Money/Credit/Debt
Highlights We expect the U.S. House of Representatives to remain in GOP hands, but the Democrats could take razor-thin control of the Senate if Clinton wins the Presidency. The current, market-bullish status quo of divided government will continue. The chances of cooperation between a Clinton Administration and the House is actually quite good on some issues. We would expect House Republicans to give in to a modest infrastructure spending plan from Clinton, in exchange for corporate tax reform. There is now bipartisan support in the U.S. for removing the sequester, opening the door to some fiscal stimulus. A shift in focus from monetary to fiscal policy will be quite bullish for the dollar, which could rise by 10% in trade-weighted terms. The Japanese government appears to be preparing another shot of fiscal stimulus, which would be quite bearish for the yen and bullish for Japanese stocks when combined with the Bank of Japan's new yield curve policy. A number of headwinds that have held back U.S. growth this year will give way, generating 2½-3% real GDP growth in 2017. Positive growth surprises will encourage the FOMC to tighten in December and another five times over 2017/18. However, the speed of rate hikes will depend on how quickly the dollar appreciates. Dollar appreciation will undermine U.S. EPS growth next year. We view this as a headwind for stocks, but not something that will prevent modest gains in the S&P 500 next year. A key risk is that a surging dollar and a more hawkish FOMC sparks a correction in EM assets in the near term, spilling over into developed market bourses. Given elevated valuations, the risk/reward balance still favors a defensive strategy, with no more than a benchmark allocation to stocks. Several trends support our recommendation to maintain slightly below-benchmark duration within fixed- income portfolios. Among them, the annual growth rate in total central bank assets for the U.S., Euro Area, the U.K. and Japan is on the verge of peaking even assuming the ECB extends, which means that the period of maximum downward pressure on global term premia is over. Continue to overweight indexed bonds versus conventional issues. Oil prices should be able to hold up in the face of dollar strength given that we expect the tightening oil market will dominate. However, base metals will struggle. Feature As we go to press, Hillary Clinton is poised to win the Presidency of the United States following a tumultuous and divisive campaign. The key question now is the Senate race, where less controversial Republicans are contesting close elections. The GOP is at high risk of losing four Senate seats, with another three in play. Democrats need only four seats to take the Senate because, assuming that Clinton wins the presidency, Vice-President Tim Kaine would then cast the tie-breaking vote in that body. We expect the GOP to hold onto the House. This means that the current, market-bullish status quo of a divided government will continue. With the House remaining in Republican hands, and Democrats clinging to a potential razor-thin control of the Senate, the Clinton White House would be constrained on some of its most left-leaning policies. Unlike Obama, Clinton's victory will not be a popular sweep. She will likely receive less than 50% of the popular vote and will be the first candidate ever elected that has more voters saying they dislike her than like her (Chart I-1). Therefore, the odds are slim that Clinton will come to power with the same level of confidence and agenda-setting mandate as Obama did in 2008. Chart I-1Clinton And Trump: The Least Charismatic Candidates Ever Nonetheless, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service believes that the chances of cooperation between a Clinton Administration and the House is actually quite good on some issues. On corporate tax reform, it is difficult to see a reduction in effective tax rates, but a deal could be struck to broaden the tax base by closing various loopholes. This would be negative for some S&P 500 multinational corporations, but would benefit America's small and medium-sized enterprises. Paul Ryan and moderate Republicans understand that there has been a paradigm shift in America and that the median voter has moved to the left. As such, we would expect House Republicans to give in to a modest infrastructure spending plan from Clinton, in exchange for corporate tax reform. There is now bipartisan support for removing the sequester. Even a modest infrastructure plan could make a substantive difference for the economy given the high fiscal multipliers of government spending in an economy with low interest rates. The political shift to the left means that a Clinton-Ryan coalition will care less about the concerns of America's large corporations than previous governments, leading to policies that will result in higher effective tax rates on major corporations, a dollar bull market (in conjunction with tighter Fed policy, see below), and rising wages over the next four years. The election outcome will also be positive for bombed-out U.S. health care stocks. Even if the Democrats take the Senate, a Republican-held House will make it difficult for Clinton to push through legislation that does serious damage to the sector's pricing power. Health care stocks are oversold and cheap, at a time when consumer demand is solid and our pricing power proxy is rising much more quickly than overall corporate sector pricing. In terms of the macro implications, a shift in focus from monetary to fiscal stimulus will be quite bullish for the dollar. Below we discuss the important changes coming in the global investment landscape stemming from a renewed dollar bull phase. U.S. Growth: Expect Upside Surprises Any boost to U.S. infrastructure spending is unlikely to show up in GDP until the second half of next year. Nonetheless, there are other reasons to be more upbeat than the consensus on growth prospects for the first half as well. It is important to note that U.S. real final sales to private domestic purchasers, a good measure of underlying demand growth, has grown at almost 2½% over the past year, and was up 3.2% in the second quarter sequentially. A number of headwinds conspired to hold back the headline GDP growth figures, but these headwinds should moderate next year (Chart I-2): The five-quarter inventory correction is almost unprecedented in its length, but there are some high-frequency indicators (i.e. durable goods inventories and the inventory component of the ISM manufacturing index) that suggest that the correction is coming to an end (Chart I-3). Inventory destocking only needs to stabilize to boost GDP growth, since it is the change of the change in inventories that affects GDP growth. Chart I-2U.S. 2016 Growth Headwinds To Fade Chart I-3Inventory Rebuilding Has Commenced Some of this year's slowdown reflects a pullback in the contribution of federal and state & local government spending. Nonetheless, this will not last long because state and local government revenues are trending higher and this sector spends all it takes in. As noted above, we also expect a boost from infrastructure spending at the federal level. Housing starts and residential investment hit a soft patch this year. The second quarter dip was mainly due to a warm winter, which pulled forward home-improvement spending. The NAHB homebuilders index heralds a rebound in housing activity in the coming months, in line with the improvement in household formation. Indeed, housing starts are still 20-25% below estimates of the amount of construction necessary to keep up with population growth. We also expect a little more capital spending once the election is out of the way, profits begin to expand again and industrial production growth improves early in the New Year. Moreover, the oil rig count has started to recover, suggesting that energy capex should stabilize and perhaps even improve. Overall corporate capital spending intentions have perked up (Chart I-4). The trade sector will be a drag on growth, especially if the dollar appreciates as we expect. Nonetheless, we believe that the unwinding of the other headwinds that have dogged the economy this year could provide real GDP growth of 2½-3% in 2017. Stronger-than-expected growth will have a positive impact on America's trading partners via import demand, but it is the response of the dollar that could really shake up global financial assets. The reasoning behind our strong dollar view is straightforward: interest rates differentials are the strongest predictor of currency trends on a 12-18 month horizon. Relative economic performance between the U.S. and the rest of the world suggests that interest rate differentials will move even further in favor the U.S. dollar. Chart I-5 highlights that the dollar tends to appreciate when U.S. interest rates are in the upper half of the interest rate distribution of the G10. With few central banks outside of the U.S. in a position to be able to lift interest rates, gently rising U.S. rates will keep the U.S. among the global developed market (DM) high-yielders for many years. Chart I-4Capex Plans Have Improved Chart I-5U.S. Sitting Atop The Global Interest Rate Distribution Buoys The Dollar Real interest rate differentials may shift even more than nominal rates in favor the dollar. Inflation expectations should rise in Europe and Japan to the extent that their respective currencies weaken and their economies receive a boost from improved U.S. import demand. But since neither central bank will allow much of an increase in local bond yields, rising inflation expectations will translate into lower real yields in the Eurozone and Japan. This will reinforce the dollar's bias to appreciate. The ECB could upset this forecast by announcing that it will taper the asset purchase program beginning in March of next year, but we believe it is more likely the central bank will extend the QE program for another six months. In Japan's case, the nominal yield curve is now fixed by the Bank of Japan out to 10-years. How Much Will The Dollar Appreciate? This is a difficult question. A central bank can tighten monetary conditions, but does not have control over how much of the tightening comes via interest rates and how much through currency appreciation. Our sense is that over the next couple of years the fed funds rate will need to rise to 2% in nominal terms (0% in real terms) and the dollar will appreciate by 10% in trade-weighted terms, to avoid an economic overheating and an overshoot of the inflation target. We expect the Fed to tighten in December, followed by two more quarter-point hikes in 2017. But, of course, an outsized dollar response to the initial rate hikes would temper the speed of Fed tightening. A 10% rise seems aggressive, but it would still leave the broad trade-weighted dollar index well below previous peaks. Wouldn't Such A Dollar Surge Kill Any Hopes Of A Recovery In U.S. Profits? Undoubtedly, dollar strength presents a direct and non-trivial risk to the earnings outlook. Our U.S. EPS model foresees a return to positive earnings growth early next year, and a full-year expansion of 5-6% (Chart I-6). This is based on three important assumptions: (1) industrial production returns to modest but positive growth next year; (2) oil prices are roughly unchanged from current levels, allowing profits in the energy patch to recover with a lag; and (3) nominal GDP growth accelerates modestly relative to labor compensation. Chart I-6The U.S. Profit Outlook However, we assumed in the base case scenario presented in May that the dollar is unchanged. Re-running the model with a 10% dollar appreciation over the next year would shave about 2-3 percentage points off of EPS growth next year (Chart I-6). In other words, EPS would rise next year, but only modestly. Can The S&P 500 Rally In The Context Of Dollar Strength? Chart I-7Stocks Can Appreciate With The Dollar An appreciating dollar is clearly a headwind, but it is the case that the S&P 500 rallied along with the dollar in the last three major dollar bull markets: 1978-1985, 1994-2002, and 2011 to today (Chart I-7). One could point to special factors in each episode. Nonetheless, our point is that if the dollar is appreciating because growth outside the U.S. is deteriorating, then the backdrop is negative for U.S. equities. But if the dollar is appreciating because the U.S. economic growth backdrop has brightened (with no deterioration elsewhere), then U.S. stocks can rally despite the negative impact of the dollar on profits. Indeed, the direction of causation reverses at times: it is the rally in U.S. risk assets (along with higher rates) that attracts foreign capital and pushes the dollar higher. A tax holiday on foreign retained earnings would also be positive for the dollar and risk assets. That said, the currency shifts we expect over the next year will favor Eurozone and Japanese stocks to the U.S. market in local currency terms. This is particularly so for Japan if more aggressive monetary and fiscal policies manage to sharply devalue the yen (see below). According to our models, a 5% depreciation of the euro and a 10% drop in the yen in trade-weighted terms would boost EPS growth next year by 3 and 5 percentage points, respectively, in the Eurozone and Japan (Chart I-8). Monetary policy divergence and relative valuation also support our recommendation to favor Japanese and Eurozone stocks versus the U.S. Chart I-8The Eurozone Profit Outlook What Does Our Dollar Outlook Mean For EM Assets? Continuing liquidity injections from the ECB and BoJ are positive for emerging market (EM) assets. Unfortunately, this will not shield emerging markets from a 10% dollar rise, especially if it is accompanied by another downleg in commodity prices (Chart I-9). A stronger greenback is likely to cause distress among over-leveraged EM borrowers given that 80% of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in dollars. Chart I-10 illustrates that there have been no periods when EM share prices rallied amid strength in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar since the early 1980s. Meanwhile, the gap between EM and U.S. nonfinancials' return on equity (RoE) remains deeply negative, which historically has been associated with EM currency depreciation. Chart I-9Dollar Strength Is Negative For Commodities... Chart I-10...And Emerging Markets The implication is that the recent rally in EM risk assets and currencies will not last. Investors should avoid this space. A dollar rally would also be a headache for the People's Bank of China (PBoC). Allowing the RMB to depreciate aggressively versus the dollar to avoid an appreciation in trade-weighted terms could ruffle political feathers in the U.S. and spark capital flight. The PBoC will likely manage the RMB's decline versus the dollar and allow it to appreciate in trade-weighted terms, while tightening capital account controls to prevent capital from fleeing the country. This outcome is slightly negative for the economy and could generate some financial market volatility as the process unfolds. We believe that China will be able to maintain GDP growth of around 6½% next year and that there will be no financial crisis related to China's high debt levels. Nonetheless, China's transition away from an investment-led to a consumer-led expansion means that the tailwind for commodity demand and EM exports will not return. FOMC: Some Like It Hot The probability of a Fed rate hike in December eased a little in recent days due to some disappointing economic data, such as the September readings on retail sales and the CPI, along with comments from Fed Chair Yellen on the benefits of allowing the economy to "run hot". Some others on the FOMC share her views, but many do not. As we highlighted in last month's Special Report,1 Yellen will not overrule the consensus on the FOMC. The appetite to test the limits of the supply side of the economy is simply not broad enough, as visions of the inflationary 1970s still loom large in some policymakers' minds. The Fed may end up being too slow in tightening policy and generate an overheated economy by accident, but the idea of purposefully engineering a temporary inflation overshoot is off the table. The hawkish shift in the consensus can be observed in the latest FOMC minutes. Not only did three members vote for a rate hike in September, but "several" members felt that a rate hike was a "close call". The remaining doves often point out that the Fed's preferred measure of inflation, core PCE, is still below the 2% target. However, this measure is an outlier; all other popular measures of underlying inflation are near or above 2% and are in a clear uptrend. Wage growth, although somewhat mixed across the various measures, is also trending up (Chart I-11). The doves already lost two members this year (Williams and Rosengren). More will jump ship if core PCE moves up in the coming months as we expect, although a 10% dollar appreciation by itself could shave almost a half point off of inflation next year (Chart I-12). Chart I-11U.S. Wage Pressure Is Growing Chart I-12The Inflation Impact Of Dollar Strength Recent data disappointments are a concern, but the bounce in both the ISM manufacturing and nonmanufacturing surveys in September, especially in the new orders components, is a sign that the soft patch will not endure. It would require a significant disappointment in the October and November payroll reports for the FOMC to stand pat at the December meeting. Beyond this year, our base-case outlook calls for five quarter-point rate hikes over 2017 and 2018, compared to only two rate hikes currently discounted in money markets. This forecast is uncertain because an even larger portion of the overall tightening in monetary conditions than we expect could come via the dollar. Indeed, there is a significant risk that dollar strength and Fed tightening sparks a correction in risk assets. The TINA phenomenon (There Is No Alternative) has forced many investors to take more risk they are comfortable holding. Valuations are also rich. This is the main reason why our investment recommendation is cautious, including only a benchmark allocation to equities in a balanced portfolio. We maintain that stocks will outperform bonds and cash on a 1-2 year horizon, although total returns will be depressed by historical standards. Moreover, we would not be surprised to see a 10% correction in the major equity bourses in the coming months. Investors with a short-term horizon should consider buying some insurance against this risk. What would it take for us to upgrade stocks to overweight? We would like to see significant fiscal stimulus in some combination of the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. It would be particularly bullish if the stimulus occurs outside the U.S., because a pickup in global growth would allow the Fed to tighten without driving the dollar significantly higher. This scenario would improve the outlook for equities inside and outside of the U.S. Finally, a 10% equity correction would create enough value that we would be quite tempted to upgrade the sector. Japan Prepares For The Next Step The dollar's ascent will be particularly acute versus the yen if we are right that more aggressive policy action looms in Japan. We argued in last month's Overview that fiscal stimulus will be particularly powerful in the context of the Bank of Japan's (BoJ) new policy framework. Instead of targeting a pace of asset purchases, the central bank is effectively fixing the yield curve by promising to hold the 10-year yield near to zero. By fixing the yield curve and by committing to maintain this policy until Japanese inflation moves above the 2% target, the BoJ is hoping to raise inflation expectations and drive down real bond yields. Fiscal stimulus in this environment would be quite effective because nominal yields would not be allowed to rise in response. Any increase in inflation expectations would flow directly into lower real yields and weaken the yen, thus reinforcing the initial thrust of fiscal policy. The timing and amount of additional fiscal spending is not clear, but the Japanese Diet is currently deliberating the third revision to the second supplementary budget. Government officials have signaled that there will be more coordination between monetary and fiscal policy in the future. The government is also debating ways to boost household income, including raising government wages, lifting the minimum wage and providing tax incentives for the private sector to be more generous on the wage front. Any efforts to boost income will add to upward pressure on actual inflation and inflation expectations. Given that the market is discounting inflation of only 0.26% per year on average over the next 20 years, the balance of risks favors an inflation rate that surprises to the upside. The resulting downward pressure on real interest rates, at a time when U.S. real rates will be rising, will depress the yen. Our currency experts expect the yen to weaken to 125 versus the dollar, representing a decline of roughly 10% in trade-weighted terms. We estimate that this would add about a half point to Japanese headline consumer price inflation next year (Chart I-12). A successful policy push would ultimately be quite bearish for JGBs. However, a critical element in the plan is that the BoJ prevents a premature rise in nominal yields. We do not expect any JGB selloff for at least a year. This means that, while total returns for JGBs will be poor (or negative for some maturities), the market will outperform the other major government bond markets in currency hedged terms if global yields rise in the coming months as we expect. The implication is that investors should favor JGBs over Bunds and, especially, Treasuries within global hedged bond portfolios. Also, stay long inflation protection in Japan, overweight the Nikkei and underweight the yen. Reason To Be Bond Bearish Chart I-13Reasons To Keep Duration Short Our fairly hawkish view on the Fed is a key factor behind our recommendation to keep duration slightly short of benchmark within bond portfolios. More broadly, the global deflation beast is far from tamed, but the firming in selected commodity prices is reducing some of the downward pressure on inflation in the advanced economies. Oil prices have breached $50/bbl on hopes that OPEC-Russia talks will result in production cuts. Our commodity strategists do not expect any agreement to have much of a lasting impact on oil prices. Indeed, there is a risk that oil prices correct if the talks ultimately fail. However, we still expect WTI to trade between $40 and $65/bbl until 2020. The annual growth rate for the continuous commodity index has reached positive territory for the first time since 2014, which is translating into a more positive pricing environment for manufactured goods and overall headline inflation rates for both developed and emerging economies (Chart I-13, bottom panel). This has given inflation expectations a boost in the major markets, at a time when output gaps in developed countries are narrowing (the gap is near to being fully closed in the U.S.). Several other factors favor a below-benchmark duration stance at least for the near term (Chart I-13): Global growth is improving slowly. The global leading economic indicator (LEI) is rising and our diffusion index shows that 10 of 15 countries have rising LEIs. We expect the U.S. economy, in particular, to surprise to the upside. The prospect of even a little fiscal stimulus is bond bearish, following years of austerity in the major developed countries. The downward pressure on global term premia is dissipating as the BoJ has switched away from quantitative targets for asset purchases to fixing the yield curve. The ECB is likely to extend the QE program by another six months, but the central bank is unlikely to lift the pace of purchases from the current level. The annual percent change in total central bank assets for the U.S., Euro Area, the U.K. and Japan is on the verge of peaking even assuming the ECB extends, which means that the period of maximum downward pressure on global term premia is over (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Liquidity Growth Peaking Out The market expects that real short-term interest rates will stay in negative territory until at least the middle of the next decade, even in the U.S. There is plenty of room for the forward yield curve to reprice higher if growth turns out to be better than expected. This is particularly the case in the U.K., where fears of a post-Brexit economic bust and a fresh shot of stimulus from Bank of England sent the pound and gilt yields to extremely low levels. Our global bond and currency services recommend taking profits on overweight gilt/underweight sterling positions, and shifting in the opposite direction. Finally, bond sentiment indicators are still bullish, particularly in the U.S. Treasury market. Nonetheless, we are far from frothing bond bears. We do not believe that the fixed income market has moved into a secular bear phase, and would likely shift to benchmark or even above-benchmark duration if the 10-year Treasury yield reached 2%. Yields could eventually re-test the year's lows if there is a sharp equity correction. This is a market to be traded for now. Conclusions A more upbeat view on global and, especially, U.S. growth prospects is positive for risk assets, but the adjustment process could be painful as investors come to grips with what this means for the Fed. Extremely low Treasury yields imply that the consensus has "bought into" the Secular Stagnation thesis for the U.S., or at least to the view that America will never again be able to grow above 2%. The pickup in growth we expect will arrive at a time when there is accumulating evidence of an acceleration in wages, signaling that the labor market has reached full employment. A shift in focus away from monetary and toward fiscal stimulus, both inside and outside the U.S., is also bond-bearish. The bond market appears to be ignoring these trends so far, although rising inflation expectations suggest that we may be at the edge of a change in market expectations for growth, inflation and the Fed outlook. A significant shift up in the dollar would limit the bond market selloff, and it would be positive for the major economies outside of the U.S. Nonetheless, a 10% dollar appreciation would carry its own risks, including a hit to the U.S. profit outlook. On its own, dollar strength would not prevent the S&P 500 from rising, but there is a non-trivial risk that it wreaks havoc in the EM and commodity space for a time, reverberating back into developed markets. The bottom line is that investors should remain focused on capital preservation, with no more than an overall benchmark weighting in equities with a bias toward defensive sectors. Within bond portfolios, keep duration on the short side and favor high-quality spread product to government bonds in the major countries. High-yield bonds would benefit from stronger-than-expected economic growth in the U.S., but value is poor and balance sheets are deteriorating; the risk/reward balance is unattractive. European investment-grade bonds issued by domestic issuers are more attractive than the U.S. market because of improving balance sheet health. Favor real-return bonds to conventional issues in the major countries and add exposure to floating-rate notes. Our dollar view means that base metals should be avoided, despite the fact that we expect that China will be able to stabilize growth at around 6-7%. Oil should be able to hold up in the face of dollar strength given that we expect a tightening oil supply/demand backdrop. Both gold and silver would weaken if the dollar continues to appreciate and real bond yields rise in the near term. Nonetheless, rising inflation should overwhelm these negatives in the medium term. This implies that precious metals deserve a strategic place in investors' portfolios, although the near-term could be rough. Finally, we have received many questions on the risks posed by mushrooming U.S. student debt. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 19, takes an in-depth look. We conclude that student debt is a modest economic drag, but is not a source of risk to the government's finances and does not represent the next "subprime" crisis. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst October 27, 2016 Next Report: November 24, 2016 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Herding Cats at the Fed," October 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com II. Student Loan Blues: Can't Repay What I Borrowed Incentives ingrained in the U.S. higher-education system have contributed to an alarming escalation in student debt over the last 15 years. About 43 million Americans owe a total of almost $1.2 trillion for their education, making student loans the second largest category of consumer debt next to mortgages. Some are comparing this trend to the housing subprime crisis, arguing that student debt is a major drag on growth at a minimum, and the source of another financial crisis at worst. Delinquency rates have surged and the 5-year cumulative default rate on student debt has reached almost 30%. Thankfully for the taxpayer, the recovery rate on defaulted student loans is extremely high, at around 80%. Sticker prices at most institutions have mushroomed, although few students pay the full fare. Rising tuition fees only explain about half of the surge in student debt. Education still pays, although the benefits have waned versus the costs. Moreover, students with debt lag significantly those with no debt in terms of wealth accumulation and home ownership after graduation. The rise in default rates have been due to the influx of non-traditional student borrowers after 2007, who come from lower income families and have had poorer educational and employment outcomes. However, the wave of such borrowers has faded, which means that overall delinquency and default rates will decline in the coming years. Debt service payments, while onerous for many families, are not a major drag on overall real GDP growth. The increased propensity of 18-35 year-olds to live with their parents has trimmed annual real GDP growth by 0.14% per year since 2007, although student debt is only one of many underlying causes. The student loan program is at worst only a minor drain on the Federal government's coffer because of the high recovery rate. The bottom line is that student debt is a social issue, and to a lesser extent, a macro issue. But it is not a financial stability issue. Student debt is not the next subprime. "We are not doing these young people any favors by giving them loans that they cannot afford, that they cannot discharge in bankruptcy, and that could be a drag on their financial well-being even into retirement". - Sheila Bair, former FDIC chief, Bloomberg interview, September 26, 2016 Ms. Bair was one of the first to warn about the risks posed by the U.S. subprime MBS market, well before Lehman went bust. Few were listening then, but more are listening now as she sounds the alarm bell regarding student loans. About 43 million Americans owe a total of almost $1.2 trillion for their education, making student loans the second largest category of consumer debt next to mortgages (Chart II-1). Ms. Bair notes that, like the MBS market before 2007, cheap and freely available credit is fueling prices (tuition in this case). Banks handed out mortgage loans to many who could not afford them in the 2000s, just as the Department of Education (DoE) is doing today with student loans. It is difficult to assess borrowers' ability to repay student loans. Some argue that the DoE is not even trying. The trajectory of student debt is indeed alarming (Chart II-2). In inflation-adjusted terms, the total value of loans outstanding has quadrupled since 2000, representing an annual average compound rate of 9.4%. The rise reflects both an increase in the number of borrowers and more borrowing per person. Average debt/person has jumped from $17,300 in 2007 to almost $28,000 in 2015 (amounts vary across data sources). Rising debt levels occurred across the family income distribution. Chart II-1Student Debt: The Next Subprime? Chart II-2Student Loan Statistics These figures understate the true debt levels because they include only loans that are made under the federal loan program, representing 81% of the total. The remainder are private loans, mostly originated by banks. Private loans do not enjoy the same borrower protection afforded to federal loans, and carry a significantly higher interest rate (average of almost 14% in 2016, compared to federal loan rates of 3.76%). The data on private loans are sparse due to limited reporting, but a study based on 2012 data showed that the average amount of debt for students with private loans was almost $40,000 at that time.1 Sticker Shock It is easy to blame rising tuition fees given soaring "sticker prices" at most institutions. The average posted fee for tuition and room & board has increased by 30% in inflation-adjusted terms since 2007 at public universities, and by 23% at private non-profit institutions (Charts II-3A & II-3B). However, due to grants, tuition discounts and tax credits for education, only a small fraction of students pay the posted rate. For the 2015/16 school year, the net price that the average student paid at a private non-profit institution was $26,400, far less than the almost $44,000 sticker price. Chart II-3ATuition & Fees: Public Institutions Chart II-3BTuition & Fees: Private Institutions Chart II-4The Distribution Of Student Debt The Brookings Institute estimates that only about 50% of the escalation in student debt in the past two decades can be explained by rising tuition costs.2 Another quarter reflects rising educational attainment; kids are staying in school longer to get a leg up in the highly competitive workplace. The remainder of the total rise in debt was left unexplained in the study. Other possible contributing factors include policy changes that expanded eligibility for federal loans programs, and the housing bust that made it more difficult for families to borrow against the value of their homes for education purposes. There was also a change in the background characteristics of borrowers after the Great Financial Crisis (see below). The share of students suffering with an extraordinary amount of debt is growing, although they still represent a small portion of the total for federal loans (Chart II-4). Five percent of student debtors owe more than $100,000 each, up from 2% in 2007. Another 10% hold between $50,000 and $100,000. About two-thirds of student borrowers owe less than $25,000. A Student Debt Crisis? Another Brookings paper provides estimates for the debt service burden associated with federal student loans. The burden is calculated as the median debt service payment divided by median earnings of employed borrowers for two years after entering the repayment period (Chart II-5).3 This ratio rose from about 4½% in 2004 to 7.1% in 2013. Unfortunately, more recent data are not available. The average interest rate on the outstanding loans has moderated since 2011, although not nearly as quickly as the drop in market interest rates.4 Nonetheless, the continued escalation in the stock of debt per person in recent years means that the debt service-to-income ratio has likely continued to escalate since 2013, despite the moderation in the average interest rate paid. The jump in student loan delinquencies has raised red flags regarding the number of borrowers in financial distress, feeding concerns that a student loan debt crisis is on the horizon. The 90-day delinquency rate for student loans has increased from about 7% in 2007 to 11% in 2012, where it has hovered ever since according to the Federal Reserve Bank of NY data (Chart II-1). However, since only about 55% of all loans are in the repayment period, the actual delinquency rate among those in repayment is almost double the official figures. Loans are considered to be in default when they are more than 270 days past due. Brookings estimates that the 5-year default rate for student loans entering the repayment period five years earlier reached 28% in 2014, up from 16% for the five-year period ending in 2007 (Chart II-6).5 Perhaps surprisingly, the default rate is still far below the peak rate of more than 40% in the late 1990s. Chart II-5Debt Service Burden Is Rising Chart II-6Defaults Are Rising Thankfully for the taxpayer, the recovery rate on defaulted student loans is extremely high, at around 80%.6 This is because borrowers are not able to discharge federal student debts during bankruptcy. Congress has passed legislation making it very difficult for borrowers to avoid repaying. The DoE has the authority to use a number of extraordinary collection means. These include garnishing a portion of borrower's wages or seizing any payment a borrower may receive from the federal government. Education Still Pays, But Not For Everyone Chart II-7Debt And Wages For 20-40 Year Olds The good news is that education still pays for the average or median borrower. Chart II-7 shows that, while the average amount of student loans has escalated, it is still well below the average wage for those borrowers in the 20 to 40-year age group.7 The gap between wages and debt has narrowed over the past 15 years, but the increase in lifetime earnings potential still far exceeds the rise in accumulated debt for the average or median student. Of course, student loans have not paid off for everyone. News reports have highlighted plenty of examples of students that have graduated with crushing debt burdens and poor job prospects. Nonetheless, the Brookings study found that, for the vast majority, "the increase in borrowing would be made up for relatively early in the career of a worker with mean earnings".8 The Digest of Education Statistics show that, in 2013, the median annual earnings for full-time workers with a Bachelor's degree in the 25 to 34 age group was $48,530, compared with $30,000 for workers with just a high-school diploma. The bad news is that it is taking much longer to repay these debts. The mean term of repayment has increased from 7½% in 1992 to about 13½ years in 2010.9 Extended repayment and income-driven repayment plans can increase the loan term to 20, 25 or even 30 years. In some cases, borrowers will still be paying for their education when their children enter college!10 There is also evidence that the debt burden is causing some young adults to delay marriage and live with their parents for longer than they otherwise would. More Debt And Less Wealth Young student debtors also lag significantly relative to their peers in terms of wealth accumulation. A Pew Research Center study found that households headed by a young, college-educated adult without any student debt obligations have about seven times the typical net worth ($64,700) of households headed by a young, college-educated adult with student debt ($8,700; Chart II-8).11 Net worth is lower for those with student loans not just because their overall debt levels are higher; the value of their assets trailed as well. This gap is despite the fact that those households with a degree had almost double the annual income of those in the study that did not. Even comparing only households headed by young adults that did not attain a degree, accumulated wealth for those with student debt fell far short of those who avoided debt. One explanation is that money being absorbed by student debt repayment is unavailable to accumulate assets. A Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) of Boston study12 estimated that a 10% increase in student loan debt per household is associated with a 0.9% decline in the value of total wealth. Student loan burdens also mean that households end up relying more on other types of debt, such as auto loans and credit cards, according to the Pew study. Chart II-8Higher Debt, Lower Wealth... Table II-1...And Lower Homeownership Student debtors are also less likely to own a home after 2009 (Table II-1). Before 2009, the FRB of Boston study found that 30-year olds with a history of student loans had a higher homeownership rate than those without student debt. This makes sense because the boost to household income from obtaining more education should make it easier to quality for a mortgage. However, the relationship between student debt and homeownership switched after the Great Recession. The economy-wide homeownership rate has fallen sharply since home prices peaked in 2006, but the drop was more severe for those with student loans. This is probably due to the erosion in future income expectations following the recession for those with student debt, as well as more limited access to additional credit based on these individuals' existing debt loads (i.e. lower credit scores). Alternatively, student debtors may simply be reluctant to add to their overall leverage in light of the more uncertain economic outlook. A Fed study estimated that every 10% increase in student debt per person now results in a 1 percentage point drop in the homeownership rate for the first five years after graduation.13 Non-Traditional Borrowers Led The Surge In Delinquencies... While student debt burdens are unlikely to ameliorate anytime soon, the default rate should moderate in the coming years. Brookings (2015) conducted a detailed assessment of the characteristics of student loan borrowers and how they changed after 2007, by matching administrative data on federal student borrowers with earnings data from tax records. The study split the sample into "traditional" and "non-traditional" borrowers. Traditional borrowers are defined to be those attending 4-year public and private institutions because they tend to be typical in nature; they start college in their late teens, soon after completing high school, are dependent on their parents for aid purposes, pursue 4-year degrees and, frequently, head on to graduate study. This group historically represented the majority of federal borrowers and loan amounts. Non-traditional borrowers historically made up only a small portion of the total. These are defined to be those borrowing for 2-year programs (primarily community college) or to attend for-profit schools. The study found that non-traditional borrowers have largely come from lower-income families, tended to be older (i.e. not supported by parents), attended institutions with relatively low completion rates and faced poor labor market outcomes after leaving school (Chart II-9). Lower median wages and higher rates of unemployment meant that non-traditional borrowers tended to default on their student loans at a higher rate than traditional students. Student borrowing is counter cyclical; it tends to accelerate during recessions as unfavorable labor market conditions encourage people to return to school or to stay in school longer. The flow of new borrowers accelerated particularly sharply during the Great Recession, as intense pressure on State budgets led to cuts in scholarships by public institutions. Access to alternative credit markets was also curtailed during and after the Great Financial Crisis. Chart II-9Non-Traditional Students Had Poor Labor Market Experience Chart II-10Surge In Non-Traditional ##br##Borrowers After 2007 Student loan inflows (i.e. the number of new borrowers) and outflows (the number paying off loans) are shown in Chart II-10. Inflows trended higher from 2000 to 2007, while outflows were fairly flat, leading to an upward trend in the net inflows. Inflows subsequently surged during the recession, reaching a peak in 2010. The jump in new borrowers was concentrated among non-traditional students. The number of non-traditional borrowers grew to represent almost half of all new borrowers soon after the recession. The wave of students who had begun to borrow during the recession entered the repayment period in increasingly large numbers from 2011 to 2014. The early years of repayment are the most precarious because debtors are just starting their careers and their earnings are the most variable. The rise in the share of non-traditional borrowers largely explains the surge in the overall default rate since 2011. In contrast, the majority of traditional borrowers have experienced strong labor market outcomes and relatively low rates of default. Of all the students who left school, started to repay federal loans in 2011, and had fallen into default by 2013, about 70% were non-traditional borrowers. ...But The Worst Is Over The situation has since begun to reverse. Inflows and the net change in the number of borrowers has declined since 2012, particularly at 2-year and for-profit institutions. The moderation of the pace of inflows, the change in the composition of borrowers (less non-traditional), and efforts by the DoE to expand the use of income-based repayment programs will put downward pressure on delinquency and default rates in the coming years. Economic Impact Of Student Debt There are several channels through which rising student debt can affect overall economic growth. Spending by households with student debt will be curtailed both by the need to service the loans and by the fact that these households have lower levels of net worth. They are also less likely to own a home or form a small business. (1)Debt Service Burden And The Wealth Effect Table II-2 presents estimates of the value of aggregate debt service payments as a percent of GDP. This is based on the median debt service-to-earnings estimates from the Brookings Institute and median income for households where the head is less than 35 years of age in the Survey of Consumer Finances. If we assume that every dollar paid to service student loans is a dollar not spent on goods and services, then Table II-2 implies that the resulting drag on the level of real GDP has doubled from 0.17% of GDP in 2004 to 0.34% in 2013 (latest year available). However, it is the increase over time that matters for GDP growth, not the level. The rise of 0.17% was spread over nine years, suggesting that the drag on GDP growth was minimal. Moreover, this represents an overestimate of the actual drag, because households with student debt have leaned more heavily on other types of debt in an attempt to maintain their living standards. Table II-2The Debt Service Drag On GDP Lower levels of asset accumulation and net worth will also undermine consumer spending. However, we believe that accounting for both the "wealth effect" and the debt-service effect on GDP would be double counting. Chart II-11Spending On Education ##br##Not A Growth Driver Education spending also provides a possible offset to the negative impact of debt service on GDP growth. However, in terms of household spending on education, in inflation-adjusted terms there has been virtually no growth in consumer spending on higher education over the past 15 years despite all the extra spending in nominal dollars (Chart II-11). Data on government spending specifically on higher education is not available, but spending on all levels of education including primary and secondary schools has declined as a fraction of real GDP since the early 2000's. The implication is that total spending on higher education by households and governments has not provided any offset to the drag on GDP growth from student debt since 2007. (2)Housing Market Earlier, we cited Fed estimates that every 10% increase in student debt per person results in a 1 percentage point drop in the homeownership rate for the first five years after graduation. The economy-wide homeownership rate has fallen by 5.5 percentage points since the beginning of 2007, reaching 62.9% in the second quarter of 2016. We estimate that rising student indebtedness could account for as much as 1½ percentage points of the total 5½ percentage point drop. This is based on the Fed's estimates, the rise in the share of student loan borrowers among the total number of households and the increase in student debt-per-person. Again, this estimate likely overstates the impact because we are implicitly assuming that every new student borrower since 2007 ultimately forms a new household upon graduation. Undoubtedly, a portion of student borrowers formed a household with other student borrowers. Even if this estimate is close to the truth, it is not clear that there is a large impact on GDP growth. The formation of new households will result in an expansion in the housing stock one-for-one (assuming no change in inventories). Whether they decide to rent or buy, this will boost the residential investment portion of GDP. Buying a home or condo often results in home renovation and purchases of new furnishings, thus providing the economy with a larger boost compared to new households that rent. Nonetheless, the difference is difficult to estimate and is probably small enough to ignore. Another way to approach the issue is to gauge the impact on the housing market of the greater propensity of 18-35 year olds to live with their parents. Those living at home jumped from 19.2 million in 2007 to 23.0 million in 2015. The proportion of those living at home of the total population of 18-35 year olds rose from 28% to 32%. If the ratio had not increased over the period, it would have resulted in an extra 2½ million young people leaving home. If we assume that one-quarter of them move in with someone else who is also leaving home, then it would result in an increase in the housing stock of more than 1.8 million units since 2007 (condos or single family homes). We estimate that the resulting boost to residential construction growth would have added an average 0.14 percentage points to real GDP growth each year since 2007. Of course, it is not clear how much of the "living at home" trend is due to student loans as opposed to low earnings or poor job prospects. This estimate thus overstates the direct impact of student loans on the housing market. Nonetheless, it is instructive that the living-at-home phenomenon has been a non-trivial drag on economic growth via new home construction. (3) New Business Creation Academic research has also linked rising student indebtedness to a slower pace of new business creation. Research by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia points out that approximately 60% of new jobs in the private sector are created by small business.14 The U.S. Small Business Administration states that small firms receive approximately three-quarters of their capital needs in the form of loans, credit cards and lines of credit, which often have a personal liability attached. Having student loans reduces one's debt capacity and thus the ability to obtain small business loans. The Fed study compared student loan data and new business formation across U.S. counties. The Fed estimates that an increase of one standard deviation in student debt results in a decrease of 70 in the annual pace of new small business creation, representing a decline of approximately 14½%. Chart II-12 shows the inverse correlation between student debt and new business formation across U.S. states. Chart II-12Student Debt Hinders Small Business Creation The impact of a slower pace of new business creation on overall economic growth is unclear. A student that does not create a new business for whatever reason will likely end up working for an already existing company that is growing, expanding the supply side of the economy anyway. True, small businesses create a lot of jobs, but they lose a lot too because the failure rate for these firms is high in the early years. Some claim that the less vibrant new business environment since 2007 reflects a less dynamic economy, helping to explain the dismal productivity record since that time. However, this flies in the face of the fact that the small business sector is less productive overall than large businesses. Chart II-13 demonstrates that there is a rough correlation between the new firm creation rate and real GDP growth per capita at the state level. However, it is not clear which one is driving the other. Our sense is that, while a less vibrant new business backdrop likely contributed to the poor post-Lehman economic record, it is far from the major driving factor. Chart II-13GDP Growth And Small Business Creation: Which One Is The Driver? (4) The Federal Budget Could the surge in delinquency rates wind up costing the taxpayer a bundle? Eighty percent of all student loans are either made directly by or are backed by the federal government, generating a potentially large contingent liability. Fortunately for the taxpayer, the recovery rate on student loans is extremely high. Moreover, the Federal government makes money on the spread between the student loan rate and the rate at which it finances these loans (Treasury yields). Congress sets the loan rates and they are kept well above Treasury yields. Under Congressional accounting rules, the cost of a student loan is recorded in the federal budget during the year the loan is disbursed, taking into account the amount of the loan, expected payments to the government over the life of the loan, and other cash flows, all discounted to the present value using interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities. By this accounting rule, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Federal government will make a net profit of almost $200 billion over the 2013-2023 period.15 However, a more reasonable "fair value" accounting method, which includes the costs of collection and other items, shows that the student loan program will cost the taxpayer roughly $100 billion over the same period. Either way, the bottom line is that the student loan program is at worst only a minor drain on the Federal government's coffer. Delinquency and default rates are likely to moderate in the coming years. But even if default rates were to surge to new highs for some reason, the recovery rate is so elevated that the impact on the Federal budget balance would be lost in the rounding. Conclusion It seems clear that incentives ingrained in the U.S. higher-education system have contributed to an alarming escalation in student debt over the last 15 years. There has been a vicious circle in which increased federal loan limits supported institutions' ability to raise tuition fees, resulting in a greater need for federal loans. Some for-profit institutions have been criticized for offering shoddy education, for graduating too many students in disciplines for which job prospects are poor, and for encouraging students to load up on high-cost debt. The U.S. spends almost 80% more per pupil on higher education than the OECD average, and yet some argue that this has not resulted in better educational outcomes. The social impact of student leveraging is clearly negative. The benefits of education have narrowed relative to the costs. Financial stress has increased along with debt service burdens, especially for non-traditional borrowers, and repayment periods have been extended to an average of over 13 years. These trends have caused young people to delay marriage and home purchases. This is a serious political and social issue that needs to be addressed. That said, we do not agree with Ms. Bair that student debt is the next "subprime" crisis. Delinquency and default rates are likely to fall in the coming years. These loans have not been packaged into opaque financial instruments and distributed throughout the investment world. The vast majority of the loans are federally backed and the recovery rate is very high. Even if there is a wave of mass defaults, the federal deficit might rise slightly but there is no channel through which the shock can propagate through the financial system. The bottom line is that student debt is a social issue, and to a lesser extent, a macro issue. But it is not a financial stability issue. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 "Student Debt and the Class of 2015," Annual Report of the Institute for College Access & Success, October 2016. 2 Beth Akers and Matthew Chingos, "Is a Student Loan Crisis on the Horizon?" Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings, June 2014. 3 Adam Looney and Constantine Yannelis, "A Crisis in Student Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended Contributed to Rising Loan Defaults," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2015. 4 Most federal student loans are at a fixed rate set by Congress. 5 Brookings (2015). 6 http://www.edcentral.org/edcyclopedia/federal-student-loan-default-rate… 7 The data are only available to 2010, but we have estimated figures to 2013. 8 Brookings (2014). 9 Brookings (2014). 10 Student loans generally have a 10-year term, but loans consolidated with the federal government are eligible for extended repayment terms based on the outstanding balance, with larger debts eligible for longer repayment terms. 11 "Young Adults, Student Debt and Economic Well-Being," Pew Research Center, May 14, 2014. 12 Daniel Cooper and J.Christina Wang, "Student Loan Debt and Economic Outcomes," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, October 2014. 13 Alvaro Mezza, Daniel Ringo, Shane Sherlund and Kamila Sommer, "On the Effect of Student Loans on Access to Homeownership," Finance and Economic Discussion Series of the Federal Reserve Board. 2016-2010. 14 Brent Ambrose, Larry Cordell, and Shuwei Ma, "The Impact of Student Loan Debt on Small Business Formation," Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper, July 2015. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Equity markets ended the month slightly lower as investors come to grips with the economic and profit implications of the pending Fed rate hike and Brexit. While TINA is still in play, caution abounds, as highlighted by waning investor sentiment and continued weakness in our Equity Technical indictor. Rising bond yields and a stronger dollar contributed to a weakening in our Monetary Indictor, trends that no doubt contributed to the overall diminished appetite for risk over the month. Our Equity Valuation Indicators have improved somewhat, but still remain in overvalued territory. Net earnings revisions have become constructive and positive earnings surprises increasingly outpaced negative ones. Despite this, we would need to see a close to 10% price depreciation for U.S. equities to appear attractive, as outlined in Section 1. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators continue to send a positive message for stock markets. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. At the moment, the low levels of the WTP indicators suggest that flows have been stronger into bonds than into stocks. From a contrary perspective, this means that there is "dry powder" available if investors decide to move more aggressively into equity markets. The U.S. and Eurozone indicators appear to have bottomed out last month and continue their ascent. This should be bullish for both U.S. and Eurozone equities. The U.S. dollar notched a strong month with a gain of more than 3%. This has tightened financial conditions as can be seen in the decline of our Financial Conditions Index. The deviation from its 12-month moving average is even more pronounced, turning negative after several months of treading water in "easing" territory. Our Dollar Composite Technical indicator displayed a violent move higher, but has yet to breach a level consistent with previous episodes of overextension; the USD can rally further. The yen is showing signs of entering an extended period of depreciation. Net speculative positions are extremely elevated and the 40-week rate of change appears to have formed a trough, rebounding from all-time lows. In a similar vein, the euro is also displaying weakness as its 40-week rate of change is crossing into negative territory. As outlined in Section 1, we expect a 10% appreciation in the U.S. dollar, a 10% depreciation in the yen and a 5% depreciation of the euro in trade-weighted terms. The commodity complex ended the month flat, with a more robust global growth backdrop offsetting the negative impact of a strong U.S. dollar and higher rates. While the advance/decline line ticked up, a positive sign for a potential broad-based gain across currencies, gold had a less than stellar month. The outsized impact of financial variables (U.S. dollar strength and higher real rates) on the yellow metal led to a more than 5% price decline. Our Commodity Composite Technical Indicator surged deeper into overbought territory, indicating that it might be time to take some risk off the table. The balance of risks for commodities excluding oil is to the downside. As mentioned in Section 1, an appreciating U.S. dollar and elevated yields will eventually feed through to weakness in the space. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market ##br##And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market ##br##And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen TechnicalsChart III-19Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China
Highlights ECB Monetary Policy: Euro Area inflation will likely remain below the European Central Bank (ECB) 2% target for the next few years due to persistent excess capacity in Europe. The ECB will signal this at the December monetary policy meeting, providing the justification to extend their quantitative easing (QE) asset purchase program beyond the current March 2017 expiration date. ECB QE Changes: The constraints imposed on the ECB's bond purchases are self-imposed, and can be easily altered in the event of potential "shortages" of available debt for the QE program. Fears of a potential taper of ECB buying because of those constraints, which have bearish implications for Euro Area bond yields, are overstated. Country Allocation: Move to an above-benchmark stance on core European government debt, which are a low-beta safe haven in the current environment of a cyclical rise in global bond yields. Feature After spending the past couple of months fretting over the next move by the U.S. Federal Reserve or the Bank of Japan, investors' attention shifted to Europe last week. With the current European Central Bank (ECB) government bond quantitative easing (QE) program set to expire in March of next year, the markets were seeking any sort of guidance on whether the ECB will end the program as scheduled, or extend the program beyond March - perhaps with a reduction ("taper") in the size of the bond buying. ECB President Mario Draghi provided no new information at the post-meeting press conference last Thursday, leaving bond investors in limbo until the December meeting when the results of the ECB's assessment of their QE program will be published. Some alterations of the program will likely be announced, but it is too soon for the ECB to consider ending their QE program. With regards to the title of this Weekly Report - the most likely outcome is that the ECB will extend the QE program past March 2017, but will tinker with the rules of QE in an effort to pretend that the central bank is still following a prudent logic for its purchases. Fears of an early taper are overstated, and this makes core European government debt a potential oasis of safety while global bond yields remain in a bear phase. Plenty Of Reasons For The ECB Not To Taper This talk of a tapering of ECB asset purchases following the scheduled end of the current QE program seems premature. After all, neither the ECB's own economic forecasts, nor those of its Survey of Professional Forecasters, are calling for inflation to get close to the 2% target until at least 2018 (Chart of the Week). The ECB staff will prepare a new set of forecasts for the December policy meeting that will include projections for 2019 - perhaps these new estimates will have inflation finally reaching the 2% goal. But in the absence of a credible forecast of inflation returning to target, the ECB will be hard pressed to signal any move to a less-accommodative monetary policy. Headline Euro Area inflation is currently only 0.4%, despite a recent increase in the oil price denominated in Euros, which has been a reliable directional indicator for Euro Area inflation (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekNo Need For An ECB Taper Chart 2European Inflation Is Stubbornly Low The steady decline in the Euro Area unemployment rate over the past three years has coincided with a move higher in overall labor compensation, but this has been purely a "volume" effect resulting from steadily increasing employment growth. With the entire region not yet at full employment, there has been minimal upward pressure on wages or inflation in domestically focused sectors like services (bottom panel). In other words, the lack of Euro Area inflation is a direct function of the excess capacity in Euro Area product and labor markets. According to the IMF, the Euro Area output gap will not close until 2020, which will limit any rise in inflation over the rest of the decade (Chart 3). It will take a more prolonged period of above-trend economic growth to close the output gap, reducing the Euro Area unemployment rate below the full employment NAIRU level, before any recovery in wages or core inflation can take place (bottom panel). This lack of realized inflation is weighing on Euro Area inflation expectations and creating some potential credibility problems for the ECB. As we have discussed in earlier Weekly Reports, inflation expectations in much of the developed economies seem to follow an "adaptive" process, where expectations are formed in lagged response to actual inflation.1 If central banks are fully credible in their ability to use monetary policy to fight inflation (and demand) shortfalls, then those forward-looking expectations should eventually gravitate towards the central bank inflation target. However, if there is a large and persistent shock to realized inflation, then inflation expectations can deviate from the central bank target for an extended period. Using a 5-year moving average of realized headline CPI inflation as a proxy for inflation expectations is a reasonably good (albeit simple) approximation of this adaptive process (Chart 4). The current 60-month moving average for Euro Area headline inflation is 0.6%, not far from the 5-year Euro Area CPI swap rate of 0.9%. However, if the ECB's inflation forecasts for the next two years come to fruition (1.2% in 2017, 1.6% in 2018), then the 5-year moving average will continue to decline, as those higher inflation figures would not offset the sharp fall in inflation witnessed over the past few years. Chart 3Excess Capacity Holding Inflation Down Chart 4Inflation Expectations Will Stay Low Simply put, the ECB's current projections are not consistent with inflation expectations hitting the 2% target by 2018, and likely even beyond that. The ECB will be presenting new projections in December, but it would take a significant upgrade of their growth and inflation forecasts to "move the needle" on longer-term inflation expectations. Perhaps a move away from fiscal austerity across the Euro Area could trigger an upgrade on growth expectations, as that would imply a faster pace of growth and a more rapidly narrowing output gap. However, while the topic of greater fiscal spending has been heating up in the halls of governments in Washington, London and Tokyo, there has been little sign that Euro Area governments are about to open the fiscal spigots anytime soon (and certainly not before elections in Germany and France in 2017). Chart 5European Banks Getting More Cautious? ECB Still Needs To Support Loan Growth The state of Euro Area banks, and what it means for future lending activity, is another factor for the ECB to consider before contemplating any move to a less-accommodative monetary policy. The current growth rates of money and credit are showing no signs of significant deceleration (Chart 5). The latest ECB Euro Area bank lending survey, released last week, did show a modest decline in the net number of banks reporting easier lending standards to businesses, as well as a reduction in the number of banks reporting increasing loan demand from firms. The ongoing hit to European bank profitability from the current negative interest rate environment could be playing a role in the banks moving to a less easy environment for lending. As can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 5, there is a reliable leading relationship between Euro Area bank equity prices and the growth in bank lending to businesses. The downturn in Euro Area bank stocks in 2016, which has been driven by declining profit expectations, could pose a risk to credit growth in the months ahead. According to a special question asked within the ECB's bank lending survey, a net 82% of respondents reported that the ECB's negative deposit rate has damaged banks' net interest income over the past six months.2 In that same survey, a net 12% of banks reported a boost to loan demand from the ECB's negative interest rate policy, and a net 15% of banks reported that the additional liquidity provided by the ECB bond purchases went towards extending loans to businesses. So while negative interest rates may be hurting bank profit margins, the impact of the ECB's QE is helping offset that to some degree by providing banks with capital gains on their bond portfolios that can be used to finance lending. So without any sign that inflation will soon approach the ECB's target, thus requiring a potential tapering of QE or even a move away from negative interest rates, the prudent course for the ECB to take to support Euro Area credit demand, and economic growth, is to continue with the QE program beyond the March 2017 expiration date. That will require some changes to the ECB's rules of the program, but, in the end, these are only self-imposed constraints. Bottom Line: Euro Area inflation will likely remain below the ECB 2% target over the next few years due to persistent excess capacity in Europe. The ECB will signal this at the December monetary policy meeting, providing the justification to extend their quantitative easing asset purchase program beyond the current March 2017 expiration date. The ECB Has Some Policy Options To Avoid A Taper Tantrum Core European bond yields have been depressed by the ECB's QE program, which have acted to push down both the future expected path of interest rates and the term premium (Chart 6). This has helped anchor real bond yields in negative territory, even with inflation expectations at such low levels. But any signs of potential slowing of the pace of QE buying could quickly unwind this effect, which makes the ECB's next steps so critical for the path of global bond yields. In Chart 7, we show the level and growth rate for the ECB's monetary base, along with five potential future scenarios: The ECB ends their QE program in March 2017, as currently planned; The ECB extends QE for six months to September 2017, at the current pace of €80bn in bond buying per month; The ECB extends QE program for twelve months to March 2018, at a pace of €80bn per month; The ECB extends QE to September 2017, but reduces the pace of purchases to €60bn per month; The ECB extends QE to March 2018, but cuts to €60bn per month. Chart 6ECB QE Still Holding Down Yields Chart 7ECB Needs To Keep The Monetary Base Growing As can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 7, the growth rate of the ECB's monetary base (and the asset side of their balance sheet) will decelerate sharply in 2017 & 2018 if the ECB does end the QE program as scheduled next March. Extending the program, however, does push out the rapid deceleration phase for monetary base into 2018. This is of critical importance for the Euro Area bond market, as both the outright level and term premium component of German Bund yields have been broadly correlated with the growth rate of the monetary base (Chart 8). In other words, extending the ECB QE program into the future is most important to prevent a "taper tantrum" in European bonds, by signalling to the markets that the ECB wishes to maintain low interest rates for longer. The ECB could even announce a reduction in the pace of purchases, along with an extension, and bond yields should remain well-behaved. This will also help prevent an unwanted appreciation of the Euro, the value of which currently reflects the far easier monetary stance in Europe (Chart 9). Chart 8An ECB Taper Would Be Bad For Bunds Chart 9An Easy-For-Longer ECB Will Weigh On The Euro Given the persistent debates within the ECB (and between the ECB and some Euro Area governments) about the long-run merits of QE, the combination of both an extension and reduction in QE purchases could be the compromise option that satisfies all parties. Alternatively, the ECB could choose to maintain the pace of bond purchases but alter the selection rules governing the program. Given the recent concerns in bond markets that the ECB is "running out of bonds to buy", changing the rules of the QE program is a sensible way for the central bank to free itself from the self-imposed shackles on its bond purchases. There are three options that the ECB can consider: Moving away from strictly allocating the bond purchases according to the ECB "capital key", which essentially weights the bond purchases by the size of each economy; Raising the issuer limits on QE, which limits the ECB to holding no more than 33% of any single issuer or individual bond issue; Reducing the current yield floor on QE, which prevents the ECB from buying any bonds with yields below the ECB deposit rate, which is currently -0.4%; We think option 1 is the least likely to occur, as this would imply buying a greater share of countries with more problematic debt profiles, like Italy or Portugal. There is little chance of such a strategy being well received by the governments in Berlin and Brussels, and the ECB would likely wish to avoid a major political confrontation by allowing larger deviations from the capital key Option 2 is an easier solution to implement. The 33% issuer constraint was always an arbitrary level that was aimed more at bonds with so-called "collective action clauses", where a majority of bondholders can force a decision on all bondholders in the event of a debt restructuring. It is understandable why the ECB would not want to become to decision-making counterparty in the event of a future messy bond restructuring in Europe. However, the ECB's ownership percentages within each Euro Area country are nowhere near the 33% limit at the moment (Chart 10) and, at the current pace and composition of buying, that 33% limit will not even be reached for Germany anytime soon.3 There is room for the ECB to raise the issuer limits, as it has already done for some other parts of its asset purchase programs, like bonds issued by European Union supranationals.4 Chart 10ECB Holdings Are Far From The 33% Issuer Limit Chart 11Lowering The Yield Floor For QE Makes Sense Option 3 is the most binding constraint of all on the ECB purchases, as very large shares of the European government bond market are now trading below the ECB's -0.4% deposit rate (Chart 11). In the case of Germany, nearly 70% of all QE-eligible debt is trading below the ECB's yield floor, which has raised investor concerns that the ECB will soon be unable to buy enough German debt at the current pace of purchases. However, that yield floor constraint is completely arbitrary - there is nothing stopping the ECB from buying bonds trading at a yield below the deposit rate, other than (we suspect) a desire to impose some sort of price discipline on the QE buying to make the ECB appear more credible with its purchases. Chart 12The QE Yield Floor Can Be Changed If the ECB decided to lower the yield floor below the current -0.4% deposit rate, this would open up a greater share of the core European bond markets to QE buying (Chart 12). This would also change the current market narrative that the ECB will soon run out of German bonds to buy. In the end, the most likely path the ECB will take following its December re-assessment of its QE program is a combination of lowering the yield floor on QE bond purchases below -0.4% and raising the issuer limits above 33%. There appears to be plenty of leeway for the ECB to alter their purchases, but without necessarily reducing the monthly pace of buying. Combined with an extension of the end-date of the QE program beyond March, this should alleviate any concerns that the ECB will soon hit a wall with its asset purchases. Bottom Line: The constraints imposed on the ECB's bond purchases are self-imposed, and can be easily altered in the event of potential "shortages" of available debt for the QE program. Fears of a potential taper of ECB buying because of those constraints are overstated. Investment Implications: Move To An Above-Benchmark Stance On Core European Bonds With the ECB having no need to end its QE program early, the case for moving to an overweight stance on core Europe is a strong one. As we noted in our last Weekly Report, favoring bond markets of countries with the lowest inflation rates is a logical investment strategy in the current environment of a modest cyclical upturn in global growth and inflation.5 That justifies our current below-benchmark recommendation on U.S. and U.K. government debt, as both realized inflation and expected inflation are rising in both countries. That leaves the Euro Area and Japan as possible candidates to move to above-benchmark weightings, given their defensive properties as low-beta bond markets. Although with the Bank of Japan now pegging the Japanese government bond (JGB) yield curve with a 10-year yield at 0%, we do not see a compelling investment case for overweighting JGBs as a defensive trade. If an investor wants safety at a 0% yield - with no chance of a capital gain from a decline in yields - than owning T-bills, or even gold, is just as viable as owning JGBs. We recently upgraded Japan to neutral in our recommended portfolio allocation, and we see no reason to move from that. Thus, core European bonds stand out as the candidate to upgrade as a defensive trade during the current bond bear phase, which we expect will continue until at least December when the Fed is expected to deliver another rate hike in the U.S. We see a case for moving to above-benchmark for both Germany and France, but especially so in the latter. The beta of bond returns between France and both the U.S. (Chart 13) & U.S.(Chart 14) is very low, making French bonds a good market to favor at the expense of U.S. Treasuries and U.K. Gilts in currency-hedged bond portfolios. Chart 13French Bonds Are Low Beta To USTs... Chart 14...And To U.K. Gilts Bottom Line: Move to an above-benchmark stance on core European government debt, which are a low-beta safe haven in the current environment of a cyclical rise in global bond yields. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Why Are Global Inflation Expectations Still So Low", dated March 1, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The Q4 2016 ECB Euro Area Bank Lending Survey can be found at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/blssurvey_201610.pdf. 3 Please note that the denominator in the percentages shown in Chart 10 include only bonds with maturities that are eligible for ECB QE purchases, omitting bonds that will mature in less than 2 year and more than 30 years. 4 For more details on that change to the supranational issuer limits, please see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp-qa.en.html. 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Return Of The Bond Vigilantes", dated October 18, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Duration: Treasury yields will continue to rise as a December Fed rate hike is priced in. A surge in bullish dollar sentiment between now and December would cause us to back away from our below-benchmark duration stance. Spread Product: Maintain a neutral allocation to spread product, favoring convexity over credit risk. A surge in bullish dollar sentiment between now and December would cause us to downgrade spread product relative to Treasuries. TIPS: The increased sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to core inflation argues for a continued overweight position in TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries. Sovereign Debt: Continue to favor U.S. corporate credit over USD-denominated sovereign government debt within a neutral allocation to spread product. Feature About one month ago, we outlined how we expected our investment strategy to evolve over the remainder of this year and into 2017.1 Our continued expectation that the Fed will lift rates in December leads us to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and a neutral allocation to spread product2 until a December rate hike has been fully discounted by the market. Chart 1Dollar Sentiment: A Key Indicator Beyond December, our investment strategy will depend largely on how the dollar responds to an upward re-rating of rate expectations. Strong dollar appreciation would likely cause us to reverse our below-benchmark duration stance and become even more cautious on spread product. Conversely, a tame dollar could mean that the sell-off in bonds and rally in spreads have further to run. The dollar has appreciated by close to +2% since early September and bullish sentiment toward the dollar has also edged higher (Chart 1). However, so far the increases appear muted compared to the rapid dollar appreciation that occurred in the run-up to last December's rate hike. The reason we care about the dollar is that a stronger currency represents a tightening of financial conditions that acts to depress expectations of future economic growth. This can spell trouble for risk assets and also lower the market-implied odds of future rate hikes. For example, spread product was performing well last year until rate hike expectations started to move higher in late October. As the market began to anticipate a December Fed rate hike, it did not take long for the combination of higher rate expectations and increasingly bullish dollar sentiment to weigh on risk assets (Chart 2). The Market Vane survey of bullish sentiment toward the dollar surged above 80% last December, and this tightening of financial conditions is what prompted the sell-off in spread product and sharp decline in Treasury yields that kicked off 2016. Chart 2More Bullish Dollar Sentiment Is A Risk For Spread Product With last year's example in mind, the relevant question for current investment strategy is: How much dollar appreciation can the market tolerate before Treasury yields reverse their uptrend and credit spreads start to widen? To answer that question we make an assessment of U.S. and global growth relative to this time last year. All else equal, if U.S. growth is improved compared to last year, then it should require a greater dollar appreciation to have a similar impact on yields and spreads. Relatedly, if the growth outlook outside of the U.S. is improved, then it would mean that the dollar's reaction to rising U.S. rate expectations might not be as strong. On this note, there is some evidence pointing toward a more resilient U.S. and global economy than at this time last year. In the U.S., our preferred leading indicators suggest that growth contributions from capital spending, housing, net exports, government spending and inventories should all move higher in the coming quarters (Chart 3). This should act to offset a likely moderation in consumer spending growth (Chart 4). All in all, the domestic U.S. growth outlook appears similar to - if not slightly better than - what was seen at this time last year. There is more cause for optimism in the global growth indicators. The aggregate global PMI and LEI are tracking close to levels seen last year, but rising diffusion indexes suggest that further increases are likely (Chart 5). Already, manufacturing PMIs in all the major economic blocs have entered clear uptrends (Chart 5, bottom two panels). This suggests that the global growth outlook is actually much brighter than at this time last year, and improved diffusion indexes suggest that the global recovery has also become more synchronized. Chart 3U.S. Growth Outlook Improving... Chart 4...Outside Of Consumer Spending Chart 5Global Growth On The Upswing The implication of a U.S. economic outlook that is broadly similar to last year and an improved outlook for global growth is that the U.S. dollar may not react as strongly to rising Fed rate hike expectations in 2016 as it did in 2015. If this turns out to be the case, then the performance of spread product should also be more resilient and the uptrend in Treasury yields is less likely to reverse. Bottom Line: We continue to track the dollar and dollar sentiment closely to inform our near-term investment strategy. While dollar sentiment has edged higher, it has not yet reached the elevated levels seen last year. A more synchronized global growth recovery makes such a spike in bullish dollar sentiment less likely this time around. What Is A High Pressure Economy? Chart 6What A "High Pressure Economy" Looks Like Fed Chair Janet Yellen introduced a new buzzword to the market two weeks ago when she suggested in a speech3 that "it might be possible to reverse the adverse supply-side effects [of the financial crisis] by temporarily running a 'high-pressure economy' with robust aggregate demand and a tight labor market." Some investors took this to mean that the Fed would be increasingly tolerant of inflation overshooting its 2% target. We think this interpretation is incorrect, although we do think that Yellen's description of a "high pressure economy" provides a lot of information about the Fed's reaction function. More than anything, Yellen's speech was a response to recent trends in the labor market. The downtrend in the unemployment rate started to abate late last year, even though the economy has continued to add jobs at an average pace of just under +200k per month. A sharp rebound in the labor force participation rate has prevented the unemployment rate from falling, despite robust job growth (Chart 6). It is this dynamic that Yellen refers to when she talks about a "high pressure economy". Essentially, her theory suggests that, despite the low unemployment rate, the economy might be able to continue to add jobs without inflation spiking higher. Put differently, the unemployment rate might be less useful as an input to the Fed's forecast of future inflation than in past cycles. The key implication for investors is that if the Fed doesn't trust the unemployment rate to provide a signal about future inflation, then it is forced to rely on the actual inflation data for guidance. In our view, core PCE and core CPI inflation are now the two most important inputs to the Fed's reaction function. On that note, while last week's September core CPI release was soft, both core CPI and core PCE remain in uptrends that began in early 2015. Further, diffusion indexes suggest that these uptrends will persist (Chart 7). The Fed's increased focus on core inflation also has implications for our TIPS call. The sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to realized core inflation has shifted higher since the Great Recession (Chart 8). In our view, this has occurred because of how the zero-lower-bound on interest rates has constrained the Fed's ability to influence investor expectations. Chart 7The Inflation Uptrend Is Intact Chart 8TIPS Breakevens & Core Inflation When the fed funds rate was well above the zero-lower-bound, investors could reasonably assume that the Fed would act to offset any temporary price shocks. As such, long-maturity TIPS breakevens remained in a relatively narrow range and were mostly influenced by perceptions about the stance of Fed policy. In a zero-lower-bound world, investors can reasonably question whether the Fed has the ability to offset a deflationary price shock. As such, inflation expectations are increasingly driven by the actual inflation data rather than the Fed. With the Fed and the market both increasingly taking their cues from the actual inflation data, it means that the Fed will likely remain sufficiently accommodative for core PCE to return to target and also that TIPS breakevens will move higher alongside the trend in realized inflation. Bottom Line: The increased sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to core inflation argues for a continued overweight position in TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries. Sovereign Credit: A Dollar Story Chart 9Sovereign Debt & The Dollar As noted above, in the current environment the path of the U.S. dollar takes on increased importance for our entire portfolio strategy. However, there is one sector of the fixed income market where the dollar is always paramount - USD-denominated sovereign debt. Specifically, we refer to the Barclays Sovereign index which consists of the U.S. dollar denominated debt of foreign governments, mostly emerging markets.4 In the long-run, the performance of sovereign debt relative to equivalently-rated and duration-matched U.S. corporate credit tends to track movements in the dollar and bullish sentiment toward the dollar (Chart 9). When the dollar appreciates it makes USD-denominated debt more expensive to service from the perspective of a foreign issuer, and therefore causes sovereign debt to underperform domestic alternatives. As stated above, we do not anticipate a near-term spike in the dollar, like what was witnessed near the end of last year. However, given that the Fed is much further along in its tightening cycle than other major central banks, the long-run bull market in the U.S. dollar should remain intact. This will continue to be a major headwind for sovereign debt. Further, the recent performance of sovereign debt relative to U.S. credit has bucked its traditional correlations with the dollar. Notice that the beta between sovereign excess returns and the dollar has moved into positive territory (Chart 9, bottom two panels). Historically, the correlation does not remain at these levels for long and sovereign debt should underperform as the more typical negative correlation is re-established. At present, there is not even an attractive valuation argument for sovereign debt relative to U.S. credit. The spread differential between the Sovereign index and an equivalently-rated, duration-matched U.S. credit index is well below zero (Chart 10), and only the USD-debt of Hungary, South Africa, Colombia and Uruguay offer spreads that appear attractive relative to the U.S. Credit index (Chart 11). Chart 10No Spread Pick-Up In Sovereigns Chart 11USD-Denominated Sovereign Debt By Issuing Country Bottom Line: Continue to favor U.S. corporate credit over USD-denominated sovereign government debt within a neutral allocation to spread product. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching", dated September 13, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 We favor negatively convex assets (MBS) over credit within a neutral allocation to spread product, on the view that negatively convex assets will outperform as yields head higher in advance of a December rate hike. In anticipation of a December Fed rate hike we are also maintain a short position in the December 2017 Eurodollar futures contract as well as positions in 2/10 and 10/30 curve flatteners. The three trades have returned: +20bps, -23bps and +4bps respectively. 3 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20161014a.htm 4 The largest issuers in the Barclays Sovereign Index are: Mexico (22%), Philippines (14%) and Colombia (11%). Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Our protector portfolio is a combination of assets that have a low or negative correlation with equities that give investors some downside protection. Replacing cash and/or Treasuries with our protector portfolio in 60-30-10 or 60-40 benchmark portfolios would have produced superior returns since 2011. We continue to advocate allocating investments to our protector portfolio in the near term as it represents an effective hedge against immediate risks such as a negative market reaction to the upcoming elections and/or disappointing third quarter profits. Feature Both equities and bonds are under pressure, as a higher likelihood of a December interest rate hike is beginning to be priced in at the same time as nervousness about Q3 earnings results has intensified. This confluence of factors - less liquidity and earnings disappointment - has been the central argument of our defensive portfolio stance for some time: any handoff from liquidity to growth would be shaky, and potentially premature. Indeed, as we wrote in the September 26 Weekly Report, liquidity conditions will largely remain favorable for risk assets for some time because even with a December rate hike, interest rates are well below equilibrium, i.e. are not restrictive. However, equity investors will suffer through bouts of earnings disappointments, similar to the chronic disappointment in GDP growth. As we show in Chart 1, throughout the economic recovery, expectations for economic growth have been revised lower and are only now finally in line with what we expect is close to reality. As highlighted in last week's report, investors' expectations about earnings are most likely to undergo the same fate because profit margins will remain a lasting headwind: investors have not yet adjusted to this new reality (Chart 2). That will hold equity gains to low single digits, at best. Chart 1Years Of One-Way (Down) Revisions Chart 2Earnings Set To Disappoint? Overall, our view is that the economic backdrop is stable as there are low odds of a recession-inducing monetary tightening occurring, and we do not see any other negative shocks that are concerning enough to trigger a recession. Still, above and beyond our worry about profit disappointments, many client queries are currently focused on U.S. election risks. On September 26, we warned of market volatility leading up to the election, since investors may continue to assign too low odds of a Trump Presidential win. However, we would expect markets to quickly recover - at least until Trump reveals his true policy colors. We took a page from the market reaction to Brexit as a possible guideline to the outcome of Trump winning the election, i.e. the election is ultimately won by a non-status quo candidate. Investors will recall that the post-vote U.K. equity market reaction to Brexit was short-lived but savage. However, the uncertainty around the upheaval of institutions and structures in the euro area and the U.K. are far greater than the election of a non-conformist U.S. President within an institutionally sound system with checks and balances. All of that said, we recognize that we could be wrong and that the U.S. election has taken over the pole position on investors' list of concerns. More specifically, investors are worried about negative financial market fallout from a Trump win.1 So, how should investors hedge the downside risk of these election results? And for that matter, what about other near-term risks? Protector Portfolio Explained This publication has been advocating for some time that investors hold some portion of their capital in a protector portfolio (currently a combination of TIPS, gold and the U.S. dollar). The goal is to find assets with a low or negative correlation to U.S. equities and offer a measure of protection against a steep selloff in stocks. As Chart 3 shows, a portfolio of 60/30/10, where 10% is placed in the protector portfolio, would have outperformed a traditional 60/30/10 allocation in which the 10% is held in straight cash since 2011 (in a ZIRP world). A 60/40 allocation where 40% is placed in the protector portfolio also beats a 60/40 stock/Treasury allocation since 2011. Chart 3Protector Portfolio Enhances Performance ##br## Since 2011 Chart 4Protector Components Are ##br## Negatively Correlated With S&P 500 The three assets included in our protector portfolio were chosen with specific risks in mind: USD: As the main global reserve currency, the U.S. dollar benefits when global risk aversion is on the rise. Admittedly, when fears have emanated from U.S. soil, the dollar has performed less well compared to other safe-haven assets, such as the Swiss franc and/or Swiss bonds. Nonetheless, for U.S. investors, investing in one's home currency can provide a natural hedge/advantage. In Chart 4, we show the one-year correlation between USD and S&P 500 equity returns. Since 2009, the correlation has been negative and the implication is that by holding USD, investors are already implicitly defensive. Gold: Gold traditionally does well in times of extreme geopolitical uncertainty and also as a hedge against inflation. More recently, gold has done less well as a hedge because the negative correlation between equity prices and gold broke down from 2011 until earlier this year (Chart 4). Gold has once again become negatively correlated with equity prices and we believe it will be an effective safe-haven asset should inflation become a concern. TIPS: Both 10-year TIPS and nominal Treasuries are negatively correlated with U.S. equity returns and both provide some measure of insurance in risk-off periods/phases of economic disappointment. Nonetheless, we prefer TIPS at the moment since they offer a measure of protection against a back-up in inflation expectations (also Chart 4). In sum, our protector portfolio is a combination of assets that are uncorrelated enough with equities to give investors some protection against a range of downside risks. Protector Portfolio: But Beware Buy And Hold Chart 5Protector Buy And Hold Will Not Work As Chart 2 has shown, our protector portfolio has outperformed both a 60-30-10 and 60-40 portfolio in recent years. However, longer -term performance has been less outstanding (Chart 5). Indeed, adding a constant proportion of safe-haven assets to a balanced portfolio over an extended period underperforms the balanced portfolio benchmark for long stretches of time: there are non-negligible costs associated with holding safe-haven assets over prolonged periods. The bottom line is that timing plays a critical part in investing in safe-haven assets. Owning a fixed share of protector portfolio assets over long horizons will not beat a traditional buy and hold strategy, although superior returns over cash offer a compelling case in a NIRP world. We continue to recommend that investors hedge against downside risk in the form of the protector portfolio - or simply by choosing the safe haven that most closely corresponds as a hedge to the specific risk at hand. However, it is important to know that safe-haven assets fall in and out of favor through time and the protector portfolio will at some point no longer be justified, and/or its components will need to be adjusted. For example, only after 2000 did Treasuries start providing a good hedge against equity corrections. The contrary is true for gold - it acted as one of the most secure investments during corrections until that time, but then became correlated with S&P 500 total returns from 2012-early 2016. That said, gold's coefficient has turned negative again, and it should be viewed as an all-weather safe haven, especially if deflation risks begin to dissipate. The Most Relevant Safe Haven In Case Of A Policy Mistake Chart 6Fed Policy Mistake? Buy Protector Portfolio As we wrote above, our base investment case is that the prospect of less liquidity and the risk of an earnings disappointment mean that investors should keep a defensive portfolio stance and be prepared for pullbacks in equities in the single digits. However, the Minutes of the latest FOMC meeting highlight that a fairly low threshold has been set for a December interest rate rise. If financial market participants interpret incoming economic information more bearishly than the Fed, then a December rate hike risks being perceived by investors as a policy mistake. Under this scenario, risk assets could be set for a much greater fall, buoying the case for further portfolio insurance. Which safe havens will outperform? We take our cue from the market reaction to the December, 2015 rate hike. In that episode, equity prices fell 12%. The protector portfolio in its current configuration2 increased 10%. The bulk of the appreciation was due to a strong run in gold prices (surely helped in part by massive woes in China) and TIPS (Chart 6). We believe that this basket of assets would once again offer an important buffer against equity losses associated with a policy mistake. The Most Relevant Safe Haven For A Trump Win If a Trump win triggers a correction in risk assets, we would expect the U.S. dollar to rally due to Trump policy uncertainty and heightened geopolitical risk. We noted above that USD does not always rally when a stress event occurs on U.S. soil. However, in the past several weeks, the performance of the dollar as well as Treasury yields has been linked to Trump's probability of winning the election. Whenever the odds of a Trump presidency rise, these risk-off assets have appreciated. And The Most Relevant Lessons From The Election Cycle This month's Geopolitical Strategy Special Report 3 provides a final forecast and implications for the elections. As we note above, we agree that a Trump win is a red herring in terms of the key issues investors face. But we also agree with our geopolitical strategists that there are several important lessons from the election cycle that may have long term ramifications for investors. Below, we highlight the most relevant for financial market participants: The median voter has moved to the left on economic policy. Trump's victory over an army of seasoned, relatively orthodox GOP contenders in the primary exposed the fact that the party's grassroots voters no longer care deeply about fiscal austerity and no longer wish to tolerate the corporate incentive for importing cheap labor. Similarly, demographic trends favoring millennials and minorities (who tend to vote left on economic policies), portends a shift by which the GOP attempts to capture left-leaning voters. Fiscal conservatism (and social conservatism, for that matter) will have less to show by way of official party machinery. The 2016 election campaign has amplified the notion that the news media works in narratives. These narratives work as a filter that preempts and distorts the presentation and, to some extent, reception of facts. This phenomenon was influential in Trump's rise - the first "Twitter" candidacy - as well as his recent decline. Investors cannot be too wary of what the mainstream press or financial "smart money" says about any particular political trend or event. It is essential to separate the wheat from the chaff by using empirics and looking at macro and structural factors to identify the constraints rather than the preferences of candidates or politicians. U.S. Economy: Neither Hot Nor Cold The NFIB survey of small business survey ranks as one of our preferred indicators of U.S. business confidence. The employment related indicators serve as a key input into our payroll model; questions about the pricing environment often provide a good leading/coincident gauge about inflation trends, and; as Chart 7 shows, the labor cost versus pricing series provides an excellent leading indicator for the profit margin outlook. The latter remains in a downtrend, reinforcing our message that profit margins will remain a headwind to earnings growth for still some time. Overall, small business optimism has been generally flat this year, after peaking in late 2014. It is somewhat discouraging that "demand" as a most important problem is no longer falling. Consumption has been one of the more robust areas of growth in the past several years and we expect consumption to continue to outshine other areas of the economy. However, even here, the data should be monitored closely. Chart 7Small Business Concerns (Part 1) Chart 8Small Business Concerns (Part 2) Retail sales (excluding gasoline and autos) growth has been slowing throughout 2016 and September data did not buck this trend (Chart 8). Results among retailers varied substantially, with growth strongest at building supply stores, sporting goods stores, vehicle dealers and furniture stores. Laggards include electronics and appliance stores - segments that are still under siege from falling prices. The bottom line is that in aggregate, consumption is holding up reasonably well and should continue to do so, as long as employment gains and modest wage growth remain intact. Stay tuned. Lenka Martinek Vice President, U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Our Geopolitical Strategy service concurs that a Trump win is a red herring, i.e. is unlikely to occur and is a distraction from more relevant issues. For more insight, please see Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report "King Dollar: The Agent Of Righteous Retribution", dated October, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 At the time, the protector portfolio performed slightly less well, as 30-year government bonds were used instead of TIPS. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "U.S. Election: Final Forecast & Implications", dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Market Calls
Highlights Global liquidity conditions are set to tighten in the months ahead. This could add some fire to a dollar rally, especially against EM and commodity currencies. The GBP has become the new anti-dollar, reflected by its strong sensitivity to the greenback. Financing the U.K.'s large current-account deficit is a difficult task when global liquidity tightens, the layer of political uncertainty now makes it a herculean labor. While the pound is now attractive as a long-term play, it still possesses plenty downside risk. A quick look at EUR/SEK, NOK/SEK, GBP/CAD, and AUD/JPY. Feature Global liquidity conditions have begun to tighten. This development is likely to send the dollar higher and inflict serious damage on EM and commodity currencies. The pound's weakness fits nicely into this larger story. Not only is the current political climate in the British Isles prompting investors to think twice about buying British assets, but a tightening in global liquidity makes financing the U.K. current account deficit even more onerous. This adjustment demands a cheaper GBP. Global Yields: A Step Forward, Half A Step Backward The main reason why global liquidity conditions are tightening is the recent back up in global bond yields. In normal circumstances, a 39 basis-point (bp), a 24bp, and a 16bp back-up in 10-year Treasury yields, JGB yields, and bund yields, respectively, would not represent much of a problem. But today is anything but normal. The shift in global monetary policy has been behind the back-up in yields. In aggregate, global central banks are about to begin decreasing their purchases of securities. This will not only lift interest rates on government paper, but it will also raise rates for private-sector borrowing, especially as global risk premia have been depressed by an effect known as TINA - or "There Is No Alternative" (Chart I-1). The Fed too is in the process of lifting global bond yields. For one thing, U.S. labor market slack is dissipating and we are starting to witness rising wage pressures (Chart I-2). As such, we expect the Fed to raise its policy rate in December, and to further push rates higher in 2017 and 2018. Given that only 62 basis points of hike are priced in until the end of 2019, there is scope for U.S. bond yields to rise. Chart I-1Central Banks Are Contributing##br## To Tightening Liquidity Chart I-2U.S. Labor Market Is ##br##Showing Signs Of Tightening In terms of investor sentiment, despite the recent back-up in long bond yields, investors remain surprisingly upbeat on the outlook for T-bonds (Chart I-3). This, combined with their still-poor valuations, is another reason to be worried about the outlook for U.S. and global bonds for the remainder of the year. Finally, we expect U.S. real rates to have more upside than non-U.S. rates. Why? The U.S. output gap is arguably narrower than that of Europe or Japan. Moreover, the U.S. economy has deleveraged more than the rest of the G10. With U.S households enjoying strong real income growth, strong balance sheet positions, and with banks easing their lending standards to households, U.S. private-sector debt levels can expand vis-à-vis those of other developed economies. This will lift U.S. relative real rates (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Upside For ##br##Yields Chart I-4Real Rate Differentials Should ##br##Move In The Dollar's Favor What does this all mean for currency markets? As we highlighted last week, we expect the U.S. dollar to display more upside, potentially rising by around 10% over the next 18 months. We also expect more tumultuous times to re-emerge in the EM space. Rising real rates have been a bane for EM assets in this cycle. This is because EM growth has been dependent on EM financial conditions, which themselves, have been a function of global liquidity conditions (Chart I-5). Exacerbating our fear, the recent narrowing in EM spreads has not been reflective of EM corporate health. This suggests that EM borrowing costs and financial conditions are at risk of a shakeout (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Global Liquidity Conditions Will Hurt EM Chart I-6EM Spreads Are Priced For Perfection This obviously leads us to worry about commodity currencies as well. For one, they remain tightly linked with EM equities, displaying a 0.82 correlation with that asset class since 2000. Moreover, as Chart I-7 and Table I-1 illustrate, commodity currencies are tightly linked with the dollar and EM spreads. Thus, a combo of a higher dollar and deteriorating EM financial conditions could do great harm to the AUD, the NZD, and the NOK. Interestingly, SEK and GBP are also two potential big casualties of any such development. Chart I-7The GBP Has Become The Anti-Dollar Table I-1Currency Sensitivities To Key Factors, Since 2014 That being said, these dynamics contain the seeds of their own demise. As they are deflationary shocks, EM and commodity sell-offs are likely to elicit a dovish response from global policymakers. This will limit the upside for yields, implying that any tightening in global liquidity conditions is likely to prompt another reflationary push early in 2017. Bottom Line: Global rates still have more upside from here. U.S. real rates could rise the most as the Fed is now confronted with an increasingly tight labor market. Moreover, the U.S. economy possesses the strongest structural fundamentals in the G10. Together, this set of circumstances is likely to boost the dollar, especially at the expense of EM, commodity currencies, and the pound. GBP: Another Arrow In The Eye Nine hundred and fifty years ago to this day, King Harold, the last Anglo-Saxon King of England, died on the battlefield at Hastings from an arrow to the eye.1 The kingship of Norman William the Conqueror ushered a long and complex relationship between the British Isles and the rest of the continent. Over the past two weeks, the fall in the pound has been a dramatic story. The collapse of the nominal effective exchange rate to a nearly 200-year low, is a clear indication that the battle between the U.K. and the rest of the EU is inflicting long-term damage on the kingdom (Chart I-8). The key shock to the pound remains political. PM May made it clear that Brexit means Brexit. Additionally, elements of her discourse, such as wanting firms to list their foreign-born employees, are raising fears among the business community that the Conservatives are taking a very populist, anti-business slant that could weigh on the long-term prospects for British growth. True, these policies may never see the light of day. But across the Channel, the EU partners are taking a hardline approach to Brexit negations. Investors cheered the announcement on Wednesday that PM Theresa May will allow deeper scrutiny from parliament before triggering Brexit. Altogether, this mostly means that the cacophony over the future of the U.K. will only grow louder. Thus, we expect political headline risks to remain a strong source of uncertainty. These political games are poisonous for the pound. The U.K. is highly dependent on FDI inflows to finance it large current account deficit of nearly 6% of GDP (Chart I-9). Not knowing the status of the U.K. vis-à-vis the common market heightens any risk premium on investments in the U.K. Also, any shift of rhetoric toward a more populist discourse increases the risk that regulations could be implemented that either hurt the future profitability of British firms or increase their cost of capital. At the margin, this makes the U.K. less attractive to foreign investors. Chart I-8Something Evil This Way Comes Chart I-9The U.K. Needs Capital This has multiple implications. The pound remains highly sensitive to global liquidity trends, a fact highlighted by its extremely elevated sensitivity to EM spreads. The pound will also remain correlated with EM equity prices. This suggests that if a rising dollar acts as a lever to tighten global liquidity conditions, the pound will continue to be the currency with the largest beta to USD. In other words, investors will continue to express bullish-dollar views through the pound. Domestic dynamics are also problematic. The recent fall in the pound is lifting British inflationary pressures, a reality picked up by our Inflation Pressure Gauge (Chart I-10). In normal times, this could have lifted the pound as investors would have expected a response by the BoE. Today, however, the British credit impulse is very weak, in part reflecting the lack of confidence toward the future of the U.K. (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Hence, the BoE is not responding to these inflationary pressures. This combo is very bearish for the pound. It means that British real rates are falling, especially vis-à-vis the U.S. (Chart I-11). The U.K. is now in a vicious circle where the more the pound falls, the higher British inflation expectations go, which depresses British real rates and puts additional selling pressure on the pound. In other words, the U.K. is in the opposite spot of where Japan was in the spring of 2016. Chart I-10Stagflation Light! Chart I-11A Vicious Circle For GBP What is the downside for the pound? On a 52-week rate of change basis, the pound is not as oversold as it was at long-term bottoms like in 1985, 1993, or 2009. More concerning, long-term bottoms are also characterized by the 2-year rate of change staying oversold for a prolonged period, which again, has yet to be the case (Chart I-12). On the valuation front, GBP/USD is cheap, trading at a 25% discount to its PPP. However, in 1985, the pound was trading at a 36% discount to PPP (Chart I-13). The uncertainty around the future of the British economy is much higher today than in 1985. A move away from the pro-business Thatcherite policies of the 1980s, could result in a GBP discount similar to that of 1985. The sensitivity of the pound to the dollar amplifies the probability that such a scenario materializes. This could imply a GBP/USD toward 1.1-1.05 at its bottom. Chart I-12GBP/USD: Not Oversold Enough Chart I-13GBP/USD Valuation When is that bottom likely to emerge? With the strong downward momentum currently weighing on the pound, and the progressive un-anchoring of market based inflation expectations in the U.K., the bottom in the pound is a moving target. Moreover, Dhaval Joshi, who runs our European Investment Strategy service, has written about the fractal dimension as a tool to identify turning points in a trend. When the fractal dimension hits 1.25, a reversal in the trend is likely. Essentially, this metric measures group-think. When both short-term and long-term investors end up uniformly expressing the same views, liquidity dries up as there are fewer and fewer sellers for each buyer (or vice-versa).2 Currently GBP/USD's fractal dimension has not yet hit that stage. While the 3-6 months risk-reward ratio for the pound remains poor, the pound is now attractive as a long-term buy. The recent collapse in real rates and sterling has massively eased monetary conditions in the U.K. (Chart I-14). Also, even if valuations are a poor guide of near term returns, the 25% discount currently experienced by the pound suggests that on a one- to two-year basis, holding the GBP will be a rewarding bet. What about EUR/GBP? EUR/GBP has moved out of line with its historical link to real-rate differentials (Chart I-15). However, the pound's beta to the dollar is twice as high as that of the euro. Moreover, the pound is many times more sensitive to EM spreads than the euro. This suggests that our view of a strong dollar and tightening EM liquidity conditions are likely to weigh on GBP more than on the EUR for the next few months. Thus we believe it is still too early to short EUR/GBP. In fact EUR/GBP could flirt with 0.95. Chart I-14A Glimmer of Hope For The Long-Term Chart I-15EUR/GBP Has Overshot Fundamentals Bottom Line: While the pound is cheap, it can cheapen further. Not only is the pound being hampered by the political quagmire surrounding Brexit, but the strong sensitivity of the pound to the dollar and EM spreads are two additional potent headwinds for the British currency. Altogether, while the pound is most likely a long-term buy at current levels, it could still experience significant downside in the near term. We remain long gold in GBP terms. Four Chart Reviews Four long-term price charts caught our eye this week. First is EUR/SEK. As Chart I-16 shows, despite the valuation, economic momentum, and balance of payments advantages for the SEK, EUR/SEK broke out. We think this reflects the SEK's strong sensitivity to the dollar and brewing EM risks. A move to slightly above 10 on this cross is likely. Second, while we remain positive on NOK/SEK, the next few weeks may prove challenging. As Chart I-17 illustrates, NOK/SEK is about to test a potent downward sloping trend line, exactly as it is becoming overbought. With NOK being slightly more sensitive to the dollar than SEK, punching above this trend line will require much firmer oil prices. While our energy strategists see oil in the mid- to upper-$50s for next year, they worry that the recent rally to $52/bbl may have been too violent and is already eliciting a supply response from U.S. shale producers. Chart I-16EUR/SEK Can Rise Higher Chart I-17Big Ceiling Above Third, since the early 1980s, GBP/CAD has formed long-term bottom in the 1.5 region, a zone we expect to be tested again (Chart I-18). While CAD is more sensitive to commodity prices than the GBP, it is much less sensitive to the USD and EM spreads than the British currency. Also, the loonie does not suffer from a massive political handicap. That being said, each time the 1.5 zone has been hit, GBP/CAD slingshots higher. We recommend buying GBP/CAD at that level. Finally, since 1991, AUD/JPY has been strongly mean-reverting in a trading band between 60 and 110 (Chart I-19). Any blow-up in EM in the next few months is likely to prompt this cross to hit the low end of this band once again. Chart I-18GBP/CAD: Target 1.5 Chart I-19AUD/JPY: A Model Of Mean Reversion Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 This story of his death is now considered more a legend than an historical event, but we like this story. 2 Please see European Investment Strategy Special Report, "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model", dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We're at a point where the economic expansion has plenty of room to run. Inflation's a little bit below our target, rather than above our target... so, I think we can be quite gentle as we go in terms of gradually removing monetary policy accommodation" - Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William Dudley (October 12, 2016) Report Links: The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Due to the role of global inflation, more stimulus is needed than in the past to deliver their domestic mandates; and where, due to the falling equilibrium interest rates, their ability to deliver that stimulus is more constrained" - ECB Executive Board Member Yves Mersch (October 12, 2016) Report Links: The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016) The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Since the employment situation has continued to improve, no further easing of monetary policy may be necessary... at any rate, I would like to discuss this thoroughly with other board members at our monetary policy meeting" - BoJ Board Member Yutaka Harada (October 12, 2016) Report Links: The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 How Do You Say "Whatever It Takes" In Japanese? - September 23, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "If the MPC and other monetary authorities hadn't eased policy - if they had failed to accommodate the forces pushing down on the neutral real rate - the performance of the economy and equity markets, and the long-term prospects for pension funds, would probably have been worse" - BoE Deputy Governor Ben Broadbent (October 5, 2016) Report Links: The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Messages From Bali - August 5, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Inflation remains quite low. Given very subdued growth in labor costs and very low cost pressures elsewhere in the world, this is expected to remain the case for some time" - RBA Monetary Policy Statement (October 3, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Messages From Bali - August 5, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Interest rates are at multi-decade lows, and our current projections and assumptions indicate that further policy easing will be required to ensure that future inflation settles near the middle of the target range" - Reserve Bank Assistant Governor John McDermott (October 11, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Fed is Trapped Under Ice - September 9, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Policy is having its effects. And obviously we have room to maneuver but its not a great deal of room to maneuver and fortunately we have a different mix of policy today and the fiscal effects we talked about should be showing up in the data any time now" - BoC Governor Stephen Poloz (October 8, 2016) Report Links: The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We feel [negative interest rates and currency market interventions] is actually how we can ensure our mandate, namely by making the Swiss franc less attractive" - SNB Vice President Fritz Zurbruegg (October 12, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Review [of the monetary policy framework] is in order... I would, however, emphasise that our experience of the current framework is positive. This suggests a need for adjustments rather than a regime change" - Norgest Bank Governor Oeystein Olsen (October 11, 2016) Report Links: The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We have all the tools but there are limits since the repo rate and additional bond purchases can produce undesired side-effects... We don't really know for how long future interest rate cuts will work in an effective way." - Riksbank Deputy Governor Cecila Skingsley (October 7, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Dazed And Confused - July 1, 2016 Grungy Times - A Replay Of The Early 1990s? - June 10, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
We are pleased to share this <i>Special Report</i> rolling out our Global ETF Strategy (GETF) service's model ETF portfolios.
We are in the latter stages of developing the digital interface that will serve as the central nervous system for the GETF service and are excited to be rolling it out next month. In the meantime, the GETF team has embarked on its regular bi-weekly publication schedule. An ETF Primer <i>Special Report</i> will follow on October 26. It will discuss ETF architecture, operation and trading, and is meant to help investors determine how they can best deploy ETFs to accomplish their tactical and strategic goals.