Economy
Highlights Duration & TIPS: The recent downtrend in nominal Treasury yields has been driven entirely by inflation that has come in weaker than expected. We are inclined to view inflation's weakness as transitory and suggest investors maintain a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, as well as an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities. Corporate Debt & The Economy: High corporate debt levels are not indicative of over-investment on the part of the corporate sector. As such, they do not suggest an elevated risk of recession. Corporate Debt & Credit Spreads: While a supportive Fed will keep corporate spreads low for the time being, rising leverage is starting to send a worrying message. Feature It's All About Inflation Chart 1End Of The Trump Trade? Treasury securities have reversed a lot of their post-election sell off during the past few weeks, and the 10-year yield is now only 38 basis points above where it was last November (Chart 1). A quick glance at the 10-year's real and inflation components reveals that weaker inflation is the culprit. The real 10-year Treasury yield remains 31 bps above its pre-election level, but the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is now only 7 bps higher (Chart 1, bottom panel). This explains a lot about the broader financial environment. Stable growth and low inflation create a fertile breeding ground for risk assets, and corporate bond spreads are indeed considerably tighter than prior to the election. The average spread on the investment grade corporate bond index is currently 113 bps, down from 135 bps in November. The average junk spread is currently 365 bps, down from 489 bps. What explains the large drop in inflation breakevens? One reason is that they had simply overshot the fair value implied by other financial instruments (Chart 2). Our financial model- based on the oil price, the exchange rate and the stock-to-bond total return ratio - shows that the 10-year breakeven rate was around 20 bps too high earlier this year. It is now almost exactly in line with our model's fair value. The most likely explanation for the overshoot is that markets started to discount a much more stimulative fiscal policy in the immediate aftermath of the election. The potential for large tax cuts at a time of already tight labor markets caused investors' inflation expectations to ramp up. While tax cuts are still likely, it now appears as though they will occur much later and be smaller in scale than was originally thought. Falling oil prices have also exacerbated the drop in breakevens by causing the fair value reading from our model to roll over (Chart 2, bottom panel). Our commodity strategists do not think oil prices will stay this low for much longer.1 OPEC 2.0 production cuts and sustained growth in emerging market trade volumes will cause oil inventories to fall this year, leading to a rebound in prices. The second explanation for this year's drop in the inflation component of yields is that the core inflation data have disappointed during the past couple of months. After reaching 1.8% in February of this year, 12-month trailing core PCE inflation has deviated sharply from the uptrend that had been in place since mid-2015. As of April, it had fallen back to 1.5%, well below the level implied by our Phillips Curve inflation model (Chart 3). Chart 2TIPS Financial Model Chart 3A Phillips Curve Inflation Model With the labor market continuing to tighten and the dollar having depreciated in recent months, we are inclined to view the recent drop in core inflation as transitory. In fact, even after making some adjustments to the estimation interval (see Box), our Phillips Curve inflation model still projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2% by the end of this year in a base case scenario where the unemployment rate, the exchange rate and survey inflation expectations are all unchanged. Box: Incorporating Different Regimes Into Our Inflation Model As has been explored in depth in prior reports,2 we have been modeling core PCE inflation using a Phillips Curve model that is inspired by one that Janet Yellen mentioned in a 2015 speech.3 Essentially, we model core inflation using lagged inflation, the gap between the unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of the natural unemployment rate, relative non-oil import prices and a survey measure of inflation expectations. Previously we estimated the coefficients for this model using the longest time interval we could obtain - starting in October 1979. However, a recent Fed paper by Jeremy Nalewaik4 motivated us to refine this approach. Nalewaik shows that core PCE inflation has been driven by different factors in different regimes, and that those regimes can be defined by whether inflation expectations were well-anchored or highly volatile. Specifically, in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, inflation expectations were highly volatile and explained much more of the variation in actual core inflation than they did in the 1960s or from the mid-1990s until the present day. We confirmed this result by splitting our sample into two periods - 1979 to 1995, and 1995 to present. Our results show that inflation expectations were a much more significant driver of core inflation in the 1979-1995 regime than they are in the current regime (Table 1). As such, we have decided that the coefficients calculated using the 1995-present interval are probably more representative of the current environment. Applying these coefficients to the four scenarios we examined in our May 2 report, our model now projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2.03% by year end in our "base case" scenario, 1.93% in our "strong dollar" scenario, 1.97% in our "bad NAIRU" scenario and 1.87% in our "deflation case" scenario. Table 1BCA Phillips Curve Model* Of Core** PCE Inflation Under Different Regression Intervals Where Are Yields Headed From Here? We see two potential scenarios that could play out between now and the end of the year. The first is that core inflation rebounds during the next few months and ends the year closer to our model's fair value estimate. The inflation component of yields would move higher in this scenario and real yields would probably also increase. The 10-year real yield closely tracks our 12-month fed funds discounter, which measures the number of rate hikes the market expects during the next year (Chart 4). The discounter currently sits at 49 bps, meaning that the market expects fewer than 2 rate hikes during the next 12 months. This would certainly be revised higher if inflation were to rebound. Chart 4Fed Wants Wider Breakevens The second possible scenario is that while U.S. growth stays close to its current 2% pace, inflation simply does not bounce back. In other words, core PCE ends the year closer to 1.5% than to 2% and a large residual opens up between inflation and our Phillips Curve model. While TIPS breakevens would be unlikely to rise in this scenario, the downside is also probably limited unless inflation were to fall below its current 1.5%. If this second scenario plays out the Fed would also probably react by adopting a more dovish policy stance. This would cause the market's rate hike expectations, and 10-year real yields, to fall. But even here the downside would appear to be limited. With the market currently priced for a mere 39 bps of hikes between now and the end of 2017 and only another 24 bps for all of 2018, there simply isn't much scope for a large dovish re-rating of the Fed. Additionally, if the Fed were to adopt a sufficiently dovish reaction function in the face of persistently low inflation, it is possible that lower rate hike expectations could spur a recovery in long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates. If the market believes that the Fed will stay dovish enough for inflation to recover to target, then the positive correlation between real yields and inflation breakevens could reverse. There are recent precedents for this (Chart 4, bottom panel). In 2011 and 2012, the Fed's Operation Twist caused rate hike expectations and real yields to fall, but also led to wider TIPS breakevens. The reverse scenario played out in 2015 when the market decided that the Fed was adopting an overly hawkish policy stance. This caused TIPS breakevens to fall as real yields rose. The conclusion here is that even if inflation stays stubbornly low for the remainder of the year, and the Fed responds by guiding the market toward a shallower rate hike path, then it is possible that some of the downside in real yields will be mitigated by rising TIPS breakevens. In our view, the risk/reward trade-off between the two scenarios outlined above suggests that investors should maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Bottom Line: The recent downtrend in nominal Treasury yields has been driven entirely by inflation that has come in weaker than expected. We are inclined to view inflation's weakness as transitory and suggest investors maintain a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, as well as an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities. Even in a scenario where inflation stays low despite continued above-trend economic growth, we view the downside in yields from current levels as limited. It's Late In The Game For Corporate Credit With last week's release of the U.S. Financial Accounts (formerly Flow of Funds) we are able to update some of our preferred credit cycle indicators. One concerning development is that net corporate leverage - defined as total debt less cash as a percent of EBITD - ticked higher for the second consecutive quarter in Q1 (Chart 5). Chart 5Corporate Balance Sheets Continue To Add Leverage As we have observed in previous reports,5 there is a strong correlation between net leverage and spreads. In fact, we are only able to identify one other period in which spreads were able to tighten as leverage rose. That period was in the late 1980s, immediately following the crash and subsequent rebound in oil prices. As is shown in Chart 5, net leverage correlates strongly with both corporate spreads and the default rate. However, in the late 1980s the collapse of the energy sector caused spreads to widen too far. Spreads then benefited from a "payback period" as energy prices recovered and defaults ebbed during the following two years. But in the background, net leverage only managed to level-off for a brief period before continuing to trend higher. The uptrend in leverage culminated in the 1990 default cycle and recession. We see a similar dynamic playing out at the moment. Spreads (and the default rate) are currently benefiting from the payback period following the 2014 collapse and subsequent recovery in commodity prices. But so far leverage has not managed to cease its upward march. What Is Leverage Telling Us Right Now? As was mentioned above, net leverage has now increased for two consecutive quarters. To see what this has meant historically, we looked at excess investment grade corporate bond returns over 6-month periods following different changes in net leverage. For example, we found that after leverage has increased for two consecutive quarters, the average (annualized) 6-month excess return to investment grade corporate bonds has been -190 bps, and also that corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries in 45% of those 6-month periods (Table 2). Table 26-Month Investment Grade Corporate Excess Returns* ##br##Following A Rise In Net Corporate Leverage** (1973 To Present) Conversely, in 6-month periods after leverage has declined for two consecutive quarters, average (annualized) excess returns came in at +120 bps, and corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries in 61% of those episodes (Table 3). Table 36-Month Investment Grade Corporate Excess Returns* ##br##Following A Decline In Net Corporate Leverage** (1973 To Present) Not surprisingly, the late 1980s episode was one that defied the above statistics. In fact, investment grade corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries by an annualized 5% in the 6-month span between September 1986 and March 1987, even though leverage had previously increased for 4 consecutive quarters. For this reason we remain comfortable with our overweight in corporate bonds for now, especially since the Fed is likely to remain sufficiently accommodative to support higher inflation and hence continued economic growth. However, it is obvious that trends in leverage will be critical to monitor going forward. Where Is Leverage Heading? A rebound in corporate profits would help stem the uptrend in leverage, and the outlook for that is good. Not only did our measure of EBITD diverge negatively from S&P 500 operating profits in the first quarter, but other leading profit indicators such as the growth in business sales less inventories suggest that EBITD should catch up to S&P 500 profits, and not the reverse (Chart 6). What remains unclear is whether the looming rebound in profit growth will be enough to cause leverage to fall. While debt growth has been rolling over (Chart 5, bottom panel), we think it will remain at a reasonably high level going forward. Meanwhile, the historical evidence suggests that net leverage does not usually reverse its uptrend unless first prompted by a recession. Turning to debt, the ratio of corporate debt to GDP is definitely eyebrow raising (Chart 7), as it is now very close to levels observed at the peak of the past two cycles. However, one important caveat is in order. While corporate debt levels have grown quickly, corporate investment has not. Chart 6Profit Growth Will Improve Chart 7Investment Is Coming Back The corporate financing gap - capital expenditures less internally generated revenue - is a good proxy for the amount of debt issued to fund investment. In the second panel of Chart 7 we see that it has only just moved into positive territory and is well below the levels observed at the end of the last two recoveries. The obvious conclusion is that most corporate debt issuance has not been used to finance investment, but rather has been used to buy back equities. This is bad news from the perspective of corporate bondholders who would certainly prefer more people below them in the capital structure, but it also means that high corporate debt levels are not indicative of over-investment on the part of the corporate sector. As such, high corporate debt levels do not suggest that the risk of recession is elevated. They merely suggest that corporations' capital structures have shifted in favor of shareholders over bondholders. Going forward, we see potential for a moderation in the amount of corporate debt issuance used to fund buybacks. This has already started to occur as evidenced by our buyback proxy (Chart 7, panel 3) - simply the difference between net issuance and the financing gap shown in panel 2. Not surprisingly, this buyback proxy is highly correlated with the difference between the equity risk premium and corporate bond spreads. However, any moderation in share buybacks will be at least partially offset by an increase in debt issuance to fund investment. Corporate investment has seen a revival during the past few quarters, and leading indicators such as ISM New Orders surveys suggest it will continue trending up (Chart 7, bottom panel). Bottom Line: While a supportive Fed will keep corporate spreads low for the time being, rising leverage is starting to send a worrying message. Unless strong profit growth causes leverage to reverse course, it will likely be appropriate to scale back on credit risk either later this year or early next year, once the monetary back-drop becomes less supportive. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil", dated June 8, 207, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 3, 2017, and "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017, both available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016078pap.pdf 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights The current economic and profit environment supports our stance of favoring stocks over bonds. The Fed will need to see more evidence to alter its gradual path for rates. Although valuations remain elevated, they are not a great market timing tool. Margins are expanding according to the S&P 500 data, and we expect this to continue in the second half of the year. But a peak in margins next year could be the justification to scale back on overweight positions in stocks, in anticipation of slower EPS growth. Corporate balance sheets continued to deteriorate in the first quarter, but that is not enough to warrant cutting back on corporate bond positions within fixed-income portfolios. Watch real short-term rates and bank C&I lending standards, as an exit warning. Feature Environment Remains Supportive For Stocks Over Bonds Investors are wondering whether the equity and currency/bond markets are living on different planets. The dollar and Treasurys seem to be priced for sluggish economic growth, less inflation and no fiscal stimulus. Yet, the S&P 500 is stubbornly holding above the 2,400 level. Many believe that the only reason that stocks got to this level in the first place is the prospect of tax cuts, deregulation and infrastructure spending. If true, then it is only a matter of time before equity investors capitulate. We look at it another way. Yes, equities initially received a boost following the U.S. election on hopes for tax reform. But indicators such as the ratio of small-to-large-cap stocks, or high-tax companies relative to the S&P 500, suggest that the stock market has priced out all chances of any tax reform. The overall stock market has performed well despite this because of the favorable profit backdrop. The fact that Corporate America can generate such profits despite a lackluster economy is impressive. Moreover, the recent softening in inflation has led many to believe that the Fed can proceed even more slowly than the market previously believed, leading to a bond rally. This is quite a bullish backdrop for equities. One does not have to conclude that the bond and stock markets are living on different planets. The backdrop is also positive for corporate bonds versus Treasurys, despite the fact that corporate health continues to deteriorate (see below). Turning to politics, the political consequences of the extraordinary U.K. general election are still not clear. The outcome of the election does not change our core views on the U.S. dollar, equity or bond markets. The dollar has rallied, Treasury yields are higher and U.S. equity prices moved up as this report was being prepared on Friday, June 9. Looking ahead, the coalition-building process in the U.K. will take time as the horse-trading between parties proceeds. Nonetheless, our high conviction view is that the investment implications are in fact already self-evident and do not require foresight into the eventual make-up of the U.K. government. A key takeaway for investors is that, aside from Brexit, domestic fiscal policy is the driving issue in British politics. Austerity is dead in Britain and investors should expect its economic policy - under whatever leadership ultimately gains power - to swing firmly to the left on fiscal, trade, and regulatory policy. Moreover, the Brexit process will continue, albeit of a potentially more "softer" variety and with a somewhat higher probability of eventual reversal.1 Will They Or Won't They? A 25-basis point rate hike is likely this week, but the FOMC will need more evidence on the direction of inflation and the economy before significantly changing the timing and pace of rate hikes or economic forecasts. The market is fully pricing in the anticipated 25-basis point rate bump, but beyond that, there is not much agreement between the Fed and the market on interest rates or economic projections. Nonetheless, as the Fed prepares its June forecast and dot plots, policymakers and the market are on the same page in terms of the labor market, inflation, and the economy in the next few years. The unemployment rate (4.3% in May 2017) is below the Fed's forecasts for 2017 (4.5%) and longer run (4.7%). The consensus outlook for the unemployment rate keeps it below the Fed's path through the end of 2018 (Chart 1, panel 3). Even assuming that the 120,000 pace of job growth in the past three months persists, the unemployment rate would remain below the Fed's view of NAIRU (Chart 2). Our unemployment rate projections are based on a stable labor force participation rate and a 1% gain in the working age population. Chart 1Fed, Market And Reality##BR##Not Too Far Apart Chart 2The Unemployment Rate##BR##Under Various Monthly Job Count Scenarios However, a closer look at what policymakers have said about prices and the trajectory of inflation in recent years suggests that the market and the Fed are not that far apart. At +1.7% in April, the PCE deflator remains near the FOMC's projection of 1.9% for this year and 2.0% in the long run. Bloomberg consensus estimates for inflation for this year and next are above the top end of the Fed's forecast range (Chart 1, panel 2). The FOMC's May minutes state that "participants generally continued to expect that inflation would stabilize around the Committee's two percent objective over the medium run as the effects of transitory factors waned." The market is still concerned that the traditional Phillips curve model may be broken and that inflation may never accelerate even with the economy below the Fed's estimate of full employment. We will discuss the Phillips curve in a post-GFC world in an upcoming edition of The Bank Credit Analyst. As we discussed in last week's report,2 GDP growth in 2017 is on track to exceed the Fed's 2017 target (2.1%) and is already running ahead of the Fed's GDP projection (1.8%) for the long term. The consensus forecast for GDP in 2018 and 2019 is at the upper end of the Fed's range set in March (Chart 1, panel 1). Despite the general agreement between the Fed and the market on certain aspects, they diverge on the outlook for the fed funds rate in the next 18 months (Chart 3). As of June 9, the Fed sees a total of six quarter-point rate hikes by the end of 2018. The market sees just two in the same period. The Fed and market are still far apart on rates in 2019. However, the disconnect between the Fed and the market is not as large as it was in early 2015. This disagreement was a major factor in the equity market pullback in the first few months of 2016 (Chart 3). Neither the recent weakness in the economic data nor softer-than-expected inflation readings will be enough to prompt a significant shift from the Fed in terms of the 'dot plot'. The economic surprise index has been declining for 63 days since peaking in early- to mid-March, but remains consistent with slow growth, not a recession. Economic data tends to disappoint for an average of 90 days after the economic surprise index is above 40, as it was in late 2016/early 2017 in the wake of the U.S. election (Chart 4). Chart 3Disconnect Between Fed##BR##And Market On Rates Chart 4Economic Surprise Index Has Rolled Over##BR##Since Early To Mid March Bottom Line: It would take a significant deterioration in the economy and labor market and in the benign inflation environment to alter the Fed's gradual rate hike plan. A backdrop of gradual hikes and eventually, a smaller balance sheet, will continue to foster the conditions under which stocks have outperformed bonds since 2009. We believe that the recent Treasury rally is overdone because the market has gone too far in revising down the path of Fed rate hikes. A re-evaluation of the outlook could see bond yields jump, sparking a small equity correction. This is not enough of a risk to scale back on equities versus bonds. Valuations, Earnings And Margins: An Update U.S. equities remain overvalued and would be even more extended if not for low rates. However, they are attractively priced relative to competing assets, such as corporate bonds and Treasurys. Valuation is not a great tool to time market turning points and, absent a significant deterioration in the economic, profit and margin environment, we don't foresee a sustained pullback in stocks. Looking beyond our tactical 6-12 month window, above-average market multiples alone imply below-average returns for stocks across a strategic time horizon. Our BCA valuation indicator has deteriorated since we last published it in March 2017 and shows that U.S. equities remain expensive.3 Individually, two of the three components of the Valuation index remain in overvalued territory. The Earnings Group remains at a record high (aside from the tech bubble). The Balance Sheet group shows the same profile. Only the Yield Group, which compares stock prices with various nominal and real interest rates, suggests that equities are undervalued. Thus, U.S. stock prices are vulnerable to a sharp jump in rates, which supports our view that U.S. equity markets will perform well in an economic and inflation backdrop that allows the Fed to raise interest rates and unwind its balance sheet gradually (Chart 5). While tax cuts and infrastructure spending might provide the equity market with a "sugar high", it probably would not last long because fiscal stimulus would bring forward Fed rate hikes. Moreover, Chart 6 shows that U.S. stocks remain favorably priced relative to competing assets such as corporate bonds, Treasurys and residential housing. That said, equity valuation measures such as price-to-book or price-to-sales make the market vulnerable to shocks. Chart 5U.S. Stocks##BR##Are Overvalued... Chart 6Stocks Look Less Expensive##BR##Relative To Competing Assets Inflated valuations alone are not enough to trigger a bear market or even a significant correction in U.S. equities. Outside of aggressive Fed tightening, we will become more defensive when profits come under pressure. On this score, the decline in Q4 profits according to the NIPA data is concerning. We are in a period where margins based on the NIPA data are diverging from the S&P's measure. Like corporate earnings, there is more than one data source for profit margin data, and the data itself is a mix of art and science. In the long run, the S&P-based margin data and the data derived from the NIPA accounts tend to move together. Over shorter time horizons, however, these two metrics may diverge. The NIPA margins peaked in 2014 and have moved steadily lower since then, but the BEA-derived profit data are not closely watched by investors and are subject to significant revision. On the other hand, margins based on S&P data are followed closely by the markets, are not subject to revision and have been moving higher since end of 2015. In the past 55 years, the peak in NIPA margins has often led the S&P data at peaks; the caveat is that it is unclear whether the NIPA data led in real time because of the endless revision process for GDP and profit data.4 The margin series based on S&P data tends to lead heading into margin troughs, but it is not a reliable signal. During the long economic expansion in the 1960s, both indicators topped out around the same time (1966-67). The NIPA derived margins peaked in 1975 as the S&P margins troughed, and later in the decade, the zenith in NIPA margins peaked three years before the S&P version. Similar to the current decade the long expansion in the 1980s saw a mid-decade collapse in oil prices and margins. In the late 80s, NIPA and S&P measures peaked almost simultaneously, which was three years before the crest in equity prices. The 1990s saw unabated margin expansion through 1997 for NIPA margins; the expansion in S&P-based margins lasted until 1999 (Chart 7). Chart 7Margins, Like Profits Are Mix Of Art & Science History also shows that falling margins do not always mean declining EPS growth. In the past 40 years, when the U.S. economy was not in recession, corporate EPS growth was very high on average when margins rose. It was mostly a wash when margins dropped, with slightly negative EPS growth on average. There were two episodes (late-1990s and mid-2000s) when margins fell, but EPS growth was strongly positive (Chart 8). The stock market can also rise significantly even after margins peak for the cycle. Chart 8EPS Can Grow Even As Margins Contract According to S&P data we are in a phase of climbing margins and we expect EPS growth to further accelerate into year end, peaking at just under 20%, before moderating in 2018. If profit growth decelerates in 2018 and the S&P measure of margins begins to narrow again, it would send a strong signal to trim exposure, especially given lofty equity valuations (Chart 9). Chart 9Profit Growth And Margins Both Rising Bottom Line: Rich valuations in U.S. equities will be overlooked as most investors are focused on the S&P and not the NIPA margins. EPS growth will decelerate sharply when margins resume their mean reversion, which could be the catalyst for a major correction or bear market in stock prices. We do not expect this scenario to play out until 2018 at the earliest. Meanwhile, rising margins and profits trump expensive multiples for U.S. equities. Stay long. Corporate Bonds: Kindling And Sparks Last week's U.S. Flow of Funds release allows us to update BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) for the first quarter (Chart 10). The level of the CHM moved slightly deeper into "deteriorating health territory." The deterioration in the Monitor over the past few years is largely reflected in the profit-related components of the CHM, including the return on capital, cash flow coverage and free cash flow-to-total debt. Chart 10Deteriorating Since 2015, But... The Monitor has been a reliable indicator for the trend in corporate bond spreads over the years. Indeed, it is one of the oldest and most reliable indicators in BCA's stable of indicators. However, spreads have trended tighter over the past year even as the CHM began to signal deteriorating health in early 2015. Why the divergence? The CHM is only one of three key items on our checklist to underweight corporate bonds versus Treasurys. The other two are tight Fed policy (i.e. real interest rates that are above the neutral level) and the direction of bank lending standards for C&I loans. On its own, balance sheet deterioration only provides the kindling for a spread blowout. A blowout requires a spark. Investors do not worry about high leverage or a profit margin squeeze, for example, until the outlook for defaults sours. The latter occurs once inflation starts to rise and the Fed actively targets slower growth via higher interest rates. Banks see trouble on the horizon and respond by tightening lending standards, thereby restricting the flow of credit to the business sector. Defaults start to rise, buttressing banks' bias to curtail lending in a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop. The three items on the checklist usually occurred at roughly the same time in previous cycles because a deteriorating CHM is typically a late-cycle phenomenon. But this has been a very different cycle. High stock prices and rock-bottom bond yields have encouraged the corporate sector to leverage up and repurchase stock. At the same time, the subpar, stretched-out recovery has meant that it has taken longer than usual for the economy to reach full employment. Even now, inflationary pressures are so muted that the Fed can proceed quite slowly. It will be some time before real short-term interest rates are in restrictive territory. As for banks, they tightened lending standards a little in 2015/16 due to the collapse of energy prices, but this has since reversed. As an aside, recent weakness in the growth rate of C&I loans has contributed to concerns over the health of the U.S. recovery. However, the easing in lending standards this year points to an imminent rebound in C&I loan growth (Chart 11). Our model for C&I loans, based on non-residential fixed investment, small business optimism and the speculative-grade default rate, supports this view. Chart 11C&I Loan Growth Set To Rebound The implication is that, while corporate health has deteriorated, we do not have the spark for a sustained corporate bond spread widening. Indeed, Moody's expects that the 12-month default rate will trend lower over the next year, which is consistent with constructive trends in corporate lending standards, industrial production and job cut announcements (all good indicators for defaults). Chart 12 presents a valuation metric that adjusts the HY OAS for 12-month trailing default losses (i.e. it is an ex-post measure). In the forecast period, we hold today's OAS constant, but the 12-month default losses are a shifting blend of historical losses and Moody's forecast. The endpoint suggests that the market is offering about 200 basis points of default-adjusted excess yield over the Treasury curve for the next 12 months. This is roughly in line with the mid-point of the historical data. In the past, a default-adjusted spread of around 200 basis points provided positive 12-month excess returns to high-yield bonds 74% of the time, with an average return of 82 basis points. It is also a positive sign for corporate bonds that the net transfer to shareholders, in the form of buybacks, dividends and M&A activity, has eased on a 4-quarter moving average basis (although it ticked up in Q1 on a 2-quarter basis; Chart 13). As a result, ratings migration has improved (i.e. easing net downgrades), especially for shareholder-friendly rating action, which is a better indicator for corporate spreads. The moderating appetite to "return cash to shareholders" may not last long, but for now it supports our overweight in both investment- and speculative-grade bonds versus Treasurys. That said, excess returns are likely to be limited to the carry given little room for spread compression. Chart 12Still Some Value In##BR##High-Yield Corporates Chart 13Net Transfers To Shareholders##BR##Eased In Past Two Quarters Within balanced portfolios, we recommend favoring equities to high-yield at this stage of the cycle, for reasons we outlined in the April 17, 2017 Weekly Report. In a nutshell, value is not good enough in HY relative to stocks to expect any sustained period of outperformance in the former, assuming that the bull market in risk assets continues. Bottom Line: Corporate balance sheets are still deteriorating but risk assets, including corporate bonds, should continue to outperform Treasurys and cash in the near term. We will look to downgrade risk assets when core inflation moves closer to the Fed's 2% target, which would trigger a more aggressive FOMC tightening campaign and tighter bank lending standards. Favor equities to high yield, but within fixed-income portfolios, overweight investment- and speculative-grade corporates versus Treasurys. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the Geopolitical Strategy Client Note "U.K. Election: The Median Voter Has Spoken, published on June 9, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Can The Service Sector Save The Day?" June 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "How Expensive Are U.S. Stocks", dated March 13, 2017 available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Growth, Inflation and the Fed", May 8, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The ECB's meeting was in line with expectations, the governing council increased its growth forecast, decreased its inflation forecast, removed it easing bias, but maintained that easy policy was key to support its objectives. Going forward, growth will have to remain just as strong for European inflation dynamics to emerge. Financial conditions between the U.S. and the euro area are moving in favor of U.S. growth, and thus, the USD. EUR/USD momentum is stretched, but it can rise further. EUR/USD at 1.15 in the coming weeks is a risk to our view. However, EUR/USD forecasts have already been ratcheted upward, and their capacity to lift the euro is losing steam. Feature The European Central Bank hit the mark yesterday with a performance that was bang on in terms of expectations, as illustrated by the euro's muted response. The governing council increased its growth forecast by 0.1% each year and curtailed its inflation forecast by an average of 0.2% until 2019, inclusively (Table I-1). Moreover, while the ECB statement removed its future easing bias, in the press conference ECB President Mario Draghi made it crystal clear that this was because deflationary risks were evaporating, but the economy still needed extremely easy conditions in order to stay on the trajectory envisioned by the ECB. As a result, despite this adjustment in forward guidance, the ECB elected to keep its asset purchases in place, even leaving the door open for time extensions and size increases if conditions warrant. After all, in the eyes of the ECB - and it is an assessment we share - the great performance of the European economy has been and remains dependent on the continuation of a very easy policy stance. In this optic, we study the outlook for growth dynamics in Europe, especially in relation to the U.S., as this is what will determine the future path of relative policy. If European policy can move in a more hawkish fashion relative to the Federal Reserve as well as current expectations, then the euro bear market will be over. Growth And Financial Conditions For the euro to rally further, the ECB has to be able to beat market expectations and the Fed has to continue to underwhelm. So far this has not happened, but markets are forward looking and are behaving as if both central banks will follow these paths. To expect a tightening of ECB policy relative to the Fed's, European growth will have to continue outperforming U.S. growth. As we argued last week, the slack in the European jobs market is much greater than that in the U.S.1 Without outstanding growth, European inflationary dynamics will remain hampered by low wage growth. Meanwhile, the Fed is facing an environment congruent with high rates (Chart I-1), something that markets are ignoring as they are only anticipating two more hikes into June 2019, beyond the one anticipated next week. So what kind of future growth dynamics are we anticipating? World growth may not be about to plunge, but global activity is set to soften as China and the U.S. have been tightening monetary conditions in an environment replete with excess capacity. Indicators are already responding to this policy shift. Our diffusion index of global leading economic indicators has already rolled over sharply, a precursor to softening global LEIs (Chart I-2). This is a bigger problem for Europe than the U.S. Since 2010, the beta of euro area LEIs to global LEIs has been around 0.8, while for the U.S. the sensitivity is around 0.2. Thus, deteriorating growth conditions are a greater handicap for Europe, a region still much more reliant on trade and manufacturing as sources of growth. Chart I-1The Fed And Its Mandate Chart I-2Global Growth Passing Its Zenith Meanwhile, purely domestic economic conditions have been buoyant in the euro area and quite morose in the U.S., though the picture seems to be reversing. To make this judgment, we begin by evaluating a global growth factor, a global economic force that lifts or pulls down all boats, similar to a tide. Such a global growth factor should not just affect various countries through trade, but it should also impact their economies through financial linkages. In order to evaluate this phenomenon, we conducted a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the LEIs of 21 countries. We found that the combined factor 1 and factor 2 explains nearly 50% of global growth dynamics (Chart I-3). Once we estimated this global growth factor, we then proceeded to estimate how much it contributes to LEI gyrations in the U.S. and euro area, using the factor loadings of both relative to the two main components revealed by the PCA. With that information in hand, we then simply subtracted the European and U.S. impact from their respective LEIs. What is left reflects purely endogenous changes in the LEIs for the euro area and the U.S. This same procedure can be applied to any country. Through this exercise, we can see very well that European domestic conditions have been rebounding sharply since 2012. However, the pure domestic element of the U.S. LEIs has been falling steadily since late 2014, shortly after the U.S. dollar began its 27% rally (Chart I-4). Chart I-3The Tide That##br## Lifts All Boats Chart I-4A Look At Purely Domestic##br## Growth Dynamics To a large degree, these differentiated dynamics make sense. 2012 marked the apex of the euro area crisis. The improvement in the domestic component of the European LEIs coincided with Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" speech. This moment was crucial as it resulted in the normalization of private sector borrowing costs across the Eurozone. Thanks to the ensuing compression in break-up risk premia, Italian and Spanish private lending rates collapsed by 110 and 240 basis points over the following 24 months, respectively. Easy money was finally being transmitted to the private sector. Chart I-5Massive Tightening In 2014 In the U.S., the deterioration began after the dollar perked up massively, but also, after the Fed began tapering its purchases of securities, events associated with a 300 basis-point increase in the Wu-Xia shadow fed funds rate (Chart I-5). The combined effect of this monetary tightening resulted in a significant brake on economic activity, one made most evident by the deceleration in the domestic component of the LEIs. These forces seems to be reversing. Today, the dollar is trading in line with its March 2015 level, and while the fed funds rate has increased by 75 basis points, this still pales in comparison to the large increase in the shadow fed funds rates recorded between May 2014 and November 2015. Meanwhile in Europe, the lagged effects of the massive 15% decline in the trade-weighted euro between June 2014 and March 2015 is dissipating. These monetary dynamics partially explain why the domestic element of the European LEIs is rolling over while the U.S. one is improving. However, we think financial conditions play a larger role. U.S. financial conditions have greatly eased in recent months, while financial conditions in Europe have been deteriorating, suggesting domestic growth conditions will follow a similar path (Chart I-6). These crosscurrents are especially evident when looking at the relative European and U.S. domestic growth impulses vis-a-vis their relative financial conditions. Currently, the purely endogenous elements of growth in the euro area look set to roll over against those of the U.S. So if the international and domestic elements of growth in Europe are set to slow relative to the U.S., when should these dynamics begin to affect market pricing? Historically, the German Ifo survey has been one of the most reliable bellwethers of European economic activity. The same can be said of the ISM in the U.S. While the ISM rolled over three months ago, the Ifo is still at all-time highs. However, historically, one of the most reliable leading indicators of the Ifo has been none other than the ISM itself. Hence, the likelihood that the Ifo rolls over sharply by September is high, especially in the context of the observations made above (Chart I-7). With expectations that European growth will remain strong but that the U.S. is incapable of generating inflation, a weak ISM is well known, but a weak Ifo would be a surprise. Chart I-6Follow The Financial Conditions Chart I-7Where The ISM Goes, The IFO Follows When the Ifo underperforms the ISM, the euro tends to suffer (Chart I-8). This was not true in 2001, but back then the euro was trading 15% below its long-term fair value, and the U.S. was entering a recession. Today, the euro is trading at a more modest 5% discount to its long-term fair value, and BCA believes the U.S. is not on the verge of a recession. Moreover, on a short-term basis, the euro is already trading 6% above its interest rate and risk-aversion implied tactical fair value. Chart I-8If No U.S. Recession Emerges, A Falling IFO Equals A Falling Euro These dynamics also imply that the massive positive skew in economic surprises between the euro area and the U.S. should soon end, which is likely to prompt a re-think of the relative monetary policy stance between the ECB and the Fed, and therefore put an end to the recent sharp rally in the euro. Bottom Line: The ECB did not surprise markets this week. Yet, Mario Draghi made it very clear that despite an upgrade to forward guidance, the path toward achieving the central bank's inflation target continues to require very easy policy. How easy? Our view is that based on global dynamics and financial conditions, European growth could slow in the coming months, delaying the point in time when the euro area output gap closes. Meanwhile, investors are too conservative regarding the U.S.'s growth and inflation prospects, and therefore are not anticipating enough rate hikes from the Fed. What To Do With Momentum? The key issue for now is that the euro's momentum is extremely powerful and hard to fight. Indeed, the euro seems to have dissociated from fundamentals. While aggregate real rate differentials continue to move in favor of the U.S. dollar, the euro is ignoring these dynamics and instead has become overtaken by powerful flows into the euro area (Chart I-9). These dynamics may be stretched, but they could still have additional room to run. Non-commercial traders have fully purged their short bets on EUR/USD, and they have accumulated the most long-euro positions in three years. Additionally, our composite sentiment indicator, based on the positioning, sentiment, and 13-week rate-of-change in the currency, is now at elevated levels relative to the past three years (Chart I-10). The violence of these shifts highlights an improving risk-reward ratio to shorting the euro, but this could be of little solace: historically, both the composite sentiment measure and positioning in the euro have hit much higher levels. Technical indicators point to similar dilemmas. Both the EUR/USD intermediate-term technical indicator and its 13-week rate of change have hit levels congruent with a reversal (Chart I-11). However, these indicators have also displayed inertia in the past, with occasions such as in 2013, where their elevated readings did not preclude a higher EUR/USD. Chart I-9EUR/USD Is A Lone Wolf Chart I-10EUR/USD Is Overbought But...(1) Chart I-11EUR/USD Is Overbought But...(2) As a result, we are highly cognizant of the risks to our positive bet on the DXY (which due to its near 60% weighting in the euro is equivalent to a short euro bet). But the good news in the euro seems well priced in. In line with the 8% surge in the euro this year, the average analyst forecast for the euro for Q4 2017 moved from EUR/USD 1.05 to EUR/USD 1.12 (Chart I-12, top panel). Recent peaks in the euro have materialized when these forecasts hit 1.13, which we are very close to. At these levels, the optimism toward Europe seems fully discounted. Chart I-12When To Be Contrarian In FX In fact, the gap between the euro itself and the forecast is now decreasing (Chart I-12, bottom panel). This suggests that each new forecast upgrade is lifting the euro less and less, implying that buyers have already internalized these increasing forecasts and need ever better news, especially on the wage and inflation front, to lift the euro higher. Hence, while worried that the EUR/USD could move to 1.15 in a blink of an eye before reversing, we remain cautiously optimistic on our negative EUR/USD and our positive DXY stances. Bottom Line: At this point, the key problem with our view is that momentum is clearly in the euro's favor, a dangerous position for euro bears. While most indicators highlight that EUR/USD is overbought, these same metrics could in fact remain overbought for longer. However, investors have already massively upgraded their EUR/USD forecasts suggesting that much news is in the price, especially as each successive upgrade is showing diminishing returns in their capacity to lift EUR/USD spot rates. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion", dated June 2, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The soft patch in the U.S. economy continues: Unit labor costs growth has softened to 2.2%, a less-than-expected pace of 2.5%; Non-Manufacturing/Services sectors are looking weak with both PMI and ISM measures underperforming; Consumer credit also grew by USD 8.2 bn, underperforming the expected USD 15.5 bn. As a result, the dollar remains weak. While the data is worrying, we stand with the Fed's view. The Fed will hike in June, and when this soft patch proves temporary, it is likely that a September hike will materialize. With the ECB constrained in its capacity to move to a hawkish stance, it is possible for the USD to see some upside sooner rather than later. Report Links: Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion - June 2, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro has witnessed a particularly strong two months due to positive surprises in data, but momentum somewhat slowed this week due to mixed data: Services PMI in Spain, Italy and France underperformed expectations, while Germany and the overall euro area outperformed; Retail sales increased at a 2.5% annual rate; German factory orders increased by 3.5% annually, which was less than expected. Even worse they contracted by 2.1% on a monthly basis; Overall GDP growth in the euro area outperformed expectations, being revised to 1.9%. Furthermore, Draghi reiterated the need for extremely easy conditions in order to stay on the path to reach the target inflation rate, especially as inflation forecasts were downgraded. If the European data cannot keep up with its current blistering pace, investors should again begin to wonder about the ECB's capacity to move away from what remain a dovish stance. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent economic data has been mixed in Japan: Consumer confidence came in at 43.6, increasing from last month. Bank lending annual growth came in at 3.2%, beating expectations. However, GDP annualized growth was greatly revised downward to 1%. Although we continue to be bullish on the yen on a short term basis, it would be preferable to play yen strength by shorting NZD/JPY rather than USD/JPY, as we believe that the correction in the U.S. dollar has run its course. Thus, we are looking to exit our short USD/JPY trade once it reaches 108. On a cyclical basis, the yield curve target implemented by the BoJ, along with a hawkish fed will weigh on Japanese real rates vis-à-vis U.S ones and consequently push the yen downward. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data has been mixed in the U.K.: Construction PMI came in at 56, blowing past expectations. Halifax house price annual growth came in at 3.3%, also outperforming expectations. However, Markit Services PMI came below expectations at 53.8. The results of the elections happening as of the date of this writing will create some volatility in the pound. A greater majority government by the conservatives would likely be a boost to the pound, as it will give Prime Minister May more leeway when negotiating the exit of the U.K. from the European Union. On the other hand, if labor wins enough seats to create a hung parliament, the pound could suffer as political uncertainty will once again reign supreme. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The Aussie experienced an upbeat week, appreciating almost 2.5%. A few positive data was recorded: TD Securities Inflation increased at a 2.8% annual rate, more than the previous 2.6% reading; GDP growth increased 1.7% annually, beating both yearly and quarterly expectations. Chinese imports were very strong, coming in at 22% growth on an annual pace, suggesting continued intake by the Middle Kingdom of what Australia exports. The GDP was a key driver in this week's rally. However, while the headline number was great, the details were more worrisome. Inventories led GDP growth, while exports subtracted most from it. This is peculiar considering that terms of trade increased at a 24.8% annual rate. This also predates the near 40% decline in iron ore futures. The trade balance for April also missed expectations greatly, coming in at 555 million, compared to the expected 1.95 million, setting up a poor start for Australia's second quarter. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The kiwi economy continues to improve: Headline and core inflation have both surpassed the 2% threshold, reaching 2.2% and 2.3% respectively in the first quarter of 2017. Meanwhile, nominal retail sales are growing at a healthy 7.5%. Considering the continued strength in the kiwi economy, the NZD should continue to outperform the AUD on a cyclical basis, given that Australia is much more sensitive to a slowdown in Chinese economic activity, which is beginning to suffer in response to the tightening campaign by the PBoC. On the other hand the upside for the NZD against the U.S. dollar remains limited. Not only is NZD/USD overbought on a short term basis, but the tight correlation between the kiwi and commodity prices should eventually weigh on this currency. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The CAD went through a rough patch this week: The seasonally-adjusted measure of PMIs delivered a disappointing 53.8 reading compared to the expected 62; Building permits are contracting at a 0.2% monthly pace; Housing starts increased at 194,700, which was less than expected; On the plus side, house price growth was at 3.9% yoy, beating expectations of 3.3%. Oil was also a big player in the loonie's weakness. Crude oil inventories were higher than expectations by roughly 6 million barrels: a 3.464 million barrels decline in inventories was expected, while inventories increased at a 3.295 million barrels. The CAD remains oversold, but we remain bullish on it in the G10 space as investors have rarely been so short the Canadian currency as they currently are. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent economic data in Switzerland has been very positive: The unemployment rate came in at 3.2%, beating expectations. Headline inflation came in at 0.5%, higher than last month and beating expectations. Yesterday, the ECB underwehlmed bulls, as ECB president Mario Draghi stated that asset purchases will "run until the end of December 2017, or beyond, if necessary". We expect the ECB to ultimately find it very difficult to switch to a hawkish bias, especially relative to relative to other central banks, as pricing power in the euro area remains muted. On the other hand, Switzerland is slowly recovering, and a removal of the implied floor by the SNB on EUR/CHF could happen as early as the end of the year. Thus, we are already shorting this cross to take advantage of such an event. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 On Wednesday, oil inventories rose by 3.3 million against expectations of a 3.5 million draw. This caused oil prices to plunge by almost 4%. Nevertheless, the response of USD/NOK has been somewhat muted. This is in part due to the fact that real rate differentials matter more than oil for USD/NOK. Indeed, while oil is down almost 15% on the year, the NOK has actually appreciated slightly in the year against the dollar, given that rates in the U.S. have decreased substantially during the year. Thus, given that we expect a more hawkish Fed than the market anticipates, we are USD/NOK bulls. Additionally, we are also bullish on CAD/NOK, as the Norges Bank is likely to have a much more dovish bias than the BoC going forward. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The SEK has been depreciating this week on the back of disappointing industrial production figures, with the yearly measure increasing at a meagre 0.8% pace, much less than the anticipated 4.2%. Moreover, IP experienced a monthly contraction of 2.4%. Additionally, the recent Financial Stability Report also highlighted that "further measures need to be introduced to increase the resilience of the household sector and reduce risks", as well as vulnerabilities in the Swedish banking system. While we think USD/SEK's weakness is nearing its end, EUR/SEK will likely see some weakness in the near future, given its expensive level. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Dear Client, Along with this brief Weekly Report, we are sending you a Special Report written by my colleague Marko Papic, Chief Strategist of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. Marko argues that the U.S. is vulnerable to serious socio-political instability by the 2020 election, as a result of the widening gulf between elites and the rest. Trump, thus far, seems unlikely to bridge this gap. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist Global Investment Strategy Highlight U.S. growth will accelerate over the remainder of the year, thanks to easier financial conditions. This will force the Federal Reserve to raise rates more than the market is currently discounting. In contrast, the BoJ and the ECB will remain on hold. The net result would be a stronger dollar. Solid Chinese growth will support commodity prices. Stay overweight global equities over a cyclical horizon of 12 months. Feature U.S. Growth Will Surprise On The Upside I have been meeting clients in Asia over the past week. The ongoing decline in Treasury yields - the 10-year yield hit a 7-month low of 2.14% this week - was a frequent topic of conversation. Investors are becoming increasingly convinced that the U.S. economy is running out of steam. The OIS curve is pricing in only 48 basis points of rate hikes over the next 12 months. Since a June rate increase is now largely seen as a done deal, the market is essentially saying the Fed will abandon its tightening cycle later this year. We think that's too early. The U.S. economy may not be on fire, but it is hardly floundering. The Blue Chip consensus estimate for Q2 growth stands at 3.1%. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model is pointing to growth of 3.4%. There is little reason to think that growth will slow substantially later this year. Financial conditions have eased significantly over the past few months thanks to a weaker dollar, falling bond yields, narrower credit spreads, and higher equity prices (Chart 1). Our research has shown that GDP growth tends to react to changes in financial conditions with a lag of around 6-to-9 months (Chart 2). This means demand growth is likely to strengthen, not weaken, over the remainder of the year. Chart 1Financial Conditions Have Been Easing... Chart 2...Which Bodes Well For Growth Running Out Of Slack If demand growth does accelerate, does the U.S. economy have the supply capacity to fully accommodate it? We do not think so. The headline unemployment rate fell to a 16-year low of 4.3% in May. It is now half a percentage point below the Fed's estimate of full employment. The broader U-6 rate, which includes marginally-attached workers and those working part-time purely for economic reasons, dropped to 8.4%, essentially completing the roundtrip to where it was before the recession (Chart 3). Chart 3A Tight Labor Market Chart 4Wage Growth Is In An Uptrend Chart 5Wage Gains Are Broad Based Contrary to popular perception, wages are rising. Looking across the various official wage indices that are published on a regular basis, the underlying trend in wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% (Chart 4). The acceleration in wage growth has been broad-based, occurring across most industries, regions, and worker characteristics (Chart 5). Wage Growth: No Mystery Here Granted, wage growth is still about a percentage point lower than it was before the recession, but that can be explained by slower productivity growth and lower long-term inflation expectations (Chart 6). Real unit labor costs, which take both factors into account, are rising at a faster pace than in 2007 and close to the pace in 2000 (Chart 7). Chart 6A Secular Downtrend In Productivity Growth ##br##And Inflation Expectations Chart 7Rising Real Unit Labor Costs: ##br##A Case Of Deja-Vu Looking out, wage growth is likely to accelerate further. The evidence strongly suggests that the Phillips curve has a "kink" at an unemployment rate of around 5% (Chart 8). In plain English, this means that a drop in the unemployment rate from 10% to 8% tends to have little effect on inflation, while a drop from 6% to 4% does. The Cost Of Waiting One might argue that the Fed can afford to take a "wait and see" approach to raising rates. There is some merit to this view, but it can be taken too far. If the Fed is to have any hope of achieving a soft landing for the economy, it needs to stabilize the unemployment rate at a level close to NAIRU. This may be possible if the unemployment rate is near 4%, but it would be difficult to pull off if the rate slips much below that level. Trying to stabilize the unemployment rate when it has already fallen well below its full employment level means accepting a permanently overheated economy. A standard "expectations-augmented" Phillips curve says that this is not possible to accomplish without accepting persistently rising inflation. If the Fed did find itself in a situation where the economy were overheating, it would have no choice but to jack up rates in order push the unemployment rate to a higher level. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that once the unemployment rate starts rising, it keeps rising. Indeed, there has never been a case in the post-war era where the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 9). Chart 9Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle The inescapable fact is that modern economies contain numerous feedback loops. When unemployment is falling, this generates a virtuous cycle where rising employment boosts income and confidence, leading to more spending and even lower unemployment. The exact opposite happens when unemployment starts rising. History suggests that trying to raise the unemployment rate by just a little bit is like trying to get a little bit pregnant. It's simply impossible to pull off. The implication is that the Fed will not only raise rates in line with the dots, but could actually expedite the pace of rate hikes if aggregate demand accelerates later this year, as we expect. Remember, it wasn't that long ago that a typical tightening cycle entailed eight rate hikes per year. In this context, the market's expectation of less than two hikes over the next 12 months seems implausibly low. No Tightening In Japan Or Europe Chart 10Inflation Is Way Below The BoJ's Target Could other major central banks follow in the Fed's footsteps and tighten monetary policy more aggressively than what the market is currently discounting? We doubt it. Japanese inflation is nowhere close to the BOJ's 2% target (Chart 10). And even if Japanese growth surprises significantly to the upside, the first step the authorities will take is to tighten fiscal policy by raising the sales tax. Monetary tightening remains some ways off. Likewise, while the ECB might remove a few of its emergency measures, it is nowhere close to embarking on a full-fledged tightening cycle. The ECB's own research department recently put out a paper documenting that the combined unemployment and underemployment rate currently stands at 18% of the labor force across the euro area (Chart 11). This is 3.5 points above where it was in 2008. If one excludes Germany from the picture, the level of unemployment and underemployment is seven points higher than it was in 2008. This is not the stuff of which tightening cycles are made. Meanwhile, on the other side of the English Channel, the BoE must contend with the fact that growth remains underwhelming, partly due to ongoing angst about Brexit negotiations (Chart 12). Chart 12U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers EM Outlook Chart 13Positive Signs For The Chinese Housing Market... The outlook for EM currencies is a tougher call. On the one hand, a more hawkish Fed and broad-based dollar strength have usually been bad news for emerging markets, given that 80% of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in U.S. dollars. On the other hand, stronger global growth should support commodity prices, even if the dollar is strengthening. Our energy strategists remain particularly convinced that oil prices will rise over the remainder of this year due to robust demand growth for crude and continued OPEC discipline. Strong Chinese growth should also boost metals demand, while limiting the need for further RMB weakness. Chart 13 shows that property developers have been snapping up new land at an accelerating pace. The percentage of households who intend to buy a new home has also surged to record high levels. This bodes well for construction, and by extension, commodity demand. The strong pace of growth in excavator sales - a leading indicator for capex - confirms this trend. Meanwhile, real-time measures of Chinese industrial activity such as rail freight traffic and electricity generation remain buoyant (Chart 14). This is helping to lift producer prices, which, in turn, is fueling a rebound in industrial company profits (Chart 15). And for all the talk about the government's crackdown on credit growth, the reality is that medium-to-long term lending to nonfinancial companies has actually picked up (Chart 16). Chart 14... And Positive Signs For Chinese Capex Chart 15Higher Producer Prices Boosting Profits Chart 16A Positive In China's Credit Picture Stick With Stocks... For Now In terms of global asset allocation, we continue to recommend a cyclical (12-month) overweight in equities relative to bonds. We have a slight preference for DM over EM stocks, although given some of the positive factors supporting EM economies noted above, we do not regard this as a high-conviction view. Within the DM universe, we favour higher-beta equity markets such Japan and the euro area over the U.S. (currency hedged). In the government bond space, we would underweight U.S. Treasurys, given the likelihood that the Fed will deliver more rate hikes over the coming months than the market is currently discounting. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights The latest reading from all the indicators confirms that the growth improvement in the manufacturing sector since early last year has moderated, while the sharp recovery in producer prices has stalled. However, it is premature to be overly alarmed by a pending Chinese growth relapse. Betting on a material Chinese slowdown solely based on some sort of credit "impulse" estimate misses the big picture. The dramatic decline in real interest rates rather than an increase in new lending is what played a pivotal role in Chinese reflation since last year. Strategically we lean against being overly bearish. The Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, but the downside risk appears low at the moment and overall business activity will remain buoyant. Feature Investors have become less sanguine on China's growth outlook in recent weeks, as the latest macro numbers are no longer unanimously positive. Concerns about a significant relapse in the Chinese economy are re-emerging, and the authorities' recent policy tightening has further heightened investors' anxiety levels. Judging from our recent conversations with clients, "China risk" is now clearly back on the radar. China's growth recovery since early last year played a major role in boosting some global risk assets such as commodities prices and emerging market equities. By the same token, will a China slowdown end the global reflation trade? The Divergence In Manufacturing PMIs Chart 1The Divergences In PMIs Investors' anxiety over China's cyclical trend has been amplified by the recent divergence between the official manufacturing Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) and the one compiled by Caixin Media group, a private source. The official survey for May still showed expansion, while the private PMI dropped slightly below the critical 50 threshold (Chart 1, top panel). Historically such divergences are not uncommon, and the private PMI appears to show sharper swings than its official counterpart, probably due to its smaller sample size and its focus on smaller private firms. Meanwhile, there were some commonalities: the sub-indices of output and new orders for both surveys remained above the expansionary threshold, while input costs and output prices for both dropped into contractionary territory. Taken together, the latest reading from all the indicators confirms that the growth improvement in the manufacturing sector since early last year has moderated, while the sharp recovery in producer prices has stalled - consistent with other recent macro variables. Meanwhile, the service industry is still showing solid expansion, according to both surveys, underpinning overall business activity (Chart 1, bottom panel). In short, it is premature to be overly alarmed by a pending Chinese growth relapse. Credit "Price" Versus "Volume": What Matters More? A common narrative to describe the reason behind China's ongoing growth moderation is policy tightening on both the monetary and fiscal fronts. As the argument goes, last year's growth recovery was driven by a massive increase in credit and fiscal spending, which has since been scaled back. As this credit and fiscal "impulse" fades away, the Chinese economy will tumble, sending shockwaves across the world. In our view, betting on a material Chinese slowdown solely based on some sort of credit "impulse" estimate misses the big picture, and is dangerously misguided. At BCA, we have long paid close attention to credit cycles and their impact on the growth outlook. However, there is no evidence that China's growth recovery since early last year was due to a massive increase in credit expansion and fiscal spending. In fact, total new credit provided by commercial banks and the "shadow banking sector" has been largely stable in recent years, and last year's credit "impulse," measured as the annual change in credit flows, was fairly modest - especially compared with previous bouts of sharp spikes (Chart 2). Similarly, Chinese fiscal spending actually decelerated sharply throughout last year, and dropped by over 10% in December, compared with a year earlier. Even if last year's fiscal retrenchment impacts the economy with a time lag, it is important to note that fiscal spending has already rebounded in recent months, which will become a tailwind for growth down the road. In our view, China's growth recovery since last year has a lot more to do with the "price" of credit rather than "volume." (Chart 3) Real interest rates dropped from double-digit levels that prevailed between 2012 and early 2016 to negative, thanks to a sharp increase in producer prices, while credit growth remained in a broad downtrend. In other words, the dramatic decline in real interest rates rather than an increase in new lending is what played a pivotal role in Chinese reflation. Chart 2Not Much 'Impulse' Chart 3Credit: 'Price' Matters More Than 'Volume' China's PPI has rolled over, which together with the authorities' attempts to tighten has begun to lift real interest rates. This will likely continue to generate some growth headwinds - a risk that clearly warrants close attention. However, monetary conditions currently are still very accommodative, and there is no reason to expect an overkill to choke off the economy. Why Growth Will Not Falter? Moreover, the bearish argument on China's cyclical outlook is fundamentally rooted in the assumption that the country's economy is dangerously imbalanced1 - a shaky house of cards propped up by policy stimulus that will immediately fall down once the policy pump-priming stops. While the structural profile of the Chinese economy will remain a major global macro issue subject to heated debates going forward, the bearish argument underestimates the economy's resilience, and therefore exaggerates the downside risks. First, it is important to note that China's growth challenges in previous years were to a large extent due to excessively tight monetary conditions, a costly policy mistake that amplified deflationary pressures. Real interest rates were kept at double digits for 5 consecutive years between 2012 and early 2016 while other major central banks were all trying desperately to lower borrowing costs within their respective economies. Furthermore, the trade-weighted RMB appreciated by 20% between 2012 and 2015. In fact, the RMB was the only major currency that appreciated in trade-weighted terms during this period (Chart 4), essentially shouldered deflationary stress for the rest of the world. In addition, Chinese regulators tried hard to block credit flows in an ill-conceived attempt to de-lever - which only prolonged credit intermediation channels and pushed loan demand to even costlier "shadow" institutions.2 All of these factors inflicted dramatic deflationary pain on Chinese manufacturers. Indeed, that the Chinese economy did not implode under the double-whammy of weak global demand and draconian domestic policy tightening - and staged a quick turnaround when monetary conditions eased - underscores the surprising resilience of the Chinese corporate sector. Second, the growth recovery since early last year has significantly improved financial conditions within the corporate sector and eased its balance sheet stress. Overall, companies have increased earnings, reduced inventories and beefed up cash positions (Chart 5). The situation can certainly deteriorate, but the sector is also better prepared for deflationary shocks than in previous years. Chart 4The RMB Shift Chart 5Inventory Is Still Very Low Third, even if China's corporate sector, especially industrial enterprises, are indeed as fragile as some bearish analysts claim, Chinese households and the service sector have much healthier fundamentals and therefore are less vulnerable. Consumer confidence has improved significantly in recent months following the growth acceleration, which should further help household consumption. The service sector now accounts for 52% of Chinese GDP, 30% larger than manufacturing. Household consumption and the service sector will provide an important anchor for business activity and prevent a major relapse in economic growth, even if the industrial sector slows more than we currently expect. Finally, the global growth environment is also largely supportive for the Chinese economy. The European economy has been showing some remarkable strength of late, and U.S. growth is likely to pick up after the recent soft patch, as per our U.S. specialists - both of which should bode well for Chinese exports. It is worth noting the recent weaker macro numbers out of China have followed growth disappointments in the U.S. (Chart 6). In fact, the ebbs and flows of "growth surprises" in the world's two largest economies in recent years have been largely in sync, albeit with China experiencing more pronounced volatility. In addition, the risk of an immediate escalation of protectionist backlash between the U.S. and China has also been lowered following President Xi's state visit to the U.S. in April.3 Overall, the Chinese economy is unlikely to slow materially, if the U.S. economy does reasonably well. Chart 6U.S. And China: Synchronized 'Surprises' All in all, we expect the Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, but the downside risk appears low at the moment. In a reported titled "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead," dated April 6th, we warned that "growth figures coming out of China in the coming months may be viewed as less market friendly."4 Recent Chinese data and investor reactions confirm this judgment. Nonetheless, we maintain the view that the Chinese economy's growth improvement remains largely intact, which will reinforce the upturn in the global business cycle and support global risk assets. Strategically we lean against being overly bearish, and we remain cyclically positive on Chinese equities, particularly H shares. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports, "The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings?" dated March 23, 2017, and "More On The Chinese Debt Debate," dated April 20, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports, "Reflecting On The Trump-Xi Summit," dated April 13, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead," dated April 6, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Crude oil prices will find support from stronger EM trade volumes, which broke out of an extended low-growth period at the end of last year and finished 1Q17 on a very strong note. Sustained growth in EM trade volumes will boost inflation at the consumer level in the U.S. and Europe, and will lift the Fed's preferred inflation gauge, provided the Fed does not constrict the growth of money supply this year and next. Energy: Overweight. We remain long Dec/17 WTI and Brent vs. short Dec/18 WTI and Brent, expecting the extended OPEC 2.0 production cuts and stronger oil demand to drain inventories this year. Base Metals: Neutral. China's Caixin manufacturing PMI for May fell below 50, indicating the manufacturing sector may be contracting. We will wait to see if this is confirmed this month and next, but for now this keeps us neutral with a negative tilt on the base metals complex. Precious Metals: Neutral. A weaker USD, and market expectations the Fed will be constrained in lifting interest rates later this year is supporting our strategic gold portfolio hedge, which is up 5.1% since it was initiated May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Front-month corn is trading through the top of the $3.55 to $3.75/bushel range it has occupied since the beginning of the year. We are not inclined to play the momentum. Feature EM import and export volumes moved sharply higher in 1Q17 after breaking out of an extended low-growth funk late last year (Chart of the Week). The year-on-year (yoy) increase in the volume of imports and exports for EM economies reported by the CPB World Trade Monitor were up on average 8.74% and 5.29% in 1Q17, respectively, versus 12-month moving average levels of 2.2% and 2.5%.1 EM trade volumes are highly correlated with EM oil demand (Chart 2), particularly in the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) era, when EM import and export growth made significant gains relative to DM trade volumes (Chart 3).2 Indeed, EM imports and exports both grew at twice the rate of DM trade between the end of 2010 and the end of 1Q17: EM import volumes grew 22% vs. DM growth of 10% over the period, while EM export volumes grew 21% vs. DM growth of 11%. Chart of the WeekEM Imports And Exports##BR##Surge In 1Q17 Chart 2EM Oil Demand Closely##BR##Tracks Trade Volumes Chart 3EM Trade-Volume Growth##BR##Surpasses DM Growth We expect EM demand will account for some 80% of ~1.53mm b/d of global oil demand growth this year. If the strong 1Q17 performance in EM trade were to carry into 2Q, we will be raising our estimated oil-demand growth for the year significantly. We will be updating our global supply-demand balances next week. Coupled with the extension to end-March 2018 of the 1.8mm-barrel-per-day crude-oil production cuts recently agreed by the OPEC 2.0, the strong EM oil-demand growth could accelerate the draw-down in global storage levels, putting the WTI and Brent forward curves into backwardation sooner than the late-2017/early-2018 timeframe we currently expect.3 EM Trade Growth Will Stoke Oil Prices And Inflation Because EM demand is the driving force of global oil-demand growth, a continuation of the strong trade performance from this sector will support oil prices going forward, and likely will lift inflation as the year progresses. In the post-GFC period, we would expect a 1% increase in EM import and export volumes to boost oil prices by a little more than 2%, and vice versa.4 This is almost twice the effect an increase in trade produces in estimates beginning pre-GFC in 2000; most likely, it reflects the increase in EM trade volumes relative to DM trade volumes post-GFC.5 Our modeling confirms key inflation gauges - particularly the Fed's preferred gauge, the core PCE; the U.S. CPI; and EMU Harmonized CPI - all are highly sensitive to EM oil demand, as expected, and, no surprise, to EM trade volumes.6 In the post-GFC period, a 1% increase (decrease) in EM oil demand can be expected to lift (drop) core PCE and the U.S. CPI by a little more than 50bps; for the EMU CPI, a 40bps increase (decrease) can be expected.7 In addition, we have found the EM trade data also is a highly explanatory variable for these inflation gauges. Imports explain ~ 84%, 91% and 89% of core PCE (Chart 4), U.S. CPI (Chart 5), and EMU CPI (Chart 6), respectively, in the post-GFC period, while exports explain 94%, 93% and 81% of these inflation gauges. The elasticities for the U.S. gauges is ~ 50bps, similar to the EM oil demand estimates, and ~35bps for the EMU CPI. Chart 4Core PCE Is Highly Sensitive To EM Trade Volumes... Chart 5...As Is U.S. CPI... Chart 6...And EMU CPI A continued expansion of EM trading volumes this year can be expected to lift inflation in the U.S. and Europe. We also would expect this to hold for China as well, given the results of our earlier research.8 Fed Could Kill The Party Chart 7U.S. M2 Is Important To EM Trade Volumes One variable we are watching closely is U.S. money supply, M2 in particular, vis-à-vis EM trade volumes (Chart 7). We find that in the post-GFC world, EM trade volumes are highly sensitive to M2, with M2 explaining 92% of EM exports and 82% of imports. This relationship did not exist in the pre-GFC world, or in estimates starting pre-GFC and extending to the present day. This no doubt is related to massive monetary accommodation and QE experiments post-GFC, but, as of this writing, we are not at all sure how this relationship will evolve going forward. Bottom Line: EM trade volumes have broken out of a long-term funk, which will be supportive of crude oil prices and will lift inflation going forward. Strong EM trade growth at the pace at which it ended 1Q17 would cause us to lift our expectation for global oil demand significantly for this year. This, combined with the extension of the OPEC 2.0 production cuts to March 2018 could normalize global inventories faster than markets currently expect. EM trade is, importantly, highly exposed to U.S. monetary policy, particularly to what happens to U.S. M2 money supply. This is a feature of the global trade picture that was not present pre-GFC. Our research affirms our conviction on the bullish oil exposure we have on - chiefly the long Dec/17 Brent and WTI vs. short Dec/18 Brent and WTI backwardation trades. Our results also support remaining long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk, and remaining long commodity-index exposure. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 The CPB World Trade Monitor is published monthly by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Please see https://www.cpb.nl/en/worldtrademonitor for data and documentation. We use CPB's volumetric data for EM imports and exports in our analysis, which are indexed to 2010 = 100; we converted these data to USD values to see how the composition of imports and exports was changing so as to better see how the relative shares of EM and DM are evolving. 2 EM export and import volumes are cointegrated with non-OECD oil consumption, our proxy for EM oil demand, in regressions starting pre- and post-GFC, meaning they share a common trend and are in a long-term equilibrium. The adjusted R2 coefficient of determination for EM oil demand as a function of EM export volumes is 0.91 for estimates starting in 2003 and 2010 (the pre- and post-GFC periods); for EM imports, it is 0.84 post-GFC, and 0.90 pre-GFC. Post-GFC, we estimate a 1% increase (decrease) in EM import and export volumes translates to an 88bp and 85bp gain (decline) in EM oil demand. The read-through on this is EM trade volumes are closely tied to income growth, given the income-elasticity of demand for oil is ~ 1.0 in non-OECD economies, according to the OECD. Please see "The Price of Oil - Will It Start Rising Again?" OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1031, p. 6 (2013). In our modeling, we assume the GFC ended in 2010. 3 Please see our discussion of this production-cut extension in the joint report we did with BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy on June 1, 2017, entitled "Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories." It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 The R2 coefficients of determination for the cointegrating regressions of Brent prices on EM export and import volumes are 0.90 and 0.93, respectively, for post-GFC estimates. For estimates beginning in 2000, the R2 coefficients are 0.88, while the elasticities are ~1.20 for the EM trade variables. These models also include a parameter for the broad trade-weighted USD, which, post-GFC, has become more important to the evolution of Brent prices: A 1% increase in the currency parameter translates to a price decline of more than 5%, which is approximately twice the value of the estimates starting pre-GFC. 5 Our estimates for WTI produce similar results for the pre- and post-GFC periods. 6 We examined this in our August 4 and 11, 2016, in "Memo To The Fed: EM Oil, Metals Demand Key To U.S. Inflation," and "Global Inflation And Commodity Markets." Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 The R2 coefficients of determination for the core PCE, U.S. CPI and EMU CPI estimates as a function of EM oil demand are 0.97, 0.94 and 0.85, respectively. It is interesting to observe that prompt measures of inflation are not correlated to oil prices, but that 5-year 5-year CPI swaps remain highly correlated with oil prices, the 3-year forward WTI futures contract in particular; the R2 for the estimate of the 5y5y CPI swap as a function of the 3-year WTI contract is 75%. 8 In the August 11, 2016, article "Global Inflation And Commodity Markets," we found Chinese inflation to be equally sensitive to EM oil demand. We will be exploring this further when we look at base metals demand vis-à-vis EM trading volumes in forthcoming research. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights Will Trump's trade rhetoric damage the U.S. service sector's abilities to generate a trade surplus and create high-paying jobs? Our assessment of the latest Beige Book via the BCA Beige Book Monitor supports the Fed's view that Q1 weakness was an anomaly and inflation is headed higher. This will keep the Fed on track to tighten in June and again later this year. GDP growth in 2017 is poised to exceed the Fed's forecast for the first time in seven years if the recent pattern of 2H GDP beating 1H GDP growth is repeated. Global oil inventories are set to move lower and drive oil prices higher. The odds of a recession remain low even with the economy at full employment. Feature The May employment report fell short of expectations, but the average gain of 121,000 jobs per month over the past 3 months and the drop in the unemployment rate are still enough to tighten the labor market and keep the Fed on track to tighten later this month. The unemployment rate dipped to 4.3% in May and is now 0.4% below the Fed's view of full employment. Wage growth remains stagnant despite the state of health of the labor market, as year-over-year average hourly earnings growth remained at just 2.5% in May (Chart 1). Chart 1Labor Market Still Tightening##BR##Despite Disappointing May Taking a broader view, the job picture in the service sector remains robust and wages in the export-oriented service industries remain well above wages in the goods sector. In this week's report we examine the impact of trade on the labor market and highlight areas where Trump's rhetoric may hurt trade-related job growth. Trump At Your Service The large trade surplus in the U.S. service sector is a hidden source of strength for the economy and labor market. Trump campaigned on his ability to create high paying manufacturing jobs, but his America First rhetoric is threatening jobs in the high paying service sector. Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has imported more than it has exported, acting as a drag on GDP growth. The trade gap reflects a large and persistent goods deficit, which more than offsets a growing trade surplus on the service side. U.S. imported goods exceeded exports by $1.3 trillion in 2016. Service exports totaled an all-time high of $778 billion in 2016, $270 billion more than imports. Exports of services have increased by 7% per year on average since 2000, which is nearly twice as fast as nominal GDP (Charts 2A & 2B). Chart 2AThe U.S. Runs Trade##BR##Surplus In Services... Chart 2B...But It's Not Large Enough To Offset##BR##The Big Trade Deficit In Goods The trade surplus in services added 0.07% to GDP in Q1 2017, 0.04% in 2016, and has consistently added to GDP growth over the past few decades, although it is swamped by the large drag on GDP as a result of the trade deficit on goods. Industries where the U.S. enjoys a trade surplus have experienced job growth that is more than seven times faster than in industries where the U.S. runs a deficit. In addition, median wages ($29 as of April 2017) among surplus-producing industries are more than 20% higher than in industries in the goods sector ($24) where there is a trade deficit, even though wages are rising quicker in the goods-producing sector in the past year (Chart 3). U.S. service sector exports tend to compete on quality (not on price) and, therefore, will not be as affected as U.S. goods exports if the dollar meets BCA's forecast of a 10% rise in the next 6-12 months (Chart 4). Chart 3Wages In Export Led Service Industries##BR##20% Higher Than In Goods Sector Chart 4Service Sector Export Orders##BR##At New High Despite Strong Dollar However, Trump's trade policies may threaten to reduce the U.S.'s global dominance in services. The U.S. has the largest trade surpluses in travel (which includes education), intellectual property, financial services, and legal, accounting and consulting services (Table 1). The U.S. also runs a large surplus in areas such as intellectual property, software and advertising. In 2015, foreigners spent $92 billion more to travel to, vacation in and be educated in America compared with what U.S. residents spent for those services overseas. Anecdotal reports note that travel to the U.S. is down by as much as 15% since the start of the year, and that 40% of U.S. colleges and universities have seen a decline in foreign applications, putting the nearly $100 billion trade surplus at risk. Other Trump policies, such as the proposed travel ban and some of his "America First" campaign-style rhetoric, could jeopardize the trade surpluses in financial services ($77 billion), software services ($30 billion), TV and film right ($13 billion), architectural services ($10 billion) and advertising ($8) billion. Table 1Key Components Of U.S. Trade Surplus In Services Trump's trade rhetoric potentially threatens U.S. service exports to NAFTA countries (Canada and Mexico), the Eurozone and the emerging markets. President Trump campaigned on renegotiating NAFTA, supporting Brexit and pulling the U.S. out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Trade in services are key to all of those treaties, although trade in goods gets more attention. At $56 billion in 2015, Canada is the U.S.'s second largest service export market, and Mexico is a top 10 destination ($31 billion). Forty percent of U.S. service exports go to Europe, and at $66 billion in 2015, the U.K. is the single largest market for U.S. service exports. The U.S. sends half of its service exports to EM nations, with markets in Asia accounting for just under 30% of all U.S. service exports. Thus investors should carefully monitor the progress of all three of these trade deals to help better assess the impact on U.S. trade and jobs in the service sector. Bottom Line: The U.S.'s large trade surplus in services fosters faster job creation and better pay than in the goods-producing area where the U.S. has a trade deficit. The Trump administration's rhetoric and actions on trade and globalism potentially risks America's dominance in the service sector. In theory, U.S. trade restrictions could add to U.S. GDP growth as long as there is no retaliation from its trading partners (which is unlikely). But any gains on the manufacturing trade front could be largely offset by damage to the U.S. surplus in services trade. Beige Book Backs The Fed For the Fed, policymakers are treating any potential changes to trade and fiscal policy as risks to their outlook. At the moment, they are judging the need for tighter policy based on the evolution of the labor market and inflation. The Beige Book released on May 31 confirmed the FOMC's base-case outlook. It keeps the Fed on track to tighten in June and then again later this year as it begins to trim its balance sheet. Our quantitative assessment of the qualitative Beige Book that we introduced in April 17 found that the economy had rebounded from a weak Q1 and that inflation was in an uptrend despite recent soft readings.1 The dollar seems to have faded as a key concern for small businesses and bankers. Business uncertainty around government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) remained elevated. Our analysis of the Beige Book also shows that commercial and residential real estate, the former a surprise source of strength in Q1 GDP, remains stout more than halfway through Q2. Chart 5 shows that the BCA Beige Book Monitor ticked up to 71% in May 2017 from 64% in April. The metric is in line with its cycle highs recorded in mid-2014 as oil prices peaked. "Inflation" words in the Beige Book hit a new peak in May and are in sharp contrast to the recent soft readings on CPI and the PCE deflator. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may be turning up soon. Chart 5May Beige Book Points To Solid Growth In Q2 In Chart 5, panel 4 we track mentions of "strong dollar" in the report. The May Beige Book saw the same number of references to a strong dollar as the May 2016 report. This suggests that the dollar is not as big a concern for business owners as it was from early 2015 through early 2016. Housing added 0.5 percentage points to growth in Q1, and business spending on structures added 0.7 percentage points. The latest Beige Book suggests that both sectors remain robust here in Q2 (Chart not shown). The implication is that the U.S. economy is poised to clear the low hurdle in 2017 set for it by the FOMC in late 2016. The Fed's economic growth target for 2017 (set at the December 2016 FOMC meeting) was just 2.1%, the lowest year ahead forecast since 2009. The projection incorporates the Fed's lowered trajectory for potential output, but may also reflect the fact that actual GDP growth has not exceeded the Fed's forecast every year since 2009 (Chart 6). GDP growth in 1H 2017 is tracking between 2% and 2.5% despite the weak start to the year. In late May, Q1 GDP growth was revised to +1.2% from the 0.7% reading reported in late April. Based on the Atlanta Fed's GDP Now, the NY Fed's Nowcast and readings on ISM, vehicle sales and the Beige Book, GDP in Q2 is tracking to near 3%. If the economy rebounds from the lackluster first quarter as we expect, then real output will be on course to match or exceed the Fed's forecast for the first time since the recession. We expect an acceleration for fundamental reasons and due to poor seasonal adjustment. In 5 of the past 7 years, real GDP growth in Q3 and Q4 was the same or stronger than the pace of expansion in the first half of the year (Table 2). During that period, 2H output growth averaged 2.4%, while 1H growth was an anemic 1.8%. In the years when Q1 GDP was weak,2 as it was this year, real economic output in the second half of the year accelerated from 1H growth nearly every time. Table 2GDP Growth In 2H Has Met Or Exceeded 1H Growth In 5 Of Past 7 Years Bottom Line: The latest Beige Book (prepared for the June 13-14 FOMC meeting) confirms policymakers' assessment that the weak growth in Q1 was transitory and inflation is in an uptrend. The economy remains on target to hit or exceed the Fed's growth objectives. The FOMC is poised to raise rates in June and one more time by year end. This view is not discounted in the bond market, implying that Treasury yields are too low. Equity prices could be undermined by higher yields and the dollar, but this will be offset by rising growth (and profit) expectations if our base-case view pans out. Oil Prices: Fade The Recent Weakness A pickup in U.S. growth will also be positive for oil prices, although it is OPEC's efforts to curtail excess inventories that is the main driver of our bullish view. Our commodity strategists believe that OPEC 2.0's recent production cut extension will be successful in bringing OECD inventories down to normalized levels, even assuming some compliance fatigue (cheating).3 Shale production is bouncing back quickly. OPEC's November 2016 agreement signaled to the world that OPEC (and Russia) would abandon Saudi Arabia's professed commitment to a market share war, and would instead work together to support a ~$50/bbl floor under the price of oil. Such a price floor dramatically reduced the investment risk for shale drilling, and emboldened producers to pour money into vastly increased drilling programs. Nonetheless, global oil demand continues to grow robustly. Moreover, production is eroding for oil producers outside of (Middle East) OPEC, Russia and U.S. Shale, which collectively supply half the market. The cumulative effects of spending constraints during 2015-18 will result in falling output in the coming years for this group of producers. Adding it all up, we expect demand to exceed supply for the remainder of 2017, which will result in a significant drawdown in oil inventories (Chart 7). Our strategists think the inventory adjustment will push the price of oil up to US$60 by year end. They expect a trading range of US$45-65 to hold between now and 2020. Chart 8 shows a simple model for oil prices, based on global industrial production, oil production, OECD oil inventories and oil consumption in the major countries and China. If OPEC is successful in reducing inventories to their 5-year moving average, the model implies that oil prices will surge by more than US$10! The coefficient on oil inventories in the model is probably overly influenced by the one major swing in inventories we have seen in the last couple of decades, suggesting that we must take the results with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, our point is that oil prices have significant upside potential if the excessive inventory problem is solved. Chart 7Significant Drawdown##BR##In Inventories Is Coming Chart 8Upside Potential For Oil##BR##If Inventory Issue Is Resolved Bottom Line: The extension of OPEC 2.0 production cuts reinforces our bullish view for oil prices. Revisiting The Odds Of A Recession It seems odd at first glance to be discussing recession risks at a time when growth is poised to accelerate. Nonetheless, BCA's Global Investment Strategy service recently noted that investors should be on watch for recession now that the economy has reached full employment.4 Historically, once the unemployment rate reached estimates of full employment, the odds of a recession in the subsequent 12 months increased four-fold. In last week's report, we maintained that the lack of progress on fiscal policy by the Trump administration may actually be positive for risk assets in the medium term because it would stretch out the cycle and thus lower recession risks.5 The economic data have disappointed so far this year, as highlighted by the economic surprise index (Chart 9). Despite this, there is not much talk of recession in the news media and various models also show slim chances of recession this year (Chart 10). Only one of eight components in our BCA model is flashing recession: the three-year moving average of the Fed funds rate is rising because the Fed rate hike cycle began in late 2015. Chart 9Economic Data Still Disappointing, But Does Not Signal A Recession Chart 10Odds Of A Recession This Year Remain Low In a prior report we dismissed the rollover in commodity prices as a recessionary signal and noted that Trump's political woes would only slow the GOP's legislative agenda. Nonetheless, even without fiscal stimulus, the U.S. economy will still grow above its long-term potential, tighten the labor market and push up wages and inflation in the coming quarters. Bottom Line: The odds of recession remain low despite the U.S. economy being at full employment. The delay in Trumponomics' will prolong the expansion and will support risk assets over the next 6-12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Growth Inflation And The Fed", dated May 8, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories", dated June 1, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Fiscal Policy In The Spotlight", dated May 26, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Corporate Earnings Versus Trump Turbulence", dated May 29, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The global economy remains awash in massive amounts of oversupply, reflecting extraordinary levels of capex in emerging markets. This will weigh on global inflation. Thanks to a tighter labor market, the U.S. is likely to suffer less from this force than the euro area or commodity producers. In this context, the tightening in Chinese and U.S. policy could represent a severe blow to the recent improvement in global trade. Continue to hold some yen and some dollars but stay short commodity and European currencies. Feature The U.S. is in its eighth year of recovery, yet core PCE is clocking in at a paltry 1.5% despite the headline unemployment rate standing 0.3% below its long-term equilibrium and despite incredibly low interest rates. The phenomenon is not unique to the U.S., euro area core CPI remains a meager 1% and even Germany, despite experiencing an unemployment at 26 year lows, is incapable of generating core inflation beyond 1.6%. Let us not even broach the topic of Japan... So what lies behind this low inflation environment? Not Enough Capex Or Too Much Capex? Capex in advanced economies has averaged 21% of GDP since 2008, compared to an average of 24% of GDP between 1980 and 2007, suggesting that the supply side of the economy is not expanding as fast as before (Chart I-1). Historically, countries plagued by low investment rates have tended to experience higher inflation. Simply put, these low investment rates mean these economies do not enjoy high labor productivity growth rates, causing severe bottlenecks. When these capacity constraints are hit, inflation emerges. This time around, the low investment rate in advanced economies is not yielding this development. Why? One reason is that demand has been hampered by the rise in savings preferences that emerged following the financial crisis (Chart I-2). But another phenomenon is also at play. Global capex has remained very elevated. Chart I-1Low Investment In DM ##br##Should Create Bottlenecks Chart I-2Post 2008: ##br##Marked Preference For Savings As Chart I-3 illustrates, global capex has averaged 25.2% of world GDP since 2010, well above the international average from 1980 to 2009. This is simply a reflection of the massive amount of capacity expansion that continues to materialize in the EM space, where investment has equaled more than 30% of GDP for eight years in a row. This matters because since the 1990s, the world has experienced a massive outward shift in the aggregate supply curve, resulting in an extended period of falling inflation and then, low inflation, independent of the state of growth or of long-term inflation expectations (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Global Capex Is High Chart I-437 Years Of Inflation History At A Glance In the 1990s, this expansion of global production capacity reflected the addition of billions of potential workers to the international capitalist system, but this phenomenon slowed massively in the 2000s and is now over (Chart I-5). Instead, the driver of the expansion of the global supply curve has since become the rampant investment taking place in developing economies, which has resulted in a massive increase in the capital-to-GDP ratio for the entire planet (Chart I-6). Chart I-62000s To Present: Capital Drives##br## The Supply Expansion In the first decade of the millennium, this massive increase in the level of global capacity was still manageable. Global real GDP growth expressed in purchasing-power parity terms averaged 7% from 2000 to 2008 and was able to absorb some of the productive capacity being added to the world economy. As a result, core inflation average 2% in the OECD while short-term and long-term interest rates averaged 2.9% and 4.1%, respectively. However, since 2009, global GDP growth expressed in purchasing-power parity terms has only averaged 4.6%, despite a continued robust pace of investment globally, suggesting that now, supply growth is outstripping demand growth by a greater margin than in the previous cycle. This means that to achieve an average core inflation rate of 1.8% in the OECD, short-term and long-term interest rates have needed to average 0.7% and 2.4%, respectively. Going forward, the problem is that global excess capacity has not been expunged. With credit growth still limited in the G10 and in a downtrend in China (Chart I-7), deflationary tendencies are likely to remain a prevalent feature of the global economy for the rest of the business cycle. Thus, central banks the world over will find it very difficult to tighten monetary policy by much without re-invigorating downward spirals in inflation. While this problem applies to the Fed - a case cogently described by Lael Brainard this week - this is even truer for many other economies. The global trend in inflation is a function of this global expansion in supply, but domestic dynamics can still affect the dispersion of national inflation rates around this depressed global level. As Chart I-8 shows, countries with an unemployment rate substantially below equilibrium - a negative unemployment gap - do experience higher levels of inflation. Today, this puts the U.S. on a path toward higher inflation relative to the euro area. This suggests that there remains a valid case to expect a tightening of monetary conditions in the U.S. vis-à-vis the euro area. Chart I-7Low Credit Growth Harms Demand Growth In this vein, Japan is an interesting case. Japan does have one of the most negative unemployment gaps among major economies, yet it experiences one of the lowest inflation rates. Japan is such an outlier that if it were excluded from the chart above, the explanatory power of the employment gap on inflation would double. This is because Japan has to grapple with another, even more pernicious problem: chronically depressed inflation expectations. Hence, the BoJ has to commit to an "irresponsibly easy" monetary policy and keep the economy growing above its potential for an extended period of time to genuinely shock inflation expectations upwards if it ever wants to remotely approach its 2% inflation target. Thus, we should remain negative the yen on a cyclical basis, only buying the JPY when asset markets are at risk. Bottom Line: The global economy remains awash in excessive supply. In the 1980s and 1990s, much of the supply expansion reflected an increase in the global labor force; since the turn of the millennium, the global supply expansion has been a function of high investment rates in developing economies. Without credit growth, the global economy will be hostage to deflationary pressures, at least for the rest of this cycle. Despite this picture, among major economies, the U.S. needs the smallest amount of monetary accommodation, supporting a bullish dollar stance. Policy Mistake In The Making? In this context of global overcapacity, low growth and underlying deflationary pressures, deflationary policy mistakes are easy to come by, and the world economy may be facing two such shocks. In and of itself, the U.S. economy may be able to handle higher rates. Even if inflation is likely to remain low by historical standards, a rebound toward 2% could happen later this year. At the very least, our diffusion index of industrial sector activity suggests that the recent inflation deceleration in the U.S. may be over (Chart I-9). However, it remains to be seen if EM economies, which is where the true excess capacity still lies, can actually handle higher global real rates. The rollover in our global leading indicator diffusion index is perplexing and points to a deceleration in global growth, a potential warning sign about the frailty of the global economy (Chart I-10). Additionally, it is true that 1% CPI inflation in China does not necessitate much of a strong policy response by the PBoC. But the vast swathe of cumulative capital investment in China implies that this country could suffer from the greatest amount of excess capacity (Chart I-11). China required a massive amount of stimulus in 2015 and early 2016 to generate a small rebound in growth. Thus, the current tightening in Chinese monetary conditions, as small as it may be, could be enough to prompt another wave of weakness in that country. The recent softness in PMIs - with the Caixin gauge falling below 50 - could be a symptom of this problem. Chart I-9U.S. CPI Deceleration Is Ending... Chart I-10...But Global Growth Is Deteriorating Chart I-11China Is Oversupplied Making the situation even more precarious is that China stands at the apex of the overcapacity problem, which makes it prone to develop virtuous and vicious cycles. Chinese corporate debt stands at 180% of GDP, heavily concentrated in state-owned enterprises and heavy industries. This means that swings in producer prices can have a deep impact on real rates. Based on a 10 percentage points swing in PPI, Chinese real rates were able to collapse from 10% to -1% in the matter of 12 months last year. The problem is that for this PPI rebound to happen, Chinese monetary conditions had to ease greatly (Chart I-12). Now that Chinese monetary conditions are tightening and now that commodity prices are weakening anew, PPI could once again fall toward 0%, lifting real rates to 4.4% in the process (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Chinese MCI: From Friend To Foe Chart I-13Real Rates Are Likely To Go Up This means that the already emerging contraction in manufacturing and the recent deceleration in new capex projects could gather further momentum (Chart I-14). As credit flows dry up because of the increasing price of credit in a weakening and over-supplied economy, so will Chinese imports, which are so sensitive to the investment cycle and credit impulse (Chart I-15). This is a problem because the recent bright patch in the global economy was based on this rebound in Chinese demand. In the wake of the Chinese growth acceleration last year, global exports and export prices rebounded sharply (Chart I-16). However, now that China is facing a renewed slowdown, this improvement is likely to dissipate. Chart I-14Problems With Chinese Growth Chart I-15Slowing Chinese Credit Will Hurt Chinese Imports... Chart I-16...Which Will Weigh On Global Trade This is obviously negative for the commodity currency complex. Not only does this mean that the negative terms of trade shock that is affecting many commodity producers could deepen - for example iron ore futures continue to fall and are now down 39% since mid-march - but also, monetary policy could be eased relative to the U.S. Actually, our monetary stance gauge, based on real short rates and the slope of the yield curve, already highlights potential weaknesses for AUD/USD (Chart I-17). This development is also a problem for Europe. As we have highlighted before, European growth is three times more levered to EM dynamics than the U.S. economy is. Also, employment in the manufacturing sector in the euro area is still five percentage points above that of the U.S., underscoring the euro area's greater exposure to global manufacturing and global trade. This means that if Chinese troubles deepen, the closing of the European unemployment gap might slow, at least relative to the U.S. where the unemployment rate is already below equilibrium. Therefore, the high-time to bet on a tightening of European policy relative to the U.S. could be passing. Already, before the European economy has even been hit by a negative shock from EM, the euro looks vulnerable. Investors are very long the euro, but also EUR/USD has dissociated enough from interest rate fundamentals that it is now expensive on a short-term basis. The relative monetary stance gauge between the euro area and the U.S. is pointing toward trouble ahead (Chart I-18). This trend may be magnified if, as we expect, global goods prices weaken anew. Another problem for the euro is that now that the world has embraced president Macron with a firm handshake, political risk may be once again rearing its ugly head in Europe. The Italicum electoral reform in Italy is progressing and there may be a new prime minister sitting in the Palazzo Chigi in Rome this fall. The problem is that the Italian public remains much more euroskeptic than France and the euro is supported by barely more than 50% of the population (Chart I-19, top panel). With euroskeptic and pro-euro parties standing neck-and-neck in the polls, the risk of a referendum on the euro in the area's third largest economy is becoming increasingly real (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Chart I-17Relative Monetary Conditions ##br##Point To A Lower AUD Chart I-18Euro At ##br##Risk Chart I-19Italy Is Not ##br##France The yen could benefit if the combined impact of higher U.S. rates and tighter Chinese policy proves to be a mistake. Our composite indicator of global asset market volatility - based on implied volatility in bonds, global stocks, global commodities, and various exchange rates - is near record lows (Chart I-20). Hence, global risk assets - commodity and EM plays in particular - could suffer some damage in the face of a deeper than anticipated global growth slowdown led by China. The recent improvement in Japanese industrial production, which mirrors the improvement in EM trade, may be short-lived. This would depress Japanese inflation expectations and boost Japanese real rates, helping the yen in the process (Chart I-21). Shorting GBP/JPY may be one of the best ways to take advantages of these dynamics (Chart I-22). Chart I-20Global Cross-Asset ##br##Volatility Is Too Low Chart I-21If China And EM Slow, Japanese ##br##CPI Expectations Will Plunge Chart I-22New Downleg In ##br##GBP/JPY? Bottom Line: An oversupplied global economy could find it difficult to withstand the combined tightening emanating from China and the U.S. The improvement in global trade and global good prices is likely to dissipate in the coming month. The euro and commodity currencies could suffer from this development and the yen could benefit. Concluding Thoughts Global policy makers will ultimately not stand pat in the face of this problem. This may in fact deepen their well-entrenched dovish biases. As a result, while the scenario above sounds dire, it is likely to be transitory. The Chinese authorities will not let growth crater; European and Japanese policymakers will fight deflation; and even the Fed may be forced to leave policy easier than it would like. We will explore this topic in more detail in future publications. A Few Words On The RMB Chart I-23China Has Regained Control ##br##Of Its Capital Account This week, the RMB has been well bid as the PBoC announced that the currency will increasingly be used as a countercyclical tool. The market has interpreted this move as an attack on speculators betting on a falling RMB. The conditions had become very propitious for this kind of announcement to lift the CNY. On the back of a weaker dollar the trade-weighted RMB had in fact weakened for most of 2017 (Chart I-23, top panel), implying that the RMB has continued to help the Chinese economy. Additionally, capital flight out of China has slowed in response to the enforcement of capital controls, something made clear by the collapse in import over-invoicing (Chart I-23, bottom panel). Going forward, it is not clear whether this announcement is necessarily bullish or bearish. It all depends on the Chinese economy and its deflationary pressures. If we are correct that Chinese deflationary pressures are set to increase in the coming quarters, this could imply that Chinese authorities put downward pressure on the CNY later this year. That being said, we remain reluctant to short the yuan to play Chinese deflationary forces. The capital account is well controlled and the PBoC will continue to aggressively manage the exchange rate. This implies that currencies like the AUD or BRL, which exhibit strong correlations with Chinese imports, could remain the main vehicles to play a Chinese slowdown in the forex space. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The greenback displayed further weakness as FOMC member Brainard shared her opinions questioning the future path of U.S. policy. We consider these remarks as temporary hurdles for the dollar, as fundamentals are still in favor of a stronger dollar, which is something the Fed recognizes. This week, some minor deflationary worries resurfaced as the ISM Prices Paid declined to 60.5 from the previous 68.5. While this is true, the labor market continues to tighten as the ADP survey come in very strong. Additionally, ISM Manufacturing PMI also paints a brighter picture for manufacturing, coming in at 54.9. We believe the Fed will hike this month, and will continue to highlight its tightening path going forward, which will provide a fillip for the dollar. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Europe delivered a more negative outlook this week with softer data: Services sentiment, economic sentiment indicator, industrial confidence and business climate all came in less than expected; German CPI disappointed with CPI increasing at a 1.5% rate, less than the expected 2% rate, and the harmonized index also underperformed at 1.4%; European CPI also disappointed at 1.4%, while core CPI also slowed; However, Italian unemployment improved to 11.1% from 11.5%. President Draghi also reiterated his dovish stance in a speech on Monday. While the euro is up this week, elevated short-term valuations warrant a lower euro in coming months. Furthermore, following Draghi's reiteration, rate differentials may continue to move in favor of the dollar. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Upbeat data from Japan has lifted the yen this week: Job/applicants ratio is at 1.48, a level last seen in 1974; Retail trade increased at a 3.2% annual pace, much more than the expected 2.3% rate; Industrial production increased at a 5.7% pace; Housing starts increased at 1 .9%. While data surprises to the upside in Japan, low inflation still remains entrenched in the economy. We believe the BoJ will remain dovish until inflation emerges, which will keep JPY's upside limited. That being said, risk-averse behavior can provide a temporary tailwind for the yen in the upcoming months. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 The U.K.'s consumer sector remains mixed, showing a ray of sunshine after batches of poor numbers: Gfk Consumer Confidence came in at -5, better than the expected -8; Consumer credit came in at GBP 1.525 bn,; M4 Money Supply also increased at 8.2% yoy. Mortgage approvals, however, clicked in below estimates, while net lending to individuals was GBP 4.3 billion, less than expected and previously reported. Nevertheless, cable has been relatively strong this week, lifted by the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 There was some negative data out of Australia this week: Building permits are still contracting, now at a 17.2% pace, less than the 19.9% pace last month; Private sector credit is expanding at a slower pace of 4.9%; AiG Performance of Manufacturing Index decreased to 54.8 from 59.2; AUD has been considerably softened recently, as commodity prices weakened. While the Chinese NBS manufacturing PMI marginally beat expectations, the Caixin Manufacturing PMI actually weakened from 50.3 to 49.6, and is now in contraction territory. As China continues to face structural issues, which are now front and center thanks to their most recent debt rating downgrade, AUD could suffer even more. In the G10 space, it is likely it will be one of the worst performing currencies this year. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The NZD has seen a broad-based appreciation across the G10 space in the past 2 weeks due to stronger than expected trade balance and visitor arrivals. Dairy prices annual growth rate also remain robust at 56% this week. Further buoying the NZD was the release of the RNBZ Financial Stability Report, which was upbeat and states that financial risks have subsided in the past 6 months. The RBNZ also highlighted the slowdown in house price growth due to macroprudential measures. Most recently, NZD has been weak against European currencies, as upbeat data and a higher euro drove up these currencies. EUR/NZD is likely to trend downwards as growth differentials could further bifurcate central bank policies, and weigh on this cross. NZD/USD, itself, is unlikely to see much upside if the dollar bull market resumes and EM cracks deepen. However, AUD/NZD should weaken some more. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The CAD has seen downside recently as oil's gains receded after markets seemed disappointed by the OPEC deal. Data further corroborated this negative view, as both industrial and raw material prices increased by less than expected at 0.6% and 1.6% respectively. Additionally, the first quarter current account also faltered into a further deficit of CAD 14.05 bn. However, GDP growth was strong and could improve further. Investors are currently highly bearish on the CAD, with net speculative positions at the lowest level in 10 years, suggesting the bad news is well priced in. Going forward, the BoC continues to argue that the output gap is closing quicker than expected which will warrant higher rates, and help the CAD. While the CAD may not appreciate much against the USD, it will be one nonetheless one of the best performing currencies in the G10 space. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF continues to drift lower as lofty short-term valuations are hurting the euro. As the ECB is likely to remain accommodative, as per Draghi's recent remarks, the recent weakness may only be the beginning of a new trend. Recent data shows that there might be a slight deceleration in the Swiss economy as the KOF leading indicator has slowed down to 101.6. However, with Italian political risks growing faster than anticipated, the CHF could find additional support. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 As oil prices falter after the OPEC deal, the NOK displayed substantial downside against the USD, the EUR, and the CAD. Despite our Commodity and Energy team seeing additional upside for oil prices, the NOK will continue to be pulled down by low rates as the Norges Bank battles against deflationary prices, falling wages, and a weak labor market. Real rate differentials will prompt upside in USD/NOK, as well as CAD/NOK, as both the U.S. and Canada have adopted a hawkish and neutral bias, respectively. Regarding data, retail sales picked up from a meager 0.1% growth rate to a still unimpressive rate of 0.2%. At 5.1%, Norway's credit Indicator also grew less than expected and continues to slowdown. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data this week showed that last quarter, the economy did not perform as well as anticipated, with GDP increasing by 2.2%, lower than the expected 2.9%. However, more recent data shows a pickup in activity, with retail sales increasing at a 4.5% rate. USD/SEK has been weak recently due to the dollar's weakness, which we think is at its tail end. EUR/SEK's recent appreciation is likely to alleviate the Riksbank's deflationary worries. However, downside is possible as the euro may retract some of its gains. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades