Correlations
Highlights Global fundamentals - supply, demand and inventories - will support oil prices generally, and will remain bullish for the evolution toward backwardated forward curves, even as the Fed's interest-rate normalization policy supports the USD's broad trade-weighted index (TWI). This will cause the oil-USD divergence noted in earlier research to persist.1 Energy: Overweight. We are once again long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI, after the resting order placed on March 9/17 was elected on March 13/17 at -$0.12/bbl. Our oil-balances modeling indicates storage will draw throughout the rest of this year and next. Base Metals: Neutral. Spot copper prices remain subdued despite strikes at Peru's Cerro Verde and Chile's Escondida mines. Meanwhile, export-license talks continue in Indonesia at the Grasberg mine. When a market fails to rally on supportive news, it normally is a bearish indicator. An unexpected surge in LME copper stocks partly offset supply-side concerns. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold will remain weak, as markets discount the timing and size of further rate hikes. We remain long volatility, with our long-put/long-call spread combination in June, recommended on February 23/17, up 29.5%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Indications of higher output of corn and beans in South America from the USDA, and a well-supported USD keep us bearish. Lower planting intentions - to be reported at month-end - could support corn. Feature Markets got a rare "two-fer" yesterday. The first, a long-anticipated bullish oil inventory report from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The second, a fully priced follow-through on the Fed's recent forward guidance in the form of a 25bp hike in overnight rates, which, while important to oil markets, will continue to be secondary to the fundamental adjustments that will be reflected in subsequent EIA reports. Not unexpectedly, U.S. commercial oil inventories drew hard last week - more than 8mm bbl (including SPR), with crude stocks accounting for 1.1 mm bbl - following weeks of builds, which forced many a long from the market. The balance of the draws will shift to crude within the next month, as U.S. refiners come back off performing routine maintenance. With the year-end surge from OPEC's Gulf producers now fully absorbed, we expect to see a sustained draw in OECD storage this year. This will force inventories toward the five-year average levels sought by OPEC and non-OPEC producers in their production-cutting agreement last year (Chart of the Week). In our balances model, we have global supply up 0.5 mm b/d in 2017 yoy and demand up 1.5 mm b/d on average. For 2018, we have supply up 1.5 mm b/d on average vs. 2017, and demand up 1.6 mm b/d. This will produce the draws in OECD inventories anticipated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia when they led the negotiations between OPEC and non-OPEC oil-producing states that will produce these supply deficits (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekOil Markets Will Tighten This Year And Next Chart 2OECD Inventories Will Draw Sharply The Fed - And The USD - Still Matter, But Not As Much The 25bp hike in overnight rates was perhaps the most strongly telegraphed messaging from FOMC members in post-GFC history. If nothing else, the Fed is unambiguously signaling its intent to normalize interest-rate policy, which, all else equal, will be supportive of the USD's TWI. We do not believe the Fed is intent on raising real rates, which will somewhat temper the rates normalization policy of the Fed. This will allow the synchronized global growth we now see - along with a synchronized increase in global inflation rates - to continue, and will prevent an overly strong USD from crimping demand ex-U.S. - particularly in the EM markets. Indeed, we continue to expect strong growth in EM oil demand, which we proxy by non-OECD oil consumption (Chart 3). Therefore, while the evolution of the USD will remain important to the evolution of oil prices, we do not expect it to dominate that evolution as it has post-GFC to the end of 1Q16. As can be seen in Chart 4, which shows Brent prices as a function of the USD TWI, this relationship has weakened some, after fundamentals - chiefly supply destruction and demand growth - reacted to the lower prices brought on by the market-share war declared by OPEC in November 2014. Chart 3EM Growth Will Drive Oil Demand Chart 4USD Will Not Dominate Oil-Price Evolution However, we do not expect this relationship to break down entirely: Indeed, it has been remarkably durable since 2000, when oil prices - like the USD - became random-walking economic variables (Chart 5).2 We do think the market is in a transition phase - chiefly from being over-supplied to tighter, given the physical deficits we expect - with price levels capable of following a more stable path with less volatility. This will translate into even greater volatility in the forward curves for oil prices, which we believe will become more backwardated as markets finally get evidence storage is drawing (Charts 6). We continue to expect WTI prices to trade between $45 and $65/bbl, with a central tendency of $55/bbl this year and next. Chart 5Expect The USD To Be Less Determinant ##br##For Oil Prices Chart 6We Continue To Expect Backwardation ##br##In Oil Forwards Back In The Backwardation Trade We are once again long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI, after the resting order placed on March 9/17 was elected on March 13/17 at -$0.12/bbl. We are including a stop-loss on this recommendation of -$0.36/bbl (i.e., the Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 spread goes into a -$0.48/bbl contango), given this is a strategic recommendation and we are willing to incur larger losses given our high-conviction view of the evolution of the WTI forward curve. As the above analysis indicates, we strongly expect storage to draw throughout the rest of this year and next. This will produce backwardated markets - prompt-delivery prices exceed deferred-delivery prices - and tighten markets globally. We recently exited the exact same trade on February 23/17, when we entered it at -$0.11/bbl (in contango), and exited at +$0.96/bbl, for a gain of +$1.07/bbl (972.7%). This is evidence of the volatility we continue to expect as the forward curve transitions to a backwardated structure. Bottom Line: The oil market is performing as we expect, with supply cuts in the face of strong demand growth producing a physical deficit. This will lead to a backwardation in the forward curves for WTI and Brent, which we are capitalizing on by re-establishing our long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI position. While the USD will continue to exert an influence on oil prices, we continue to believe this will be secondary to the evolution of prices. Fundamentals will drive price discovery going forward. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Days Of Oil Future's Past: Mean-Reversion," dated March 2, 2017, and "Fed's Pre-Emptive Hike Will Hit Gold, Not Oil," dated March 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Days Of Oil Future's Past: Mean-Reversion," published March 2, 2017, referenced above. In that article we examine the evolution of oil prices from a mean-reverting series to a difference-stationary series. We considered the possibility the KSA - Russia production agreement could deepen, allowing these states to exert more control over the evolution of prices. This is not foregone, by any means, but it is useful to consider the implications of supply contracting as a result of their detente, and the return of a more inelastic supply curve. In such a market, small adjustments to the supply side can have profound effects on prices - assuming demand remains inelastic - and allow these states to regain a measure of control over oil market fundamentals. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights Once the Brexit starting gun is fired, the EU27's high-level guidelines and red lines will create more vulnerabilities and uncertainties for the U.K. than for the euro area. The BoE will be more boxed in than the ECB. Brexit trades have more legs. We describe four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets (on page 6). Our favourite structural investment themes are Personal Product equities, euro/yuan, and real estate in Spain, Ireland and Germany. Feature "Many in Great Britain expected a major calamity... but what happened was near enough nothing ." The citation above perfectly describes the 9 months that have elapsed since the U.K.'s June 23 2016 vote to exit the EU. In fact, it refers to the 9 months that elapsed after Britain declared war on Germany on September 3 1939 - a period of calm, militarily speaking, which became known as the 'Phoney War'.1 But outside the military sphere a lot did happen in the Phoney War. Most notably, a propaganda war ensued. On the night of September 3 1939 alone, the Royal Air Force dropped 6 million leaflets over Germany titled 'Note to the German People'. Chart of the WeekOne Big Correlated Trade: Pound/Euro And Eurostoxx600 Vs. FTSE100 Brexit Phoney War And The Markets Fast forward 77 years. The 9 months since the Brexit vote has also been a period of calm, economically speaking. Indeed, the U.K. economy has sailed along remarkably smoothly. And this has fuelled a propaganda war for those who believe that Brexit's economic impact will be near enough nothing. But outside the economic sphere, a lot has happened in the Brexit Phoney War: The pound has slumped 12% versus the euro and 17% versus the dollar. The FTSE100 has surged 16%, substantially outperforming the 8% gain in the Eurostoxx600 The U.K. 10-year gilt yield is down 40 bps when the equivalent German bund yield is up 40 bps and the equivalent U.S. Treasury yield is up 90 bps. These relative moves appear to reflect different asset class stories, but it is crucial to realise that: All of these relative moves are just one big correlated trade. The relative moves in bond yields have just tracked the expected differences in central bank policy rates two years ahead (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). This is exactly in line with the theory that a bond yield just equals the expected average interest rate over the bond's lifetime. Chart I-2Difficult Brexit = Gilt Yields Fall Vs. Bund Yields Chart I-3Difficult Brexit = Gilt Yields Fall Vs. T-Bond Yields Likewise, the moves in pound/dollar and pound/euro have also closely tracked the same expected differences in central bank policy rates (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Again, this is exactly in line with theory. Over short horizons, the biggest driver of exchange rates is fixed income cross-border portfolio flows - which always seek out the highest yield adjusted for hedging costs. Chart I-4Difficult Brexit = Pound/Euro Falls Chart I-5Difficult Brexit = Pound/Dollar Falls In turn, FTSE100 performance versus the Eurostoxx600 has near-perfectly tracked the inverse direction of pound/euro. Once more, this is exactly as theory would suggest. The FTSE100 and Eurostoxx600 are just a collection of multinational dollar-earning companies quoted in pounds and euros respectively. So when pound/euro weakens, the dollar earnings increase more in FTSE100 index terms than in Eurostoxx600 index terms, resulting in Eurostoxx600 underperformance (Chart of the Week). Now that the Brexit battle is about to begin in earnest, what will happen to these Brexit trades? Brexit Battle Begins It is not our intention here to forecast all the twists and turns of the Brexit battle. We will leave that to a later report. Instead, we just want to list the likely opening salvos. With Parliamentary approval now sealed, Theresa May is due to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in the week commencing March 27 and thereby formally begin the Brexit battle. Expect the first EU27 response within 48 hours, probably through the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. In this response, Tusk may also give the date for the first European Council 'Brexit' summit. This EU27 Brexit summit will take place within 8 weeks of the Article 50 trigger, and likely after the two-round French Presidential Election in April/May. At the Brexit summit, the EU27 will establish its strategy, high-level guidelines and red lines for the Brexit negotiations. The European Council will present these negotiating guidelines to the European Commission. Drawing upon its own legal and policy expertise, the Commission will then draft a mandate which sets out more technical details of each area of negotiation. Next, the Council of the EU2 must approve this draft mandate by qualified majority vote (obviously excluding the U.K.) Once approved, the European Commission can begin the detailed negotiations with the U.K., keeping within the final mandate's guidelines. But what does all this mean for investors? The preceding analysis showed that the dominant driver for all Brexit trades is the expected difference in central bank policy interest rates two years ahead. Recall that not long ago the BoE was vying with the Fed to be the first to hike rates in this cycle, while the ECB was likely to ease further. But after the Brexit vote and the resulting uncertainty about the U.K.'s position in the world, the tables have turned. The EU27's high-level negotiating guidelines and red lines are likely to create more vulnerabilities and uncertainties for the U.K. than for the euro area. And now, these vulnerabilities and uncertainties are amplified by Scotland First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, calling for a second referendum on Scottish Independence. For central bank policy, this means that the BoE will be hamstrung; whereas, absent any tail-events, the ECB can continue to back away from its extreme dovishness - a process that Draghi verbally started at the ECB Press Conference last week. Therefore, at least into the early summer, stay: Overweight U.K. gilts versus German bunds. Long euro/pound. Long FTSE100 versus Eurostoxx600 (or Eurostoxx50). Long U.K. Clothes and Apparel equities versus the market (Chart I-6). Short U.K. Real Estate equities versus the market (Chart I-7). But a word of warning for risk control. Remember that all five positions are in effect just one big correlated trade. So they will all work together, or they will all not work together! Chart I-6Difficult Brexit = U.K. Clothes And Apparel Outperforms Chart I-7Difficult Brexit = U.K. Real Estate Equities Underperform Four Disruptors The final section this week takes a wider-angle view of the world, and briefly highlights four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets in the coming years. Disruptor 1: Protectionism. Since the Great Recession, an extremely polarised distribution of economic growth has left most people's standard of living stagnant - despite seemingly decent headline economic growth and job creation (Chart I-8). Looking to find a scapegoat, economic nationalism and protectionism have resonated very strongly with voters in the U.K. and U.S. - resulting in Brexit and President Donald Trump. Other voters could follow in the same vein. But history teaches us that protectionism ends up hurting many more people than it helps. Disruptor 2: Technology. The bigger danger is that people are misdiagnosing the illness. The vast majority of middle-income job losses are not due to globalization, but due to technology. Specifically, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is replacing secure middle-income jobs and displacing workers into insecure low-income manual jobs - like bartending and waitressing - which AI cannot (yet) replace (Table I-1). And AI's impact on middle-income jobs is only in its infancy.3 The worry is that by misdiagnosing the illness as globalization and wrongly taking a protectionist medicine, the illness will intensify, rather than improve. Chart I-8Disruptor 1: Protectionism Table I-1Disruptor 2: Technology Disruptor 3: Debt super-cycles have reached exhaustion. The protectionist medicine carries a further danger. Major emerging market economies are coming to the end of structural credit booms and need to wean themselves off their credit addictions (Chart I-9). At this point of vulnerability, aggressive protectionism risks tipping these emerging economies into a sharp slowdown. Chart I-9Disruptor 3: Debt Super-Cycles Have Reached Exhaustion Disruptor 4: Equities are overvalued. Disruptors one, two and three come at a time when equities are valued to generate feeble total nominal returns over the next decade (Chart I-10). Risk premiums are extremely compressed. And if investors suddenly demand that risk premiums rise to average historical levels, it necessarily requires equity prices to adjust downwards. Chart I-10Disruptor 4: Equities Are Overvalued The long-term investment message is crystal clear. With the four disruptors in play, we strongly advise long-term investors not to follow passive (equity) index-tracking strategies. Instead, we advise long-term investors to stick to bespoke structural investment themes. Our favourite structural investment themes are Personal Product equities, euro/yuan, and real estate in Spain, Ireland and Germany. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 C N Trueman 'The Phoney War'. 2 The Council of the EU should not be confused with the European Council. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Superstar Economy: Part 2," dated January 19, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model This week's trade is to short Netherlands equities, but wait until after the election result. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Risk assets have rallied smartly, yet key indicators like the relative performance of Swedish stocks or the price of kiwi equities are not corroborating these moves. With the Fed now very likely to increase rates in March, the broad-trade-weighted dollar could be about to resume its rally. This would prompt a correction in metals, and EM as well as commodity currencies. We think the tactical correction in the broad-trade-weighted dollar is over, and the cyclical dollar rally can resume. EUR and JPY will not suffer as much as the commodity currencies, go long EUR/AUD, short NZD/JPY. Feature In the Roman calendar, the Ides of March corresponds to the 15th of that month. Consigning that date to posterity in the year 44 BCE, Julius Caesar was assassinated on the floor of the senate in Rome, with his adoptive son Brutus, being among the conspirators. This event prompted yet another round of civil war in the republic, and ultimately a regime shift: the end of the Roman Republic and the Beginning of Imperial Rome under Augustus in 27 BCE. Fast forward 2061 years to the present. March 15th will be the day when the FOMC meeting ends. Will the period around the Ides of March represent a regime shift once again - albeit on a much different scale - where risk assets finally correct? Can the dollar resume its ascent? We believe the answer to both questions is yes. Unusual Market Moves Strange market dynamics have piqued our interest. In recent weeks, DM stock prices, and bond yields have been moving up (Chart I-1). This is consistent with investors pricing in an improving growth outlook and a Fed moving toward a tighter policy. On the other hand, EM stocks, metals, and gold in particular have also been moving up (Chart I-2). This move is more disturbing as it tends to imply an easing in monetary conditions, especially the strength in gold, even if it may have ended yesterday. This strange performance could be explained if the dollar was weakening or inflation expectations were moving up. However, the dollar has been strengthening in recent days and inflation expectations have been flat. Additionally, the U.S. yield curve has flattened, suggesting that the adjustment in the Fed's expected rate path is beginning to have marginally negative implications for future growth (Chart I-3). Chart I-1More Growth, More Hikes Chart I-2More Reflation As Well Chart I-3No Sign Of A Fed Behind The Curve So based on current information, how are these market moves likely to resolve themselves? Let's look at indicators. In the past, we have followed the common-currency performance of Swedish relative to U.S. equities as a gauge for the global growth outlook, and particularly non-U.S. growth relative to U.S. growth. This reflects the fact that U.S. stocks tend to be defensive, while Swedish stocks are very pro-cyclical. This dynamic is accentuated by the nature of the Swedish economy. Sweden is a small open nation that trades heavily with EM. While its biggest trading partner is the euro area, where it tends to export many intermediate goods and machinery, which are then re-exported as finished products to the EM space. Currently, Swedish equities continue to underperform U.S. ones. What is most striking is that this underperformance has happened despite a strong performance in EM stocks and metals, a very rare divergence (Chart I-4). Another worrying signal comes from New Zealand stocks in USD terms. New Zealand is another small open economy with deep trade links to the EM space. It is therefore very sensitive to global growth dynamics. While Kiwi equities did flag the rebound in EM growth and global manufacturing activity that happened in 2016, since late January, they have stopped participating in the rally in global risk assets despite a booming New Zealand economy. They have even begun swooning in recent weeks (Chart I-5). Chart I-4A Strange Divergence Chart I-5Are Kiwi Stocks Telling Us Something? Finally, two other reliable indicators of global growth are also not corroborating any further improvement in global growth from here: Small caps are underperforming large caps and oil is underperforming gold (Chart I-6). Obviously the next question becomes: are all these indicators likely to converge back toward EM equities, the AUD and the BRLs of the world or are the risk assets mentioned above likely to be the ones experiencing a downward adjustment? Here economics should give us a clue. For one, the 2016 rally in EM and risk assets can be explained by the large improvement in economic conditions. G10 and EM surprise indexes have moved up vertically in recent months (Chart I-7). However, this move might reflect the past not the future. Chart I-6Some Growth Indicators Are##br## Not Doing Well Anymore Chart I-7Too Much Of##br## A Good Thing? China has been a key reason explaining why EM assets and economic activity have been so positive. However, the large dose of fiscal stimulus that has supported that economy has dissipated (Chart I-8). Based on the IMF's October Fiscal Monitor, the fiscal thrust in China was 1.7% of potential GDP in 2015 (heavily loaded to the second half of that year), and 0.3% in 2016. It is moving to 0% in 2017. This means that as the lagged effects of the late 2015 fiscal surge dissipate, a key reflationary wind behind the global economy will disappear. The Keqiang index is mirroring these dynamics. After flirting with cyclical highs, and therefore highlighting a sharp improvement in the Chinese industrial sector, it has begun to roll over (Chart I-9). More weakness is likely in the cards. Fiscal dynamics have followed a similar pattern on a global level. The overall EM fiscal thrust was at its strongest in 2015, at 0.6% of EM potential GDP, fell to 0.1% in 2016, and is expected to hit -0.2% in 2017. In the DM, the pattern is slightly different. The high point of fiscal stimulus was 2016, when the fiscal impulse hit 0.4% of potential GDP. However, this measure is moving back to -0.1% in 2017. Chart I-8Losing A Source ##br##Of Reflation Chart I-9Chinese Industrial Activity ##br##May Be Rolling Over Additionally, the monetary environment is not as stimulative as it once was. Bond yields have risen in the whole DM space, with Treasury yields now more than 110bps higher than in July, Bund yields having moved from -0.18% to 0.31%, and JGB yields having adjusted 37bp higher to 0.07%. High-frequency loan data out of the U.S. already shows some strains caused by this rise in borrowing costs (Chart I-10). This combination points toward a deceleration in the growth impulse, especially in the goods sector. As such, we do expect the EM and G10 surprise indexes to roll over in coming weeks. Even if this phenomenon may prove temporary, the market is not priced for this event. Highlighting this vulnerability is the high level of complacency we have already flagged last week, which suggests that global investors are positioned for a continuation of the improvement in the growth outlook (Chart I-11). So high seems the conviction that growth will continue to accelerate that it is outweighing the move toward a tighter Fed going forward. Finally, the implied correlation in the S&P 500 has fallen to post 2010-lows. This could incentivize investors to take on more leveraged bets on portfolios of stocks. A low correlation results into higher diversification benefits and therefore, a lower portfolio volatility (Chart I-12). A rise in correlation would cause volatility to rise and thus a mini-deleveraging and de-risking cycle to take hold amongst investors. Chart I-10Response To Higher Yields Chart I-11Lots Of Complacency Globally Chart I-12Correlation-Induced Derisking On Its Way? Bottom Line: DM stocks are up, yields are up, the dollar is firming, yet EM equities, metals and gold especially have risen as well, and the U.S. yield curve is flattening while inflation expectations have recently been stable. We expect risk assets to end up buckling. Some reliable indicators of the trend in risk assets are pointing south, global investors are expecting further growth improvement in the coming months while global growth may in fact temporarily decelerate, and finally, if the low level of implied correlation in stocks normalizes, a correction may be catalyzed. What About The Fed Because Lael Brainard has been such a reliable dove on the FOMC, when she says that a hike is coming soon, we must listen. The fact that the market has come to price in an 83% probability of a Fed hike in March will only give the FOMC more comfort in increasing interest rate when it meets in two weeks (Chart I-13). While we have been expecting the Fed to move in line with its Summary of Economic Projection's interest rate forecast, and thus increase three times this year, we are surprised by the fast change of tune in recent days. Nonetheless, we are acknowledging this reality. Is this publication moving toward expecting four rate hikes in 2017? Not yet. We want to see how the market handles the coming hike going forward. A correction in risk assets, commodities, and EM is likely to force the Fed to pause again before resuming its hiking path. We are clearly expecting such a development. The broad dollar is likely to be caught in a bullish cross current. However, differentiation between the minors vis-à-vis the EUR and JPY might be essential for investors. Chart I-14 shows that recently, the broad-trade-weighted dollar has not kept pace with the increase in interest rate expectations for the U.S. With our capitulation index for this measure of the dollar moving closer to "oversold" territory, the weeks leading up to the Fed meeting could witness a stronger broad trade-weighted dollar. We are therefore removing our tactical short bias and moving in line with our cyclical bullish dollar stance. Chart I-13The Fed Tends To Telegraph ##br##Its Intention To Hike Chart I-14The Dollar Should ##br##Catch Up We believe that in this process, the dollar will be strongest against EM and commodity currencies. To begin with, the USD is trading near 19, 18, and 17 months lows against the BRL, ZAR, and RUB respectively. As recently as Wednesday, the AUD was also trading near the top of its distribution of the past two years (Chart I-15). Moreover, EM and commodity currencies are heavily geared to global growth. As such, the combination of a tightening Fed, rising bond yields, and a potential roll-over in global economic surprises may weigh especially heavily on them. On the other hand, in 2015 and 2016, the dollar has tended to be softer against the EUR and the JPY in periods of market turbulence. Thus, the call on EM and commodity currencies seems much cleaner than on these two currencies. In this regard, two crosses have caught our eye. One is EUR/AUD. Not only is it at the bottom end of a trading range established since June 2013, it has only traded lower at the apex of the euro area crisis between 2011 and the first half of 2013 (Chart I-16). The recent rollover in French / German bund spreads is potentially a good signal to buy this cross. The picture for JPY is now muddied. While higher interest rates should hurt the JPY, a period of risk-asset selloff should support the JPY. To play the cross-current described above, we are opening a short NZD/JPY position, a cross historically levered to rising volatility (Chart I-17). Chart I-15AUD Is Elevated Chart I-16To Fall From Here, EUR/AUD Needs A Euro Crisis Chart I-17Short NZD/JPY: A Risk-Off Play Bottom Line: The Fed moving forward its planned rate hike to March could be the ultimate catalyst to prompt a correction in risk assets, especially the segment of the market most levered to EM and growth conditions: EM and commodity currencies. We are removing our tactical USD stance and we are moving in line with our bullish cyclical stance. We are also buying EUR/AUD and shorting NZD/JPY. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 2 Recent data paints a healthy picture for the U.S. economy: Fourth quarter annualized GDP came in unchanged from the previous quarter at 1.9%; PCE Price Index increased at a 1.9% annual pace, near the Fed's target; Core PCE remained steady at 1.7% annually and increased to 0.3% monthly, indicative of a robust economy; ISM Manufacturing PMI went up to 57.7. The market is now pricing in an 83% probability of a rate hike. Further enhancing growth prospects were Trump's remarks at his Joint Address to Congress, where he stated that there will be a "big, big cut" in corporate tax, and that he will seek to gain approval for a $1 trillion infrastructure plan. Hawkish comments from the previous FOMC meeting strengthened the dollar in February; Trump's comments may be an additional tailwind to the dollar's upside this month. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism - January 27, 2017 The Euro EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 2 Fundamentally, the euro area economy remains resilient: Services sentiment, business climate, and industrial confidence all picked up in February, outperforming expectations; Germany recorded a decrease in unemployed persons of 14,000; German CPI picked up to a 2.2% annual pace, also beating expectations Nevertheless, EUR/USD is unlikely to see any substantive upside in the coming months. With the Dutch elections in around 2 weeks, considerable volatility could rise up, something which has not been priced in. The Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index is showing a low reading of 16.55, just above the all-time low of 12. The ECB will meet next week and is likely to display a dovish bias due to potential political turmoil. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The French Revolution - February 3, 2017 GBP: Dismal Expectations - January 13, 2017 The Yen JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 2 On a cyclical basis we are still bearish on the yen, as the BoJ will continue to pursue radical measures to pull Japan out of its liquidity trap. Recent data seems to indicate that these measures have been somewhat successful: Retail trade YoY growth outperformed expectations coming in at 1%. Housing starts YoY growth also outperformed, coming in at 12.8%. On a tactical basis the picture is more nuanced. While it is very possible that the coming rate hike could lift rate expectations in the U.S., lifting USD/JPY, there is a risks that the hike might trigger a sell-off in risks assets, which could be very positive for the yen. For this reason we are shorting NZD/JPY, as this cross is very vulnerable to an increase in volatility. Report Links: JPY: Climbing To The Springboard Before The Dive - February 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism - January 27, 2017 British Pound GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 2 The past week has not been kind to the pound, with GBP depreciating by about 2% against both the Euro and the U.S. Dollar. This was in part due to the prospect of a Scottish Independence referendum. On the economic side, data for the U.K. continue to be mixed: House prices annual growth outperformed expectations coming in at 4.5% M4 broad money annual growth continues to climb higher and it is now at 7%. On the other hand manufacturing PMI, although still high, underperformed expectations, coming in at 54.6. Although the cyclical dollar bull market should continue to weigh on cable, we are more bullish on the pound, particularly against the euro, as expectations for the U.K. economy continue to be too pessimistic, while the dark cloud of this year's election cycle looms on the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Australian Dollar AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 2 AUD lost 1.3% of its value Thursday morning amid disappointing trade data. It seems that the market largely ignored stronger data this week: GDP grew at a 2.4% annual rate Q42016 and both NBS and Ciaxin Chinese Manufacturing PMI beat expectations. Exports, however, contracted at a 3% pace and the surplus missed expectations by 66%, most likely due to the AUD's strength this year, even alongside higher commodity prices. This is also particularly worrying seeing that exports failed to pick up despite a previously strong Chinese PMI reading. Now, alongside a Keqiang Index that is topping out, the future for Australian exports could be limited. Additionally, this outlook is further supported by investment diverting to the non-resource sector. It is difficult to see whether the RBA will respond to this export slump, as the contractionary Q32016 GDP data was largely overlooked and dismissed. Nevertheless, we stand by our bearish outlook on AUD. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 New Zealand Dollar NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 2 The RBNZ continues to assert its neutral bias. On Wednesday, RBNZ Governor Graeme Wheeler stated that "there is an equal probability that the next OCR adjustment could be up or down". This caused the kiwi to come close to reaching 0.71, its lowest point since mid-January. We continue to believe that the RBNZ stance is not hawkish enough, as powerful inflationary forces continue to brew in New Zealand. That being said, it is very likely that the RBNZ will continue with its neutral tone up until the middle of the year, when we start to have a clearer picture about the outcome in European elections. Therefore, given that the Fed is likely to hike in March, diverging monetary policies should continue to weigh on NZD/USD until then. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Canadian Dollar CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 2 The BoC left their overnight rate target unchanged at 0.5% despite a high CPI reading of 2.1% in January. A further surprise was a particularly dovish tone, highlighting that higher energy prices will have a temporary effect on inflation, and indicating "material excess capacity in the economy". Additional weaknesses were highlighted with regards to competitiveness challenges for the export sector and subdued wage growth accompanied by contracting hours worked. Trade developments are an additional headwind for the Canadian economy that the bank is monitoring and will continue to do so until the outlook clarifies. CAD has lost more than 2% of its value against the USD in 3 days due also to a stronger dollar based on Fed rate hike expectations and Trump's potential infrastructure spending and tax cuts. It is unlikely that CAD will see any strength in the near future as the Bank has set forth a rather cautious tone. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Swiss Franc CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data has been mixed, which indicates that although economic activity in Switzerland is improving, it still is very tepid: The KOF leading indicator outperform expectations coming in at 107.2 Retail sales outperformed expectations. However they are still contracting by 1.4% GDP annual growth was 0.6%, falling significantly from last quarter reading of 1.4% The SNB is currently in a tight spot, as improvements are very marginal and it is evident that the economy is still plagued by strong deflationary forces. Meanwhile EUR/CHF is under 1.065 and has been unable to climb above this level this month, as the SNB continues to fight risk off flows coming into the franc due to the risks of the European election cycle. As these risks increase, the floor in this cross will continue to get tested. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Norwegian Krone NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 2 Risks continue to point for further upside in USD/NOK. Oil is unlikely to rally much further from current levels, even if the OPEC agreement continues. Thus the movements in USD/NOK should be dominated by monetary divergences between the United States and Norway. These are likely to continue to favor the dollar, as the Fed should continue its hawkish tone. Meanwhile the Norges Bank is likely to stay dovish, as their economy has been to be very weak. GDP growth is negative, the output gap is over -2% of GDP and employment and real wages continue to contract. Meanwhile, the high inflation that Norway experiences last year is likely to continue its slowdown, as the effects of the currency depreciation should start to dissipate. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swedish Krona SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 2 In past reports, we have argued that the Swedish economy is robust and inflation is picking up. This has been corroborated by strong consumer and business confidence, and high resource utilization and inflation expectations. Recent data has supported this view: Retail sales picked up 2.2% annually; Producer price index was up 8.2% from last year in January; Annual GDP growth came in at 2.3% at the end of last year. Growth and inflation have been supported by expansionary monetary policy. With the Riksbank stating that "there is still a greater possibility that the rate will be cut than... raised in the near future", these conditions are unlikely to falter. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is this cautionary stance by the Bank that is the reason for the SEK's recent weakness, not fundamentals. It is now the probable case that any upside in the SEK will be noted and limited by the Riksbank, capping the upside on the krona. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Since the 1950s, the trends in margins and earnings growth have been one and the same: as profit margins decline, so does earnings growth. The decline in profit margins that began in early 2015 has gone on hiatus for the past two quarters. But this rebound in margins is unlikely to be sustained. However, even if profit margins turn lower on a sustained basis, there is scope for equity returns to stay positive, based on historical precedent. Similar to a broad-based profit margin decline, further currency strength will be an earnings headwind, but not a show-stopper for profit growth. All in all, with forward multiples now at multi-decade highs, there is lots of room for earnings growth to disappoint, but the conditions for an equity bear market are not in place. Feature Equity prices continue to march higher and the S&P 500 made another all-time high last week. Q4 earnings reporting is now nearly complete, with about two-thirds of companies surprising to the upside. According to FactSet, the share of Q4 surprises is below the 5-year average, while the size of surprises (2.9% above the estimate) is also a smaller margin than the "average surprise" in the past five years (Chart 1). Nonetheless, that has not stopped analysts from getting even more bulled up about 2017 earnings. Analysts' consensus for S&P 500 operating earnings is 10.2% for the calendar year, and the forward multiple now stands at 17.5x, its highest level since 2004 (Chart 2). Chart 1Q4 Earnings Surprises: Better, ##br##But Not That Surprising Chart 2Forward P/E At ##br##Decade Highs A 10% rise in earnings within the year would not be an unprecedented move - there are numerous historical re-accelerations of operating earnings of that size. However, it would be unprecedented for earnings growth to move consistently higher over the next year without an upward trend in profit margins. As Charts 3A and 3B shows, the turning points in earnings growth always correspond with turning points in profit margins. True, there have been 13 minor episodes whereby profit margins have declined but earnings growth accelerated. But these periods were very short-lived, never lasting more than three months at a time. In the majority of these episodes, equity investors saw through the blip down in margins; equity prices continued to rally higher and returns for the year were larger than average. Chart 3AProfit Growth And Margins: An Iron Link Chart 3B There have been far more one-quarter episodes whereby earnings growth decelerates and profit margins continue to rise (39 times since 1951). In these cases, equities exhibit below average returns. Chart 4Slow Growth Will Stay A Profit Headwind The key takeaway is that when profit margins and earnings growth temporarily fail to pull in the same direction, investors have tended to focus on earnings growth. However, the caveat to the above analysis is that we rely on data going back to 1951. The current cycle is unique in that potential GDP growth has never been this low (Chart 4). In a low-growth environment, it is harder for volume expansion to compensate for any fall in margins. We believe that understanding the profit margin backdrop in this environment will remain particularly important. The Outlook For Profit Margins The trend in profit margins is determined largely by the relative growth rates of selling prices, compensation and productivity. Unit labor costs (ULC), which is compensation divided by productivity, account for about 60% of production expenses: the ratio of selling price to unit labor costs is a good proxy for profit margins (Chart 5). In terms of the denominator, unit labor costs have been choppy, but have nonetheless been on a rising trend since the beginning of the recovery. Since the early 1990s, unit labor costs tended to rise throughout the business expansion, and then fall sharply once businesses retrenched during recessions. If this cycle follows historical patterns, then unit labor costs could push higher toward 3%. In other words, labor expenses may not accelerate quickly, but it is highly unlikely that profits will benefit from a fall in ULC growth at this stage of the expansion. In a recent Special Report,1 we made the case that the economy is at full employment and there would be cyclical pressure for wages to rise, despite some structural headwinds. We do not anticipate a surge in labor costs, rather a slow creep higher. Chart 5Can Selling Prices ##br##Catch Up To Labor Cost? Chart 6Businesses Will Find It Hard ##br##To Pass On Price Increases Our major concern is whether or not selling prices (i.e. the numerator in our proxy) can keep up with even mild cost pressures. Traditionally, the conditions that allow companies to raise prices are also associated with rising costs of inputs and labor, and higher inflation prompts the Fed to impose monetary restraint. Thus, profit margins - and therefore equity prices - have generally done better when price inflation is low. However, the concern today is that inflation (corporate selling prices) is too low and that it is difficult for firms to pass on rising input costs, i.e. that a margin squeeze occurs because businesses cannot sufficiently pass on rising labor costs, as consumers have become conditioned to entrenched deflation, particularly at the retail level. We have written extensively in recent publications about inflation. Our bias is to expect broad-based inflation (PCE and CPI measures) as well as corporate selling price inflation (i.e. businesses pricing power) to rise slowly this cycle. The key points are as follows: Inflation expectations are extremely well anchored (Chart 6). True, there is a gap that has opened between survey and market-based inflation expectations. But as we explained in our January 9 Weekly Report, there are several reasons why market-based measures are likely overstating the rise in inflation expectations. Even so, these measures remain well below historic averages and continue to signal that even if the trend is up, the rate of inflation remains very benign. If survey-based inflation expectations are correct, then this business cycle could be a mirror opposite of the 1970s/80s. In that cycle, strong inflation expectations became self-fulfilling/self-reinforcing and lead to higher realized inflation. Today, after a long period of fearing deflation and experiencing massive price discounting at the retail level (Chart 6), consumers have become conditioned to expect prices will never go up. Even once the output gap is fully closed, it could take several years for inflation to gain traction. A strong dollar argues for constant drag on 30% of consumer price inflation (i.e. tradable goods and services). This will keep a lid on inflation for the foreseeable future. Overall, wage costs have outpaced pricing power since 2014, with the exception of the prior two quarters. We do not have a strong view on whether profit margins are finally in a sustained mean-reverting phase, but the above framework suggests that due to a very solid anchoring of inflation expectations, businesses could be faced with a tough pricing backdrop much later than is typical in the business cycle. Flat/falling margins are historically not enough to derail the bull market at this stage of the expansion. However, as we highlighted above, equities are now trading at sky-high forward valuations and have become extremely vulnerable to earnings disappointment. What About The Dollar? A frequent question from clients is about the role of the dollar in U.S. earnings and how enthusiastic can one be about earnings growth if the dollar is rising? As our U.S. Equity Strategy team has pointed out in the past, there are two distinct camps on the impact of U.S. dollar strength on equities.2 Bulls believe that dollar strength will depress commodity and import prices, tamping down inflation pressures and allowing the Fed to avoid monetary tightening. Therefore, the net monetary conditions impact will be positive for the U.S., which is a relatively closed economy. Under these conditions, capital would continue to flow into stocks. Bears see the currency as undermining profitability, given that foreign translation will take a hit along with income from foreign affiliates selling into weaker demand abroad (Chart 7). In other words, the rest of the world is exporting deflationary pressures to the U.S. via currency depreciation. This threatens the earnings outlook, particularly relative to still lofty growth expectations. Chart 7Dollar Headwind Our take is somewhere in between these two extremes. It is certainly true that a strong dollar helps contain inflation pressures, and allows for a prolonged business cycle. But as highlighted above, in an economy still struggling to grow much above 2%, inflation pressures are not an overly large concern to begin with. Meanwhile, hedging means that the currency translation effect on financial performance is not immediate. And the impact of any dollar strength surely depends on the conditions under which it is strengthening: dollar strength in a period of weak global growth will be more detrimental to returns than a dollar that is rising due to exceptionally strong domestic conditions. We are currently at neither one of these extremes (Chart 8). Chart 8U.S. And Global Economy: Not Hot, Not Cold Our Bank Credit Analyst service recently presented a matrix of different scenarios for the dollar and economic growth applied to a model for EPS growth. The key finding was that the effect of even small changes in growth assumptions dominate the effect of much larger moves in the dollar. A 10% dollar appreciation from current levels would shave about 2% from profits, assuming no change to the GDP growth outlook. The bottom line is that the recent improvement in margins has helped earnings recover from last year's profit recession. However, it is unlikely that margins have entered a lasting uptrend; firms lack pricing power and the labor market is now tight enough that unit labor costs will rise on a sustained basis. As profit margins trend lower in the coming years, this will present a headwind for profit growth. Similarly, our expectation that the currency will continue to appreciate over the next 12-18 months is a headwind to earnings growth. Current sky-high equity valuations leave little room for these risks. We expect that disappointments will eventually cause an equity price reset, but timing is uncertain. As we wrote last week, technical indicators do not currently suggest an important pullback is imminent. Looking further out, the overall backdrop of slowly building inflation, a go-slow Fed, and a mild pickup in nominal GDP growth, is a positive backdrop for long-term stocks. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "U.S. Wage Growth: Paid In Full?", dated November 28, 2016, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Service Special Report, “Equity Sectors And The Soaring U.S. Dollar,” dated November 3, 2014, available at uses.bcaresearch.com
Highlights Global manufacturing inventories are low but this does not guarantee higher share prices for global cyclical stocks. If an increase in inventories is accompanied by strengthening final demand, it will be very bullish for the global business cycle. If final demand growth falters, global cyclical plays will relapse amid rising inventories. China's inventory depletion has been due to the large fiscal and credit impulse in the past 12 months - i.e., improving final demand has been instrumental to inventory shedding. Looking forward, the mainland's aggregate credit and fiscal impulse seems to have topped out raising the odds of a reversal in EM/China plays sooner than later. The risk/reward of EM/China plays remains unattractive. Feature Global Manufacturing Inventories Global manufacturing inventories have been depleted over the past 12 months, and inventory levels are generally low (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). Chart I-1Global Manufacturing Inventories Are Low Chart I-2Global Manufacturing Inventories Are Low Could inventory re-stocking extend the current manufacturing cycle recovery worldwide? Will low inventories and re-stocking in China lengthen the nation's business cycle upswing? Chart I-3 demonstrates inventory cycles and manufacturing production within manufacturing-intensive economies. The correlation is not stable. Currently, this entails that low manufacturing inventories and a potential rise in inventories over the course of this year do not guarantee acceleration in industrial output growth. Having reviewed manufacturing inventory cycles and their correlation with share prices, we conclude that the key to share prices is final demand - not inventory swings. Manufacturing inventories have dropped in the past 12 months because final demand has been robust (Chart I-4). Historically, periods of re-stocking have often coincided with poor equity market performance. Indeed, Taiwanese, Korean, Japanese and German non-financial share prices have no stable correlation with their respective manufacturing inventory cycles (Chart I-5). In short, manufacturing inventories could rise in the months ahead, but this does not guarantee higher share prices in cyclical industries. Chart I-3Inventories And Production ##br##Are Not Always Correlated Chart I-4Robust Demand Has Led ##br##To Inventory Depletion Chart I-5Non-Financial Share Prices And##br## Inventories: Little Correlation By and large, the outlook for corporate profits is contingent on final demand rather than re-stocking. All of the above confirms that inventories are a residual of demand and supply. Stronger-than-expected demand is bullish for share prices, though it also often coincides with declining inventories. By contrast, rising inventories typically reflect demand falling behind output growth (one can define it as involuntary re-stocking) and these periods are not favorable for share price gains in cyclical industries. One caveat is that there could be a re-stocking cycle amid strengthening demand or, in other words, voluntary re-stocking. If this transpires in the coming months, it will be extremely bullish for share prices as it will supercharge output growth. While the latter scenario - inventory re-stocking amid strengthening final demand - could very well occur within the advanced economies this year, odds of such positive dynamics are low in EM/China. Bottom Line: Share prices in global cyclical sectors are driven by swings in final demand - not in inventories. Going forward, global manufacturing inventories will rise. If this rise is accompanied by strengthening demand, it will be very bullish for the global business cycle. Otherwise, global cyclical plays will relapse as inventories rise. What Drives China's Inventory Cycles Chart I-6 shows that China's manufacturing inventories typically deplete when the credit and fiscal impulse is rising, and vice versa. China's manufacturing inventories have been exhausted because demand has been strong in the past 12 months. In turn, demand strength has originated from the country's massive fiscal and credit stimulus push from the first half of 2016. Chart I-6China: Strong Policy Stimulus Led To Manufacturing Inventories Reduction That said, China's aggregate fiscal and credit impulse seems to have recently rolled over, pointing to a top in its manufacturing mini-cycle and commodities prices (Chart I-7). This signals a potential deceleration in final demand. On the whole, the ongoing modest tightening by the People's Bank of China and by the bank regulator (the China Banking Regulatory Commission) amid a lingering credit bubble is raising the odds of a moderate credit slowdown in the months ahead. Even modest credit growth deceleration will result in a negative credit impulse (Chart I-8, top panel). Meanwhile, the mainland's fiscal impulse has already dropped (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7China: Aggregate Credit And Fiscal##br## Stimulus Has Topped Out Chart I-8China: A Breakdown Of Credit ##br##And Fiscal Impulses On the whole, these developments are leading us to maintain our negative bias toward EM risk assets and China plays. What has gone wrong in our view/analysis on China in the past 12 months is that the nation's credit growth has stayed much stronger than we expected. In our April 13, 2016 report,1 we did a scenario analysis and argued that China's large fiscal stimulus push would be offset by a negative credit impulse if credit growth slowed from 11.5% to below 10%. In reality, credit growth has been between 11.5-12.5%, producing a positive credit impulse. Barring tightening by the central bank or bank regulators, mainland banks can continue originating loans/money at a double-digit pace, as they have been doing for many years (Chart I-9). In general, commercial banks do not need savings to create money/loans and there are few limits on Chinese banks originating loans "out of thin air," as we argued in our Trilogy of Special Reports on money/loan creation, savings and investment.2 Chart I-9China's Credit/Money Growth##br## Remains Rampant Therefore, if credit growth does not slow, our negative view on China's growth will be off-the-mark again. The pressure point in such a case will be the exchange rate. Unlimited money creation/oversupply of local currency is bearish for the value of the RMB. The RMB will continue depreciating, but it is not certain if it will hurt EM risk assets. It is a major consensus view nowadays that the Chinese authorities will not allow growth to suffer ahead of the Party Congress in autumn of this year. Yet, the PBoC and bank regulators are modestly tightening to "normalize" credit growth. Some clients may wonder why we are placing so much emphasis on the rollover of credit and fiscal impulses now, while placing little emphasis on these same indicators in 2016 when they were recovering. The rationale is as follows: when there is a credit bubble - as there is in China now - we tend to downplay the importance of policy easing and put more significance on policy tightening. The opposite also holds true: when the credit/banking system is healthy, we tend to downplay the impact of moderate policy tightening and put greater emphasis on policy easing. In a credit bubble, it does not take much tightening to trigger a downtrend that unwinds excesses. Similarly, moderate tightening in a healthy credit system should not be feared. From a big picture perspective, we turned bearish on China's growth several years ago due to the formation of a credit bubble. The bubble has only gotten larger and an adjustment has not yet even started. This does not justify altering our fundamental assessment of China's growth outlook. It would have been ideal to turn positive tactically on EM/China plays a year ago. Unfortunately, we did not do that. Presently, chasing the market higher might not be the best investment idea. Based on all this and given: the sharp rally in EM/China plays and widespread investor complacency and consensus that "everything" will be fine before the end of this year; modest tightening in Chinese monetary policy amid lingering credit and asset (property and the corporate bond market) bubbles; our outlook for higher U.S. bond yields and a stronger U.S. dollar; the fact that financial markets are forward looking, and timing is impossible; We believe the risk/reward of EM/China plays remains unattractive. In regard to EM ex-China, as we documented in last week's report, domestic demand in the developing economies has not recovered at all, or is mixed at best. DM final demand strength and global manufacturing inventory rebuilding will certainly help Korea and Taiwan, but not other emerging economies. The most important variables for other EM economies including China are domestic demand and/or commodities prices. If commodities prices relapse along with China's credit and fiscal impulse (Chart I-7, bottom panel), EM financial markets will suffer regardless of the growth trends within advanced economies. In fact, strong U.S. growth could lead to higher U.S. interest rate expectations and prop up the U.S. dollar. This will also be a bad omen for EM and commodities. Bottom Line: China's inventory depletion has been due to the large fiscal and credit impulse in the past 12 months - i.e., improving final demand has been instrumental to inventory shedding. Looking forward, the mainland's aggregate credit and fiscal impulse seems to have topped out, raising the odds of a reversal in EM/China plays sooner than later. Industrial Metals Inventories And Prices There is no good data reflecting industrial metals inventories globally. London Metal Exchange and Shanghai Futures Exchange data are likely not indicative of global metals stockpiles. China accounts for close to 50% of global demand for industrial metals, and its demand is critical to prices. Given that the large spike in metals prices in the past several months has coincided with improving Chinese economic data, one would expect the mainland to be the driving force behind the rally. However, Chart I-10 demonstrates that China's imports of industrial metals actually contracted in 2016. This is puzzling, but we have to take it at face value. The top panel of Chart I-11 depicts that traders' net long positions in copper are at a six-year high. This might partially explain the rally in copper in the recent months. Chart I-10China's Import Of Base Metals##br## And Base Metals Prices Chart I-11Traders Are Long ##br##Copper And Oil Clearly, China has been depleting its stock of industrial metals, and is likely primed to increase its imports. Nevertheless, periods of metals re-stocking by the mainland have historically not entailed higher industrial metals prices (Chart I-10). On the contrary, rising Chinese imports of metals have actually coincided with falling prices. One can interpret this relationship as China buying industrial metals when prices are falling. This is consistent with China attempting to buy commodities on dips. As to metals inventories in China, the picture is as follows: Steel inventories have plummeted and are low (Chart I-12). One can safely argue that there will be an inventory re-stocking cycle in China. Nevertheless, it is highly uncertain if this will be bullish for steel prices and steel stocks. In fact, there has been a mild negative correlation between steel prices and inventories; historically, when inventories have risen, prices declined (Chart I-12, top panel). This confirms that inventory levels are a residual of demand and supply, and prices are often driven by final demand - not inventories. This is also corroborated by the bottom panel of Chart I-12, which illustrates that share prices of global steel companies are sometimes negatively correlated with China's steel inventories. Stock prices occasionally sell off when inventories rise, and rally when inventories are shrinking. In contrast to steel and steel products, iron ore inventories have risen, and it seems the re-stocking cycle is well advanced (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China: Steel Inventories And Prices Chart I-13China: Iron Ore Inventories And Prices Yet, again there is no strong correlation between inventories and prices of iron ore (Chart I-13). In our discussions with clients, investors often attribute the rally in industrial metals in general and steel prices in particular over the past 12 months to supply cutbacks in China. While supply reductions have helped in the case of certain metals, it is also evident that the rally in industrial commodities has been driven by rising demand globally and in China. First, China's aggregate credit and fiscal impulse was positive until very recently, implying strengthening demand and thereby higher metals prices. Second, if there were only production cutbacks in steel and other commodities and not demand recovery, the mainland's manufacturing PMI would not have risen (Chart I-14). Finally, steel production has risen both in China and the rest of the world (Chart I-15). Hence, world steel supplies have expanded in the past 12 months. Given this has coincided with rising steel prices, it confirms there has been notable improvement in demand for steel. Chart I-14China: Steel Prices Are Up ##br##Because Of Strong Demand Chart I-15Chinese And Global ##br##Steel Production We are not experts in the ebbs and flows of commodities supplies, but it seems the Chinese government's mandated steel capacity cutbacks have not prevented rising steel output in China. In the meantime, rising prices amid rising production and falling inventories are indicative of robust final demand for many metals. Bottom Line: Industrial metals prices have risen because demand in the real economy and among financial investors has been strong. That said, a rollover in China's fiscal and credit impulse and a strong U.S. dollar will likely create headwinds for industrial metals prices over the course of this year. A Word About Oil Inventories OECD oil product inventories have continued to rise, despite supply cuts (Chart I-16, top panel). At the same time, our proxy for change in China's oil inventories has been very elevated for a while, depicting strategic and/or commercial inventory building on the mainland (Chart I-16, bottom panel). It is true that supply curtailments have been instrumental to the rally in oil prices, but the continued inventory buildup also indicates that supply is still outpacing demand. Besides, traders' net long positions in crude have spiked close to their 2014 highs (Chart I-11, bottom panel). This corroborates that demand for crude, like for copper, has partially been financial rather than from final consumers. Finally, U.S. rig counts have recovered somewhat, which may be indicative of a continued rise in America's oil output (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Oil Inventories Keep On Rising Chart I-17U.S. Rig Counts And Oil Production Bottom Line: While we do not have expertise to follow or forecast oil supply dynamics, we are biased in believing that the risk-reward for oil prices is unattractive because of a strong U.S. dollar and potentially weak EM/China asset prices, which could trigger a reduction in net long positions in crude. Investment Conclusions Complacency reigns in the global financial markets. EM equity volatility has fallen close to its cycle lows, the U.S. VIX is depressed, U.S. equity investor sentiment is very elevated and EM corporate credit spreads have plummeted to a ten-year low (Chart I-18). While the timing of a reversal is impossible, the risk-reward profile of EM financial markets is greatly unattractive. The U.S. trade-weighted dollar has consolidated recently, and might be primed for another upleg. As the U.S. dollar resumes its uptrend, EM risk assets will likely sell off. Finally, EM share prices have failed to outperform the developed bourses much, despite the rally in commodities and amelioration in Chinese growth (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Complacency Reigns Chart I-19EM Equities Have Not Yet Outperformed Remarkably, analysts' net earnings revisions for EM stocks have so far failed to turn positive (Chart I-20). Either analysts' EPS expectations were originally still too high, or companies are failing to deliver profits. Whatever the reason, the implication is that the consensus is more bullish on EM than is suggested by the underlying fundamentals. Within an EM equity portfolio, our overweights remain Taiwan, Korea, India, China, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil and Peru. We are neutral on other bourses. Finally, the EM equity benchmark is at a critical technical resistance level (Chart I-21) but odds do not favor a sustainable breakout. Chart I-20EM EPS Net Revisions Are Still Negative Chart I-21EM Stocks: A Breakout Attempt Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Revisiting China's Fiscal And Credit Impulses", dated April 13, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Trilogy of Special Reports on money/loan creation, savings and investment, titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses" dated October 26, 2016, "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016 and "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Rate Volatility: Forecast disagreement about GDP growth and T-bill rates will increase over the course of the year. This, alongside elevated policy uncertainty, will translate into higher interest rate volatility. Treasury Yields: Higher rate volatility should cause the term premium in the Treasury curve to increase at the margin. However, this impact could be offset if rate volatility and equity volatility rise in concert. An increase in equity vol would encourage flight-to-safety flows into bonds. MBS: Higher interest rate volatility and the unwinding of the Fed's mortgage portfolio will lead to wider MBS spreads during the next two years. Feature Low interest rate volatility has been a constant feature of the investing landscape during the past few years. In fact, you need to go back to the 1970s to find another period when interest rate volatility was consistently at or below its current level (Chart 1). Not surprisingly, the implied volatility priced into Treasury options is also as low as it has been during the past 30 years, with the exception of the period just prior to the financial crisis in 2007 (Chart 2). Chart 1Yield Volatility: Lowest Since The 70s Chart 2Implied And Realized Yield Volatility Move Together This begs the question of whether the current low-vol environment can be sustained, or whether overly complacent investors are in for a shock. At the very least, we believe that rate volatility has already passed its cyclical trough and will start to move up this year. Investors should prepare themselves for higher volatility. In this week's report we examine the key macro drivers of interest rate volatility and discuss the implications of rising vol for both Treasury yields, and crucially, mortgage-backed securities. Macro Uncertainty & Rate Volatility Chart 3Macro Drivers Of Rate Volatility In a Special Report published in 2014,1 we posited that the long-term trends in volatility across all asset classes are largely driven by common macroeconomic factors. Specifically, investor uncertainty regarding the outlook for economic growth and monetary policy. A 2004 paper by Alexander David and Pietro Veronesi2 provides some theoretical justification for this view, as the authors observed that investors tend to overreact to new information when macro uncertainty is high, and underreact when uncertainty is low. To test the linkage between interest rate volatility and macro uncertainty we consider three measures of uncertainty. The first two measures, shown alongside the MOVE index of implied Treasury volatility in Chart 3, are measures of GDP growth and T-bill rate forecast dispersion. We measure dispersion - the disagreement among forecasters - by looking at individual forecasts of GDP growth and T-bill rates and calculating the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles. The series shown in Chart 3 are equal-weighted averages of the forecast dispersion calculated for five different time horizons, ranging from the current quarter to four quarters ahead. As can be seen in the top two panels of Chart 3, implied interest rate volatility is higher when the disagreement among forecasters is greater, consistent with our thesis. The third measure of uncertainty we consider is the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index created by Baker, Bloom and Davis.3 This index tracks uncertainty about the macro environment by counting the number of mentions of certain key words in major global newspapers. Elevated readings from this index have also coincided with high rate volatility in the past (Chart 3, bottom panel). GDP Growth Forecast Dispersion Chart 4Forecast Dispersion & Corporate Lending Disagreement among GDP growth forecasts reached an all-time low in the fourth quarter of 2016, but has since recovered to slightly more typical levels. Historically, we have found that C&I lending standards and corporate sector balance sheet health correlate most closely with GDP growth forecast dispersion (Chart 4) and both measures suggest that forecast dispersion is biased upward. T-Bill Rate Forecast Dispersion T-bill rate forecast dispersion was abnormally low between 2011 and 2014 for two reasons. The first reason is quite simply the zero-lower-bound on interest rates. A short rate bounded at zero necessarily trimmed the distribution of possible T-bill rate forecasts, since forecasters logically assumed that further interest rate cuts were not possible. This impact will gradually dissipate the further the fed funds rate moves off zero. Chart 5Fed Says March Meeting Is Live The second reason for extremely low T-bill rate forecast dispersion was the Fed's forward guidance. During this timeframe the Fed was actively trying to convince the public that interest rates would remain low. The most obvious example being the "Evans Rule", where the Fed promised not to lift interest rates at least until the unemployment rate had fallen below a specific threshold. This activist forward guidance limited the range of conceivable T-bill rate forecasts and crushed interest rate volatility. Nowadays, the Fed is engaged in a different sort of forward guidance, trying to convince markets that every FOMC meeting is live and that rate hikes could occur at any moment. Essentially, the Fed is trying to inject volatility into the rates market. Just a few weeks ago, when asked about the low probability markets are assigning to a March rate hike (Chart 5), San Francisco Fed President John Williams replied flatly: "I don't agree. All our meetings are live." Global Economic Policy Uncertainty We have written a lot about the policy uncertainty index in recent reports,4 focusing specifically on how it has diverged from its historical relationships with many asset prices. At the very least, we expect that sustained elevated policy uncertainty will place upward pressure on asset price volatility at the margin. Bottom Line: Forecast disagreement about GDP growth and T-bill rates will increase over the course of the year. This, alongside elevated policy uncertainty, will translate into higher interest rate volatility. Rate Volatility & Treasury Yields Long-dated nominal Treasury yields can be decomposed in a few different ways. In recent reports we have focused on the decomposition of the nominal 10-year Treasury yield into its real and inflation components. By identifying different macro drivers for each component we concluded that nominal Treasury yields will increase this year, driven by a rising inflation component and relatively stable real yields.5 Alternatively, we can think of the nominal 10-year Treasury yield as consisting of an expectations component equal to the market's expected path of short rates over the next ten years, and a term premium that reflects all of the other market imbalances and uncertainties associated with taking duration risk. This second approach is complicated by the fact that it requires a model of ex-ante interest rate expectations and every commonly used model is fraught with its own unique difficulties.6 Setting that aside, if we use the Kim & Wright (2005)7 estimate of the 10-year term premium we observe an expectations component that generally tracks the fed funds rate and a term premium component that is correlated with implied Treasury volatility (Chart 6), although the latter correlation is less than perfect. This decomposition also suggests that nominal Treasury yields should rise. The Fed is much more likely to hike rates than cut them and we have concluded that rate volatility is likely to trend higher from current depressed levels. However, the relationship between rate volatility and the term premium is complicated. The main reason for the complicated relationship between interest rate volatility and the term premium is the fact that elevated interest rate volatility also tends to be correlated with high equity volatility (Chart 7). So while higher rate volatility puts upward pressure on the term premium, the associated increase in equity volatility tends to raise investor risk aversion and increase the perceived value of bonds as a hedge against equity positions. This mitigates some (or often all) of the impact of rising rate volatility on the term premium. Chart 6Which Way For The ##br##Term Premium? Chart 7MOVE & VIX Have Opposing##br## Impacts On Bond Yields Bottom Line: Higher rate volatility should cause the term premium in the Treasury curve to increase at the margin. However, this impact could be offset if rate volatility and equity volatility rise in concert. An increase in equity vol would encourage flight-to-safety flows into bonds. Rate Volatility & MBS The relationship between rate volatility and MBS is much more straightforward than for Treasury yields. We observe a tight correlation between nominal MBS spreads and the MOVE implied volatility index (Chart 8). Chart 8 suggests that, even in the near-term, MBS spreads are too low for current levels of rate vol. The relationship between MBS spreads and rate volatility is easily explained. The defining characteristic of a negatively convex asset, such as MBS, is that its duration is positively correlated with the level of interest rates (Chart 9). This correlation leads to increased losses when yields rise and lower gains when yields fall. It's not surprising that negatively convex assets perform best in low volatility environments. Chart 8MBS Spreads Are Linked To Vol Chart 9MBS Duration Moves With Yields We maintain an underweight allocation to MBS given that spreads are already low and that the volatility environment is poised to become less favorable. Further, if the Fed continues along its planned normalization path it is likely to cease the reinvestment of its MBS portfolio at some point in 2018. There are two reasons why this poses a risk for MBS. The first reason is that the unwinding of the Fed's MBS portfolio is likely to place upward pressure on implied volatility. While private investors often hedge their MBS positions by purchasing volatility, the Fed has no incentive to do so. It follows that by removing a large stock of MBS from private hands the Fed has also removed a large source of demand for volatility. When this supply is re-introduced into the market, demand for volatility is likely to increase. The second reason relates more directly to the supply and demand balance for MBS. In years when net MBS issuance (adjusted for Fed purchases) has been negative, excess MBS returns have tended to be positive (Chart 10). Further, while negative net MBS issuance (adjusted for Fed purchases) has been the norm since Fed asset purchases began in 2009 (Chart 11), this state of affairs will change once the Fed starts to unwind its MBS portfolio. Chart 10Annual MBS Excess Returns ##br## Vs. Net Supply Since 1989 Chart 11Net Issuance Will Turn##br## Positive In 2018 During the past three years the Fed has been buying between $20bn and $40bn MBS per month, just to keep its balance sheet stable. Net new MBS issuance will not be strong enough to overcome this hurdle in 2017, but net MBS issuance (adjusted for Fed purchases) will swing quickly into positive territory in 2018 if the Fed decides to let its MBS portfolio run down. Bottom Line: Higher interest rate volatility and the unwinding of the Fed's mortgage portfolio will lead to wider MBS spreads during the next two years. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Volatility, Uncertainty And Government Bond Yields", dated May 13, 2014, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 "Inflation and earnings uncertainty and volatility forecasts", Alexander David and Pietro Veronesi, Manuscript, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago (2004). 3 Please see www.policyuncertainty.com for further details. 4 Please see Theme # 4 in U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Is It Time To Cut Duration?", dated January 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Bond Volatility - The Unwelcome Guest That Will Not Leave", dated June 16, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Don H. Kim and Jonathan H. Wright, "An Arbitrage-Free Term Structure Model and the Recent Behavior of Long-Term Yields and Distant-Horizon Forward Rates", FEDS 2005-33. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2005/index.htm Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Deflation has decisively ended, and the economy is making a gradual transition towards inflation. The upshot is that growth is reviving rapidly in nominal terms. It is unrealistic to expect exports to be a main growth driver for the Chinese economy in the post-crisis world - even without protectionist pressures from President-elect Trump. The "Trump" wildcard serves as a wake-up call for Chinese policymakers to further focus on supporting domestic demand. There is a strengthening case for cyclical improvement in manufacturing investment. This further limits downside risk and sets the stage for potential positive surprises in the coming months. Feature Investors will be paying close attention to President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration speech this coming Friday, which may allow for a clearer understanding of his world view and economic policies, as well as their global implications. The inauguration will overshadow China's key economic statistics to be released later this week, and which we expect to show that the Chinese economy has picked up sequentially. As political uncertainty will stay elevated and deserves close monitoring going forward, it is equally important to keep in mind the economic big picture. In the next two months, China's economic data will once again be heavily distorted by the Chinese New Year holiday, making it more difficult to detect genuine growth trends. In last week's report, we laid out our view on China's growth and policy outlook for 2017.1 This week, we offer a reality check and our take on some key cyclical issues. Watch For Inflation Surprises The biggest change in China's macro condition in the past year, in our view, has been the sharp turnaround in producer prices. Rising PPI has lifted corporate pricing power, reduced real interest rates and eased financial stress in some heavy industries, the weakest link in the corporate sector - all of which are important reasons behind China's growth improvement of late. Looking forward, we expect inflation will remain well behaved. Improving producer prices is to a large extent attributable to RMB depreciation, which has already begun to crest. The trade-weighted RMB's depreciation has halted, and it is unrealistic to expect it to continue to depreciate at an ever-accelerating pace (Chart 1). This should cap the upside of PPI inflation. The headline consumer price index (CPI), the broader inflation measure, was fairly stable throughout last year's roller coaster ride in PPI (Chart 2). Moreover, the fluctuation in headline CPI was mainly attributable to food prices, which have been noisy due to seasonal factors and unexpected supply-demand disruptions, but have been largely trendless in recent years. There is no case for a food-induced inflation outbreak. Chart 1PPI Inflation Is Peaking Chart 2No Case For Food Inflation More fundamentally, although the Chinese economy has strengthened, it is still operating below potential. Historically, runaway inflation has always occurred when the economy overheated, which is far from the current situation (Chart 3). Without a strong growth rebound, it is difficult to expect genuine inflationary pressures. In short, the current environment is best characterized as "easing deflation" rather than "rising inflation," and our base case remains that inflationary pressures will stay at bay. Nonetheless, it is important to note that strong deflationary pressures have prevailed since the global financial crisis, which has led to major adjustments in the world economy. In China's case, for example, capital spending has slowed sharply. Meanwhile, cutting excess capacity has been an explicit policy priority, which, together with strengthening demand may lead to a quick rise in prices. Last year's sharp rebound in steel, thermal coal and some other raw materials prices provided clear evidence of this. Indeed, several factors warn against being overly complacent about the inflation outlook. For producers, the improvement in pricing power appears rather broad based, as both industrial firms and the service sector have been reporting rising levels in their respective output prices. In other words, rising prices are not just contained in resource sectors associated with global commodities prices and Chinese capacity cuts. For consumers, inflation expectations have begun to rise (Chart 4). Consumers' inflation expectations may be just a response to changes in prices rather than a leading indicator for future price moves. However, there has been a significant pickup in confidence on future income growth, which is likely a reflection of a tighter labor market and rising wages. If this trend holds, it would make it a lot easier for producers to pass through rising input costs to end users. Chart 3Inflation Vs Economic Overheating Chart 4Inflation Expectations Are On The Rise Overall, it is premature to worry about an inflation outbreak, and we do not consider inflation as a major policy constraint for the People's Bank of China. However, it appears that deflation has decisively ended, and the economy is making a gradual transition towards inflation. The upshot is that growth is reviving rapidly in nominal terms, supercharged by both improvement in real activity and a rising GDP deflator. Nominal GDP may reclaim a double-digit annual pace in the coming quarters. Exports: Why Has The Historical Correlation Broken Down? China's latest export numbers continued to disappoint, falling by 6.1% in dollar terms from a year ago. Part of the decline is due to falling prices measured in dollar terms; exports in volume terms are considerably stronger. Nonetheless, the export sector has been a chronic underperformer in the Chinese economy in recent years. Historically, China's export sector performance was highly predictable based on some key domestic and global variables - this correlation has clearly broken down since 2015 (Chart 5). If the historical correlation still held, export growth should have rebounded sharply. Many have viewed the divergence as a sign that Chinese exporters have lost competitiveness, which does not seem credible, as Chinese exports have continued to gain global market share. In our view, the chronic disappointment of the Chinese export sector's performance is due to several factors. First, the global financial crisis was a watershed event that marked structural breaks in economic correlations. Since then, consumers in the developed world have been focusing on deleveraging and fixing their balance sheets, and therefore the growth recovery has not led to a corresponding increase in demand - and imports for - consumer goods. Second, protectionist pressures have been on the rise since the global financial crisis, as all countries have tried to protect domestic producers in the face of weak final demand. Anti-dumping measures initiated by World Trade Organization member countries have increased notably in recent years, a growing share of which have been targeted at Chinese exporters (Chart 6). The high profile anti-dumping measures adopted by the Obama administration against Chinese tire and steel products have caused significant damage to Chinese producers and exporters.2 Chart 5Exports Have Disappointed Chart 6Protectionism Is Already On The Rise Finally, Chinese export numbers have been distorted by disguised capital flows driven by speculation on the RMB exchange rate. The sharp swings in Chinese exports to Hong Kong since the global financial crisis can be viewed as proxy for shifting expectations on the yuan (Chart 7). Immediately after the global financial crisis, the RMB was widely expected to rise against the dollar, leading to a massive surge in Chinese sales to Hong Kong as exporters overstated export revenues to bring more foreign currencies onshore. The tide completely reversed in early 2014 when the RMB began to drop against the greenback. Exporters may have been underreporting overseas sales so they could park part of their foreign revenues offshore in anticipation of a weaker RMB, weighing on overall export sector performance. Whatever the reason, the important point here is that it is unrealistic to expect exports to be a main growth driver for the Chinese economy in the post-crisis world - even without protectionist pressures from President-elect Trump. In recent years the Chinese authorities systematically overestimated the vigor of global demand, and export sector performance almost always lagged the government's annual targets, which contributed to chronic growth disappointments. In this regard, the "Trump" wildcard serves as a wake-up call for Chinese policymakers to further focus on supporting domestic demand. Has Investment Bottomed? With exports chronically disappointing, domestic capital spending holds the key for economic growth. Policy driven investment on infrastructure construction has held up strongly since 2013, while private sector investment mainly in the mining and manufacturing sectors has downshifted sharply. Looking forward, infrastructure spending will likely remain buoyant, supported by both public budgetary sources and public-private-partnerships (PPPs).3 What's changing is that capital spending in the manufacturing sector may have bottomed from a cyclical point of view. Inventory destocking in the manufacturing sector has become very advanced. Improving new orders and rising producer prices should lead to a restocking cycle. There has been a notable improvement in corporate sector profitability and confidence of late, which has historically led capital spending in the manufacturing sector (Chart 8). Consistently, the latest credit numbers show a significant pickup in medium- and long-term loans by the corporate sector, which are typically used to finance investment spending rather than replenish working capital. Chart 7Hong Kong Trade And The RMB Chart 8Manufacturing Capex Has Bottomed The long-term outlook for Chinese private capital spending hinges critically on structural reforms on many fronts. As far as the corporate sector is concerned, it is widely recognized that China's overall tax burden is not high by global standards, but is primarily shouldered by the corporate sector rather than households, and a rebalancing is long overdue. The government under incumbent Premier Li Keqiang has been focusing on reducing administrative red tape and mandatary employee benefits provided by employers as ways to cut corporate sector costs. If the Chinese authorities can implement reforms despite the populist resistance to shifting some of the tax burden from the corporate sector to households, it could further boost corporate profitability and revive animal spirits among Chinese entrepreneurs, leading to another round of investment boom. Any tax reform measures in this direction should be viewed as a major positive development. For now, we see a strengthening case for cyclical improvement in manufacturing investment, after decelerating for over six years. The current sub-par "new normal" growth trajectory rules out a sharp revival in capex, but the marginal change in "second derivatives" is still important as it diminishes a chronic growth headwind. This further limits downside risk and sets the stage for potential positive surprises in the coming months. Stay tuned. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1, 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China-U.S. Trade Relations: The Big Picture," dated November 17, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights China's monetary and fiscal policy in 2017 will likely remain accommodative, in order to achieve the goal of an average 6.5% GDP growth over the next five years. China's policies related to its property market will be much more restrictive than the previous two years. Chinese metal demand will grow at a slower pace than last year, as reflationary policies are throttled back. Feature Base metals and bulk markets had a fantastic year in 2016, a complete reversal of their miserable performance in 2015 (Chart 1, panels 1 and 2). Last year, the LMEX base metal index, steel prices and iron ore prices were up 30%, 75%, and 91%, respectively (using average prices in January and December). In comparison, during the same period of 2015, the LMEX index, steel and iron ore were down 22%, 30%, and 41%, respectively. Massive supply reductions, and recovering demand caused by China's reflationary fiscal and monetary policies, were the driving forces behind these sharp rallies in bulks and base metals prices last year. Both the official manufacturing PMI and Keqiang index, which are broadly used as key measures of Chinese economic conditions, reached a three-year high in late 2016 (Chart 1, panels 3 and 4). Clearly, metal prices had already discounted a positive outlook vis-a-vis Chinese economic growth, which was boosted by a series of reflationary policy initiatives in the past two years. The question now is: will reflationary monetary and fiscal policies continue into 2017? If so, on how large a scale will it be? What factors could limit or even prevent reflationary policies in China? A look back China's reflationary policies actually started in late 2014, when the property market and overall economy showed signs of weakness. The country accelerated its reflationary policies throughout 2015 and maintained a moderate reflationary stance in 2016, in order to spur domestic economic growth. Monetary policy: China cut its central-bank directed policy rate five times in 2015 from 5.6% to 4.35%, the lowest level since the data started in 1980 (Chart 2, panel 1). The People's Bank of China (PBoC), the country's central bank, also lowered the reserve requirement ratio at banks - the amount of reserves banks must keep on hand - four times in 2015 and once in 2016 from 18% to 15%, the lowest level since May 2010 (Chart 2, panel 2). Chart 1China Reflationary Policy Drove ##br##Metal Price Rallies In 2016 Chart 2Both Monetary and Fiscal Policies ##br##Were Reflationary Last Year Fiscal policy: China halved its 10% sales tax on passenger cars with engines up to 1.6 liters in October 2015, which boosted auto sales and production significantly last year (Chart 2, panel 3). The country also maintained its high-growth infrastructure investment last year (Chart 2, panel 4). Real estate-related policy: China loosened its housing-related policies extensively since September 2014, by among other things, reducing down-payment requirements for first-time home buyers, and reducing down payments needed to finance second homes. The goal of the policies was to reduce elevated housing inventories. Indeed, those policies, along with the combination of falling mortgage rates, revived the Chinese property market in 2016, and sparked a massive rally in steel-making commodities - metallurgical coal and iron ore - and in base metals. For the first 11 months of last year, the average selling prices of 70 cities and the total floor-space-sold area rose 13.6% and 24.3% yoy, respectively, which considerably improved from the 2015 same period's 6% and 7.4% yoy growth. The floor-space-started area had an even more significant improvement - a growth of 7.6% for the first 11 months of last year versus a deep contraction of 14.7% yoy for the same period of 2015 (Chart 3). What now? This year, we continue to expect accommodative monetary and fiscal policy in China. "Stability" was the key word during the three-day Central Economic Work Conference (December 14-16, 2016), an annual meeting that set out economic targets and policy priorities for next year. "Stability" means the country's leaders will try to implement policies designed to keep the country's GDP growth around 6.5% this year, the average GDP growth target for the five years between 2016 and 2020, under China's five-year plan. China's economic growth is on a downtrend, coming in at 6.9% in 2015, and a predicted 6.7% in 2016 (for the first three quarters of 2016, China's GDP growth was all 6.7%) (Chart 4, panel 1). Chart 3Property Market Policy: ##br##Greatly Loosened In 2015 And 2016 Chart 4We Expect Chinese Monetary And Fiscal Policies ##br##To Stay Accommodative This Year The market's expectation for China's 2017 GDP growth currently is 6.5%. Even though President Xi has stated he is open to growth in China falling below 6.5%, too far below this level - for example, below 6% - could cause widespread disappointment in the country and trigger the "instability" leaders are trying to avoid. Hence, monetary accommodation likely will persist in 2017. As both headline inflation and core inflation in China still are not elevated, we do not expect any rate hikes or increases in the reserve requirement ratio to be announced by the PBoC this year (Chart 4, panel 2). In addition, the RMB depreciated considerably last year, which helps the country's exports and, to some extent, stimulates domestic economic growth (Chart 4, panel 3). In mid-December last year, Chinese policymakers raised the tax on small-engine autos slightly - from 5% last year to 7.5% this year - but this is still below its normal 10% level. This also indicates the country wants to maintain a moderate, but not too expansionary, level of fiscal stimulus In 2017. In 2016, most of Chinese automobile production growth came from small-engine passenger cars, which clearly benefited from this policy (Chart 4, panel 4). This year, we still expect positive growth in Chinese vehicle production but at a much slower rate than last year. Curbing Property Market Exuberance Regarding the Chinese property market, our take-away from the Central Economic Work Conference was that "curbing the speculative home purchases, containing asset bubbles and financial risks" will be among the country's top 2017 priorities. In comparison, back in 2016, reducing housing inventories was the focus. Indeed, with property sales recovering, inventory has fallen from its 2015 peak. Inventories still are elevated, but most of the overhang is in third- and fourth-tier cities, with some of it in even smaller cities (Chart 4, panel 5). A continuation of stricter housing policies deployed since last September to cool the over-heated domestic property market is expected. For example, Beijing raised the down payment for first-time homebuyers from 30% to 35%. Down payments for second homes rose from 30% to a minimum of 50%. For a second home larger than 140 square meters, the down payment is now 70%. So far, more than 20 cities have declared similarly strict policies to control speculative buying in property markets. Currently, a record high 20% of people surveyed plan to buy a new house in the next three months, which indicates further cooling measures are needed for the property market (Chart 5, panel 1). In the meantime, new mortgage loans as a share of home sales in value also reached a record high of 49%, and real estate-related loans as a share of total new bank loans now stand at a 6-year high, signaling financial risk in these markets is rising (Chart 5, panels 2 and 3). All of these factors signal that the Chinese authorities will maintain their restrictive property market policies in 2017. This will be negative for the country's bulk and base metals demand, as the property market accounts for some 35% of demand for these commodities. In conclusion, China's monetary and fiscal policies are likely to stay accommodative in 2017, while the country's housing market is facing restrictive policies. Shifting Economic Drivers For Bulk and Base Metal Demand We would like to remind our clients that China's economic structure is shifting: Services (also known as the "tertiary sector") account for a rising share of GDP, and are not big users of bulks or metals, while manufacturing (i.e., the "secondary sector) demand for these commodities is slowing. Services now account for 51.4% of GDP, while manufacturing now accounts for 39.8% (Chart 6). The GDP weight of services is up from 42% ten years ago, while the GDP weight of manufacturing is down 8 percentage points over the same period. Chart 5Property Market Policy Will Remain ##br##Restrictive in 2017 Chart 6China's Economic Structure Shift Is ##br##Negative To Metals Demand This shift is negative for metal demand growth, as the related manufacturing activity growth slows faster than the overall GDP growth. Overall, we believe Chinese bulk and base metal demand growth in 2017 will slow as a result of less expansionary policies than prevailed last year, and a more restrictive domestic housing market. Next week The Chinese Central Economic Work Conference also emphasized that 2017 will be a year to deepen supply-side structural reforms, which we will discuss in our next week's pub. We also will address the impact of Chinese environmental policy on Chinese metal output. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com ENERGY Chart 7Evidence Of Production Cuts Will Lift Oil Prices Oil Production Expected To Fall Reports of production cuts and reduced volumes being made available to U.S. and Asian refiners have been trickling out since the start of the year, lending underlying support to prices globally (Chart 7). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is reducing exports of heavy-sour crudes favored by U.S. Gulf refiners, and boosting light-sweet sales, which will compete with North Sea volumes and U.S. shale production. This should tighten the spread between the light-sweet benchmarks Brent and WTI vs. Dubai (medium/heavy-sour). Reduced volumes being shipped by KSA to Asian refiners - particularly to Chinese refiners - will support Brent prices. We continue to expect the production cuts negotiated under the leadership of KSA and Russia to become apparent next month, and for inventories to draw in response. Continued high output by Iraq likely will be reduced in the near future. U.S. shale-oil output most likely will increase in 2H17 by ~ 200k to 300k b/d on average, given higher prices supporting drilling economics. Our expectation for global demand growth remains ~ 1.4mm b/d this year, roughly in line with 2016 growth. Given these underlying fundamentals, we expect inventories will begin showing sharp draws, causing backwardation in crude-oil markets to re-emerge in 2H17. As such, we are re-establishing our Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 WTI front-to-back spread - i.e., buying Dec/17 WTI and selling Dec/18 WTI against it. This spread was in contango going to press, making it particularly compelling. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017
Highlights The global 6-month credit impulse is now in its longest upcycle in a decade. Given also that bond yields have had their sharpest spike in a decade, we would not bet on the upcycle lasting much longer. Lean against the rise in bond yields and bank equities. Underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Underweight the IBEX versus the Eurostoxx600. Feature A few days into the New Year, two over-arching economic questions are exercising our minds. Is the relationship between sharply higher bond yields and weaker bank credit creation still valid? And is the relationship between weaker bank credit creation and decelerating economic growth still valid? Chart of the WeekCredit Impulses Heading In Different Directions We suspect the answers are yes and yes. European Investors Must Think Globally, Not Locally Europe is not an investment island. Major European stock market indexes comprise large multinational companies whose sales and profits come from across the world. The upshot is that European stock markets almost always move up and down in tandem with other major world stock markets, such as the S&P500 and Nikkei225 (Chart I-2). Mainstream bond markets might seem to be more parochial, given that they are supposedly under the influence of the local central bank. But investors buy and sell high quality bonds as a global asset class. The upshot is that European bond markets also almost always move up and down in tandem with other major developed bond markets (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Major Equity Markets Move Together Chart I-3Major Bond Markets Move Together Hence, European investors must look first and foremost at global drivers. For us, the most important such driver is the global 6-month credit impulse - which sums the 6-month (dollar) credit impulses in the euro area, the United States and China. Does the global 6-month credit impulse have any predictive power? Yes. Chart I-4 shows that it has consistently led the 6-month cycle in the global government bond yield, which is a good proxy for the global growth cycle. Admittedly, this powerful predictive relationship weakened somewhat through 2013-14 during the most aggressive and distortive phase of worldwide QE. However, in the past couple of years, as QE has waned, the global 6-month credit impulse's predictive power has strongly re-asserted itself (Chart I-5). Chart I-4The Credit Impulse Leads ##br##The Global Growth 'Mini-Cycle' Chart I-5The Credit Impulse's Predictive ##br##Power Has Re-Asserted Itself In effect, the charts illustrate that whatever the structural economic backdrop, the global economy experiences a perpetual 'mini-cycle' lasting about 15-24 months. Higher bond yields (or credit restrictions) weaken the credit impulse; the weaker impulse then depresses growth; the depressed growth lowers bond yields; lower bond yields (or credit easing) strengthen the credit impulse; the stronger impulse then boosts growth; the boosted growth lifts bond yields; and back to the beginning... Remember, the credit impulse measures the growth in the credit flow. The important point to grasp is that the impulse can weaken even if the credit flow numbers themselves seem strong. For example, if the credit flow increased from $100bn to $150bn to $190bn it might appear to be growing very healthily. But actually, the impulse would have weakened from $50bn to $40bn, creating a headwind. Where are we in the perpetual mini-cycle? Today, the euro area credit impulse is losing momentum, while the U.S. impulse is waning. Which leaves China's rising credit impulse as the only component supporting the global credit impulse (Chart of the Week). But for how much longer? To repeat, it would just take the global credit flow to decelerate for the impulse to roll over. Now consider that high-quality bond yields have had their sharpest 6-month spike in a decade. And that the current 10 month upcycle in the global credit impulse already makes it the longest in a decade. Hence, we would not bet on this mini-upcycle lasting much longer. A Few Words On Our Credit Cycle Framework Our credit cycle framework has several features which uniquely define it. First, the framework focusses on bank credit. This is because the magic of fractional reserve banking allows a bank to create money and new spending power out of thin air. When somebody borrows from a bank, his bank account and spending power goes up, but nobody's spending power has to go down. In contrast, when somebody borrows by issuing a bond, it merely reallocates spending power from one person to another person. The borrower sees his bank account and spending power go up, but the lender sees his bank account and spending power go symmetrically down. Spending will rise to the extent that the borrower has a higher propensity to spend than the lender, but this may or may not be the case. Second, as already discussed, the framework focusses on the bank credit impulse - which measures the growth in the bank credit flow. This is just to compare apples with apples. Remember that GDP is itself a flow statistic. So the growth in GDP receives a contribution from the growth in the credit flow1 (and not from the flow itself). Third, the framework focusses on the 6-month bank credit impulse. We choose this periodicity because 6 months is about the time that it takes to for credit to be fully spent, thereby yielding the greatest predictive power from the credit impulse to economic activity. Fourth, the framework calculates the credit cycle using bank credit to the non-financial sector2 rather than the more commonly-quoted money supply statistics such as euro area M3. The simple reason is that not all loans generate economic activity. Bank to bank lending may stay trapped in the financial system. The money supply - which is on the liabilities side of the banks' balance sheet - would not pick up this distinction. As M3 captures all bank deposits, it would still be expanding rapidly, giving the false signal that demand should be growing. Hence, it is better to focus on bank lending - which is on the assets side of the banks' balance sheet - and only count lending that is likely to generate economic activity (Chart I-6). This reasoning only works if the official data on bank loans is accurate and complete. In China, this is unlikely to be the case, given its large shadow banking system. But unofficial shadow lending must eventually show up in the money supply. Therefore, exceptionally for the China sub-component, our credit cycle framework does prefer to use the money supply (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Our Euro Area Credit Impulse##br## Uses Bank Lending... Chart I-7...But Our China Credit Impulse ##br##Uses Money Supply A Few Words On Our Reductionist Framework We are also strong believers in Investment Reductionism. This philosophy stems from two guiding principles: Occam's Razor - which says that when there are competing explanations for the same effect, the simplest explanation is usually the best; and the Pareto Principle - which says that 80% of effects come from just 20% of causes.3 The important point is that most of the moves in most financial markets result from a very small number of over-arching macro drivers. To reiterate, Europe is not an investment island. Investment Reductionism means that much of asset allocation, sector selection, and regional and country allocation distills down to getting the global growth cycle right. The remaining charts should leave readers in no doubt. Chart I-8 shows that the global 6-month credit impulse leads the cyclical direction of the global bond yield, and thereby determines asset class selection. Chart I-9 then shows that the direction of bond yields determines sector selection: for example Banks versus Technology. Chart I-8Investment Reductionism Step 1: The Global##br## Credit Impulse Leads The Bond Yield Cycle Chart I-9Step 2: The Bond Yield ##br##Drives Sector Selection Chart I-10 and Chart I-11 then show that the sector selection of Banks versus Technology determines both the regional allocation of Eurostoxx600 versus S&P500, and the country allocation of IBEX versus Eurostoxx600. Chart I-10Step 3: Sector Selection Drives##br## Regional Allocation Chart I-11Step 4: Sector Selection Drives ##br##Country Allocation To sum up, the global 6-month credit impulse is now in its longest up-cycle in a decade, and bond yields have had their sharpest spike in a decade. Hence, we would not chase cyclicality at this juncture. Which means that on a 6-month horizon: Lean against the rise in bond yields and bank equities. Underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500.4 Underweight the IBEX versus the Eurostoxx600. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Equivalently, the credit impulse is the growth in the growth (second derivative) of the credit stock. 2 The non-financial sector includes households, (non-financial) firms and government. 3 Often known as the 80-20 rule. 4 BCA Strategists differ on this position. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to express a tactical short in equities via Italy's MIB. An alternative market-neutral trade is to go short Italy's MIB and symmetrically long Hong Kong's Hang Seng. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 Chart I-13 Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II_2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations