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Special Report

Highlights The Biden administration will not attempt a major diplomatic “reset” with Russia. The era of engagement is over. Russia faces rising domestic political risk and rising geopolitical risk at the same time. A war in the Baltics is possible but unlikely. Putin has benefited from taking calculated risks and wants to keep the US and Europe divided. The Russian economy is weighed down by structural flaws as well as tight policy. Investors focused on absolute returns should sell Russian assets. For EM-dedicated investors, our Emerging Markets Strategy recommends a neutral allocation to Russian stocks and local currency bonds and an overweight allocation to US dollar-denominated sovereign and corporate debt. Feature “We will not hesitate to raise the cost on Russia.” – US President Joseph R. Biden, State Department, February 4, 2021 The Biden presidency will differ from its predecessors in that there will not be a major attempt to engage Russia at the outset. Previous US presidents sought to reach out to their Russian counterparts to create room for maneuver. This was true of Presidents Reagan, Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump. Even Biden has shown a semblance of reengagement by extending an arms reduction pact. But investors should not be misled. The United States and the Democratic Party have shifted their approach to Russia since the failure of the diplomatic “reset” that occurred in 2009-11 and Washington will take a fundamentally more hawkish approach. Russia is not Biden’s top foreign policy focus – that would be Iran and China. But as with China, engagement has given way to Great Power struggle and hence there will not be a grace period before geopolitical tensions re-escalate. Tensions will keep the risk premium elevated for Russia’s currency and assets. The same is true of emerging European markets that get caught up in any US-Russia conflicts. Putin, Biden, And Grand Strategy Understanding US-Russia relations in 2021 requires a brief outline of both the permanent and temporary strategies of the United States and Russia. Russia’s grand strategy over the centuries has focused on establishing a dominant central government, controlling as large of a frontier as possible, and maintaining a high degree of technological sophistication. The nightmare of the Russian elite consists of foreign powers manipulating and weaponizing the country’s extremely diverse peoples and territories against it, reducing the world’s largest nation-state to its historical origin as a geographically indefensible and technologically backward principality. Chart 1Russia's Revival In Perspective Russia can endure long stretches of austerity in order to undermine and outlast rival states in this effort to achieve defensible borders. Russia’s strategy since the rise of President Vladimir Putin has focused on rebuilding the state and military after the collapse of the Soviet Union so as to restore internal security and re-establish political dominance in the former Soviet space (Chart 1). Partial invasions of Georgia and Ukraine and a military buildup along the border with the Baltic states show Russia’s commitment to prevent American or US-allied control of strategic buffer spaces. Expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union poses an enduring threat to Putin’s strategy. Putin has countered through conventional and nuclear deterrence as well as the use of “hybrid warfare,” trade embargoes, cyberattacks, and disinformation. To preempt challengers within the former Soviet space Russia also maintains a “veto” over geopolitical developments outside that space, as with nuclear proliferation (Iran), civil wars (Syria, Libya), or resource production (OPEC 2.0). The evident flaw in Putin’s strategy is the decay of the economy, the long depreciation of the ruble, and the drop in quality of life and labor force growth. See the macro sections below for a full discussion of these negative trends. Compare the American strategy: America’s grand strategy is to control North America, dominate the oceans, prevent the rise of regional empires, and maintain the leading position in technology and talent. A nightmare for American policymakers would be a collapse of the federal union among the disparate regions and the rise of a secure foreign empire that could supplant the US’s naval preponderance. This is especially true if the rival empire were capable of supplanting US supremacy in technology, since then the US would not even be safe within North America. America’s strategy under the Biden administration is to mitigate internal political divisions through economic growth, maintain its global posture by refurbishing alliances, and reassert its technological primacy by encouraging immigration and trade. The status quo of strong growth and rising polarization has been beneficial for US technology but not for foreign and defense policy (Chart 2). Political polarization has prevented the US from executing a steady long-term strategy for over 30 years. As a result, Russia has partially rebuilt the Soviet sphere of influence and China is constructing a sphere of its own. A few conclusions can be drawn from the above. First, China poses a greater challenge to the US than Russia from a strategic point of view. China is capable of creating a regional empire that can one day challenge the US for technological leadership. Modern Russia must summon all its strength to carve out small pieces of its former empire – it is not a contender for supremacy in technology or in any regions other than its own. Second, however, Russia’s resurgence under Putin poses a secondary challenge to American grand strategy. Russia can undermine US strategy very effectively. The effect today is to aid the rise of China, on which Russia’s economy increasingly depends (Chart 3). Chart 2US Tech Boom Coincided With Disinflation, Polarization Chart 3Russia’s Turn To The Far East Unlike the US, Russian leadership has not changed over the past year – and Vladimir Putin’s tactics are likely to be consistent. These were underscored by the constitutional revisions approved by popular vote in September 2020. Not only will Putin be eligible to remain president till 2036 but also Russia reaffirmed its willingness to intervene militarily into neighboring regions by asserting its right to defend Russian-speaking peoples everywhere. Finally, Russia ensured there would be no giving away of territories, thus ruling out a solution on Ukraine over Crimea.1 Bottom Line: The US-Russia conflict will continue under the Biden administration, even though Biden’s primary concern will be China. Biden’s Foreign Policy Intentions It is too soon to draw conclusions about Biden’s foreign policy “doctrine” as he has not yet faced any major challenges or taken any major actions. Biden’s first two foreign policy speeches and interim national security strategy guidance establish his foreign policy intentions, which will have to be measured against his administration’s capabilities.2 His chief intentions are to revive the economy and court US allies: First, Biden asserts that every foreign action will be taken with US working families in mind, co-opting Trump’s populism and emphasizing that US international strength rests on internal unity which flows from a strong economy. This goal will largely be met as the administration is already passing a major economic stimulus and is likely to pass a second bill with long-term investments by October. The impact on Russia is mixed but the Biden administration is largely correct that a strong recovery in the US economy and reduction in political polarization will be a major asset in its dealings with Russia and other rivals. Second, Biden asserts that diplomacy will be the essence of his foreign policy. He aims to create or rebuild an alliance of democracies that spans from the UK and European Union to the East Asian democracies. The two goals of economy and diplomacy are connected because Biden envisions the democracies working together to make “historic investments” in technology, setting global standards and rules of trade, and defending against hacking and intellectual property theft. This goal will have mixed success: the EU and US will manage their own trade tensions reasonably well but they will disagree on how to handle Russia and especially China. Biden explicitly sets up this alliance of democracies against autocracies. He calls China the US’s “most serious competitor” but also highlights Russia: “The challenges with Russia may be different than the ones with China, but they’re just as real.”3 Table 1 shows the Biden administration’s notable comments and actions on Russia so far. What is clear is that the US will not seek an extensive new diplomatic engagement with Russia.4 The failure of the Obama administration’s “diplomatic reset” with Russia has disabused the Democratic Party of the notion that strategic patience and outreach are the right approaches to Putin’s regime. The reset and its failure are described in detail in Box 1. Table 1Biden Administration's First 100 Days: Key Statements And Actions On Russia Box 1: What Was The US-Russia Diplomatic Reset? What Comes Next? Most American presidents open their foreign policy with overtures to Russia to create space to maneuver, given that Russia is capable of undermining US aims in so many areas. The Barack Obama administration made a notable effort at this in 2009, which was dubbed the “diplomatic reset.” It was a rest because relations had collapsed over Russia’s use of natural gas pipelines as a weapon against Ukraine and especially its invasion of Georgia in 2008. Then Vice President Joe Biden led the reset. President Putin had stepped aside in accordance with constitutional term limits, putting his protégé Dmitri Medvedev in the presidential seat, which supported the reset because Medvedev had at least some desire to reform Russia’s economy. The reset lasted long enough for Washington and Moscow to agree on the need for a strategic settlement on the question of Iran – which would culminate in the 2015 nuclear deal – as well as to admit Russia to the World Trade Organization (WTO). But the aftermath of the financial crisis proved an inauspicious time for a reset. Along with the Arab Spring, popular unrest emerged in Moscow in 2011 and western influence crept into Ukraine – all of it allegedly fomented by Washington. Putin feared he would lose central control at home and frontier control abroad. He also sensed an opportunity given that commodity prices were filling state coffers while the US was focused on domestic policy, increasingly polarized, and unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to solidify its influence in eastern Europe. Russia’s betrayal of the reset resulted in a string of losses for the US and its European allies: the Edward Snowden affair, the invasion of Ukraine, the intervention in Syria, the meddling in the 2016 US election, and most recently the SolarWinds hack. The Obama administration refrained from a strong reaction over Crimea partly to seal the Iran deal. But Russia pressed its advantage after that. It is doubtful that Russia’s influence decided the 2016 election but, regardless, the Democratic Party fell from power and then watched in dismay as the Trump administration revoked the Iran deal. Now that the Democrats are back in power they will seek to retaliate not only for the SolarWinds hack but also for the betrayal of the reset. However, retaliation will come at a time of Washington’s choosing. Bottom Line: The Biden administration’s foreign policy will emphasize alliances of democracies in opposition to autocracies like Russia and China. Biden is planning a more hawkish approach to Russia than previous recent administrations. Biden’s Foreign Policy Capabilities There are a few clear limitations on Biden’s foreign policy goals. First, his administration will largely be focused on domestic priorities. In foreign affairs there is at best the chance to salvage the Obama administration’s foreign policy legacy. Second, Biden’s dealings with China will take up most of his time and energy. China’s fourteenth five-year plan contains a state-driven technological Great Leap Forward that will frustrate any attempt by Biden to reduce tensions. Biden will not be able to devote much attention to Russia if he pursues China with the attention it deserves, i.e. to secure US interests yet avoid a war.5 Third, Biden will be limited by allied risk aversion and the need for consensus on difficult decisions. If his diplomacy with Europe is successful then China and Russia will face steeper costs for any provocative actions. If it fails then European risk aversion will prevail, the allies will remain divided, and China and Russia will faces few costs for maintaining current policies. Table 2Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity The Nordstream Two pipeline will be a key test of European willingness to follow the US’s lead even if it means taking on greater risks: Nordstream Two is a major expansion of Russian-EU energy cooperation but contrary to America’s national interest. German Chancellor Angela Merkel still backs the project despite Russia’s poisoning and imprisonment of dissident Alexei Navalny and forceful suppression of protests. However, Merkel is a lame duck and there is some evidence that German commitment to the project is fraying.6 Biden has not tried to halt the pipeline project, but he still could. There are only 100 miles left to the pipeline. Construction resumed in January after a hiatus last year due to US sanctions. The project will take five months to complete at the rate of 0.6 miles per day. The Biden administration still has time to halt the project through sanctions. If it does, the Russians will react harshly to this significant loss of economic and strategic influence over Europe (Table 2). Biden will have a crisis on his hands in Europe. If Biden does nothing on Nordstream, then Russia will conclude that his administration is not serious and take actions that undermine the Biden administration in accordance with Putin’s established strategy. This would prompt Biden to act on his pledge to stand up to Putin’s provocations. Whereas if Biden imposes sanctions to halt Nordstream, Russia will retaliate. Elsewhere it is possible that Biden will be too confrontational with Russia for Europe’s liking. Biden plans to increase support for Ukraine, which will prompt an increase in military conflict this spring.7 The US will promote democracy across eastern Europe, including Belarus, and it is possible that Russia could overreact to this threat of turning peripheral regimes against Russia. The EU is on the front lines in the conflict with Russia and will not want the US to act aggressively – but the US is specifically seeking to “raise the cost” on Russia for its aggression.8 Bottom Line: Russia is not Biden’s priority. But his pledge both to promote democracy and retaliate against Russian provocations sets the US up for a period of higher tensions. US-Russia Engagement On Iran? Will the US not need to engage Russia to achieve various policy goals? Specifically, while highlighting competition, Biden says he will engage Russia and China on global challenges, namely the pandemic, climate change, cybersecurity, and nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation is the only one of these areas where US-Russia cooperation might matter. After all, there is zero chance of cybersecurity cooperation. Whereas on nuclear issues, the US and Russia immediately extended the New START arms reduction treaty through 2026 and could also work together on Iran. Biden is determined to restore the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear deal. Moscow does not have an interest in a nuclear-armed Iran so there is some overlap of interest. The Iranian issue will require Biden to consider whether he is willing to make major concessions to Russia: Compromise the hard line on Russia: A new Iranian administration takes office in August. Biden is likely to have to rush a return to the 2015 nuclear deal before that time if he wants a deal with Iran. Otherwise it would take years for Biden and the Europeans to reconstitute the P5+1 coalition with Russia and China and negotiate an entirely new deal. Biden would have to make major concessions to Russia and China. His stand against autocracy would be compromised from the get-go. Maintain the hard line on Russia: The alternative is for Biden to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal with a flick of his wrist, with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani signing off by August. Biden would extract promises from the Iranians to keep talking about a broader deal in future. In this case Biden would not need to give the Russians or Chinese any new concessions. Chart 4China Enforces Iran Sanctions The Biden administration will be keen to make sure that Russia does not exploit the US eagerness for a deal with Iran as it did with the original deal in 2014-15. Iran has an individual interest in restoring the deal, which is to gain sanction relief and avoid air strikes. The Europeans have helped Iran keep the deal alive. China is at least officially enforcing sanctions (Chart 4). Russia is also urging a return to the deal and would be isolated if it tried to sabotage the deal. This could happen but it would escalate the conflict between the US and Russia. Otherwise, if a deal is agreed, the US will continue putting pressure on Russia in other areas. Bottom Line: The Biden administration is likely to seal an Iranian nuclear deal without any major concessions to Russia. Tail Risk – A War In The Baltics? It is well established that the Putin regime will use belligerent foreign adventures to distract from domestic woes. Just look at poor opinion polling tends to precede major foreign invasions (Chart 5). With the eruption of social unrest in the wake of COVID-19 and the imprisonment of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, it is entirely possible that Russia will activate this tool again. The implication is a new crisis in Ukraine, a larger Russian military presence in Belarus, or further escalation of hybrid warfare or cyberwar in other areas. What about an invasion of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia? Unlike other hotspots in Russia's periphery this is a perennial "black swan" risk that would equate with a geopolitical earthquake in Europe. A Baltic war is conceivable based on Russia’s geographic proximity, military superiority, and military buildup on the border and in the Kaliningrad exclave. The combined military spending of NATO dwarfs that of Russia but NATO is extremely vulnerable in this far eastern flank (Chart 6). However, Europe would cutoff Russia’s economy and join the US in countermeasures while Russia would be left to occupy hostile countries.9 Chart 5Putin Lashes Out When Popularity Falls The Baltic states are members of NATO and thus an attack on one is theoretically an attack on all. President Trump ultimately endorsed Article V of the NATO treaty on collective self-defense and President Biden has enthusiastically reaffirmed it. The guarantee is meaningless without greater military support to enforce it, so NATO could try to reinforce its forward presence there. This could provoke Russia to retaliate, likely with measures short of full-scale war. Chart 6Russia Would Be Desperate To Invade Baltics Since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US rivals have observed that the American public lacks the willingness to fight small wars. It responded weakly to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and China’s encroachments in the South China Sea and Hong Kong. However, foreign rivals do not know whether the unpredictable US leadership and public are willing to fight a major war. Hence Russia and China are likely to continue to focus on incremental gains and calculated risks rather than frontal challenges. Based on the Biden administration’s moderate political capital (very narrow electoral and legislative control), the US will continue to be divided and distracted. Russia, China, and other powers will test the administration and make an assessment before they attempt any major foreign adventures. The testing period is imminent, however, and thus holds out negative surprises for investors. It is also possible that Biden could make the first move – particularly on Russia, where retaliation for the 2020 SolarWinds hack should be expected. Bottom Line: A full-scale war in the Baltics is possible but unlikely as the Russians have succeeded through calculated risks whereas they face drastic limitations in a major war against the NATO alliance. Growth Weighed Down By Tight Policy We now turn to Russia’s domestic economic conditions. Here, Russia also faces major challenges. Authorities are determined to keep a tight lid on both monetary and fiscal policies. In particular, high domestic borrowing costs and negative fiscal thrust will weigh down domestic demand over the next six-to-12 months. There are three reasons authorities will maintain tight monetary and fiscal policies: First, concerns about high inflation are deeply entrenched among consumers, enterprises, and policymakers. Russian consumers and businesses tend to have higher-than-realized inflation expectations. This is due to the history of high inflation as well as stagflation in Russia. A recent consumer poll reveals that rising prices are the number one concern among households (Table 3). Remarkably, the poll was conducted in August amid the height of the pandemic and high unemployment. This suggests that households do not associate growth slumps with lower inflation but rather fear inflation even amid a major recession (i.e., worry about stagflation). Table 3Fear Of Inflation Prevalent Amongst Consumers’ Expectations Second, Central Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina is one of the most hawkish central bankers in the world. Her early tenure was characterized by the 2014-15 currency crisis and a major inflation spike. To combat structural inflation and bring down persisting high inflation expectations, the central bank has adopted a very hawkish policy stance since 2014. There is no sign that the central bank is about to change its hawkish policy. Specifically, monetary authorities have been syphoning liquidity from the banking system. With relatively tight banking system liquidity and high borrowing costs, private credit growth will fail to accelerate from current levels. Third, the government still projects an austere budget for 2021. The fiscal thrust will be -1.7% of GDP this year (Chart 7). While a moderate spending increase is likely, it will not be sufficient to boost materially domestic demand. There are no signs yet that the fiscal rule10 will be further relaxed, potentially releasing more funds for the government to spend this year. The fiscal rule has become an important gauge of the country’s ability to weather swings in energy prices. In addition to the points listed above, policymakers’ inflation worries stem from the economy’s structural drawbacks: Despite substantial nominal currency depreciation in recent years, Russia runs a current account deficit excluding energy. When a country runs a chronic current account deficit, including periods of major domestic demand recessions and currency devaluations, it is a symptom of a lack of productivity gains. Real incomes grew at a quick pace from the mid-1990s, largely driven by the resource boom in the 2000s. Yet rising real incomes were not complemented by expanding domestic manufacturing capacity to produce consumer and industrial goods. As such, imports of consumer goods and services rose alongside real incomes. Russia has been underinvesting. Gross fixed capital formation excluding resources industries and residential construction has never surpassed 10% of GDP in either nominal or real terms (Chart 8). Chart 7Russia: Fiscal Policy Will Remain Austere In 2021 Chart 8Russia: Underinvestment Within Domestic Sectors Geopolitical tensions with the West have discouraged FDI inflows and hindered Russian companies’ ability to raise capital externally. This has inhibited capital spending and ”know-how” transfer and, hence, bodes ill for productivity gains. Russian domestic industries are highly concentrated and, in some cases, oligopolistic in nature. This allows incumbents to raise prices. The number of registered private enterprises has fallen below early 2000s levels (Chart 9). Despite chronic currency depreciation, Russian resource companies have failed to grab a large share of their respective export markets. For instance, Russia’s oil market share of total global oil production has been flat for over a decade and the nation has been losing market share in the global natural gas industry. A shrinking labor force due to poor demographics and meager immigration complements Russia’s sluggish productivity growth and caps its potential GDP growth (Chart 10). Chart 9Russia: Increasing Industry Concentration Some positive signs are appearing in the form of import substitution. Since the Ukraine conflict in 2014 and the resulting Western sanctions, the government has enacted various laws and decrees to incentivize domestic production, and with it providing substitutions for imported goods. Their impact is noticeable in certain sectors. Chart 10Russia: Poor Potential Growth Outlook In particular, the country has invested heavily in the food industry, as food imports are 16% of overall imports. Agricultural sector output has been rising while imports of key food categories have declined. Recent decrees on industrial goods will likely boost domestic production of some goods and processed resources. Around 40% of Russian imports are concentrated in machinery, industrial equipment, transportation parts, and vehicles. Hence, raising competitiveness in production of industrial goods is essential for Russia to reduce reliance on imports. In short, fewer imports of goods for domestic consumption will make inflation less sensitive to fluctuations in the exchange rate. The current trend is mildly positive, but its pace remains slow. Bottom Line: Russia needs to raise its productivity and labor force growth and, hence, potential GDP growth to deliver reasonable high-income growth without raising inflation. The Cyclical OutLook: Worry About Growth, Not Inflation Cyclically, high domestic borrowing costs and lackluster fiscal spending will weigh down domestic growth and cap inflation for the next 12 months. Russia’s real borrowing costs are among the highest in the EM space. High borrowing costs are causing notable financial stress amongst corporate and household debtors. Commercial banks’ NPLs and provisions are high and rising (Chart 11). Unwilling to take on more credit risk, banks have shunned traditional lending and have instead expanded their assets into financial securities. This trend will likely persist and corporate and consumer credit will fail to boost investment and consumption. The recent pickup in inflation was primarily due to rising food prices and the previous currency depreciation pass-through. Chart 12 illustrates the recent currency appreciation heralds a rollover in core inflation. Chart 11Russia: High Borrowing Costs Are Leading To Higher Credit Stress Chart 12Russia: Inflation Will Rollover Due To Stable RUB In fact, a broad range of inflation indicators suggest that core inflation remains within the central bank target (Chart 13). These measures of inflation are less correlated with the ruble movements. Chart 13Russia: Inflation Is At Central Bank Target Of 4% Chart 14Russia: Tame Recovery In Domestic Activity High-frequency data suggest that consumer spending and business activity remain tame (Chart 14). Bottom Line: The latest uptick in Russia’s core CPI is likely transitory. Cyclical conditions for a material rise in inflation and hence monetary tightening are not in place. Investment Takeaways Chart 15Russia Underperforms Amid Commodity Bull Run Russia’s sluggish economy and austere policy backdrop suggest that the fires of domestic political unrest will continue to burn. While political instability may force the Kremlin to ease fiscal policy, the easing so far envisioned is slight. The implication is that Russia faces rising domestic political risk simultaneously with the rise in international, geopolitical risk stemming from the Biden administration’s efforts to promote democracy in Russia’s periphery and push back against its regional and global attempts to undermine the US-led global order. So far the totality of Russia’s risks have outweighed the benefits of the global economic recovery as Russian assets are trailing the rally in commodity prices (Chart 15). The ruble is above the lows reached at the height of the Ukraine crisis, whether compared to the GBP or the EUR, suggesting further downside when US-Russia tensions spike (Chart 16). The currency is neither cheap nor expensive at present (Chart 17). Chart 16Ruble Will Fall Further On Geopolitical Risk But Floor Not Far Chart 17Russia: The Ruble Is Fairly Valued   Chart 18Geopolitical Risk Will Revive Despite Apparent Top Our Geopolitical Risk Indicator for Russia is forming a bottom, implying that global investors believe the worst has passed. This is a mistake and we expect the indicator to change course and price in new risk. The result will weigh on Russian equities, which are fairly well correlated with this indicator (Chart 18). Overall, we recommend investors who care about absolute returns to sell Russian assets. For dedicated EM equity as well as EM local currency bond portfolios, BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy recommends a neutral stance on Russia (Chart 19). Rising bond yields in the US will continue weighing especially on high-flying growth stocks. The low market-cap weight of technology/growth stocks in the Russian bourse makes the latter less vulnerable to rising global bond yields. Concerning local rates, we see value in 10-year swap rates, as tight monetary and fiscal policies will keep a lid on inflation. With the central bank unlikely to hike rates anytime soon, a steep yield curve offers good value in the long end of the curve for fixed income investors. Finally, orthodox macro policies will benefit fixed-income investors on the margin. In regard to EM credit (USD bonds) portfolio, the Emerging Markets Strategy team recommends overweighting Russia (Chart 20). The government has little local currency debt and minimal US dollar debt. Not surprisingly, Russia has been a low-beta credit market and it will outperform its EM peers in a broad sell off. Chart 19Russia: Move To Neutral Local Currency Bond Allocation Lastly, the Emerging Markets Strategy is moving Ukrainian local currency government bonds to underweight and closing the 5-year local currency bond position. Risks of military confrontation on the Ukraine front have escalated. Chart 20Russia: Remain Overweight On USD Credit     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Andrija Vesic Associate Editor Emerging Markets Strategy AndrijaV@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Pavlo Limkin et al, “Putin’s new constitution spells out modern Russia’s imperial ambitions,” Atlantic Council, September 10, 2020, atlanticcouncil.org. 2 See White House, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” February 4, 2021, and “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19, 2021, whitehouse.org. 3 See “Remarks … at the … Munich Security Conference” in footnote 2 above. 4 We first outlined this US-Russia disengagement in our last joint special report on Russia, “US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet),” July 3, 2020, bcaresearch.com. 5 See Margarita Assenova, “Clouds Darkening Over Nord Stream Two Pipeline,” Jamestown Foundation, February 1, 2021, Jamestown.org. 6 Biden’s “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” White House, March 3, 2021, whitehouse.org, reinforces this point by focusing most of its attention on China and largely neglecting Russia. 7 See “Kremlin concerned about rising tensions in Donbass,” Tass, March 4, 2021, tass.com. 8 One way in which this could transpire would be a carbon border tax. The EU says imposing a tariff on carbon-intensive imports will proceed unilaterally if there is not a UN agreement in November because it is a “matter of survival” for its industry as it raises green regulation. The Biden administration also promised in its campaign to levy a “carbon adjustment fee.” Russia, which is exposed as a fossil fuel exporter that does not have a carbon pricing scheme, says such a fee would go against WTO rules. See Kate Abnett, “EU sees carbon border levy as ‘matter of survival’ for industry,” Reuters, January 18, 2021, reuters.com; Sam Morgan, “Moscow cries foul over EU’s planned carbon border tax,” Euractiv, July 27, 2020, euractiv.com. 9 See Heinrich Brauss and Dr. András Rácz, “Russia’s Strategic Interests and Actions in the Baltic Region,” German Council on Foreign Relations, DGAP Report, January 7, 2021, dgap.org; Christopher S. Chivvis et al, “NATO’s Northeastern Flank: Emerging Opportunities for Engagement,” Rand Corporation, 2017. 10 The rule stipulates that a portion of oil and gas revenues that the government can spend is determined by a fixed oil price benchmark. Currently, the benchmark oil price stands at $42 per barrel. The fiscal rule also encompasses constraints on the National Welfare Fund withdrawals in oil prices below $42 per barrel.

Highlights Both the US and Iran have the intention and capability of restoring the 2015 nuclear deal so investors should presume that an escalation in tensions will conclude with a new arrangement by August this year. However, the deal that the Iranians will offer, and that Biden can accept, may be unacceptable to the Israeli government, depending on Israel’s March 23 election. Moreover if a deal is not clinched by August, the timeframe will stretch out for most of Biden’s term and strategic tensions will escalate. Major Middle Eastern conflicts and crises tend to occur at the top of the business cycle when commodity prices are soaring rather than in the early stages where we stand today. But regional instability is possible regardless, especially if the US-Iran talks fall apart. Maintain gold and safe-haven assets as the Iranian question can lead to near-term escalation even if a deal is the end-game. Feature Geopolitics is far from investors’ concerns today, so it could create some nasty surprises. Two urgent tests await the Biden administration – China/Taiwan and Iran – and provide a basis for investors to add some safe-haven assets and hedges amidst an exuberant stock rally in which complacency is very high. The past week’s developments underscore these two tests. First, Chinese officials flagged that they would cut off rare earth elements to the US, implying that they would retaliate if Biden refuses to issue waivers for US export controls on semiconductors to China.1 Second, Biden spoke on the phone with Benjamin Netanyahu for the first time. The delay signaled Biden’s distance from Netanyahu and intention to normalize ties with Israel’s arch-enemy Iran. In both the Taiwan Strait and the Persian Gulf, the base case is not a full-fledged military conflict in the short run. This is positive for the bull market. But major incidents short of war are likely in the near term and major wars cannot be ruled out. In this report we update our view of the Iran risk. A long-term solution to the nuclear threat is not at hand, which means that Israel could in the worst-case take military action on its own. Meanwhile tensions and attacks will escalate until a deal is agreed. Iranian-backed forces in Iraq have already attacked a US base near Erbil, killing an American military contractor.2 In the event of an Iranian diplomatic crisis, the stock market selloff will be short. The macro backdrop is highly reflationary and investors will buy on the dips. In the event of full-scale war, the US dollar will suffer for a longer period. Oil Price A Boon But Middle East Regimes Still Vulnerable Chart 1Oil Recovery A Boon For Middle East Markets Brent crude oil prices have rebounded to $65 per barrel on the global economic recovery. Middle Eastern equities are rallying in absolute terms, though not relative to other emerging markets (Chart 1). This underperformance is fitting given that the region suffers from poor governance, obstacles to doing business, resource dependency, insufficient technology and capital, and high levels of political and geopolitical risk. Non-oil producers and non-oil sectors in the Middle East have generally lagged the global economic recovery (Chart 2). The continuation of the recovery is essential to these regimes because most of them lack the fiscal room to provide large fiscal relief packages. The global average in fiscal support over the past year has been 7.4% but most Middle Eastern governments have provided 2% or less (Chart 3). Current account deficits have plagued oil producers since the commodity bust of 2014 and twin deficits have become a feature of the region, limiting the fiscal response to the global pandemic. Chart 2Middle East Economy Starts To Recover Chart 3Middle Eastern Regimes Fiscally Constrained The good news is that the recovery is likely to continue on the back of vaccines and fiscal pump-priming in all of the major economies. The bad news is that a black cloud hangs over the Middle East in the form of geopolitics. Given the underperformance of regional equities, global investors are not ignoring these risks – but they are a persistent factor until the Biden administration survives its initial tests in the region to create a new equilibrium. The unfinished geopolitical business in the region centers on the role of the US and the question of Iran. It is widely understood that the US has less and less interest in the region due to its newfound energy independence on the back of the shale revolution (Chart 4). This is why the US can afford to sign and break deals as it pleases under different administrations, namely the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA). The Obama administration spent two terms concluding the deal while the Trump administration spent one term nullifying it, leaving the central geopolitical question of the region in limbo. Israel and Arab governments feel increasingly insecure in light of the US’s apparent lack of foreign policy coherence and declining interest in the region. The US has not truly abandoned the region – if anything the Biden administration is looking to maintain or increase US international involvement.3 Washington still sees the need to preserve a strategic balance between Iran and the Arab states, prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, and maintain security in the critical oil chokepoint of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz (Chart 5). But Washington’s appetite for commitment and sacrifice is obviously waning. The American public is openly hostile to the idea of Middle Eastern entanglements, and three presidents in a row have been elected on the assurance that they would scale down America’s “forever wars.” A decisive majority of Americans, including military veterans and Republicans, believe the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not worth fighting.4 And only 6% of Americans view Iran as the top threat to their country. Chart 4Waning US Interest In Middle East Chart 5Strait Of Hormuz Critical To Global Stability America’s lack of concern about the Iranian threat marks a difference from the early 2000s and especially from its critical Middle Eastern ally Israel. Naturally Israelis have a much greater fear of Iran, and 58% see it as the nation’s top threat (Chart 6). Israel and the Gulf Arab states are drawing together, under the framework of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, in case the US abandons the region. A deal normalizing relations with Iran would enable Iran to expand its power and influence and, if unchecked by the US, would pose a long-lasting threat to US allies. Chart 6No US Appetite For War With Iran – Israel A Different Story Chart 7China/Asia, Not Iran, The Strategic Priority For The US The US’s reason for dealing with Iran is that it needs to devote more attention to its strategy in the western Pacific in countering China (Chart 7). But China is also a reason for the US to stay involved in the Middle East. China’s role is expanding because of resource dependency and the desire to expand economic integration. Beijing wants to deepen its global investments, open up new markets, and create closer links with Europe (Chart 8). Chart 8AChina's Expanding Role In Middle East Chart 8BChina's Expanding Role In Middle East Chart 9Unresolved US-Iran Deal A Geopolitical Risk The opening of the Iranian economy would give the US (and EU) a greater role in Iran’s development, where China has a special advantage as long as Iran is a pariah. The US would add economic leverage to its military leverage in a region that provides China with its energy. The Chinese are not yet as capable of projecting power into the region but that is changing rapidly. There is a possible strategic balance to be established between these simultaneous foreign policy revolutions: the US-Iran détente, the Israeli-Arab détente, and the rise of Mideast-China ties. But balance is an ideal and not yet a reality. In the meantime these foreign policy revolutions must actually take place – and revolutions are rarely bloodless. It is possible for a meltdown to occur in light of the region’s profound changes. In particular, the US-Iran détente is incomplete and faces Israeli/Arab opposition, Iranian paranoia, and US foreign policy incoherence. At the moment it is premature to declare an end to the bull market in US-Iran tensions. That will come when a deal is actually sealed, and then tested and enforced. In the meantime Iranian incidents will occur (Chart 9). Geopolitical risks threaten to reduce global oil supply. Different regimes and their militant proxies will strike out against each other to establish red lines. But a US-Iran deal is highly likely – and once that occurs, the risk to oil supply shifts to the upside, as Iran’s economy will open up. Not only will Iran start exporting again but Gulf Arab producers will want to preserve their market share, which means they will pump more oil. Iran’s Regime Hardens Its Shell Ahead Of Leadership Succession The COVID-19 crisis has weakened regimes in the Middle East, much like the Great Recession sowed the seeds for the Arab Spring and many other sweeping changes in the region. But unlike the Arab Spring, the regimes most at risk today are majority Shia Muslim – with Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq all teetering on the verge of chaos (Chart 10). Chart 10Iranian Sphere De-Stabilized Amid COVID Chart 11Iranian Economy Weak (Despite Green Shoots) Chart 12Jobless Iranian Youth The Iranian economy is starting to show the faintest green shoots but it is far too soon to give the all-clear signal. US sanctions have shut off access to oil export revenues. Domestic demand is weak and imports are still contracting, albeit much less rapidly. The country has seen a double dip recession over the past ten years (Chart 11). Unemployment is rife, especially among the youth. The working-age population makes up 60% of total and periodically rises up in protest (Chart 12). Inflation is soaring and the currency is still wallowing in deep depreciation (Chart 13). All of these points suggest Iran is weaker than it looks and will seek to negotiate a deal with the Biden administration. But Iran cannot trust the US so it will simultaneously prepare for the worst outcome – no deal, sanctions, and eventually war. Chart 13Iran Still Ripe For Social Unrest Chart 14Iranian Regime Turning HawkishIran’s response to the US’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and imposition of maximum pressure sanctions has been to adopt a siege mentality and fortify the regime for a potential military confrontation. The country is preparing for a highly uncertain and vulnerable transition from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to a future leader or group of leaders. The government fixed the 2020 parliamentary elections so that hardliners or “principlists” rose to prominence at the expense of independents and especially the so-called reformists. The reformists have been humiliated by the US betrayal of the deal and re-imposition of sanctions, which exploded the economic reforms of President Hassan Rouhani, who will step down in August (Chart 14). The Timeline Of Biden’s Iran Deal Still, it is likely that the US and Iran will return to some form of the 2015 nuclear deal. Lame duck Rouhani is politically capable of returning to the deal: President Rouhani is a lame duck president whose popularity has cratered. If he can restore the deal before August then he can salvage his legacy and provide a pathway for Iran out of economic ruin by removing sanctions. It is manifestly in Iran’s interests to restore the deal – one reason why it has never left the deal and has only made incremental and reversible infractions against it. If Rouhani falls on his sword he provides the Supreme Leader and the next administration with a convenient scapegoat to enable the deal to be restored. Freshman President Biden has enough political capital to return to the deal: Biden is capable of restoring the deal, as he clearly intends to do judging by his statements, cabinet appointments, and diplomatic actions thus far. He has demanded that Iran enter back into full compliance with the deal before he eases sanctions but even this demand can be fudged. After all, it was the US that exited the deal in the first place, and Iran remains in partial compliance, so it stands to reason that the US should make the first concession to bring Iran back into compliance. None of the signatories have nullified the deal other than the US, and it was an executive (not legislative) deal, so President Biden can ultimately rejoin it by fiat. This would not be a popular move at home but the US public is preoccupied. Biden would achieve a foreign policy objective early in his term. The timeline is critical – an early deal is our base case. But if it falls through, then it could take the rest of Biden’s term in office, or longer, to forge a deal. Tensions would skyrocket over that period. The timeline is shown in Table 1. The US has identified April or May as the time when Iran will reach “breakout” capability, i.e. produce enough highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb. The Israelis, for their part, estimate that breakout phase will be reached in August – the same month Rouhani is set to step down. Both the US and Israel view breakout as a red line, though there is some room for interpretation. Table 1Can Lame Duck Rouhani Salvage US Deal For Legacy By August? The option of rejoining the old deal with Rouhani as a scapegoat will end when Rouhani exits in August. The next Iranian president is unlikely to repeat Rouhani’s mistake of pinning his administration on a promise from the Americans that could be revoked as early as January 20, 2025. The next Iranian president will be a nationalist or hardliner. Opinion shows that the public looks most favorably upon the firebrand ex-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or the hardline candidate from 2017 Ebrahim Raisi. Another possible candidate is Hossein Dehghan, a brigadier general. The least favorable political figures are the reformists like Rouhani (Chart 15). Chart 15Iran’s Next President Will Be Hawkish We cannot vouch for the quality of these opinion polls but they are corroborated by other polls we have seen and they make sense with what we know and have observed in recent years. Apparently the public has turned its back on the dream of greater economic opening, with self-sufficiency making a comeback in the face of US sanctions (Chart 16). The regime will promote this attitude in advance of the leadership transition as it must be prepared to conduct a smooth succession even under the worst-case scenario of sanctions or war. Chart 16Iran Preparing For Supreme Leader’s Succession Chart 17Nuclear Bomb Key To Regime Survival The hitch is that Iran is interested in rejoining the deal it signed in 2015, not a grander deal. It will not sign an expanded deal that covers its regional militant proxies and ballistic missile program or requires irreversible denuclearization. The Supreme Leader has witnessed that an active nuclear weapon program and ballistic missile program provide the surest guarantees of regime survival over the long haul. The contrasting cases of Libya and North Korea illustrate the point (Chart 17). Libya gave up its nuclear program and weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 only to see the regime collapse in 2011 and leader Muammar Gaddafi die under NATO military pressure. By contrast, North Korea refused to give up its nuclear and missile programs and repeatedly cut deals with the US that served only to buy time and ease sanctions, and today North Korea possesses an estimated 30-45 nuclear weapons deliverable through multiple platforms. Leader Kim Jong Un has used this leverage to bargain with the great powers. The lesson for Iran could not be clearer: a short-term deal with the Americans may buy time and a reprieve from sanctions. But total, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization means regime suicide. The Biden administration would prefer to create a much more robust deal rather than suffer the criticism of rejoining the 2015 deal, given its flaws and that the first set of deadlines in 2025 is only four years away. But Biden cannot possibly reconstruct the P5+1 coalition of countries to force Iran into a grander bargain in the context of US-Russia and US-China tensions. The sacrifices that would be necessary to bring Russia and China on board would not be worth it. Therefore Biden’s solution will be to rejoin the existing deal plus an Iranian promise to enter negotiations on a more comprehensive deal in future. The Iranians can accept this option since it serves their purpose of buying time without making irreversible concessions on their nuclear and missile programs. Israel then becomes the sticking point, as Iranian officials have said that the US rejoining the original 2015 deal would be a “calamity” and unacceptable. The Israeli government is studying options for military action in the event that Iran reaches nuclear breakout. However, the Israeli election on March 23 will determine the fate of Benjamin Netanyahu and his government’s hawkish approach to Iran. A change of government in Israel would likely bring the US and Israel into line on concluding a deal with Iran so as to avoid military conflict for the time being. If Netanyahu wins, yet the US and Iran fall back into compliance with the 2015 deal (Table 2), then Iran is still limiting its nuclear capabilities through 2025, obviating the need for a unilateral Israeli strike in the near term. Israel will not launch a unilateral strike except as a last resort, as it fears permanent alienation from its greatest security guarantor, the United States. Table 2Iran’s Compliance (And Non-Compliance) With The Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action If a deal cannot be put together by the time Rouhani steps down then the risk of conflict will increase as there will not be a prospect of a short-term fix. A much longer diplomatic arc will be required as Iran would draw out negotiations and the US would have to court allies to pressure Iran. The US and/or Israel could conduct sabotage or air strikes to set back the Iranian nuclear program. It is possible that the Iranian leadership or the increasingly powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps could overplay their hand in the belief that the US has no stomach for waging war. While it is true that the US public is war-weary, it is also true that that attitude would change overnight in the event of a national humiliation or attack. Investment Takeaways The Trump administration drew a hard line on nuclear proliferation. Trump’s defeat marks a softening in the US line regarding proliferation. This does not mean that the Biden administration will be ineffective – it could be even more effective with a more flexible approach – but it does mean that nuclear aspirants currently feel less pressure to make major concessions. This will hold at least until Biden demonstrates that he too can impose maximum pressure. Hence nuclear and missile tests will go up in the near term – as will various countries’ demonstrations of credible threats and red lines. The global economic recovery will strengthen oil producers by giving them greater government revenues with which to stabilize their domestic politics and restart foreign policy initiatives. The global oil price is reasonably correlated with international conflicts involving oil producers (Chart 18). With rising oil revenues, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and others will be emboldened to pursue their national interests. Chart 18Oil Price And Global Conflict Go Hand In Hand While the Biden administration’s end-game is a nuclear deal with Iran, the period between now and the conclusion of a deal will see an increase rather than a decrease in tensions and tit-for-tat military strikes across the region. Unexpected cutoffs of oil supplies and a risk premium in the oil price will be injected first, as we have argued. When a deal is visible on the horizon then oil prices face a downside risk, due to the resumption of Iranian oil exports and any loss of OPEC 2.0 discipline. It is possible that this moment is already upon us. This report shows a clear path to a US-Iran deal by August. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is reaching out to the Iranians. Saudi Arabia has recently announced that it will not continue with large production cuts. Russian oil officials have argued that the global market is balanced and production cuts are no longer necessary.5 But given that the Russians and Saudis fought an oil market share war as recently as last year, it is not clear that a collapse in OPEC 2.0 discipline is imminent. What will be the market impact if hostilities revive in anticipation of a deal? Or worse, if a deal cannot be achieved and a much longer period of US-Iran conflict opens up for Biden’s term in office? Table 3 provides a list of major geopolitical incidents and crises in the Middle East since the Yom Kippur war. We look at the S&P500’s peak and trough within the three months before and after each crisis. The median drawdown is 8% and the market has usually recovered within one month. Twelve months later the S&P is up by 12%. Table 3Stock Market Reaction To Middle East Geopolitical Crises Table 4 shows a shortened list of the same incidents with the impact on the trade-weighted dollar, which is notable in the short run but is only persistent in the long run in the case of full-fledged wars like the first and second Persian Gulf wars. Table 4US Dollar Falls On Middle East Geopolitical Crises The stock market impact can last for a year if the crisis coincides with a bear market and recession. Middle Eastern crises tend to occur at the height of business cycles when economic activity is running hot, inflationary pressures are high, and governments feel confident enough in their economic foundation to take foreign policy risks. The Yom Kippur war and first oil shock initiated a recession in 1973. The first Iraq war also coincided with the onset of a recession. The terrorist attack on the USS Cole occurred near the height of the Dotcom bubble and was followed by the 2001 recession. The 2019 Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq refinery also occurred at the peak of the cycle. More analogous to the situation today are crises that occurred in the early stages of the global cycle. The Arab Spring and related events in 2011 coincided with a period of market weakness that lasted for most of the year as the aftershocks of the Great Recession rippled across the emerging world. This scenario is relevant in 2021 and especially 2022, as global stimulus wears off and governments strive to navigate the deceleration in growth. Middle Eastern instability could compound that problem. The chief risk in the coming years would be a failure to resolve the Iranian question followed by a US-Iran or Israel-Iran conflict that generates instability across the Middle East. Such a catastrophe could cause major energy supply shock that would short-circuit the global economy. History shows this risk is more likely to come late in the cycle rather than early but the above analysis indicates that a failure of the Biden administration to conclude a deal this year could lead to a multi-year escalation in strategic tensions with a new hawkish Iranian president. That path, in turn, could bring forward the time frame of a major war and supply shock. The Iranians have taken a hawkish turn, are fortifying their regime for the future, and will reject total denuclearization. The US is fundamentally less interested in the region and thus susceptible to continued foreign policy incoherence. The Israelis are just capable of taking military action on their own in the event of impending Iranian nuclear weaponization. These points suggest that the risk of war with Iran is non-trivial, even though a US-Iran deal is the base case.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Sun Yu and Demetri Sevastopulo, "China targets rare earth export curbs to hobble US defence industry," Financial Times, February 15, 2021, ft.com. 2 For the US response to the Erbil attack see Jim Garamone, "Austin Pleased With Discussions With NATO Leaders," Department of Defense News, February 17, 2021, defense.gov. 3 For example, Biden is unlikely to withdraw precipitously from the region, including Afghanistan, as Trump intended, especially as long as he is in a high-stakes negotiation with Iran. 4 Ruth Igielnik and Kim Parker, "Majorities of U.S. veterans, public say the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not worth fighting," Pew Research, July 10, 2019, pewresearch.org. 5 See Benoit Faucon and Summer Said, "Saudi Arabia Set to Raise Oil Output Amid Recovery in Prices," Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2021, wsj.com; Yuliya Fedorinova and Olga Tanas, "Global Oil Markets Are Now Balanced, Russia’s Novak Says," Bloomberg, February 14, 2021, Bloomberg.com.

Highlights Transitory dislocations – i.e., supply and demand disruptions in the wake of the Polar Vortex engulfing the US midcontinent – are wreaking havoc on spot oil markets; however, they will not profoundly alter longer-term fundamentals (Chart of the Week). Gasoline prices in the US are up 10 cents/gal this month, as are diesel prices, indicating the impact on production and consumption is affecting the former slightly more at the margin.  In the hard-hit Midwest and US Gulf regions, price gains are slightly less, according to the US EIA. Oil production in the vanguard Permian Basin likely will fall 7-8mm barrels this month. Refineries and pipelines experiencing power outages and severe cold are reducing operations, which will dampen exports. The weather-induced rally pushed Brent above $63/bbl this week, our average price forecast for this year in January. This month, we are lifting our 2021 average price forecast back to $65/bbl and lowering our 2022 forecast slightly to $70/bbl. The balance of price risks remains to the upside. Nonetheless, we remain cautious given ongoing COVID-19 risks – particularly around variants; a strong USD; and the resumption of Saudi-Russian tensions that likely will arise within OPEC 2.0 with prices above $60/bbl. Feature Despite headline-grabbing reports of the Polar Vortex engulfing the US Midwest and Gulf regions, supply-demand fundamentals are unlikely to experience a prolonged dislocation in its wake.  Oil output likely will be hit hard in the short term, particularly in the Permian Basin, where producers, by and large, are unaccustomed to the deep-freeze conditions their colleagues to the north take for granted.  We expect some 7-8mm barrels of production will be lost in the Permian this month, but that it will be returned next month, which will restore US output to its previous trajectory (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekOil Forecasts Steady, Despite Polar Vortex Chart 2Lost US Oil Ouput Will Return In March Operations at refineries and pipelines are ramping down as a precaution, which will force product inventories to draw as temperatures return to normal.1 This will reduce exports until refining assets and pipelines are brought back up to speed as refiners prepare for the summer driving season.  With vaccine distribution in the US picking up steam, we expect product demand to rise, and, given the lost oil and refining output from the current weather-induced disruptions, we expect refining margins in 2Q21 and 3Q21 to be stout. Global Oil Markets Remain Steady Our global oil balances are largely unchanged versus last month, save for a few marginal adjustments, leaving our price forecasts largely unchanged. The weather-induced push to prices that lifted Brent to our $63/bbl forecast from last month ahead of schedule – mostly as lost US production opened short-term sales opportunities for Brent-related crudes – will recede, producing a shallow correction as markets return to normal.  Thereafter, in 2Q21, we expect global supply-demand fundamentals to resume the pre-winter evolution we have been modeling for months.  WTI prices, which were pushed above $60/bbl this week, also will recede in the short term as weather returns to normal. On the demand side, we continue to expect a stout recovery in DM and EM markets, with consumption gaining 6.6mm b/d this year and 2.8mm b/d in 2022 on the back of massive fiscal and monetary stimulus globally (Chart 3).  We expect supply to continue reflecting the production management of OPEC 2.0 (Chart 4), which has been remarkably successful in keeping the level of supply below demand (Chart 5), which is driving the drawdown in global inventory levels (Chart 6).  OPEC 2.0’s strategy likely will be maintained into 2022, however, as we discuss below, this is not a given (Table 1). Chart 3Stout EM, DM Demand Expected Chart 4OPEC 2.0 Production Will Respond Quickly To Demand Changes Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Policy Continues To Keep Supply Below Demand... Chart 6...Allowing Inventories To Draw Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) US Real Rates Keep USD Bid US nominal rates are increasing while inflation has yet to show up in the data, which means implied real rates are rising.  This has been supporting the USD and keeping it well bid in the new year (Chart 7). We continue to expect a weaker USD – given the massive fiscal stimulus and support measures deployed globally, particularly in the US. The Fed continues to signal it will continue to accommodate as much debt as the government takes on to support America’s recovery from COVID-19 and reduce unemployment. Global Economic Policy Uncertainty continues to fall as pandemic uncertainty falls.  This will bring the USD down with it, as demand for safe havens diminishes along with lower uncertainty.2 However, markets still remain highly sensitive to any news suggesting the struggle to contain the COVID-19 pandemic is tipping in favor of the virus. Chart 7US Real Rates Keep USD Well Bid OPEC 2.0 Tensions Will Follow Prices OPEC 2.0 has been remarkably consistent in its adherence to a policy of calibrating production to demand, so much so that even as demand was collapsing during the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic global inventories fell.  This is the result of a deliberate effort by OPEC 2.0 to keep the level of supply below demand.  In so doing, markets tightened, prices rose, and forward curves backwardated as inventories drew down, as we have been expecting for months (Chart 8). Going forward, as prices continue to strengthen – we expect Brent to average $65/bbl and $70/bbl this year and next – the cohesion of the OPEC 2.0 coalition again will be tested by differing domestic policy goals in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. Chart 8Forward Curves Backwardate In Line With OPEC 2.0 Policy Our maintained hypothesis in assessing oil-market supply-demand fundamentals is KSA and Russia are trying to strike a balance between their disparate goals: KSA needs higher prices to support its diversification efforts away from oil exports as the principal driver of its economy, and Russia desires lower prices so as to discourage another surge in US shale-oil output.  In our estimation, for the near term – i.e., the next 2-3 years – KSA prefers Brent prices in a range of $70-$75/bbl, while Russia prefers prices in a range of $50-$55/bbl.3 In the best of all possible worlds, maintaining OPEC 2.0 cohesion likely represents a compromise that keeps Brent prices somewhere between $60-$70/bbl, perhaps a touch lower.  Our modeling assumption is $65/bbl is a policy variable KSA and Russia can accept, and can agree to manage their production around that level.  Brief excursions below and above the $65/bbl level are acceptable to both sides, but neither expects an excursion favoring their desired price level to endure indefinitely.  Nor, we believe, do they expect the other side to countenance supporting their target at the expense of their domestic goals. At present, with Brent prices gravitating toward that ideal midpoint (at least in our estimation) of $65/bbl, markets will begin looking for signs the OPEC 2.0 alliance once again will start to fray, as it did in March 2020, when KSA and Russia could not agree on the level of production cuts at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. At that time, Russia effectively declared a market-share war, which was readily engaged by KSA. Our prior – every month when we re-estimate supply-demand balances, and price forecasts – is both sides are sufficiently sensitive now to the damage they can inflict on the other, which, of course, also damages their economic interests. To borrow a well-turned phrase from the Bard, “Things should start to get interesting right about now.”4   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Words fail to describe the price surges seen in US natural gas markets, which, on at least one pipeline system squarely situated along the cold front engulfing the midcontinent, surged to $500/MMBtu in spot trading going into this past weekend.  The Polar Vortex powering through the midcontinent brought sub-zero temperatures and snow as far south as Galveston, TX.5 In futures trading, March-delivery futures in Henry Hub, LA, traded above $3.20/MMBtu earlier this week and settled above $3.10/MMBtu as we went to press (Chart 9).  Base Metals: Bullish At ~ $3.85/lb, copper prices are trading at levels not seen since the beginning of 2012 on the CME’s COMEX exchange.  Falling on-exchange inventories globally are contributing to bullish sentiment, as we discussed last week.6  Key markets – e.g., iron ore, which is holding ~ $160/MT, and nickel at ~ $18,800/MT – remain well bid during the Lunar New Year in China, when liquidity typically falls (Chart 10).  We are getting tactically long spot London nickel at tonight’s close, with a price target of $29,000/MT by July.  Precious Metals: Bullish Silver is holding up better than gold, which moved sharply lower as US real rates rose on the back of higher 10-year bond yields, which went from 1.2% on Friday to 1.3% on Tuesday, a one-year high.  We remain long gold, and are getting tactically long silver at tonight’s close.  We expect COMEX silver to reach $30/oz by July, as supply tightens, and demand increases on the back of a recovery in DM and EM economies. Ags/Softs: Neutral Wheat moved higher this week in the wake of the Polar Vortex sweeping through the US midcontinent, which raised fears of a winter crop kill-off as temperatures dropped well below zero (F) in key crop regions.  Corn prices also moved higher, reversing WASDE-induced selling last week. Chart 9Prices Surge In US Natgas Markets Chart 10Nickel Remains Well-Bid During The Lunar New Year   Footnotes 1     Please see U.S. oil wells, refineries shut as winter storm hits energy sector, posted by reuters.com for a summary of refinery and pipeline outages in oil and gas markets in the US midcontinent and Gulf regions.   2     Please see Pandemic Uncertainty Will Fall, Weakening USD, Boosting Metals, which we published 28 January 2021, for additional discussion on the interplay of these factors. 3    In our estimation, Russia’s budget is geared toward a Urals price of $42/bbl, while KSA’s likely assumes a price closer to $65/bbl.  Please see Saudi Arabia's 'realistic' 2020 budget assumes lower oil price than 2019: economists published by S&P Global Platts 19 Dec 2019, and “Falling oil prices threaten to derail Putin’s spending promises,” published by ft.com 2 March 2020. 4    This is a line from a song titled Mississippi, which is found on Bob Dylan’s “Love And Theft” album.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights For the month of February, our trading model recommends shorting the US dollar versus the euro and Swiss franc. While we agree a barbell strategy makes sense, we would rather hold the yen and the Scandinavian currencies. In the near term, we recommend trades at the crosses, given the potential for the dollar rally to run further. An opportunity has opened up to short the AUD/MXN cross. We are tightening the stop on our short EUR/GBP position to protect profits. We believe EUR/CHF still has upside. While the US has been labelling Switzerland  a currency manipulator, the real culprit is Europe. Precious metals remain a buy. We are placing a limit sell on the gold/silver ratio at 70, after our initial target of 65 was touched. Platinum should also outperform in 2021. Remain long AUD/NZD, as the key drivers (relative terms of trade and cheap valuation) remain intact. Feature Currency markets are at a crossroads. On the one hand, news on the vaccine front continues to progress, raising the specter that we might return to normalcy sometime in the second half of this year. On the other hand, the current lockdowns are slowing down economic activity across the developed world, which is bullish for the dollar. With the DXY index up 1.4% this year, it appears near-term economic weakness is dominating the currency market narrative. Our long-term trade basket is centered on a dollar-bearish theme, but we have been shifting much focus in the near term to non-US dollar opportunities. Central to this has been our conviction that the dollar is due for a countertrend bounce, in an order of magnitude of 2%-4%.1 It appears we are already halfway there (Chart I-1). For the month of January, our trade recommendations outperformed the model allocation. Notable trades were being short gold versus silver and being short EUR/GBP. Silver in particular was a big winner in January (Chart I-2). Most emerging market currencies saw weakness, especially the Korean won, Russian ruble, and Brazilian real Chart I-1The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 Chart I-2Our FX Portfolio Did Well In January For the month of February, our trading model recommends shorting the US dollar, mostly versus the euro and Swiss franc (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). The model gets its signal from three variables: Relative interest rates (both levels and rates of change), valuation, and sentiment.2 While some of these variables have moved in favor the dollar, the magnitude of these moves has not been sufficient to trigger a model shift. We agree a barbell strategy makes sense. That said, we would rather hold the yen (as the safe haven, compared to the CHF) and the Scandinavian currencies (compared to the EUR). These are our two strategic positions, and we made the case for yen long positions last week. Chart I-3Our FX Model Remains ##br##Short USD... Chart I-4...Especially Versus The Euro And Swiss Franc Circling back to our trades at the crosses, we maintain that they should continue to perform well in February and beyond. We revisit the rationale behind these trades, as well as introduce a new idea: Short the AUD/MXN cross. Go Short AUD/MXN A tactical opportunity has opened up to go short the AUD/MXN cross. Central to this thesis are three catalysts: relative economic activity, valuation, and sentiment. The Australian PMI has rebounded quite strongly relative to that in Mexico, driven by the performance of the Chinese economy, versus that of the US economy. Australia exports mostly to China, while Mexico is heavily tied to the US economy. With the Chinese credit impulse rolling over, the US economy has been outperforming of late. If past is prologue, this will herald a lower AUD/MXN exchange rate (Chart I-5). Correspondingly, oil prices are outperforming metals prices. China is the biggest consumer of metals, while the US is the biggest consumer of oil. A higher oil-to-metal ratio is negative for AUD/MXN. Terms of trade between Australia and Mexico have been an important driver of the exchange rate (Chart I-5). China had a massive restocking of metals last year, much more than oil and natural gas. This implies that the destocking phase (should it occur) will be most acute among metal inventories (Chart I-6), suggesting oil imports into China could fare better than metals. On a real effective exchange rate basis, the Aussie is expensive relative to the Mexican peso. Historically, this has heralded a lower exchange rate (Chart I-7). Chart I-5AUD/MXN And Terms Of Trade   Chart I-6Chinese Destocking: From Crude Oil To Metals? Chart I-7AUD/MXN Is ##br##Expensive Back in 2020, when everyone was short the Aussie and long the MXN, being a contrarian paid off handsomely. Now, speculators are roughly neutral both crosses. Should the trends we are highlighting carry on into the next few months, this will be a powerful catalyst for speculators to jump on the bandwagon. We recommend opening a short AUD/MXN trade today, with a stop loss at 16.50 and an initial target of 13. Stay Short EUR/GBP Chart I-8An Asymmetry In Pricing Our short EUR/GBP position is performing well, amidst a more hawkish Bank of England this week. Technically, there remains room for much downside on the cross. Real interest rates in the UK are rising relative to those in the euro area. The Brexit discount has not been fully priced out of the EUR/GBP cross, whereas broad US dollar weakness has eroded the discount in cable (Chart I-8). From a technical perspective, speculators are still very long the EUR/GBP, even though our intermediate-term indicator is nearing bombed-out levels (Chart I-9). Chart I-9EUR/GBP Still Has Downside Finally, short EUR/GBP tends to benefit from an outperformance of oil prices. We will be revisiting the fair value of the pound in upcoming reports given the fundamental shifts that are happening in the post-EU relationship. For now, we are tightening stops on our short EUR/GBP position to 0.89, in order to protect profits. Remain Long NOK And SEK Chart I-10NOK Follows Oil Prices The Scandinavian currencies are  extremely cheap and an attractive bet for 2021. As such, we believe the recent relapse in their performance provides an opportunity for fresh long positions. For the NOK, a rising oil price is bullish, both against the EUR and USD (Chart I-10). Meanwhile, superior handling of the pandemic has buoyed domestic economic data in Norway. Both retail sales and domestic inflation have been perking up, pushing the Norges Bank to dial forward expectations of a rate lift-off. Sweden is also holding up relatively well this year. Part of the reason for this is that over the years, the drop in the Swedish krona, both against the US dollar and euro, has made Sweden very competitive. With our models showing the Swedish krona as undervalued by 13% versus the USD, there is much room for currency appreciation before financial conditions tighten significantly. The bottom line is that both Norway and Sweden are well positioned  to benefit from a global economic recovery, with much undervalued currencies that will bolster their basic balances. We expect both the SEK and NOK to remain the best performers versus the USD in the coming year.  Stay Long EUR/CHF While the US has been labelling Switzerland  a currency manipulator, the real culprit is the euro area. To be clear, the SNB has been actively intervening in the currency markets. However, when one looks at relative monetary policy, the expansion in the ECB’s balance sheet far outpaces that of the SNB (Chart I-11). With the correlation between balance sheet policy and the exchange rate shifting, it may embolden Switzerland to intervene even more strongly in currency markets. Historically, the Swiss franc was buffeted by the global environment (improving global trade) and rising productivity in Switzerland. As a result, the SNB had no alternative but to try to recycle those excess savings abroad by lifting its FX reserves, or see even stronger appreciation of its currency. With global trade much more muted, intervention in the FX market could be a more potent headwind for the franc. Chart I-11The SNB Is More Hawkish Than The ECB Chart I-12EUR/CHF And The Global Cycle In the near-term, the risk to this trade is that safe-haven flows  reaccelerate, as investors re-price risk. However, this will be a short-term hiccup. EUR/CHF is a procyclical cross and will benefit from improvement in the Eurozone economy relative to the rest of the world (Chart I-12). Meanwhile, by many measures, the Swiss franc remains expensive versus the euro. Stay Long AUD/NZD Chart I-13RBA QE Will Hurt AUD/NZD The rally in the kiwi has provided an exploitable opportunity to lean against it. We remain long the AUD/NZD cross, despite the RBA stepping up the pace of QE at its latest meeting. The rationale is as follows: The balance sheet of the RBA was already lagging that of the RBNZ, so the latest move is simply  catch up (Chart I-13). It has no doubt been negative for the cross, as Australia-New Zealand rates have compressed. However, when the program expires, the AUD will be subject to external forces once again.  The Australian bourse is heavy in cyclical stocks, notably banks and commodity plays, while the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the G10. Should value outperform growth, this will favor the AUD/NZD cross. The kiwi has benefited from rising terms of trade, as agricultural prices have catapulted higher. Should a correction ensue, as we expect, this will favor NZD short positions. Our conviction on long AUD/NZD has clearly been hit with the RBA’s latest move. As such, we are tightening stops to 1.05 for risk management purposes. Stay Long Precious Metals, Especially Silver And Platinum We are placing a limit sell on the gold/silver ratio at 70, after our initial 65 target was hit. The rationale for the trade remains intact: In a world of ample liquidity and a falling US dollar, gold and precious metals are bound to benefit. However, silver has underperformed the rise in gold. The long-term mean for the gold/silver ratio is 50, providing ample alpha for this trade (Chart I-14). Chart I-14The Case For Short Gold Versus Silver Silver is heavily used in the electronics and renewable energy industries, which are capturing the new manufacturing landscape. Silver faced resistance near $30/oz. However, this will be a temporary hiccup. The next important level for silver will be the 2012 highs near $35/oz. After this, silver could take out its 2011 highs that were close to $50/oz, just as gold did.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see our Foreign Exchange Strategy report, "Sizing A Potential Dollar Bounce," dated January 15, 2021. 2 Please see our Foreign Exchange Strategy report, "Introducing An FX Trading Model," dated April 24, 2020. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Pandemic uncertainty and global economic policy uncertainty likely will rebound with increasing COVID-19 infection, hospitalization and death rates, which will keep the USD well bid as a safe haven, and continue to stymie the near-term revival of oil demand globally (Chart of the Week). OPEC 2.0 will continue to calibrate production with demand, which will keep the rate of supply growth in check, keeping inventories on a downward trajectory. US shale-oil production is holding up a bit better than expected, suggesting rig productivity is improving. This is lifting our output forecast slightly this year and next. In line with the World Bank’s forecast, we expect global growth to expand by 4% this year and 3.8% next year.1 These estimates drive our expectation global oil demand will rise by 6.9mm b/d this year and 2.6mm b/d next year (Chart 2). Our 2021 Brent forecast remains $63/bbl; our 2022 forecast is for Brent to average $71/bbl. We expect greater vaccine availability will power demand higher, but COVID-19-related risks remain elevated. Feature Our maintained hypothesis for oil prices – i.e., OPEC 2.0 will keep the rate of growth in production below that of consumption – continues to work. Chart of the WeekPandemic Fuels Global Uncertainty Chart 2Global Recovery Drives Oil Demand Growth Our maintained hypothesis for oil prices – i.e., OPEC 2.0 will keep the rate of growth in production below that of consumption – continues to work, as was demonstrated earlier this month when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) unilaterally announced it would cut 1mm b/d of output in February and March.2 This keeps inventories drawing in this month’s balances estimates, and continues to power prices out of the nadir reached in April 2020. We expect the USD to resume its bear market as soon as safe-haven demand driven by disappointing vaccine distribution is addressed. This will reduce global economic policy uncertainty, which will reduce safe-haven demand for the USD. The other powerful fundamental supporting our expectation of higher oil prices this year and next – i.e., USD weakness – keeps getting interrupted by bouts of renewed global economic policy uncertainty, which can largely be laid at the feet of the uneven progress in combating the COVID-19 pandemic. This is amply demonstrated in the Chart of the Week. As we have shown in previous research, safe-haven demand for the USD moves in lock-step with economic policy uncertainty (Chart 3). The sporadic success in distributing COVID-19 vaccines, particularly in the US, will keep the dollar well bid. This is occurring at a time when massive fiscal stimulus – exceeding 25% of GDP in the US as the Biden administration takes the reins of government – and fulsome support for ultra-accommodative monetary policy by the Fed could be expected to push the USD sharply lower (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Policy Uncertainty Fuels USD Safe-Haven Demand Chart 4Massive Fiscal, Monetary Stimulus Should Push USD Lower We expect the USD to resume its bear market as soon as safe-haven demand driven by disappointing vaccine distribution is addressed. This will reduce global economic policy uncertainty, which will reduce safe-haven demand for the USD. Our high-conviction view is that once markets get tangible proof the distribution problems have been addressed, commodity prices – but most especially oil – will move sharply higher. Oil Supply Growth Will Remain Subdued From its inception, OPEC 2.0’s goal has been to drain unintended inventory accumulations OPEC 2.0 remains the determinant force on the supply side’s response to COVID-19. We expect continued adherence to the coalition’s overall production management strategy, which is directed toward draining global storage levels and targeting a price level acceptable to both KSA and its allies and Russia and its allies. We treat the coalition as the oil market’s dominant supplier, and those outside OPEC 2.0 as a price-taking cohort. We believe a range of $60 to $70/bbl for Brent is consistent with meeting these disparate market views – KSA wants a higher price to fund its diversification and is willing to forego some market share, while Russia appears to be more focused on market share particularly vis-à-vis the US shales. Russia's production could be higher, as it is not recouping the totality of the decline in its market share (Chart 5). From its inception, OPEC 2.0’s goal has been to drain unintended inventory accumulations following the brief market-share war launched by Russia in March of last year; the COVID-19 demand destruction of 2020, which still lingers; and residual unintended inventories left over from OPEC’s 2014-16 market-share war. If successful, this will backwardate the forward curve. We have shown in prior research how this backwardation will develop. OPEC 2.0’s massive spare capacity, judicious inventory and shipping management and forward guidance – i.e., reminding the market its low-cost capacity can be brought to market quickly – should allow it to respond to changes in demand on the downside and the upside, and keep the rate of growth in production below that of consumption (Chart 6). Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Leaders Expected Market Shares Chart 6OPEC 2.0 Keeps Supply Growth Below Demand Growth This will drain inventories, which will backwardate the forward curve (Chart 7). If the coalition is successful in reaching this goal, its members’ term contracts, which are indexed to spot prices, will realize the highest price on the forward curve when they sell their oil. By 2H22, OPEC 2.0 will have to raise production to keep Brent from exceeding $80/bbl. OPEC 2.0 still has to navigate the return of unstable supply sources, chiefly from Libya and Iran, which we expect to increase production next year (Chart 8). We believe the coalition will be able to accommodate these states’ increasing volumes, as they have shown in years past (Table 1). Chart 7...Which Allows Inventories To Draw Chart 8Sporadic Producers Will Be Accomodated Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) US Shale Production Improving Slightly The marginal producer in the price-taking cohort – exemplified by the US shale producers – will be hedging at lower prices closer to their marginal costs, which will limit the amount of oil they are able to produce. The price-taking cohort is further limited by a lack of access to capital, which will only be reversed if this group is able to demonstrate it is capable of generating returns in excess of their cost of capital. Unless and until they can return capital to shareholders via stock buybacks, or maintain and increase dividends, most of their growth will come from retained earnings. EIA data suggests shale production is holding up better than expected, likely due to higher rig productivity, which caused us to revise our output estimate. However, output will remain far from its 2019 peak (Chart 9). In our latest estimates, we increased the number of drilled-but-uncompleted (DUC) wells completed over the next few months, which marginally increases our production estimate. For 2022, we have production recovering, but believe this will be restrained because of (1) a possible fracking ban on federal lands imposed by the incoming Biden administration, which could depress sentiment in the industry and reduce drilling, and (2) capital discipline continues, which reduces the elasticity of oil prices vs rig counts, which, in our models, is based on the historical relationships reflecting a higher sensitivity to price levels. For this year, we expect US Lower 48 crude production to be at 8.64mm b/d (vs. 8.88mm b/d for the EIA) and at 9.35mm b/d (vs. 9.27mm b/d) next year. Chart 9US Shale Production Will Be Slightly Higher Stronger GDP Growth Boosts Demand The World Bank expects global growth in real GDP (constant 2010 USD) of 4% this year and 3.8% next year, which we show in Chart 2. In our modeling, we have revealed a strong relationship between real GDP and oil consumption, which has persisted despite the demand-destruction brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Bank’s estimates drive our overall expectation global oil demand will rise by 6.9mm b/d this year and 2.6mm b/d next year. Of that, 3.8mm b/d comes from EM economies in 2021, and 3.1mm b/d comes from DM economies. Next year, EM demand is expected to increase 1.3mm b/d, with DM accounting for 1.4mm b/d. Global demand is being stymied by a strong dollar, which, given the massive fiscal stimulus already deployed in the US – with more expected from the Biden administration – and the Fed’s oft-repeated insistence it is in no rush to taper or tighten doesn’t make sense to us. Particularly given the high likelihood the Fed will tolerate lower rates even as inflation moves higher, which will keep real rates negative into the foreseeable future. USD Safe-Haven Bid Is Back The strengthening of the USD in the wake of higher global economic policy uncertainty is being fueled by higher pandemic uncertainty. This has stymied the oil-price rally over the past few weeks. Based on the USD’s performance these past few weeks as lockdowns have proliferated in response to, more potent variants of COVID-19 spreading around the globe, markets are once again concerned the public-health response to the pandemic – particularly in the US – is faltering. This has re-introduced safe-haven demand into FX markets, which is keeping the USD well bid. This can be seen in the Chart of the Week. Systematically important governments are now racing to vaccinate as many people as possible in a relatively short period so as to not fall behind the accelerated spread of these new variants, and the risk that additional mutations of the COVID-19 virus become more virulent. We highlighted this risk last week.3 While we believe odds favor an effective public-health response that arrests the spread of the COVID-19 virus, these risks remain elevated. This is what is showing up in the Pandemic Uncertainty Index, which feeds into the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. Bottom Line: Our Brent forecast for 2021 remains at $63/bbl, based on our latest assessment of global supply-demand fundamentals. For next year, we expect OPEC 2.0’s production-management strategy, limited recovery in the US shales and in provinces outside the OPEC 2.0 member states and continued recovery in demand to lift prices to $71/bbl (Chart 10). The strengthening of the USD in the wake of higher global economic policy uncertainty is being fueled by higher pandemic uncertainty. This has stymied the oil-price rally over the past few weeks. We expect the public-health response to get out ahead of the pandemic, which will reduce policy uncertainty and reduce the safe-haven bid for dollars. This will allow the USD bear market to resume. But this is not without risk. Chart 10USD71 Brent Expected in 2021   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Canadian oil production has recovered most of its pull back due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which sent WCS prices down to $3.8/bbl in April. Western Canadian production fell by close to 1mm b/d amid the crisis reaching a low of 3.4mm b/d in May 2020. Production has now almost fully rebounded and is expected to reach record levels this year. Still, recent news the Biden administration is considering revoking the presidential permit required to build the Keystone XL pipeline could pressure the WCS-WTI spread (Chart 11). With production on the rise in Alberta, transportation constraints could emerge over the next few years and deter investors sentiment and willingness to deploy capital to the sector. Base Metals: Bullish A fire at a Vale loading pier could reduce exports of the Brazilian iron-ore producer over coming weeks. According to mining.com, the Ponta da Madeira maritime terminal (TPPM) in Maranhão state is “one of the most important iron ore and manganese loading terminals in the world.” The loss of the pier could remove ~ 32mm MT of Vale’s export capacity of high-grade (65% Fe) ore from an already-tight market this year. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold prices remain flat since last week at ~ $1,840/oz after falling earlier this month from above $1,950/oz. Inflows to gold-backed ETFs moved up in the last week of December following close to 2 months of outflows (Chart 12). We expect investors will continue allocating capital to gold markets as supportive monetary and fiscal policies keep pressuring the USD and real yields down and pushing inflation expectations up. The US fiscal policy’s stimulative stance was further established earlier this week by Janet Yellen – Joe Biden’s nominee to run the Treasury Department – which said the US must act big with its next relief package to boost its economy. Ags/Softs: Neutral Rains in Brazil earlier this week resulted in lower corn prices, as fear of drought diminished. Separately, China’s grain imports set records last year, as reuters.com reported the country imported 11.3mm MT of corn, exceeding its previous import record by a factor of two. Chart 11 Chart 12     Footnotes 1     Please see the Bank's Global Economic Prospects released 5 January 2021 entitled Subdued Global Economic Recovery. 2     Please see our January 7, 2021 report KSA Output Cut, Weak Dollar Support Oil. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    Please see Higher Inflation On The Way, which highlighted an MIT Technology Review article entitled We may have only weeks to act before a variant coronavirus dominates the US published 13 January 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights Both the massive inventory accumulation and robust underlying consumption have been driving Chinese crude imports in recent years. Chinese crude oil import growth will decelerate in 2021 due to a slower pace in the country’s oil inventory accumulation. The country’s underlying crude oil consumption growth will remain robust this year, which will support a still positive growth in Chinese crude oil imports this year. Strong Chinese crude oil imports are positive to global oil prices this year. Feature The gap between China’s total crude oil supply and its domestic crude oil consumption has been widening in recent years, due to a massive buildup in Chinese crude oil inventory (Chart 1A and 1B). In fact, China’s crude oil inventories have quadrupled in the past five years, exceeding two billion barrels as of November 2020 and are equal to about 70% of OECD total inventory (Chart 2). Chart 1AA Massive Buildup In Chinese Crude Oil Inventory Chart 1BChina: Total Crude Oil Supply Growth Has Exceeded Its Domestic Consumption Growth In addition, China’s crude oil import growth has been outpacing domestic oil consumption growth, while domestic production remains stagnant (Chart 3). Chart 2Crude Oil Inventories In China Have Quadrupled In The Past Five Years Chart 3China: Crude Oil Import Growth Has Been Stronger Than Its Domestic Consumption Growth Will China maintain its strong crude oil import growth this year? How will the interplay between domestic consumption and imports evolve in 2021? We expect China’s crude oil consumption growth to remain solid in 2021, growing at an annual rate of about 6-7% and up from the 4.5% growth rate reached in 2020. However, China’s crude oil imports are likely to increase by 4-6% in 2021 from the previous year, slower than the 7.2% growth seen in 2020. The moderation in Chinese oil imports in 2021 will mainly be due to a slower pace of crude oil inventory buildup. Understanding The Surge In Crude Oil Inventory Chart 4China's Crude Oil Inventory Buildup: One Major Driver Behind Its Strong Imports Since 2016 The massive buildup in domestic crude oil inventory has been one major driving force behind the strong growth in China's crude oil imports since 2016 (Chart 4). As oil prices continue to rebound, and given China’s existing large oil inventories, we think the pace of inventory accumulation in China will slow in 2021. Therefore, growth in Chinese oil imports this year will likely moderate. China’s crude oil imports currently account for about 75% of the country’s total crude oil supply. Since China’s domestic crude oil production has been stagnant in the last decade, the fluctuations in Chinese crude oil imports are largely driven by the change in the country’s total demand, which includes both domestic consumption and changes in inventories. China’s crude oil import growth has significantly outpaced domestic consumption growth in the past five years, leading to a buildup in inventory. China’s crude oil inventory includes Commercial Petroleum Reserves (CPR), which are held by refiners and traders; and Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR), which are held by the government. Our Chinese crude oil inventory proxy1 was constructed based on the crude oil flow diagram shown in Chart 5.  Chart 5How Did We Derive Our Chinese Crude Oil Inventory Proxy? Our research has suggested that since 2016, most of the buildup has occurred in CPR. This is due to the following: The government in 2015 required refiners to keep their inventory level at no less than their 15-days requirement for operation use. Chinese refinery capacity had been expanded at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.8% during 2016-2019. These existing and new refineries have been building their inventories to meet government regulations in the past several years.  In addition, the government started to allow independent refineries to import crude oil by setting a quota in mid-2015, and the import quotas have been increased every year. In 2020, the quota reached 184.6 million tons, equaling to about 3,700 kbpd, nearly five times the quota in 2015. The total increase in imports of these independent refiners over the past five years was about 2,950 kbpd, accounting for 70% of the increase in the country’s total crude oil imports during the same period. Chart 6China: Rising Run Rates For Its Independent Refineries Independent refiners import crude oil for both refinery purposes and to meet the new inventory requirement. Over the last several years, the increased amount of quota has improved Chinese independent refiners’ profitability and refinery capacity run rate, as the import quota allows these private sector refiners to save operating costs by cutting out the “middleman” and by actively managing their own feedstocks. For example, Shandong has the largest number of independent refineries among all provinces. Chart 6 shows that the run rate of the region’s independent refineries has surged since 2016, from about 40% in that year to 75% this year. In addition, since 2016, the fluctuations in their run rates have become much more closely correlated with global oil prices.   Commercial crude oil users have much larger physical reserve space than the SPR. Notably, they tend to sharply increase their imports when crude oil prices are low.  In addition, inventory accumulation often occurs when credit/financing is available with low costs and refiners expect higher prices ahead. Meanwhile, our research shows the SPR development has been slowing considerably in recent years, resulting in little inventory buildup in SPR. The last time the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported the SPR data was December 29, 2017. It showed the SPR was about 37.73 million tons by mid-2017, not far from the country’s target of 40 million tons for the first two phases2 of SPR. This suggests that the country was at least close to finishing its second phase of the SPR in 2017. Since then, there has been little information about the third phase of the SPR progress. We have only been able to find two pieces of news on that subject, and both suggest the construction of the third phase of SPR has been stagnant, and the planning of two sites only started in 2019. As the average construction time for projects in the second phase of SPR was about four years, we do not think these sites were completed in 2020. The NBS data shows that even during the period of mid-2015 and mid-2017, the SPR had only increased by 234 kbpd, about 117 kbpd per year. In comparison, the Chinese total crude oil inventory increased by 600-700 kbpd per year in 2016 and 2017. Clearly, SPR only accounted for a small share of the Chinese total crude oil inventory. Looking forward, we expect a much slower pace of crude oil inventory buildup in China in 2021. Our forecast is based on the following factors: Current Chinese crude oil inventories (CPR and SPR combined) are already in the upper range when comparing the OECD countries (Chart 7). Although the IEA data shows that Japan and Korea have oil stocks of 200 days and 193 days of their respective crude oil net imports, Chinese oil inventories are currently equivalent to 195 days of crude oil net imports and much higher than the 90 days the IEA requires OECD countries to hold. With Brent oil prices having risen by a lot from the April 2020 trough and elevated domestic crude oil inventories, both government and commercial users will likely slow their purchases of overseas oil for inventory accumulation. In comparison, Chinese crude oil inventory accumulation growth slowed sharply in 2018 when Brent oil prices rose by 95% from their trough in mid-2017 (Chart 8), A significant portion of Chinese oil inventory buildup was accumulated over the past five years. At 1,170 kbpd, the largest annual accumulation was in 2020, higher than the 700-900 kbpd fill per year during 2017-2019. Chart 7China's Crude Oil Inventory: No Longer Low Chart 8China: Rising Oil Prices Will Likely Slow Down Its Pace Of Crude Oil Inventory Accumulation We do not expect the fast inventory accumulation of 2020 to repeat in 2021. Instead, a mean-reversal in the inventory accumulation pace will likely occur. Table 1Our Estimates Of The Scale Of Chinese Crude Oil Inventory In 2021 Our baseline estimate based on China’s 2021 import quota and refinery capacity3 is that Chinese crude oil inventory will increase to 207-210 days of Chinese crude oil imports by this year-end, up from 192 days at last year-end (Table 1). With already-elevated crude oil inventory, the pace of the inventory accumulation in China will be slower than last year. Bottom Line: After a massive buildup over recent years, the pace of inventory accumulation in China will slow in 2021 and probably onwards as well. As a result, Chinese oil import growth will converge with the pace of domestic consumption growth. China’s Robust Crude Oil Consumption Growth In 2021 Chart 9China: Resilient Domestic Crude Oil Consumption Growth In 2020 Despite the pandemic outbreak, last year’s underlying consumption of crude oil in China was resilient at a year-on-year growth of 4.5%, even though the rate was smaller than the average growth of 6-7% in 2018-2019 (Chart 9).  The growth in oil consumption last year was mainly from the non-transportation sector. The output of non-transportation fuels, including fuel oil, naphtha, petroleum coke, and petroleum pitch, are mostly having impressive growth, suggesting strong consumption in sectors like chemical products, steel sector and infrastructure (Chart 10). For example, naphtha is the primary feedstock for ethylene production. Ethylene is the building block for a vast range of chemicals from plastics to antifreeze solutions and solvents. Transportation fuel consumption was weak in 2020, with the output of major transportation fuels including gasoline, diesel oil and kerosene in contraction (Chart 11). Chart 10Strong Consumption In Non-Transportation Sectors in 2020 Last Year Chart 11Transportation Fuel Consumption Was Weak In 2020 In 2021, we expect the underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China to increase to 6-7% from last year’s 4.5%. This will be in line with its growth in both 2018 and 2019 (Chart 9 on page 7). First, the consumption of transportation fuels will likely recover this year. Transportation fuels are the largest consuming sector for Chinese petroleum products. Based on British Petroleum data, gasoline, diesel and kerosene accounted for 55% of total Chinese oil consumption in 2019. We expect the transportation fuel consumption growth to be stronger (i.e., 6-7%) than its five-year compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.1% during 2015-2019. Chart 12China's Automobile Sales Correlated Well With Its Crude Oil Imports Automobile sales in China correlated well with the country’s crude oil imports (Chart 12, top panel). Despite a year-on-year contraction of 2% for the whole year of 2020, automobile sales had been strong with a double-digit growth nearly every month since May. Only 5% of these automobiles are new energy vehicles (NEV). About 80% of them are gasoline cars and 15% are diesel automobiles. Annual total car sales still account for about 9% of total existing automobiles (Chart 12, bottom panel). This means a 6-7% growth in the transportation consumption of passenger cars and commercial cars is very possible in 2021. The number of airports and airplanes are still on the uptrend in China. The CAGR of Chinese kerosene consumption rose from 10.1% during 2010-2014 to 10.6% during 2015-2019. This suggests that the kerosene consumption growth in China could reach 11% in 2021. Domestic gasoline and diesel prices are near decade lows (Chart 13). This will encourage consumption of these fuels. Second, the oil consumption growth in the industry sector will likely be larger than the 5% in the recent years (Chart 14). Based on the NBS data, the industry sector accounts for about 36% of China’s petroleum product consumption. Chart 13Low Domestic Gasoline And Diesel Prices Encourage Fuel Consumption This Year Chart 14Robust Oil Consumption Growth In The Industry Sector In 2021 Third, infrastructure spending and property market construction will slow in 2H2021 given the credit, fiscal, and regulatory tightening that has been taking place. However, construction only accounts for about 6% of Chinese petroleum product consumption.  Given all of this, achieving a 6-7% underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China this year is possible. Taking into consideration the slower pace of inventory buildup, we expect China’s crude oil imports to increase by 4-6% in 2021 over the previous year, slower than last year’s 7.2% growth. Bottom Line: The underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China is likely to increase to 6-7% in 2021 from last year’s 4.5%, providing solid support to China’s crude oil imports. What About Other Factors Affecting Chinese Crude Oil Imports? Currently, both domestic crude oil production and net exports of Chinese petroleum products exports are small contributors to the growth of Chinese crude oil imports. However, as the Chinese petroleum export sector becomes more competitive in the global market, it will likely take a bigger share of China’s crude oil imports going forward. Chart 15Net Exports Of Chinese Petroleum Products Are On The Uptrend We expect domestic crude oil output to be stagnant in 2021. The breakeven prices for most domestic oil fields are US$50-60 per barrel. Without a considerable rally in oil prices, the total domestic crude oil output is unlikely to pick up. Moreover, due to the massive crude oil inventory buildup in recent years, Chinese oil producers may constrain their output. In this scenario, a reduction in domestic crude oil output by 1-2% in 2021 from 2020 is possible. Nonetheless, this will only increase China’s oil imports by a small amount of about 40-80 kbpd. The net exports of Chinese petroleum products are on the uptrend (Chart 15). Currently net exports of Chinese petroleum products account for only about 6% of Chinese crude oil imports.  However, Chinese refineries are increasingly competitive in global gasoline and diesel markets, since most of the new refineries in the country are high technology equipped and highly efficient. In addition, last July, China started issuing export licenses to private refiners, and we expect the trend to continue. According to Bloomberg, China is set to surpass the US to become the world’s largest oil refiner in 2021. As such, in the coming years we expect rising Chinese exports of petroleum products will demand more imports of crude oil.  We expect Chinese petroleum products net exports to rise by 100-150 kbpd in 2021 15-20% growth from last year), which may increase our estimate of China’s year-on-year crude oil import growth from 4-6% to 5-7% in 2021. However, increasing Chinese petroleum product exports does not increase global final demand for oil. It cannot be viewed as a fundamentally bullish factor for oil prices. Bottom Line: Stagnant domestic crude oil output and rising net exports of Chinese petroleum products will also lead to an increase of China’s crude oil imports.  Investment Implications Chart 16China: An Increasingly Important Factor For Global Oil Demand Strong crude oil imports by China have supported global oil prices in recent years. China has become an increasingly important driving force of global oil demand. Its oil imports currently make up about 12% of global oil demand, more than doubled from a decade ago (Chart 16). The country’s crude oil imports will continue expanding this year. Even at a slower rate, the robust oil consumption and imports from China will remain a positive factor for global oil prices in 2021. Beyond 2021, however, the country’s crude oil import growth outlook is facing increasing downside risks. Demand that is due to inventory accumulation is ultimately finite and non-recurring. Moreover, more oil accumulations in 2021 on top of China’s already elevated oil inventories may weigh on Chinese oil imports beyond 2021. In the meantime, US crude oil producers may benefit from continuing strong purchases from China. In 2020, China significantly ramped up its crude oil imports from the US, as the country has pledged to boost purchases of US energy products under the phase one trade deal signed with President Trump in January 2020. Chart 17Chinese Imports Of US Crude Oil May Continue To Rise In 2021 In 2020, Chinese imports of US crude oil in volume terms were 155% higher from a year before (Chart 17, top panel). Its share of total Chinese crude oil imports also spiked from 1-2% in late 2019 to 7-8% in the past several months (Chart 17, bottom panel). In the meantime, China’s share of US crude oil export also jumped from 4.6% in 2019 to 14.7% last year. In 2021, our baseline view is that China will want to show goodwill to the newly elected Biden administration by continuing to boost its crude oil purchase from the US. This will benefit US crude oil producers. However, if China buys more from the US, it may buy less from other countries.   Ellen JingYuan He  Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1By deducting crude oil used in refineries and in direct final consumption from the total supply, we derived the flow of inventory and the level of changes in inventory. By using the cumulative value of the flow inventory data, we were able to derive the stock of inventory. We assume the initial inventory in 2006 was zero. This assumption is reasonable as the first fill of the SPR was in 2007 and the stock of CPR was extremely low at that time as well. In addition, based on the data from the National Bureau of Statistics, we found out that the direct final consumption of crude oil without any transformation only accounted for about 1-2% of total supply. 2 In 2004, the government planned three phases of SPR construction, targeting 10-12 million tons of crude oil SPR for the first phase, 28 million tons for the second phase, and another 28 million tons for the third phase. 3The import quota for independent refiners in 2021 has been increased by 20% (about 823 kbpd), and the country’s refinery capacity will expand at about 500 kbpd per year over 2021-2025. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Rising commodity prices and a weaker dollar will lead to higher inflation at the consumer level beginning this year. In the real economy, tighter commodity fundamentals – restrained supply growth, increasing demand, and falling inventories in oil, metals and grain markets – will push prices higher, which will feed US CPI inflation and inflation expectations going forward. Stronger fiscal stimulus, and the expanding budget deficits that will accompany it – along with the Fed’s oft-affirmed willingness to accommodate them – will allow the USD to resume its bear market, and will also boost commodity prices. Policy support will be kicking into a higher gear as COVID-19 vaccines are more widely distributed, contributing to a revival in organic growth globally. This will keep the rate of growth in commodity demand above that of supply. Increasing inflation expectations will be evident in longer-dated CPI swaps markets used by traders, portfolio and pension-fund managers to manage longer-term inflation risks (Chart of the Week). Risks remain elevated to the upside and downside: Fundamentals and policy are supportive; public-health risks are acute, and political risk is elevated, particularly in the US, where tensions remain high following the assault on the Capitol in Washington. Feature In the real economy, industrial commodities – particularly oil and copper – are signaling prices will move higher. The real economy and financial markets are pointing to higher inflation going forward. This will become apparent in the longer-term US CPI swaps markets used by traders, portfolio and pension managers as commodity prices continue to rise and the USD resumes its bear market.1 In the real economy, industrial commodities – particularly oil and copper – are signaling prices will move higher. Production-management in the oil market is keeping the rate of growth in supply below that of demand, a trend we expect will continue this year. In the copper market, demand growth will outstrip supply growth this year and next (Chart 2). As a result, both markets will see physical supply deficits this year. Chart of the WeekReal And Financial Markets Point To Higher Inflation Chart 2Copper Supply-Demand Balances Point To Growing Deficits Physical Deficits in Oil, Copper Indicate Supplies Are Tightening Fiscal stimulus in the US will be accommodated by the Fed, which, despite some dissonant messaging, continues to signal its policy of targeting average inflation can be expected to result in lower real rates, as inflation overshoots its 2% target. Policy support is helping to maintain commodity demand globally. Fiscal policy worldwide continues to be supportive. In the US, it likely will become even more expansionary, following the electoral wins of Democrats in Senate run-off elections last week, which will bolster president-elect Joe Biden's position in stimulus-package negotiations after he takes office next week. This expansion of fiscal stimulus will dwarf the levels seen in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008-09 (Chart 3). This fiscal stimulus in the US will be accommodated by the Fed, which, despite some dissonant messaging, continues to signal its policy of targeting average inflation can be expected to result in lower real rates, as inflation overshoots its 2% target. This continued policy support will lead to a resumption of the USD bear market, following a brief dead-cat bounce over the past few days. This will support demand by lowering the local-currency costs of dollar-denominated commodities, and restrict supply growth at the margin by raising the local-currency cost of production. Chart 3Massive US Fiscal Stimulus Will Grow Real Economy Will Boost Inflation Expectations Global fiscal and monetary policy support will further energize the rebound in industrial activity and trade globally. This will keep the rate of growth in commodity demand generally above that of supply, and keep prices elevated. The top panel in the Chart of the Week shows the relationship between CPI 5-year/5-year (5y5y) swaps and crude oil and copper prices, price indexes like the DJ UBS commodity index and the S&P GSCI index, and EM trade volumes in the post-GFC period (2010 to now). The curve in the top panel shows the average of single-equation regressions that use these variables as to estimate CPI 5y5y swap rates; the average coefficient of determination for these equations is just below 0.81, meaning these real variables explain ~ 81% of the level of the CPI 5y5y swaps level post-GFC. This also illustrates how prices and activity in the real economy feed into inflation expectations, which we have demonstrated in the past.2 There also is a correspondence between our measures of real activity – i.e., BCA’s Global Industrial Activity index, Global Commodity Factor and EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast – and CPI 5y5y swaps can be seen in Chart 4. These gauges are more heavily weighted to industrial, manufacturing and trade activity than the commodity indexes, and have an average correlation of ~51% with the level of CPI 5y5y swaps. These series are not as highly correlated with CPI 5y5y swaps as the real and financial variables we used above, but they are, nonetheless, useful indicators to track. Chart 4Real Economic Activity Feeds Into Inflation Expectations Real Economic Activity Feeds Into Inflation Expectations Financial Markets Point To Higher CPI Swaps The Fed’s oft-affirmed willingness to accommodate expanding fiscal deficit strongly supports a weaker-dollar view. The bottom panel in the Chart of the Week shows the average of single-equation estimates that use dollar-related financial variables as regressors against CPI 5y5y swap rates – i.e., the USD broad trade-weighted index, the DXY index, and DM financial-conditions index; the average coefficient of determination for these equations is just below 0.83, meaning these financial variables explain ~ 83% of the CPI 5y5y swaps levels. The Fed’s oft-affirmed willingness to accommodate expanding fiscal deficits strongly supports a weaker-dollar view, which also will boost commodity prices and feed into the CPI swaps market. This fiscal and monetary support will be kicking into a higher gear as COVID-19 vaccines are more widely distributed, contributing to a revival in organic growth globally. This will keep the rate of growth in commodity demand above that of supply. As CPI swaps rates continue to move higher, longer-maturity TIPS breakevens will follow suit (Chart 5). We remain strategically long TIPS versus nominal US Treasuries. We remain strategically long TIPS. Chart 5Expect TIPS Breakevens To Stay Well Bid Risks Remain Elevated CPI 5y5y swap rates will move higher on the back of rising commodity prices, growth in real economic activity, and a weaker dollar. While fundamentals and policy continue to be supportive – and jibe with our longer-term view that industrial commodity prices will move higher – downside risks remain acute. On the health front, COVID-19 pandemic risks remain high, with public-health officials now warning the risk of a more contagious variant of the virus that emerged in the UK could become the dominant strain by March. Public health officials are considering expanded lockdowns to contain the spread of this strain, which reportedly is 50% to 74% more transmissible, according to the MIT Technology Review.3 Fed policy remains supportive of markets in general and commodities in particular. However, with officials offering conflicting views on the policy stance going forward – specifically re the need to taper sooner rather than later – uncertainty around monetary policy will remain a near-constant feature of the market. Lastly, short-term political risk is elevated, particularly in the US, where tensions are high going into the second impeachment of US President Donald J. Trump, following the assault on the US Capitol. This is an evolving story we will be following closely. Bottom Line: CPI 5y5y swap rates will move higher on the back of rising commodity prices, growth in real economic activity, and a weaker dollar. While risks remain elevated, we expect policy risks to be managed and for organic growth to pick up going into 2H21.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Brent prices reached an 10-month high on Tuesday at close to $57/bbl. Saudi Arabia’s surprise cuts will offset the slowdown in demand growth caused by renewed lockdowns in most DM countries, which is expected to be most pronounced in 1Q21. Consequently, in its most recent forecast, the EIA revised its demand estimate for OECD demand by -450k b/d on average in 2021. Separately, cold weather in Asia, combined with supply and shipping constraints, pushed JKM LNG prices close to $20/MMBtu earlier this week (Chart 6). The cold wave will push storage in Europe lower ahead of the summer injection season, as LNG cargoes are redirected towards Asia to meet higher space-heating demand. Base Metals: Bullish Chinese imports of metallurgical coal from Australia fell to 447.5k MT in December, the lowest level since January 2015, when Refinitiv, a Reuters data and analytics service, started tracking them. Met coal imports peaked last year in June 2020 at 9.6mm MT, according to reuters.com. The proximate cause of this collapse is the Chinese retaliation to Australia’s call for an investigation into the source of the COVID-19 pandemic. China’s imports from Indonesia have surged, while India’s imports from Australia have picked up much of the loss in Chinese demand, Reuters notes. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold prices fell by $78/oz to $1,834/oz on Friday – a 2-week low – following Democrats win in run-off elections that gave them both of Georgia’s Senate seats last week. The decline in gold prices largely reflects the rise in US real rates, which rose following an increase in US nominal rates that was not accompanied by higher inflation reports in the short term (Chart 7). Going forward, we expect investors will increasingly focus on inflation risks as fiscal policy in the US expands. Democrats will be able to provide extra COVID relief – increasing monthly income-support payments to individuals to $2,000 from $600 – in a reconciliation bill in 2021. This will pressure real rates down as inflation expectations steadily move higher. Ags/Softs: Neutral In its global supply-demand estimates released earlier this week, the USDA lowered its global grain and soybean production and yields forecasts, which pushed prices sharply higher. CME spot corn prices held sharp price gains, which sent futures limit up Tuesday, on the back of lower production and yields. Soybean and wheat futures also responded to reduced supply estimates in the wake of the WASDE release. Chart 6DECLINE IN GOLD PRICES REFLECTS A RISE IN US REAL RATES Chart 7TIGHTENING MARKETS PUSH UP LNG PRICES   Footnotes 1 We focus on US CPI swaps because they are responsive to the perceived stance of US monetary policy, even if the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge is the PCE deflator and not the CPI. US monetary policy has a strong bearing on the trajectory of US interest rates and the USD, which impacts commodity prices directly. Please see Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), posted by the US Treasury, which notes: TIPS “provide protection against inflation. The principal of a TIPS increases with inflation and decreases with deflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. When a TIPS matures, you are paid the adjusted principal or original principal, whichever is greater.” A fixed interest payment, which changes as the CPI changes, is made twice a year. 2 See, e.g., Trade And Commodity Data Point To Higher Inflation, which we published 27 July 2017. Our approach – i.e., treating inflation expectations as a function of global real variables and financial variables – is consistent with that of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which is described in Has globalization changed the inflation process?, posted 4 July 2019. We treat the events of the GFC and central banks’ responses to them as a regime change. In our modeling we estimate dynamic OLS and ARDL equations, to ensure we are modeling cointegrated systems. The average of the coefficients of determination estimated using real variables in DOLS models is pulled lower by the model using COMEX copper futures as an explanatory variable. 3 Please see We may have only weeks to act before a variant coronavirus dominates the US published by the MIT Technology Review 13 January 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades