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Money/Credit/Debt

Highlights The labor market continues to tighten and pressure the Fed. Tightening financial conditions suggest more muted returns for U.S. dollar assets and are associated with a peak in cyclical sectors. BCA's proprietary Monetary Indicator (MI) has turned lower, indicating that liquidity is drying up. Assessing performance of financial markets and the economy as financial conditions tighten. Feature Chart 1Oil Prices And Breakevens##BR##Moving In Lock Step Oil prices rose last week, U.S. equity prices climbed and credit spreads narrowed. Energy prices surged in the wake of President Trump's withdrawal from the 2015 JCPOA deal with Iran. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy team noted that the decision is unambiguously bullish for oil prices.1 Escalating geopolitical risks2 with Iran will add the potential for oil supply losses down the road and hence, add a premium to prices. Venezuelan oil production has been declining for the past two years, sitting at only 1.5 million b/d. The pace of future declines is unknown, but the potential for another steep contraction is worrisome as Venezuela's economic collapse continues and links in the oil export supply chain are breaking down. In light of these factors, BCA expects oil prices to test $90/bbl by the end of year. Importantly, inflation expectations are escalating along with oil prices (Chart 1). Continued upward pressure will have implications for monetary policy, particularly in the U.S. where inflation is approaching the Fed's target. The bottom panel of Chart 1 shows that the correlation between Brent crude and the 10-year Treasury breakeven swaps is positive and rising. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 3.28%.3 The Fed is poised to raise rates gradually this year and next as the labor market tightens further, pushing up wage inflation. Fed rate hikes will squeeze financial conditions and ultimately trigger the next recession in early 2020. Tightening financial conditions suggest more muted returns for U.S. dollar assets and are associated with a peak in cyclical sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, liquidity indicators remain generally favorable for financial assets and the U.S. economy. Nonetheless, BCA's proprietary Monetary Indicator (MI) has turned lower, indicating that liquidity is drying up. The March To 3.5% Data from the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) in April and the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) in March support our stance that the slack in the U.S. labor market is tightening and will ultimately lead to higher wage inflation. As noted in last week's report,4 the U.S. economy created an average of 208,000 new jobs in the three months ending April and the unemployment rate fell to a new cycle low of 3.9%. Annual wage inflation moderated in April to just 2.6% from a recent high of 2.8% in January. Chart 2 shows that small business owners' compensation plans remained near all-time highs in April. This metric is closely aligned with the wages and salaries component of the Employment Cost Index (ECI) and suggests further acceleration ahead for the ECI (panel 1). Job openings via the JOLTS data also hit a new zenith in March, creating an even wider gap between openings and hires (panel 2). Moreover, quits minus layoffs, another indicator of labor market slack, reached a record high (panel 3). The stout labor market has lifted the prime age (25-54 years) participation rate. BCA expects that the overall participation rate will remain flat in the next year or so. However, we concur with the Congressional Budget Office that due to demographics, the participation rate will drift lower in the next decade.5 Moreover, the robustness of the labor market is widespread. Charts 3A and 3B show the ratio of job openings to the number of unemployed in 10 sectors of the economy. The ratio is at an all-time high in 9 of the 10 sectors. The exception is the information sector, which includes industries such as newspaper and magazine publishing, broadcasting and telecommunications. Chart 2Labor Market Slack Is Disappearing Chart 3AStrength In The Labor Market... Chart 3B... Is Broad-Based Bottom Line: The U.S. labor market continued to tighten as Q2 began. BCA's stance is that the unemployment rate will fall to a 50-year low of 3.5% by mid-2019.6 The FOMC pegs the longer-term unemployment rate at 4.5%.7 The implication is that BCA and the FOMC expect the U.S. economy to continue to run below full employment this year. However, BCA's view is that the FOMC's forecast for the unemployment rate at the end of 2018 (3.8%) is too high and only marginally lower than the current 3.9%. This is inconsistent with real GDP growth well in excess of its supply-side potential. The macro backdrop will likely justify the FOMC hiking more quickly than the March 2018 dots forecast. The risks are skewed to the upside. BCA expects the 2/10 curve to remain around 50bps until the inflation breakevens are re-anchored between 2.3% and 2.5% as upward pressure on the short end from Fed rate hikes is offset by the upward thrust of the breakevens on the long end.8 Stay underweight duration. How High Is High? Chart 4Cyclical Spending Suggests That##BR##Monetary Policy Remains Accommodative The uptrend in cyclical spending suggests that U.S. monetary policy remains accommodative for the time being. Chart 4 shows overall cyclical spending as a share of potential GDP (panel 1) and for sectors most sensitive to the business cycle and interest rates: consumer spending on durables (panel 2), capital spending (panels 3 and 4) and housing (panel 4). All of these metrics are in an uptrend, although the rate of increase has declined during the past few quarters because of slightly weaker consumer spending on durables. In last week's report, we noted that rising rates and tighter financial conditions will not impact household and business spending this year.9 Table 1 shows that since 1960 total cyclical spending as a share of potential GDP has peaked six quarters prior to the onset of a recession. Consistent with our prior research,10 housing reached a zenith several quarters before other sectors. On the other hand, business spending on commercial real estate topped out only a year before a recession. Housing also provides the earliest warning in long economic cycles,11 peaking 14 quarters before the end of an expansion. Overall, cyclical sectors in long expansions crest 10 quarters before the onset of a downturn. Bottom Line: The performance of cyclical segments of the economy suggests that monetary policy is still accommodative. A distinct peak in these sectors will signal that Fed policy has turned restrictive and that long-term rates are close to their cyclical highs. Until then, stay long stocks over bonds and underweight duration. Tightening liquidity and financial conditions are associated with peaks in the cyclical sectors of the economy. Table 1Recession Signals From Cyclical Sectors Of The Economy Liquidity And Financial Conditions While liquidity conditions are accommodative, they are not nearly as abundant as prior to the Lehman event. The October 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report on liquidity12 noted that monetary conditions are super easy, while balance sheet and financial market liquidity are reasonably constructive. In contrast, funding liquidity, while vastly improved since the global financial crisis (GFC), is still a long way from the pre-Lehman go-go years, according to several important indicators such as bank leverage. Moreover, the Fed is in the process of unwinding a massive amount of monetary liquidity provided by its quantitative easing program. The gauges of liquidity have turned restrictive in recent months. Chart 5 shows M2 growth less GDP growth (top panel) along with monetary conditions and world reserves ex gold. Furthermore, the gap between nominal GDP growth and short rates has narrowed this year (Chart 6). Still, GDP growth is outpacing short rates, a sign that monetary liquidity is still present. Chart 5Monetary Liquidity Indicators (I) Chart 6Monetary Liquidity Indicators (II) Balance sheet liquidity for corporations, households and the banking sector remains supportive. The top panel of Chart 7 presents short-term assets-to-total liabilities for the corporate sector. It is a measure of readily available cash or cash-like instruments that make it easier to weather economic downturns and/or credit tightening phases. The non-financial corporate sector is in very good shape from this perspective. The seizure of the commercial paper market during the GFC encouraged firms to hold more liquid assets on their balance sheets. However, the uptrend began in the early 1990s and likely reflects tax avoidance efforts. The impact of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 may partially reverse this trend. Households are also very liquid when short-term assets are compared with income (panel 2). Liquidity is low as a share of individuals' total discretionary financial portfolios, but this is not surprising given extraordinarily unattractive interest rates. In the banking sector, short-term assets as a percentage of total bank credit has climbed in the past decade as banks were forced to hold more liquid assets in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Chart 8). Chart 7Balance Sheet Liquidity Chart 8Banking Sector Liquidity Charts 9 and 10 show market liquidity in the U.S. equity and high-yield markets. For the equity market, we present the one-year moving average of trading volume divided by shares outstanding or share turnover to get a sense of relative liquidity between firms (Chart 9). This measure has improved in recent years, but remains compressed vis-a-vis pre-crisis levels. BCA's Equity Trading System favors firms with lower liquidity, since investors pay a premium for liquidity.13 Liquidity in the high-yield market has recovered in recent years, but flows into high-yield bond funds turned negative in mid-2017 (Chart 10, panels 1 and 2). Nonetheless, the default-adjusted junk spread remains below its long-term average (panel 3). BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service recommends investors overweight high-yield bonds relative to Treasuries.14 Chart 9Equity Market Liquidity Chart 10High Yield Bond Market Liquidity Funding liquidity - as measured by primary dealers' securities lending - has recovered from financial crisis lows, but has not reached pre-crisis highs (Chart 11, panel 1). Primary dealers make loans to other financial institutions with the purpose of buying securities, thereby providing both funding liquidity and market liquidity. The uptrend in margin debt remains in place (panel 2). The steep escalation in this direct measure of funding liquidity is less impressive when compared with the S&P 500's market cap. Bank's lending standards for C&I loans are another measure of funding liquidity (Chart 12). These surveys reflect bank lending standards on loans to the household or corporate sectors. Nonetheless, a financial institution's appetite for lending for the purposes of securities purchases is highly correlated. Lending standards eased in 2017 and in early 2018, but they are not as loose as they were earlier in this cycle or in the pre-crisis period (2005-2007). Chart 11Funding Liquidity:##BR##Securities Lending And Margin Debt Chart 12Funding Liquidity:##BR##Bank Lending Standards Perspective On Liquidity And Financial Conditions BCA expects that both monetary and financial conditions will constrict in the next year as inflation moves through the Fed's 2% target and the FOMC gradually boosts rates in the next 12 months. A stronger dollar and higher bond yields will contribute to the tightening, but higher equity prices are an offset. Chart 13, Appendix Chart 1, and Tables 2 and 3 show BCA's MI versus key U.S. financial assets and commodities, and U.S. economic variables. The S&P 500 index has historically rallied strongly when the MI is above its long-term average. Moreover, BCA's stocks-to-bonds ratio rises, investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds outperform Treasuries. However, oil prices struggle in this environment (Chart 13 and Table 2). Chart 13Risk Assets When BCA's Proprietary Monetary Indicator Is Below Zero Table 2Performance Of Risk Assets When Monetary Indicator Is Above Zero Table 3Performance Of Risk Assets When Monetary Indicator Is Below Zero When MI is below zero, on the other hand, economic performance is mixed. GDP growth, cyclical spending as a share of GDP, and employment tend to peak when the MI is decelerating, but recessions rarely occur when the MI is negative (Appendix Chart 1, panels 2, 3 and 4). Core inflation often peaks when the MI is above zero (not shown). However, the MI is sending a negative signal because interest rates have increased and credit growth has slowed. Table 3 indicates the performance of U.S. financial assets when the MI is below zero. We used the periods in which the MI was persistently below zero to avoid false signals. Note that the average and median returns for most asset classes in Table 3 (MI below zero) are well below those in Table 2 (MI above zero). Notable exceptions are oil and the dollar, which strengthen when the MI is below zero. S&P 500 earnings growth struggles during this episodes. Chart 14, Appendix Chart 2, and Tables 4 and 5 present financial conditions versus key U.S. financial assets and commodities, and U.S. economic variables. BCA expects the financial conditions index (FCI) to decline further into negative territory in the next few years. U.S. equities and credit tend to perform better when the FCI rises (Table 4) rather than when it falls (Table 5). However, when it does fall, gold and oil are stronger. Chart 14Risk Assets When Financial Conditions Tighten Table 4Performance Of Risk Assets When Financial Conditions Are Easing Table 5Performance Of Risk Assets When Financial Conditions Are Tightening Moreover, we note that GDP growth and cyclical spending as a share of GDP often peak when FCI drops. Employment and inflation are mixed at best when the FCI decelerates (Appendix Chart 2). Bottom Line: The U.S. economy is growing above its long-term potential, the labor market is tightening and inflation is at the Fed's target but poised to move higher next year. The Fed will increase rates to cool the overheating economy. Therefore, liquidity and financial market conditions will deteriorate further in the next year as Treasury yields increase and the dollar climbs in tandem with a more aggressive Fed. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds for now, but look to pare back exposure later this year. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report "Geopolitical Certainty: OPEC Production Risks Are Playing To Shale Producers' Advantage," published May 9, 2018. Available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," published March 28, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Coming To Grips With Gradualism," published May 9, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Stressing The Housing And Consumer Sectors," published May, 7 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/workingpaper/53616-wp-laborforceparticipation.pdf 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Waiting...," published March 26, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20180321.pdf 8 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Back To Basics," published April 17, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stressing The Housing And Consumer Sectors," published May 7, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "2018: Synchronized Global Growth," published December 4, 2017, and "Drives U.S. Economy And Markets," published December 4, 2017. Both available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, published November 24, 2016. Available at bca.bcarearch.com. 12 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, "Liquidity And The Great Balance Sheet Unwind," published October 2017. Available at bca.bcarearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Research's Equity Trading Strategy Special Report, "Introducing ETS: A Top-Down Approach to Bottom-Up Stock Picking," published December 3, 2015. Available at ets.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary "Coming To Grips With Gradualism," published May 8, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Appendix Chart 1The Economy When Monetary Indicator Is Below Zero Appendix Chart 2The Economy When Financial Conditions Are Tightening
