Market Returns
Highlights 2018 YTD Summary: Investment grade corporate debt in the developed economies has performed poorly so far in 2018, led by lagging returns in Financials and some steepening of credit curves. U.S. credit has outperformed European equivalents. These trends are likely to continue over at least the next six months. Our Sector Portfolios: Our investment grade sector model portfolios have underperformed modestly so far in 2018 (-3bps each in the U.S., euro area & U.K.) - primarily due to our overweight stance on Financials which have performed poorly. Looking Ahead: We are maintaining a neutral level of target spread risk (i.e. duration-times-spread equal that of the benchmark index) in our sector model portfolios for the U.S., euro area and U.K. We will look to reduce that spread risk on signs of a deeper global growth slowdown, which we expect will unfold in 2019. Feature Chart of the WeekReversal Of Fortune The performance of investment grade (IG) corporate bonds in the developed markets, as an asset class, has been underwhelming so far in 2018. Using the total return indices from Bloomberg Barclays, IG corporates in the U.S., euro area and U.K. - the regions with the three largest corporate bond markets among the developed economies - have lost -2.0%, -0.3% and -1.1%, respectively. The numbers do not look much better when shown on an excess return basis versus duration-matched government bonds: U.S. IG -0.8%, euro area -1.2% and the U.K. -1.3%. The sluggish performance for IG corporates is a mirror image of the strong showing in 2017 when looking at credit spreads, which reached very tight levels at the end of last year (Chart of the Week). The 2017 rally left global corporates exposed to any negative shocks, of which there have been many so far in 2018 (the February VIX spike, the Q1 global growth slowdown, intensifying U.S.-China trade tensions, ongoing Fed tightening, a strengthening U.S. dollar, less dovish non-U.S. central banks, Italian politics, emerging market turmoil). Given the more challenging environment for overall corporate bond performance, the role of sector selection as a way to generate alpha, by mitigating losses from beta, is critical. In this Weekly Report, we take a brief look at IG sector performance so far this year and update our sector allocations based on our relative value models for IG corporates in the U.S., euro area and U.K. 2018 YTD Global Corporates Performance: A Down Year The major IG sector groupings for the U.S., euro area and U.K. are presented in Table 1, ranked by the 2018 year-to-date excess returns (all are shown in local currency terms). The overall index return for each region is also shown (highlighted in gray) in the table, to highlight how individual sectors have performed relative to the overall IG index. Table 12018 Year-To-Date Investment Grade Sector Returns For The U.S., Euro Area & U.K. As is always the case with IG corporates, the performance of the broad Financials grouping (which includes banks, insurance companies, REITs, etc.) heavily influences the returns of the overall IG index given the large weighting of Financials within the Corporates index across all three regions. In both the euro area and U.K., the sharp underperformance of Financials seen year-to-date (-1.3% and -1.4%, respectively) has created a somewhat odd situation where the majority of sectors have outperformed the overall index. That could only happen given the large weight of Financials in the euro area index (40%) and U.K. index (43%). Financials are also a big part of the U.S. index (32%), but there is more balance in the U.S. IG index which has helped boost the "beta" return from U.S. corporates. Specifically, the weightings of the top three largest U.S. broad sector groupings - Energy (9%), Technology (8%) and Communications (9%) - are a combined 26% of the overall U.S. IG index. Those three sectors are also among upper tier of the 2018 performance table in the euro area and U.K., but only represent a combined 15% and 8%, respectively, of each region's IG index. The conclusion is that index composition has flattered the performance of U.S. IG corporates versus European equivalents, given the latter's heavier weighting in Financials. The poor performance of Financials can be attributed to flattening global government bond yield curves (which is a negative for banks) and poor returns from global credit, especially in emerging markets (which is a negative for insurers that invest in spread product). We do not anticipate either of those trends reversing anytime soon - particularly the ongoing selloff in emerging market assets - thus Financials are likely to remain a drag on corporate bond performance for at least the next 3-6 months. One other factor that has weighed on overall IG corporate performance has been the steepening of credit spread curves. The gaps between credit spreads for Baa- and A-rated corporates have widened since the end of January, most notably in the euro area and the U.K. where growth has been slower than in the fiscal-policy fueled U.S. economy (Chart 2). With Baa-rated debt now representing one-half of the IG index for the U.S., euro area and U.K. (Chart 3) - a function of rising corporate leverage - continued underperformance of lower quality sectors will negatively impact the future overall returns from IG corporates. Chart 2Spread Curves Are##BR##Steepening In Europe Chart 31/2 Of Investment Grade Corporate Indices##BR##Are Now Baa-Rated Looking ahead, credit investors should be wary of the potential for downgrade risk in their portfolios given the high proportion of Baa-rated debt in the IG benchmark indices. This risk will become more acute when the global business cycle runs out of steam (a 2019 story, at the earliest, in our view). Bottom Line: Investment grade corporate debt in the developed economies has performed poorly so far in 2018, led by lagging returns in Financials and some steepening of credit curves. U.S. credit has outperformed European equivalents. These trends are likely to continue over at least the next six months. Our Corporate Sector Valuation Models: Winners & Losers Our recommended IG sector allocations come from our relative value model, which measures the valuation of each individual sector compared to the overall Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index for each region. The methodology takes each sector's individual option-adjusted spread (OAS) and regresses it in a panel regression with all other sectors in each region. The dependent variables in the model are each sector's duration, convexity (duration squared) and credit rating - the primary risk factors for any corporate bond. Using the common coefficients from that panel regression, a risk-adjusted "fair value" spread is calculated. The difference between the actual OAS and fair value OAS is our valuation metric used to inform our sector allocation ranking. The latest output from the models can be found in the tables and charts in the Appendix starting on Page 13. We also show the duration-times-spread (DTS) for each sector in those tables, which we use as the primary way to measure the riskiness (volatility) of each sector. The scatterplot charts in the Appendix show the tradeoff between the valuation residual from our model and each sector's DTS. We then apply individual sector weights based on the model output and our desired level of overall spread risk in our recommended credit portfolio. The weights are determined at our discretion and are not the output from any quantitative portfolio optimization process. The only constraints are that all sector weights must add to 100% (i.e. the portfolio is fully invested with no use of leverage) and the overall level of spread risk (DTS) must equal our desired target. That target portfolio DTS is the first decision in our discretionary allocation process, which is informed by our strategic views on corporate credit in each region. For example, if we were recommending an overweight allocation to U.S. IG corporates, then we would target a portfolio DTS that was greater than the index DTS. If we then became a bit more cautious on U.S. corporates, we could reduce the target DTS (spread risk) of our model sector portfolio while maintaining an overall overweight allocation to U.S. corporates versus U.S. Treasuries. That is exactly what we did one year ago, when we began to target a weighted DTS of all our individual sector tilts that was roughly equal to the overall IG corporate index DTS for each region (U.S. euro area, U.K.) while maintaining an overall overweight stance on global corporate credit versus government debt. More recently, we have downgraded our stance on global spread product to neutral, while continuing to favor the U.S. over Europe, in response to growing tensions from emerging markets and the brewing U.S.-China trade war.1 Chart 4Performance Of Our IG Sector Allocations We last presented a performance update for our global IG corporate sector allocations back on April 12th of this year. Since then, our recommended tilts have modestly underperformed the benchmark index in excess return terms by a combined -3bps (Chart 4). This came entirely from the euro area, with both the U.S. and U.K. sector allocations simply matching the benchmark index. Year-to-date, our IG sector allocations have underperformed the benchmark by a combined -9bps in excess return terms, split equally among the U.S., euro area and U.K. This is a result entirely consistent with our long-standing stance to overweight Financials in all three regions, which continue to appear cheap in our valuation framework. Also, an increasing number of sectors had become expensive within that framework, in all three regions, so some portion of that overweight to global Financials was "by default" given that our model portfolios must be fully invested (finding value has been a persistent problem for credit investors over the past year). The return numbers for our U.S. sector allocations can be found in Table 2. Since our last update in April, the best performing sectors (in excess return terms) within our recommended tilts have all been underweights: Pharmaceuticals (+1.2bps), Electric Utilities (+1.1bps), Retailers (+0.6bps), Health Care (+0.6bps), Diversified Manufacturing (+0.5bps) and Chemicals (+0.4bps). These were fully offset, however, by underperformance from our large overweights to Energy (-4.1bps) and Financials (-2.7bps). Table 2U.S. Investment Grade Performance The return numbers for our euro area sector allocations - shown here hedged into U.S. dollars as is the case when we present all our model portfolio returns - can be found in Table 3. Since our last update in April, the best performing sectors (in excess return terms) within our recommended tilts have been underweights to Transportation (+2.0bps) and Electric Utilities (+0.6bps), with underperformance coming from our underweight to Food/Beverage (-2.4bps) and overweight to Life Insurers (-3.1bps). Table 3Euro Area Investment Grade Performance The return numbers for our U.K. sector allocations (again, hedged into U.S. dollars) can be found in Table 4. Since our last update in April, the best performing sectors (in excess return terms) within our recommended tilts have been our underweight to Utilities (+2.0bps) and Consumer Non-Cyclicals (+0.9bps), but this was nearly fully offset by our large overweight to Financials (-2.6bps). Table 4U.K. Investment Grade Performance Despite the underperformance of our sector portfolios year-to-date, the cumulative alpha from the portfolios since we began tracking the performance of the recommendations remains positive (+2bps in the U.S., +9bps in the euro area, +42bps in the U.K.). Bottom Line: Our investment grade sector model portfolios have underperformed modestly so far in 2018 (-3bps each in the U.S., euro area & U.K.) - primarily due to our overweight stance on Financials which have performed poorly. Changes To Our Sector Model Portfolios As mentioned earlier, the first choice we make when determining the recommended sector allocations within our model portfolios is how much spread risk (DTS) to take. For the U.S., euro area and U.K., we have already been maintaining a portfolio DTS that is close to the index DTS since August 2017. After our recent decision to downgrade global spread product allocations to neutral versus government bonds, we do not feel a need to further reduce our spread risk by targeting a below-index DTS. That would likely be our next decision when we wish to get more defensive on credit, which would await evidence that global leading economic indicators are sharply slowing and/or global monetary policy is becoming restrictive. Within that neutral level of spread risk, we are making the following portfolio changes based on the updated output from our valuation models presented in the Appendix Tables on pages 13-18. The goal is to favor sectors that have a DTS close the index DTS but have positive valuation residuals from our model: U.S.: We downgrade Tobacco and Wireless to Neutral; we downgrade Paper to Underweight. Euro Area: We upgrade Transportation, Other Industrials, Natural Gas, Brokerages/Asset Managers and Finance Companies to Overweight; we upgrade Automotive, Retailers and Tobacco to Neutral; we downgrade Wireless to Neutral; we downgrade Diversified Manufacturing & Media Entertainment to Underweight. U.K.: We upgrade Health Care, Transportation and Other Industrials to Overweight; we upgrade Integrated Energy to Neutral; we downgrade Technology & Wireless to Neutral; we downgrade Metals & Mining and Supermarkets to underweight. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Corporate Bond Exposure To Neutral", dated June 26th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Appendix Table 1U.S. Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Appendix Chart 1U.S. Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Appendix Table 2Euro Area Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Appendix Chart 2Euro Area Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Appendix Table 3U.K. Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Appendix Chart 3U.K. Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Feature Desynchronization To Continue This year has been characterized by strong growth and asset performance in the U.S., and weakness everywhere else. While U.S. stocks are up by 10% year-to-date, those in the rest of the world have fallen by 3% in dollar terms (Chart 1). GDP growth in Q2 was 4.2% QoQ annualized in the U.S., compared to 1.6% in the euro area and 1.9% in Japan. Leading economic indicators point to this continuing and, therefore, to the U.S. dollar strengthening further (Chart 2). This has already put significant pressure on emerging markets, where equities have fallen by 7% this year in USD terms. Recommended Allocation Chart 1U.S. Has Outperformed Chart 2...And Leading Indicators Suggest This Will Continue There are many reasons why the desynchronization is likely to continue: U.S. growth continues to be boosted by tax cuts and increased fiscal spending which, according to IMF estimates, will add 0.7% to GDP growth this year and 0.8% next. The peak impact from the stimulus will not come until around Q1 next year. Further protectionist tariff increases. Despite August's tentative agreement between the U.S. and Mexico, the Trump administration still plans to implement 10-25% tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports, and also possibly 25% tariffs on auto imports, in September. This will - initially at least - be more negative for global exporters, such as China, the euro area and Japan, than for the U.S. China is unlikely to implement the sort of massive stimulus that it carried out in 2009 and 2015.1 It has recently cut interest rates and brought forward fiscal spending to cushion downside risk. But, given the Xi administration's focus on deleveraging and structural reform, we do not expect to see a substantial increase in credit creation (Chart 3). This indicates that emerging markets, and capital goods and commodities exporters, will continue to struggle. European banks will stay under pressure because of the problems in Italy (which will fight this fall with the European Commission over its fiscal stimulus plans) and Turkey. Euro zone equity relative performance is heavily influenced by the performance of financials, even though the sector is only 18% of market cap (Chart 4). The euro zone and Japan are also far more sensitive to a slowdown in EM growth: exports to EM are 8.4% and 6.4% of GDP in the euro zone and Japan respectively, but only 3.6% in the U.S. Chart 3China Unlikely To Repeat 2009 and 2015 Chart 4Banks Drive European Equity Performance Eventually, however, strong growth in the U.S. will become a headwind for U.S. assets too. Already, there are some signs of wage growth ticking up (Chart 5), suggesting that the labor market is finally becoming tight. Fed chair Jerome Powell, in his speech at Jackson Hole last month, reiterated that a "gradual process of normalization [of monetary policy] remains appropriate", suggesting that the Fed will continue to hike by 25 basis points a quarter. But the futures market is pricing in only 75 basis points in hikes over the next two years (Chart 6). And, if core PCE inflation were to rise above the Fed's forecast of 2.1% (it is currently 2.0%), the Fed would need to accelerate the pace of tightening. This all points to further dollar strength which will hurt emerging markets, given the consistent inverse correlation between U.S. financial conditions and EM asset performance (Chart 7). Chart 5Is Wage Growth Finally Accelerating? Chart 6Markets Pricing In Only Three More Fed Hikes Chart 7Tightening Financial Conditions Are Bad For EM We continue for now, therefore, to remain overweight U.S. equities in USD terms within a global multi-asset portfolio, despite their strong performance this year. We are neutral on equities overall and expect to move to negative perhaps early next year, when we will see some of the classic warning signs of recession (inverted yield curve, rise in credit spreads, peak in profit margins) starting to flash. Profit expectations are one key to the timing of this. Analysts forecast 22% YoY EPS growth for S&P 500 companies in Q3 and 21% in Q4, slowing to 10% in 2019. Those are strong numbers. But if companies are unable to beat these forecasts, what would be the catalyst for stocks to continue to rise? Moreover, analysts' expectations for long-term earnings growth are more optimistic currently than any time since 2000 (Chart 8). It would not take much of a downside earnings surprise - perhaps caused by the strength of the dollar, or regulatory change for internet companies - to disappoint the market. Equities: Our strongest conviction call remains an underweight on emerging markets. Emerging markets are entering what is likely to be a prolonged period of deleveraging, given their elevated levels of debt relative to GDP and exports (Chart 9). That makes them very vulnerable to the stronger U.S. dollar and higher interest rates that we expect. While EM equities have already fallen significantly, they are not yet cheap and investors have mostly not capitulated: outflows from EM funds have been small relative to inflows in previous years (Chart 10). Among developed markets, we keep our overweight on the U.S.: not only does its lower beta mean it should outperform in the event of a sell-off, but if markets were to see a last-year-of-the-bull-market "melt-up" (similar to 1999), this would likely be led by tech and internet stocks, where the U.S. is overweight. Chart 8Analysts Too Optimistic About Long-Term Earnings Growth Chart 9Long Period Of Deleveraging Ahead For EM Chart 10No Signs Of Capitulation In EM Yet Fixed Income: Higher inflation, and more Fed tightening than the market is pricing in, suggest that long-term rates have further to rise. Fed rate surprises have historically been a good indicator of the return from U.S. Treasury bonds (Chart 11). We expect to see the 10-year yield reach 3.3-3.5% by early next year. We therefore remain underweight duration, and prefer TIPS over nominal bonds. We recently lowered our weighting in corporate credit to neutral (within the underweight fixed-income category). Junk bonds have continued to perform well, thanks to their 250 basis point default-adjusted spread over Treasuries. But spreads typically start to widen one to two quarters before equities peak, so we think caution is already warranted, particularly in the light of the higher leverage, longer duration, and falling average credit rating which currently characterize the U.S. corporate credit market. Currencies: As described above, mainly because of divergent growth and monetary policy, we expect the U.S. dollar to strengthen further, but more against emerging market currencies than against the yen or euro. Short-term, however, the dollar may have overshot and speculative positions are significantly dollar-long (Chart 12), so a temporary pullback would not be surprising. Chart 11More Fed Hikes Means Higher Long-Term Rates Chart 12Are Investors Too Dollar Bullish? Chart 13Dollar And China Hurting Commodities Commodities: Industrial metals prices have declined sharply over the past few months, on the back of the stronger dollar and slowdown in China (Chart 13). We expect this to continue. Gold, we have long argued, has a place in a portfolio as an inflation hedge. But it is also negatively impacted by rises in the dollar and real interest rates, and these are likely to continue to be a drag on performance. The oil price is currently being driven by supply dynamics: How much more oil will Saudi Arabia produce? Will the E.U. and Japan follow the U.S. in imposing sanctions on Iran? Will Venezuelan production fall further? These will make the crude oil price more volatile, but our energy strategists see Brent softening a little to average $70 in H2 this year, but with potential upside surprises taking it up to an average of $80 in 2019. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 For details on why we think massive stimulus is unlikely, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?" Parts One and Two, dated 8 August 2018 and 15 August 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
Dear Client, There will be no U.S. Bond Strategy report next week. Our regular publishing schedule will resume on September 4th. Best regards, Ryan Swift Highlights Global Growth Divergences: The impact of weak foreign growth will eventually be felt in the U.S. and could even result in the Fed pausing its rate hike cycle for a time. But history tells us that the resulting decline in Treasury yields will not last long. Investors should hedge the risk of weak foreign growth by maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product, but should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Corporates: As global growth divergences deepen and the dollar strengthens, corporate profit growth will eventually fade and corporate leverage and defaults will rise. Accelerating wages will exacerbate the problem, much like in the late 1990s. Municipal Bonds: Municipal bonds offer attractive yields relative to corporate bonds, especially considering that they are more insulated from weakening foreign growth. Remain overweight municipal bonds. Feature "It is just not credible that the United States can remain an oasis of prosperity unaffected by a world that is experiencing greatly increased stress." - Alan Greenspan, September 19981 Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan uttered the above sentence in early September 1998. Russia had just defaulted on its government debt and a few weeks later the heavily-exposed hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management would require a bail-out, kicking off a period of turmoil in U.S. financial markets. The Federal Reserve responded by cutting interest rates by 75 basis points between September 30th and November 4th, despite a domestic labor market that Chairman Greenspan described as "unusually tight." We recall this tumultuous period because a divergence between strong U.S. and weak non-U.S. growth is once again putting upward pressure on the U.S. dollar, leading to pain in emerging markets. So far it is the Turkish lira bearing the brunt of the sell-off, but the lesson from the late 1990s is that other EMs, and eventually the U.S., are also vulnerable. A joint Special Report, published last week, from our Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services provides a blow-by-blow account of the late 1990s period, with implications for today's currency markets.2 In this week's report, we focus on what divergences between strong U.S. growth and weak non-U.S. growth mean for U.S. bond portfolios. A History Of False Starts The divergence between strong U.S. and weak non-U.S. growth is illustrated in Chart 1. The shaded regions in the chart correspond to periods when the Global (ex. U.S) leading economic indicator (LEI) is contracting while the U.S. LEI continues to rise. There have been 10 such episodes since 1966. In the four instances that occurred prior to 1993, the U.S. economy remained insulated from flagging growth in the rest of the world. That is, the U.S. LEI continued to expand and the Global (ex. U.S.) LEI eventually recovered into positive territory. However, since 1993, every time the Global (ex. U.S) LEI has dipped below zero the U.S. LEI has eventually followed. In other words, prior to 1993 the U.S. economy acted very much like an oasis of prosperity. But global events have become much more important since then. Chairman Greenspan's claim was correct in 1998 and remains relevant today. Case Study: 1997 Two of the post-1993 growth divergence episodes are particularly relevant for bond investors today. The first occurred in 1997 (Chart 2). The Fed tried to kick off a rate hike cycle in March 1997, but the combination of a Fed rate hike and weak foreign growth led to a surge in the dollar. Eventually, the strong dollar dragged our Fed Monitor below zero and the Fed was forced to abandon rate hikes until June 1999. In the interim, the Fed's dovish turn caused the dollar to halt its uptrend (Chart 2, panel 3). Treasury yields collapsed and then recovered (Chart 2, panel 4). Credit spreads moved in line with the exchange rate (Chart 2, bottom panel), widening alongside a stronger dollar in 1997/98, and then leveling off as the Fed eased policy and the dollar moved sideways. The end result of the 1997 episode is that Treasury yields took a round trip, falling as the Fed backed away from its rate hike path, then rising again once rate hikes resumed. Credit spreads, however, never fully recovered their 1997 tights. Case Study: 2015 More recently, growth divergences flared again in 2015 (Chart 3). This time, our Fed Monitor was already recommending rate cuts in late-2015, but the Fed pressed on and delivered the first rate hike of the cycle that December. Once again, the combination of a hawkish Fed and weak foreign growth put upward pressure on the dollar (Chart 3, panel 3), and the Fed was forced to pause its rate hike cycle. Chart 1The Weight Of The World Chart 2False Start 1997 Chart 3False Start 2015 Much like in 1997, Treasury yields declined as the Fed went on hold and then started to rise again as rate hikes resumed (Chart 3, panel 4). Also like 1997, credit spreads widened alongside the strengthening dollar, though this time they actually managed to tighten back to new lows when the Fed went on hold and the upward pressure on the dollar abated in 2016/17 (Chart 3, bottom panel). Implications For The Present Day Chart 4Inflation Is Much Closer To Target What lessons can we take away from these two episodes? The first is that if growth divergences continue to worsen and the dollar continues to appreciate, it will eventually cause our Fed Monitor to dip below zero and the Fed will likely pause its rate hike cycle. Such a dovish pause will lead to a decline in Treasury yields and a flattening-off, or even depreciation, of the dollar. However, we also know from history that any decline in Treasury yields is likely to prove fleeting. Once dovish Fed action takes the shine off the dollar, foreign economic growth will improve and the Fed will soon be able to resume rate hikes. This was the case in both 1997 and 2015. There is even reason to believe that any pause in Fed rate hikes could be particularly short-lived this time around. Inflation is already closing-in on the Fed's target and there is some evidence that long-dated inflation expectations have become stickier. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have not fallen much in recent weeks, even as weakening foreign growth has dragged down commodity prices (Chart 4). As for credit spreads, history shows that they are likely to widen as global growth divergences deepen and the dollar appreciates. Then, any pause in Fed rate hikes will improve credit's outlook for a time. Once again, because relatively strong inflation will limit the length of time that the Fed can pause lifting rates, we think any period of spread tightening that coincides with more dovish Fed policy will be short-lived. We also see similarities with the 1997 episode in terms of the outlook for corporate defaults. Such similarities bode ill for credit spreads, as is discussed in the next section. Bottom Line: The impact of weak foreign growth will eventually be felt in the U.S. and could even result in the Fed pausing its rate hike cycle for a time. However, history tells us that the resulting decline in Treasury yields will not last long. Investors should hedge the risk of weak foreign growth by maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product, but should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Corporate Defaults: Look To The Late 1990s Considering the two case studies presented above, the reason corporate bonds performed worse in 1997 compared to 2015 is that in 1997 corporate leverage and defaults started to creep higher and did not peak until the 2001 recession. In contrast, corporate leverage flattened-off and defaults fell once the Fed paused its rate hike cycle in 2016 (Chart 5). Chart 5Corporate Defaults: The Late 1990s Roadmap Looking closer, the bottom panel of Chart 5 shows that once profit growth fell below the rate of debt growth in 1997 it continued to trend down. In 2015/16, profit growth was again dragged lower by the strong dollar, but it quickly rebounded once the Fed turned dovish. In our view, if global growth divergences continue to worsen and the dollar continues to strengthen, the next increase in corporate leverage will probably look more like 1997. To see why, we consider the two reasons why profit growth decelerated in 1997. The first is the obvious reason that the strong dollar started to weigh on corporate revenues. The growth in business sales moderated and the PMI dipped below 50 (Chart 6). Today, we have not yet seen enough dollar strength to weigh on business sales or the manufacturing PMI, which is still hovering around 60 (Chart 6, bottom panel). But this will change as the emerging market turmoil spreads and eventually impacts the U.S. business sector. The second reason why the 1997 corporate default episode is the most comparable to the present day is that much like in 1997, but unlike in 2015, the labor market is extremely tight and wages are starting to accelerate (Chart 7). The growth in unit labor costs started to outpace the growth in corporate selling prices in 1997, and this caused our Profit Margin Proxy to fall (Chart 7, panel 2). At present, our Profit Margin Proxy is very close to the zero line, but with a sub-4% unemployment rate further downside is likely. Finally, much like in 1997, small businesses are increasingly citing labor quality as a more important problem than lack of sales (Chart 7, bottom panel). The difference between the rankings of these two problems has done a good job tracking profit growth historically. This indicator is currently at levels that are much more reminiscent of the late 1990s. Chart 6Dollar Strength Drags Down Revenue Chart 7Wages Will Weigh On Profits Bottom Line: As global growth divergences deepen and the dollar strengthens, corporate profit growth will eventually fade and corporate leverage and defaults will rise. Accelerating wage growth will exacerbate the problem, much like in the late 1990s. Take Shelter In Municipal Bonds Chart 8Munis As A Safe Haven Another implication of the divergence in growth between the U.S. and the rest of the world is that fixed income sectors that are more exposed to the domestic U.S. economy and less exposed to foreign growth and the exchange rate should fare better. In this regard, municipal bonds are an obvious candidate. While state & local government net borrowing has flattened off at a relatively high level during the past few quarters, state governments have recently re-committed to austerity (Chart 8). Data from the National Association of State Budget Officers show that states enacted a net $9.9 billion increase in revenues in fiscal year 2018, with another $2.8 billion planned for fiscal year 2019. Historically, revenue raises of this magnitude have led to declines in net borrowing, which should ensure that municipal ratings upgrades continue to outpace downgrades for the time being (Chart 8, bottom panel). But there's an even better reason for investors to favor municipal bonds. Quite simply, yields remain attractive compared to the riskier corporate alternatives, particularly at longer maturities. The top section of Table 1 shows relevant statistics for the 5-year, 10-year and 20-year tax-exempt Bloomberg Barclays Municipal bond indexes, along with the closest comparable indexes from the investment grade corporate sector. We observe that a 5-year Aa-rated municipal bond carries a yield of 2.18% versus a yield of 3.26% for a comparable corporate bond index. This implies that an investor with an effective tax rate of 33% should be indifferent between the two bonds. Any investor exposed to an effective tax rate above 33% should favor the municipal bond, even before considering the differences in risk between the two sectors. Moving further out the curve, the breakeven tax rate falls to 24% at the 10-year maturity point and to either 13% or 21% at the 20-year maturity point, depending on whether you use Aa-rated or A-rated corporate debt as the relevant comparable. We also find that High-Yield municipal debt looks attractive compared to the corporate alternative. The Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield Muni Index (excluding Puerto Rico) trades at a breakeven tax rate of 18% relative to a Ba-rated corporate bond, and 33% relative to a B-rated corporate bond. Even the taxable municipal space is attractive. The bottom section of Table 1 shows that the average yield on the 1-5 year taxable municipal bond index is slightly higher than that of the closest comparable corporate bond index. The same goes for the 5-10 year taxable muni index. Table 1A Comparison Of Municipal And Corporate Bond Yields Finally, drawing on work we presented in a recent Special Report, we provide total return forecasts for different municipal bond indexes along with the comparable corporate sector indexes (Table 2).3 We show results for three different effective tax rates, depending on how many rate hikes you expect from the Fed during the next 12 months and whether you expect Municipal / Treasury yield ratios to remain flat, widen to their post-2016 highs, or tighten to their post-2016 lows. Table 2Municipal Bonds Total Return Forecasts Vs. Corporate Sector Comparables For example, in an environment where the Fed delivers four rate hikes during the next 12 months and Municipal / Treasury yield ratios remain flat, an investor with a 24% effective tax rate can expect a total return of 2.81% from the 10-year Municipal bond index. If we adjust returns using the top marginal tax rate of 37% the expected total return rises to 3.52%. In the same scenario, where corporate spreads also remain flat, investors can expect a total return of 2.86% from a corporate bond with similar duration and credit rating. Bottom Line: Municipal bonds offer attractive yields relative to corporate bonds, especially considering that they are more insulated from weakening foreign growth. Remain overweight municipal bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980904.htm 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy / Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Bear And The Two Travelers", dated August 17, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Dear Client, We had intended to send you the second part of our two-part special report on long-term inflation risks this week, but given the sharp moves in the dollar and emerging market assets, we decided to write this bulletin instead. Barring any further major market turbulence, we will send you the sequel to the inflation report next week. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The dollar rally and EM selloff have further to go. The U.S. economy is firing on all cylinders, while the rest of the world is sputtering. Turkey is not an isolated case. Emerging markets as a whole have feasted on debt over the past decade, and now will be held to account. We remain neutral on global equities, while underweighting EM relative to DM and overweighting defensives relative to deep cyclicals. Brewing EM stresses could cause the 10-year Treasury yield to temporarily fall to 2.5%, leading to a further flattening of the yield curve. However, the long-term path for yields is up. Feature King Dollar Reigns Supreme Our expectation going into this year was that the dollar would strengthen, triggering turmoil in emerging markets. This thesis has panned out, raising the question of whether it is time to declare victory and move on. We don't think so. While market positioning has clearly shifted closer towards our own views, we still think that the stronger dollar/weaker EM story has further to run. To understand why, it is useful to review the reasoning behind our thesis. Our bullish dollar view was based on a simple observation, which is that the U.S. had finally reached a point where aggregate demand was starting to outstrip supply. This implied that the dollar would need to strengthen in order to shift demand away from the United States. It is amazing how many commentators still think that the U.S. can divert spending towards imported goods without any change in the value of the dollar. Americans do not care what the CBO's or IMF's estimate of the domestic output gap is when they are deciding whether to buy U.S. or foreign-made goods. They care about relative quality-adjusted prices. Since the U.S. is a fairly closed economy - imports are only 15% of GDP - we reckoned that the dollar would need to strengthen considerably in order to displace a significant amount of domestic production with foreign-made goods. This is exactly what happened. Still More Upside For U.S. Rates Currency values tend to track interest rate differentials (Chart 1). As such, our prediction of a stronger dollar entailed the expectation that investors would increasingly price in a more hawkish path for the fed funds rate. This has indeed occurred. Since the start of the year, the expected fed funds rate has risen by 34 basis points for end-2018 and by 65 basis points for end-2019 (Chart 2). Chart 1Historically, The Dollar Has Moved In Line With Interest Rate Differentials Chart 2Rate Expectations Have Increased, ##br##But There Is Still A Long Way To Go Our sense is that U.S. interest rate expectations can rise further. Faster wage growth will boost consumption. The household savings rate can also fall from its current elevated level, which will give consumer spending an additional boost (Chart 3). Business investment should remain firm. Chart 4 shows that capex intentions are strong, while bank lending standards for commercial and industrial loans, which tend to lead loan growth, continue to ease. Fiscal stimulus will also goose the economy. Chart 3Consumption Could Accelerate As The Savings Rate Drops Chart 4U.S. Capex Investment Going Strong Could interest rate expectations move up more in the rest of the world than in the U.S., causing the dollar to tumble? It is possible, but unlikely. In contrast to most other central banks, the Fed wants to tighten financial conditions in order to keep the economy from overheating. A weaker dollar would entail an easing of financial conditions, and hence would require an even more hawkish response from the Fed. Currency Intervention Is Unlikely To Succeed Some have speculated that the Trump administration will intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to drive down the value of the dollar. We doubt this will happen, but even if such interventions were to take place, they would not be successful. Presumably, currency interventions would take the form of purchases of foreign exchange, financed through the issuance of Treasurys. The purchase of foreign currency would release U.S. dollars into the financial system, but the sale of Treasury securities would suck out those dollars from the financial system. The net result would be no change in the volume of U.S. dollars in circulation - what economists call a "sterilized" intervention. Both economic theory and years of history show that sterilized interventions do not have lasting effects on currency values. The Fed could, of course, provide funding for the Treasury's purchases of foreign exchange, leading to an increase in the monetary base. This would be tantamount to an unsterilized intervention. However, such a deliberate attempt to weaken the dollar by expanding the money supply would fly in the face of the Fed's efforts to cool growth by tightening financial conditions. We highly doubt the Fed's current leadership would go along with this. Emerging Markets In The Crosshairs This brings us to emerging markets. EM equities almost always fall when U.S. financial conditions are tightening (Chart 5). One can believe that emerging market stocks will go up; one can also believe, as we do, that the Fed will do its job and tighten financial conditions. But one cannot believe that both of these things will happen at the same time. Some pundits think that the plunge in the Turkish lira is not emblematic of the problems facing emerging markets. We are skeptical of this sanguine conclusion. Chart 6 shows that as a share of both GDP and exports, EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s. Turkey may be the worst of the lot, but it is hardly an isolated case. Chart 5Tightening U.S. Financial Conditions Do Not Bode Well For EM Stocks Chart 6EM Dollar Debt Is High Chart 7 presents a vulnerability heat map for a number of key emerging markets.1 We consider fourteen variables (expressed as a share of GDP, unless otherwise noted): 1) Current account balance; 2) Net international investment position; 3) External debt; 4) Change in external debt during the past five years; 5) External debt-servicing obligations coming due over the next 12 months as a share of exports; 6) External funding requirements over the next 12 months as a share of foreign exchange reserves; 7) Private sector savings-investment balance; 8) Private-sector debt; 9) Change in private-sector debt over the past five years; 10) Government budget balance; 11) Government debt; 12) Change in government debt over the past five years; 13) Share of domestic debt held by overseas investors; and 14) Inflation. Our analysis suggests that Turkey, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia are all vulnerable to balance of payments stresses. Chart 7Vulnerability Heat Map For Key EM Markets Of course, asset markets in some of these economies have already moved quite a bit over the past few months, so it is useful to benchmark their stock markets and currencies to the underlying macro risks they face. For stock markets, we do this by comparing the heat map score with a composite valuation measure that incorporates price-to-book, price-to-sales, price-to-forward earnings, price-to-cash flow, and the dividend yield. Our analysis suggests that stocks in Russia and Korea are rather cheap, while equities in Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Argentina are still quite expensive (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8Some EM Stock Markets And Currencies Have Not Fully Priced In Macro Risks For currencies, we compare the heat map score with the level of the real effective exchange rate relative to its ten-year average. The Mexican peso, Brazilian real, Chilean peso, Indonesian rupiah, and South African rand still look pricey on this basis (Chart 8, bottom panel). In contrast, the Turkish lira and the Argentine peso are starting to look fairly cheap, although they could still get quite a bit cheaper before finding a floor. The China Wildcard The last time emerging markets seemed at risk of melting down was in 2015. Fortunately for them, China came to the rescue, delivering a massive double dose of fiscal and credit easing. Things may not be so straightforward this time around. China does not want to let its economy falter, but high debt levels and an overvalued housing market have made the usual policy prescriptions less appealing. As such, we would not necessarily conclude that the recent decline in the Chinese three-month interbank rate is a signal that the authorities want to see much faster credit growth (Chart 9). They may simply want to see a weaker currency. This is an important distinction because while faster credit growth would boost demand for EM exports, a weaker yuan would hurt other emerging markets by giving China a leg up in competitiveness. A weaker yuan would also make it more expensive for Chinese companies to import natural resources, thus putting downward pressure on commodity prices. It is too soon to know what policy mix the Chinese authorities will choose to pursue. Investors should pay close attention to the monthly data on the growth rates of social financing and local government bond issuance. So far, the combined credit and fiscal impulse has continued to weaken, suggesting that the authorities are in no hurry to open the stimulus floodgate (Chart 10). Chart 9Is China Trying To Stimulate Credit ##br##Growth Or Weaken The Yuan? Chart 10China Has Been Slow To Open The Credit And Fiscal Spigots Worries About The Euro Area Slower EM growth is likely to take a bigger toll on the euro area than the United States. Exports to emerging markets account for only 3.6% of GDP for the U.S., compared to 9.7% of GDP for the euro area. Euro area banks also have more exposure to emerging markets than U.S. banks. Notably, Spanish banks have sizeable exposure to Turkey and other vulnerable emerging markets (Chart 11). Meanwhile, worries about Italy have resurfaced. The 10-year Italian bond yield has moved back above 3%, not far from its May highs. The gap in fiscal policy between what Italy's new populist government has promised voters and what the European Commission is willing to accept remains a mile wide. Italian banks have become increasingly wary of financing their spendthrift government. With the ECB stepping back from asset purchases, two critical buyers of Italian debt are moving to the sidelines. The credit impulse in the euro area turned negative even before concerns about emerging markets and Italian politics came to the fore. As Chart 12 shows, the credit impulse has reliably tracked euro area growth. Right now, there is little reason to think that European banks will open the credit spigots, suggesting that euro area growth will be lackluster. Chart 11Who Has More Exposure To EM? Chart 12Euro Area Credit Impulse Suggests Growth Will Remain Lackluster Investment Conclusions If last year was the year of global growth resynchronization, this year is turning into one of desynchronization. The U.S. economy is outperforming the rest of the world, and the dollar is benefiting in the process. As we go to press, the broad trade-weighted dollar is up 6.1% year-to-date and stands only 2.2% below its December 28, 2016 high (Chart 13). From a long-term perspective, the greenback has become expensive, so we are inclined to close our strategic long DXY trade for a potential carry-adjusted profit of 15.7% if it reaches our target of 98 (as of the time of writing, the DXY is at 96.5). However, even if we were to close this trade, our tactical bias would be to remain long the dollar until clearer evidence emerges that the brewing EM crisis is about to abate. We moved from overweight to neutral on global equities on June 19. The MSCI All-Country World index has fluctuated a lot since then, but is currently up only 0.7% in dollar terms. Developed markets have gained 1.4%, while emerging markets have lost 3.8% (Chart 14). We have yet to reach a capitulation point for EM equities. The number of shares in the iShares MSCI Turkey ETF has almost doubled since August 3rd, as a stampede of bottom fishers have plowed into the fund (Chart 15). Equity investors should maintain our recommendation to underweight emerging markets relative to DM and to favor defensive sectors over deep cyclicals. We expect euro area stocks to perform in line with their U.S. peers in local-currency terms, but to underperform in dollar terms over the remainder of the year. Chart 13The Dollar Is Back Near Its Highs Chart 14Stock Market Performance: Roller Coaster Ride Chart 15Foreign Investors And Turkish Stocks: ##br##Trying To Catch A Falling Knife In the fixed-income realm, the long-term trend in global bond yields remains to the upside, but near-term EM stresses could cause the 10-year Treasury yield to temporarily fall back towards 2.5%. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 We collaborated with our colleague Mathieu Savary and his team at BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy to build this heat map. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Our antennae are twitching wildly, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) walks back a widely telegraphed commitment to surge production. This occurs against the backdrop of a possible loss of as much as 2mm b/d in exports from Iran and Venezuela next year, with demand expected to remain fairly strong. U.S. President Donald Trump remains silent. We believe the proximate cause of KSA's reversal boils down to one or all of the following: President Trump told KSA to expect an SPR release ahead of November mid-terms; KSA found it difficult to maintain higher production; or Short-term demand for KSA's output is falling, so they reduced production. We have questioned the ability of KSA to sustain production above 10.5mm b/d for an extended period in the past. However, we believe July's 200k b/d cut was produced by a combination of No. 1 and No. 3. We expect KSA to build storage ahead of Iran sanctions. On the back of our updated balances modeling we are maintaining our 2H18 Brent ensemble forecast of $70/bbl, and raising our 2019 forecast to $80/bbl from $75/bbl (Chart of the Week): The front-loaded production increase we expected from OPEC 2.0 could be less than expected. Highlights Energy: Overweight. The U.S. EIA reported U.S. crude and product inventories rose 17.4mm barrels for the week ended August 10, 2018. Markets traded sharply lower as a result, falling more than 3% in WTI and 2% in Brent. As we went to press, October Brent was trading just above $70/bbl. We are maintaining our $70/bbl Brent forecast for 2H18. Base Metals: Neutral. Union leaders at BHP's Escondida mine in Chile, the largest in the world, will take proposed contract terms to members this week.1 We were stopped out of our tactical Dec18 copper call spread with a 10.2% loss. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold remains under pressure as the broad trade-weighted USD rises. We remain long as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA export data show year-to-date wheat and soybean exports are down 20% and 10% y/y in the Oct17 - Jun18 period. Feature Forward guidance from OPEC 2.0's leadership and its predecessor, the regular old OPEC, has not been helpful of late.2 This complicates our balances assessment this month (Chart of the Week), and raises the odds volatility will increase sooner than we expected. Chart of the Week2H18 Brent Forecast Stays At $70/bbl, 2019 Moved Up To $80/bbl KSA's reversal in July of its earlier, widely telegraphed decision to sharply raise production in response to aggressive tweeting from U.S. President Donald Trump beginning in May - to as much as 11mm b/d from just over 10mm b/d in the first five months of this year - was followed by an abrupt output cut of ~ 200k b/d last month. Last month, we expected KSA's crude production to average 10.60mm b/d in 2H18, and 10.50mm b/d next year. In our current balances estimate (Table 1), we now expect the Kingdom's output to average 10.28mm b/d in 2H18 and 10.35mm b/d in 2019, down 300k b/d and 150k b/d, respectively. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) Russia, OPEC 2.0's other putative leader, also is complicating assessments of liquids production by the producer coalition. Given the signaling it and KSA were providing over the past couple of months, we expected Russia to raise production 80k b/d in 2H18 to 11.27mm b/d, and by 160k b/d in 2019 to 11.35mm b/d. We still expect Russia to raise its production and revised our baseline estimates to 11.32mm b/d and to 11.43mm b/d for this year and next, respectively. However, it is difficult to reconcile our expectation with the 11.13mm b/d 2H18 liquids production expected by OPEC for Russia in its August Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR), as we are highly confident Russia signed off on that estimate before it was published. Chart 2Physical Deficit Worsens Our global liquids supply estimate for 2H18 now stands at 101.08mm b/d, down 680k b/d from last month's estimate. For 2019, we lowered our supply estimate by 800k b/d to 101.01mm b/d. But this could end up overstating supply, given what we're seeing from OPEC 2.0 presently. On the demand side, we've lowered our 2018 and 2019 expectations slightly - to 1.67mm b/d and 1.62mm b/d, respectively, or ~ 50k b/d on average versus our previous estimates. This is still relatively stout demand growth - supported by still-strong global trade, particularly in the EM economies - which means storage will be forced to draw harder next year than we expected even a month ago (Chart 2). Physical Deficit Worsens In 2019 We expected OPEC 2.0's supply increase would persist at a higher level during 2H18, which would allow refiners to build precautionary inventories going into next year. This no longer is a tenable assumption, given what is being reported for OPEC 2.0's largest producers - KSA and Russia. In addition, we have amended our base case supply model, to reflect the loss of 1mm b/d of Iranian exports to U.S. sanctions for most of next year; we have this occurring in 250k b/d increments in the Nov18 - Feb 19 period, leaving production from March 2019 on at 2.8mm b/d. This replaces our earlier assumption of a 500k b/d by the end of 1H19. We took this action on the back of the increasingly strident rhetoric from the U.S. administration, and press reports indicating widespread compliance with the sanctions is expected - particularly reports suggesting China and India will not be looking to increase purchases of Iranian crude. Offsetting the higher Iranian export losses we foresee, our base case includes a re-start of Neutral Zone production in 2Q19.3 We expect KSA and Kuwait to each bring 175k b/d back on line, for a total of 350k b/d. It is not clear this is counted in both countries' spare capacity, but if it is, then spare capacity will become tighter within OPEC 2.0 next year. In our scenario analysis, we continue to give a relatively high weight to the loss of Venezuela's exports - anywhere from 800k to 1mm b/d - as that country's oil industry continues to degrade. Our ensemble analysis indicates OECD storage will draw more than previously estimated (Chart 3), on the back of these higher assumed Iranian export losses, and a reduction in OPEC 2.0's front-loaded production increases, particularly in 2019. As storage draws, days-forward-cover (DFC) also will contract (Chart 4). In addition to steepening the backwardation in crude forward curves, we expect implied option volatility to increase in 2019 (Chart 5). Chart 3Storage Will Draw##BR##Harder Next Year Chart 4Days-Forward-Cover##BR##Will Fall In 2019 Chart 5Implied Volatilities Will Rise,##BR##As OECD Storage Falls Ensemble Forecast Update In addition to moving the 1mm b/d loss of Iranian exports from a scenario and into our base case - offset somewhat by higher Neutral Zone production - we expect transportation bottlenecks in the Permian Basin to slow production growth in the U.S. shales even more. We have lowered our expected U.S. production growth to 1.21mm b/d this year and 1.22mm b/d in 2019, versus earlier estimates of 1.30mm b/d and 1.34mm b/d, as a result (Chart 6 shows the trajectory we expect from this scenario).4 Coupled with the lower-than-expected production increase from OPEC 2.0 and still-strong demand growth globally, this will lead to tighter markets in 2019. Chart 6Higher Volatility = Wider Expected Price Range We also are including a scenario showing a slowdown in demand growth, which takes y/y growth to 1.43mm b/d in 2018 and 2019, versus our current estimates of average growth of 1.64mm b/d over the two-year interval. Bottom Line: Numerous conflicting data have entered the oil pricing picture over the past month, which greatly complicates our analysis and forecasting. The fact that OPEC 2.0's leadership - KSA and Russia - is providing little in the way of forward guidance does not make this any easier. We admit to being puzzled by KSA's apparent decision to walk back its production increase going into 2019, when the likelihood of losing close to 2mm b/d of exports from Iran and Venezuela becomes markedly higher. Based on our current modeling we expect higher prices next year ($80/bbl vs. our earlier estimate of $75/bbl for Brent), and a steepening of the Brent and WTI backwardations next year. We continue to expect WTI to trade $6/bbl below Brent in 2H18 and 2019. The steepening backwardation will lift implied volatility, particularly next year. We remain long call option spreads along the Brent forward curve in 2019, in expectation prices and volatility will move higher. We continue to believe the balance of price risk is to the upside. However, as the lower-demand scenario in our ensemble forecast shows, an unexpected slowdown in growth can have profound effects on prices. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Chile's Escondida union to take new labor proposal to members," published by reuters.com August 15, 2018. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. At the end of June, the coalition's member states agreed to increase production to bring it into line with the originally agreed deal to remove 1.8mm b/d of output from the market. 3 Please see "Kuwait, Saudi to resume output from Neutral Zone in 2019 - Toyo Engineering," published by reuters.com July 2, 2018. 4 We place our scenarios within the context of a market-generated confidence interval, which we calculate using implied volatilities derived from Brent and WTI options markets. Please see Ryan, Bob and Tancred Lidderdale (2009), "Energy Price Volatility and Forecast Uncertainty," particularly Appendix 1 beginning on p. 18, for a derivation of the confidence intervals. The article was published by the U.S. EIA. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Seasonal capacity restrictions in China during the winter heating months - when pollution from steel mills is particularly high - and continued efforts to limit particulate emissions in major cities will drive steel prices higher. The steel rebar market in China is backwardated, indicating physical markets are tight; inventories have been falling since mid-March. We expect prices to remain elevated going into the winter months, when capacity restrictions kick in. Ongoing capacity reductions in steelmaking will favor higher-grade iron ores, which will widen price differentials versus lower-grade ores. We are recommending a long China rebar futures on the SHFE in 1Q19 vs short 62% Fe iron ore futures on the Dalian DCE in 1Q19 at tonight's close, based on our research. Energy: Overweight. Loadings of Iranian crude are expected to be curtailed beginning this month, as the November 4 deadline for the imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions kick in. Our base case calls for the loss of 500k b/d of exports from Iran; our ensemble forecast includes an estimate of 1mm b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. BHP asked the Chilean government to intervene in the strike called by unions at its Escondida mine. Union officials delayed strike action while talks are being held. Negotiators have until August 14 to reach an agreement. Reuters reported Chile's copper production was up 12.3% y/y in 1H18 to 2.83mm MT.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. U.S. sanctions on trading gold and precious metals with Iran went into effect earlier this week. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese imports of U.S. soybeans could fall 10mm MT over the next year, if pig and chicken farmers switch to lower-protein feed and substitutes like sunflower seeds, and boost local production of the legume, state-run news service Xinhua reported.2 The USDA expects U.S. exports of 55.52mm MT of soybeans in the 2018 - 19 crop year, down 1.22mm MT from last year. Feature Steel prices have performed exceptionally since the beginning of 2Q18, seemingly oblivious to Sino - U.S. trade tensions, a stronger USD, and risks to China's economy roiling other metal markets (Chart of the Week). The MySteel Composite Index we use to track steel prices is up 7% since the beginning of April. With demand growth leveling off, steel's price dynamics highlight the continued relevance of the market's supply-side developments. Most notably, Beijing's battle for blue skies: Winter capacity curbs, and, to a lesser extent, ongoing efforts to retire older, highly polluting capacity will keep prices elevated over the next 9 months. Winter Curbs: China's New Normal As we highlighted in our April 12 weekly, despite the much-ballyhooed reductions in China's steel capacity over the 2017 - 18 winter months, markets in China and globally remained relatively well supplied over the winter.3 However, several key changes this year suggest the impact of these measures will intensify this time around, keeping producers constrained in their ability to ramp up production of the metal. For one, the data suggest strong production levels amid the anti-pollution curbs last winter were a result of an increase in output from regions unaffected by the capacity restrictions (Chart 2). This went a long way in muting the impact of the restrictions in the heavily industrialized Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region of northern China. Chart of the WeekSteel Oblivious To Pessimism Chart 22017/18 Winter Cuts: A Net Non-Event This year's curbs will broaden the regions targeted by anti-pollution restrictions. The campaign will encompass 83 cities, up from last year's 28, thereby reducing the potential production ramp up from regions not covered by these measures (Chart 3). This coming winter's closures will cover regions where producers traditionally account for 68% of China's steel output (Chart 4). Chart 3Second Annual Winter Capacity ##br##Restrictions Will Broaden Coverage... Chart 4...And##br## Impact The anti-pollution campaign is one of the three battles prioritized in Xi Jinping's plan for the coming years. These curbs will be implemented during the October 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019 heating season, extending the duration from last year's mid-November to Mid-March period. Because the minimal effect observed per last year's closures was due to specifying too narrow a range of plants and regions, not to non-compliance, we expect the measures announced for this coming winter to be fully implemented. These measures come amid already-tight market conditions. The steel rebar market in China is in backwardation - meaning a physical shortage is pushing up prompt prices relative to those further out the curve. Inventories have been falling since mid-March, reflecting supply-demand dynamics in other steel product markets. Thus, we expect prices to remain elevated going into the winter months. Capacity Impacts Are Difficult To Gauge Opaqueness and discretionary authority in the new rules clouds the outlook on how anti-pollution reforms will impact the steel market. This makes it difficult to estimate their impact with precision. This time around, China's State Council announced that curbs will be implemented in a more scientific and targeted approach, ensuring maximum efficiency to attain the targets. This means the constraints this year will depend on emissions in each region, which will be set at the discretion of local authorities.4 For example, steel mills in six key cities including Tianjin, Shijiazhuang, Tangshan, Handan, Xingtai and Anyang will be asked to keep capacity below 50% this winter, while producers in the rest of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region will keep production running at less than 70% of capacity. Furthermore, a draft plan by the city of Changzhou - which planned to implement the curbs beginning August 3 - suggests production curbs may vary by company, depending on operational situations and emission levels.5 These restrictions are applied to capacity, rather than production. Without up-to-date and accurate information on crude steel-making capacity across the different regions, it is extremely difficult to accurately quantify the impact. Specifics of the plans are up to the discretion of local authorities. Thus, these restrictions can be applied to different stages in the steel-making process (Diagram 1), impacting furnaces, pig iron or sintering plants. In some cases, the output curbs are not only restricted to the winter heating months. Several regions have been implementing curbs throughout the year on an as-needed basis. The cities of Tangshan and Changzhou are two such examples, implementing restrictions during the summer months as well. Furthermore, all industrial plants in the city of Xuzhou remain shut. High profit margins at steel mills may incentivize the shuttered illegal furnaces to restart. The industry ministry acknowledges this threat, and claims it will carry out checks on these producers to ensure they do not come back online. Diagram 1Steelmaking Production Process: Restrictions Can Be Applied To Different Stages Without full knowledge of these details, quantifying the impact of these restrictions is a challenge. Morgan Stanley estimates the impact of these curbs on steel output to be 78mm MT during the winter period by assuming capacity utilization is restricted to 50% in the key cities, while the rest of the areas cut capacity by 30%. The estimated production loss from these restrictions accounts for 9% of China's 2017 crude steel output.6 China's Ongoing Capacity-Reduction Reforms Most of the planned permanent capacity shutdowns have already taken place. Of the targeted 150mm MT of cuts between 2016 and 2020, 115mm MT have already taken place over the past two years. Furthermore, 1H17 witnessed the closure of all illegal induction furnaces producing sub-par quality steel, estimated to account for 140mm MT of crude steel capacity (Table 1).7 Table 1De-Capacity Reforms Still Ongoing We expect the magnitude of cutbacks to slow considerably. Even though the industry ministry issued a statement in February that it plans to meet steel capacity reduction targets this year - two years ahead of schedule. Furthermore, mills face restrictions on new steel capacity. China's State Council announced it intends to prevent new steel capacity additions in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Guangdong province, and Yangtze River Delta regions, and a cap set at 200mm MT in Hebei by 2020. The capacity replacement plan, which allows a maximum of 0.8 MT of new capacity for each MT of eliminated capacity, will ensure capacity does not grow going forward. In fact, not all mills are eligible to take advantage of the replacement policy. Among others, now-shuttered induction furnace capacity, as well as producers that previously benefited from cash and policy support will not meet the requirements for this program. Steel And Iron Ore Prices Will Not Reconverge As a result of China's reform policies in the steel industry, iron ore prices have diverged from steel. Reduced steel production lowers demand for raw materials, including iron ore. This is reflected in falling Chinese iron ore imports amid contracting production (Chart 5). Chart 5Weak Demand For Iron Ore Chart 6EAF Penetration In China: Still Some Catching Up To Do China's reform and anti-pollution campaigns have had serious consequences on iron ore markets. For starters, China is encouraging the adoption of electric arc furnaces (EAF), rather than additional new blast furnaces.8 While the latter primarily uses iron ore, the former uses scrap steel. EAF penetration in China's steel industry significantly lags the rest of the world (Chart 6). This means that even if the capacity-replacement program allows eliminated furnaces to be replaced with newer, more up-to-date capacity, this will not spur demand for iron ore. Instead, we expect to see higher scrap steel prices (Chart 7). Furthermore, as we first highlighted in our January report, China's anti-pollution campaign coupled with high steel profit margins has incentivized the use of higher grade iron ore and iron ore pellets, widening the price spread between high- and low- grade ores (Chart 8).9 Chart 7EAFs Support Scrap Steel Demand Chart 8IO Grade Premiums Will Remain Elevated While high-grade ores are more expensive, they emit less pollution in the steelmaking process. Similarly, unlike fines, pellets which are direct charge feedstock, are not required to undergo the highly polluting sintering stage and can be fed directly into the furnace. China's Steel Dynamics Overshadow Global Markets The ongoing supply-side reforms in China are overshadowing events in other markets. Globally, steel is expected to remain in physical deficit this year (Chart 9). This is largely on the back of an increase in world ex-China demand, and the decline in Chinese supply, despite expectations of weaker Chinese demand, and increased supply from the rest of the world (Table 2). Chart 9Physical Steel Deficit Will Persist... Table 2...Despite Weaker Chinese Demand And Stronger RoW Supply These figures do not consider the impact of the ongoing Sino - U.S. trade dispute, which could evolve into a full-blown trade war, weighing on EM incomes and demand. In such a scenario, global demand for steel would take a hit, potentially shifting global markets into surplus. In theory, trade barriers on U.S. steel imports could lead to weaker domestic supply for American users and at the same time, leave more of the metal for use by the rest of the world. The net effect of that would be a higher price for American steel relative to the rest of the world. However, since May, 20,000 requests for steel tariff exemptions have been filed in the U.S., of which the Commerce Department has denied 639. To the extent that American steel users are able to obtain tariff exemptions, the impact of the barriers on global steel markets will be muted. Bottom Line: We expect China's steel market to tighten as we go into the winter season, during which capacity cuts will be broadened to 82 cities, from last year's 28. This will keep steel prices elevated. At the same time, we expect prices of 62% Fe material and lower iron ore grades to weaken, as appetite for the steelmaking raw material contracts during these months. Mills still running in the mid-November to mid-March period will have a preference for higher-grade ores and pellets, keeping premiums on these grades elevated. Barring a significant demand-side shock, expect more upside to steel prices and downside to iron ore prices over the coming 9 months. Based on our research, we are recommending a long China rebar futures on the SHFE in 1Q19 vs. short 62% Fe iron ore futures on the Dalian DCE in 1Q19 at tonight's close. Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "BHP asks for government mediation in talks at Chile's Escondida," published August 6, 2018, by uk.reuters.com. 2 Please see "Economic Watch: China can cut soybean imports in 2018 by over 10 mln tonnes," published August 5, 2018, by xinhuanet.com. 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Chinese Steel, Aluminum Markets Well Supplied Despite Winter Capacity Cuts," dated April 12, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Chinese steel output cuts to vary from mill to mill next winter," dated July 21, 2018, available at reuters.com. 5 The restrictions will not only apply to the city's steel mills, but also to copper smelters, chemical makers as well as cement producers. Please see "China's Changzhou plans to enforce output curbs in steel, chemical plants," dated July 30, 2018, available at reuters.com. 6 Please see "Shanghai steel resumes rise, coke rallies as China eyes winter curbs," dated August 2, 2018, available at reuters.com. 7 Low-quality steel produced by induction furnaces, also referred to as ditiaogang, is made by melting scrap steel using induction heat, preventing sufficient control over the quality of the steel. Platts estimates ditiaogang production in 2016 to be 30-50mm MT. As we explain in our September 7, 2017 Weekly Report titled "Slow-Down In China's Reflation Will Temper Steel, Iron Ore In 2018," given that ditiaogang is illegal, these closures are not reflected in official steel production figures. Thus the closures of these mills have no impact on actual steel production, but instead raise the capacity utilization rates for Chinese steel producers. 8 China launched a carbon trading system in January 2018, which penalizes blast furnace operators with higher environmental taxes relative to EAF processes. 9 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "China's Environmental Reforms Drive Steel & Iron Ore," dated January 11, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Chart 1Yield Curve Suggests GDP Growth Has Peaked Last month we learned that the U.S. economy grew 4.1% in the second quarter, the fastest pace since 2014. The gap between year-over-year nominal GDP growth and the fed funds rate - a reliable recession indicator - also widened considerably (Chart 1). However, our sense is that this might be as good as it gets for the U.S. economy. With fewer unemployed workers than job openings and businesses reporting difficulties finding qualified labor, strong demand will increasingly translate into higher prices rather than more output. Higher interest rates and a stronger dollar will also start to weigh on demand as the Fed responds to rising inflation. For bond investors, it is still too soon to position for slower growth by increasing portfolio duration. Markets are priced for only 83 basis points of Fed tightening during the next 12 months, below the current "gradual" pace of +25 bps per quarter. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and a neutral allocation to spread product. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 133 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -50 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 14 bps on the month, and currently sits at 109 bps. Corporate bonds remain expensive with 12-month breakeven spreads for both the A and Baa credit tiers near their 25th percentiles since 1989 (Chart 2). Further, with inflation now close to the Fed's target, monetary policy will provide much less support for corporate bond returns going forward. These are two main reasons why we downgraded our cyclical corporate bond exposure to neutral near the end of June.1 Recent revisions to the U.S. National Accounts reveal that gross nonfinancial corporate leverage declined in Q4 2017 and Q1 2018, though from an elevated starting point (panel 4). While strong Q2 2018 profit growth should lead to a further decline when the second quarter data are reported in September, the downtrend in leverage will probably not last through the second half of the year. A rising wage bill and stronger dollar will soon drag profit growth below the rate of debt growth. At that point, leverage will rise. Historically, rising gross leverage correlates with rising corporate defaults and widening corporate bond spreads. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for the second quarter was released yesterday, and it showed that banks continue to ease standards on commercial & industrial loans (bottom panel). Rising corporate defaults tend to coincide with tightening lending standards (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 128 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +205 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 27 bps on the month, and currently sits at 334 bps. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses is currently 213 bps, below its long-run mean of 247 bps (Chart 3). This tells us that if default losses during the next 12 months are in line with our expectations, we should expect excess high-yield returns of 213 bps over duration-matched Treasuries, assuming also that there are no capital gains/losses from spread tightening/widening. However, we showed in a recent report that the default loss expectations embedded in our calculation are extremely low relative to history (panel 4).2 Our assumption, derived from the Moody's baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of the recovery rate, calls for default losses of 1.2% during the next 12 months. The only historical period to show significantly lower default losses was 2007, a time when corporate balance sheets were in much better shape than today. While most indicators suggest that default losses will in fact remain low for the next 12 months, historical context clearly demonstrates that the risks are to the upside. It will be critically important to track real-time indicators of the default rate such as job cut announcements, which declined last month but remain above 2017 lows (bottom panel), for signals about whether current default forecasts are overly optimistic. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -4 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread tightened 3 bps on the month, driven by a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp tightening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The excess return Bond Map shows that MBS offer a relatively poor risk/reward trade-off, particularly compared to Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS, High-Yield and Sovereigns. However, our Bond Map analysis does not account for the macro environment, which remains very favorable for the sector. In a recent report we showed that the two main factors that influence MBS spreads are mortgage refinancing activity and residential mortgage bank lending standards.3 Refi activity is tepid (Chart 4) and will likely stay that way for the foreseeable future. Only 5.8% of the par value of the Conventional 30-year MBS index carries a coupon above the current mortgage rate, and even a drop in the mortgage rate to below 4% (from its current 4.6%) would only increase the refinanceable percentage to 38%. As for lending standards, yesterday's second quarter Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that they continue to ease (bottom panel), though banks also reported that they remain at the tighter end of the range since 2005. The still-tight level of lending standards suggests that further gradual easing is likely going forward. That will keep downward pressure on MBS spreads. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +2 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 179 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -35 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed by 24 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -22 bps. Local Authorities outperformed by 33 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +61 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 6 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. Domestic Agency bonds broke even with duration-matched Treasuries in July, keeping year-to-date excess returns steady at -1 bp. The strengthening U.S. dollar is a clear negative for hard currency Sovereign debt (Chart 5) and valuation relative to U.S. corporates remains negative (panel 2). Maintain an underweight allocation to Sovereigns. In contrast, the Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors continue to offer a favorable risk/reward trade-off compared to other fixed income sectors (please see the Bond Maps on page 15). Maintain overweight allocations to both sectors. The Bond Maps also show that while the Supranational and Domestic Agency sectors are very low risk, expected returns are feeble. Both sectors should be avoided. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 66 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +187 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio fell 3% in July to reach 83% (Chart 6). This is more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and only slightly higher than the average of 81% that was observed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. The total return Bond Map shows that municipal bonds still offer an attractive risk/reward profile for investors who are exposed to the top marginal tax rate. For investors who cannot benefit from the tax exemption there are better alternatives - notably Supranationals, Domestic Agency bonds and Agency CMBS. While value is dissipating, the near-term technical picture remains positive. Fund inflows are strong (panel 2) and visible supply is low (panel 3). Fundamentally, revisions to the GDP data reveal that state & local government net borrowing has been fairly flat in recent years, and in fact probably increased in the second quarter (bottom panel). At least so far, ratings downgrades have not risen alongside higher net borrowing, but this will be crucial to monitor during the next few quarters. Stay tuned. Treasury Curve: Buy The 5/30 Barbell Versus The 10-Year Bullet Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve's bear flattening trend continued in July. The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 4 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 2 bps, as yields moved higher. Despite the curve flattening, our position long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell returned +8 bps on the month and is now up +30 bps since inception.4 The trade's outperformance is due to the extreme undervaluation of the 7-year bullet versus the 1/20 barbell. As of today, the bullet still plots 12 bps cheap on our model (Chart 7), which translates to an expected 42 bps of 1/20 flattening during the next six months. We view that much flattening as unlikely.5 Table 4 of this report shows that curve steepeners are also cheap at the front-end of the curve, particularly the 2-year bullet over the 1/5 and 1/7 barbells. Meanwhile, barbells are more fairly valued relative to bullets at the long-end of the curve. The 5/30 and 7/30 barbells look particularly attractive relative to the 10-year bullet. We recommend adding a position long the 5/30 barbell and short the 10-year bullet. The 5/30 barbell is close to fairly valued on our model (panel 4), which implies that the 5/10/30 butterfly spread is priced for relatively little change in the 5/30 slope during the next six months. This trade should perform well in the modest curve flattening environment we anticipate, and it provides a partial hedge to our 1/7/20 trade that is geared toward curve steepening. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of August 3, 2018) TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 10 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +139 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate increased 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 2.12%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate increased 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.24% (Chart 8). Both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. We expect breakevens will return to that target range as investors become increasingly convinced that the risk of deflation has faded. Consistent inflation prints at or above the Fed's 2% target will be the deciding factor that eventually leads to this upward re-rating of inflation expectations. In that regard, core PCE inflation was relatively weak in June, growing only 0.11% month-over-month. That pace is somewhat below the monthly pace of 0.17% that is necessary to sustain 2% annualized inflation (panel 4). Nevertheless, 12-month core PCE inflation at 1.9% is only just below the Fed's target, and the 6-month rate of change is above 2% on an annualized basis. These readings are confirmed by the Dallas Fed's trimmed mean PCE inflation measure (bottom panel). Maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS relative to nominal Treasury securities for now. We will reduce exposure to TIPS once both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward breakeven rates reach our target range of 2.3% to 2.5%. ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +9 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS narrowed 5 bps on the month and now stands at 38 bps, only 11 bps above its pre-crisis low. The Bond Maps show that consumer ABS continue to offer relatively attractive return potential compared to other low-risk spread products. However, we maintain only a neutral allocation to this space because credit quality trends have started to move against the sector. Despite the large upward revision to the personal savings rate that accompanied the second quarter GDP report, the multi-year uptrend in the household interest coverage ratio remains intact (Chart 9). This will eventually translate into more frequent consumer credit delinquencies, and indeed, the consumer credit delinquency rate appears to have put in a bottom. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for Q2 was released yesterday and it showed that average consumer credit lending standards tightened for the ninth consecutive quarter (bottom panel). Credit card lending standards tightened for the fifth consecutive quarter, while auto loan standards eased after having tightened in each of the prior eight quarters. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +98 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 71 bps (Chart 10). In a recent report we showed that the macro picture for CMBS is decidedly mixed.6 A typical negative environment for CMBS is characterized by tightening bank lending standards for commercial real estate loans and falling demand. Yesterday's Q2 Senior Loan Officer Survey reported that both lending standards and demand for nonresidential real estate loans were very close to unchanged (bottom two panels). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +31 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 47 bps. The Bond Maps show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector continues to make sense. The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of August 3, 2018) Chart 12Total Return Bond Map (As Of August 3, 2018) Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Go To Neutral On Spread Product", dated June 26, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Out Of Sync", dated July 3, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Balance Sheet Problem", dated July 17, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty", dated June 19, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Balance Sheet Problem", dated July 17, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
