High-Yield
Highlights Fed Policy Loop: Low inflation is preventing rate hike expectations from being revised higher, prolonging the current rally in spread product. We expect rate hike expectations to move up as inflation recovers, eventually leading to a correction in spread product. Such a correction will prove fleeting as long as inflation stays below target. High-Yield: High-yield valuation is consistent with its historical average, after accounting for expected default losses. Current valuation levels should translate into excess returns of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months. Aaa Spread Product: Non-agency CMBS offer the most spread pick-up of any Aaa-rated sector. However, we prefer to focus our Aaa-rated spread product allocation in Agency CMBS and credit card backed consumer ABS. Feature Chart 1The Fed Policy Loop In Action One of this publication's main themes during the past few years has been the Fed Policy Loop.1 In essence, the Loop describes the feedback mechanism between monetary policy and financial markets, a relationship that results from both investors' sensitivity to the Fed's policy stance and the Fed's reliance on financial conditions as a predictor of economic growth. In practice, the Loop works as follows: Easier Fed policy causes spread product to outperform Treasuries. Tighter credit spreads lead to easier financial conditions, which the Fed interprets as a sign that economic growth will accelerate. An improved economic outlook causes the Fed to step up the pace of tightening. Tighter Fed policy causes spread product to underperform Treasuries. Wider credit spreads lead to tighter financial conditions, which the Fed interprets as a sign that economic growth will moderate. A worse economic outlook causes the Fed to slow its expected pace of tightening. Rinse, repeat. Chart 2 provides a graphical description of the Loop, and its most recent iteration can be seen in Chart 1 above. Chart 1 shows that corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries leading up to the March rate hike, but then rate expectations rose too far. In mid-March the market was discounting a fed funds rate of 1.86% by the end of 2018. These overly stringent rate hike expectations caused corporate bonds to underperform, and this underperformance led rate hike expectations to be revised lower. The market now expects a fed funds rate of only 1.47% by the end of 2018, and these depressed rate expectations have fueled the rally in corporate bonds that started in mid-April. Normally at this stage of the Fed Policy Loop we would expect rate hike expectations to move higher until they eventually prompt a correction in corporate spreads. However, extremely disappointing core inflation prints during the past three months have caused the market to keep its rate hike expectations depressed. This has extended the most recent rally in spread product. This is why we have consistently pointed to core inflation and the cost of inflation protection embedded in long-maturity bond yields as the main factors to watch to determine how much life is left in the corporate bond trade. As long as inflation stays below target, the Fed absolutely needs it to rise. It will therefore be quick to respond to any tightening of financial conditions/widening of credit spreads. Table 1 shows average monthly excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds relative to duration-matched Treasuries. These returns are split into buckets based on the reading from the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure (PPM). The PPM is a composite of 104 economic indicators designed to measure the probability that inflation will exceed 2.5% during the next 12 months. As can be seen, average monthly excess returns are strongest when inflation pressures are low, but they gradually decline as inflation heats up and the Fed's reaction function becomes less supportive for markets. At present, the PPM gives a reading of only 4.8%. Table 1Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Under Different ##br## Ranges Of Price Pressures Measure** (January 1990 To Present) Similarly, Table 2 shows that it is difficult to get a long-lasting correction in an environment with low inflation pressures and a responsive Fed. This table shows the results of a "buy the dips" trading strategy where if the average junk spread widens by 20 basis points we buy the junk index versus duration-matched Treasuries and hold it for a period of 1, 2 or 3 months. Just as in Table 1, this strategy works well when inflation pressures are muted, but starts to fail as inflation ramps up. Table 2High-Yield Corporate Bond Returns* Achieved By Holding The Junk Index ##br## Following A 20 BPs Widening In High-Yield Corporate OAS** Under Different Ranges Of ##br## The St. Louis Fed Price Pressures Measure*** (February 1994 To Present) Beatings Will Continue Until Morale Improves So when will the Fed staunch the current rally? That depends on how quickly inflation rebounds,2 and also on how much emphasis Fed policymakers place on financial conditions versus the actual inflation data. At the moment, most indexes are sending the message that financial conditions are easier than average and that the Fed should continue to tighten (Chart 3). However, as was noted above, inflation gauges are sending the opposite signal (Chart 3, panel 2). For now, the Fed is downplaying low inflation as transitory. It decided to leave its median projected rate hike path unchanged at the June FOMC meeting. But the Fed's refusal to capitulate in the face of weaker inflation has caused the yield curve to flatten, the cost of inflation protection to plummet (Chart 3, bottom panel) and investors to grow increasingly concerned about a policy mistake (Chart 4). Chart 3Financial Conditions Are Supportive Chart 4Should The Fed Keep Tightening? This brings up an interesting flaw in the financial conditions approach to policymaking. Most indexes of financial conditions are at least partially driven by long-maturity Treasury yields (lower yields = easier financial conditions, and vice-versa). This makes some sense. Lower yields do in fact indicate that the financing back-drop is more supportive and tend to translate into higher growth in the future (Chart 5). Chart 5Financial Conditions Lead Economic Growth However, what if lower long-maturity Treasury yields are the result of excessively tight Fed policy? This would appear to be the case at the moment. Investors are revising their long-run inflation forecasts lower on the view that the Fed is not doing enough to allow prices to rise. In such a situation it would be incorrect to interpret lower Treasury yields as a signal that policy needs to tighten further. On the contrary, tighter policy would only exacerbate the downtrend in yields. For this reason we do not include the level of yields in the financial conditions component of our Fed Monitor (Chart 3, top panel). As a result, this financial conditions indicator is not as deep in "easing territory" as most other indicators. However, it is still above the zero line, suggesting that policy should be biased tighter at the margin. Bottom Line: Low inflation is preventing rate hike expectations from being revised higher, prolonging the current rally in spread product. We expect rate hike expectations to move up as inflation recovers, eventually leading to a correction in spread product. Such a correction will prove fleeting as long as inflation remains below the Fed's target. The key risk is that inflation stays low but the Fed continues to focus exclusively on "easy" readings from financial conditions indexes, and proceeds on its current tightening path. In that scenario cries of "policy mistake" will grow louder and spread product will sell off, converging with lower rate hike expectations. We view this scenario as a low-probability tail risk. Junk Valuation Update At 378 bps, the average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is only 55 bps above its post-crisis low, but still more than 100 bps above the level where it tends to settle in the late stages of the economic cycle when the Fed is tightening policy (Chart 6, top panel). Higher debt levels than are typical for this stage of the cycle suggest that somewhat wider spreads are justified,3 but the idea that junk spreads are extremely tight compared to history does not hold up to scrutiny. Chart 6High-Yield Default-Adjusted Spread Our preferred measure of junk valuation, the default-adjusted high-yield spread, paints an even rosier picture. The second panel of Chart 6 shows an ex-post measure of the default-adjusted spread (the option-adjusted spread of the high-yield index less actual default losses over the subsequent 12 months). The most recent reading from this indicator is based on our forecast of default losses for the next 12 months, and is shown as a dashed line. The message from the default-adjusted spread is that, assuming our default loss forecast is correct, junk bonds currently offer compensation for default risk that is in line with the historical average. That level of compensation would be consistent with an excess return of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months (Chart 6, panel 3), and is contingent on the speculative grade default rate falling to 2.68%, in line with Moody's baseline forecast (Chart 6, bottom panel). We expect a decline in the default rate to materialize in the coming months as commodity sector defaults continue to work their way out of the data. Moody's did not record any commodity-related defaults in May, the first month this has occurred since January 2015. The risk going forward is that defaults start to emerge in the increasingly stressed retail sector. So far, Moody's has recorded two retail defaults this year. However, more are probably on the way. This will be especially true if inflationary pressures start to mount and the Fed tightens policy, giving banks less incentive to extend credit. We will be monitoring the situation in retail closely going forward. Bottom Line: High-yield valuation is consistent with its historical average, after accounting for expected default losses. Current valuation levels should translate into excess returns of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months. Aaa Roundup As can be inferred from the previous two sections, we are still reasonably comfortable taking credit risk in U.S. bond portfolios. However, this week we also look at the compensation offered by Aaa-rated spread product. For investors who desire some Aaa-rated allocation outside of the Treasury market, Chart 7 provides a snapshot of where the most additional spread is available. The first thing that jumps out is that Agency bonds offer very little spread compared to other Aaa-rated instruments. Agency residential mortgage-backed securities also offer relatively little compensation, unless one is willing to extend into premium coupons (4% and above). Agency CMBS, auto ABS and credit card ABS all offer more spread than Aaa-rated corporate bonds. Non-agency CMBS offer much more attractive spreads than the other Aaa sectors, but we see potential for capital losses in that segment, as is discussed below. Agency MBS Only agency MBS carrying coupons of 4% or above offer interesting compensation relative to other Aaa-rated sectors, and even there we see potential for spread widening in the coming months. Nominal MBS spreads are already very tight compared to history (Chart 8) and appear even tighter relative to trends in net issuance (Chart 8, panel 2). While refinancing activity will likely stay depressed (Chart 8, panel 3), we see potential for option-adjusted spreads to follow net issuance higher, even as the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) remains low. A similar scenario played out in 2007 (Chart 8, bottom panel). The Fed's exit from the MBS market, which could occur as early as September, represents an additional upside risk for spreads. Chart 8MBS Spreads Biased Wider Chart 9Avoid Non-Agency CMBS CMBS As noted above, non-agency CMBS look very attractive compared to other Aaa-rated spread products. But we see potential for spread widening in this sector. Commercial real estate lending standards are tightening and property prices are decelerating, both should pressure non-agency CMBS spreads wider (Chart 9). Agency CMBS offer somewhat lower spreads than their non-agency counterparts. But this sector should be more insulated from spread widening. For one thing, Agency CMBS are mostly backed by multi-family loans. Multi-family property prices have been stronger than those in the retail or office segments (Chart 9, panel 3), and multi-family properties have also experienced much lower delinquencies (Chart 9, bottom panel). Consumer ABS Chart 10Credit Cards Greater Than Autos While Chart 7 shows that Aaa-rated auto ABS offer a slight spread advantage over Aaa-rated credit card ABS, we are inclined to view credit card ABS more favorably. Rising auto loan net loss rates pose a risk for auto ABS spreads, while credit card charge-offs remain historically low (Chart 10). Auto lending standards have also moved deep into "net tightening" territory, while credit card lending standards have dipped back into "net easing" territory. The small extra compensation available in auto ABS relative to credit card ABS does not seem to be worth the extra risk. Bottom Line: Non-agency CMBS offer the most spread pick-up of any Aaa-rated sector. However, we view the risk of a further widening in non-agency CMBS spreads as substantial. We prefer to focus our Aaa-rated spread product exposure in Agency CMBS and credit card backed consumer ABS. Both sectors offer reasonably attractive spreads, and should remain insulated from capital losses going forward. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Caught In A Loop", dated September 29, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Our view is that core inflation will rebound fairly quickly. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights While the yield curve is a critical indicator for developed economies, its significance in China should be put in proper perspective, as the country's market-based financial intermediation is much less important compared with the West. The inverted Chinese yield curve indicates tighter interbank liquidity in recent months, but the impact on the economy should be limited. The PBoC will at minimum pause its liquidity tightening campaign, which will provide a window for bonds to rally. Go long Chinese onshore corporate bonds. The near term impact of MSCI's A Share inclusion should be negligible for the broader market. Valuation indicators of the select 222 large-cap names are much more attractive compared with their domestic peers, which may well provide a catalyst for some catch-up rally. Feature Chart 1China's Inverted Yield Curve The Chinese authorities' tightening measures on the financial sector have significantly pushed up interest rates across the curve, particularly in the short end, leading to rapid yield-curve flattening. By some measures, long-dated interest rates are currently lower than short rates, generating an inverted yield curve (Chart 1). Some have viewed an inverted Chinese yield curve as a harbinger of an impending material growth slowdown. While the yield curve is undoubtedly a critical indicator for developed economies, its significance in China should be put in proper perspective. In short, bank loans still play a dominant role in financial intermediation, the interest rates on which are still largely determined by the policy lending rate. Therefore, a simple comparison of the Chinese yield curve to its counterparts in the West misreads the situation and is overly alarmist. Moreover, we suspect that the phase of maximum strength of policy tightening is over, at least in the near term. Therefore, Chinese interest rates are likely to fall in the coming three to six months. This week we recommend a long position in Chinese onshore corporate bonds. Why The Yield Curve Matters Less For China To be sure, the yield curve is among the most relevant and watched indicators in some developed economies. In the U.S., for example, an inverted yield curve, defined as U.S. 10-year Treasury yields resting below three-month Treasury yields, has historically been a reliable indicator in predicting economic recessions (Chart 2). Evidence from other developed economies such as Japan and Europe is less compelling, but a flat/inverted yield curve is still generally regarded as a market signal for growth problems. Chart 2U.S. Yield Curve Inversion Predicts Economic Recession The reasons for the linkage between yield curve inversion and economic recessions have been the subject of lengthy debates among academia, policymakers and investors. From a financial market perspective, it is generally accepted that an inverted yield curve occurs when the bond market anticipates a significant slowdown in growth and/or decline in inflation, which bids down long-term yields, while policymakers fail to respond in a timely manner, which holds short-term rates at elevated levels. Yield curve inversion is typically followed by aggressive monetary easing as central banks wake up to the economic reality predicted by the bond market. Economically, the costs of funding in most developed countries are tightly linked with interest rates in the bond markets. One of banks' key functions as financial intermediaries is to transform maturity - i.e. to "borrow short and lend long," and therefore interest rates of bank loans are tied to government bond yields at the longer end, while their costs of funding are linked to the shorter end. Therefore, an inverted yield curve typically compresses banks' interest margins, which tends to hinder credit origination and slow down business activity. For example, Chart 3 shows that U.S. mortgage interest rates historically have been tightly linked with 10-year Treasury yields, while interest rates of banks' deposit base and interbank rates for "wholesale" funding are both determined by short-term Treasury yields, which is in turn determined by the fed funds rate. In China, the yield curve plays a much smaller role than in the developed world, simply because the country's market-based financial intermediation is much less important. Traditionally both lending rates and deposit rates of commercial banks were rigidly set by the People's Bank of China, and there was little lending/borrowing activity outside the formal commercial banking system. The situation has been gradually changing in recent years as a result of financial reforms. Banks are given flexibility to set their own interest rates, and non-bank lending, or shadow banking activity that is more driven by market interest rates, has expanded. However, commercial banks still play a dominant role. Chart 3U.S. Bank Loan Rates Follow Treasury Yields Closely Chart 4China: Bank Loans Still Dominate Bank loans currently account for over 70% of China's total non-equity social financing, both in terms of flow and total outstanding stock (Chart 4). Commercial banks' average lending rate still closely tracks the PBoC policy benchmark. Banks' prime lending rate moves in lock step with PBoC interest rate adjustments, and average interest rates on new mortgages are also primarily determined by the policy rate (Chart 5). Banks' cost of funding is also primarily determined by retail deposit interest rates, which are in turn set by the PBoC. Retail deposits account for about 80% of total loanable funds for large banks, or 70% for smaller banks (Chart 6). Repo and interbank transactions, which are subject to the central bank's liquidity tightening, only account for 14% of smaller lenders' source of funds, or a mere 2% for large lenders. Chart 5Chinese Bank Loan Rates ##br##Still Track PBoC Benchmarks Chart 6Retail Deposits Are Still The Dominant Funding Source ##br##For Commercial Banks The important point is that market signals from China's juvenile and volatile financial markets should be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism, and a simple comparison with the West is often misleading. For example, a significant decline in stock prices in developed economies may well herald a growth recession in their respective economies. In China, however, domestic stock prices have routinely gone through massive boom and bust cycles without any tangible impact on the broader economy, as the equity markets play a marginal role for both the corporate sector in terms of raising capital and for households in managing their wealth. In recent years, China's financial sector reforms have been gradually introducing market forces in setting interest rates, but the process is far from advanced enough to have a meaningful and direct impact on the cost of funding for both the corporate sector and banks. Overall, the inverted Chinese yield curve indicates tighter interbank liquidity in recent months, but the impact on the economy should be limited. PBoC Tightening: Passing The Phase Of Maximum Strength Moreover, it is noteworthy that yield-curve flattening has been a global phenomenon rather than a China-specific development (Chart 7). What's different is that in other countries the flatter yield curve has been mostly due to falling yields of longer-dated bonds, while in China it has been entirely driven by a sharp increase in short-term yields due to the PBoC's liquidity tightening.1 Looking forward, the PBoC will maintain close scrutiny on the financial sector to keep financial excesses in check. However, we believe the phase of maximum strength of liquidity tightening is likely over, at least in the near term. There is no case for genuine monetary tightening, as inflation is extremely low and growth momentum is already softening. It is very unlikely that the PBoC will tighten monetary conditions further, amplifying deflationary pressures in the process.2 The PBoC's tightening measures have already significantly reduced the pace of leverage buildup and excesses in the financial system. Banks' exposure to non-bank financial institutions has tumbled, net issuance of commercial banks' negotiable certificates of deposits has turned negative of late, and overall off-balance-sheet lending by financial institutions, or shadow banking activity, has slowed sharply in recent months (Chart 8). In other words, the tightening campaign has achieved the intended consequences, diminishing the odds of further escalation. Chart 7Synchronized Yield Curve Flattening Chart 8Financial Excesses Are Being Reined In Global developments are also conducive for some loosening by the PBoC. Last week's rate hike by the Federal Reserve has further pushed down both U.S. interest rates and the dollar. The spread between Chinese 10-year government bond yields and U.S. Treasurys has widened sharply of late, which is helping stabilize the RMB (Chart 9). All of this has reduced pressure on the PBoC to follow the Fed with additional domestic tightening. Already, the PBoC has stepped in to ease liquidity pressure in the interbank system in recent weeks. After massive liquidity withdrawals early this year, the PBoC has been injecting liquidity into the interbank market through various open market operations in the past two months, according to our calculations - likely a key reason why interbank rates have stopped rising of late (Chart 10). Chart 9China - U.S. Interest Rate Spread Versus##br## Exchange Rate Chart 10The PBoC Is Stepping In ##br##To Ease Interbank Liquidity Pressure Chart 11Onshore Corporate Bonds ##br##Are Attractive Chinese corporate bonds will benefit the most, should the authorities stop further tightening (Chart 11). Onshore corporate spreads have widened sharply since late last year amid the PBoC crackdown, and are now substantially higher than in other countries. Chinese corporate spreads should recover without further escalation in liquidity tightening, and will also benefit from the ongoing profit recovery in the corporate sector. We expect both quality spreads and government bond yields to drop in the next three to six months, lifting corporate bond prices. Bottom Line: The PBoC will at minimum pause its liquidity tightening campaign, which will provide a window for bonds to rally. Go long Chinese onshore corporate bonds. A Word On The MSCI A-Share Inclusion MSCI Inc. announced this week its decision to include Chinese A shares in its widely followed emerging market and world equities indexes. The company will add 222 China A large-cap stocks to its EM benchmark at a 5% partial inclusion factor, which will account for about 0.73% of EM market cap. This marks a major milestone in China's capital market development and financial sector liberalization. Increasing participation of foreign institutional investors will also over the long run help improve China's corporate governance and regulatory practices - all of which are instrumental for improving the efficiency of domestic capital market as well as the efficiency of capital allocation. Table 1Valuation Of China A-Share Universe The near-term market impact, however, should be negligible. After all, the inclusion will take effect June next year. In addition, foreign investors already have access to these A share companies through the existing Stock Connect channels between Chinese domestic exchanges and Hong Kong. Moreover, potential capital inflows from global managed assets benchmarked to MSCI indexes in the initial step will be marginal. It is estimated that a total of US$18 billion, or RMB 125 billion, foreign capital may follow the MSCI decision into the A share market, a tiny fraction of A-shares' almost RMB 40 trillion market cap. That said, the valuation indicators of the select 222 large-cap names look attractive compared with their domestic peers, with median trailing P/E and P/B ratios at 23 and 2 times, substantially lower than other major domestic indexes (Table 1). MSCI inclusion may well provide a catalyst for some catch-up rally. We will follow up on this issue in the following weeks. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "A Chinese Slowdown: How Much Downside?," dated June 8, 2017, and "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead," dated April 6, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights The main driving force behind EM risk assets this year has been downshifting U.S. interest rates and a weak U.S. dollar. These factors have more than offset the relapse in commodity prices and the deteriorating growth outlook for China/EM. Going forward, odds favor a rise in U.S. interest rates and a stronger dollar. If this scenario materializes, the EM rally will reverse. Meanwhile, China's liquidity conditions have tightened, warranting a meaningful slowdown in money/credit and economic growth. Altogether, the outlook for EM risk assets is extremely poor, and we reiterate our defensive strategy. In Argentina, we continue favoring local currency bonds and sovereign credit, especially relative to their EM counterparts. Feature What Has Not Worked In This Rally Financial market actions of late have been rife with contradictions, and momentum trades have been prevalent. In the past few months we have been highlighting that EM risk assets - stocks, currencies and bonds - have decoupled from most of their historically reliable indicators such as commodities prices, China's money and credit impulses and China/EM manufacturing PMI.1 This week we highlight several additional indicators and variables that EM risk assets have diverged from. Chinese H shares - the index that does not contain internet/social media stocks - have decoupled from the Chinese yield curve (Chart I-1). The mainstream press have been focused on inversion in the 10/5-year Chinese yield curve, but we do not find it to be a particularly credible or useful indicator for the economy. Our preference is the 5-year to 3-month yield curve to gauge the cyclical growth outlook. Chart I-1China's Yield Curve Heralds Lower Share Prices Not only has the yield curve been flattening, but it has also recently inverted, suggesting an impending downturn in China's business cycle (Chart I-2). Chart I-2China's Yield Curve Inversion Points To A Growth Slump In China, commercial banks' excess reserves at the People's Bank of China (PBoC) have begun shrinking since early this year, reflecting the PBoC's liquidity tightening (Chart I-3, top panel). Banks' excess reserves are the ultimate liquidity constraint on banks' ability to originate new credit/money and expand their balance sheets. Meanwhile, Chinese commercial banks are stretched and overextended, as illustrated by the record-high ratios of both M2 and commercial banks' assets-to-excess reserves (Chart I-3, bottom panel). These are true measures of the money multiplier, and they have surged to very high levels. Besides, financial/bank regulators are clamping down on speculative activities among banks and other financial intermediaries, and are also forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets. Faced with dwindling liquidity (excess reserves), rising interest rates and a regulatory clampdown, banks will slow down credit / money origination. Slower credit growth will cause a considerable slump in capital spending, and overall economic growth will downshift. On a similar note, interest rates lead money/credit growth in China, as evidenced in Chart I-4. Chart I-3China: Dwindling Excess Reserves ##br##Will Cause A Credit Slowdown Chart I-4China: Interest Rates ##br##And Money Growth The considerable - about 200 basis points - rise in Chinese money market and corporate bond yields since November heralds a deceleration in money/credit growth. Historically, interest rates affect money/credit growth and ultimately economic activity with a time lag. There is no reason why this relationship will not hold in China this time around. Given that Chinese companies are overleveraged, credit growth is likely to be more sensitive to rising than falling interest rates. Hence, the lingering credit excesses in China make rising interest rates more dangerous. Industrial commodities prices have reacted to liquidity tightening in China sensibly by falling since early this year (Chart I-5A and Chart I-5B). Chart I-5AWidespread Decline In Commodities Prices (II) Chart I-5BWidespread Decline In Commodities Prices (I) The weakness in commodities prices since early this year is especially noteworthy because it has occurred at a time of U.S. dollar weakness and dissipating Federal Reserve tightening concerns. When and as the U.S. dollar gains ground again, the selloff in commodities will escalate. Outside commodities, there are early signposts that another Chinese slowdown is beginning to unfold - slowing exports in May from Korea and Taiwan to China, being one glaring example (Chart I-6). This chart corroborates our argument that the surge in Chinese imports in late 2016 and the first quarter 2017 was a one-off growth boost, and appeared very strong because of the low base from a year ago. Consistently, Taiwan's manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratio has rolled over, which correlates well with the tech-heavy Taiwanese stock index (Chart I-6, bottom panel). With respect to the broader EM universe, EM equities and currencies have decoupled from U.S. inflation expectations (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Shipments To China Have Rolled Over Chart I-7EM And U.S. Inflation Expectations: ##br##Unsustainable Decoupling? Historically, falling U.S. inflation expectations have reflected dropping oil prices and caused real rates (TIPS yields) to rise. In turn, lower oil prices and/or rising TIPS yields weighed on EM risk assets. The decline in U.S. Treasurys yields since last December has been largely due to inflation expectations rather than real rates. Such a mixture has historically been ominous for EM risk assets. Notwithstanding, EM risk assets have rallied a lot, despite such a hostile backdrop year-to-date. Finally, the Brazilian and South African exchange rates and their bonds have been among the more stellar performers in the past 12 months. Nevertheless, first quarter GDP releases in Brazil and South Africa have confirmed that there has been little domestic demand recovery in either country. Remarkably, in both countries, agriculture and mining volumes boomed in the first quarter, boosting GDP growth, yet final domestic demand remained shockingly depressed, as illustrated in Chart I-8. This discards the popular EM rally narrative that improving global growth will lift EM economies. Neither a poor domestic growth backdrop and political volatility nor falling commodities prices have prompted a meaningful plunge in either the Brazilian or South African exchange rate. Chart I-9 portends that the BRL and ZAR have historically been correlated with commodities prices but have recently shown tentative signs of decoupling. Chart I-8Not Much Recovery In Brazil ##br##And South Africa's Domestic Demand Chart I-9BRL And ZAR And Commodities Bottom Line: EM financial markets have veered away from many traditional indicators. These constitute important contradictions and raise the question of whether this time is different. We do not think so. What Has Driven This EM Rally: U.S. Rates And The U.S. Dollar The variables that have explained the EM rally in the past six months have been falling U.S. interest rate expectations and a weaker U.S. dollar, as well as the global technology mania. We elaborated on the tech rally in recent weeks,2 and this week re-visit EM's link with U.S. interest rates and the greenback. The main driving force behind EM risk assets, year -to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart I-10). In short, it has been the carry trade that has transpired since the Fed's meeting on December 15, 2016 - regardless of EM growth dynamics and fundamentals. Going forward, barring a major growth relapse in China/EM growth and an associated U.S. dollar rally, the odds favor a rise in U.S. interest rates in general and U.S. TIPS yields in particular: The U.S. composite capacity utilization gauge (Chart I-11, top panel) - constructed by our Foreign Exchange Strategy team based on the unemployment gap and industrial capacity utilization - is moving above the zero line, denoting that there is little slack in the U.S. economy. Chart I-10U.S. TIPS Yields, Dollar And EM Chart I-11The U.S. Economy: Is It The Time To Bet On Higher Bond Yields? Any time the indicator has moved above the zero line in the past 55 years - the shaded periods on Chart I-11 - inflationary pressures, wages and bond yields have typically risen, and vice versa. The message from this indicator is unambiguous: U.S. inflationary pressures will become evident soon, and interest rates will rise. In this context, U.S. interest rate expectations are too low. Re-pricing of U.S. interest rates will shake off lingering complacency across many financial markets worldwide. Notably, the U.S. mortgage purchase index is surging, job openings are very elevated (Chart I-12), financial and property markets are buoyant and the dollar has been weak. If the Fed does not normalize interest rates now, when will it? Finally, both nominal and inflated-adjusted U.S. bond yields are at their technical support, and will likely bounce from these levels (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Are U.S. Rate Expectations Too Low? Chart I-13U.S. Bond Yields Are At A Critical Juncture Chart I-14U.S. Growth Underperformance Is Late Rising U.S. interest rates will trigger another up leg in the U.S. dollar. Notably, the relative economic surprise index between the U.S. and the G10 is close to its post-crisis lows (Chart I-14). The relative U.S. growth underperformance versus DM is late and will turn around very soon. While it does not always define the fluctuations in the U.S. dollar, we would still expect it to lend some support to the greenback. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service believes the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is still in a bull market, especially versus EM, DM commodities currencies and Asian currencies. We have less conviction on the magnitude of the downside in the euro, but the latter at minimum will not rally above 1.14 -1.15 for now. Finally, various EM currencies are facing an important technical resistance (Chart I-15A and Chart I-15B). We expect these technical levels to mark their top. Chart I-15AEM Currencies Are Facing Technical Resistance (II) Chart I-15BEM Currencies Are Facing Technical Resistance (I) At the same time, the precious metals index seems to be rolling over at its 200-day resistance level (Chart I-16). A top in the precious metals index would be consistent with a bottom in U.S. TIPS yields and the U.S. dollar. Chart I-16Precious Metals Are Facing ##br##A Major Resistance Bottom Line: U.S. interest rate expectations are too low and are set to rise. Rising interest rates will remove a major support underpinning the EM rally. A Resolution There are three potential scenarios as far as the ongoing EM rally is concerned: The goldilocks scenario of low interest rates in the U.S., a weaker dollar and steady-to-improving growth in EM/China. The markets have already priced in a lot of good news, but the rally could feasibly continue for some time if this scenario transpires. Re-pricing of the Fed. U.S. interest rates will rise and the dollar will get bid up. The rationale is the modest U.S. inflationary pressures will become evident amid solid U.S. growth. This will weigh on EM risk assets, even if EM/China growth does not falter. The basis for this is the EM rally year-to-date has been driven by diminishing U.S. interest rates expectations. Deflation trade redux. China/EM growth will deteriorate meaningfully (for reasons discussed above), causing a considerable downshift in commodities prices and EM risk assets. This could well occur even if U.S. rates stay low. In fact, this is the main plausible reason to bet against a rise in U.S. interest rate expectations from current levels. Investing is about assigning probabilities. We assign much lower probability to the first scenario (no more than 20%), while we see the odds of either the second or third scenarios playing out in the short term at closer to 40%. In the medium term (nine-to 12 months), scenario 3 will be the most prevalent one. If conditions in scenario 2 (rising U.S. bond yields) coincide with a deflationary shock emanating from China, EM financial markets will face a perfect storm. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend a defensive investment strategy for absolute-return investors, and recommend an underweight allocation towards EM within global portfolios across stocks, credit and currencies. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "EM: Is This Time Different?", dated June 7, 2017, link available on page 19. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Can Tech Drive EM Stocks Higher?", dated May 17, 2017, and Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "EM: Is This Time Different?", dated June 7, links available on page 19. Argentina: Favor Local Bonds And Sovereign Spreads EM fixed-income portfolio should continue to overweight Argentine local currency bonds and sovereign credit based on the following reasons: Policymakers continue pursuing credible orthodox policies. The central bank has been accumulating foreign exchange as a part of its explicit program to increase international reserves from 10% to 15% of GDP and keep the peso competitive. At the same time, the monetary authorities have partially siphoned off liquidity via reverse repos (Chart II-1). On a net-net basis, monetary stance is rather tight as evidenced by money and credit contraction in real (inflation-adjusted) terms (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Argentina: Rising Reserves ##br##And Reverse Sterilization Chart II-2Argentina: Inflation-Adjusted Money ##br##And Credit Are Contracting Rapid disinflation is proving difficult to achieve due to inflation inertia and high inflation expectations. However, the authorities are holding their position steady in wage negotiations. Wages in both the public and private sectors are contracting in real terms (Chart II-3). Provided wages are a major driver of inflation, employee compensation growing at a slower pace than inflation signals lower inflation ahead. The economy is not yet recovering as evidenced by Chart II-4 and lingering economic stagnation will foster disinflation. Chart II-3Argentina: Lower Wage Growth ##br##Is Critical To Anchor Inflation Chart II-4Argentina: The Economy ##br##Is Still In Doldrums A change in our fundamental view on inflation would require an irresponsible central bank tolerating run away money and credit growth. We find this scenario unlikely and hold the view that the inflation outlook will improve (Chart II-5). Chart II-5Argentina: Inflation Is On The Right Track In regard to the currency, the Argentine central bank will allow the peso to depreciate as maintaining a competitive exchange rate is a major policy priority for them. This is especially true if commodities prices fall and the regional currencies (BRL and CLP) depreciate versus the greenback. The current account and fiscal deficits are large but Argentina is seeing significant FDI and foreign portfolio capital inflows. Hence, funding will not be a problem for some time. The eventual economic recovery and the cheap currency, as well as slow but progressing reforms, will make Argentina a more attractive destination for foreign investors and ensure foreign capital inflows. Overall, there are many challenges, but the outlook for Argentina is much better compared with EM economies in general, and Brazil in particular. Hence, we recommend staying long Argentinian assets on a relative basis versus EM counterparts, particularly Brazil. Specifically, we maintain the following positions: Long ARS versus BRL. We do not expect the currency to depreciate more than what the NDF market is pricing in the next 12 months, and believe it will outperform the BRL on a total return basis (including carry). Stay long Argentine 7-year local currency government bonds. Stay long Argentine / short Brazilian and Venezuelan sovereign credit. Overweight Argentine stocks within the emerging and frontier market universes. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights The current economic and profit environment supports our stance of favoring stocks over bonds. The Fed will need to see more evidence to alter its gradual path for rates. Although valuations remain elevated, they are not a great market timing tool. Margins are expanding according to the S&P 500 data, and we expect this to continue in the second half of the year. But a peak in margins next year could be the justification to scale back on overweight positions in stocks, in anticipation of slower EPS growth. Corporate balance sheets continued to deteriorate in the first quarter, but that is not enough to warrant cutting back on corporate bond positions within fixed-income portfolios. Watch real short-term rates and bank C&I lending standards, as an exit warning. Feature Environment Remains Supportive For Stocks Over Bonds Investors are wondering whether the equity and currency/bond markets are living on different planets. The dollar and Treasurys seem to be priced for sluggish economic growth, less inflation and no fiscal stimulus. Yet, the S&P 500 is stubbornly holding above the 2,400 level. Many believe that the only reason that stocks got to this level in the first place is the prospect of tax cuts, deregulation and infrastructure spending. If true, then it is only a matter of time before equity investors capitulate. We look at it another way. Yes, equities initially received a boost following the U.S. election on hopes for tax reform. But indicators such as the ratio of small-to-large-cap stocks, or high-tax companies relative to the S&P 500, suggest that the stock market has priced out all chances of any tax reform. The overall stock market has performed well despite this because of the favorable profit backdrop. The fact that Corporate America can generate such profits despite a lackluster economy is impressive. Moreover, the recent softening in inflation has led many to believe that the Fed can proceed even more slowly than the market previously believed, leading to a bond rally. This is quite a bullish backdrop for equities. One does not have to conclude that the bond and stock markets are living on different planets. The backdrop is also positive for corporate bonds versus Treasurys, despite the fact that corporate health continues to deteriorate (see below). Turning to politics, the political consequences of the extraordinary U.K. general election are still not clear. The outcome of the election does not change our core views on the U.S. dollar, equity or bond markets. The dollar has rallied, Treasury yields are higher and U.S. equity prices moved up as this report was being prepared on Friday, June 9. Looking ahead, the coalition-building process in the U.K. will take time as the horse-trading between parties proceeds. Nonetheless, our high conviction view is that the investment implications are in fact already self-evident and do not require foresight into the eventual make-up of the U.K. government. A key takeaway for investors is that, aside from Brexit, domestic fiscal policy is the driving issue in British politics. Austerity is dead in Britain and investors should expect its economic policy - under whatever leadership ultimately gains power - to swing firmly to the left on fiscal, trade, and regulatory policy. Moreover, the Brexit process will continue, albeit of a potentially more "softer" variety and with a somewhat higher probability of eventual reversal.1 Will They Or Won't They? A 25-basis point rate hike is likely this week, but the FOMC will need more evidence on the direction of inflation and the economy before significantly changing the timing and pace of rate hikes or economic forecasts. The market is fully pricing in the anticipated 25-basis point rate bump, but beyond that, there is not much agreement between the Fed and the market on interest rates or economic projections. Nonetheless, as the Fed prepares its June forecast and dot plots, policymakers and the market are on the same page in terms of the labor market, inflation, and the economy in the next few years. The unemployment rate (4.3% in May 2017) is below the Fed's forecasts for 2017 (4.5%) and longer run (4.7%). The consensus outlook for the unemployment rate keeps it below the Fed's path through the end of 2018 (Chart 1, panel 3). Even assuming that the 120,000 pace of job growth in the past three months persists, the unemployment rate would remain below the Fed's view of NAIRU (Chart 2). Our unemployment rate projections are based on a stable labor force participation rate and a 1% gain in the working age population. Chart 1Fed, Market And Reality##BR##Not Too Far Apart Chart 2The Unemployment Rate##BR##Under Various Monthly Job Count Scenarios However, a closer look at what policymakers have said about prices and the trajectory of inflation in recent years suggests that the market and the Fed are not that far apart. At +1.7% in April, the PCE deflator remains near the FOMC's projection of 1.9% for this year and 2.0% in the long run. Bloomberg consensus estimates for inflation for this year and next are above the top end of the Fed's forecast range (Chart 1, panel 2). The FOMC's May minutes state that "participants generally continued to expect that inflation would stabilize around the Committee's two percent objective over the medium run as the effects of transitory factors waned." The market is still concerned that the traditional Phillips curve model may be broken and that inflation may never accelerate even with the economy below the Fed's estimate of full employment. We will discuss the Phillips curve in a post-GFC world in an upcoming edition of The Bank Credit Analyst. As we discussed in last week's report,2 GDP growth in 2017 is on track to exceed the Fed's 2017 target (2.1%) and is already running ahead of the Fed's GDP projection (1.8%) for the long term. The consensus forecast for GDP in 2018 and 2019 is at the upper end of the Fed's range set in March (Chart 1, panel 1). Despite the general agreement between the Fed and the market on certain aspects, they diverge on the outlook for the fed funds rate in the next 18 months (Chart 3). As of June 9, the Fed sees a total of six quarter-point rate hikes by the end of 2018. The market sees just two in the same period. The Fed and market are still far apart on rates in 2019. However, the disconnect between the Fed and the market is not as large as it was in early 2015. This disagreement was a major factor in the equity market pullback in the first few months of 2016 (Chart 3). Neither the recent weakness in the economic data nor softer-than-expected inflation readings will be enough to prompt a significant shift from the Fed in terms of the 'dot plot'. The economic surprise index has been declining for 63 days since peaking in early- to mid-March, but remains consistent with slow growth, not a recession. Economic data tends to disappoint for an average of 90 days after the economic surprise index is above 40, as it was in late 2016/early 2017 in the wake of the U.S. election (Chart 4). Chart 3Disconnect Between Fed##BR##And Market On Rates Chart 4Economic Surprise Index Has Rolled Over##BR##Since Early To Mid March Bottom Line: It would take a significant deterioration in the economy and labor market and in the benign inflation environment to alter the Fed's gradual rate hike plan. A backdrop of gradual hikes and eventually, a smaller balance sheet, will continue to foster the conditions under which stocks have outperformed bonds since 2009. We believe that the recent Treasury rally is overdone because the market has gone too far in revising down the path of Fed rate hikes. A re-evaluation of the outlook could see bond yields jump, sparking a small equity correction. This is not enough of a risk to scale back on equities versus bonds. Valuations, Earnings And Margins: An Update U.S. equities remain overvalued and would be even more extended if not for low rates. However, they are attractively priced relative to competing assets, such as corporate bonds and Treasurys. Valuation is not a great tool to time market turning points and, absent a significant deterioration in the economic, profit and margin environment, we don't foresee a sustained pullback in stocks. Looking beyond our tactical 6-12 month window, above-average market multiples alone imply below-average returns for stocks across a strategic time horizon. Our BCA valuation indicator has deteriorated since we last published it in March 2017 and shows that U.S. equities remain expensive.3 Individually, two of the three components of the Valuation index remain in overvalued territory. The Earnings Group remains at a record high (aside from the tech bubble). The Balance Sheet group shows the same profile. Only the Yield Group, which compares stock prices with various nominal and real interest rates, suggests that equities are undervalued. Thus, U.S. stock prices are vulnerable to a sharp jump in rates, which supports our view that U.S. equity markets will perform well in an economic and inflation backdrop that allows the Fed to raise interest rates and unwind its balance sheet gradually (Chart 5). While tax cuts and infrastructure spending might provide the equity market with a "sugar high", it probably would not last long because fiscal stimulus would bring forward Fed rate hikes. Moreover, Chart 6 shows that U.S. stocks remain favorably priced relative to competing assets such as corporate bonds, Treasurys and residential housing. That said, equity valuation measures such as price-to-book or price-to-sales make the market vulnerable to shocks. Chart 5U.S. Stocks##BR##Are Overvalued... Chart 6Stocks Look Less Expensive##BR##Relative To Competing Assets Inflated valuations alone are not enough to trigger a bear market or even a significant correction in U.S. equities. Outside of aggressive Fed tightening, we will become more defensive when profits come under pressure. On this score, the decline in Q4 profits according to the NIPA data is concerning. We are in a period where margins based on the NIPA data are diverging from the S&P's measure. Like corporate earnings, there is more than one data source for profit margin data, and the data itself is a mix of art and science. In the long run, the S&P-based margin data and the data derived from the NIPA accounts tend to move together. Over shorter time horizons, however, these two metrics may diverge. The NIPA margins peaked in 2014 and have moved steadily lower since then, but the BEA-derived profit data are not closely watched by investors and are subject to significant revision. On the other hand, margins based on S&P data are followed closely by the markets, are not subject to revision and have been moving higher since end of 2015. In the past 55 years, the peak in NIPA margins has often led the S&P data at peaks; the caveat is that it is unclear whether the NIPA data led in real time because of the endless revision process for GDP and profit data.4 The margin series based on S&P data tends to lead heading into margin troughs, but it is not a reliable signal. During the long economic expansion in the 1960s, both indicators topped out around the same time (1966-67). The NIPA derived margins peaked in 1975 as the S&P margins troughed, and later in the decade, the zenith in NIPA margins peaked three years before the S&P version. Similar to the current decade the long expansion in the 1980s saw a mid-decade collapse in oil prices and margins. In the late 80s, NIPA and S&P measures peaked almost simultaneously, which was three years before the crest in equity prices. The 1990s saw unabated margin expansion through 1997 for NIPA margins; the expansion in S&P-based margins lasted until 1999 (Chart 7). Chart 7Margins, Like Profits Are Mix Of Art & Science History also shows that falling margins do not always mean declining EPS growth. In the past 40 years, when the U.S. economy was not in recession, corporate EPS growth was very high on average when margins rose. It was mostly a wash when margins dropped, with slightly negative EPS growth on average. There were two episodes (late-1990s and mid-2000s) when margins fell, but EPS growth was strongly positive (Chart 8). The stock market can also rise significantly even after margins peak for the cycle. Chart 8EPS Can Grow Even As Margins Contract According to S&P data we are in a phase of climbing margins and we expect EPS growth to further accelerate into year end, peaking at just under 20%, before moderating in 2018. If profit growth decelerates in 2018 and the S&P measure of margins begins to narrow again, it would send a strong signal to trim exposure, especially given lofty equity valuations (Chart 9). Chart 9Profit Growth And Margins Both Rising Bottom Line: Rich valuations in U.S. equities will be overlooked as most investors are focused on the S&P and not the NIPA margins. EPS growth will decelerate sharply when margins resume their mean reversion, which could be the catalyst for a major correction or bear market in stock prices. We do not expect this scenario to play out until 2018 at the earliest. Meanwhile, rising margins and profits trump expensive multiples for U.S. equities. Stay long. Corporate Bonds: Kindling And Sparks Last week's U.S. Flow of Funds release allows us to update BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) for the first quarter (Chart 10). The level of the CHM moved slightly deeper into "deteriorating health territory." The deterioration in the Monitor over the past few years is largely reflected in the profit-related components of the CHM, including the return on capital, cash flow coverage and free cash flow-to-total debt. Chart 10Deteriorating Since 2015, But... The Monitor has been a reliable indicator for the trend in corporate bond spreads over the years. Indeed, it is one of the oldest and most reliable indicators in BCA's stable of indicators. However, spreads have trended tighter over the past year even as the CHM began to signal deteriorating health in early 2015. Why the divergence? The CHM is only one of three key items on our checklist to underweight corporate bonds versus Treasurys. The other two are tight Fed policy (i.e. real interest rates that are above the neutral level) and the direction of bank lending standards for C&I loans. On its own, balance sheet deterioration only provides the kindling for a spread blowout. A blowout requires a spark. Investors do not worry about high leverage or a profit margin squeeze, for example, until the outlook for defaults sours. The latter occurs once inflation starts to rise and the Fed actively targets slower growth via higher interest rates. Banks see trouble on the horizon and respond by tightening lending standards, thereby restricting the flow of credit to the business sector. Defaults start to rise, buttressing banks' bias to curtail lending in a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop. The three items on the checklist usually occurred at roughly the same time in previous cycles because a deteriorating CHM is typically a late-cycle phenomenon. But this has been a very different cycle. High stock prices and rock-bottom bond yields have encouraged the corporate sector to leverage up and repurchase stock. At the same time, the subpar, stretched-out recovery has meant that it has taken longer than usual for the economy to reach full employment. Even now, inflationary pressures are so muted that the Fed can proceed quite slowly. It will be some time before real short-term interest rates are in restrictive territory. As for banks, they tightened lending standards a little in 2015/16 due to the collapse of energy prices, but this has since reversed. As an aside, recent weakness in the growth rate of C&I loans has contributed to concerns over the health of the U.S. recovery. However, the easing in lending standards this year points to an imminent rebound in C&I loan growth (Chart 11). Our model for C&I loans, based on non-residential fixed investment, small business optimism and the speculative-grade default rate, supports this view. Chart 11C&I Loan Growth Set To Rebound The implication is that, while corporate health has deteriorated, we do not have the spark for a sustained corporate bond spread widening. Indeed, Moody's expects that the 12-month default rate will trend lower over the next year, which is consistent with constructive trends in corporate lending standards, industrial production and job cut announcements (all good indicators for defaults). Chart 12 presents a valuation metric that adjusts the HY OAS for 12-month trailing default losses (i.e. it is an ex-post measure). In the forecast period, we hold today's OAS constant, but the 12-month default losses are a shifting blend of historical losses and Moody's forecast. The endpoint suggests that the market is offering about 200 basis points of default-adjusted excess yield over the Treasury curve for the next 12 months. This is roughly in line with the mid-point of the historical data. In the past, a default-adjusted spread of around 200 basis points provided positive 12-month excess returns to high-yield bonds 74% of the time, with an average return of 82 basis points. It is also a positive sign for corporate bonds that the net transfer to shareholders, in the form of buybacks, dividends and M&A activity, has eased on a 4-quarter moving average basis (although it ticked up in Q1 on a 2-quarter basis; Chart 13). As a result, ratings migration has improved (i.e. easing net downgrades), especially for shareholder-friendly rating action, which is a better indicator for corporate spreads. The moderating appetite to "return cash to shareholders" may not last long, but for now it supports our overweight in both investment- and speculative-grade bonds versus Treasurys. That said, excess returns are likely to be limited to the carry given little room for spread compression. Chart 12Still Some Value In##BR##High-Yield Corporates Chart 13Net Transfers To Shareholders##BR##Eased In Past Two Quarters Within balanced portfolios, we recommend favoring equities to high-yield at this stage of the cycle, for reasons we outlined in the April 17, 2017 Weekly Report. In a nutshell, value is not good enough in HY relative to stocks to expect any sustained period of outperformance in the former, assuming that the bull market in risk assets continues. Bottom Line: Corporate balance sheets are still deteriorating but risk assets, including corporate bonds, should continue to outperform Treasurys and cash in the near term. We will look to downgrade risk assets when core inflation moves closer to the Fed's 2% target, which would trigger a more aggressive FOMC tightening campaign and tighter bank lending standards. Favor equities to high yield, but within fixed-income portfolios, overweight investment- and speculative-grade corporates versus Treasurys. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the Geopolitical Strategy Client Note "U.K. Election: The Median Voter Has Spoken, published on June 9, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Can The Service Sector Save The Day?" June 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "How Expensive Are U.S. Stocks", dated March 13, 2017 available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Growth, Inflation and the Fed", May 8, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Chart 1Something's Got To Give Last Friday's disappointing employment report reinforced the bond market's recent strength. The 10-year Treasury yield reached a new 2017 low of 2.15%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate broke below 1.8% and the overnight index swap curve is now priced for only 47 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months. Increasingly, the bond market is discounting two different future states of the world that cannot possibly coexist. Decelerating wage growth has caused the market to expect fewer Fed rate hikes, while concurrently, the cost of long-maturity inflation protection has fallen and the yield curve has flattened (Chart 1). This means the market expects that poor wage growth and inflation will cause the Fed to back away from its expected pace of two more rate hikes this year, but also that this relent will not be sufficient to prompt a recovery in economic growth or inflation. This dichotomy cannot exist for long. Either wage growth and inflation will bounce back in the second half of the year allowing the Fed to lift rates twice more in 2017 (our base case expectation), or inflation will continue to disappoint in which case the Fed will slow its pace of hikes. In both cases long-maturity Treasury yields should head higher, led by an increasing cost of inflation compensation. Stay at below benchmark duration. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in May. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 3 bps on the month and, at 113 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). Limited inflationary pressure will keep monetary policy accommodative enough to ensure excess returns consistent with carry. However, corporate spreads have already discounted a substantial improvement in leverage (Chart 2) and we do not see much potential for spread tightening from current levels. BEA data show that EBITD contracted in Q1, causing the annual growth rate to tick back below zero (panel 4). Meanwhile, gross issuance has been strong so far this year, suggesting that leverage will show an uptick in Q1 when the Flow of Funds data are released later this week. This aligns with our observation that, historically, net leverage - defined as total debt less cash as a percent of trailing EBITD - has never declined unless prompted by a recession. In other words, the corporate sector never voluntarily undertakes deleveraging, it only starts to pay down debt when forced by a severe economic contraction. For now, rising leverage will limit the amount of spread tightening, but shouldn't lead to negative excess returns. That will only occur when inflationary pressures are more pronounced and the Fed steps up the pace of tightening - probably sometime next year. Energy related sectors still appear cheap on our model (Table 3), and have outperformed the overall corporate index this year even though the oil price has fallen. Remain overweight. High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 48 basis points in May. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 8 bps on the month and, at 362 bps, it is currently 18 bps above its 2017 low. While the average spread on the junk index is a mere 38 bps above its post-crisis low, our estimate of the default-adjusted high-yield spread is 204 bps, only slightly below its historical average (Chart 3). Assuming our forecast for default losses is correct, a default-adjusted spread in this range has historically coincided with positive 12-month excess returns to high-yield bonds 74% of the time, with an average excess return of 82 bps. Our estimate of 12-month forward default losses is calculated using Moody's baseline assumption for the speculative grade default rate, which stands at 2.96%. We also incorporate an expected recovery rate of 47%. This expectation for a continued decline in the default rate squares with trends in corporate lending standards (which are once again easing), industrial production (which is accelerating) and job cut announcements (which are trending lower). Weak first quarter profit growth will be a headwind if it persists, but we expect it will recover alongside the broader economy in Q2. Overall, with muted inflationary pressures, an improving default back-drop and still moderate valuations, we think junk bonds will deliver small positive excess returns during the next 12 months. Stay overweight. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in May. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) rose 2 bps on the month, but this was entirely offset by a 2 bps tightening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The most important issue for mortgage investors at the moment is when and how the Fed will cease the reinvestment of its MBS portfolio. We have written extensively on this topic in recent weeks,1 and through Fed communications have learned the following: The unwinding of the balance sheet will start before the end of this year (assuming the economic outlook does not deteriorate substantially) Both MBS and Treasury securities will be impacted The process will be "tapered" with monthly caps set on the amount of securities that will be allowed to run off. The caps will gradually increase according to a pre-set schedule. MBS OAS are already starting to look attractive, especially relative to Aaa-rated credit (Chart 4). But we are hesitant to move back into MBS at current levels. OAS have further upside relative to trends in net issuance (panel 4), and the increased supply from the end of Fed reinvestment will only add to the widening pressure. Remain underweight. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 86 bps. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors outperformed by 18 bps and 38 bps, respectively. Meanwhile, the low-beta Domestic Agency and Supranational sectors outperformed by 7 bps and 9 bps, respectively. The Sovereign sector underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 12 bps on the month. Sovereigns underperformed in May even though the broad trade-weighted dollar depreciated by 1.4%. Similarly, Mexican debt - which carries the largest weighting in the Sovereign index - underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 22 bps, even though the peso continued to appreciate versus the dollar (Chart 5). With U.S. growth likely to rebound following a weak Q1, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar should appreciate in the second half of this year. Meanwhile, our Emerging Markets Strategy thinks that Mexico's central bank could deliver another 25 bps rate hike, but it won't be long before tighter policy becomes a drag on consumer spending.2 The peso could stay well-bid for now, but the longer run trend is for a weaker peso versus the U.S. dollar. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors continue to offer attractive spreads, after adjusting for credit rating and duration, compared to most U.S. corporate sectors. We continue to recommend overweight positions in Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities within an overall underweight allocation to the Government-Related Index. Municipal Bonds: Cut To Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in May (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio declined 8% on the month, and is now more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. In a recent report,3 we noted that the current weakness in state & local government revenue growth mostly reflected the fall-out from the mid-2014 commodity price slump. As such, we expect that revenue growth will rebound in the months ahead and that state & local government net borrowing will decline. However, this eventuality is now fully discounted in M/T yield ratios (Chart 6, panel 3). Further, M/T yield ratios benefited from a steep decline in issuance during the past few months (bottom panel), and the recent uptick in visible supply suggests that the tailwind from declining issuance is about to shift. Factor in the uncertainty surrounding tax reform and a potential infrastructure program, and it is difficult to make the case for much tighter yield ratios. We recommend investors reduce municipal bond exposure to underweight (2 out of 5). Investors should continue to capture the premium in long-maturity munis relative to short maturities (panel 2), and also favor the debt of commodity-dependent states where tax revenues should grow more quickly. In particular, Aaa-rated Texas General Obligation bonds offer a premium of 14 bps versus the overall Aaa muni curve at the 10-year maturity point. The average premium offered by other Aaa-rated states is -0.6 bps. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted lower and flattened in May. The 2/10 slope flattened 8 basis points and the 5/30 slope flattened 3 bps. For the second consecutive month yields remained stable out to the 2-year maturity point, but declined further out the curve. As stated on the first page of this report, the recent flattening of the Treasury curve indicates that the market expects the Fed will maintain a policy that is too restrictive for inflation to return to target. We think this is flat out wrong. Either core inflation will turn higher in the second half of this year, allowing the Fed to lift rates twice more in 2017. Or, core inflation will remain depressed. In the latter scenario, the Fed would adopt a more dovish policy stance until inflation starts to rise. In either case, the cost of inflation compensation at the long-end of the curve is not high enough, and it will cause the curve to steepen as it rises (Chart 7). We previously documented that the positive correlation between TIPS breakeven rates and the slope of the yield curve still holds during Fed rate hike cycles.4 We continue to recommend positioning for a steeper 2/10 curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This trade returned 0 bps in May, but is still 26 bps in the money since inception on December 20, 2016. While this trade no longer benefits from the extreme cheapness of the 5-year bullet relative to the rest of the curve (panel 3), it will continue to outperform as TIPS breakevens widen and the curve steepens in the second half of the year. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 107 basis points in May. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate fell 11 bps on the month and, at 1.79%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. A series of disappointing inflation reports have led to weakness in TIPS breakevens so far this year. Year-over-year trimmed mean PCE inflation fell to 1.75% in April, all the way from a peak of 1.91% as recently as January (Chart 8). As we discussed in two recent reports,5 a Phillips Curve model- based on lagged inflation, the employment gap, non-oil import prices and inflation expectations - forcefully predicts that core inflation will trend higher for the remainder of the year (panel 4). In a base case scenario in which both the unemployment rate and the trade-weighted dollar remain flat at current levels, the model projects that core PCE inflation will exceed 2% by the end of this year. In fact, we find it difficult to create a set of reasonable economic assumptions that don't result in core PCE inflation at (or above) the Fed's 1.9% forecast by year end. While we anticipate a rebound in core inflation between now and the end of the year, if that rebound does not seem to be materializing by the end of the summer, the Fed is likely to adopt a more dovish policy stance. Such a policy shift would lend support to TIPS breakeven wideners. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +52 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 7 bps on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level. In a recent report, we highlighted that consumer balance sheets are in their best shape since prior to the start of the housing bubble.6 As such, consumer ABS should remain a relatively low risk investment. However, some signs of stress are beginning to emerge, particularly in the sub-prime auto space. According to the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey, credit card lending standards tightened in Q4 of last year, but have since reverted into net easing territory (Chart 9). In contrast, auto loan lending standards continue to tighten and net losses on auto loans appear to have bottomed for the cycle. At least so far, auto ABS are not discounting much deterioration in credit quality. After adjusting for volatility, Aaa-rated auto ABS do not offer much of a spread pick-up relative to Aaa-rated credit card ABS (panel 3) and the spread differential between non-Aaa auto ABS and Aaa auto ABS has fallen to one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. We continue to recommend that investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans within an overall overweight allocation to consumer ABS. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 33 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +52 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 4 bps on the month, but remains below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). Apartment and office building prices are growing strongly, but retail sector property prices have been close to flat during the past year (bottom panel). Tighter lending standards and falling demand also suggest that credit stress is starting to mount in the commercial real estate sector. So far, this stress has manifested itself in rising retail and office delinquency rates, while multi-family delinquencies remain low (panel 5). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +50 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS tightened 5 bps on the month, and currently sits at 49 bps. The option-adjusted spread on Agency CMBS still looks attractive compared to other high-quality spread product: Agency MBS = 36 bps, Aaa consumer ABS = 39 bps, Agency bonds = 17 bps and Supranationals = 19 bps. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.49% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.41%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound. The U.S. PMI has dipped lower in recent months, but remains firmly entrenched above the 50 boom/bust line. Meanwhile, the Eurozone PMI continues to surge ahead. China's PMI is the real source of concern. It has recently dipped below 50, and there is a risk that tighter monetary policy could lead to further contraction in the near term (bottom panel).7 For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.15%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017, U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017, U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017 and U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017. All available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "A Time To Be Contrarian", dated April 5, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?", dated May 16, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017 and U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017. Both available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Past Peak Pessimism", dated May 9, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon) Current Recommendation
Highlights Chart 1Rate Hikes Lagging Wage Growth Last Friday's GDP report showed that the U.S. economy grew a meagre 0.7% (annualized) in the first quarter of 2017, well below levels necessary to sustain an uptrend in inflation. However, our forward looking indicators still point to U.S. growth of around 2% during the next few quarters. It is likely that faulty seasonal adjustments suppressed Q1 GDP growth. Q1 growth has averaged -0.1% during the past 10 years, while Q2 growth has averaged more than 2%. Q2 growth has also exceeded Q1 growth in 8 of the last 10 years. For its part, the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index has provided an average return of close to 1% during the past 10 Q1s and an average return of 0.4% during the past 10 Q2s. Treasury returns have been greater in the first quarter than in the second quarter in 6 out of the past 10 years. Investors would be wise to ignore Q1 GDP and stay focused on the uptrends in wage growth and inflation that are likely to persist (Chart 1). With the market priced for only 38 bps of rate hikes between now and the end of the year, there is scope for the Fed to send a hawkish surprise. Stay at below-benchmark duration and short January 2018 Fed Funds Futures. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 23 basis points in April. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 2 bps on the month and, at 116 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). While supportive monetary policy will ensure excess returns consistent with carry, investors should not bank on further spread compression as spreads have already discounted a substantial improvement in leverage (Chart 2). In a recent report,1 we noted that net leverage (defined as: total debt minus cash, as a percent of EBITD) is positively correlated with spreads, and also that it has never reversed its uptrend unless prompted by a recession. In other words, the corporate sector never voluntarily undertakes deleveraging, it only starts to pay down debt when forced by a severe economic contraction. We conclude that debt growth will likely continue to outpace profit growth (panel 4), even as profits rebound over the course of this year. If our anticipated timeline plays out, we will be looking to scale back on credit risk in 2018, when inflationary pressures are more pronounced and the Fed steps up the pace of tightening. Energy related sectors still appear cheap after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration (Table 3). Further, our commodity strategists expect OPEC production cuts will be extended through to the end of the year, and that $60/bbl remains a reasonable target for oil prices. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in April. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 12 bps on the month and, at 371 bps, it is currently 27 bps above its 2017-low. Wider junk spreads in recent months appear to be largely related to flight-to-safety flows driven by elevated global political uncertainty. We find it notable that spreads tightened following the market-friendly result of the first round of the French election. While political uncertainty remains, we view current spreads as attractive on a 6-12 month horizon. In a recent report,2 we tested a strategy of "buying dips" in the junk bond market and found that it produced favorable results in a low-inflation environment. With the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure still suggesting only a 6% chance of PCE inflation above 2.5% during the next 12 months, we think this strategy will continue to work. Moody's recorded 21 defaults in Q1 (globally) down from 41 in the first quarter of 2016, with the improvement attributable to recovery in the commodity sectors. While commodity sectors still accounted for half of the defaults in Q1, Moody's predicts that the retail sector will soon assume the mantle of "most troubled sector." According to Moody's, nearly 14% of retail issuers are trading at distressed levels. Moody's still expects the U.S. speculative grade default rate to be 3% for the next 12 months, down from 4.7% for the prior 12 months. Based on this forecast we calculate the High-Yield default-adjusted spread to be 207 bps (Chart 3), a level consistent with positive excess returns on a 12-month horizon more than 70% of the time. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in April. The conventional 30-year MBS yield fell 10 bps on the month, driven by an 11 bps decline in the rate component. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) rose by 2 bps, but this was partially offset by a 1 bp tightening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). Since the middle of last year the MBS OAS has widened alongside rising net issuance, but this has been offset by a falling option cost (Chart 4). This is exactly the price behavior we would expect to see in an environment where mortgage rates are moving higher and the market is starting to discount the Fed's eventual exit from the MBS market. Higher mortgage rates suppress refinancings, and this will ensure that the option cost component of spreads remains low. However, higher mortgage rates are also unlikely to halt the uptrend in net MBS issuance, since the main constraint on housing demand this cycle has been insufficient household savings, not un-affordable mortgage payments.3 This means that OAS still have room to widen alongside greater net issuance. The winding down of the Fed's mortgage portfolio - a process that is likely to begin later this year - will only add to the supply that the market needs to absorb. How will the opposing forces of low option cost and widening OAS net out? The option cost component of spreads is already close to its all-time low, while the OAS is still 16 bps below its pre-crisis mean. We think it is unlikely that a lower option cost can fully offset OAS widening. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in April, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 75 bps. The high-beta Sovereign and Foreign Agency sectors outperformed by 8 bps and 1 bp, respectively. Meanwhile, the low-beta Domestic Agency and Supranational sectors outperformed by 7 bps each. Local Authorities underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 23 bps. Since the beginning of the year, excess returns from the Sovereign sector have been supported by a weakening U.S. dollar (Chart 5). Mexican debt, in particular, has benefited from a 10% appreciation of the peso relative to the U.S. dollar (panel 3). A stronger peso obviously makes Mexico's USD-denominated debt easier to service and has led to year-to-date excess returns of 402 bps for Mexican sovereign debt relative to U.S. Treasuries. Mexican debt accounts for 21% of the Sovereign index. Our Emerging Markets Strategy service thinks that Mexico's central bank could deliver another 50 bps of rate hikes, because inflation is above target, but also maintains that further rate hikes will soon start to squeeze consumer spending.4 Conversely, the Fed has scope to hike rates much further. Sovereigns no longer appear expensive on our model, relative to domestic U.S. corporate sectors. But we still expect them to underperform as the dollar resumes its bull market. Local authorities and Foreign Agencies still offer lucrative spreads on our model, and we remain overweight those spaces within an overall underweight allocation to the Government-Related index. Municipal Bonds: Neutral Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in April (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio was flat on the month, but has fallen 15% since peaking shortly after the U.S. election (Chart 6). The sparse details of the Trump administration's proposed tax reform plan, released last week, did not include any specific mention of the municipal bond tax exemption, but did call for the elimination of "targeted tax breaks" leaving some to wonder if the tax exemption is in play. It is too soon to tell whether repealing the tax exemption will be part of the final tax reform plan, although its repeal would be at odds with the President's stated desire to spur infrastructure spending. For this reason, we suspect the tax exemption will ultimately survive. Assuming the tax exemption survives, the proposed repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax and of the state & local government income tax deduction should both increase demand for tax-exempt municipal bonds. However, this positive impact will be offset by lower tax rates. All in all, it is too soon to know how this will all shake out, but the considerable uncertainty makes us reluctant to take strong directional bets in the municipal bond market for now. Meanwhile, Muni mutual fund inflows have totaled more than $9 billion since the beginning of the year, while total issuance is at a 12-month low. Strong inflows and low supply likely explain why yield ratios are testing the low-end of their post-crisis trading range. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted lower in April, with the 2/10 slope flattening by 12 basis points and the 5/30 slope steepening by 6 bps. The 5-year Treasury yield declined 12 bps on the month, while the 10-year yield fell 11 bps. The 2-year yield actually ticked 1 bp higher. Significant outperformance in the 5-year part of the curve means that our recommendation to favor the 5-year bullet over a duration-matched 2/10 barbell has returned 27 bps since inception on December 20, 2016. This 5-year bullet over duration-matched 2/10 barbell trade is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening, which has not yet materialized. Instead, the trade has performed well because the 2/5/10 butterfly spread has moved much closer to our estimate of fair value (Chart 7). The 5-year bullet still looks moderately cheap on the curve, but no longer offers an exceptional valuation cushion. For our trade to outperform from here we will likely need to see some 2/10 curve steepening. We continue to hold the 5-year bullet over duration-matched 2/10 barbell trade, because we still expect the 2/10 slope to steepen. This steepening will be driven by wider long-maturity TIPS breakevens which should eventually catch up to leading pipeline inflation measures (see next page). In a recent report,5 we outlined the main drivers of the slope of the yield curve on a cyclical horizon and concluded that wider breakevens can cause the nominal curve to steepen even with the Fed in the midst of hiking rates. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 25 basis points in April. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate declined 5 bps on the month and, at 1.92%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. Our Financial Model of TIPS breakevens - which models the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate using the stock-to-bond total return ratio, the price of oil and the trade-weighted dollar - attributes the recent decline in breakevens to weakness in the stock-bond ratio and the fact that the 10-year breakeven rate was already quite elevated compared to fair value (Chart 8). Both core and trimmed mean PCE inflation dropped sharply in March, and are now running at 1.6% and 1.8% year-over-year, respectively (bottom panel). This decline is likely to reverse in the coming months. Crucially, pipeline inflation measures, such as the ISM prices paid index, are holding firm at high levels (panel 4). We remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries on the view that growth will be strong enough to keep measures of core inflation on a steady upward trajectory, eventually converging with the Fed's 2% inflation target. In that environment, TIPS breakevens should eventually return to their pre-crisis range. In last week's report,6 we considered the possibility that TIPS breakevens might not return to their pre-crisis trading range, even if measures of core inflation remain strong. The most likely reason relates to structural rigidities in the repo market that have made it more costly to arbitrage the difference between real and nominal rates. For now, we consider this simply a risk to our overweight view. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in April, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +33 bps. Aaa-rated issuers outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps on the month, while non-Aaa issues outperformed by 13 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 1 bp on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level. Banks are now tightening lending standards on both auto loans and credit cards. While we do not expect this recent development to have much of an impact on consumer spending,7 it is usually an indication that there is growing concern about ABS collateral credit quality. This concern is echoed by the fact that net losses on auto loans are trending sharply higher (Chart 9). Credit card charge-offs remain subdued for now - and we continue to recommend that investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans - but even in the credit card space quality concerns are starting to mount. Capital One reported a 20% drop in earnings in Q1 versus the same quarter in 2016, and noted that it has been tightening underwriting standards against a back-drop of credit card loans growing faster than income. We remain overweight ABS for now, as the securities still offer attractive spreads compared to other high-quality spread product, but we are closely monitoring credit quality metrics for signs of rising stress. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in April, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +19 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 1 bp on the month, and is fast approaching its average pre-crisis level. Apartment and office building prices are growing strongly, but as in the corporate space, the retail sector is a major drag (Chart 10). Tighter lending standards and falling demand also suggest that credit stress is starting to mount, but while office and retail delinquencies are rising multi-family delinquencies remain low (panel 5). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in April, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +19 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS widened 1 bp on the month, and currently sits at 54 bps. The option-adjusted spread on Agency CMBS looks attractive compared to other high-quality spread product: Agency MBS = 35 bps, Aaa consumer ABS = 46 bps, Agency bonds = 17 bps and Supranationals = 20 bps. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.59% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.43%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound (bottom panel). Large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in other economic indicators tend to mean revert fairly quickly. So we are inclined to view the fair value reading from our 2-factor model as more indicative of true fair value at the moment. It should also be noted that the fair value readings from both the 2-factor and 3-factor models are calculated using FLASH PMI estimates for April. These estimates will be revised later today when the actual PMI data are released. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.32%. 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips", dated March 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips", dated March 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "A Time To Be Contrarian", dated April 5, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Breakevens Ever Recover?", dated April 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Odds Of March", dated February 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Highlights Duration: The market is now priced for only 30 bps of rate hikes between now and the end of the year, despite little evidence that growth is actually slowing. Stay at below-benchmark duration and remain short the January 2018 Fed Funds Futures contract. TIPS: Although we still expect TIPS breakevens to widen as inflation rises, this week we review possible arguments for why breakevens might have shifted to a permanently lower post-crisis equilibrium. Remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. Corporate Valuation: Our Default-Adjusted Spread remains at reasonably attractive levels, suggesting that corporate spreads will tighten in the coming months if the economic recovery remains on track. Remain overweight corporate bonds within U.S. fixed income portfolios. Feature Chart 1Yields Lower Since March FOMC In last week's report we argued that recent bond market strength was caused by a politically-induced flight-to-quality. In particular, we noted that the term structure of implied equity volatility had inverted - investors were paying more to hedge equity positions over a 1-month horizon than over a 3-month horizon. But political tensions have eased somewhat during the past week. President Trump promised to unveil his administration's tax reform plan this Wednesday, and the first round of the French election resulted in centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron securing a significant advantage over far-right candidate Marine Le Pen. As a consequence, 1-month implied equity vol fell back below 3-month vol, and the bond rally ebbed with the 10-year Treasury yield edging up to 2.29% from 2.17% at this time last week. Nonetheless, bond yields are still far below the levels seen following the last FOMC meeting in mid-March. Since that meeting, the 10-year Treasury yield has fallen 27 bps, split between a 12 bps decline in the real yield and a 15 bps drop in the cost of inflation compensation (Chart 1). Real Yields Are Too Low As shown in the top panel of Chart 1, the 10-year real yield is tightly linked to the number of rate hikes discounted in the overnight index swap curve during the next 12 months. Further, the drop in both of these series since mid-March occurred alongside a string of economic data disappointments, as evidenced by the sharp fall in the Economic Surprise Index (Chart 2). Our assessment, however, is that the mean reversion in the surprise index represents excessively optimistic expectations rather than a trend change in the pace of U.S. growth. Chart 2Disappointments Are Discounted To test this theory, we looked at the New York Fed's Nowcast for Q1 GDP growth and noted that it has been revised lower from 2.96% (as of March 24) to 2.65% (as of April 20). We observed that the data releases responsible for the bulk of the downward revision were: Real consumer spending Retail sales and food services Import & Export growth Housing starts As can be seen in Chart 3, with the exception of real consumer spending, all of the other data disappointments represent small corrections from elevated levels. As for real consumer spending, we noted last week that the recent weakness is probably explained by problems with Q1 seasonal adjustments.1 Taking a step back, U.S. growth still appears to be on solid footing. The BCA Beige Book Monitor, introduced last week by our U.S. Investment Strategy service,2 scans the Federal Reserve's Beige Book3 for the words "strong" and "weak" (and their derivatives like stronger, weakened, etc...). The Monitor is the number of "strong" words less the number of "weak" words, and it has been an excellent coincident indicator of GDP growth since the mid-1990s (Chart 4). At present, the Beige Book Monitor is sending a robust signal for U.S. growth. Similarly, despite supposed weakness in housing starts and trade data, our preferred leading indicators point to continued strength in both the residential investment and net export components of GDP (Chart 4, bottom 2 panels). Chart 3What Weak Data? Chart 4Growth Still Looks Strong Bottom Line: The market is now priced for only 30 bps of rate hikes between now and the end of the year, despite little evidence that growth is actually slowing. We still expect the Fed will lift rates by at least 50 bps between now and the end of the year. Stay at below-benchmark duration and remain short the January 2018 Fed Funds Futures contract. TIPS Breakevens: How Far From Fair Value? As was mentioned above, the cost of 10-year inflation compensation has also declined since mid-March alongside some weakness in the headline non-seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index (see Chart 1). Our Financial Model of TIPS Breakevens - which models the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate using the stock-to-bond total return ratio, the price of oil and the trade-weighted dollar - attributes the recent decline to weakness in the stock-to-bond ratio and the fact that the 10-year breakeven rate was already quite elevated compared to our model's fair value (Chart 5). The 10-year breakeven rate is still somewhat wide compared to our model's fair value, but much less so. We remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries on the view that growth will be strong enough to keep measures of core inflation on a steady upward trajectory, eventually converging with the Fed's 2% inflation target. The fair value reading from our TIPS Financial Model should also trend gradually higher in this environment. Historically, core PCE inflation anchored around the Fed's 2% inflation target has corresponded with a 5y5y TIPS breakeven inflation rate in the range of 2.4% to 2.5% (current value 1.89%) and a 5y5y CPI swap rate between 2.8% and 2.9% (current value = 2.31%) (Chart 6). These remain our target levels for TIPS breakevens and CPI swaps, respectively. Chart 5TIPS Financial Model Chart 6Still Below Target However, we must also consider the possibility that these target ranges, based on the mid-2000s, may no longer be applicable. Put differently, it is possible that the market for inflation protection underwent a structural shift following the financial crisis and the appropriate level for long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates when core PCE is anchored around 2% might now be lower. A Structurally Lower Inflation Risk Premium? It is common to think of the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate as: TIPS Breakeven Inflation = Inflation Expectations + Inflation Risk Premium The inflation risk premium is the extra return required by nominal bond investors to bear the risk that future inflation will differ from expected inflation. In theory, this premium can be influenced by uncertainty about the inflation outlook, but also by structural factors that make it more or less attractive to include TIPS in a portfolio. For example, any asset that is negatively correlated with equities is more valuable as a hedge in the context of an overall portfolio and investors should demand less of a risk premium to hold that asset. As one recent Fed paper4 noted, the correlation between long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates and equities has shifted from being negative in the 1980s to being sharply positive in recent years. This means that TIPS have become less valuable as a hedge against equity positions. All else equal, this should increase the yield that investors demand to hold TIPS and thus lower the TIPS breakeven inflation rate. We acknowledge the strong positive correlation between equities and TIPS breakevens, but are inclined to view it as more of a cyclical phenomenon. Chart 7 shows that the correlation between inflation expectations5 and equities was negative when inflation was above the Fed's 2% target in the 1980s and also that the correlation becomes more positive when the Fed eases and more negative when the Fed tightens (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 7Correlation Between Breakevens & Equities Is Cyclical In other words, when inflation is low the Fed has an incentive to maintain an accommodative monetary policy. It does not react strongly when inflation rises, and this supports increases in both inflation expectations and equity prices. However, when inflation becomes too high, the correlation between inflation expectations and equity prices shifts because higher inflation now signals a more rapid pace of Fed tightening which tends to depress equities. It therefore seems likely that the correlation between TIPS breakevens and equity prices will weaken as inflation rises and the Fed tightens policy. So we do not view this as a compelling reason for why TIPS breakevens might be permanently lower. Structural Limits To Arbitrage? A potentially more interesting line of argument comes from a 2010 paper by Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig.6 In this paper, the authors document a persistent arbitrage opportunity between TIPS and nominal Treasury bonds. Investors can earn risk-free returns using inflation swaps and TIPS to replicate the cash flows from a nominal Treasury bond. The authors also find that this arbitrage opportunity biases TIPS breakeven rates lower, and that this bias worsens in times of increased financial market volatility. Chart 8Repo Market Less Efficient Specifically, the authors demonstrate that the size of the downward bias in TIPS breakevens increases as repo market fails trend higher. The rationale being that repo fails occur when market participants are unable to acquire specific Treasury collateral. This is taken as a signal that the supply of government bonds is constrained, which makes it more difficult to take advantage of the arbitrage between TIPS and nominal Treasuries. Interestingly, repo fails have been trending higher since the financial crisis as repo market activity has been reduced by strict post-crisis regulations (Chart 8). The case has been made that new regulations - specifically the Supplementary Leverage Ratio which forces dealer banks to set aside a fixed amount of capital for any assets they hold, regardless of riskiness - have caused dealers to shy away from low margin businesses such as making markets in repo.7 It is conceivable that reduced activity in the repo market has resulted in less available collateral and increased fails. If this is the new state of affairs, then it is possible that TIPS breakevens will be permanently lower in the post-crisis world because lack of liquidity in the repo market has reduced the attractiveness of arbitraging the difference between nominal and real yields. So far, we are reluctant to draw any sweeping conclusions from this analysis. In fact, if the Fed believes that the fair value for long-maturity TIPS breakevens is between 2.4% and 2.5%, then does the "limits to arbitrage" argument even matter? Also, Manmohan Singh of the IMF has argued that the act of the Fed unwinding its balance sheet would free up balance sheet space for dealer banks, mitigating some of the regulatory burden and leading to a more efficient repo market.8 If this is correct, then repo fails could decline as the Fed starts to let its balance sheet run down, a process that is likely to start later this year. For now, we consider the theory of a permanently lower equilibrium for TIPS breakevens a risk to our view that merits further research in the coming weeks. Corporate Bond Valuation Update With the release of the Moody's Default Report for March we were able to update our High-Yield Default-Adjusted Spread (Chart 9). Our Default-Adjusted Spread is equal to the average option-adjusted spread from the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index less a 12-month forecast of default losses. That 12-month forecast is based on Moody's baseline forecast for the speculative grade default rate and our own forecast of the recovery rate. Chart 9Default-Adjusted Spread Moody's data show that the speculative grade default rate was 4.7% for the 12 months ending in March, and the baseline forecast calls for it to fall to 3% during the next 12 months. Using this forecast we calculate that the current Default-Adjusted Spread is 228 bps. Our analysis shows that excess returns for both Investment Grade and High-Yield corporate bonds are usually positive unless the Default-Adjusted Spread is below 100 bps. The relationship between excess returns and the Default-Adjusted Spread for both Investment Grade and High-Yield corporates is shown graphically in Charts 10 & 11 and also in Tables 1 & 2. Chart 1012-Month Excess Investment Grade Returns ##br##Vs. Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread (2003 - Present) Chart 1112-Month Excess High-Yield Returns Versus Ex-Ante ##br##Default-Adjusted Spread (2003-Present) Table 112-Month Investment Grade Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Table 212-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Given our relatively optimistic outlook for U.S. growth, we tend to view current valuation levels as attractive and see scope for spread tightening during the next few months. However, the weakening state of corporate balance sheets means spreads are at risk once inflation starts to bite and monetary policy turns less accommodative, possibly as early as next year.9 Bottom Line: Our Default-Adjusted Spread remains at reasonably attractive levels, suggesting that corporate spreads will tighten in the coming months if the economic recovery remains on track. Remain overweight corporate bonds within U.S. fixed income portfolios. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade The Flight To Safety", dated April 18, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 According to the Fed, the Beige Book provides "an up-to-date depiction of regional economic conditions based on anecdotal information gathered from a diverse range of business and community contacts." 4 Chen, Andrew Y., Eric C. Engstrom, and Olesya V. Grishchenko (2016). "Has the inflation risk premium fallen? Is it now negative?," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 4, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.1720 5 In order to benefit from more back-data, in Chart 7 we use the Cleveland Fed's measure of inflation expectations rather than TIPS breakeven rates. Details about the Cleveland Fed's methodology can be found here: https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/our-research/indicators-and-data/inflation-expectations.aspx 6 Fleckenstein, Matthias, Francis A. Longstaff, and Hanno Lustig (2010). "Why Does the Treasury Issue TIPS? The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle", NBER Working Paper No. 16358. September 2010. JEL No. E6,G12,G14. http://www.nber.org/papers/w16358 7 https://www.forbes.com/sites/lbsbusinessstrategyreview/2016/03/11/why-are-big-banks-offering-less-liquidity-to-bond-markets/#64286f5729de 8 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/04/24/2187716/guest-post-why-shrinking-the-fed-balance-sheet-may-have-an-easing-effect/ 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
I am honored to join BCA Research as Senior Vice President of the U.S. Investment Strategy service. I have been researching and writing about the economy and financial markets for more than 30 years. I joined BCA Research from LPL Financial in Boston, MA where I served as the firm’s Chief Economic Strategist. At LPL I helped to manage more than $120 billion in client assets and provided more than 14,000 financial advisors and 700+ financial institutions with insights on asset allocation, global financial markets and economics. Prior to LPL, I served in similar functions at PNC Advisors, Stone & McCarthy Research, Prudential Securities, and the Congressional Budget Office in Washington, DC. I look forward to meeting you and providing quality research in the years to come. John Canally, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy Highlights We are not changing our view on Treasury markets or our stocks over bonds call despite the news that the Fed will begin shrinking its balance sheet later this year. The Fed's action is marginally dollar positive. For the major industrialized economies, the so-called "hard" data are moving in line with the "soft" survey data for the most part. Retail sales and industrial production have accelerated, although "hard" data on business capital spending remains weak. We introduce our Bond Duration checklist this week. These are the key economic and market indicators that we are watching to assess whether we should maintain our current below-benchmark portfolio stance. We continue to favor U.S. equites over bonds in 2017 and recommend keeping duration short of benchmark. Despite outsized performance from high-yield corporate bonds in 2016, investors should favor stocks over high-yield over the coming year. We introduce the BCA Beige Book Monitor this week. This metric provides a quantitative look at the qualitative, or "soft" data in the Fed's Beige Book. The Beige Book is due out Wednesday, April 19. Feature Chart 1Weak Data And More Weighed ##br##On Risk Assets U.S. stocks stumbled and Treasury yields slumped last week with the 10-year Treasury yield hitting a 2017 low. The drop in yields came despite news from the FOMC that the Fed is prepared to shrink its balance sheet later this year, a bit sooner than the market expected. Comments from Fed Chair Yellen - who expressed concern that the Fed's independence is "under threat"- should have jolted the bond market, but didn't. Not yet at least. Geopolitics played a role in the week's market action as well, the main culprits being upcoming French elections, the aftermath of President Trump's missile attack on Syria and ongoing tensions in North Korea. The looming Q1 earnings reporting season weighed on risk assets as well. The dollar ended lower last week. Trump told the Wall Street Journal he prefers a weak dollar. Those comments and the tepid data helped to offset the safe-haven bid generated by the geopolitical events of the week (Chart 1). The "hard" vs "soft" data debate will continue this week and likely for some time thereafter. "Hard" data on housing and manufacturing for March as well as the U.S. leading indicator are due out this week. Of course, the ultimate set of "hard" data is the corporate earnings data. Nearly 70 S&P 500 firms will report Q1 results and provide guidance for Q2 and beyond this week. "Soft" data on the PMI, Philly Fed and Empire State manufacturing sector for April will undoubtedly keep the debate going. Our view is that the hard data will catch up with the upbeat surveys in the U.S. This week we review the key economic indicators for the major advanced economies, which highlight that the global growth acceleration remains on track. We also introduce a Duration Checklist designed to help separate "signal from noise" in the bond market. Most of the items on the Checklist remain bond-bearish. Fed plans to shrink its balance sheet is not particularly negative for bond prices, but it certainly won't be supportive. The main risk to our bond-bearish view remains geopolitics, including the first round voting and results in the French election due on Sunday, April 23. Balance Sheet Bedlam? Maybe Not The release of Minutes from the FOMC's March meeting contained a robust discussion of the Fed's balance sheet. Until recently, most market participants had assumed that the Fed would maintain the size of its balance sheet via reinvesting through at least late 2017/early 2018. The latest FOMC minutes suggest that, assuming the economy continues to track the Fed's forecast, the FOMC will allow its balance sheet to shrink this year. The FOMC will achieve this by ceasing reinvestment of both its MBS and Treasury holdings at the same time. No decision has been made about whether the reinvestments will end all at once or will be phased out over time (tapered). Chart 2 shows that when QE1 ended in 2010 and QE2 ended in 2011, U.S. equities underperformed bonds. It's important to note, however, that underperformance didn't occur in a vacuum. The European debt crisis, the U.S. rating downgrade and debt ceiling debates all weighed on risk assets after QE1 and QE2 ended. Other factors played a role as well, such as weak economic growth and policy uncertainty. Amid QE3, U.S. equities surged in 2013, returning 32.4%, while bonds fell 8.5%. But in late 2013, the Fed announced that purchases would be tapered over the course of 2014. QE3 finally ended in late 2014. Stocks and bonds battled it out over 2014 and 2015, with stocks beating bonds by 3%. Chart 2Reminder What Happened When QE1, QE2 & QE3 Ended Bottom Line: Our view remains that Fed balance sheet run-off won't have a big impact on Treasury yields, although may lead to a widening of MBS spreads. What matters more for Treasury yields than the size of the balance sheet is the expected path of short rates. As for equities, while geopolitical risks are ever-present, the U.S. economy is in far better shape today than it was when QE1, QE2 and QE3 ended. U.S. corporate earnings are pointing higher as well. While we've clearly entered a new part in the Fed cycle, the news on the Fed's balance sheet does not change our view that U.S. stocks will outperform bonds this year. All else equal, the dollar should get a small boost from a shrinking Fed balance sheet, supporting our view that the dollar will rise 10% this year. Overplaying The Soft Data And Underplaying Geopolitics...In 2018 Chart 3Global Pick-Up On Track Traders and investors have been giving up on the global reflation story of late, sending the 10-year Treasury yield down to the bottom end of this year's trading range. Missile strikes, upcoming French elections and U.S. saber rattling regarding North Korea have lifted the allure of safe havens such as government bonds. At the same time, the Fed was unwilling to revise up the 'dot plot', doubts are growing over the ability of the Trump Administration to deliver any stimulus and a few recent U.S. data releases have disappointed. It is difficult to forecast the ebb and flow of safe-haven demand for bonds, especially related to North Korea and Syria. However, our geopolitical team holds a high-conviction view that angst over Eurozone elections this year are overblown. The Italian election in 2018 is more of a threat. While we cannot rule out an even stronger safe-haven bid from developing in the coming weeks, the global cyclical economic backdrop remains negative for government bond markets. For the major industrialized economies, the so-called "hard" data are moving in line with the "soft" survey data for the most part. For example, retail sales growth continues to accelerate, reaching 4.7% in February on a year-over-year basis (Chart 3). This follows the sharp improvement in consumer confidence. Manufacturing production growth is also accelerating to the upside, in line with the PMIs. The global manufacturing sector is rebounding smartly after last year's recession, which was driven by the collapse in oil prices and a global inventory correction. Readers may be excused for jumping to the conclusion that the rebound is largely in the energy space, but this is not true. Production growth in the energy sector is close to zero on a year-over-year basis, and is negative on a 3-month rate of change basis (Chart 4). The growth pickup has been in the other major sectors, including consumer-related goods, capital goods and technology. In the U.S., non-energy production has boomed over the three months, rising 5.2% at annual rates (Chart 5). The weak spot has been in capital goods orders (Chart 3). We only have data for the big three economies - the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone - but growth is near to zero or slightly negative for all three. These data are perplexing because they are at odds with an acceleration in the production of capital goods (noted above) and a pickup in capital goods imports for 20 economies (Chart 3, third panel). Nonetheless, improving CEO sentiment, strengthening profit growth and activity surveys all suggest that capital goods orders will "catch up" in the coming months. Chart 4Manufacturing Rebound Is Not About Energy Chart 5U.S.: Non-Energy Production Surging That said, one risk to our positive capex outlook in the U.S. is that the Republicans could fail to deliver on their promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. This is not our base case, but current capex plans could be cancelled or put on indefinite hold were there to be no corporate tax cuts or immediate expensing of capital expenditures. Duration Checklist: What We're Watching BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service recently introduced a "Duration Checklist" designed to keep us focused on the most relevant factors while trying to sift out the signal from the noise (Table 1).1 These are the key economic and market indicators that we are watching to assess whether we should maintain our current below-benchmark portfolio stance. Naturally, leading and coincident indicators for global growth feature prominently in the top section of the Checklist (Chart 6). All four of these indicators appear to have topped out except the Global Leading Economic Indicator (GLEI), suggesting that the period of maximum growth acceleration has past. Nonetheless, all four are still consistent with robust growth for at least the near term. Table 1Stay Bearish On Treasuries & Bunds Chart 6Some Warning From Leading Indicators The rapid decline in the diffusion index, based on the 22 countries that comprise our GLEI, is concerning. The LEIs for two major economies and two emerging economies dipped slightly in February, such that roughly half of the country LEIs rose and half fell in the month. While it is too early to hit the panic button, the diffusion index is worth watching closely; a decline below 50 for several months would indicate that a peak in the GLEI is approaching. The remainder of the items on the checklist are related to growth, inflation pressure, central bank stance, investor risk-taking behavior and bond market technicals. We are focusing on the U.S. and Eurozone at the moment because we believe these two economies will be the main driver of global yields over the next 12 months. In the U.S., the Fed is tightening and market expectations are overly benign on the pace of rate hikes in the coming years. Upside pressure on global yields should intensify later this year, when the ECB announces the next "tapering" of its asset purchase program. All of the economic growth, inflation pressure and risk-seeking indicators on the Checklist warrant a check mark for the U.S., although this is not the case for the Eurozone inflation indicators. From a technical perspective, the Treasury and bund markets no longer appear as oversold as they did after the rapid run-up in yields following last November's U.S. elections. Large short positions have largely unwound. This removes one of the largest impediments to a renewed decline in global bond prices. For the U.S., we expect that the 10-year yield to rise to the upper end of the recent 2.3%-2.6% trading range in the next couple of months, before eventually breaking out on the way to the 2.8%-3% area by year-end. Bottom Line: A number of political pressure points and some modest U.S. data disappointments have triggered an unwinding of short bond positions. Nonetheless, the global manufacturing revival and growth impulse remain in place, and the majority of items on our Checklist suggest that the recent bond rally represents a consolidation phase rather than a trend reversal. Keep duration short of benchmark within fixed-income portfolios. Favor Stocks Over Junk Bonds Table 2A New Trend In Junk Vs. Stocks? We continue to favor U.S. equities over bonds in 2017 and recommend keeping duration short of benchmark. But what about U.S. equities versus high-yield bonds? As a reminder, favoring corporate bonds over equities was a long-running BCA theme during the early stages of the economic recovery.We noted that corporate bonds were likely to outperform equities in a prescient Special Report published in late-2008,2 and we continued to favor corporate bonds until late-2012 when we shifted towards strong dividend-paying stocks. Table 2 highlights that our corporate bond vs equity recommendations have worked out well over the past several years. The table presents the annual total return for the S&P 500 and high-yield corporate bonds (as well as the difference between the two), and it shows that the former underperformed the latter from 2008 to 2011 (and again in 2012 in risk-adjusted terms). However, stocks materially outperformed high-yield bonds from 2013-2015, which followed our recommendation to favor the S&P Dividend Aristocrats index over corporate bonds in our November 2012 Special Report.3 But Table 2 also shows that the trend of stock outperformance reversed last year, with high-yield bonds having somewhat outpaced the S&P 500 in total return terms. Does this imply that investors are witnessing the beginning of a new uptrend in corporate bond outperformance versus equities? In our view, the answer is 'no'. Chart 7 presents our simple framework for the relative performance of stocks vs high-yield corporate bonds, which suggests that investors should favor the former over the latter. Panel 1 highlights that the trend in stocks vs high-yield is generally the same as that vs 10-year Treasuries, with a few notable exceptions of sustained difference. The first exception was from 2002 to 2004, when stocks significantly outperformed government bonds but were flat vs high-yield. The second exception occurred during the early part of this expansion, which again saw high-yield corporate bonds post equity-like returns. Chart 7Major Valuation Advantage Needed For High-Yield To Outperform Stocks Panel 2 suggests that both of these circumstances were fueled by a substantial high-yield valuation advantage over stocks. The panel illustrates the gap between the speculative-grade corporate bond yield-to-worst and the S&P 500 12-month forward earnings yield, which was elevated and fell materially in both of the cases of sustained divergence shown in panel 1. The key point for investors is that last year's outperformance of junk bonds is unlikely to continue. While the compression of the junk/stock yield gap did lead the former to outperform last year, the gap was not high to begin with and is currently not that far away from its historical lows. This suggests that there is no reason to expect the stock/junk relative performance trend to deviate from the overall stock/government bond trend, which we expect to rise further over the coming 6-12 months. Bottom Line: Despite outsized performance from high-yield corporate bonds in 2016, investors should continue to favor stocks over high-yield over the coming year (but favor both over Treasuries and cash). Introducing The BCA Beige Book Monitor Chart 8BCA Beige Book Monitor: ##br##A "Hard" Look At "Soft" Data The Fed's Beige Book is released eight times a year, two weeks ahead of each FOMC meeting. It was first released in 1983. The Beige Book's predecessor was the Red Book, first produced in 1970. The Beige Book itself got a makeover from the Fed in early 2017. The Fed changed the way the information was presented across the 12 Fed districts, but, according to the Fed, the Beige Book will continue to provide "an up-to-date depiction of regional economic conditions based on anecdotal information gathered from a diverse range of business and community contacts." In addition to the Beige Book, FOMC officials also review what is now known as the "Teal Book" at each meeting. The Teal Book combined the "Green Book" - a review of current economic and financial conditions - and the "Blue Book"- which provided context for FOMC members on monetary policy actions. As noted in the Fed's own description, the Beige Book is "soft data". In discussing the Beige Book, the financial press often notes the number of districts where growth is expanding and contracting or describes the pace of overall activity (modest, moderate etc). The BCA Beige Book Monitor takes a more quantitative approach to all the qualitative data in the Beige Book. We began by searching the document for all the words we could think of that signify strength: Strong, strength, rise, increase, accelerate, fast, expand, advance, positive, robust, optimistic, up, etc. We then counted up all the words that denote weakness: Weak, fell, slow, decelerate, decrease, decline, soft, negative, pessimistic, down, contract, etc. Next, we subtracted the number of weak words from the strong words to calculate the BCA Beige Book Monitor. The Monitor begins in 2005, so it covers the time period from the middle of the 2001-2007 expansion, through the Great Recession (2007-2009) and the recovery since 2009. A more streamlined approach, using the words "strong" and "strength" (and their derivatives like stronger, strengthened, etc) as proxy for all the strong words and the word "weak" as a proxy for all the weak words, showed the same results. We adopted this simpler approach. Chart 8, panels 1 and 2, shows the BCA Beige Book Monitor versus real GDP and CEO Confidence. The BCA Beige Book monitor does a good job explaining GDP, but it is more timely. The Monitor leads CEO confidence, especially around turning points. We intend to do more work with the Beige Book Monitor and present it to you in future editions of this publication. We also track mentions of other key words in the Beige Book. For example changes in mentions of "inflation" words in the Beige book track, and sometimes lead, core inflation (Panel 3). Mentions of the "strong dollar" track the dollar itself, although tends to be lagging (Panel 4). We'll be watching for those inflation words and mentions of the dollar in the Beige Book this week. The Beige Book will also help to shed some qualitative light on the recent weakness in capital spending and C&I loans. Has the uncertainty about the timing, scope and scale of Trump's legislative agenda (taxes, infrastructure and the repeal of Obamacare, etc) had an impact on corporate spending or borrowing? We'll find out this week. Bottom Line: Although technically it is "soft" data, the Beige Book is a major input on monetary policy decision making for the FOMC. As we showed last week, the rise in "inflation" words in the Beige Book has certainly captured the Fed's attention, and confirms the "hard" we've seen on inflation. The next FOMC meeting is on May 2-3, and neither we nor the consensus expects a hike at that meeting. Despite the apparent flare-up in geopolitics last week and the run of disappointing economic data, we continue to expect the Fed to raise rates 2 more times in 2017. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jonathan LaBerge Vice President, Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasurys And German Bunds," dated February 15, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Value And The Cycle Favor Corporate Debt Over Equities," dated November 14, 2008, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Search For Yield Continues: Aristocrats Or High Yield?" dated November 5, 2012, available at usis.bcaresearch.com
Highlights Duration: Bond market positioning is no longer at a bearish extreme and the economy is quickly approaching full employment. We expect Treasury yields will soon break through the upside of their post-election trading range. Maintain below-benchmark duration. Fed's Balance Sheet: The unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet is only important for Treasury yields if it impacts the market's rate hike expectations. However, the extra supply of MBS should lead to wider MBS spreads. Credit Cycle: Corporate spreads are in a "payback period" from 2014's energy shock that will allow them to tighten as corporate profits rebound, even though corporate leverage continues to trend higher. The weakening state of corporate balance sheets means spreads are at risk once monetary policy turns less accommodative. Feature The bond bear market has been on pause for the past few months, with Treasury yields confined to a trading range since last November's post-election sell off. While yields have not moved meaningfully higher during this time, firm floors have also formed beneath both the 5-year and 10-year yields (Chart 1). Even after last Friday's disappointing payrolls number, the 10-year did not move below 2.3% and the 5-year did not move below 1.8%. Trading Range About To Break? Our sense is that the current consolidation phase in Treasuries is approaching its end and yields will soon head higher. Global growth indicators have continued to improve during the past few months, and as we noted in last week's report,1 our 2-factor Treasury model, based on Global PMI and U.S. dollar sentiment, pegs fair value for the 10-year yield at 2.54%. We attribute the recent leveling-off in yields to technical shifts in bond positioning and sentiment. Earlier this year, net positions in Treasury futures and asset manager duration allocations were deep in "net short" territory (Chart 2). Extreme short positioning usually leads to a period of bond market strength until short positions are washed out. Now that bond market positioning is closer to neutral, a key impediment to further yield increases has been removed. Chart 1Poised For A Breakout? Chart 2Positioning Has Normalized The elevated level of economic surprises has also been flagged as a potential roadblock to the bond bear market. Extended readings from the economic surprise index tend to mean revert as investor expectations are revised higher in the face of improving data. However, our research suggests that the change in Treasury yields tends to lead the economic surprise index by 1-2 months (Chart 2, bottom panel). Given this relationship, we suspect that the bond market has already discounted a lot of mean reversion in the economic surprise index. Chart 3Approaching Full Employment Finally, last week's employment report should not be taken as a signal that U.S. economic growth is weakening. Bad weather in the northeast played a key role in the low March payrolls number - only 98k jobs added. But more importantly, at this stage of the cycle we should expect payroll growth to slow and wage pressures to increase as we approach full employment. As can be seen in Chart 3, the late cycle trends of slowing payroll growth and rising wages are very much in place. Further, even broad measures of labor market tightness, such as the U6 unemployment rate,2 are quickly approaching levels that suggest the economy is operating at full employment. Increasingly it is measures of labor market utilization, wage growth and inflation that will guide the Fed's decision making, and these measures continue to improve. It was even noted in the minutes from the March FOMC meeting that "tight labor markets [are] increasingly a factor in businesses' planning". The minutes also reported that: Business contacts in many Districts reported difficulty recruiting workers and indicated that they had to either offer higher wages or hire workers with lower qualifications than desired Accordingly, surveys show that households are increasingly describing jobs as "plentiful" (Chart 3, panel 3) and small businesses are indeed ramping up their compensation plans (Chart 3, bottom panel). At this stage of the cycle, continued progress on measures of labor market utilization, wage growth and inflation will be sufficient for the Fed to continue lifting rates, pushing Treasury yields higher. Bottom Line: Bond market positioning is no longer at a bearish extreme and the economy is quickly approaching full employment. We expect Treasury yields will soon break through the upside of their post-election trading range. Maintain below-benchmark duration. The Fed Will Shrink Its Balance Sheet This Year Last week's release of the minutes from the March FOMC meeting also contained some new information about how the Fed plans to deal with its large balance sheet. To summarize, we learned that: The Fed intends to start shrinking its balance sheet later this year (assuming growth maintains its current pace). The Fed will shrink its balance sheet by ceasing the reinvestment of both its MBS and Treasury holdings at the same time. Still no decision has been made about whether reinvestments will stop entirely or whether they will be phased out over time ("tapered"). On February 28, we published a detailed report about the Fed's balance sheet policy.3 In that report we explained why the winding down of the balance sheet will not have much of an impact on Treasury yields, but could lead to a material widening in MBS spreads. The new information received last week does not change either of these conclusions. The minutes did make clear that the Fed favors what Governor Lael Brainard recently called a "subordination strategy" for dealing with its balance sheet.4 [A subordination strategy] would prioritize the federal funds rate as the sole active tool away from the effective lower bound, effectively subordinating the balance sheet. Once federal funds normalization meets the test of being well under way, triggering an end to the current reinvestment policy, the balance sheet would be set on autopilot, shrinking in a gradual, predictable way until a "new normal" has been reached, and then increasing in line with trend increases in the demand for currency thereafter. Under this strategy, the balance sheet might be used as an active tool only if adverse shocks push the economy back to the effective lower bound. Essentially, the Fed is trying to de-emphasize the size of the balance sheet and would rather investors focus on the fed funds rate to assess the stance of monetary policy. For our part, we think it would be unwise to "fight the Fed" on this issue. For Treasury yields, we observe that the real 10-year Treasury yield closely tracks changes in the expected number of rate hikes during the next 12 months, while the inflation component of the 10-year yield tracks changes in realized inflation (Chart 4). These two relationships will continue to determine trends in bond yields going forward, and Fed balance sheet shrinkage is only important if it impacts the expected pace of rate hikes or inflation. The Fed's "subordination strategy" should ensure that the act of winding down the balance sheet does not have much of an impact on the expected pace of rate hikes. Ironically, if Treasury yields were to rise sharply following the announcement of balance sheet runoff, then the ensuing tightening of financial conditions would probably lower the expected pace of rate hikes and bring Treasury yields back down again. The story for MBS is somewhat different. Nominal MBS spreads remain tight by historical standards and closely track implied interest rate volatility (Chart 5). But we can also think of nominal MBS spreads as being split between the option cost, which is the compensation for expected prepayments, and the option-adjusted spread (OAS), which tends to correlate with net supply (Chart 5, panel 2). Chart 4Focus On Rate Expectations Chart 5Stay Underweight MBS In recent weeks, the OAS has widened alongside rising net issuance, but this has been offset by a sharp decline in the option cost. This is generally the pattern we would expect to play out as the Fed lifts rates and removes itself from the MBS market. The increased supply of MBS should lead to wider OAS, but refinancing applications should also stay low as Treasury yields and mortgage rates rise (Chart 5, bottom panel). However, netting it all out, the option cost component of MBS spreads is already near its historical lows and the OAS could move materially wider just to catch up to net issuance. In prior reports,5 we have also made the case that rate volatility should rise as the fed funds rate moves further away from the zero-lower-bound. Investors should stay underweight MBS. Bottom Line: The unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet is only important for Treasury yields if it impacts the market's rate hike expectations. However, the extra supply of MBS should lead to wider MBS spreads. Checking In On The Credit Cycle We continue to recommend overweight allocations to both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds. This optimistic outlook is predicated on low inflation and a Fed that will support risk assets by remaining sufficiently accommodative until inflationary pressures are more pronounced. We think this "reflationary window" will stay open at least until core PCE inflation is firmly anchored around 2% and long-maturity TIPS breakevens reach the 2.4% to 2.5% range.6 Behind the scenes, however, leverage is building in the nonfinancial corporate sector. In this week's report we take a look at several different indicators of corporate credit quality and conclude that once the support from low inflation and accommodative monetary policy vanishes, it is very likely that corporate defaults will start to increase and corporate spreads will widen. If our anticipated timeline plays out, we will be looking to scale back on credit risk in 2018. Corporate Health Vs. The Yield Curve Our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM, see Appendix for further details) has been signaling deteriorating nonfinancial corporate health since late 2013 (Chart 6), and moved even deeper into 'deteriorating health' territory in Q4 of last year. Chart 6Corporate Health Is Deteriorating, But Monetary Policy Remains Supportive Periods when the CHM is in 'deteriorating health' territory are marked by shaded regions in Chart 6. We see that these regions usually correspond with periods when corporate spreads are widening. Even in the current episode, corporate spreads have yet to regain their mid-2014 tights. However, the bottom panel of Chart 6 shows that periods of deteriorating corporate health and wider corporate spreads are typically preceded by a very flat (often inverted) yield curve. This makes sense because a flat yield curve usually signals that interest rates are high and monetary policy is tight. Tight policy and elevated rates lead to more stringent bank lending standards and increase firms' interest burdens. With the curve still quite steep, we think the risk of sustained spread widening is minimal. However, if the CHM is still above zero when the yield curve is flatter, no support will remain for excess corporate bond returns. Net Leverage & The Payback Period We would further argue that the CHM will almost certainly be in 'deteriorating health' territory once the yield curve is close to flat. In Chart 7 we see that net leverage (defined as: total debt minus cash, as a percent of EBITD) is not only positively correlated with spreads, but also has never reversed its uptrend unless prompted by a recession. In other words, the corporate sector never voluntarily undertakes deleveraging, it only starts to pay down debt when forced by a severe economic contraction. Chart 7The Uptrend In Leverage Will Only Be Broken By Recession Closer inspection of Chart 7 reveals that the period between 1986 and 1989 is the only period when corporate spreads tightened even though leverage remained in an uptrend. In the late 1980s, leverage and corporate spreads both shot higher as a collapse in the energy sector caused overall corporate earnings to contract (Chart 7, bottom panel). But then the energy sector recovered just as quickly, and earnings growth bounced back. This caused spreads to tighten for a couple of years, even though the trend in net leverage only ever managed to flatten-off. Debt growth stayed robust during this time, despite the wild fluctuations in earnings. If any of this sounds familiar, it should. The energy sector collapse of 2014 caused net leverage and spreads to shoot higher, and now spreads have started to tighten again as earnings have rebounded. Notice that just like in the late-1980s, net leverage has not reversed its uptrend. We believe that corporate spreads have entered a "payback period" very similar to the late 1980s. Spreads can tighten as earnings rebound, but because the economy is not in recession, debt growth will remain solid and leverage will continue to trend higher. Once inflationary pressures start to bite and Fed policy becomes less accommodative, the payback period will end and spreads will head wider. Debt Growth Chart 8Bond Issuance Is Back Although we have made the case that the corporate sector does not delever unless prompted by a recession, it is notable that net corporate bond issuance was negative in Q4 of last year and the growth rate in bank lending to the corporate sector has slowed sharply. We do not think this cycle is different, and expect corporate debt growth (both bonds and loans) to rebound in the coming months. We chalk up weak corporate bond issuance in 2016Q4 to uncertainty surrounding the U.S. election. In fact, we see that gross corporate bond issuance has already rebounded strongly in January and February of this year (Chart 8). Turning to bank loans, we observe that the outright level of outstanding bank loans only contracts following a recession, and that the rate of increase follows bank lending standards with a lag (Chart 9). In other words, Commercial & Industrial (C&I) loan growth is still responding to the surge in defaults that resulted from the energy sector's 2014 collapse. Now that defaults have waned, this process will soon be thrown into reverse. In fact, our model of the 6-month rate of change in C&I lending - based on private non-residential fixed investment, small business optimism and corporate defaults - points to an imminent bottoming in C&I loan growth (Chart 10). Chart 9Loan Growth Follows Lending Standards Chart 10BCA C&I Loan Growth Model Bottom Line: Corporate spreads are in a "payback period" from 2014's energy shock that will allow them to tighten as corporate profits rebound, even though corporate leverage continues to trend higher. The weakening state of corporate balance sheets means spreads are at risk once monetary policy turns less accommodative. Ratings Trends & Shareholder Friendly Activities Chart 11Shareholder Friendly Activity Has Ebbed Our assessment of the cyclical back-drop for corporate spreads is primarily based on the combination of balance sheet quality - as determined by our Corporate Health Monitor and its underlying components - and the stance of monetary policy - as determined by the slope of the yield curve and C&I lending standards (among other factors). However, ratings migration and "shareholder friendly" activities have also historically provided advance notice of turns in the credit cycle. Net transfers to shareholders, i.e. payments to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks, are a direct transfer of capital from bondholders to equityholders. These transfers tend to rise late in the cycle, just before defaults start to increase and spreads start to widen (Chart 11). Net transfers to shareholders had been moving higher, but have recently rolled over. Similarly, ratings downgrades related to shareholder transfers have also moderated (Chart 11, panel 2). Historically, ratings migration related to "shareholder friendly" activities has been a more reliable indicator of the credit cycle than overall ratings migration. It has tended to move into "net downgrade" territory later in the cycle, closer to the onset of recession (Chart 11, panel 3). Ratings trends and transfers to shareholders are not flagging any imminent risk of spread widening. However, there is the additional risk that downgrades have simply not kept pace with the actual deterioration in credit quality of the nonfinancial corporate sector. Using firm-level data, we calculated the percent of high-yield rated companies with net debt-to-EBITDA ratios above 5. We see that actual ratings migration is too low relative to the number of highly-levered firms (Chart 11, bottom panel). It is possible that ratings agencies have already incorporated the rebound in energy prices and profit growth into their assessments while the actual debt-to-EBITDA data are lagging, but this is still a risk that bears monitoring. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Reflation Window Still Open", dated April 4, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 The U6 unemployment rate is a broader measure than the headline (U3) unemployment rate. It also includes those "marginally attached" to the labor force and those working part-time for economic reasons. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170301a.htm 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Road To Higher Vol Is Paved With Uncertainty", dated February 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips", dated March 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Appendix Chart 12Corporate Health Monitor Components Box 1: Corporate Health Monitor Components The BCA Corporate Health Monitor is a normalized composite of six financial ratios, calculated for the non-financial corporate sector as a whole (Chart 12). These six ratios are defined as follows: Profit Margins: After-tax cash flow as a percent of corporate sales Return on Capital: After-tax earnings plus interest expense, as a percent of capital stock Debt Coverage: After-tax cash flow less capital expenditures, as a percent of all interest bearing debt Interest Coverage: EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortization) divided by the sum of interest expense and dividends Leverage: Total debt as a percent of market value of equity Liquidity: Working Capital, excluding inventories, as a percent of market value of assets Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification