We spent last week visiting our clients in China. In this report, we share some of the key questions from the client meetings as well as our responses.
To produce a moderate economic recovery, at least RMB 3 trillion in additional government expenditures is needed in H1 2025. Our bias is that Beijing is not yet ready to launch such a massive fiscal support measure. Hence, volatility-adjusted equity returns in China will be poor.
The adrenaline from the recent policy stimulus might be sufficient to produce a window of outperformance for Chinese equities and China-plays in financial markets. However, this adrenaline will not extend to China's real economy. Net-net, we are upgrading the allocation to EM in a global equity portfolio from underweight to neutral.
We believe the PBoC’s recent policy stimulus might bolster investor confidence, potentially stabilize onshore Chinese equity prices, and provide modest support to offshore stocks. However, they are unlikely to significantly boost economic growth in the mainland.
Both the Chinese and US central banks will likely take policy actions in the coming weeks. What is the potential impact of a mortgage rate cut on China’s household consumption and the broader economy? Will the anticipated Fed easing cycle further lift the RMB exchange rate versus the US dollar?
Chinese property developers will require at least RMB 500 billion in additional government funding to prevent further declines in housing completions for the rest of 2024. However, without addressing the underlying challenges, any new rescue measures similar to those announced in May are unlikely to effectively support the real estate market.
China's cyclical and structural headwinds will likely undermine Beijing’s initiative to accelerate urban migration over the next five years.
This report provides our framework for interpreting the messages from last week’s Third Plenum, and the potential implications for the economy and investors.