Highlights The big danger of higher bond yields is to the $380 trillion edifice of global risk-assets, rather than to the global economy per se. Buy a small portfolio of 30-year government bonds, given that higher bond yields are now hurting equities and 30-year yields are close to resistance levels. The ongoing drama of Italian politics is an irritation, rather than an existential risk to the euro area, as long as Italian populists correctly focus their fire on EU fiscal rules rather than the single currency. Nevertheless, we prefer France's CAC over Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX, given the latter markets' outsize exposure to banks, a sector in which we remain underweight. Feature When travellers from the U.K. find themselves in Continental Europe or the U.S. they frequently make a potentially fatal error. Trying to cross a busy street, they look right instead of left... Your author has made this error several times and lived to tell the tale, but there is an important moral to the story. However carefully you look, you won't spot the oncoming truck if you are looking in the wrong direction! Chart of the WeekEquities And Bonds Are Both Offering A Paltry 2% Look At the Markets, Not The Economy The global long bond yield is up around 60bps from the lows of last September, and it would be natural to ask if this poses a danger to the economy. Credit sensitive economic sectors are understandably feeling a headwind, and global growth has indisputably decelerated (Chart I-2). Yet there is no sense of an oncoming truck. Chart I-2Credit Sensitive Sectors Are Feeling A Headwind But are we looking in the wrong direction? While higher bond yields do not yet threaten the global economy, the big danger is to the $380 trillion edifice of global risk-assets.1 In the space of a few weeks, the correlation between bond yields and equities has suddenly and viciously reversed. When the 10-year T-bond yield was below 2.65%, the correlation was a near perfect positive, r = +0.9 (Chart I-3) but above 2.85%, it has flipped to a near perfect negative, r = -0.8 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Below A 2.65% T-Bond Yield, Equities And##br## Bond Yields Were Positively Correlated Chart I-4Above A 2.85% T-Bond Yield, Equities And ##br##Bond Yields Have Been Negatively Correlated In 2000, 2008 and 2011, the right direction to look was at the financial markets. Recall that it was instabilities in the financial markets - the bursting of the dot com bubble, the mispricing of U.S. subprime mortgages, and the widening of euro area sovereign credit spreads - that spilled over into economic downturns. In any case, for investment strategy, whether such financial instabilities do or do not spill over into the real economy is a secondary concern. The primary concern must always be to identify financial market vulnerabilities - and opportunities. Rich Valuations Are In A Precarious Equilibrium The single most important determinant of an investment's long term return is not the investment's cash flows per se, it is the price that you pay for the cash flows. This is the fundamental lesson of investment. An investment's cash flows might be growing strongly, but if you overpay for the cash flows - for example, in a bubble - you will end up with a negative return. Conversely, cash flows might be collapsing, but if you buy them at an overly depressed price, you will end up with a positive return. It turns out that the long term prospective return from most investments is well-defined. For government bonds, it is the yield to maturity;2 for equities and other risk-assets it is empirically well-defined by the starting valuation, which tends to be an excellent predictor of the prospective long term return (Chart I-5). Chart I-5World Equities Are Priced To Generate 2% A Year For the long term prospective return from bonds, the main determinant is central bank policy, and specifically the expected path for interest rates. For the long term prospective return from equities, the main determinant is the return that the market demands relative to that on offer from bonds. What establishes this relative return? The answer is relative riskiness, specifically the potential for short term losses versus short term gains, technically known as negative skew. Investors hate negative skew - the potential to experience larger short term losses than gains. Hence, investors demand relative returns that are commensurate with the investments' relative negative skews. This brings us to the crux of the matter. At low bond yields, bonds become much more risky: their returns take on negative skew. Intuitively, this is because the lower bound to interest rates forces a very unattractive asymmetry on bond returns: prices can fall a lot, but they can no longer rise a lot. At a bond yield of 2%, theoretical and empirical evidence shows that bonds and equities possess the same negative skew (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6At A 2% Bond Yield, 10-Year Bonds Have##br## The Same Negative Skew As Equities... Chart I-7...So At A 2% Bond Yield, Equities ##br##Must Also Offer A 2% Return Right now, the negative skews on bonds and equities are roughly the same, so investors are accepting roughly the same long term return from global equities as they can get from global bonds - a paltry 2% (Chart of the Week). This justifies an equity valuation as rich as at the peak of the dot com bubble. The trouble is that the valuation justification for $380 trillion of global risk-assets would crumble if the bond yield were to rise meaningfully. But which bond yield? As asset-classes tend to move as global rather than regional assets, the yield that matters is the global long bond yield. Given the large spread in yields across major bonds, a global yield of 2% equates to around 3% in the U.S. and 1% in Europe. This may explain why these are the yield levels at which the correlation between bond yields and equities has suddenly and viciously reversed. This brings us to the investment opportunity: 30-year government bonds. In recent years, 30-year yields have failed to sustain breaks through upper bounds: 3.2% for T-bonds; 2.0% for U.K. gilts; 1.4% for German bunds; and 0.9% for JGBs. Indeed, looking at these yields since 2015 it is hard to discern a bear market in 30-year government bonds (Charts I-8- I-11). Chart I-8Resistance At 3.2% Chart I-9Resistance At 2.0% Chart I-10Resistance At 1.4% Chart I-11Resistance At 0.9% With higher bond yields now hurting equities, and 30-year yields close to resistance levels, it is a good time to buy a small portfolio of 30-year government bonds. What Unites Italy With Japan? Italy and Japan are the only two major economies in which private indebtedness is considerably less than public indebtedness (Chart I-12 and Chart I-13). In the case of Italy, the very low private indebtedness means that its total indebtedness - as a share of GDP - is actually less than that in the U.K., France, Spain and Sweden. Chart I-12Private Indebtedness Is Less Than ##br##Public Indebtedness In Italy... Chart I-13...And In ##br##Japan The other thing that unites Italy with Japan is that their banking systems were left undercapitalised and in a 'zombie' state for years. Which, to a large extent, explains why private indebtedness has been declining in both economies. When somebody in the private sector pays down debt, say €100, and the banking system does not reallocate that €100 to a new private sector borrower, aggregate demand will contract by €100. To prevent this demand recession, the government must step in to borrow and spend the €100. Moreover, because the private sector is deleveraging, what seems to be fiscal largesse does not lead to crowding out, inflation, or surging interest rates. Instead, government borrowing and spending turns out to be a very sensible economic policy. On this basis, Japan countered its aggressive private sector deleveraging with equally aggressive public sector leveraging and thereby kept its economy motoring along. By contrast, Italy had its hands tied by the EU fiscal compact - which mistakenly looks at public indebtedness in isolation rather than in combination with private indebtedness. Hence, the Italian government was prevented from recapitalizing its banking system, and the Italian economy stagnated for a decade (Chart I-14 and Chart I-15). Chart I-14The Italian Government Was Prevented ##br##From Recapitalising The Banks... Chart I-15...And The Italian Economy ##br##Stagnated For A Decade In this sense, the populist parties in Italy - The League and 5 Star Movement - have correctly identified that Italy's problem is not the euro per se, but the EU's fiscal dogma. Both parties have dropped calls for a referendum on Italy's membership of the euro area, but have doubled down on their intentions to ignore the EU's misguided fiscal rules, such as the 3 per cent limit on budget deficits. As long as Italian populists correctly focus their fire on EU rules rather than the single currency, investors should view the ongoing drama of Italian politics as an irritation, rather than an existential risk to the euro area. Nevertheless, for the time being, we prefer France's CAC over Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX. This is less a function of politics, and more a function of the latter markets' outsize exposure to banks, a sector in which we remain underweight. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Global equities and high yield and EM debt is worth around $160 trillion and global real estate is worth $220 trillion. 2 Assuming no default risk and no reinvestment risk. Fractal Trading Model* This week, we note that SEK/EUR is at a key technical turning point, and due a countertrend rally. As we already have a long SEK/GBP position open, we are not doubling up with SEK/EUR. In other trades, we are pleased to report that long USD/Chilean peso hit its 2.7% profit target, and is now closed. This leaves us with four open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-16 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report There is scant evidence that the character of the equity market advance is changing and the fact that weak balance sheet stocks are no longer outperforming strong balance sheet stocks is giving us pause (Chart 1). Chart 1Time To Pause And Reflect Using the Goldman Sachs equity baskets - that utilize the 'Altman Z-score' framework to select stocks - via Bloomberg, we find that the weak balance sheet over strong balance sheet share price ratio leads the broad market at both peaks and is coincident at troughs. The most recent peak occurred in early 2017 and it is rather surprising that a proxy for this ratio using the fixed income market, i.e. the total return high yield bond index versus the total return investment grade bond index, is moving in the opposite direction and not confirming the equity market's message (Chart 2). This begs the question: Which market signal is right, stocks or fixed income, and what are the equity sector investment implications? But before trying to answer these questions, we first zoom out and look at the broad U.S. debt picture. How Will It All End? In our travels and conference calls one common question keeps coming up: What will end all this? The short answer is that rising interest rates will eventually deal a blow to the debt overhang and the expansion will give way to a fresh deleveraging cycle. In other words, a whiff of inflation will entice the Fed to keep on raising the fed funds rate to the point where the business cycle turns down. As demand falters, a decreasing cash flow backdrop will not be able to service the debt overload, as both coupon payments and principal repayments will become a big burden. This will ignite a jump in the default rate, a message the yield curve is already sending (Chart 3). Chart 2Which Market Is Right? Chart 3Has The Junk Default Rate Troughed? Peering back to the onset of the GFC, a U.S. financial sector debt crisis engulfed the world. Subsequently, this morphed into a government sector debt problem in the Eurozone and more recently into a non-financial corporate sector debt overhang mostly in the commodity complex and the emerging markets. Debt Supercycle Lives On The investment world is obsessed with China's excess debt uptake and that is a valid concern. However, investors should also be aware that U.S. debt has not been fully purged. Rather, it has moved around between different domestic sectors. The debt supercycle lives on.1 The implication is that an interest rate-induced debt bubble pricking would be deflationary, and thus identifying the U.S. domestic sector most exposed to such risk is important. Chart 4 breaks down U.S. total debt into the four largest sectors using flow of funds data. While households and the financial sector have significantly de-levered, the government and the non-financial business sector have been picking up the slack and aggressively re-levering. While the Trump Administration has embarked on a two-year fiscal policy easing period that will add to the government debt profile, the nonfinancial corporate debt overhang is more vulnerable and thus troublesome in our view (fed funds rate shown inverted, Chart 5). Worrisomely, since the GFC, nonfinancial corporates have been issuing debt and partially using this debt to retire equity and pay handsome dividends. According to the flow of funds data, the cumulative nonfinancial net equity retirement figure stands near $4tn over the past decade (middle panel, Chart 6). Undoubtedly, this has been a large contributor to equity market returns (top panel, Chart 6), and will likely gain further momentum this year on the back of the tax repatriation holiday. Some sell side equity retirement estimates for the S&P 500 hover around $800bn for calendar 2018 or roughly twice the past decade's annual average. AAPL's recent announcement of a $100 billion share repurchase program confirms that the buyback bonanza is persevering and will continue to boost equities. Clearly, such breakneck equity retirement pace is unsustainable and will converge down to a lower trend rate in 2019 and beyond, especially given the drying liquidity as the Fed continues to pursue a tighter monetary policy. Chart 4Debt Is Moving Around Chart 5Tight Monetary Policy Pricks Bubbles, And... Chart 6...Threatens To End The Equity Retirement Binge Introducing BCA's Sector Insolvency Risk Monitor (IRM) The purpose of this Special Report is to identify debt soft spots and outliers in the U.S. GICS1 equity sectors. What follows is a financials statement-heavy analysis of sector indebtedness. We introduce the 'Altman Z-score' sector analysis that gauges sector credit strength, with a rising score indicating improving health and a declining Z-score signifying deteriorating health.2 In absolute terms, a score below 1.8 warns of a possible credit event, whereas any reading above 3 signals that bankruptcy risk is very low (see appendix below). Our analysis includes our flagship Bank Credit Analyst's Corporate Health Monitor framework that breaks down corporate health in the different sectors3 (see appendix below). We also sift through a number of different stock market reported ratios/data to gauge each sector's health, with net debt-to-EBITDA and interest coverage at the forefront of our analysis, and try to identify outliers (see appendix below). Finally, with the invaluable help of BCA's Chief Quantitative Strategist, David Boucher, we created our new insolvency risk monitor (IRM) per U.S. equity sector incorporating the respective 'Altman Z-scores', BCA's corporate health monitor readings and net debt-to-EBITDA ratios. In more detail, we ranked each sector (ex-financials and real estate) on a monthly basis on each of these three measures. Then we used a simple average of the ranked measures per sector to come up with the final sector ranking. We also selected the median sector ranking per measure and used the average of the three metrics as a proxy for the broad market.4 This way we were able to compare each sector IRM to the overall market. Note that the IRMs are designed so that a higher IRM ranking means better solvency. Charts 7 & 8 summarize the results and showcase this new all-inclusive relative ranking alongside relative share price performance. Chart 7Unsustainable... Chart 8...Divergences Sector Outliers Consumer discretionary stocks are the clearest outliers and the message from the relative IRM is to expect a significant underperformance phase in the coming quarters (top panel, Chart 7). AMZN's juggernaut is blurring the discretionary landscape given its 20% index weight, and artificially boosting relative share prices. Ex-AMZN, this early cyclical sector is behaving similar to previous episodes when the Fed embarked on a tightening interest rate cycle. We reiterate our recent downgrade to a below benchmark allocation.5 Consumer staples equities are steeply deviating from their increasing relative IRM score, underscoring that investors are unduly punishing staples stocks (second panel, Chart 8). We maintain our overweight stance and treat this sector as a small portfolio hedge to our otherwise general dislike of defensives (as a reminder we are underweight both the S&P health care and the S&P telecom services sectors). Chart 9Cyclicals Have The Upper Hand The utilities share price ratio is also deviating from the IRM relative reading (fourth panel, Chart 8). The implication is that extreme bearishness toward the sector is overdone and we reiterate our mid-February upgrade to a neutral stance.6 Energy stocks have fallen behind the energy IRM rebound reading (top panel, Chart 8). We expect a catch up phase on the back of the global capex upcycle, still improving debt profile, favorable underlying commodity supply/demand dynamics and firming oil prices. The S&P energy sector remains a high-conviction overweight. The niche materials sector is also trailing the sector's slingshot IRM recovery. Keep in mind that, as expected, the materials IRM is one of the most volatile series (second panel, Chart 8). Materials manufacturers are capital intensive and high operating leverage businesses and despite the debt dynamic betterment since the recent global manufacturing recession, this sector is still saddled with a large amount of debt that makes it extremely sensitive to the ebbs and flows of global economic growth. We continue to recommend a benchmark allocation. The remaining sectors' (tech, health care, telecom services and industrials) relative share prices are moving in tandem with their respective IRM readings (Charts 7 & 8). In addition, we have complied all the cyclical and defensive IRMs in two distinct series and the relative IRM ratio is giving the all-clear sign to continue to prefer cyclicals over defensives on a 9-12 month time horizon (Chart 9). So What? In sum, the IRM is one new additional metric we are using to gauge the validity of our sector positioning and should not be used in isolation. To answer our original question, while the weak balance sheet versus strong balance sheet stock underperformance is alarming and we will continue to closely monitor this stock price ratio, it is premature to change our constructive overall equity market view on a 9-12 month horizon. We therefore continue to recommend a cyclical over defensive portfolio bent. Finally, for completion purposes, the appendix below shows a number of debt-related indicators we track, including the absolute 'Altman Z-score' and corporate health monitor readings, in two charts per sector along with the cyclicals over defensives compilation and the overall market (ex-financials). Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 For a primer on the debt super cycle please refer to Box 1 in the BCA Special Year End Issue: "Outlook 2013: Fewer Storms, More Sunny Breaks," dated December 19, 2012, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Altman Z-Score = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E. Where: A = working capital / total assets, B = retained earnings / total assets, C = earnings before interest and tax / total assets, D = market value of equity / total liabilities and E = sales / total assets. Source: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/altman.asp 3 Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Report, "U.S. Corporate Health Gets A Failing Grade," dated January 28, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 We refrained from using the top down computed S&P 500 'Altman Z-Score' and net debt-to-EBITDA as the financials sector really skewed the results and therefore opted to use the median sector 'Altman Z-score' and net debt-to-EBITDA as a proxy for the broad market because using the mean also skewed the results largely because of the tech sector. Staying consistent in our analysis, we also used the median sector BCA corporate health monitor to proxy the broad market. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Reflective Or Restrictive?" dated March 12, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Manic-Depressive?" dated February 12, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Appendix U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market I U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market II U.S. S&P Industrials I U.S. S&P Industrials II U.S. S&P Energy I U.S. S&P Energy II U.S. S&P Consumer Staples I U.S. S&P Consumer Staples II U.S. S&P Tech I U.S. S&P Tech I U.S. S&P Utilities I U.S. S&P Utilities II U.S. S&P Materials I U.S. S&P Materials II U.S. S&P Consumer Discretionary I U.S. S&P Consumer Discretionary II U.S. S&P Telecom Services I U.S. S&P Telecom Services II U.S. S&P Health Care I U.S. S&P Health Care II U.S. S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives I U.S. S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives II
Highlights The global 6-month credit impulse is now indisputably in a mini-downswing phase. Stick with underweights in the classically cyclical sectors: banks, basic materials and industrials. The strategy has worked well since the start of the year, and it is too early to exit. For bonds, the implication is that yields can move only slightly higher before stronger headwinds to risk-assets and/or the economy provide a tradeable reversal in yields. The trade-weighted euro has some support given that the BoE and/or the Fed have tightening expectations that can be priced out, while the ECB doesn't. We have a slight preference for the FTSE100 and S&P500 over the Eurostoxx50. Feature Entering the fifth month of the year, one puzzle for investors is the conflicting messages coming from banks and bonds. While banks' relative performance is close to its 2018 low, bond yields are not far from their year-to-date high (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekBanks Or Bonds: Which One Is Right? This poses a puzzle because the performances of banks and bond yields are usually joined at the hip. The underperformance of the economically sensitive banks would suggest that global growth is decelerating, whereas the performance of bond yields would suggest that global activity is holding up well. Which one is right? The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Is Indisputably In A Mini-Downswing Looking at the other classically cyclical sectors, the mystery seems to deepen. Industrials and basic materials are also in very clear downtrends this year, which corroborates the message from the banks. But the oil and gas sector is close to a year high, which corroborates the message from bond yields (Charts I-2-I-4). Chart I-2Industrials Have Underperformed... Chart I-3...And Basic Materials Have Underperformed Chart I-4...But Oil And Gas Has Outperformed... The conflicting messages from banks, basic materials and industrials on one side and bond yields and oil and gas equities on the other side reflect the disconnect between non-oil commodity prices which have drifted lower this year and oil prices which have moved sharply higher (Chart I-5). This disconnect, resulting from differing supply dynamics in the different commodity markets, points us to a likely solution to our puzzle. Chart I-5...Because Oil Has Disconnected ##br##From Other Commodities The classically cyclical sectors are taking their cue from global growth and industrial activity, which does appear to be losing momentum. The global 6-month credit impulse is now indisputably in a mini-downswing phase. In contrast, bond yields are taking their cue from the oil price, given its major impact on headline inflation, inflation expectations, and thereby on central bank reaction functions. Based on previous mini-cycles, we can confidently say that mini-downswing phases last at least six to eight months and that the usual release valve is a decline in bond yields. In this regard, the apparent disconnect between decelerating activity and un-budging bond yields risks extending this mini-downswing phase. Therefore, for the next few months, it is appropriate to stick with underweights in the classically cyclical sectors: banks, basic materials and industrials. The strategy has worked well since we initiated it at the start of the year, and it is too early to exit. This sector strategy necessarily impacts regional allocation as explained in the next section. For bonds, the implication is that yields can move only slightly higher before stronger headwinds to risk-assets and/or the economy provide a natural cap and a tradeable reversal in yields. Even More Investment Reductionism Imagine a world in which all the global commodity firms decided to get their stock market listings in London; all the global financials decided to list on euro area bourses; all the major tech companies listed in New York; and all the industrials listed in Tokyo. Clearly, each major stock market would just be a play on its underlying global sector and nothing more. Our imagined world is an exaggeration, but it does illustrate an important truth. A quarter of the market capitalisation of each major stock market is in one dominant sector, and this gives each equity index its defining fingerprint: for the FTSE100 it is commodity firms; for the Eurostoxx50 it is financials; for the S&P500 it is technology; and for the Nikkei225 it is industrials (Table I-1). Table I-1Each Major Stock Market Has A Defining Fingerprint There is another important factor to consider: the currency. A global oil company like BP receives its revenue and incurs its costs in multiple major currencies, such as euros and dollars. In this sense, BP's global business is currency neutral. But BP's stock price is quoted in pounds. This means that if the pound strengthens, the company's multi-currency profits will decline relative to the stock price and weigh it down. Conversely, if the pound weakens, it will lift the BP stock price. So the currency is the channel through which the domestic economy can impact its stock market, albeit it is an inverse relationship: a strong currency hinders the stock market; a weak currency helps it. The upshot is that the defining fingerprints for the major indexes turn out to be: FTSE100: global commodity shares expressed in pounds. Eurostoxx50: global banks expressed in euros. S&P500: global technology expressed in dollars. Nikkei225: global industrials expressed in yen. And that's pretty much all you need to know for regional equity allocation! The charts in this report should leave you in no doubt. True to our Investment Reductionism philosophy, the relative performance of the regional equity indexes just reduces to their defining fingerprints: FTSE100 versus S&P500 reduces to global commodity companies in pounds versus global tech companies in dollars, Eurostoxx50 versus Nikkei225 reduces to global banks in euros versus global industrials in yen. And so on (Charts I-6-I-11). Chart I-6FTSE 100 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Commodity##br## Equities In Pounds Vs. Global Tech In Dollars Chart I-7FTSE 100 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Commodity ##br##Equities In Pounds Vs. Global Industrials In Yen Chart I-8FTSE 100 Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 = Global Commodity##br## Equities In Pounds Vs. Global Banks In Euros Chart I-9Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Banks In ##br##Euros Vs. Global Tech In Dollars Chart I-10Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Banks In##br## Euros Vs. Global Industrials In Yen Chart I-11S&P 500 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Tech In ##br##Dollars Vs. Global Industrials In Yen The Right Way To Invest In The 21st Century One important implication of Investment Reductionism is that the head-to-head comparison of stock market valuations is a meaningless and potentially dangerous exercise. Two sectors with vastly different structural growth prospects - say, banks and technology - must necessarily trade on vastly different valuations. So the sector with the lower valuation is not necessarily the better-valued sector. By extension, the stock market with the lower valuation because of its sector fingerprint is not necessarily the better-valued stock market. Another implication is that simple 'value' indexes may not actually offer better value! In reality, they comprise a collection of sectors on the lowest head-to-head valuations which, to repeat, does not necessarily make them better-valued. Some people suggest comparing a valuation with its own history, and assessing how many 'standard deviations' it is above or below its norm. The problem is that the whole concept of standard deviation assumes 'stationarity' - meaning, no step changes in a sector's valuation through time. Unfortunately, sector valuations are 'non-stationary': they undergo major step changes when they enter a vastly different economic climate. For example, the structural outlook for bank profits undergoes a step change when a credit boom ends. Therefore, comparing a bank valuation after a credit boom with the valuation during the credit boom is like comparing an apple with an orange. Pulling together these complexities of sector effects, currency effects, and step changes in sector valuations, we offer some strong advice on how to sequence the investment process: 1. Make your asset class decision at a global level. This is because asset classes tend to move as global entities, not regional entities. And also because at a global level, asset class valuation comparisons are less distorted by sector and currency effects. 2. Make your sector decisions. Given that the companies that dominate European (and all major) indexes are multinationals, the sector decision should be based on the direction of the global economy. 3. Make your currency decisions. 4. You do not need to make any more major decisions! The main regional equity allocation, country allocation and value/growth allocation just drop out from the sector and currency decision. With the global 6-month credit impulse now indisputably in a mini-downswing phase (Chart I-12), the classically cyclical sectors are likely to continue underperforming for the next few months; the rise in bond yields faces resistance; and the euro - at least on a trade-weighted basis - has some support given that the BoE and/or the Fed have tightening expectations that can be priced out, while the ECB doesn't. Chart I-12The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Is Indisputably In A Mini-Downswing Finally, in terms of regional equity allocation, Investment Reductionism implies a slight preference for the FTSE100 and S&P500 over the Eurostoxx50. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* In addition to the fundamental arguments in the main body of this report, fractal analysis finds that the outperformance of Oil and Gas relative to other commodity equities is technically extended. Hence, this week's trade recommendation is to underweight euro area Oil and Gas versus global Basic Materials. Set a profit target of 5%, with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, we are pleased to report that long USD/ZAR hit its 6% profit target, and is now closed. This leaves us with five open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-13 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Both the euro's undervaluation and the euro area's massive trade surplus constitute disequilibria, which cannot persist in the long term. Hence, the trade-weighted euro will structurally appreciate... ...and euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos. Banks are not a sector to buy and hold for the long term, but rather a sector to own for periodic cyclical rallies. We anticipate the next such cyclical opportunity will arise later this year. Feature Yanis Varoufakis, the former Finance Minister of Greece, recently highlighted EU institutions' obsession with protecting their credibility at all costs. Once set on a course, EU institutions tend to suffer a blinkered tunnel-vision. A big fan of Shakespeare, Varoufakis likened this resistance to change course - no matter the repercussions - to Lady Macbeth's declaration that "what's done cannot be undone."1 As Mario Draghi prepares to take the stage again, we recall the final line of his last performance on March 8 as an echo of Lady Macbeth. Asked to justify the ECB's obsession with the 2 per cent inflation point-target, Draghi declared that "there are serious costs about changing course on credibility". We fully understand the ECB's desire to protect its credibility. The trouble is that it is set on a course that is incredibly difficult to accomplish: a single mandate to sustain a 2 per cent inflation point-target, based on a consumer price basket that omits one of the largest items of household expenditure - housing itself. Chart of the WeekAs The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters Euro Area Inflation Is Running Higher Than The HICP Suggests Homeowners will testify that the cost of maintaining their homes constitutes one of their largest expenses. Which makes the omission of this cost from the euro area Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) completely ludicrous. Using the experience of U.S. inflation which does include owner occupiers' housing costs, we estimate that a price basket that correctly included home maintenance costs would outperform the HICP by an average of 0.5 percentage points a year (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Including Owner Occupiers' Housing Costs ##br##Adds 0.5% To Inflation Recognizing this error, the U.K.'s Office For National Statistics recently changed its main inflation index from the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) to the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), acknowledging that "the costs of housing services associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's home are an important component of household expenditure that are not included in the CPI... Therefore the CPIH is the most comprehensive measure of inflation." We expect the BoE's target for 2 per cent inflation to switch eventually to the CPIH too, albeit it remains the CPI for the time being. However, a 1 to 3 per cent 'variation band' around the CPI inflation target does give the BoE considerable breathing space. By comparison, the ECB's target for 2 per cent inflation excluding owner occupiers' housing costs and excluding a variation band gives it a significantly more difficult task than its peer central banks. The crucial point is that the ECB's ultra-loose policy is to a large extent a function of a tunnel-vision pursuit of an HICP inflation rate which significantly understates true inflation. As true inflation is higher than suggested, it means that true real interest rates are lower than suggested. And as currency markets feel true real interest rate differentials - rather than those derived from the faultily constructed HICP - it means that markets have undervalued the euro. This has resulted in an over-competitive euro area, and a massive trade surplus (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Euro Area Trade Surplus Is A Mirror-Image ##br##Of The Undervalued Euro Both the currency undervaluation and the associated trade surplus constitute disequilibria, which cannot persist in the long term. We have no strong conviction for the very near term move in the euro, but there are two longer term implications: the trade-weighted euro will structurally appreciate by about 10%; and euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos (Chart of the Week). Japanese Lessons For Europeans: The Homework A few weeks ago in Japanese Lessons For Europeans we made some counterintuitive observations about Japan's post-bubble economic experience.2 Most notably, we showed that on a real GDP per head basis, Japan has outperformed every other major economy over the past twenty years. Our finding was based on real GDP divided by working age (15-64) population because we wanted to capture real productivity gains - which rely mainly on the productive population. The counterintuitive finding elicited a couple of questions. One question was whether the result changes if we were to divide by the total population rather than the working age population. The answer is, not really. Dividing by total population, Japan would no longer be top of the leader board, but the broad result would still hold. Japan has performed impressively, and we fail to see the so-called 'lost decades' (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Japan Has Performed Impressively On ##br##Real GDP Per Working Age Population... Chart I-5...And Real GDP Per##br## Total Population Still, some people pointed out that Japan's public indebtedness now equals 210% of its GDP, up from 120% at the start of the century. So a second question was whether Japan's impressive performance is entirely due to its fiscal largesse. The answer is, not exactly. What matters is the change in total indebtedness - public plus private. As a share of GDP, public indebtedness is up by 90% but private indebtedness is down by 40%. So total indebtedness is up by 50% of GDP, considerably less than the increases elsewhere in the developed world. For example, over the same period, the U.K.'s total indebtedness is up by 100% of GDP. Moreover, even the level of Japan's total indebtedness as a share of GDP - at 370% - is not that different to other major economies. In Belgium, it is 340%; in France it is 305%; in Canada it is approaching 300% (Charts I-6-Chart I-17). Chart I-6Japan: Total Debt Up From 315% ##br##To 370% Of GDP Chart I-7U.S.: Total Debt Up From 185% ##br##To 250% Of GDP Chart I-8Canada: Total Debt Up From 225%##br## To 290% Of GDP Chart I-9Australia: Total Debt Up From 150% ##br##To 235% Of GDP Chart I-10U.K.: Total Debt Up From 180%##br## To 280% Of GDP Chart I-11Switzerland: Total Debt Up From 245%##br## To 270% Of GDP Chart I-12Germany: Total Debt Down From 185%##br## To 180% Of GDP Chart I-13France: Total Debt Up From 190%##br## To 305% Of GDP Chart I-14Italy: Total Debt Up From 195%##br## To 265% Of GDP Chart I-15Spain: Total Debt Up From 165% ##br##To 270% Of GDP Chart I-16Belgium: Total Debt Up From 260% ##br## To 340% Of GDP Chart I-17Sweden: Total Debt Up From 210% ##br##To 275% Of GDP Public Sector Leveraging Must Counterbalance Private Sector Deleveraging People who take on debt tend to be young, while those who pay down debt tend to be older. As population pyramids in developed economies shift to older cohorts, there are fewer people who wish to take on debt and more people who wish to pay it down. Specifically, the 50-70 age cohort tends to use pre-retirement income and retirement lump-sum payments to extinguish any outstanding mortgage debts. Consider an older person with an income of €1000 who wishes to pay down €100 of debt. It follows that the person will spend €900. Ordinarily, the banking sector will then reallocate the paid-down €100 to, say, a younger person who wants to borrow it. When the borrower spends the €100, aggregate expenditure totals €1000, which equals the original income. And all is well and good. However, in a world where there is an excess of people who wish to pay down debt versus those that wish to borrow, it might not be possible to reallocate the paid-down €100 to a new borrower in the private sector, even with interest rates at ultra-low levels. In this case, the only way to prevent a contraction in expenditure - a recession - is if the government steps in to borrow and spend the aforementioned €100 to keep the economy's expenditures at €1000. Moreover, because the private sector is paying down debt, what seems to be fiscal largesse does not lead to crowding out, inflation, or surging interest rates. The above illustration describes the structural situation in many developed economies at the moment. And it explains why we should not look at the evolution of indebtedness in the public sector and the private sector separately, but rather in combination. This is another important Japanese lesson for Europeans. A final observation is that if the private sector is deleveraging, private indebtedness as a share of GDP tends to drift lower. This necessarily means that banks total assets' are growing slower than overall sales in the economy. As banks' asset growth is their main driver of long-term profit growth, it also means that banks struggle to outperform the market on a sustained basis. This has been the experience in Japan since 1990 and in the euro area since 2008 (Chart I-18). Chart I-18When The Private Sector Pays Down Debt, Banks Structurally Underperform With private indebtedness declining as a share of GDP in many major economies, we conclude that banks are not a sector to buy and hold for the long term, but rather a sector to own for periodic cyclical rallies. We anticipate the next such cyclical opportunity will arise later this year. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 From Yanis Varoufakis's 2018 Rose Shakespeare Lecture. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Japanese Lessons For Europeans" April 5, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* It was a mixed week for our trades. Long USD/ZAR is approaching the end of its 3 month maximum holding period comfortably in profit. Against this, the recent intense volatility in the metals market closed the pair-trade long lead/short nickel at its stop-loss. We are not initiating any new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-19 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Highlights Slower nominal GDP growth explains virtually all of the increase in China's debt-to-GDP ratio over the past ten years. The authorities were unwilling to restrain debt growth as it became obvious that nominal income was decelerating because this would have only exacerbated the economic downturn. Excess private-sector savings forced the Chinese government to rely on debt-financed investment by state-owned companies (SOE) and local governments in order to keep aggregate demand elevated. Financial deregulation also encouraged debt accumulation. Debt growth linked to speculative activity can be curbed without endangering the economy, but a lasting solution to the surplus savings problem will require consumers to spend more. This will take a while. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of SOE and local government debt onto its own balance sheet. The risk to investors is that this "debt nationalization" happens reactively rather than proactively. Feature If there are too many pro-cyclical factors in the economy, cyclical fluctuations are magnified and there is excessive optimism during the period, accumulating contradictions that could lead to the so-called Minsky Moment. - Zhou Xiaochuan, Former Governor of the People's Bank of China, October 19, 2017 The Calm Before The Storm? Stability begets instability. That is the nature of business cycles, Hyman Minsky famously argued. Rising confidence leads to excessive risk-taking, higher asset prices, and mounting economic imbalances. Eventually the mood sours. Like Wile E. Coyote running off a cliff, investors look down and see that there is nothing but thin air between them and the ground below. Panic ensues. Is China on the verge of its own Minsky Moment? A glance at the evolution of its debt-to-GDP ratio would certainly say so. But before running towards the exit door, consider the following: People have been fretting about spiraling Japanese government debt levels for over twenty years now. And yet, interest rates remain at rock-bottom levels in Japan. China's Savings Glut In many respects, China finds itself facing similar problems to those that have haunted Japan. The simultaneous bust in equity and real estate prices in 1990 sent Japan's private sector into a prolonged deleveraging cycle (Chart 1). In order to prop up demand, the Japanese government was forced to run large budget deficits. In effect, the government had to absorb the excess savings of the private sector with its own dissavings. The abundance of domestic private-sector savings forestalled a financial crisis, but it also led to today's gross government debt-to-GDP ratio of 240%. Like Japan, China suffers from a dearth of spending, or equivalently, an abundance of savings. The IMF estimates that Chinese gross national savings reached 46% of GDP in 2017. While this is down from a peak of 52% of GDP in 2008, it is still abnormally high for any major economy, even by emerging market standards (Chart 2). Chart 1 Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Chart 2China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards By definition, whatever a country saves must either be invested domestically or channeled abroad via a current account surplus. China's savings rate has edged lower over the past ten years, but its current account surplus has dropped even more, falling from nearly 10% of GDP in 2007 to 1.4% of GDP at present. As a result, investment as a share of GDP has actually risen to 44%, a three-point increase since 2007 (Chart 3). The decline in China's current account surplus was inevitable (Chart 4). In 2007, China accounted for 6% of global GDP in dollar terms. Today it accounts for 15%. Having a massively undervalued currency, as China had in 2007, is just not politically tenable anymore, especially with Donald Trump in the White House. Simply put, China has become too big to continue exporting its way out of its problems. Chart 3Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Chart 4Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Debt As The Conduit Between Savings And Investment How does a country transform savings into investment? In an economy like China where the stock market at times appears to be little more than a casino, the answer is that credit markets must play the dominant role. Households or firms with surplus savings park their funds in banks or other financial institutions. These institutions channel the savings to willing borrowers. Debt ends up being the natural byproduct of surplus savings. China is still a relatively poor country with a lot of catch-up potential. Capital-per-worker is a fraction of what it is among advanced economies (Chart 5). Even with its bleak demographics, China would need to grow by around 6% per year over the next few years just to converge with South Korea in output-per-worker by 2050 (Chart 6). All this means that China needs to invest more than most other economies, which is only possible if it saves more than other economies. Chart 5China Has More Catching Up To Do (1) Chart 6China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) Unfortunately, one can have too much of a good thing. The fact that China's capital stock-to-output ratio has risen dramatically in recent years means that the economy is already investing too much. And the optimal amount of investment will only fall over time as potential GDP growth continues to decelerate. Unless savings come down, China will find itself increasingly awash in excess capacity. Chart 7If Only GDP Growth Did Not ##br## Decelerate Over The Past Ten Years Slower trend growth will also make deleveraging more difficult to achieve. The overall stock of nonfinancial debt grew at an annualized rate of 18.8% between 2008 and 2017. Notably, this growth rate was not much higher than the one of 16.5% between 2003 and 2007 - a period when the debt-to-GDP ratio was broadly stable. The main difference between the two periods lies in the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio, not in the numerator: Nominal GDP expanded at an annualized rate of 11.2% between 2008 and 2017, a sizable retreat from the pace of 18.4% between 2003 and 2007. Chart 7 shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio today would be virtually identical to its end-2007 level had nominal GDP continued to grow at its 2003-2007 pace over the past ten years. Financial Deregulation Has Exacerbated The Debt Problem The Chinese government's reluctance to crack down on credit growth was motivated by the desire to support aggregate demand. However, in turning a blind eye to what was happening in credit markets, a lot of debt was generated that was not directly tied to the intermediation of savings into investment. Chart 8Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt can be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of goods or services. Debt can also be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of pre-existing assets. Crucially, while the former typically requires additional "savings" (i.e., someone needs to reduce their spending relative to their income), the latter does not.1 Granted, savings can still play an indirect role in facilitating debt-financed asset purchases. Financial assets are typically backed by something of value. A mortgage is backed by a piece of property. A corporate bond is backed by both the tangible and intangible capital that a firm possesses. The more a country has been able to save over time, the larger its capital stock will be. China, of course, has been saving like crazy for years. It is thus no surprise that its debt-to-GDP ratio has soared as its capital stock has expanded (Chart 8). Financial deregulation in China has allowed a large share of its capital stock to repeatedly shift hands. Debt has often been created in the process. The problem is that debt-financed asset purchases drive up asset prices, sometimes to unsustainable levels. And the higher the price of the asset, the greater the risk that it will not yield enough income to cover the borrowing costs. When asset prices are rising, borrowers and lenders are apt to disregard this risk, figuring that they can always sell the asset at a high enough price to pay back the loan. But once prices start falling, reality sets in very quickly. Stability begets instability. Consumers Need To Step Up The authorities are keenly aware of the risks discussed above. This is the key reason why they are clamping down on the shadow banking system, which has increasingly become the main source of speculative lending in China. We expect the pressure on shadow banks to persist in 2018. This will continue to weigh on credit growth. The more vexing challenge is how to reduce excessive household savings. The government's current strategy of cramming down the capital stock by taking out excess capacity from sectors such as steel, coal, and solar may be better than nothing, but it still pales in comparison to a strategy of encouraging consumer spending. Higher consumer spending would obviate the need for state-owned companies and local governments to keep people employed in make-work projects. The good news is that there are plenty of ways that China can boost household consumption. Government spending on education, health care, and pensions as a share of GDP is close to half of the OECD average (Chart 9). Increasing social transfer payments would give households the wherewithal to spend more. Unlike in most countries, the poor in China are net savers (Chart 10). Expanding the social safety net would discourage precautionary savings. Chart 9Chinese Social Welfare Spending ##br##Is Lagging The OECD Average Chart 10Low Income Households Are Net ##br##Savers In China The Chinese income tax structure is fairly regressive. Poor households face an effective income tax rate exceeding 40%. This is well above OECD norms (Chart 11).2 A more progressive tax system would boost spending among poorer households. It would also curb inequality, which has increased sharply over the past few decades (Chart 12). The saving rate among the richest 10% of Chinese earners is close to 50%. Policies that shift income from the rich to the poor would reduce overall household savings. Chart 11High Tax Burden For ##br##Low Income Households In China Chart 12Shifting Income To Poorer Households Would Reduce ##br##China's Household Savings Rate Debt Nationalization Is Inevitable Chart 13Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking,##br## And China Is No Exception Realistically, reforms aimed at encouraging consumption will take a while to implement. In the meantime, debt levels are likely to keep rising. Much of China's debt burden remains on the books of state-owned companies and local governments. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of this debt onto its own balance sheet. This would ease concerns about a mass wave of defaults. The key question for investors is whether this de facto "debt nationalization" is done proactively or reactively in response to a crisis. If the latter occurs, investors should steer clear of Chinese assets, as well as China-related plays such as commodities and commodity currencies. If the former pans out, global risk assets could rally. While the truth will fall somewhere between those two extremes, our bet is that the proactive view will prove closer to the mark, at least relative to market expectations (keep in mind that Chinese banks are trading below book value, so a lot of bad news has already been priced in). The Chinese authorities talk a lot about the importance of reducing moral hazard, but in practice, they have shown very little tolerance for defaults. Just as they did in the early 2000s, government leaders could commission state-owned asset management companies to purchase distressed debt from banks and other lenders at inflated prices. Chinese financials, which are nearly 70% of the H-share index, will benefit. Will investors balk at the prospect of the Chinese government blowing out the budget deficit in order to rescue insolvent borrowers? There might be some short-term panic, but as has been the case with Japan, as long as there are plenty of excess domestic savings to go around, the risk of a debt crisis will remain minimal. Indeed, the issuance of more government debt would help alleviate what has become a critical problem for Chinese savers: The lack of safe, liquid domestic assets available for purchase. What is true, from a longer-term perspective, is that the combination of higher debt and slower growth will eventually create a strong incentive for the Chinese government to inflate away debt. As in many other countries, China's "support ratio" -- broadly defined as the ratio of workers-to-consumers -- has peaked (Chart 13). As the growth of output and income falls behind consumption growth, China's savings glut will become a thing of the past. Rather than raising rates, the PBOC will just let the economy overheat. Such a day of reckoning is probably still at least five years away, but eventually inflation will return to China. Concluding Thoughts On The Current Market Environment A true "Minsky moment" in China - one where the financial sector seizes up due to spiraling fears of bankruptcies and defaults - is not in the cards. Nevertheless, China's economy is slowing, and growth is likely to decelerate further over the next few quarters as the authorities restrain credit growth and the property market continues to cool. The slowdown in Chinese growth is occurring at the same time as the economic data has been deteriorating around the world. The equity component of our MacroQuant model - which is highly sensitive to changes in the direction of growth - has been in bearish territory for two straight months (Chart 14). Our base case remains that global growth will stabilize over the next few months at an above-trend pace. Global bond yields are still near record-low levels and fiscal policy is moving in a more stimulative direction (Chart 15). It would be odd for the global economy to deteriorate sharply in such an environment. Chart 14MacroQuant Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted Trade protectionism is an obvious risk to this sanguine cyclical view. BCA has long argued that globalization is under threat from the combination of rising populism and the end of America's role as the world's sole superpower. However, the retreat from globalization will occur in fits and starts. Just as investors were overly complacent about protectionism a few months ago, they have become overly alarmist now. Both the U.S. and China have a strong incentive to reach a mutually-satisfying agreement over trade. President Trump has been able to shrug off the decline in equities because his approval rating has actually risen during the selloff (Chart 16). However, if the problems on Wall Street begin to show up on Main Street - as is likely to happen if stocks continue to fall - Trump will change his tune. Chart 15Global Economy Buttressed By ##br##Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Chart 16Trump's Approval Rating Has ##br##Actually Risen During Equity Selloff For its part, the Chinese government is also looking to strike a deal. The U.S. exported only $131 billion in goods to China last year. This is already less than the $150 billion in Chinese goods that Trump has targeted for tariffs. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. Bottom Line: The near-term picture for global equities and other risk assets is murky, but the 12-month cyclical outlook is still reasonably upbeat. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 For instance, if someone buys stock on margin or takes out a second mortgage on their house, new debt is created without anyone having to cut back on spending. In the context of China, imagine a financial institution which funds the purchase of a building by issuing a certificate of deposit or by selling a "wealth management" product. Both the asset and liability side of the financial institution's balance sheet go up (i.e., new debt is created). Suppose further that the company that sold the building puts the proceeds into a certificate of deposit or wealth management product. The entire transaction is self-financing. The example above illustrates that debt can go up in some situations even if everyone's spending habits remain the same. The need to intermediate savings is one source of debt growth, but it does not have to be the only one. 2 Please see "People's Republic Of China: Selected Issues," IMF Country Report, dated August 15, 2017.
Special Report Highlights Slower nominal GDP growth explains virtually all of the increase in China's debt-to-GDP ratio over the past ten years. The authorities were unwilling to restrain debt growth as it became obvious that nominal income was decelerating because this would have only exacerbated the economic downturn. Excess private-sector savings forced the Chinese government to rely on debt-financed investment by state-owned companies (SOE) and local governments in order to keep aggregate demand elevated. Financial deregulation also encouraged debt accumulation. Debt growth linked to speculative activity can be curbed without endangering the economy, but a lasting solution to the surplus savings problem will require consumers to spend more. This will take a while. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of SOE and local government debt onto its own balance sheet. The risk to investors is that this "debt nationalization" happens reactively rather than proactively. Feature If there are too many pro-cyclical factors in the economy, cyclical fluctuations are magnified and there is excessive optimism during the period, accumulating contradictions that could lead to the so-called Minsky Moment. - Zhou Xiaochuan, Former Governor of the People's Bank of China, October 19, 2017 The Calm Before The Storm? Stability begets instability. That is the nature of business cycles, Hyman Minsky famously argued. Rising confidence leads to excessive risk-taking, higher asset prices, and mounting economic imbalances. Eventually the mood sours. Like Wile E. Coyote running off a cliff, investors look down and see that there is nothing but thin air between them and the ground below. Panic ensues. Is China on the verge of its own Minsky Moment? A glance at the evolution of its debt-to-GDP ratio would certainly say so. But before running towards the exit door, consider the following: People have been fretting about spiraling Japanese government debt levels for over twenty years now. And yet, interest rates remain at rock-bottom levels in Japan. China's Savings Glut In many respects, China finds itself facing similar problems to those that have haunted Japan. The simultaneous bust in equity and real estate prices in 1990 sent Japan's private sector into a prolonged deleveraging cycle (Chart 1). In order to prop up demand, the Japanese government was forced to run large budget deficits. In effect, the government had to absorb the excess savings of the private sector with its own dissavings. The abundance of domestic private-sector savings forestalled a financial crisis, but it also led to today's gross government debt-to-GDP ratio of 240%. Like Japan, China suffers from a dearth of spending, or equivalently, an abundance of savings. The IMF estimates that Chinese gross national savings reached 46% of GDP in 2017. While this is down from a peak of 52% of GDP in 2008, it is still abnormally high for any major economy, even by emerging market standards (Chart 2). Chart 1 Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Chart 2China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards By definition, whatever a country saves must either be invested domestically or channeled abroad via a current account surplus. China's savings rate has edged lower over the past ten years, but its current account surplus has dropped even more, falling from nearly 10% of GDP in 2007 to 1.4% of GDP at present. As a result, investment as a share of GDP has actually risen to 44%, a three-point increase since 2007 (Chart 3). The decline in China's current account surplus was inevitable (Chart 4). In 2007, China accounted for 6% of global GDP in dollar terms. Today it accounts for 15%. Having a massively undervalued currency, as China had in 2007, is just not politically tenable anymore, especially with Donald Trump in the White House. Simply put, China has become too big to continue exporting its way out of its problems. Chart 3Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Chart 4Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Debt As The Conduit Between Savings And Investment How does a country transform savings into investment? In an economy like China where the stock market at times appears to be little more than a casino, the answer is that credit markets must play the dominant role. Households or firms with surplus savings park their funds in banks or other financial institutions. These institutions channel the savings to willing borrowers. Debt ends up being the natural byproduct of surplus savings. China is still a relatively poor country with a lot of catch-up potential. Capital-per-worker is a fraction of what it is among advanced economies (Chart 5). Even with its bleak demographics, China would need to grow by around 6% per year over the next few years just to converge with South Korea in output-per-worker by 2050 (Chart 6). All this means that China needs to invest more than most other economies, which is only possible if it saves more than other economies. Chart 5China Has More Catching Up To Do (1) Chart 6China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) Unfortunately, one can have too much of a good thing. The fact that China's capital stock-to-output ratio has risen dramatically in recent years means that the economy is already investing too much. And the optimal amount of investment will only fall over time as potential GDP growth continues to decelerate. Unless savings come down, China will find itself increasingly awash in excess capacity. Chart 7If Only GDP Growth Did Not ##br## Decelerate Over The Past Ten Years Slower trend growth will also make deleveraging more difficult to achieve. The overall stock of nonfinancial debt grew at an annualized rate of 18.8% between 2008 and 2017. Notably, this growth rate was not much higher than the one of 16.5% between 2003 and 2007 - a period when the debt-to-GDP ratio was broadly stable. The main difference between the two periods lies in the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio, not in the numerator: Nominal GDP expanded at an annualized rate of 11.2% between 2008 and 2017, a sizable retreat from the pace of 18.4% between 2003 and 2007. Chart 7 shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio today would be virtually identical to its end-2007 level had nominal GDP continued to grow at its 2003-2007 pace over the past ten years. Financial Deregulation Has Exacerbated The Debt Problem The Chinese government's reluctance to crack down on credit growth was motivated by the desire to support aggregate demand. However, in turning a blind eye to what was happening in credit markets, a lot of debt was generated that was not directly tied to the intermediation of savings into investment. Chart 8Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt can be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of goods or services. Debt can also be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of pre-existing assets. Crucially, while the former typically requires additional "savings" (i.e., someone needs to reduce their spending relative to their income), the latter does not.1 Granted, savings can still play an indirect role in facilitating debt-financed asset purchases. Financial assets are typically backed by something of value. A mortgage is backed by a piece of property. A corporate bond is backed by both the tangible and intangible capital that a firm possesses. The more a country has been able to save over time, the larger its capital stock will be. China, of course, has been saving like crazy for years. It is thus no surprise that its debt-to-GDP ratio has soared as its capital stock has expanded (Chart 8). Financial deregulation in China has allowed a large share of its capital stock to repeatedly shift hands. Debt has often been created in the process. The problem is that debt-financed asset purchases drive up asset prices, sometimes to unsustainable levels. And the higher the price of the asset, the greater the risk that it will not yield enough income to cover the borrowing costs. When asset prices are rising, borrowers and lenders are apt to disregard this risk, figuring that they can always sell the asset at a high enough price to pay back the loan. But once prices start falling, reality sets in very quickly. Stability begets instability. Consumers Need To Step Up The authorities are keenly aware of the risks discussed above. This is the key reason why they are clamping down on the shadow banking system, which has increasingly become the main source of speculative lending in China. We expect the pressure on shadow banks to persist in 2018. This will continue to weigh on credit growth. The more vexing challenge is how to reduce excessive household savings. The government's current strategy of cramming down the capital stock by taking out excess capacity from sectors such as steel, coal, and solar may be better than nothing, but it still pales in comparison to a strategy of encouraging consumer spending. Higher consumer spending would obviate the need for state-owned companies and local governments to keep people employed in make-work projects. The good news is that there are plenty of ways that China can boost household consumption. Government spending on education, health care, and pensions as a share of GDP is close to half of the OECD average (Chart 9). Increasing social transfer payments would give households the wherewithal to spend more. Unlike in most countries, the poor in China are net savers (Chart 10). Expanding the social safety net would discourage precautionary savings. Chart 9Chinese Social Welfare Spending ##br##Is Lagging The OECD Average Chart 10Low Income Households Are Net ##br##Savers In China The Chinese income tax structure is fairly regressive. Poor households face an effective income tax rate exceeding 40%. This is well above OECD norms (Chart 11).2 A more progressive tax system would boost spending among poorer households. It would also curb inequality, which has increased sharply over the past few decades (Chart 12). The saving rate among the richest 10% of Chinese earners is close to 50%. Policies that shift income from the rich to the poor would reduce overall household savings. Chart 11High Tax Burden For ##br##Low Income Households In China Chart 12Shifting Income To Poorer Households Would Reduce ##br##China's Household Savings Rate Debt Nationalization Is Inevitable Chart 13Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking,##br## And China Is No Exception Realistically, reforms aimed at encouraging consumption will take a while to implement. In the meantime, debt levels are likely to keep rising. Much of China's debt burden remains on the books of state-owned companies and local governments. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of this debt onto its own balance sheet. This would ease concerns about a mass wave of defaults. The key question for investors is whether this de facto "debt nationalization" is done proactively or reactively in response to a crisis. If the latter occurs, investors should steer clear of Chinese assets, as well as China-related plays such as commodities and commodity currencies. If the former pans out, global risk assets could rally. While the truth will fall somewhere between those two extremes, our bet is that the proactive view will prove closer to the mark, at least relative to market expectations (keep in mind that Chinese banks are trading below book value, so a lot of bad news has already been priced in). The Chinese authorities talk a lot about the importance of reducing moral hazard, but in practice, they have shown very little tolerance for defaults. Just as they did in the early 2000s, government leaders could commission state-owned asset management companies to purchase distressed debt from banks and other lenders at inflated prices. Chinese financials, which are nearly 70% of the H-share index, will benefit. Will investors balk at the prospect of the Chinese government blowing out the budget deficit in order to rescue insolvent borrowers? There might be some short-term panic, but as has been the case with Japan, as long as there are plenty of excess domestic savings to go around, the risk of a debt crisis will remain minimal. Indeed, the issuance of more government debt would help alleviate what has become a critical problem for Chinese savers: The lack of safe, liquid domestic assets available for purchase. What is true, from a longer-term perspective, is that the combination of higher debt and slower growth will eventually create a strong incentive for the Chinese government to inflate away debt. As in many other countries, China's "support ratio" -- broadly defined as the ratio of workers-to-consumers -- has peaked (Chart 13). As the growth of output and income falls behind consumption growth, China's savings glut will become a thing of the past. Rather than raising rates, the PBOC will just let the economy overheat. Such a day of reckoning is probably still at least five years away, but eventually inflation will return to China. Concluding Thoughts On The Current Market Environment A true "Minsky moment" in China - one where the financial sector seizes up due to spiraling fears of bankruptcies and defaults - is not in the cards. Nevertheless, China's economy is slowing, and growth is likely to decelerate further over the next few quarters as the authorities restrain credit growth and the property market continues to cool. The slowdown in Chinese growth is occurring at the same time as the economic data has been deteriorating around the world. The equity component of our MacroQuant model - which is highly sensitive to changes in the direction of growth - has been in bearish territory for two straight months (Chart 14). Our base case remains that global growth will stabilize over the next few months at an above-trend pace. Global bond yields are still near record-low levels and fiscal policy is moving in a more stimulative direction (Chart 15). It would be odd for the global economy to deteriorate sharply in such an environment. Chart 14MacroQuant Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted Trade protectionism is an obvious risk to this sanguine cyclical view. BCA has long argued that globalization is under threat from the combination of rising populism and the end of America's role as the world's sole superpower. However, the retreat from globalization will occur in fits and starts. Just as investors were overly complacent about protectionism a few months ago, they have become overly alarmist now. Both the U.S. and China have a strong incentive to reach a mutually-satisfying agreement over trade. President Trump has been able to shrug off the decline in equities because his approval rating has actually risen during the selloff (Chart 16). However, if the problems on Wall Street begin to show up on Main Street - as is likely to happen if stocks continue to fall - Trump will change his tune. Chart 15Global Economy Buttressed By ##br##Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Chart 16Trump's Approval Rating Has ##br##Actually Risen During Equity Selloff For its part, the Chinese government is also looking to strike a deal. The U.S. exported only $131 billion in goods to China last year. This is already less than the $150 billion in Chinese goods that Trump has targeted for tariffs. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. Bottom Line: The near-term picture for global equities and other risk assets is murky, but the 12-month cyclical outlook is still reasonably upbeat. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 For instance, if someone buys stock on margin or takes out a second mortgage on their house, new debt is created without anyone having to cut back on spending. In the context of China, imagine a financial institution which funds the purchase of a building by issuing a certificate of deposit or by selling a "wealth management" product. Both the asset and liability side of the financial institution's balance sheet go up (i.e., new debt is created). Suppose further that the company that sold the building puts the proceeds into a certificate of deposit or wealth management product. The entire transaction is self-financing. The example above illustrates that debt can go up in some situations even if everyone's spending habits remain the same. The need to intermediate savings is one source of debt growth, but it does not have to be the only one. 2 Please see "People's Republic Of China: Selected Issues," IMF Country Report, dated August 15, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Trade wars have captured investors' imaginations, but slowing global growth is a more immediate risk for both asset prices and exchange rates. As reflationary forces ebb, slow global growth will help the dollar stage a rally. EUR/USD and GBP/USD could decline over the next two quarters. We are selling EUR/CHF. The AUD has more downside. It is too early to close short AUD/NZD or AUD/JPY. Short EUR/CAD with a first target at 1.44. Feature The growing trade skirmish between China and the U.S. has been blamed for much of the movements in risk assets this year. We do not deny that this has been a very important factor determining the price action of all assets globally; after all, market participants are trying to price in the probability that global supply chains as we currently know them will be forever impaired. If this were to happen, global growth and profits would suffer considerably. This warrants a risk premium, one that is currently being estimated by the market.1 As we have written in recent weeks, this will be a stop-and-go pattern, and behind-the-scene negotiations between China and the U.S. will remain intense until June, when the U.S. tariffs are in fact implemented. However, trade wars are not the only force impacting asset returns today. Global asset prices are also slowly adjusting to a world where reflation is ebbing and where growth may be dipping from its heightened state. This week, we examine the role of liquidity and how it is affecting growth,2 and the implications for various currency pairs. From Reflation To Less Growth Through most of 2016 and 2017, risk assets, EM plays, commodity prices and growth greatly benefited from a wave of global reflation implemented by monetary and fiscal authorities around the world in the wake of a market meltdown that culminated in January 2016. A great victim of this reflationary effort was the U.S. dollar. Once global growth and inflation perked up, the dollar sold off. The U.S. economy is not as levered to global growth as the rest of the world is, thus investors were attracted by greater shift in expected returns outside the U.S. than in the U.S. But how is this reflation story faring today? Global monetary policy is not as supportive as it once was as central banks are not adding to global base money as forcefully as before. For example, the Federal Reserve has begun the rundown of its balance sheet, and the real fed funds rate is closing in on the Laubach-Williams estimate of the neutral rate; the European Central Bank has begun tapering it asset purchases, the European shadow policy rate has increased by 400 basis points; and the Bank of Japan has not hit its JGB target of JPY80 trillion of purchases since mid-2016. Even the Swiss National Bank has not seen any increase in its sight deposits since mid-2017. We like to use excess money growth to measure the impact of these changes in base money growth. Excess money supply growth is measured as the difference between broad money supply growth and money demand as approximated by loan growth. As base money and deposits become scarcer in the banking system relative to the pool of existing loans, the liquidity position of commercial banks deteriorates. This deprives them of the necessary fuel to generate further loan growth down the road. Chart I-1 not only shows that excess money in the U.S., euro area and Japan has been decelerating sharply in recent months, but also that this decline points toward slowing global industrial activity, widening junk spreads and decline EM stock prices. Beyond quantity-based measures of liquidity, price-based measures are sending a similar signal. The widening in the LIBOR-OIS spread has now been well documented. It is true that technical factors such as the issuance of T-bills by the Treasury and the progressive move away from LIBOR as a key benchmark for the pricing of loans partly explain this phenomenon. However, this development is now spreading outside the U.S., with Australia in particular experiencing some especially sharp widening in the spread between deposit rates and the OIS. In fact, the LIBOR-OIS spread for the G-10 as a whole is now at its widest since 2012 (Chart I-2). This also portends a situation where liquidity is becoming scarcer than it once was. Chart I-1Deteriorating Liquidity Conditions Chart I-2Price Of Liquidity Is Increasing Growth is responding to these dynamics, and the softening in PMIs around the world was in full display this week. Interestingly, two bellwethers of global growth are showing especially clear signs of a slowing.3 In Korea, exports have greatly decelerated, industrial production is contracting and PMIs are well below 50 (Chart I-3). Taiwan is also showing some signs of weakness, as exports and export orders are both slowing sharply (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Korea: A Key Global Bellweather Is Slowing Chart I-4Taiwan Echoes Korea's Message This message is also being relayed by the Japanese economy. Japan's exports to Asia have been slowing sharply as well. As Chart I-5 illustrates, weak Japanese shipments to Asia correlate closely with a weak AUD/JPY, weak EM stock prices and widening junk spreads, suggesting that these specific shipments capture systematic developments behind global growth. Key growth-sensitive currencies are flashing a similar signal. As the top panel of Chart I-6 shows, NZD/JPY has historically rolled over and declined ahead of recessions, growth slowdowns or EM crashes. It has clearly weakened for eight months now. Meanwhile, the bottom panel of Chart I-6 shows the Swedish krona versus the euro. This cross is also a good leading indicator of global growth, and it is clearly pointing south. Chart I-5Japanese Exports Point To A Malaise Chart I-6NZD/JPY And EUR/SEK: Confirming The Risks Finally, one of our favorite gauges to measure the impact of reflation has substantially weakened: the combination of global growth and inflation surprises. This indicator clearly shows that after a massive upsurge in reflationary forces over the past two years, reflation is now waning (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Economic Surprises Are Declining If reflation is about pushing growth and prices upward, removing stimulus could have the opposite impact. While it is clear that global growth is slowing, what about inflation? We do not think that global inflation is set to slow significantly: global growth is unlikely to move back below trend, and the U.S. is experiencing increasingly potent domestic inflationary pressures supercharged by fiscal profligacy. That being said, the uptrend in global inflation is nonetheless set to flatten for now as our Global Inflation Diffusion Index based on consumer and producer prices across 27 economies has begun to fall, which normally points to lower global headline and core consumer prices (Chart I-8). Bottom Line: The market's attention has been captured by the dramatic flare-up in trade tensions between the U.S. and China, but a more imminent risk has been garnering less press: the decline of reflation. China sent the first salvo on this front; DM central banks have also slowly been either tightening outright or not expanding monetary aggregates as aggressively as before. As a result, global liquidity is tightening and global growth is slowing. Global inflation is also set to decelerate as well, suggesting the decline in economic activity will not be a real phenomenon only, but a nominal one as well. Key Currency Market Implications One of the key implications of lower global growth and ebbing inflationary pressures is likely to be a stronger dollar. As Chart I-9 illustrates, when our Global Inflation Diffusion Index declines and global inflationary pressures ebb, the dollar tends to strengthen. This makes sense: the dollar does best when global growth weakens, inflation slows and commodity prices soften. This time around, the case for a few quarters of dollar strength may be even better defined. U.S. inflation is unlikely to decelerate as much as non-U.S. inflation as U.S. capacity utilization is tighter, the U.S. labor market is at full employment and America is receiving an extraordinarily large amount of fiscal stimulus at this late stage of the business cycle. Chart I-8No Acceleration For Now In Global Inflation Chart I-9Ebbing Inflationary Pressures Will Help The Dollar Technical considerations suggest the dollar is well placed to take advantage of these dynamics. On a short-term basis, both our intermediate-term oscillator and 13-week rate-of-change measures have formed positive divergences with the DXY itself (Chart I-10). While the pattern does not look as bullish as the one registered in 2014, it evokes deep similarities with the 2011 formation. On a longer-term basis, the dollar is massively oversold, as measured by the 52-week rate of change measure. It is true that it managed to stay at similarly oversold levels for nearly a year in 2003, but back then the dollar was much more expensive than today: the U.S. current account deficit was 4.4% of GDP versus 2.4% today and the basic balance of payments deficit was at 3% of GDP versus 2% today (Chart I-11). It is reasonable that with these stronger fundamentals, the dollar will not need to hit as oversold levels as back then before staging a significant rebound. Chart I-10Positive Divergences For The Greenback Chart I-11Dollar Technicals And Valuations: 2003 Vs. Today With global growth slowing, especially in Asia, it is easy to paint a picture where the dollar only strengthens against EM and commodity currencies - the currencies most exposed to both global growth and this specific geographic area. However, while we do see downside in USD/JPY, we expect the greenback to rally against the euro toward EUR/USD 1.15. Our model for EUR/USD shows that the euro is trading 10% above its fair value determined by real rate differentials, the relative slope of yield curves and the price of copper relative to lumber (Chart I-12). In fact, since Europe is more levered to global economic activity than the U.S., these drivers are likely to deteriorate a bit further for the remainder of 2018. Chart I-12EUR/USD Is Vulnerable GBP/USD also looks set to experience a period of weakness against the greenback. Historically, GBP/USD and EUR/USD have been correlated. This is a simple reflection of the fact that the U.K. has a deeper economic relationship with the euro area than the U.S., and thus benefits from the same economic impulses as the eurozone. Chart I-13GBP/USD: ##br##Extremely Overbought Some pound-specific factors will also play against GBP/USD. As we argued last week, the British domestic economy is rather weak; this week's construction PMI confirmed this assessment.4 Additionally, the British basic balance of payments is in deficit anew. This is not only a reflection of the U.K.'s current account deficit of 4% of GDP, it also reflects the fact that FDI into the U.K. has been melting in response to uncertainty surrounding Brexit. This means the U.K. is dependent upon global liquidity to finance this large deficit. An environment where global growth is set to decelerate and where global liquidity is tightening will make it more expensive to finance this large hole. The fastest means to increase expected returns on British assets to attract foreigners' funds is to depreciate the pound today. Finally, the GBP's annual momentum has hit levels consistent with a reversal in cable (Chart I-13). Staying in Europe, another pair is currently interesting and devoid of taking on any USD risk: EUR/CHF. While we think EUR/CHF has more upside over the remainder of the economic cycle,5 this is unlikely to be the case in the second and third quarters of 2018. The Swiss franc tends to outperform the euro when reflationary forces retreat, when global growth slows and when FX volatility increases - all views we espouse for the coming quarters. Moreover, Switzerland's current account and basic balance-of-payment surpluses are 6.5% of GDP and 11.5% of GDP greater than that of the euro area, providing further attraction in a growth soft spot. Finally, EUR/CHF is massively overbought right now, pointing to heightened vulnerability to the economic risks highlighted above (Chart I-14). We are opening a short EUR/CHF trade this week. In the same vein, we remain bearish EUR/JPY. Finally, in previous reports, we highlighted the AUD as being the currency most at risk from any downshift in global growth.6 Despite its recent weakness, we think the AUD is likely to remain very vulnerable. We have been short AUD/NZD since last October, and we do believe this pair will retest 1.04 before forming a base. Australia is experiencing even less inflationary pressures than New Zealand, and is more exposed to slower global industrial production than its neighbor. Technically, AUD/NZD still has some downside. As Chart I-15 illustrates, the 13-week rate of change measure for AUD/NZD has not yet hit the kind of depressed levels associated with complete capitulation. In fact, the recent breakdown in momentum points toward such capitulation as being imminent. AUD/JPY too is not yet oversold enough to be a buy, especially in the context of slowing global growth. Thus, we continue to recommend investors stay short this pair. Chart I-14Technical Indicators Confirm ##br##The Fundamental Vulnerability Of EUR/CHF Chart I-15AUD/NZD Has A Little Bit More Downside Bottom Line: Ebbing reflationary forces suggest the trade-weighted dollar is likely to rally over the coming months. We do see upside for the USD against EM and commodity currencies, but against European currencies as well. Only the yen is anticipated to buck this trend. Within the commodity-currency complex, we foresee that the AUD will suffer the most, and the CAD the least. Within the European currency complex, we are selling EUR/CHF. We are not selling EUR/USD as we are already long the DXY. A Cyclical Opportunity To Sell EUR/CAD This trade is an attractive means to bet on global growth slowing, especially relative to the U.S. As we have argued, U.S. financial conditions have eased relative to the rest of the world, the U.S. is enjoying large injections of fiscal stimulus and it is less exposed to declining global growth. As a result, we anticipate the outperformance of the U.S. ISM to continue relative to global PMIs. Historically, this is an environment where EUR/CAD tends to depreciate (Chart I-16). This is because while 75% of Canadian exports go to the U.S., only 13% of euro area exports end up there. Thus, Canada is much more exposed to the U.S. business cycle than Europe, who is exposed to the rest of the world's. Domestic factor also argues in favor of shorting EUR/CAD. Canadian core inflation is in an uptrend, and at 2% is at the Bank of Canada's target. European core inflation meanwhile only stands at 1%. Moreover, Canada's unemployment's rate is already 0.5% below equilibrium, while the euro area's is 0.4% above such equilibrium (Chart I-17). Thus, European wages and service sector inflation is likely to continue to lag behind Canada's. As a result, we continue to expect the BoC to keep hiking in line with the Fed, or another three times this year. The same cannot be said for the ECB. Chart I-16EUR/CAD: A Play Global Vs. U.S. Growth Chart I-17No Slack In Canada, Plenty In Europe Making the trade even more attractive, EUR/CAD is currently trading at a premium on many metrics. First, our augmented interest rate parity models show that the EUR/CAD trades anywhere between 10-15% above fair value (Chart I-18).7 Relative productivity trends have been a reliable long-term indicator of the path for EUR/CAD. On this metric as well, EUR/CAD is trading at a significant 9% premium (Chart I-19). Finally, EUR/CAD has tended to trend in an inverse relationship with oil prices. Today, it is well above levels implied by various oil prices (Chart I-20). Chart I-18EUR/CAD Trades At A Premium To Rate Differentials... Chart I-19...At A Premium To Relative Productivity... In our view, a key factor explains these discounts: Fears regarding the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement. An abandonment of NAFTA would hurt Canadian growth and prompt the BoC to be much more dovish than we anticipate. However, while there will be some small tweaks to NAFTA, the probability of a major overhaul that deeply affects the North American supply chain has declined, as Canada and Mexico are being exempted from steel and aluminum tariffs and as the White House has softened its stance on the U.S. content of Canadian auto exports back to the U.S. Our Geopolitical team assesses that the probability of a major NAFTA overhaul has declined from 50% to less than 20%, especially as Trump now has bigger fish to fry with China. As a result of these improvements in negotiations, EUR/CAD is potentially set to decline toward 1.44 over the rest of 2018, especially as our oil strategists continue to expect Brent prices to average US$74/bbl this year. Meanwhile, the ratio of copper prices to oil prices, which has been a decent early directional indicator for this cross, suggests the timing is ripe to bet against euro/CAD (Chart I-21), especially as slowing global growth will further weigh on copper relative to oil. Chart I-20...And A Premium To Oil Chart I-21Where Copper-To-Oil Goes, So Does EUR/CAD Bottom Line: An attractive means to bet on slowing global growth while benefiting from the impact of the U.S.'s fiscal stimulus is to short EUR/CAD. Not only is this cross a play on the differential between international and U.S. growth, it is also currently trading at a large premium on various metrics. Dissipating risks that NAFTA will be abrogated in a major way are providing an attractive cyclical entry point to short EUR/CAD, with an initial target of 1.44. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Analyst haarisa@bcaresearch.com 1 For more analysis on trade wars and the current China/U.S. spat, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Are Tariffs Good or Bad For The Dollar?" dated March 9, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com as well as the Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Demands On China", dated April 4, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 We have already gone over the role of China at length to explain the global growth slowdown. For detailed discussions on the topic, Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Return Of Macro Volatility", dated March 16, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 For more indicators pointing toward slower global growth, Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Canaries In the Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades", dated December 1, 2017 and "Canaries In the Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth", dated December 15, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Do not Get Flat-Footed By Politics", dated March 30, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The SNB Doesn't Want Switzerland To Become Japan", dated March 23, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop in Frankfurt", dated January 26, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 7 EUR/CAD trades 15% above a fair value model, that does not encapsulate the trend in the cross. If the recent cross is taken into account through a model that incorporates mean-reversion, EUR/CAD trades at a more modest 10% above its fair value. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: ISM Manufacturing came in slightly weaker than expected at 59.3; However, ISM Prices Paid was a very strong number, 78.1, up from the previous 74.2; Services PMI and Non-Manufacturing ISM also disappointed expectations; The trade balance in February fell to US$ -57.6 bn; Initial jobless claims, however, came in much higher than expected at 242,000. The dollar is now up more than 2% from its February lows. This has been driven by slowing global growth, particularly in Korean and Taiwanese trade data. The greenback should fare well in this environment. Report Links: Do Not Get Flat-Footed By Politics - March 30, 2018 Are Tariffs Good Or Bad For The Dollar? - March 9, 2018 The Dollar Deserves Some Real Appreciation - March 2, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 European data was mixed: German retail sales disappointed, growing at a 0.7% monthly pace and a 1.3% annual pace; German Manufacturing PMI came in slightly lower than expected at 58.2; European unemployment dropped to 8.5% as expected; Headline inflation improved to 1.4% also as expected, but core inflation came in weaker than expected at 1%. The euro is set to experience a period of correction as inflation in the Eurozone remains weak and global growth is slowing, as Asian economic data increasingly shows. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Housing starts yearly growth outperformed despite coming in at -2.6%. The Nikkei manufacturing PMI surprised on the strong side, coming in at 53.1 However, the Markit Services PMI underperformed expectations coming in at 50.9. USD/JPY has been relatively flat this week. Overall, we expect that the yen will continue to strengthen, given that the market will continue to be rattled by the increasing a weakening in global growth. This risk off environment should benefit the yen. However, given the slowdown in Japanese economic data, the BoJ will eventually have to intervene to make sure that the rise in the yen does not derail the economic recovery and particularly, its inflation objective. Report Links: The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now - February 16, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Markit Manufacturing PMI outperformed expectations, coming in at 55.1. It also increased slightly from last month's reading. However PMI construction underperformed expectations substantially, coming in at 47. This is the lowest level in more than 2 years. GBP/USD has been relatively flat this week. Overall the latest construction PMI number confirms our analysis: the uncertainty caused by Brexit is weighing heavily on Britain's housing market. This weakness in the housing sector, coupled with a strong pound, will likely limit how high British interest rates can go. Therefore GBP/USD has downside on a tactical basis. Report Links: Do Not Get Flat-Footed By Politics - March 30, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was weak: The RBA's Commodity Index in SDR terms contracted by 2.1% annually, much more than the expected 0.1% contraction; Building permits contracted on a monthly basis at a rate of 6.2%, while also contracting at a 3.1% pace in annual terms; However, retail sales did pick up in monthly terms at a rate of 0.6%. At the monetary policy meeting on Tuesday, Governor Philip Lowe referenced the increase in short-term funding costs that have spilled over from the U.S. into foreign markets owing to higher volatility, particularly in Australia. An escalation of a trade war will also prove to be very damaging for the Australian economy, which is a large export-based and commodity-dependent nation. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD/USD has been flat this week. Overall we expect this cross to weaken going forward, given that New Zealand is one of the most open economies in the G10, and thus, it stands to risks the most from both an increasing risk of trade wars and slowing global growth. Moreover, there are also some negative aspects of New Zealand on a more structural basis, as the neutral rate is set to be lowered. This is because the populist government is looking to lower immigration while also implementing a dual mandate for the central bank. All of these factors will cause the kiwi to suffer on a long term basis. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Data out of Canada was mixed: Manufacturing PMI came in line with expectations of 55.7; Exports and Imports for February came in at CAD 45.94 bn and CAD 48.63 bn, respectively, sinking the trade balance to CAD -2.69 bn. The CAD received a fillip on Tuesday as President Trump hopes to conclude preliminary negotiations for NAFTA by the end of next week. While the outcome for these negotiations remains uncertain, the Canadian economy is still in great shape, with a tight labor market, high wage growth and a closing output gap. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Headline inflation outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.8%. Real retail sales yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at -0.2%. However, the SVME PMI underperformed expectations, coming in at 60.3. EUR/CHF has been relatively flat this week. Overall, we expect EUR/CHF to have further upside on a long-term basis. The Swiss economy is still weak and inflationary pressures are tepid. This means that any further appreciation by the franc will weigh heavily on the SNB's goals. While for now EUR/CHF could suffer as global growth declines, the SNB will fight this trend in order for them to achieve their inflation target. Thus, any rally in the CHF will prove temporary. Report Links: The SNB Doesn't Want Switzerland To Become Japan - March 23, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has been relatively flat this week. Overall, the krone should outperform most other commodity currencies given that oil should perform better than the rest of the commodity complex in the current environment. While all commodities would be affected by a possible slowdown in global growth and Chinese industrial production, oil will probably hold up the best given that advanced economies consume a greater proportion of oil than they do of other commodities, making oil less sensitive to gyrations in global industrial activity than metals. Moreover, the supply backdrop for oil remains more favorable than that of other commodities thanks to OPEC and Russia's production restrains. All of these developments should help the NOK outperform currencies like the NZD and the AUD. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data was disappointing: Manufacturing PM came in at 55.9, below last month's 59.9; New Orders increased annually only by 1.3% compared to 8.7% in January; Industrial production contracted in monthly terms by 0.5%, and grew annually by 5.7%, but it was still a deceleration relative to the previous 7.7% reading. The SEK has been weakening because of three factors: the talk of trade wars, the slowdown in the global manufacturing sector, and Sweden's housing bubble. While these risks are very real, Sweden's favorable macro backdrop of a cheap currency, a high basic balance of payments surplus and an economy operating above capacity mean that inflation will pick up meaningfully. This will prompt the SEK to rally once global growth can find its floor. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Hong Kong's leverage burden is a corporate sector rather than a household sector problem. But this corporate sector debt is highly concentrated in the finance and real estate industries, meaning that investors should be legitimately concerned over Hong Kong's extremely elevated debt service ratio. Our BCA Hong Kong Debt Risk Monitor serves as an important tool to help investors gauge the risk of a serious credit-driven downturn in the region. While the risk from excessive leverage is real, the current message from our DRM is that the odds of a deleveraging event over the coming year are low. Due to the importation of U.S. monetary policy, Hong Kong may "enjoy" easy monetary policy on a permanent basis. This suggests that Hong Kong's private sector may continue to leverage itself even in the face of rising interest rates, setting up the potential for a cataclysmic future recession. Stay neutral Hong Kong stocks versus the global benchmark over the coming 6-12 months. While equities may rise in relative terms if earnings momentum converges with that of the global benchmark, it is not a sufficiently compelling prospect to outweigh the significant structural risk facing the region. Feature Hong Kong has appeared in the headlines of the financial press for two reasons over the past few months. The first is due to the recent weakness in the Hong Kong dollar (HKD), a topic that we addressed last week.1 The second was prompted by the BIS' March 2018 Quarterly Review, which noted that mainland China, Hong Kong, and Canada stood out among 26 jurisdictions as being the most vulnerable to a banking crisis according to their research. The BIS's warning is rooted in the fact that Hong Kong is a highly leveraged economy, but there are two additional reasons for investors to be cautious about the region: China's industrial sector is slowing, and monetary policy is tightening due to the region's direct link to U.S. interest rates. While Hong Kong has avoided the full brunt of rising U.S. rates over the past year thanks to plentiful interbank liquidity (which has limited the rise in 3-month HIBOR), we noted in last week's report that the weakness in the HKD likely means that gap between interbank rates and the base rate cannot get much wider. This means that further Fed rate hikes over the coming year are likely to feed more fully into tighter Hong Kong monetary conditions. In this report we review the extent and disposition of Hong Kong's indebtedness, and develop an indicator for investors to monitor in order to gauge the risk of a serious private sector deleveraging event. We conclude that while it is too early to position aggressively against Hong Kong stocks, the risk from excessive leverage is real and is very likely to eventually cause a serious credit-driven downturn. For now, however, that appears to be a story for another day, and as we explain below, potentially a distant one. Breaking Down Hong Kong's Debt Chart 1 presents the basis for concern about Hong Kong's debt. The chart shows the BIS' nonfinancial private sector debt service ratio ("DSR", which includes both households and nonfinancial corporations) for the G10 countries alongside that of China, Hong Kong, and Canada. The chart shows that Hong Kong's DSR has risen nearly to 26%, a full 10 percentage points higher than the G10 average, and is now the highest among the 32 economies that the BIS has debt service data for. One important point to note is that among the three countries that the BIS recently singled out for concern, the disposition of Hong Kong's private sector debt is more similar to that of China than Canada. Chart 2 highlights that the private sector debt in China and Hong Kong is predominantly owed by the nonfinancial corporate sector, whereas in Canada the debt is more equally split among the two sectors, with households owing more in total. Chart 1Hong Kong's Debt Burden Hits##br## A New High Chart 2Unlike In Canada, Hong Kong's Leverage##br## Is A Corporate Sector Problem Normally we would be inclined to suggest that the skew in Hong Kong's debt towards the corporate sector makes it less risky than in other jurisdictions where elevated leverage is a household sector problem. The rationale is that while corporations can (and often do) misallocate their capital, firm borrowing is usually employed to acquire income-producing assets, with problems arising only when the value of those assets (or their potential to generate income) declines sharply. Household leverage problems, on the other hand, are almost always the result of a sharp rise in residential mortgage credit, and our view is that the purchase of residential property is fundamentally an act of consumption rather than a true investment. In addition, the past experiences of several countries have shown that housing-related leverage busts are particularly pernicious, in that the resulting recessions tend to be followed by long periods of subpar economic growth. But unlike in China where the majority of nonfinancial corporate sector debt is held on the balance sheets of state-owned enterprises, Hong Kong's corporate debt does not have de-facto state backing and appears to be enormously concentrated in the real estate and financial sector. Over 80% of Hong Kong's total nonfinancial sector debt (which includes households) is provided by domestic banks, and Chart 3 shows that among bank loans to firms, 35% have been granted to property building & construction companies and another 22% to "financial concerns" and stockbrokers. This high concentration of corporate sector debt in the real estate sector means that investors should be legitimately concerned over Hong Kong's extremely high DSR. On the household side, we have made the case in a previous report that a replay of another spectacular housing bust (similar to what occurred in 1997) is highly unlikely despite the fact that Hong Kong house prices have vastly outstripped income over the past decade2 (Chart 4). Chart 3Loans To Businesses Are Highly Concentrated ##br##And Exposed To Property Chart 4Lofty House Prices Are A Red Herring: ##br##The Risk Is On The Business Side This suggests that, despite extremely elevated residential property prices, investors should be more concerned about a shock that will destabilize the commercial real estate market. Hong Kong households would not likely escape the impact of such a shock, since commercial and residential real estate prices move strongly in tandem (Chart 5). But in terms of watching for a "tipping point" that could push Hong Kong's private sector into a balance sheet recession, the trigger seems more likely to occur in the market for the former, rather than the latter. Bottom Line: Hong Kong's leverage burden is a corporate sector rather than a household sector problem. But this corporate sector debt is extremely concentrated in the finance and real estate industries, meaning that investors should be legitimately concerned over Hong Kong's extremely high debt service ratio. Chart 5Still, Households Will Be Hurt##br## If CRE Prices Fall Chart 6The BIS' Warning Thresholds ##br##Don't Seem To Apply To Hong Kong Timing The Onset Of A Balance Sheet Recession Our analysis above supports the recent warnings from the BIS that the risk of a banking crisis / private sector deleveraging event in Hong Kong is nontrivial. This raises the obvious question of how to gauge the timing of such an event in order for investors to properly position their exposure towards Hong Kong's financial markets. The BIS has itself investigated this question, and has published several reports on its "Early Warning Indicator" (EWI) approach.3 Table 1 presents a list of these indicators for several countries, and highlights that the two of the most informative measures (the credit-to-GDP gap4 and the overall debt service ratio) are flashing red for Hong Kong. In fact, Table 1 served as the basis for the BIS' warning in their most recent Quarterly Review that we noted above. The BIS' EWI research has focused on identifying thresholds for these measures that can predict a banking crisis within a three-year window based on the historical record. But in the case of Hong Kong, it is not clear that these thresholds apply. Chart 6 shows the credit-to-GDP gap and overall private sector DSR along with the more stringent BIS threshold noted in Table 1, and highlights that these measures have been flashing red for 4-8 years. Based on this approach, Hong Kong should have experienced a banking crisis long ago. Table 1BIS Early Warning Indicators For Stress In Domestic Banking Systems Rather than relying on the BIS' framework, we have instead constructed our own private-sector debt risk monitor for Hong Kong. In contrast to the BIS' measures, which have been specifically constructed to predict a banking crisis, the goal of our indicator is to help predict a serious credit-driven downturn regardless of its character (i.e. we abstract from whether the result of the downturn is a full-blown financial crisis or simply a prolonged period of economic stagnation). Chart 7Low Risk Of A Serious Credit-Driven ##br##Downturn, For Now Chart 7 presents our BCA Hong Kong Debt Risk Monitor (DRM) and its five equally-weighted components, a summary of which is provided below. All series have been scaled such that an increase in the DRM represents higher risk. Alpha: We have highlighted the importance of examining the alpha as well as the beta of regional equity returns in a previous report,5 and we include a composite indicator of Hong Kong's rolling alpha versus the global benchmark as a measure of Hong Kong-specific stock performance that adjusts for Hong Kong's riskiness. While this component of our DRM was quite elevated in early-2016 (signaling weak Hong Kong stock performance), it is presently in line with its historical average, and thus is not flashing a warning sign. Property Prices: Given the high concentration of Hong Kong's corporate sector debt in the real estate sector, our DRM includes the deviation of office & retail property prices from their 9-month moving average. Similar to the first component of our indicator, Hong Kong property prices are roughly in line with their trend and are not signaling serious economic weakness. Credit Impulse: The third component of our DRM is a simple bank credit impulse, calculated as the flow of credit over the past year as a percent of GDP. While this component has fallen well into "low risk" territory, over the past year, there are some tentative signs of a reversal that investors should monitor. Monetary Policy Stance: The fourth component of our DRM is a structural variable that attempts to measure whether U.S. (and thus Hong Kong) interest rates are either consistent or out of alignment with economic conditions in Hong Kong. This component is an average of two measures of the stance of monetary policy: 1) the difference between U.S. 10-year government bond yields and Hong Kong nominal GDP growth, and 2) the difference between the base rate and a Taylor Rule estimate for the region (with the latter acting purely as an estimate of the cyclical equilibrium interest rate).6 The chart shows that despite the onset of tighter monetary policy in the U.S. over the past few years, our gauge of Hong Kong's policy stance suggests that conditions are still easy, and that material further increases would likely be required in order to see this component rise to +1 sigma territory. Debt Service Ratio: The final component of our DRM is the BIS' total private sector DSR shown in Chart 6, acting as a second structural variable that captures the underlying debt servicing risk that the BIS has warned about. We extent the BIS' series back to the early-1990s on a best efforts basis, by adjusting the product of Hong Kong's prime rate and the total private sector debt-to-GDP ratio to best align with the official DSR series over the course of its history. Our extended series suggests that Hong Kong's debt servicing burden is indeed the highest that it has been over the past three decades, underscoring that our DRM is likely to rise materially if the cyclical factors included in the indicator deteriorate. The overall message of our DRM is that a threat to Hong Kong's economy from excessive debt does not appear to be imminent, despite the underlying risks highlighted by the BIS. While the risk from excessive leverage is real and is very likely to eventually cause a serious credit-driven downturn, the odds of this occurring over the coming 6-12 months appear to be low. Bottom Line: Our BCA Hong Kong Debt Risk Monitor serves as an important tool to help investors gauge the risk of a serious credit-driven downturn in the region. While the risk from excessive leverage is real, the message from our DRM is that the odds of a deleveraging event over the coming year are low. The Spooky Implications Of The Natural Interest Rate Gap Interestingly, at least part of the benign reading of our DRM is due to the fourth component of the indicator, our gauge of Hong Kong's monetary policy stance, which suggests that there is ample room for further rate increases. In fact, in our view this observation carries much deeper significance than many may initially perceive, as it may explain why the BIS' early warning indicator thresholds have not worked in the case of Hong Kong, and why the region may avoid a debt crisis for a further significant period (but ultimately experience a much more painful collapse when it finally arrives). At root, the reason that U.S. 10-year Treasury yields remain exceedingly low relative to U.S. nominal GDP growth is because investors believe that real U.S. policy rates are likely to be much lower on average over the next 10-years than they have been historically (Chart 8). Abstracting from calendar-based cyclical considerations (such at the timing of the next U.S. recession), this fundamentally reflects the prevalent view among fixed-income investors that the U.S. natural rate of interest (or "r-star") has likely permanently declined. If true, this is of enormous importance for Hong Kong, as it suggests that the region will permanently "enjoy" easy monetary policy. This is because the substantial leveraging that has occurred in Hong Kong in response to low interest rates implies that there has been no impairment (yet) to Hong Kong's natural rate of interest (Chart 9). Chart 8A Low Estimate Of R-Star Has Depressed##br## U.S. Bond Yields Chart 9No Evidence Of A Low R-Star##br## In Hong Kong In some ways the dynamic we are describing is not new: the importation of easy monetary policy from the U.S. via competitive currency devaluation over the past decade has been a well-known phenomenon that was quite prominent during the early phase of the global economic recovery. But the fixed exchange rate regime in Hong Kong means that this process cannot be avoided without abandoning the peg, an event that itself could trigger a deleveraging event via a sharp decline in asset prices. The key point for investors is that if the U.S. natural rate of interest has indeed fallen materially and permanently below potential GDP growth, then Hong Kong will not experience tight monetary conditions even once the Fed has normalized short-term interest rates, unless it raises them well above equilibrium levels. This suggests that Hong Kong's private sector may perpetually leverage itself until debt service burdens reach some, as yet, unknown maximum level, precipitating what would likely become a cataclysmic recession. The fact that no crisis erupted in late-2015/early-2016 when the cyclical components of our DRM deteriorated significantly suggests that this level may be materially higher than is presently the case. Bottom Line: Due to the importation of U.S. monetary policy, Hong Kong may "enjoy" easy monetary policy on a permanent basis. This suggests that Hong Kong's private sector may continue to leverage itself even in the face of rising interest rates, setting up the potential for a cataclysmic future recession. Investment Implications: Stay Neutral, For Now Chart 10Room For A Rise In Relative Earnings Momentum The picture painted by our above analysis suggests that a benign cyclical outlook for Hong Kong is arrayed against a negative (and potentially horrific) structural outlook. How should investors position towards Hong Kong equities in response? First, as noted above, our Debt Risk Monitor does not signal that there is an imminent threat facing the Hong Kong economy that would herald the potential for a major deleveraging event over the near-term. Second, while Hong Kong's earnings momentum is stretched in absolute terms, Chart 10 highlights there is room for a catchup versus global stocks, which could boost relative performance over the coming year. Third, relative valuation and technical conditions are at neutral levels (Chart 11), and thus do not provide any compelling basis to avoid Hong Kong stocks. But to us, the weight of this modestly positive assessment over the coming year is overshadowed by the structural outlook, meaning that we continue to recommend a neutral allocation towards Hong Kong stocks over the coming 6-12 months. The most investment-relevant conclusion from our analysis is that investors will one day be able to earn significant risk-adjusted returns from underweighting / shorting Hong Kong stocks once a serious credit-driven downturn begins. As an example, Chart 12 shows the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Hong Kong's relative performance, a period where our DRM rose sharply and persistently into "high risk territory". It took 12½ years for Hong Kong to rise to a new high in relative total return terms, and it has yet to do so in price terms. Chart 11Neutral Relative Valuation And ##br##Technical Conditions Chart 12One Day, Shorting Hong Kong Stocks##br## Will Be Enormously Profitable So while the economic and financial market conditions are not yet in place to act on a bearish structural view, we will be closely watching our Debt Risk Monitor over the coming months and years for signs of a significant deterioration, as it will likely provide a major opportunity for investors to earn outsized returns. Stay tuned! Bottom Line: Stay neutral Hong Kong stocks versus the global benchmark over the coming 6-12 months. While equities may rise in relative terms if earnings momentum converges with that of the global benchmark, it is not a sufficiently compelling prospect to outweigh the significant structural risk facing the region. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Stocks: Trade Frictions Make For A Tenuous Overweight", dated March 28, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Hong Kong Housing Bubble: A Replay Of 1997?", dated June 29, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 For example, please see "Evaluating early warning indicators of banking crises: Satisfying policy requirements" by Mathias Drehmann and Mikael Juselius, BIS Working Paper No. 421, August 2013. 4 The BIS defines the credit-to-GDP gap as the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-run trend, derived using a one-sided (i.e. backward-looking) Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 5 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "China: No Longer A Low-Beta Market", dated January 11, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Our Taylor Rule estimate for Hong Kong is constructed in a fashion similar to what we showed for China in our January 18 Weekly Report, using a neutral policy rate estimate of 5%. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Continue to underweight the most cyclical sectors - Banks, Basic Materials, and Energy. As predicted, global growth is losing steam. This implies that the Eurostoxx50 will struggle to outperform the S&P500. Continue with a currency pecking order of "yen first, euro second, pound third, dollar fourth." The sell-off in bonds is due a retracement, or at least a respite. Stock markets' rich valuations are contingent on low bond yields. Feature The views in this report do not necessarily align with the BCA House View Matrix. Chart I-2Cyclicals Were Underperforming##br## Long Before The Trade Skirmishes Stock markets have experienced turbulence this year, and it would be very simple to blame the first skirmishes of a global trade war. It would also be simplistic. The sharp underperformance of cyclical stocks started in January, well before any inkling of the Trump tariffs (Chart I-2). The trade skirmishes have merely accelerated a process that was already underway. In this week's report, we make sense of the market turbulence from three broad perspectives: the global economic mini-cycle; market technicals; and valuation. The Economic Mini-Cycle Has Likely Turned Down When bond yields rise, interest rate sensitive sectors in the economy feel a headwind, but this headwind is felt with a delay. Similarly, when bond yields decline, interest rate sensitive sectors feel a tailwind, but the tailwind is felt with a delay. This delay occurs because credit supply lags credit demand by several months. But if credit supply lags demand, an economic theory called the Cobweb Theorem1 points out that both the quantity of credit supplied and its price (the bond yield) must undergo 'mini-cycle' oscillations. The theory is supported by compelling empirical evidence (Chart I-3). Furthermore, as the quantity of credit supplied is a marginal driver of economic activity, economic activity will also experience the same mini-cycle oscillations (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Compelling Evidence For Mini-Cycles In##br## Credit Supply And The Bond Yield... Chart I-4...And ##br##Economic Activity These mini-cycles are remarkably regular with half-cycle lengths averaging around eight months. Their regularity creates predictability. And as most investors are unaware of these cycles, the next turn is not discounted in financial market prices - providing a compelling investment opportunity for those who do recognise the predictability. Mini half-cycles average eight months, and the latest mini-upswing started last April. Hence, on January 4 we predicted that "contrary to what the consensus is expecting, global growth will lose steam in the first half of 2018." The predicted deceleration is precisely what we are now witnessing, and we expect this to continue through the summer months. From an equity sector perspective, the relative performance of the most cyclical sectors - Banks, Basic Materials, and Energy - very closely tracks the regular mini-cycles in global growth. In a mini-downswing these cyclical sectors always underperform (Chart of the week). Accordingly, continue to underweight these sectors through the summer months. Chart of the weekCyclicals Always Underperform In An Economic Mini-Downswing For the time being, this implies that the Eurostoxx50 will struggle to outperform the S&P500 - because euro area bourses have an outsize exposure to the most cyclical sectors. From a currency perspective, the stark asymmetry of central bank 'degrees of freedom' favours the euro and the yen over the dollar. In essence, as the ECB and BoJ are at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy, long-term expectations for their policy rates possess an asymmetry: they cannot go significantly lower, but they can go significantly higher. In contrast, long-term expectations for the Fed policy rate possess full symmetry: they can go either way, lower or higher. Hence, on January 18 we advised a currency pecking order of "yen first, euro second, pound third, dollar fourth." This currency pecking order has also worked perfectly this year, and we expect it to continue working through the summer months. Cyclical Sectors Had Bullish Groupthink Groupthink in any investment is a warning sign that the investment's trend is approaching exhaustion, because the liquidity that has fuelled the trend is about to evaporate. Liquidity is plentiful when market participants disagree with each other. Consider a stock whose price is rising strongly: a momentum trader wants to buy it, while a value investor wants to sell it. Hence, the market participants trade with each other with plentiful liquidity. Liquidity starts to evaporate when too many market participants agree with each other. Instead of dispassionately investing on the basis of value, value investors get sucked into chasing a price trend, and their buy orders fuel the trend. But when all the value investors have become momentum traders, the trend reaches a tipping point. If a value investor suddenly reverts to type and puts in a sell order, he will find that there are no buyers left. Liquidity has evaporated and finding new liquidity might require a substantial reversal in the price to attract a buy order from an ultra-long-term deep value investor. As regular readers know, our proprietary fractal analysis measures whether groupthink in a specific investment has become excessive, signalling the end of its price trend. Furthermore, using a 130-day groupthink indicator (fractal dimension), the fractal framework provides a powerful and independent reinforcement of our mini-cycle framework. This is because 130 (business) days broadly aligns with the mini half-cycle length. Fractal analysis reinforces our decision to underweight cyclical sectors, because it shows excessive (bullish) 130-day groupthink in these economically sensitive sectors (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Excessive Bullish Groupthink In Cyclical Sectors It also shows excessive (bearish) 130-day groupthink in government bonds, suggesting that the sell-off in bonds is due a retracement, or at least a respite (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Excessive Bearish Groupthink In Government Bonds Rich Valuations Are Contingent On Low Bond Yields On price to sales, world equities are as richly valued as they were at the peak of the dot com boom in 2000. The observation is important because price to sales has proved to be a near-perfect predictor of future 10-year returns. It shows that in 2010, world equities were priced to generate 8% a year compared with 4% a year available from global bonds. Today, richer valuations mean that both world equities and global bonds are priced to generate a paltry 2% a year (Chart I-7). Chart I-7World Equities As Richly Valued As At The Peak Of The Dot Com Boom Nevertheless, this makes perfect sense, because when bond yields are at 2%, bonds and equities are equally risky as each other. It follows that they must offer the same return as each other. One of the biggest errors in finance is to define an investment's risk in terms of its (root mean squared) volatility. This is incorrect because nobody fears sharp gains, they only fear sharp losses. Consider an investment whose price goes up sharply one day and then sideways the next day ad infinitum. The investment has a very high volatility, but it has no risk. You can never lose money, you can only make money. This leads us to the correct definition of risk, as defined by Professor Daniel Kahneman. He proved that investors are not concerned about volatility per se, they are concerned about the ratio of potential short-term losses versus short-term gains, a measure known as 'negative skew'. The important point is that at low bond yields, bond returns start to exhibit negative skew. Intuitively, this is because the lower bound to yields forces an unattractive asymmetry on bond returns: prices can fall a lot, but they cannot rise a lot. Specifically, at a bond yield of 2%, theoretical and empirical evidence shows that bonds and equities possess the same negative skew (Chart I-8). And as the two asset classes are equally risky, they must offer the same return, 2% (Chart I-9). Chart I-8At A 2% Bond Yield, 10-Year Bonds##br## Have The Same Negative Skew As Equities... Chart I-9...So At A 2% Bond Yield, ##br##Equities Must Also Offer A 2% Return Therefore, equities find themselves in a precarious equilibrium. Rich valuations are justified if bond yields remain at low levels or fall, but rich valuations become increasingly hard to justify if bond yields march higher. Seen through this lens, the rise in bond yields at the start of the year is one important reason why equities have experienced a turbulent 2018 so far. What lies ahead? The combination of our economic mini-cycle, market technicals and valuation perspectives suggests that the equity sector and currency trends established since the start of the year should persist into the summer. As for equities in aggregate, the greatest structural threat would arise if bond yields gapped upwards. But for the time being, this is not our expectation. Happy Easter! Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' published on January 11 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model Given the Easter holidays, there are no new trades this week. But we are pleased to report that our long global utilities versus market trade achieved its 3.5% profit target and is now closed. Out of our four open trades, three are in profit with the short nickel / long lead trade already up sharply in its first week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations