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Highlights U.S. Corporates: U.S. corporate debt, both Investment Grade and High-Yield, is fully priced for an improvement in economic growth and profits. Tight valuations offer no yield cushion before the expected December Fed rate hike. Maintain a defensive up-in-quality stance on U.S. corporates, favoring Investment Grade over junk. Euro Area Corporates: Euro Area corporate bonds are not as expensive as U.S. equivalents, but are by no means cheap. The likely extension of the ECB QE program until at least the latter half of 2017 will help keep valuations at rich levels, especially for Investment Grade issuers where the ECB is directly buying bonds. Stay defensive in Euro Area corporates, favoring Investment Grade over High-Yield. Feature Better Global Growth Not Necessarily Better For Corporate Bonds Back in July of this year, BCA put its flag in the ground and called an end to the 35-year global bond bull market after government bond yields hit historic lows following the shocking U.K. Brexit vote.1 Yields have steadily crept up since we made that declaration, due to a combination of changing cyclical factors (improving global growth, modest increases in inflation), some signs of diminished political concerns (no immediate global spillovers from a more drawn-out Brexit process, the fall in the odds of victory of the "anti-status-quo" candidate in the U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump) and structural factors (worries about less accommodative monetary policies, a political shift towards greater deficit-financed government spending). While government bond yields have been rising from depressed levels, corporate bond returns on either side of the Atlantic Ocean have at the same time lost considerable momentum, both in absolute terms and relative to sovereign debt (Chart of the Week). This is a bit of a surprise given the recent improvement in global growth data that is now appearing in a broadening number of countries (Chart 2), which would suggest a potential brighter outlook for corporate earnings. However, credit valuations and the liquidity backdrop matter, and a potential cyclical improvement in profits may not benefit corporate bond performance at a time of tight spreads and greater uncertainty about future central bank policies. Chart of the WeekIs The Party Ending For Corporate Bonds? Chart 2A Broadening Pickup In Global Growth With credit spreads currently priced for a near-perfect backdrop of low volatility and highly accommodative central banks, we continue to recommend an overall defensive posture in "Trans-Atlantic" corporate bonds, favoring Investment Grade (IG) over High-Yield (HY) in both the U.S. and Euro Area. Chart 3U.S. Corps Are Now ONLY A 'Tina' Trade U.S. Corporates: Stretched Valuations, Especially For Junk Bonds U.S. corporate bonds have been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the so-called "TINA" (There Is No Alternative) trade, where investors have been forced into riskier assets out of low-yielding government bonds. The return performance for both investment grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) debt has been outstanding, with the former up 8.2% year-to-date and the latter up +15.9%. The fundamental backdrop for corporate debt, however, has shown few signs of any improvement that would justify such strong returns, according to our U.S. Corporate Bond Checklist (Chart 3): 1.Corporate balance sheets are deteriorating: Our U.S. Corporate Health Monitor (CHM), an amalgamation of various bottom-up credit metrics applied to top-down corporate profit data, continues to signal that balance sheets are worsening. This trend has been ongoing for more than two years and shows no signs of slowing, with companies continuing to ramp up leverage to record highs at a time of increasing downward pressure on profit margins. 2.Bank lending standards are slowly tightening: The U.S. Federal Reserve's Senior Bank Loan Officer Survey has begun to flash that a greater number of U.S. banks are tightening lending standards on commercial & industrial loans. The net number is still low within the history of this series, and is largely the result of tightening standards on domestic energy companies suffering from the lower oil prices of the past two years. Nonetheless, the highly cyclical nature of lending standards suggests that a move back to easier standards may not happen at this advanced stage of the multi-year credit cycle. 3.Monetary conditions are tighter, but remain stimulative: Our U.S. Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which is a weighted combination of short-term interest rates and the U.S. dollar, remains at an accommodative level, even after the 18% rise in the trade-weighted dollar since the trough in 2014 and the Fed's lone rate hike last year.2 Interest rates are far more important in our MCI calculation than the dollar (by a 10/1 ratio), however, so it would take an exceptionally large move in the dollar to push the MCI to restrictive territory after just a single 25bp rate hike. Yet with the Fed clearly in a slow hiking cycle that could deliver at least another 75bps of rate hikes by the end of 2017, the MCI will continue in a tightening direction that has historically been correlated with wider corporate bond spreads. With only an easy money backdrop supportive of narrower credit spreads, there is a growing risk that U.S. corporates could respond poorly to a December Fed rate hike that we expect - especially if that also coincides with renewed strength in the U.S. dollar. Already, the Fed's trade-weighted dollar index has risen by 3.2% during the recent Treasury market selloff, as the market-determined probability of a December hike has risen to 66%. This remains below the peaks seen in the run-up to the rate hike at the end of 2015, which coincided with a big widening of corporate credit spreads (Chart 4). One major difference from a year ago is that the Fed is not signaling the same degree of monetary tightening after the next hike. The FOMC median interest rate projections (the "dots") were indicating another 100bps of hikes following the December 2015 rate increase, and are now only signaling another 50bps of hikes after the Fed's expected next move in December. This is keeping both the 2-year Treasury yield and the dollar well below the peaks seen at the end of last year, helping prevent a breakout in market volatility and credit spreads. So if there is a fresh spike in volatility and/or the dollar, it would be striking the corporate credit markets at a time when valuations look stretched. We can see that in a number of indicators. U.S. corporate bond excess returns have far exceeded the levels suggested by domestic capacity utilization, which are relevant for corporates given their long-standing correlation to profit margins (Chart 5). Our colleagues at our sister publication, U.S. Bond Strategy, have calculated that a 0.4% improvement in capacity utilization has historically coincided with a 100bps tightening in HY bond spreads over a 1-year period; thus, utilization would have to rise to 77.2% by next February (a level last seen in March 2015 when the annual growth rate of Industrial Production was 2.5 percentage points faster than the current pace) to justify HY spreads at current levels.3 In other words, junk bonds are already priced for a significant recovery in U.S. economic growth and corporate profits. Chart 4U.S. Corps Not Responding To A Rising USD...Yet Chart 5Ignoring The Signal From Capacity Utilization U.S. corporate bond excess returns over duration-matched Treasuries during the past twelve months have been strongly positive: +316bps for IG and +844bps for HY. Our past work analyzing U.S. credit cycles has shown that such a positive return performance usually occurs during the deleveraging stage of the corporate credit cycle, typically during recessions when profits are falling and growth in company debt stalls or even contracts (Charts 6 & 7). Chart 6Investment Grade Corporate Annual Excess Return* Chart 7High-Yield Annual Excess Return* Chart 8Spreads Ignoring The Usual Credit Cycle The current environment is one of declining corporate profits but with debt growth still expanding, similar to the credit spread widening backdrop around the 2000 and 2008 U.S. recessions (Chart 8). This sends a similar message to the relationship of credit returns with capacity utilization, with corporate bonds now priced for a strong rebound in profit growth that may be difficult to achieve over the next year. A similar situation exists in the equity market, where the consensus bottom-up expectation is for overall profit growth to surge to +13% in 2017 and +11% in 2018.4 That would represent a sharp rebound from the profit declines witnessed in 2015 and the first half of 2016. Chart 9A Stretched Rally In U.S. Junk Some may argue that such a significant rebound in overall corporate earnings could happen just from the impact of better outlook for profits in the Energy sector given the recent recovery in oil prices. However, it appears that U.S. corporate bond valuations already more than fully discount a higher crude price. The 2016 rally in U.S. junk bonds has been led by the massive tightening of spreads of oil-related names, with the benchmark Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield Energy index returning 33% year-to-date as spreads have collapsed. However, the current Energy index OAS is at 550bps - levels last seen during the 2015 counter-trend rally in oil prices after the 2014 plunge (Chart 9, middle panel) That rally took the Brent crude price of oil up to $67/bbl, well above the current price hovering around $50/bbl. Our Commodity strategists continue to see $60/bbl as being the ceiling for the oil price range over the next year, as prices above that would begin to draw supply back into the market from U.S. shale companies and other global oil producers with higher break-even prices. Thus, U.S. HY energy debt already discounts an oil price that is unlikely to be achieved in the medium-term. A similar situation exists when looking at non-Energy junk spreads, which are highly correlated with macro volatility measures like the VIX index and which already fully reflect the current low volatility backdrop (Chart 9, bottom panel). We are concerned about a pick-up in volatility in the near-term from either a political surprise like a Trump victory on November 8 or, more likely, market jitters when the Fed delivers on a rate hike in December. With our fundamental VIX model, which is based off the lagged impact of rising corporate leverage and tightening monetary conditions, continuing to signal that the fair value level of the VIX is around 20, credit markets are not prepared for a potential rise in volatility in the next few months. Challenging Valuations At All Levels When we look at our various valuation gauges for U.S. corporate debt, it is difficult to find many areas where credit looks cheap. With regards to IG debt, our preferred measure of valuation is the 6-month breakeven spread, which shows how much spreads would need to widen to full offset the carry advantage of owning IG debt over duration-matched U.S. Treasuries, assuming spread volatility is maintained at recent levels. That breakeven spread now sits at a mere 9bps (Chart 10, top panel), well below the long-run mean. In other words, IG excess returns can easily turn negative with only a modest widening of spreads. For HY debt, our preferred valuation metric is the default-adjusted spread, where we subtract expected default losses estimated by our default rate and recovery rate models from the current junk spread. That adjusted spread is now only 69bps - a level more than one standard deviation below the long-run mean that we consider to be overvalued (bottom panel). With spreads at such depressed levels relative to expected default losses, the historical probability of junk delivering positive excess returns over the next year is extremely low. We see a similar stretched valuation backdrop when looking at credit spreads among sectors and ratings cohorts. Within the IG universe, the OAS for Financials, Industrials and Utilities have fully converged (Chart 11, top panel), while credit spread curves are near the tranquil 2005-2007 period of historically low volatility that we do not expect to be repeated (bottom panel). Within sectors, our U.S. IG relative value model only sees attractive spreads in the debt of Banks, Energy, Metals & Mining, Building Materials, Technology and Airlines. Chart 10Expensive Valuations, Especially For Junk Chart 11Not Much Difference To Choose From Here Bottom Line: U.S. corporate debt, both Investment Grade and High-Yield, is fully priced for an improvement in economic growth and corporate profits. Tight valuations offer no yield cushion before the expected December Fed rate hike. Maintain a defensive up-in-quality stance on U.S. corporates, favoring Investment Grade over junk. Euro Area Corporates: ECB Buying Keeping IG Rich While Junk Fundamentals Worsen Turning towards Europe, a similar story of expensive corporate credit valuations exists, although not to the same magnitude as in the U.S. Of course, valuations may not matter for Euro Area IG with the European Central Bank (ECB) buying corporate debt as part of their quantitative easing (QE) asset purchase program. That surge in QE buying (both real and anticipated by investors) helped drive both yields and spreads for Euro Area IG sharply lower between March and June of this year. Since then, however, both yields and spreads have gone up moderately (Chart 12), reflecting both the rising global yield backdrop and the worsening situation for Euro Area banks whose debt dominates the IG market. Chart 12Euro Area Corporate Bond Rally Has Stalled Chart 13Euro Area Valuations Are Not That Cheap The rise in Euro Area corporate credit spreads comes at a time when investors have grown increasingly concerned about a potential tapering of the ECB's QE when the current program expires in March of next year. As we discussed in our previous Weekly Report, we expect the ECB to announce in December an extension of the government bond QE to at least September 2017, likely with some additional changes to the rules of the QE program to avoid hitting any self-imposed purchase limits.5 This could help keep spreads anchored near current levels, all else equal. Of course, all else is never equal, and the liquidity story can be trumped by expensive valuations, as we currently see in U.S. junk bonds. Using the same metrics for U.S. IG and HY credit spreads that we presented earlier shows that both the breakeven spread for Euro Area IG, and the default-adjusted spread for Euro Area HY, are below the long-run mean (Chart 13). Euro Area junk valuations are not as stretched as U.S. junk valuations on this basis, but they are hardly cheap. A similar story exists when looking at Euro Area IG corporates grouped by credit rating, with spread curves looking as flat as the U.S. curves shown earlier (Chart 14). Our Euro Area IG sector relative value model (Table 1 on Page 11) is also showing a handful of sectors with comparatively cheap spreads, ranging from commodity-focused industries (Energy, Metals & Mining) to financial groups (Insurers, Banks). However, the "cheapness" in the latter likely represents some degree of risk premium on Euro Area banks, whose poor profitability and capital adequacy issues are now well known to investors. Euro Area bank spreads may stay cheaper for longer until those problems begin to be addressed. Chart 14Euro Area Credit Spread Curves Are Flat Table 1Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Sector Spread Valuations One final note on the relative value between Euro Area and U.S. corporates: the bottom-up Corporate Health Monitors for both regions that we introduced earlier this year continue to show gaps favoring Euro Area IG over U.S. equivalents (Chart 15), and U.S. HY over Euro Area equivalents (Chart 16). The relative balance sheet trends are showing up in the relative investment performance across the Atlantic, with Euro Area IG starting to outperform U.S. IG, and Euro Area HY lagging the returns in U.S. HY. We continue to recommend allocations based on these relative valuation trends, keeping the lightest weighting on Euro Area junk bonds that score poorly on all relative balance sheet metrics. Chart 15Favor Euro Area IG Over U.S. IG Chart 16Euro Area Junk Is Unattractive Vs. The U.S. Bottom Line: Euro Area corporate bonds are not as expensive as U.S. equivalents, but are by no means cheap. The likely extension of the ECB QE program until at least the latter half of 2017 will help keep valuations at rich levels, especially for Investment Grade issuers where the ECB is directly buying bonds. Stay up in quality in Euro Area corporates, favoring Investment Grade over High-Yield. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy/U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "A Note On The Long-Term Outlook For Global Bonds", dated July 27, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com and usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 A neutral reading of the MCI is the zero line is consistent with a U.S. economy without any output gap, growing at its potential rate, and with unemployment at full employment levels. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Don't Chase The Rally In Junk", dated Nov 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Source: Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The ECB's Next Move: Extend & Pretend", dated Oct 25, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Beyond early last century's military rearmament, the idea of militarily outspending opponents was very evident in the early-1960s when U.S. defense spending surged by 20% on a year-over-year basis. If our hypothesis that a global arms race will continue to heat up in coming years pans out, then owning global (but especially U.S.) defense stocks as a structural play will pay handsome dividends. The early-1960s experience in U.S. aerospace & defense (A&D) stocks is the closest stock market parallel we found in our analysis (given data constraints). Then, relative performance was up over 100% in a span of four years, as U.S. A&D industrial production (IP) swelled to a 20% per annum clip with utilization rates running at 95%. A&D factories were humming, racing to fulfill orders as U.S. military expenditures boomed. That demand surge translated into a jump in sector sales and given the industry's high operating leverage, earnings and book values soared. The chart shows that from trough to peak, sector EPS rose by more than 400%, margins expanded from sub 2% to nearly 8%, and book value doubled. That stellar performance justified initial valuation premiums at the time. Using that period as a guide would imply that there is ample upside left for relative performance of the BCA U.S. defense index (that is a pure play on global defense spending). Bottom Line: Stay overweight the BCA U.S. defense index (LMT, GD, RTN, NOC, LLL), and please see yesterday's Special Report for additional details.
Special Report Highlights The U.S. presidential election is now too close to call. Hillary Clinton has a 61.6% chance of winning, according to our quant model. But Trump's real chances are approaching 50%, given momentum. Trump still trails in Virginia and Colorado, the two key swing states. A narrow Clinton win revives the fear of gridlock with a GOP-controlled House. Hedge against Trump by going long USD/SEK, long biotech stocks / short S&P 500 exporters, and long U.S. Treasurys. Feature After penning our latest missive on the U.S. election, "You've Been Trumped!" for our sister publication the Global Investment Strategy, a client complained that giving Trump 34.5% probability of winning the election was "laughable."1 To be fair to the client, our odds of a Trump victory were on average three times higher than that of other quantitative models.2 BCA's Geopolitical Strategy is not a stranger to receiving hate mail. Nor are we strangers to giving higher odds than the consensus to unexpected political events (see: Brexit).3 Since our October 21 report, Trump has narrowed Clinton's lead in the polls from 6.2% to 2.2%. Chart 1 shows that polls are retreating into their now-familiar oscillating pattern. In addition, FBI Director James Comey disclosed to Congress on October 28 that the law enforcement agency was reopening its investigation into Clinton's email practices while secretary of state. Chart 1Trump As The 'Comeback Kid' Needless to say, we are quite comfortable with the 38.4% Trump odds that our "polls-plus" model is forecasting.4 The reason it gives Trump such strong odds is because we do not only rely on the polls to make our forecast. Polls are a (poor) snapshot of reality, but predicting the future is about more than just "traveling with events." Forecasting requires a strong net assessment of structural factors through which one filters the incoming data, whether they be new polls or "October surprises." In this note, we revisit our quantitative model, review our qualitative "White Hype" model, and update our forecast. We suggest that clients hedge for a Trump victory. Quant Model: Trump Remains A Strong Candidate Our net assessment remains that this election is a much closer affair than the media narrative would have it. The FBI revelation is only important because it highlights that Hillary Clinton is a structurally weak candidate who is susceptible to "October surprises." This is best exemplified by Chart 2, which we have repeatedly published and shown to clients in meetings. It is simply difficult to take polls seriously when they are asking voters to choose between a "fire" and a "frying pan." Chart 2Clinton And Trump: The Least Charismatic Candidates Ever To be clear, Secretary Clinton has several structural advantages: The Democratic party has a strong Electoral College lead over the GOP, a lead that Donald Trump has to overcome by winning a slew of large states that Mitt Romney lost in 2012; Hillary Clinton is polling well with minorities and women, both constituencies that preferred her to Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primary; Clinton is not a five-year-old trapped in the body of a 70-year-old. On the other hand, the "plus" in our polls-plus model reveals some structural weakness in the Clinton campaign: Two-Term Curse: It is notoriously very difficult for the incumbent party to retain the presidency after a successful multiple-turn run. Since the start of the twentieth century, this has happened only four times: William Taft (1908), Herbert Hoover (1928), Harry S. Truman (1948), and George H. W. Bush (1988). Only the last two examples are relevant in the modern context, and they happened in the wake of the monumentally popular presidencies of FDR and Ronald Reagan.5 We code for this factor in our model. Third Party: Our model also accounts for the presence of prominent third party candidates. At face value, this ought to hurt both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump equally. However, Libertarian Gary Johnson has seen a dramatic drop in support, from nearly 10% in September to roughly just 5% today. The expanding correlation between Trump and Johnson's polling breaks negative in mid-October, suggesting that some Johnson fans are jumping the Mary Jane bus and getting on the Trump bandwagon (Chart 3). Meanwhile, Stein continues to take approximately 2% of the vote away from Clinton, which could make a difference in a close election in key swing states. Obama: Finally, we also code for the incumbent president's approval rating. While Obama's 52.5% is a solid number, it is not an "out of the ballpark" figure. Bill Clinton held a 58% approval rating in October 2000 as did Dwight Eisenhower in October 1960. Both saw their anointed successors lose in extremely tight races. Our model also relies on voting patterns and economic variables to "correct" the polling numbers for political cycles. First, we use each state's previous election results, going back to 1980, to gauge voter predisposition. We also include a momentum variable which measures the change in the differential between the two previous elections. In addition to the actual election data, we constructed two dichotomous variables to account for voter polarization and the presence of a strong third party. These structural forces favor the Republican challenger. Second, we use changes in state and national economic conditions prior to the elections to capture the macroeconomic context. These include national GDP, oil prices, and state-level disposable income. Since the economy has definitely seen improvement in the last four years of Obama's presidency, the data give the edge to the Democrats. Chart 3Third-Party Voters##br## Shifting To Trump Table 1Probabilities Of Victory:##br## GPS Polls-Plus Model Our model gives 60% weight to the probabilities derived from state polling and 40% to our structural econometric model. At the moment, the model is giving Clinton a 61.6% chance of winning the election (Table 1). Chart 4 shows that Clinton has 260 electoral votes in states where she has more than a 70% chance of winning. These are strong figures for Clinton, but they still give Trump around 38.4% chance of winning the election. We think it is closer to 50% and we discuss below why. Chart 42016 U.S. Presidential Election: GPS Polls-Plus Model Full Results Bottom Line: Given our quantitative model, we give Clinton a very slight edge to win the election. But the actual election is likely too close to call at this point. As we pointed out in our latest missive, a 3% lead in the polls for Clinton would not be enough to give us any confidence in our forecast due to the potential for polls to underappreciate Trump's support. Are Polls Wrong? The risk that polls are "wrong" remains considerable. Voters could be lying about supporting Trump because of various social stigmas related to it. For that reason, we suspect that any Clinton lead of less than 3% turns this election into "too close to call" and any lead of less than 5% leaves us with only a "low conviction" view that Clinton will win. We did not pick these numbers randomly; recent U.S. elections reveal that polls can miss results by as much as 3% (Chart 5). Our concern about the quality of polling is not random. It is informed by three factors: Undecideds: At this point in the election cycle, one would expect only 6% of voters to remain undecideds. However, this year, that figure stands at 9% (Chart 6). Now, this is likely because both candidates are deeply unfavorable, as Chart 2 illustrates. However, it could be because many voters are responding to pollsters with the "undecided" answer instead of saying that they support the controversial and politically incorrect candidate Donald Trump. In other words, the large number of undecideds could be where the "shy Trump voters" are hiding and ought to worry Clinton supporters a lot. Chart 5Election Polls Usually Miss By A Few Points Chart 6More Undecided Voters This Time Around Libertarian Collapse: Our theory about the undecideds could already be playing out with the Johnson voters. As we pointed out above, Johnson's support has halved in just one month. Most of his support appears to have gone to Donald Trump, but some could be bolstering Clinton's support levels in the "Mountain West" states of Colorado and New Mexico. Johnson's support may be inflated by voters who are embarrassed to say that they support Trump yet may end up voting for him. Poll Oscillation: We modified Chart 1 into Chart 7 by adding some "chart chat" to indicate when Trump made controversial - read: stupid - comments about Hispanics, Muslims, or women, which prompted a huge outcry from the media and society in general. Each event caused Trump's support to fall by an average of 4.9% from peak to trough. What would have happened to his polls had he not made such comments? Or, in other words, what is the true Trump support trajectory ex-controversial comments? Thus Chart 7 shows our back-of-the-envelope "technical" analysis of Trump's support. The reason polls are constantly oscillating may be that, with each egregious comment, Trump's real fans become "shy fans" and decline to select him during polling. But his true level of support may be very much on par with Hillary Clinton. Chart 7Trump's Surprising Resilience Bottom Line: There is some anecdotal evidence that Trump's support is underestimated by the polls. Hillary Clinton has to carry a +3% lead in the polls on November 8 for us to have any confidence in our quantitative model's predictions that she is indeed the favorite to win. This is no longer the case. Qualitative Model: "White Hype" Is Still Not Enough Our qualitative model relies on testing Trump's electoral strategy - boosting the share of the white vote accruing to the GOP - in the real world. We concluded in March that Trump did have a path to victory, albeit a very narrow one.6 Our colleague Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist of the BCA Global Investment Strategy, did so as early as September of last year.7 Our research showed that Trump's strategy is mathematically viable, at least in 2016 when the white share of the total population remains large enough. We specifically showed that Trump would only need to increase white voters' support by 1.7% and 2.9% in Florida and Ohio, respectively, to flip those states. We also pointed out that getting a 5.7% swing in Iowa could be feasible. Chart 8 shows the result of our qualitative work on the White Hype model. It illustrates that while Florida and Ohio are well within Trump's grasp, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin would require a very large swing of white voters in Trump's favor: 13.9%, 7.8%, and 8.1% respectively. Chart 8Trump Needs X Percent Of White Voters To Switch To The GOP We used the figures from Chart 8 to create Trump's "ideal Electoral College map." Map 1 shows how our White Hype model grafts onto the Electoral College. Even if we give Trump Ohio, Florida, Iowa, and North Carolina (the latter because Mitt Romney won it in 2012), Trump still needs 11 Electoral College votes to win the election. Map 1Trump's Ideal Electoral College Map Where could he get those 11 votes? The answer is Virginia (13) or a combination of Colorado (9) and either Nevada (6) or New Hampshire (4). In other words, Virginia and Colorado are critical to Trump's chances of winning the election and he remains behind Clinton by 5.2% and 4% in the two respectively. In addition, while Trump has narrowed his lead on Clinton nationally, we have only noticed significant narrowing of the state polls in Florida, Ohio, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Michigan. In Michigan and New Hampshire, however, Clinton's lead remains 6.3% and 5.6%. Meanwhile, the narrowing has been either minor or non-existent in Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin (Chart 9). In each of these states, Clinton's lead is either around or above 5%. Unless the FBI investigation or some other surprise changes the dynamic, Trump's recent rally appears to be concentrated in states that are either GOP strongholds, are predicted to go to Trump by our "White Hype" model in Map 1, or are out of his reach anyway (like Michigan). Chart 9Trump's Comeback In The Swing States Bottom Line: State-by-state analysis of the polls shows that our White Hype model remains a cogent guide for this election. Trump can win both Ohio and Florida and he may still lose the election. This is because his White Hype electoral strategy works in those two critical states, but appears insufficient to overcome the Democrat advantage in white voters in the Midwest (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin). Ultimately, we stick to our call from March: this election will come down to Virginia and Colorado, two states where Clinton's lead remains 5.2% and 4% respectively. That said, Trump has momentum nationally and in swing states. Investment Implications: Hedging A Trump Victory Our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou of the BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy pointed out in September 30 missive that volatility typically spikes in October of each U.S. presidential election.8 Charts 10 and 11, as well as Table 2, summarize the findings of his research that looked at the last seven presidential cycles going back to 1988. We agree and suspect that this year's election could see even more volatility in November given the narrowing in the polls and the ongoing FBI investigation into Clinton's email scandal. Chart 10October Surprises The Markets, 1988-96 Chart 11October Surprises The Markets, 2000-12 Table 2VIX Spikes The Month Before The U.S. Election We recommend that our clients read Anastasios research first, and then put on his volatility hedge by buying a VIX 20-25 bullish call spread for November 16th expiry (capturing the election result), and to sell a 13 strike November 16th VIX put in order to bring down the cash outflow. The total cost for this hedge is $0.80/contract with a maximum gain capped at $5/contract, as of intra-day trading at the time of writing November 1. There is downside risk with selling the put option, but Anastasios points out that the VIX is unlikely to fall below 10, thus the risk to the downside is losing the $0.80/contract plus $2.68/contract assuming the VIX collapses to the 2014 closing low. In addition, we would hedge for a Trump victory by initiating the following trades: Currencies: Mathieu Savary, Chief Strategist of BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy, recommends that we hedge a Trump win via a long USD/SEK trade. As our colleague Peter Berezin has posited before, the USD will rally if Trump wins due to the combination of coming fiscal expansion and risk aversion flows.9 Meanwhile, SEK would be hurt due to the realization by investors that globalization is at an end, given that Sweden is a small, highly open, economy. Trump's trade policies will be a nail in the coffin of globalization, proving our "Apex of Globalization" theme.10 Additionally, investors may want to do the obvious and short "NAFTA currencies" versus the USD. Sectors: Our favorite way to hedge a Trump victory via U.S. sectors would be to go long biotech / short S&P 500 exporters.11 Biotech would rally on the news that the risk of Clinton's regulatory action against pharmaceutical industry has dissipated. Meanwhile, major U.S. multinational exporters would be hurt by the twin effects of USD's likely appreciation and our "Apex of Globalization" theme, which would be supercharged following a Trump victory. Clients could alter this hedge by replacing biotech with financials, given that a Trump victory would allay investors' fears of further regulation against the financial industry. Fixed Income: BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy strategist, Ryan Swift, believes that a simple "buy-Treasurys" hedge is the best way to deal with the risk-off of a Trump presidency. A more long-term idea would be to underweight municipal bonds in a bond portfolio. A Trump tax-cutting administration would de-value the tax advantage in municipal bonds.12 Another hedge - this one courtesy of Rob Robis, Chief Strategist of BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy - may be to consider a 2-year/30-year Treasury curve steepener. If the USD were to appreciate following a Trump victory, the Fed may think twice about a December rate hike, especially if the stock market sells off at the same time. The front end of the Treasury curve would rally in that environment. Meanwhile, the long end may react to the prospect of big deficit-financed fiscal expansion that Trump has promised, thus steepening the curve. The initial risk-off move after a Trump win may push the entire yield curve lower, but the bond market may quickly begin to price in the potential medium-term fiscal ramifications of a Trump presidency. What To Watch For On November 8? There are three things investors should watch on November 8, the day of the election, and in its immediate aftermath: Final results: In 2012, the statistical result was projected by the news networks around 11:30pm EST Nov. 6, according to the New York Times. Romney's concession speech occurred just after midnight on November 7. In the 2008 election, the result was projected by CNN as early as 7pm EST on election day (November 4), but that was due to the fact that the Obama win over Senator John McCain was a landslide. Obviously the 2000 election is a reminder that the results may not be clear immediately. The result in Florida was announced by 8pm EST on election day in favor of Gore, but the counting in the wee hours of the morning favored Bush. Gore conceded privately to Bush, then the tally went back to Gore, who withdrew his concession, and finally Bush was given the final tally several days later. The official result was not declared until November 26; Gore did not concede until December 12. The electoral college will vote on December 19, so states will have to resolve any recounts or disputes by December 13. Congress counts and certifies the result on January 6. Margin of victory: It is now clear that a Clinton win, if it were to happen, will be a narrow one. It is almost guaranteed at this point that the chances of a Democratic sweep in the House of Representatives is at zero. This is a positive development for the market as a Democratic sweep would mean a slew of anti-business regulation out of Congress. Nonetheless, a narrow Clinton win - with sub-50% of the vote - would give Hillary Clinton an extremely weak mandate. On top of the numbers, she will clearly have to deal with an unprecedented amount of investigations while in office. The chances of a compromise between the White House and GOP in Congress is therefore declining. Our "best-case scenario" of a Clinton-Paul Ryan compromise is therefore also very low. This will put in jeopardy any possibility of modest fiscal stimulus under a Clinton White House, or of corporate tax reforms. The gridlock that will emerge from Congress under a Clinton presidency may, therefore, not be so sanguine after all. A Tie? What happens if the Electoral College vote is tied, or if by a fluke neither candidate wins a majority? There is a non-negligible probability that both Trump and Clinton could end up with 269 votes - i.e. one vote short of the 270 absolute majority required to win the White House. After all, Al Gore lost the 2000 election by only five electoral votes. How is the U.S. president chosen in that case? The House of Representatives convenes, allots one vote to each state (whose representatives must decide among themselves), and chooses the next president by a majority of the states. The presidential candidates in this case would be chosen from the top three recipients of electoral college votes.13 Here is the kicker: the vice-president would be chosen by the Senate from the top two candidates, meaning that Trump or Clinton would serve as the other's vice-president! Given the Republican majority in the House and among the states, Trump would likely prevail as president with 66% of the House vote, leaving Clinton to become vice-president. The United States would finally do what should always be done with squabbling children - force them to play on the same team! Faithless Electors: Another possibility is that an Electoral College member or "elector" could refuse to cast his or her ballot for the candidate chosen by popular vote in that elector's state. Electors are chosen by the political parties and are presumed to be staunch loyalists, but sometimes they deviate or make mistakes. Hardly more than half the states have passed laws to prevent or punish these so-called "faithless electors." No such elector has ever changed the outcome of a presidential race, but in an extremely tight race, abstentions, mistakes, or conscientious objection in the Electoral College could occur. The Supreme Court would have to settle any ensuing challenges, and would normally be expected to reassert the elector's independence to vote for any eligible candidate. Of course, the Supreme Court is currently undermanned at eight justices. If they were to split along ideological lines, any constitutional issues emanating from this election would remain gridlocked for a time, which would be a period of extreme uncertainty. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com David Boucher, Editor/Strategist davidb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "You've Been Trumped!" dated October 21, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see FiveThirtyEight, "Who Will Win The Presidency?" dated October 31, 2016, available at fivethirtyeight.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Final Forecast & Implications," dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Of the four examples, only Bush Sr. in 1988 and Truman in 1948 are really relevant today. First, the Theodore Roosevelt transition to William Taft happened more than 100 years ago. Second, Hoover took over from eight years of Republican rule when the economy was at a peak, which is hard to compare with the post-financial crisis environments after 1929 and 2008. Thus the only relevant victories for the incumbent party following a multi-term presidency occurred after the reigns of two iconic presidents: Ronald Reagan and Frank D. Roosevelt, two of the greatest American presidents. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: The Great White Hype," dated March 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," dated September 4, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Quarterly Review And Outlook," dated September 30, 2016, available at gss.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three (New) Controversial Calls," dated September 30, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization: All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 The S&P 500 globally-exposed industry groups index is derived by BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy. 12 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy, "Trading The Municipal Credit Cycle," dated October 18, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 13 Technically, then, Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson, the likeliest third-place candidate, would be eligible to become president under the House of Representative vote. Politically, however, it would be nearly impossible to orchestrate. The deadline for the House to decide this "contingent election" would be January 20, at which point the vice-president, elected by the Senate, would serve as acting president until the House resolved the issue. If the House and Senate have not chosen a president and vice-president by January 20, a new law must be passed to decide the outcome. Oh the humanity! Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election Primer: Let's Get Ready To Truuuumble," dated February 29, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model The model significantly reduced the weight of France by six percentage points due to change in liquidity condition, the other downgrade, albeit much smaller, was the U.S. All other countries had been upgraded as a result, with Germany being the largest beneficiary. Japan and U.K. remain the two largest underweights (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the overall model outperformed the MSCI World benchmark by 27 basis points (bps) in October, driven completely by the Level 2 model (as U.K and Australia underperformed the euro area). The Level 1 model was in line with the benchmark. Since going live, the overall model performed slightly better than its benchmark. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model". http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850 GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of October 31, 2016. The momentum component has shifted Financials from underweight to overweight. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Senior Analyst patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
Special Report Highlights Defaults: The default outlook is improving alongside a brighter forecast for economic growth. The corporate default rate will fall from 5.4% to close to 4% during the next 12 months. Valuation: The low starting point for spreads means the risk/reward trade-off in junk bonds remains poor, despite a more encouraging default outlook. Strategy: In addition to a poor longer run risk/reward trade-off, the risk of a Fed rate hike in December makes us extremely cautious on junk in the near term. Maintain a maximum underweight allocation to high-yield and await a better entry point for spreads in the New Year. Feature This year's rally in High-Yield has been nothing short of impressive. The average spread on the Barclays High-Yield index has narrowed to 467bps from a February high of 839bps, and excess junk returns have now recovered all the ground lost since the mid-2014 peak (Chart 1). Chart 1Back In The Black When considering the potential for further spread tightening we first observe that, despite this year's rally, the average junk spread remains 144bps above the cycle lows reached in June 2014. However, the credit cycle is also two years older, corporations are more highly levered and the default rate has started to increase. The dramatic sell-off and subsequent recovery in the price of oil has also had a large impact on junk bond performance since mid-2014, but now that the average spread on energy debt is within 100bps of the overall index (Chart 1, bottom panel), its influence will be much smaller going forward. In this week's report we consider the potential for further junk bond outperformance through three different analytical approaches. We conclude that: Junk spreads already discount a significant improvement in capacity utilization Junk spreads do not adequately reflect the risks from higher implied equity volatility Although the outlook for default losses has improved, current spreads do not offer adequate compensation Growth Rebound Is In The Price As we anticipated,1 last Friday's preliminary Q3 GDP print exceeded expectations. Further, we expect that a number of headwinds which have held back U.S. growth in 2016 will give way next year, generating 2.5% - 3% real GDP growth in 2017.2 This should bode well for junk bond performance, except that a relatively large growth acceleration has already been incorporated into high-yield spreads. Of all economic indicators high-yield spreads correlate most closely with capacity utilization (Chart 2), which bottomed in March of this year shortly after the peak in junk spreads. But capacity utilization has not kept pace with the tightening in junk spreads since then. Historically, a 100bps tightening in junk spreads during a 12-month period has coincided with a 0.4% improvement in capacity utilization. This would suggest that even if junk spreads remain flat, capacity utilization should reach 77.2% by next February (Chart 2, bottom panel). While industrial production will continue to improve, in large part because of rebounds in the oil price and rig count (Chart 3), it will be difficult for any rebound to surpass the expectations that have already been baked into the high yield market. Chart 2Junk Spreads & Capacity Utilization Chart 3Drag From Energy Has Dissipated The Risk From Rising Vol Is Understated Another well-known correlation is between junk spreads and the VIX. As was observed by Robert Merton in 1974,3 corporate bond investors effectively bear the risk from equity investors who own portfolio insurance against downside tail risk (see Box). In other words, an increase in the price of volatility can be thought of as a transfer of default risk from equity holders to bondholders. Unusually, junk spreads have tightened during the past three months while the price of volatility (VIX) has risen (Chart 4). Box - Merton Model Of Corporate Debt Robert Merton pointed out that holding a corporate bond is equivalent to holding a risk-free security plus a short put option on the value of the assets of the corporation. For a corporation with zero default risk, the option is worthless and the bondholder owns a risk-free security. However, the closer a corporation comes to default, the put option (which the bondholder is short and the equity holder is long) increases in value. If the value of assets of the corporation falls below the value of the debt outstanding, then the equity holders are better off defaulting on the debt than repaying it. The act of defaulting on debt is analogous to exercising the put option in that the shareholders put the assets of the corporation to the debt holders rather than repay the debt. Higher volatility increases the value of this put option, effectively reducing the value of corporate debt relative to equity. In other words, higher asset price volatility increases the risk of default. Similarly, a drop in volatility makes default less likely and so increases the value of corporate debt. Although asset volatility and equity volatility are not identical, they are closely related. Therefore, declining equity implied volatility is positive for corporate bonds since it reduces the value of the implicit short put option embedded in corporate debt. This divergence is not sustainable, and the near-term risks clearly favor a convergence via wider spreads rather than a lower VIX. A Trump victory in this month's election would obviously surprise markets and prompt a flight to safety. But the polling data suggest this is a low probability event. More likely is that the VIX rises in anticipation of a Fed rate hike in December. This process could begin as early as tomorrow afternoon, if the Fed teases a December rate hike in the statement from this week's meeting. We anticipate a December rate hike and would expect investors to bid up the price of vol between now and then. As a rate hike becomes more likely, investors will become increasingly worried about a repeat of last year when a Fed rate hike precipitated a large sell-off in risk assets. The trend in equity volatility is also biased higher in the longer run. While it is impossible to accurately forecast all of the wiggles in the VIX index, its long-run underlying trend tends to be driven by corporate health and monetary conditions (Chart 5). Chart 4Higher Vol A Near-Term Risk Chart 5Long Run Vol Drivers Easier monetary conditions tend to reduce investor risk aversion and send the VIX lower. But easy money also encourages the corporate sector to take on debt. Initially, a virtuous circle is created between a lower VIX and a re-levering corporate sector. To the extent that corporate credit growth fuels aggregate demand, risk aversion will decline even further leading to even lower volatility. Eventually, the virtuous circle is broken when either monetary conditions are tightened or leverage increases so much that investors question the sustainability of corporate balance sheets. Chart 5 suggests that the current level of the VIX does not reflect the reality of tightening monetary conditions or deteriorating corporate balance sheets. Bottom Line: A sizeable improvement in capacity utilization and persistently cheap equity volatility are required to sustain junk spreads at current levels. A Brighter Outlook For Defaults Around this time last year we called the beginning of the default cycle,4 and our view remains that we are one year into a prolonged grind higher in corporate defaults. Typically, once corporate defaults start to trend higher they do not peak until the next recession and we do not expect this cycle to be any different. This is because firms tend not to engage in voluntary de-leveraging. Rather, they tend to continue to add leverage until the economy forces retrenchment upon them. One exception to this trend is the small increase and subsequent reversal in defaults that occurred in the mid-1980s (Chart 6). In this instance it was not an improvement in corporate balance sheets that caused the uptrend in defaults to reverse. Instead, it was a dramatic easing of monetary conditions that gave banks the necessary confidence to keep the credit taps open, despite worsening corporate health. This episode can be contrasted with the mid-1990s cycle when corporate health continued to deteriorate but monetary conditions did not ease. This resulted in a persistent grind higher in defaults. