Money/Credit/Debt
Highlights Economic data and policy announcements over the past month reflect the view that policymakers are serious about restraining credit growth, and that they will attempt to combat any weakness in external demand by boosting domestic consumption. A review of historical episodes of "outsized" investment intensity shows that policymakers have good reason to try and shift the composition of China's economy towards consumption, as it suggests that China's current experience probably cannot be sustained. A shift even somewhat away from heavy investment-led growth means that the "strike price" of the China put option has fallen relative to past economic slowdowns, implying that it will take more pain before investors can cash in. It is too soon to move towards an outright long position favoring domestic stocks, even though considerable bad news has been priced in. CNY-USD likely has further downside, and investors allocating among Chinese stocks should only favor domestic over investable equities in currency-hedged terms. Feature September's total social financing data, released earlier this month, provided important evidence supporting our view that Chinese policymakers are not aiming for a significant acceleration in private sector credit growth. Chart 1 highlights that the year-over-year growth rate of adjusted total social financing (TSF) actually ticked modestly lower in September, in clear contrast to the bet of many investors that China is following its "old stimulus rulebook". Chart 1Chinese Policymakers Are Not Pumping The Credit Taps Some market participants have pointed to the fact that adjusted TSF is rising sharply on a 3-month annualized basis after adjusting for seasonality (Chart 2), and have concluded from this fact that a sustained expansion in credit growth is forthcoming. However, Chart 3 illustrates that the pickup shown in Chart 2 is due to a surge in special local government bond issuance, which reflects front-loading of fiscal spending. Financial news outlets have reported that "provincial authorities had by the end of September already raised 92 percent of the 1.35 trillion yuan ($195 billion) worth of special infrastructure bonds that the central government has targeted for the entire year",1 implying that local government bond issuance in Q4 will drop off significantly relative to the past three months. Chart 2A Near-Term Pickup... Chart 3...Caused By Front-Loaded Fiscal Spending The September credit data aside, we acknowledge that there have been several small-scale stimulus announcements from the Chinese government over the past month. But the bottom line for now is that developments over this period reflect the view that policymakers are serious about restraining credit growth, and that they will attempt to combat any weakness in external demand by boosting domestic consumption.2 Restraining Credit Growth: Wisdom Or Folly? China's unwillingness to resort to a significant acceleration in credit growth to help stabilize its economy has surprised some investors, and raised criticism in some corners that the country is making a policy mistake. A recurring argument in this vein, particularly among perennial China bulls, is that policymakers should not be concerned about China's elevated levels of private sector debt because it is the natural and inevitable result of a high savings rate. According to this view, restraining credit growth and attempting to boost consumption merely dooms China's ability to escape the middle-income trap, because higher per capita income can only be achieved by further growth in the stock of capital. BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not dispute the notion that a high savings rate can lead to a high leverage ratio, particularly among small, fast-growing economies. But in the case of China, the sharp rise in private sector debt that has occurred since 2010 was not natural, and certainly was not inevitable. Instead, our view is that it was the result of an explicit "least-bad" choice made by policymakers to weather the reality of poor external demand following the global financial crisis. Chart 4 presents, in a nutshell, the theoretical support for the "keep investing" view. The chart depicts real per capita GDP for 80 countries in 2014 as a function of the average share of gross capital formation to GDP from 1960 to 2014. The chart clearly shows that richer countries today have tended to invest more on average in the past, which is entirely consistent with textbook economic theory. Chart 4Higher Investment Has Led To Higher Per Capita GDP Growth... However, there are two reasons why the simple inference from Chart 4 that China should just "keep investing" is deeply flawed. First, while investment as a share of GDP in China has recently declined from its 2011-2014 peak, it remains close to 45%. This is a massive rate of investment, and a historical review points to the conclusion that it probably cannot be sustained: 45% is nearly off the x-axis scale shown in Chart 4, suggesting that China's current rate of investment is not achievable over extended periods of time. In fact, the chart suggests that 30% is the highest realistic rate of investment as a share of GDP that a country can maintain over an extended period. In 2014, based on the definition of the data from the Penn World Table (GDP share of gross capital formation at current purchasing power parity), China had maintained its investment share above 30% for 12 years. At first blush, there appears to be some precedent suggesting that China's outsized investment run can go on for longer: among the 80 countries included in Chart 4, 14 of them have experienced a longer continuous run of investment as a share of GDP. However, Chart 5 shows that most of these experiences occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when global exports as a share of GDP were rising from a very low base. This implies that historical examples of outsized investment runs have largely reflected export-driven catch-up stories, which bodes poorly for China's ability to continue to invest at its recent massive scale given that global exports to GDP appear to have peaked. Chart 5...But Very High Rates Of Investment Have Driven By Exports Second, the relationship shown in Chart 4 captures the potential gains of profitable and rational investment, or in other words the accumulation of a "useful" stock of capital. But an unfortunate reality facing savers is that while one can choose to save or invest, one cannot necessarily choose the accompanying rate of return. If China invests heavily at very low or negative rates of return, the idea that investment will lead China out of the middle-income trap is very likely wrong. As we have discussed in previous reports, there is good evidence to suggest that the marginal gains from investment in China have been falling. The private sector debt-to-GDP ratio features prominently in the case against profitable investment in China: despite a massive rise in investment and debt from 2002-2007, the private sector debt-to-GDP ratio barely rose, because this debt was used to accumulate capital that verifiably delivered nominal GDP growth. Yet following 2010 the ratio rose sharply, implying that the returns from the investment that has taken place over the past decade have been (at least so far) considerably lower than those of the prior decade. Also, we noted in our August 29 Special Report that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have accounted for a sizeable portion of the private sector leveraging that occurred after 2010,3 and that the marginal operating gain from debt for SOEs has become negative (Chart 6). A gap between the cost/return on borrowed funds strongly implies that the investment channeled through SOEs over the past several years does not represent, on balance, the accumulation of useful capital. Chart 6Strong Evidence Against Productive SOE Investment In our view, a cohesive story emerges from the above analysis, one that counters the view that China is making a policy mistake by trying to avoid another significant episode of private sector leveraging. China's enormous catchup in per capita GDP over the past 20 years was initially export-led, but was sustained after 2010 by quasi-fiscal spending in the form of a material leveraging of state-owned enterprises. This shadow government spending was aimed at preventing large-scale job losses, but proved to be considerably less productive than the private, export-driven investment-boom that preceded it. This suggests that China is simply investing too much for an economy that needs to accumulate capital for the purposes of domestic production, and that any further, aggressive leveraging of the private sector will simply raise the odds or the cost of the eventual bailout. While investors who are hoping to profit from China's credit excesses may wish for a different outcome, the bottom line is that Chinese policymakers will act in the best interests of their country, and they have good reason to try and shift China's economy away from extremely high rates of investment towards more consumption. Implications For Investment Strategy As would be the case in any other major country, we have no doubt that Chinese policymakers will eventually move to a maximum reflationary stance (which would imply a significant reacceleration in credit growth) if they feel that the existing slowdown will lead to deep, threatening economic instability. The key point for investors is that a desire of policymakers to shift even somewhat away from heavy investment-led growth means that the "strike price" of the China put option has fallen relative to past economic slowdowns, implying that it will take more pain before investors can cash in. Within the universe of Chinese financial assets, there are three pertinent investment strategy questions that arise from this reality: Even if there is more pain to come, Chinese domestic stocks have fallen 30% in local currency terms, and close to 40% in U.S. dollar terms (Chart 7). Is it time to go outright long? Should investors allocating among Chinese stocks favor domestic or investable equities? What is the outlook for CNY-USD? For now, our answers are as follows: 1) not yet, 2) domestic over investable in currency-hedged terms, and 3) weaker (possibly significantly so). Chart 7The Bear Market In A-Shares Is Advanced... We agree that 30% is a reasonable estimate of the likely decline in domestic earnings over the coming year, which normally would suggest that A-shares have fully priced the bad news and that investors should consider buying. However, there are two key reasons why we think this conclusion is premature: We noted in our September 19 Weekly Report that the lesson of 2014/2015 was Chinese stocks needed both policy stimulus and earnings clarity before bottoming.4 For now, China's stimulative response has been measured, and we have yet to see any decline in domestic 12-month forward earnings (Chart 8). While it is not the only factor contributing to the decline, the escalation in the trade war with the U.S. acted as a clear negative catalyst for the Chinese stock market. We have argued that the evolution of the trade positions of both sides suggests that the imposition of a third and final round of import tariffs covering all Chinese exports to the U.S. is likely, which would further reduce Chinese earnings visibility for investors. News reports this week suggested that an announcement to this effect could occur in early-December, if a meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi is called off or fails (as we expect). Chart 8...But Forward EPS Have Yet To Start Falling Chart 9 presents our framework for forecasting CNY-USD as a function of various U.S. import tariff scenarios, which we used to argue that a break above the psychologically-important level of 7 for USD-CNY appeared likely barring strong action from the PBOC4. The RMB has weakened in line with our view over the past month, and Chart 9 shows that it stands to weaken further, potentially significantly, if the U.S. does move ahead with a 25% import tariff on all imports from China. Chart 9Further Downside In CNY-USD Is Likely Finally, our negative outlook for the currency informs our view that a relative position favoring domestic over investable stocks should be currency-hedged. Chart 10 shows that an uptrend in relative performance does appear to be forming in local currency terms, but not in U.S. dollar terms (due to the recent renewed weakness in CNY-USD). Chart 10Relative To Investable Stocks, Only Favor A-Shares In Hedged Terms We opened a shadow trade in our July 5 Weekly Report of being long the MSCI China A Onshore index / short MSCI China index,5 which we said we would consider implementing in response to a 5% rally in relative performance. Our intention was to structure this trade in unhedged terms (consistent with most of the trades in our trade book), and our judgement is that it is simply too early to do so despite the fact that a 5% relative rise in U.S. dollar terms has indeed occurred. Signs of a durable bottom in CNY-USD, or an assessment of minimal further downside coupled with strong outperformance of domestic stocks in local currency terms, are likely catalysts for a green light. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 "China Is Struggling To Find Projects To Spend Bond Splurge On", Bloomberg News, October 22, 2018. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Reports "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?", dated August 8, 2018, and "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two", dated August 15, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging", dated August 29, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Investing In The Middle Of A Trade War", dated September 19, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Standing On One Leg", dated July 5, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Policy easing is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a bottom in the business cycle. For monetary easing to become effective, there should be loan demand, banks should be willing to lend, and businesses and consumers should be keen to spend more. In China, risks to both the money multiplier and the velocity of money are to the downside. This will hinder the effectiveness of monetary policy easing in generating economic growth. Eroding business and consumer confidence in China will - for now - negate the budding improvement in its broad money impulse. Emerging markets risk assets and currencies are set to drop further. Stay put. Feature The selloff in EM and Chinese stocks has begun to weigh heavily on DM share prices. The global equity index has broken below its January lows, entailing further downside. Importantly, global cyclical equity sectors such as global industrials, materials and semiconductors are underperforming, and are breaking down in absolute terms. This confirms global trade is in a full downturn swing (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Global Trade Is Decelerating What is required to turn around this global trade slowdown? Our bias is that this growth slump has roots in China/EM and trade tensions are dampening business and investor sentiment on top of that. Consequently, a reversal in the equity selloff is largely contingent on an improvement in China's economy. It is in this context that we devote this week's report to an extensive discussion surrounding the issues of policy stimulus, deleveraging and growth in China. In this report, we answer the questions we think are most pertinent to investors at this moment. Question: Why are financial markets rioting, even though China has announced stimulus? Answer: The market's interpretation is that these stimuli are insufficient to turn around China's business cycle immediately. We agree with this assessment. Policy easing does not always immediately translate into higher share prices and improving growth. For example, amid China's 2015 stock market crash, the Chinese authorities began aggressively stimulating in the middle of 2015, yet Chinese and global markets continued to riot until February 2016 (Chart I-2). Chart I-2China In 2015: Money Growth Preceded Bottom In Markets By Seven Months Indeed, there was a period of seven months when EM and DM stocks plummeted, despite on-going and very aggressive policy easing in China. In short, these stimulus measures did not preclude a considerable drawdown in global and EM share prices. Outside China, there have been other examples where policy easing did not preclude a full-fledged bear market. For instance, in 2001-'02 and 2007-'08, the Federal Reserve was cutting interest rates aggressively, yet the bear market in U.S. equities did not reverse (Chart I-3). Chart I-3AFed's Easing Did Not Prevent Equity Bear Market Chart I-3BFed's Easing Did Not Prevent Equity Bear Market Similarly, the ECB was expanding its balance sheet from the onset of the euro area debt crisis in 2011, yet the region's share prices did not bottom until the middle of 2012, 12 months later (Chart I-4). Chart I-4ECB Balance Sheet Expansion Did Not Prevent Equity Bear Market Question: It is clear there could be a time lag between policymakers stimulating and financial markets and the business cycle turning the corner. What is causing these time lags, and how should one handicap them? Answer: Indeed, monetary and fiscal policies affect the economy with time lags. These lags vary from cycle to cycle. In China, the broad money impulse has improved of late (Chart I-5). Historically, this has led the mainland's business cycle by about nine months on average. Hence, it signifies a tentative bottom early next year. Chart I-5China: Money Impulse Has Bottomed The credit impulse, however, has not improved at all (Chart I-6). The current divergence between credit and money impulses is due to a plunge in shadow (non-bank) credit (Chart I-7). The distinction between broad money and credit is as follows: money is originated by commercial banks when they lend to or acquire an asset from non-banks. Meanwhile, total credit also includes lending and bond purchases by non-banks. Chart I-6China: Credit Impulse Has Not Yet Bottomed Chart I-7Bank And Non-Bank Credit Have Diverged Importantly, money/credit fluctuations are not the sole factors that generate swings in economic activity. Companies' and households' willingness to consume and invest matter too. We have written extensively in the past that changes in the velocity of money mirror fluctuations in the marginal propensity to consume and invest.1 Technically speaking, nominal GDP growth is a product of money growth and change in the velocity of money. Nominal GDP = Money Growth x Velocity Of Money When a decline in the velocity of money - stemming from eroding business and consumer confidence - overwhelms an acceleration in money growth, economic growth weakens, despite improvement in the money impulse. Notably, money and credit have led previous business cycles in China by varying time periods. In other words, the velocity of money has not been constant on the mainland. In particular, both the money and credit impulses were early - by about 12 months - in forecasting a growth slowdown in China and global trade at the beginning of 2017. The reason why a growth slowdown did not commence at that time was due to the surge in the velocity of money. The latter is akin to confidence among economic agents. In short, companies and households turned their money balances faster, which offset the impact of weak money/credit impulses on economic activity. Concerning fiscal policy, time lags differ because of implementation delays and varying fiscal multipliers. In China, aggregate fiscal spending, including central, local governments and managed funds, has not yet accelerated (Chart I-8). Chart I-8China: No Rebound In Broad Fiscal Spending While special bond issuance by local governments spiked in August and September, overall credit flows in the economy have not yet improved - please refer to Chart I-6. As an aside, there are reports that 42% of the amount raised via special bond issuance will be used to purchase land rather than for infrastructure spending.2 This will not benefit economic growth much. Question: Do you think the time lag between the bottom in China's money/credit impulses and the business cycle will be longer or shorter this time around? Answer: Our bias is that the time lag between the bottom in money/credit impulses and the resultant pickup in growth will be longer than before. Presently, there is some evidence that both business and consumer sentiment in China are beginning to whither at the hands of the trade wars, tanking domestic share prices and budding deflation in real estate prices. Eroding business and consumer confidence in China will - for now - negate the improvement in the broad money impulse. Chart I-9 depicts the velocity of money in China. After rising over the past two years, our bias is that it will drop again. It is critical to realize that forecasting the direction and magnitude of swings in the velocity of money - the marginal propensity to spend - is a dismal science. It reflects business and consumer sentiment, and any assessment on this is very subjective. This is why economic forecasting and investment calls are more of an art. Chart I-9China: The Velocity Of Money Among many variables we are monitoring to gauge the turn in the mainland's business cycle is the marginal propensity to invest among mainland industrial companies. This indicator is falling, suggesting that monetary policy easing is facing formidable hurdles in re-igniting investment appetite among Chinese companies (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Companies' Marginal Propensity To Spend The BCA Emerging Markets Strategy team's assessment is that China-related financial markets are in an air pocket. Investors should not try to catch falling knives. On the contrary, there is still meaningful downside. Question: But the People's Bank of China has been injecting a lot of liquidity into the system via various facilities. Would this liquidity not find its way into financial markets and the real economy? Answer: When a central bank injects liquidity into the banking system, it creates excess reserves. Excess reserves also rise when a central bank cuts the required reserve ratio (RRR). It is essential to differentiate money that households and business use to conduct transactions from reserves of commercial banks at the central bank. Required and excess reserves are not a part of narrow and broad monetary aggregates. Excess reserves are the banking system's liquidity held at the central bank. Importantly, banks do not lend reserves, and do not use reserves to pay for assets they purchase from non-banks. Banks use reserves to settle transactions/payments among themselves. Reserves are "manufactured" solely by central banks. Commercial banks cannot create reserves. They do, however, create the overwhelming majority of money when they lend to or purchase an asset from non-banks. Central banks create broad money - that circulates in the economy - only when they lend to or buy assets from non-banks. Given central banks typically do few transactions with non-banks, central banks originate a very small portion of the broad money supply. For example, as a part of quantitative easing efforts, new money is originated only when a central bank buys bonds from a non-bank (say, an insurance company). In contrast, no money is created when a central bank buys bonds from a bank. In brief, there is no automatic leakage of reserves into the real economy and financial markets. Banks need to be willing to lend to and purchase assets from non-banks for the money supply to expand. Question: But won't expanding excess reserves - banking system liquidity - eventually encourage banks to lend and purchase financial assets? Answer: It will at some point, but it is not imminent. The mainland banking system's excess reserves ratio is depicted in Chart I-11. A few observations are in order: Chart I-11China: Excess Reserves Not Are Growing First, the excess reserve ratio - excess reserves (ER) as a share of total deposits - is currently rather low (Chart I-11, top panel). The absolute level of ER is not elevated either (Chart I-11, middle panel). To adjust the absolute level of ER for seasonality, we show the annual change of this measure - it has dropped to zero in September (Chart I-11, bottom panel). This is in contrast to the prevailing market narrative that the PBoC is injecting a lot of liquidity into the system. While they have been injecting liquidity via RRR cuts, at the same time many lending facilities have been maturing without renewal. Does the low level of ER ratio mean the PBoC has been tightening? No, it has not been tightening. Shrinking excess reserves that lead to higher money market rates would qualify as tightening. Provided money market rates are low and are not rising in China, there has been no de-facto tightening, despite the low level of reserves (Chart I-12). Chart I-12China: Excess Reserves And Interest Rates Second, any central bank can simultaneously target either quantity of reserves or short-term interest rates, but not both. Before 2014, the PBoC was targeting the level of ER. As a result, short-term interest rates fluctuated a lot to equilibrate demand and supply for ER. Since early 2014, the PBoC has switched to targeting interest rates. Therefore, the level of ER is no longer a policy objective, but rather a tool to navigate interest rates. Chart I-13 illustrates what drives PBoC policy in terms of interest rates and liquidity management. The PBoC sets interest rates based on the strength in the economy - i.e., interest rates rise when loan demand is improving and fall when loan demand is weakening (Chart I-13, top panel). Chart I-13China: What Drives Interest Rates? Then, the central bank adjusts the amount of ER to achieve its desired level of short-term interest rates. Hence, the amount of ER is a function of demand for reserves by banks at the current level of interest rates. The current low level of ER is indicative of weak demand for ER by banks. As loan origination has diminished, economic activity has cooled off and the number of transactions by companies and consumers has dwindled, demand for reserves among banks has declined. Third, declining/expanding ER do not always cause a slowdown/acceleration in money/credit growth, as demonstrated on Chart I-14. There is another variable that stands between ER and money/credit: the money multiplier (MM). The latter is defined as how much broad money/credit banks create per one unit of ER. A rising money multiplier reflects banks' willingness and ability to expand their balance sheets aggressively. A falling multiplier signifies growing risk aversion among banks, or their inability to expand their balance sheets. Chart I-14China: Excess Reserves And Money/Credit Impulses Notably, the credit boom in China since 2009 has been driven not by rapidly expanding ER but primarily by a surging MM. The MM has skyrocketed from 40 in 2008 to 65 presently (Chart I-15). This was the manifestation of excessive risk taking by banks. Chart I-15China: Money Multiplier Why is it sensible to expect the MM in China to decline? With ongoing regulatory tightening, falling asset prices and rising defaults, the odds are non-trivial that mainland banks will be reluctant to expand their balance sheets aggressively. We are not implying they will not boost lending forever, but they may be slower to do so compared to previous downturns. Following the peak in their respective credit bubbles and experiencing deteriorating asset quality, banks in Japan, the U.S., the U.K. and euro area shrunk their balance sheets - even though their respective central banks provided enormous amount of excess reserves, and interest rates were at zero. We do not expect bank credit growth to contract in China like it did in those countries. In fact, bank assets and broad credit are still growing at an annual rate of 7% and 12%, respectively (Chart I-16 and Chart I-7 above). Our point is that deleveraging in China has barely begun, and it still remains a policy priority. Consequently, money and credit growth will languish longer in this downturn than in previous ones. Chart I-16China: Bank Asset Growth To Stay Tame Question: So, how would you summarize the key known unknowns to gauge whether and when monetary policy easing will translate into stronger economic growth? Answer: For monetary policy easing to translate effectively into economic growth, the MM and the velocity of money should rise. Both are driven by sentiment and marginal propensity to lend, borrow and spend. Hence, variations in the MM as well as the velocity of money are contingent on sentiment and behavior among bankers, companies and households. The regulatory clampdown on banks and non-bank financial institutions will hamper their willingness and ability to lend, despite sufficient liquidity and low interest rates. Hence, the MM could surprise on the downside. A combination of the ongoing crackdown on leverage, the starting point of high indebtedness, falling asset prices and trade confrontations, will likely weigh on corporate and consumer sentiment, curb their spending and, thereby, dampen the velocity of money. All in all, risks to both the MM and the velocity of money are to the downside rather than upside at the moment. This will hinder the transmission mechanism from policy easing to economic growth. Question: What is your take on financial markets? Are we close to the bottom in EMs and China-related plays? Answer: EMs and China-plays are in a genuine bear market as we have argued in past.3 BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service reckons there is still meaningful downside in EM risk assets and currencies. The EM/China bear market will continue. The Fed is not about to come to markets' rescue, because U.S. growth is very robust and inflation is rising. A very important market to watch is the RMB exchange rate. If the RMB depreciates further - which is our baseline scenario - Asian and other EM financial markets will continue plunging. The RMB/USD exchange rate has been closely tracking the interest rate differential between China and the U.S. (Chart I-17). As the Fed continues to raise rates and China maintains rates at their current level or reduces them to stimulate, the RMB will depreciate. Chart I-17RMB/USD And Interest Rate Differentials Yuan depreciation will lead to a decline in other Asian currencies. In fact, the Korean won is at a critical technical juncture, and a major move is in the cards. Our bias is it will likely break down, consistent with our bearish view on EM risk assets and currencies. As the RMB depreciates, the amount of U.S. dollars that China emits to emerging economies via imports will decline. This will hurt EM exports to China, their currencies and commodities prices. Overall, the U.S. dollar has more upside. The growth disparity between the U.S. and the rest of world warrants a stronger greenback. The latter and a slowdown in EM/China herald a considerable drop in commodities prices. Question: One commodity that has defied the dollar rally and slowdown in China is oil. Will crude continue to float higher? Answer: Oil prices have risen much further and for far longer than we expected.That said, it appears that oil prices are finally beginning to crack, and we see considerable downside.4 China's imports of oil and petroleum products has decelerated substantially (Chart I-18, top panel). This is occurring at a time when Chinese oil strategic and commercial inventories are very elevated (Chart I-18, bottom panel). Chart I-18China's Oil Imports To Weaken Further Oil prices in local currency terms are at record highs in many developing countries. Given oil and fuel subsidies have been removed or reduced in recent years, high oil prices are curbing oil demand in many emerging economies. Global oil production has been outpacing global oil demand since May (Chart I-19, top panel). Typically, this heralds a rollover in oil prices (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Chart I-19A Risk To Oil Prices Finally, oil output has been surging in the U.S. and strong in Russia (Chart I-20); further, Saudi Arabia could boost its crude output as per its recent pledge. Chart I-20Global Oil Output Has Been Surging While geopolitics remains a supportive factor for crude prices, it seems a lot of good news is already priced in the oil market and investors are very long. In short, oil prices are probably heading south. This will contribute to the negative investment sentiment toward EM financial markets. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Questions For Emerging Markets," dated November 29, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-21/china-s-195-billion-debt-splurge-has-less-bang-than-you-think 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EMs Are In A Bear Market," dated October 18, 2018; the link is available on page 17. 4 This is BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team's view and differs from the BCA house view on oil. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Asset allocation: Go long industrial commodities versus equities on a 6-month horizon. If an inflationary impulse is dominating, beaten-down industrial commodities have more upside than richly valued equities; and if a disinflationary impulse is dominating, its main casualty will be equities. Currencies: Take profits on long EUR/CNY. Maintain a broadly neutral stance to EUR, with short EUR/JPY counterbalancing long EUR/USD. Equity sectors: overweight basic materials versus the market. And within the basic materials sector, overweight basic resources versus chemicals. Chart of the WeekChina's 6-Month Credit Impulse Provides A Perfect Explanation For Commodity Inflation Feature Equity markets are entering the crossfire between two opposing forces: an inflationary impulse coming from the global economy; and a disinflationary impulse as higher bond yields threaten to deflate the very rich valuations of equities and other risk-assets. As this battle plays out in the coming months a good strategy is to go long commodities versus equities. The logic is simple: if the inflationary impulse from the economy is dominating, then beaten-down industrial commodities have more upside than richly valued equities; and if the disinflationary impulse from higher bond yields is dominating, then commodities have less downside than equities, because commodities have a much weaker valuation link with bond yields. Therefore, going long industrial commodities versus equities on a 6-month horizon should be a good strategy however the battle between inflationary and disinflationary impulses plays out. Inflationary Impulse Battles Disinflationary Impulse Chart I-2 shows the credit impulse oscillations in the euro area, U.S., and China since the start of the millennium, all expressed in dollars to allow a comparison between the three major economies. It is a fascinating chart because the change in the dominant oscillation - the one with the highest amplitude - perfectly illustrates the shift in global economic power and influence from Europe and the U.S. to China. Chart I-2The Shift In Economic Power From Europe And The U.S. To China Through 2000-08 the impulses in the euro area and the U.S. dominated. But during the global financial crisis that all changed: the credit stimulus from China dwarfed the responses from the western economies. Then through 2009-12 the impulse oscillations from the three major economies were briefly the same size, before China took on the undisputed mantle of dominant impulse, which it has held consistently since 2013. The world's three major economies are now all in 'up' oscillations according to their credit impulses. This means the global economy will experience an inflationary impulse for the next couple of quarters or so. However, battling the inflationary impulse is a disinflationary impulse. As the inflationary impulse pushes up bond yields, it threatens to deflate the very rich valuations of equities (and other risk-assets). Crucially, this disinflationary force is particularly vicious when bond yields are rising from ultra-low levels. We have described this dynamic exhaustively in previous reports, so we will not go into the detail here. But in a nutshell, both parts of an equity's required return - the risk-free component and the risk premium - go up together when bond yields are rising from ultra-low levels. Meaning that rising yields deflate equity valuations exponentially (Chart I-3).1 Chart I-3At Low Bond Yields The Valuation Of Equities Changes Exponentially But Which Inflationary Impulse? At our recent investment conference in Toronto, the three speakers on the China panel gave three different conclusions on China: aggressively bullish, moderately bullish, and bearish! The aggressive bull pointed out that the 3-month credit impulse has gone vertical (Chart I-4); the moderate bull pointed out that the 6-month credit impulse appears to be turning up (Chart I-5); while the bearish argument was that the level of the 12-month credit and fiscal impulse remains depressed. Chart I-4The 3-Month Impulse Is Up Sharply... Chart I-5But The 6-Month Impulse Is Just Turning So which narrative should we use? The answer is the one that provides the best explanatory power for the cycles that we actually observe in the economic and financial market data. As we described in our Special Report The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles, the theory and evidence powerfully identifies the 6-month credit impulse as the one with the best explanatory power for the oscillations that we actually observe in the economy and markets - because the 6-month period aligns most closely with the lag between credit demand and credit supply.2 In any case, as we use the 6-month impulse to powerful effect in Europe, consistency demands that we must use the 6-month impulses in U.S. and China too. For the sceptics, the Chart of the Week should finally obliterate any lingering doubts. China's 6-month impulse gives a spookily perfect explanation for the industrial commodity inflation cycle. The important takeaway right now is that if the 6-month impulse is turning up, so will industrial commodity inflation. What Does All Of This Mean For Investors? This brings us to our central message. As we have just seen, an up-oscillation in 6-month impulses, especially in China, will lift industrial commodity inflation. But it will likely have a much smaller influence on developed market equities which, in these circumstances, will be under the strong constraining spell of higher bond yields. On this basis the asset allocation recommendation is to go long industrial commodities versus equities on a 6-month horizon (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Go Long Commodities Vs. Equities Interestingly, technical analysis also supports this recommendation over the next three months or so. Our tried and tested measure of excessive trending and groupthink suggests that the recent underperformance of industrial commodities relative to developed market equities is extreme and at a point which indicates a countertrend move, or at least a trend exhaustion (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Underperformance Of Industrial Commodities Is Technically Stretched For currencies, the foregoing analysis and charts means it is time to take profits in our long position in the euro versus the Chinese yuan. This leaves us with a broadly neutral exposure to the euro, with a short position versus the yen counterbalancing a long position versus the dollar. As for European equities, many years ago they were a pure play on events in Europe. Today, this might still be true for European 'tail-events' such as the euro sovereign debt crisis, or a potential 'no deal' Brexit. However, for the most part, European equity markets are tightly integrated with global equity markets - at least in direction if not level. Given that industrial commodity inflation takes its cue from the 6-month credit impulse - especially in China - it is hardly surprising that the European basic materials sector follows exactly the same cycle, both in absolute terms (Chart I-8) and relative to the broader equity market (Chart I-9). Therefore the equity sector recommendation is to overweight basic materials versus the market. Chart I-8China's 6-Month Credit Impulse Drives Europe's Basic Material Equities In Absolute Terms... Chart I-9...And In Relative Terms Interestingly, there is also a play within the basic materials sector. The basic resources sector which represents the miners and extractors of raw materials should fare better than the chemicals sector which uses these raw materials as an input (Chart I-10). Hence, overweight basic resources versus chemicals. Chart I-10Overweight Basic Resources Vs. Chemicals Readers may argue that most of the foregoing charts illustrate the same cycle. But that's precisely the point! Never forget that financial markets follow the Pareto principle: the most important 20 percent of analysis explains 80 percent of the moves across all asset classes across all geographies across all times. The key to successful investing is to find the most important 20 percent of analysis. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Reports 'Trapped: Have Equities Trapped Bonds?' September 13, 2018 and 'The Rule Of 4 For Equities And Bonds' August 2, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* It was a busy week for our trades. Long basic resources versus chemicals achieved its profit target, but short U.S. telecom versus U.S. autos hit its stop-loss. Meanwhile, short trade-weighted dollar reached the end of its 65 day holding period broadly flat. All three trades are now closed. In line with the main body of the report, this week's trade recommendation is to go long industrial commodities (represented by the CRB industrials index) versus equities (represented by the MSCI World Index in USD). The profit target is 2% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Set your overall investment strategy with two 'rules of 4' based on 10-year bond yields: If either the Italian BTP or the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB stays above 4 percent, then sell equities and buy bonds. If both the Italian BTP and the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB are in the 3-4 percent range, then remain broadly neutral. If both the Italian BTP and the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB fall below 3 percent, then buy equities and sell bonds. Stay neutral to Italy's MIB and Italian banks for the time being. Among the mainstream European equity markets our top pick remains France's CAC. Feature Many people believe that Italy has one of the world's most indebted economies, but this widely-held belief is wrong. Although Italy's public indebtedness is high, Italy's private indebtedness is one of the lowest in the world (Chart of the Week). This means that Italy's total indebtedness is less than that of France and the U.K., and broadly similar to that of the U.S. (Chart I-2 - Chart 1-5).1 Chart of the WeekItaly's Private Sector Indebtedness Is One Of The Lowest In The World Chart I-2Italy: Total Indebtedness = 260% Of GDP Chart I-3France: Total Indebtedness = 305% Of GDP Chart I-4U.K.: Total Indebtedness = 280% Of GDP Chart I-5U.S.: Total Indebtedness = 250% Of GDP The Myth Of Italian Indebtedness An economy's debt sustainability depends on its total indebtedness, and not on its public indebtedness or its private indebtedness in isolation. Debt becomes unsustainable when the marginal extra euro of debt results in misallocation of resources and mal-investment. At this point, the extra debt adds nothing to growth or, worse, it subtracts from growth. Therefore, debt reaches its sustainable limit when the economy has exhausted all productive uses for it. But it does not matter whether these productive uses are funded with private debt or with public debt. For example, successful economies require investment in high-quality healthcare and education. Some economies fund this with private debt, while others fund it with public debt. This means that if productive private indebtedness is low, there is more scope for productive public indebtedness. The crucial point is that Italy has extremely low private indebtedness, which means that it can afford relatively high public indebtedness before reaching the limit of debt sustainability. Right now, this is especially true because the Italian banking system remains dysfunctional, preventing the private sector from borrowing (Chart I-6). Under these circumstances, the Italian government can borrow the private sector's excess savings and debt repayments and put them to highly productive use - which will paradoxically reduce the deficit in the long term. Chart I-6Italy's Private Sector Is Not Borrowing Hence, the M5S/Lega government is following excellent economic policy in proposing a modest increase in the fiscal deficit in 2019. An appropriately sized and targeted fiscal stimulus is exactly what Italy needs right now. But this excellent economic policy will take time to bear fruit and show up in Italy's growth and deficit data. Italy's big problem is that bond vigilantes do not wait, they shoot first and ask questions later. Italy Is Especially Vulnerable To Bond Vigilantes Italy is also a world leader in running primary surpluses (Chart I-7 and Table I-1). In plain English, this means that the Italian government spends considerably less than it receives, if interest payments are excluded. Chart I-7Italy Is A World Leader In Running Primary Surpluses Table I-1Italy Has Consistently Run Primary Surpluses Put differently, Italy's government deficit results not from its operational spending relative to its income, but from the interest payments on its debt. This makes Italy especially vulnerable to the bond vigilantes. If the bond vigilantes distort Italy's interest rate, they can tip the Italian government into financial distress, even if that distress is not justified by the economic fundamentals. Is this a real risk? Sadly, yes. The euro debt crisis was essentially a liquidity crisis which resulted from bond vigilantes running amok. When irrational markets refuse to lend to sovereigns at a fair interest rate, maturing debt has to be refinanced at a penalising interest rate, causing an undeserved deterioration in the government's finances. Thereby, the irrational fear of insolvency becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Italy has an additional problem. When Italian bond prices decline, it erodes the value of the banking system's euro 350 billion portfolio of BTPs and weakens the banks' fragile balance sheets. If a bank's equity capital no longer covers its net non-performing loans (NPLs), investors get nervous. In this regard, the largest Italian banks now have euro 160 billion of equity capital against euro 130 billion of net NPLs, implying a cushion of euro 30 billion (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds ##br##Net NPLs By Euro 30 Bn... So the markets would start to worry about Italian banks' mark-to-market solvency if their bond portfolios sustained a loss of €30 billion. We estimate this equates to the 10-year BTP yield breaching and remaining above 4 percent (Chart I-9).2 Chart I-9...The Excess Would Disappear If The 10-Year BTP Yield Stayed Above 4% The ECB solved the euro debt crisis at a stroke by committing to act as lender of last resort to distressed sovereigns at an 'undistorted' interest rate. Indeed, the commitment alone was enough to defeat the bond vigilantes without the ECB spending a single cent from its Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program.3 But recall that the ECB only threatened its firepower when the 2-year Spanish Bono yield had breached 6.5 percent and the 10-year yield had breached 7.5 percent. It follows that if the 10-year Italian BTP yield breached 4 percent, the yield would be high enough to hurt the Italian banks, but not nearly high enough for any powerful intervention from the ECB. Hence, the 10-year BTP yield at 4 percent is the level at which we would return to a pro-defensive strategy. Conversely, a level below 3 percent would create some margin of safety providing one precondition for a more pro-cyclical investment stance. In the meantime, the current level at 3.3 percent justifies a neutral cyclical stance to Italy's MIB and Italian banks. Among the mainstream European equity markets our top pick remains France's CAC. The Connection Between Bubbles And Liquidity Crises Bubble formation may seem to have no connection with a liquidity crisis but the two phenomena are closely related. Bubble formation is simply a brewing liquidity crisis resulting from irrational euphoria rather than irrational fear. A bubble forms when value investors stop investing on the basis of a valuation framework. Instead, they get lured into the momentum herd that is participating in a strong rally, and the additional buy orders fuel the euphoria. However, once all of the value investors have joined the momentum herd, and a value investor then suddenly reverts to type and puts in a sell order, the market will suffer a liquidity crisis. There are no buyers left! And finding one might require a substantial reversal in the price to attract an ultra-long-term deep value investor. As regular readers know, fractal analysis measures whether the herding behaviour in any financial instrument is becoming excessive. The analysis suggests that developed market equities are not yet at the tipping point of excessive euphoria that signalled the last two trend exhaustions in May 2017 and January 2018 (Chart I-10). But this does not mean that there are clear blue skies ahead. Chart I-10Developed Market Equities Are Not Yet At A Trend Exhaustion The danger is not that the rich valuation is irrationally excessive, but that it is hyper-sensitive to bond yields. At low bond yields, bonds offer no price upside but substantial price downside. Confronted with this increased riskiness of bonds, equity returns justifiably collapse to the feeble returns offered by bonds with no additional 'risk premium', giving equity valuations an exponential uplift. But if bond yields normalise, the process goes into vicious reverse - the rich valuation of equities must decline as exponentially as it rose. We have defined the danger point as when the sum of the 10-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, German bund, and JGB breaches and stays above 4 percent. In summary, set your overall investment strategy with two 'rules of 4' based on 10-year bond yields: If either the Italian BTP or the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB stays above 4 percent, then sell equities and buy bonds. If both the Italian BTP and the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB are in the 3-4 percent range, then remain broadly neutral. If both the Italian BTP and the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB fall below 3 percent, then buy equities and sell bonds. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Indebtedness defined as a share of GDP. 2 Assuming that the average maturity of Italian banks' BTPs is around 5 years. 3 The ECB's Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program was created in 2012 in response to the euro debt crisis and facilitates the ECB's lender of last resort function to solvent but illiquid sovereign borrowers. Fractal Trading Model* We are pleased to report that our long China/short India trade achieved its 9% profit target and is now closed. This week, we note that the underperformance of the Eurostoxx50 versus the Nikkei225 is technically stretched, with a 65-day fractal dimension approaching the limit which signaled a very recent trend reversal. Hence, this week's recommended trade is long Eurostoxx50 versus Nikkei225. The profit target is 3.5% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Fed policy and U.S. interest rates are not irrelevant to EM, but they are of secondary importance. The most vital factors that drive EM financial markets - the direction of global trade, domestic demand, corporate profits, and borrowing costs - do not currently indicate a sustainable bottom. Stay short/underweight EM risk assets. Feature How long and how deep will the selloff in emerging markets (EM) be? There are many factors that investors should be watching to gauge potential for further downside in the EM universe, and to exercise judgement about a bottom. These include the business cycle trajectory, policy actions and shifts, market technicals, liquidity, valuations and other fundamental variables. Not all of preconditions typically need to be satisfied before a major bottom emerges. What's more, not all bottoms are identical and contingent on the same factors. Hence, there is no magical formula for calling a bottom or top in any financial market. Today we revisit some of the variables that, in our opinion, are worth monitoring in terms of gauging a bottom. To begin, we address a currently popular narrative within the investment industry, which contends the following: EM woes are primarily being driven by Federal Reserve tightening. According to this view, when the Fed halts its tightening campaign, the skies will clear for EM risk assets. By and large, we disagree with this narrative. EM And The Fed: Let's Get Things Straight Fed policy and U.S. interest rates are not irrelevant to EM, but they are of secondary importance. The primary drivers of EM economies are domestic fundamentals and the overall global business cycle. Historically, the correlation between EM risk assets and the fed funds rate has been mixed (Chart 1). On this chart, we shaded the periods in which EM stocks rallied, despite a rising fed funds rate. Chart 1EM Equity Prices And Fed Funds Rate: Mixed Correlation There were only two episodes when EMs crashed amid rising U.S. interest rates: the 1982 Latin America debt crisis and the 1994 Mexican Tequila crisis. Yet, it is vital to emphasize that these crises occurred because of poor EM fundamentals: elevated foreign currency debt levels, negative terms-of-trade shocks, large current account deficits, pegged exchange rates, and so on. Importantly, EM stocks and currencies did well during other periods of a rising fed funds rate: in 1983-1984, 1988-1989, 1999-2000 and 2017, as illustrated by the shaded periods in Chart 1. Hence, statistically there is no case that EMs plunge when the Fed is tightening policy. Why did the behavior of EM risk assets during various Fed tightening episodes differ? The key was EM fundamentals at the time: When fundamentals were healthy, EM managed to rally, despite Fed tightening; when fundamentals were flawed, EM markets relapsed regardless of the Fed's policy stance. Dire EM fundamentals also prevailed before the Asian/EM crises of 1997-1998. However, these late-1990s EM crises occurred without much in the way of Fed tightening or rising U.S. bond yields. Notably, U.S. and EU growth were booming and U.S. bond yields were dropping in 1997-'98. Specifically, U.S. and EU import volumes were growing at double-digit rates but this did not preclude EM crises, including in export-dependent Asian economies such as Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (Chart 2). It is critical to emphasize that China was not an economic superpower in the late 1990s. EM economic dependence on the U.S. and European economies was much greater than it is today. Yet neither booming demand in the U.S. and EU nor falling U.S. government bond yields prevented the Asian/EM crises from rolling across the globe in 1997-'98 (Chart 3A). Moreover, the S&P 500 was in a bull market in the second half of 1990s, as it is today (Chart 3B), but it did not help EM either. Chart 2Asian/EM Crises In 1997-98 Occurred Amid Booming Growth In U.S. And EU Chart 3AAsian/EM Crises In 1997-98 Took Place Amid Falling U.S. Bond Yields And Rising S&P 500 Chart 3BAsian/EM Crises In 1997-98 Took Place Amid Falling U.S. Bond Yields And Rising S&P 500 Hence, we can safely conclude that the EM fallout in 1997-'98 was due to EM domestic fundamentals - not developed market dynamics in general and Fed tightening in particular. An essential question is: Why are EM risk assets currently plunging while U.S. stocks and credit markets are holding up just fine? The U.S. economy is much more exposed to rising U.S. borrowing costs than EM. Despite this, the American economy, U.S. share prices and corporate bonds have been performing very well. In our view, this also stipulates that the core root for the current EM bear market is EM fundamentals. As we have repeatedly noted in various reports,1 EM fundamentals have been very frail, and the end of easy Fed monetary policy has not helped. The Fed's tightening can be regarded as the trigger - not the cause - of the EM bear market. The cause is weak EM fundamentals, such as credit excesses, low return on capital, weakening productivity growth and, in some cases, inflation and dependence on external funding. Importantly, the dependence of EM countries on the Chinese economy is presently greater than their dependence on the U.S. as shown in Table 1. Further, mainland growth is decelerating. Adding it all up, it is not surprising to us that EM financial markets are in turmoil. Table 1Many Emerging Economies Sell More##br## To China Than to The U.S. Our bearish view on EM has not been based on a negative view on U.S./EU growth. On the contrary, we have been bearish on EM/China and positive on domestic demand in the U.S. and the EU. Early this year, we promoted the theme of tectonic macro shifts,2 arguing that China/EM growth would slump and the U.S. economy would accelerate - and that such dynamics would propel the U.S. dollar higher. In turn, a firm dollar would inflict substantial pain on EM. Bottom Line: Rising U.S. interest rates, in and of itself, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for EM to sell off. Consequently, the Fed adopting an easier policy stance or lower U.S. Treasury yields may not, in and of themselves, create sufficient conditions for a reversal in EM financial markets, unless they coincide with a turnaround in other variables that matter for EM. What Matters For EM? As of now, we do not think sufficient conditions exist for a bottom in EM financial markets because of several pertinent factors: The most important factor for EM assets in the medium term is the direction of the business cycle in EM in general, and in China in particular. The EM business cycle is still decelerating, as evidenced by falling manufacturing PMI indexes in EM ex-China and China (Chart 4). Consistently, corporate earnings growth is decelerating for EM non-financial companies and Chinese non-financial A-share corporates (Chart 5). The rationale for our focus on non-financial corporate earnings is that non-performing loans are usually not recognized and provisioned for by banks in a timely way to reflect their true profitability. Typically, banks' earnings cycle lags the real economy. When the real economy is slowing, banks' profits typically deteriorate with a time lag. Chart 4Manufacturing Is Slowing In China And EM Ex-China Chart 5EM/China Corporate Profit Growth Is Decelerating Corporate profits in China and in EM have not yet contracted, but our view is that there will be a meaningful profit contraction in this downturn. As and when corporate earnings shrink, share prices will sell off. In brief, we are not out of the woods yet. In China, the industrial part of the economy continues to weaken, as evidenced by the slump in the total freight index and electricity consumption by manufacturing and resource sectors (Chart 6). So far, the cumulative impact of policy easing in China has not been sufficient to reverse its business cycle. As we discussed in our prior report,3 money/credit impulses lead China's industrial sector by nine months or so. Even if the government's recent stimulus initiatives cause money/credit impulses to improve materially today (which we still doubt), the impact on growth will be felt only next year. While financial markets are forward-looking, they are unlikely to bottom a full six months before the bottom in the real economy. Hence, we are currently in the window where China plays in financial markets remain at risk. Global trade is also weakening, as evidenced by falling semiconductor prices (Chart 7) and industrial metals. Similarly, the container freight index at Chinese ports is sluggish, and broader Asian export volumes are slowing (Chart 8). Chart 6Signs Of Industrial Slowdown In China Chart 7Semiconductor Prices Are Plunging Chart 8Asian Export To Slow Further Regarding liquidity, there are various definitions and ways to measure liquidity. One measure of EM liquidity is EM local interest rates. Chart 9A and 9B shows that interbank rates in various EM countries are rising due to the ongoing currency weakness. EM benchmark local currency bond yields are also under upward pressure (Chart 10, top panel). These are all signs of tightening liquidity. The ramifications of higher interest rates will be a slowdown in money and credit, and consequently a slump in domestic demand. Chart 9AEM: Interbank Rates##br## Are Rising Chart 9BEM: Interbank Rates##br## Are Rising Chart 10EM: Local Currency Bonds Yields##br## And Narrow Money Growth Chart 10 illustrates that local bond yields negatively correlate with narrow money growth in EM ex-China, Korea, Taiwan and India. These four markets are not included in the EM GBI local bond index; to maintain consistency, we have removed them from the money supply aggregate. EM sovereign and corporate bond yields continue to rise. As we have shown numerous times in previous reports, EM share prices do not bottom until EM corporate and sovereign bond yields roll over on a sustainable basis. Finally, we discussed EM equity and currency valuations in our August 23 report. We maintain that aggregate EM equity and currency valuations are not yet cheap enough to warrant bottom-fishing. Bottom Line: The most vital factors that drive EM financial markets - the direction of global trade, domestic demand, corporate profits, and borrowing costs - do not currently indicate a sustainable bottom. Stay short/underweight EM risk assets. 6 September 2018 The list of our trades and country allocation is always presented at the end of each report (please see page 10-11). Specifically, we continue shorting BRL, CLP, ZAR, IDR and MYR versus the U.S. dollar. Within the equity space, our overweights are Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, Chile, India, Mexico and central Europe; and underweights are Brazil, Peru, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Africa. Among local currency bonds we are overweight Russia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, and central Europe and underweight Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Understanding The EM/China Cycles," July 19, 2018. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Tectonic Macro Shifts," January 31, 2018. 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Do Note Catch A Falling Knife," August 23, 2018. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights President Trump has little to do with the ongoing EM selloff; The macro backdrop is the real culprit behind Turkey's woes, particularly the strong dollar... ... Which is a product of global policy divergence, with the U.S. stimulating while China pursues growth-constraining reforms; Chinese stimulus is important to watch, as it could change the game, but we do not expect China to save EM as it did in 2015; Turkey's troubles are a product of its late-stage populist cycle and will not end with Trump's magnanimity; The positive spin on the EM bloodbath is that it may force the Fed to slow its rate hikes, prolonging the business cycle. Feature Chart 1EM: Bloodbath Markets are selling off in Turkey and the wider EM economies (Chart 1), with the financial media focusing on the actions taken by the U.S. President Donald Trump in the escalating diplomatic spat between the two countries. Investors should be very clear what it means to ascribe the ongoing selloff to President Trump's aggressive posture with Ankara in particular and trade in general. If President Trump started EM's troubles with his tweets, he can then end them with another late-night missive. This is not our view. Turkey is enveloped in a deep morass of populism and weak fundamentals since at least 2013. What is worse, the ongoing selloff is likely going to ensnare at least the other fragile EM economies and potentially take down EM as an asset class. In this Report, we recount the pernicious macro backdrop - both geopolitical and economic - that EM economies face today. We then focus on Turkey itself and show that President Trump has little to do with the current selloff. The Bloodbath Is Afoot, Again Every financial bubble, and every financial bust, begins with a compelling story grounded in solid fundamentals. The now by-gone EM "Goldilocks Era" (2001-2011) was primarily driven by exogenous factors: a generational debt-fueled consumption binge in DM; an investment-fueled double-digit growth rate in China that kicked off a structural commodity bull market; and the unleashing of pent-up EM consumption/credit demand (Chart 2).1 These EM tailwinds petered out by 2011. Subsequently, China and EM economies entered a major downtrend that culminated in a massive commodity rout that began in 2014. But before the bloodbath could motivate policymakers to initiate painful structural reforms, Chinese policymakers stimulated in earnest. In the second half of 2015, Beijing became unnerved and injected enormous amount of credit and fiscal stimulus into the mainland economy (Chart 3). The intervention, however, did not change the pernicious fundamentals driving EM economies but merely caused "a mid-cycle recovery, or hiatus, in an unfinished downtrend," as our EM strategists have recently pointed out (Chart 4).2 Chart 2Goldilocks Era##BR##Is Over For EM Chart 3Is China About To Cause Another##BR##EM Mid-Cycle Recovery? Take Brazil, for example. Instead of using the 2014-2015 generational downturn to double-down on painful fiscal and pension reforms, the country's politicians declared President Dilma Rousseff to be the root-cause of all evil that befell the nation, impeached her in April 2016, and then proceeded to unceremoniously punt all painful reforms until after this year's election (if ever). They were enabled to do so by the "mid-cycle recovery" spurred by Chinese stimulus. In other words, Brazil's policymakers did nothing to actually deserve the recovery in asset prices but got one anyway. The country now will experience "faceoff time" with the markets, with no public support for painful reforms (Chart 5) and hardly an orthodox candidate in sight ahead of the October general election.3 Chart 4Where Are China/EM In The Cycle? Chart 5Brazil's Population Is Not Open To Fiscal Austerity Could Brazilian and Turkish policymakers be in luck, as Chinese policymakers have blinked again?4 Our assessment is that the coming stimulus will not be as stimulative as in 2015. First, President Xi's monetary and fiscal policy, since coming into office in 2012, has been biased towards tightening (Chart 6). Second, Chinese leverage has plateaued (Chart 7). In fact, "debt servicing" is now the third-fastest category of fiscal spending growth since Xi came to power (Table 1). Third, the July 31 Politburo statement pledged to make fiscal policy "more proactive" and "supportive," but also reaffirmed the commitment to continue the campaign against systemic risk. Chart 6Xi Jinping Caps##BR##Government Spending And Credit Chart 7The Rise And Plateau##BR##Of Macro Leverage Whether China's mid-year stimulus will be globally stimulative is now the question for global investors. The key data to watch out of China will be August credit numbers, to be released September 9th through 15th. Is President Trump not to be blamed at all for the EM selloff? What about the trade war against China? If anything, tariffs against China have caused Beijing to "blink" and implement some stimulative measures this summer. If one must find fault in U.S. policy, it is the double dose of fiscal stimulus that has endangered EM economies. A key theme for BCA's Geopolitical Strategy this year has been the idea that global policy divergence would replace the global growth convergence.5 Populist economic stimulus in the U.S. and structural reforms in China would imperil growth in the latter and accelerate it in the former, forming a bullish environment for the U.S. dollar (Chart 8). Table 1Total Government Spending Preferences (Under Leader's General Control) Chart 8U.S. Outperformance Should Be Bullish USD As such, the White House is partly responsible for the EM selloff, but not in any way that can be changed with a tweet or a handshake. Furthermore, we do not see the upcoming U.S. midterm election as somehow capable of altering the global growth dynamics.6 It is highly unlikely that Democrats will seek to spend less, and they cannot raise taxes under Trump. Bottom Line: EM economies have never adjusted to the end of their Goldilocks era. A surge in global liquidity pushed investors further down the risk-curve, propping up EM assets despite poor macro fundamentals. China's massive 2015-2016 stimulus arrested the bear market, giving investors a perception that EM economies had recovered. This mid-cycle hiatus, however, has now been overtaken by the global policy divergence between Washington and Beijing, which is bullish USD. President Trump's trade tariffs and aggressive pressure on Turkey do not help. However, they are merely the catalyst, not the cause, of the selloff. As such, investors should not "buy" EM on a resolution of China-U.S. trade tensions or of the Washington-Ankara diplomatic dispute. Contagion Risk BCA's Emerging Market Strategy is clear: in all episodes of a major EM selloff, the de-coupling between different regions proved to be unsustainable, and the markets that showed initial resilience eventually re-coupled to the downside (Chart 9).7 One reason to expect contagion risk among all EM markets is that the primary export market for China and other East Asian exporters are other EM economies, particularly the commodity producers (Chart 10). As such, it is highly unlikely that East Asian EM economies will be able to avoid a downturn. In fact, leading indicators of exports and manufacturing, such as Korea's manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratio and Taiwan's semiconductor shipments-to-inventory ratio herald further deceleration in their respective export sectors (Chart 11). Chart 9Asian And Latin American Equities:##BR##Unsustainable Divergences Chart 10EM Trades##BR##With EM Chart 11Asia Export##BR##Slowdown Is Afoot In respect of foreign funding requirements of EM economies, our EM strategists have pointed out that there is a substantive amount of foreign currency debt coming due in 2018 (Table 2), with majority EM economies facing much higher foreign debt burdens than in 1996 (Table 3).8 Investors should not, however, rely merely on debt as percent of GDP ratios for their vulnerability assessment. For example, Malaysia's private sector FX debt load stands at 63.7% of GDP, the second highest level after Turkey. But relative to total exports (a source of revenue for its indebted corporates) and FX reserves (which the central bank can use to plug the gap in the balance of payments), Malaysia actually scores fairly well. Table 2EM: Short-Term (Due In 2018) FX Debt Table 3EM Private Sector FX Debt: 1996 Versus Today Chart 12 shows the most vulnerable EM economies in terms of foreign currency private sector debt exposure relative to FX reserves and total exports. Unsurprisingly, Turkey stands as the most vulnerable economy, along with Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, and Colombia. Chart 12BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy Has Already Pinned Turkey As The Most Vulnerable EM Economy Will the EM selloff eventually ensnare DM economies as well, particularly the U.S.? We think yes. The drawdown in EM will bid up safe-haven assets like the U.S. dollar. The dollar can be thought of as America's second central bank, along with the Fed. If both the greenback and the Fed are tightening monetary conditions, eventually the U.S. economy will feel the burn. As such, it is dangerous to dismiss the ongoing crisis in Turkey as a merely localized problem that could, at its worst, spread to other EM economies. In 1997, Thailand played a similar role to that of Turkey. The Fed tightened rates in early 1997 and largely remained aloof of the developing East Asia crisis that eventually spread to Brazil and Russia, ignoring the tumult abroad until September 1998 when it finally cut rates three times. Fed policy easing at the end of 1998 ushered in the stock market overshoot and dot-com bubble, whose burst caused the end of the economic cycle. The same playbook may be occurring today. The Fed, motivated by the strong U.S. economy and fears of being too close to the zero-bound ahead of the next recession, is proceeding apace with its tightening cycle. It is likely to ignore troubles in the rest of the world until the USD overshoots or U.S. equities are impacted directly. At that point, perhaps later this year or early next year, the Fed will back off from tightening, ushering the one last overshoot phase ahead of the recession in 2020 - or beyond. Bottom Line: Research by BCA's EM strategists shows that EM contagion is almost never contained in just a few vulnerable economies. For investors who have to remain invested in EM economies, we would recommend that they go long Chinese equities relative to EM, given that Beijing policymakers are stimulating the economy to ensure that Chinese growth is stabilized. While this will be positive for China, it is likely to fall short of the 2015 stimulus that also stimulated non-China EM. An alternative play is to go long energy producers vs. the rest of EM - given our fundamentally bullish oil view combined with rising geopolitical risks regarding sanctions against Iran.9 We eventually expect EM risks to spur an appreciation in the USD that the Fed has to lean against by either pausing its tightening cycle, or eventually reversing it as it did in the 1997-1998 scenario. This decision will usher in the final blow-off stage in U.S. equities that investors will not want to miss. What About Turkey? Chart 13Turkey: Volatile Politics, Volatile Stocks In 2013, we called Turkey a "canary in the EM coal mine" arguing that its historically volatile financial markets would mean-revert as domestic politics became turbulent (Chart 13).10 Turkey is a deeply divided society equally split between the secularist cities, which are primarily located on the Mediterranean (Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, etc.), and the religiously conservative Anatolian interior. This split dates back to the founding of the modern Turkish Republic in the post-World War I era (and in truth, even before that). The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), a religiously conservative but initially pro-free-market party, managed to appeal to the conservative Anatolia while neutering the most powerful secularist institution in Turkey, its military. Investors hailed AKP's dominance because it reduced political volatility and initially promised both pro-market policies and even accession to the EU. However, the AKP has struggled to win more than 50% of the popular vote in a slew of elections and referendums since coming to power (Chart 14), a fact that belies its supposed iron-grip hold on Turkish politics since it came to power in 2002. The vulnerability behind AKP's hold on office has largely motivated President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's attempt to consolidate political power. While we disagree with the consensus view that Erdogan's constitutional changes have turned Turkey into a dictatorship, some of his actions do suggest a deep fear of losing power.11 Populist leadership is characterized by a strategy of "giving people what they want" so that the policymakers in charge remain in office. Erdogan's perpetually slim hold on power has motivated several populist policy decisions that have stretched Turkey's macro fundamentals. First, Turkey's central bank has essentially been conducting quantitative easing since 2013 via net liquidity injections into the banking system (Chart 15). Notably, these injections began at the same time as the May 2013 Gezi Park protests, which saw a huge outpouring of anti-government sentiment across Turkey's large cities. Essentially, politics has been motivating Ankara's monetary policy over the past five years. Chart 14AKP's Stranglehold On Power Is Overstated Chart 15Turkey's Populist Policies Began##BR##With Gezi Park Protests Second, Turkey's current account balance has suffered under the weight of rising energy costs, with no attempt to improve the fiscal balance (Chart 16). The government has done little in terms of structural reforms or fiscal austerity, instead President Erdogan has continued to challenge central bank independence on interest rates, despite a clear sign that the country is experiencing a genuine inflationary breakout (Chart 17). Chart 16Populism Means No Austerity Is In Sight Chart 17Genuine Inflation Breakout Overall, Turkey is a classic example of how populism in a highly divided and polarized country can get out of control. Foreign investors have long assumed that Erdogan's populism was benign, if not even positive, given the presumably ample political capital at the president's disposal. However, with every election or referendum, the government did not double-down on pro-market structural reforms. Instead, the pressure on the central bank only increased while Turkey's expensive and extravagant geopolitical adventures in neighboring Syria accelerated. In this pernicious macro context, it has not taken much to knock Turkey's assets off balance. President Trump's threats to expand sanctions to Turkish trade are largely irrelevant, given that the vast majority of Turkey's exports and FDI sources are non-American (Chart 18). However, given past behavior - such as after the shadowy Gülen "plot" to take over power or the 2016 coup d'état - markets are by now conditioned to expect that Turkish policymakers will double-down on populist policies in the face of renewed pressure. Chart 18Turkey-U.S. Relationship Is Not Economic What of Turkey's membership in NATO? Should investors fear broader geopolitical instability due to the domestic crisis? No. Ankara has used its membership in NATO, and particularly the U.S. reliance on its Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, as levers in previous negotiations and diplomatic spats with Europe and the U.S. If Ankara were to renege on its commitments to the Western military alliance, it would likely face a united front from Europe and the U.S. As such, we would expect Turkey neither to threaten exit from NATO, which it has not done in the past, nor even to threaten U.S. operations in Incirlik, which Erdogan's government has threatened before. The most likely outcome of the ongoing diplomatic spat, in fact, would be to see Ankara give in to U.S. demands, given the accelerating financial and economic crisis. Such an outcome, however, will not arrest the downturn. Turkey's economy and assets are fundamentally under pressure due to the realization by investors that this year's main macro theme is not the resynchronized global growth recovery, but rather the global policy divergence between the U.S. and China, which has appreciated the U.S. dollar. No amount of kowtowing by Ankara will change this macro trend. Bottom Line: The list of Turkish policy sins is long. Erdogan's reign has been characterized by deep polarization and populism, leading to suboptimal policy choices since at least 2013. The latest U.S.-Turkey spat is therefore merely one of many problems plaguing the country. As such, its resolution will not be a buying opportunity for investors. Investment Implications Our main investment theme in 2018 was that the global policy divergence between the U.S. and China - emblematized by fiscal stimulus in the U.S. and structural reforms in China - would end the global growth resynchronization. As the U.S. economy outperformed the rest of the world, the U.S. greenback would appreciate, imperiling EM economies. The best cognitive roadmap for today is the late 1990s, when the U.S. economy continued to grow apace as the rest of the world suffered from an EM crisis. The problems eventually washed onto American shores in the form of a stronger dollar, forcing the Fed to back off from tightening in mid-1998. Policy easing then led to the overshoot phase in U.S. equities in 1999. Investors should prepare for a similar roadmap by being long DXY relative to EM currencies, long DM equities (particularly U.S.) relative to EM equities, and tactically cautious on all global risk assets. Strategically, however, it makes sense to remain overweight equities as a Fed capitulation would be a boon for risk assets. If the current selloff in EM gets worse, we would expect that the Fed would again back off from tightening as it did in 1998, ushering in a blow-off stage in equities ahead of the next recession. Once the dollar peaks and EM assets bottom, U.S. equities will become the laggard, with global cyclicals outperforming. A secondary conclusion is that President Trump's trade rhetoric in general, and aggressive policies towards Turkey in particular, are merely a catalyst for the selloff. As such, if President Trump changes his mind, we would fade any rally in EM assets. The fundamental policy decisions that have led to the greenback rally have already been taken in 2017 and early 2018. The profligate tax cuts and the two-year stimulative appropriations bill, combined with Chinese policymakers' focus on controlling financial leverage, are the seeds of the current EM imbroglio. Finally, a small bit of housekeeping. We are booking gains on our long Malaysian ringgit / short Turkish lira trade for a gain of 51.2% since May. We are also closing our speculative long Russian equities relative to EM trade for a loss of -0.9% as a result of the persistent headwind from U.S. sanctions. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Understanding The EM/China Cycles," dated July 19, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Special Report, "Brazil: Faceoff Time," dated July 27, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?" dated August 8, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, and Weekly Report, "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Trump Fail The Midterm?" dated April 18, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Sustained Decoupling, Or Domino Effect?" dated June 14, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "A Primer On EM External Debt," dated June 7, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "U.S., OPEC Talk Oil Prices Down; Gulf Tensions Could Become Kinetic," dated July 19, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Turkey: Canary In The EM Coal Mine?" in "The Coming Political Recapitalization Rally," dated June 13, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Turkey: Deceitful Stability," in "EM: The Beginning Of The End," dated April 19, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.