decelerate The other contributor to money growth, bank credit, is expected to accelerate; but its expansion will not be rapid as banks are still suffering from elevated NPLs. Third, fuel price inflation has likely peaked in India. Last year authorities imposed substantial new taxes on local gasoline and diesel prices, which artificially raised consumer inflation (Chart 7). Since there is little chance of new fuel levies this year and given that crude prices are unlikely to rise much from the current levels (which is EMS’s view), fuel inflation will subside materially next year. And as fuel costs often eventually spill into core inflation, this deceleration will help check the latter as well. Finally, given the massive negative output gap that opened up in the economy during the pandemic-related lockdowns, it will take a while before the economy overheats again. Odds are therefore low that India’s inflation will accelerate much in the coming months. Notably, our cyclical inflation models for both headline and core CPI – built using the drivers discussed above – also vouch for a modest decline in inflation (Chart 1, on page 1). Does Inflation Hurt Stocks? Currently, the Indian economy is not plagued by any major excesses and therefore has no major macro vulnerability. The only potential vulnerability that the economy and stock markets face stem from any possible rise in inflation. Notably, the primary driver of Indian stocks is economic growth and corporate profits. Historically, inflation (CPI) in low- and mid-single digits did not hurt Indian stocks. However, once inflation approached a high-single digit mark (usually 8%), a sell-off in stocks typically occurred. Chart 8 shows that, during India’s high-inflation era (from 1994 to 2013), every time CPI breached the 8% mark (the dotted line in the chart), stocks fell in absolute USD terms, or at the minimum, were weak. Chart 8Indian Stocks Faced Major Headwinds When Headline CPI Approached 8% Chart 9In Recent Years Inflation Has Ceased To Be A Headwind For Indian Stocks Interestingly, the above correlations have changed dramatically since 2014. The top panel of Chart 9 shows that core CPI does not have any steady correlation with stock prices anymore. And core PPI, in fact, has developed a strong positive correlation with stocks (Chart 9, bottom panel) – in complete reversal of the dynamics that prevailed in the previous two decades. The adverse impact of inflation on stock prices is via multiple compression, as rising interest rates lead to equity de-rating. What’s notable is that the multiple compressions do not begin as soon as a rate hike cycle commences. Rather, it takes a meaningful rise in interest rates before it starts to hurt multiples (Chart 10). Given the above, one can expect a material multiple compression only if inflation rises a few notches above the central bank’s target (Chart 11). The odds of that happening now are low. Therefore, policy rates will remain lower for longer, and stock valuations will remain at a higher level than usual. Chart 10Interest Rates Usually Needed To Rise Several Points Before Stock Multiple Compression Began Chart 11India's Inflation Remains Within RBI Target Bands   Incidentally, thanks to material rate cuts, real interest rates paid by Indian firms – deflated by both core producer and core consumer prices – have plummeted. Lower real rates benefit the borrowers (i.e., non-financial listed companies) (Chart 12). The bottom line is that, with India’s inflation now being both structurally low (by Indian history) and cyclically tame, it is unlikely to be a cause of any major equity sell-off. Are Indian Equity Valuations Justified? With a trailing P/E of 31, and P/Book of 3.9, there is no doubt that Indian stocks are expensive. Yet, part of the multiple expansion in India, like most other DM countries, has been a direct outcome of a sharply lower policy rate, as discussed above. Incidentally, if one were to look at the cyclically adjusted valuation measures (CAPE), Indian markets appear to be only moderately expensive (Chart 13, top panel). Chart 12Lower Real Rates Boost Firms' Profits And Warrant Higher Stock Prices Chart 13Cyclically-Adjuted P/E Ratio Chart 14Relative Equity Multiples: India vs. EM In terms of relative valuation vis-à-vis the rest of the EM, Indian stocks continue to command a high premium: around 90% in the case of P/E and P/Book multiples. (Chart 14). In terms of cyclically adjusted valuation (CAPE) relative to the EM, India also appears to be quite pricey (Chart 13, bottom panel). The bottom line is that Indian stocks are expensive; and that is a risk to this bourse. A pertinent question here is whether India still merits the structurally high premium that it has enjoyed over the years relative to its peers. Our answer is in the affirmative. One reason this bourse has continued to enjoy a high premium, especially since the mid-2000s, is because the growth of Indian corporate earnings has been superior to those of most other EM countries. But more importantly, the volatility of those earnings has been much lower than its peers. These strong, yet less volatile earnings are what investors have been willing to pay a premium for. Going forward, we see both traits remaining intact. Long-term growth in India will likely stay as one of the highest in the EM world. Earnings volatility is also unlikely to change anytime soon. The reason is, first, lower inflation going forward will entail relatively lower interest rate volatility, and therefore, lower business cycle / earnings volatility. Second, India’s currency volatility will also likely stay lower. Part of the reason is the near absence of foreign investors on government bonds in India. This has precluded India from suffering a major currency sell-off during global risk-off episodes – as few bond investors head for the exit. We discussed this and several other issues related to Indian bond markets and the rupee in much greater detail in our last report on India. Taken together, lower volatility in both local currency earnings and the exchange rate entails lower overall volatility for US dollar-denominated earnings. That will help Indian stocks’ premium to stay elevated beyond any short-term fluctuations. Inflation And The Rupee Chart 15The Rupee Strengthens When Relative Inflation In India Versus US Decelerates The impact of inflation on the rupee is nuanced. It’s not the absolute level of India’s CPI or PPI that affects the rupee-dollar exchange rate; it’s the relative inflation between these two economies that does so. Chart 15 shows that the rupee usually strengthens versus the dollar when inflation in India falls relative to that of US (shown in inverted scale in the chart). These relative inflation dynamics could also provide insight into the exchange rate outlook. Chart 16 shows that the rupee is currently 10% cheaper when measured against what would be its “fair value” (Chart 16, bottom panel). The fair value has been derived from a regression analysis of the exchange rate on the manufacturers’ relative producer prices of the two countries. Investment Recommendations Indian stocks have decisively broken out both in absolute terms and relative to their EM counterparts (Chart 17). Notably, the outperformance is not just due to a sell-off in Chinese TMT stocks. It is even more impressive relative to the ‘mainstream EM’ bourses (i.e., EM excluding China, Taiwan and Korea). Given India’s relatively superior structural and cyclical backdrops, this outperformance should continue for a while (Chart 17, bottom two panels). Investors should stay overweight this bourse in an EM equity portfolio. Chart 16The Indian Rupee Is Now About 10% Below Its Fair Value Versus The US Dollar Chart 17Indian Stocks' Breakout Is Decisive And The Relative Outperformance Is Broad-based Chart 18Higher Carry And A Better Currency Outlook Will Lead To Indian Domestic Bonds' Outperformance The medium-term outlook for the rupee is also positive. The currency is cheap and competitive –an added incentive for both foreign direct investors and portfolio investors. Finally, Indian domestic bonds offer value – both relative to their EM peers and the US treasuries. 10-year government bonds yields, at 6.2%, offer an enticing 480 basis points over similar duration US Treasuries. Given the sanguine rupee and inflation outlooks, Indian bonds will likely continue to outperform EM local bonds (Chart 18). Investors should stay on with our recommendation of overweighting India in an EM local currency bond portfolio. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The reasons include a surge in bank NPLs, lack of bankable projects, a kind of policy paralysis resulting in delay in various regulatory clearances for capital projects etc.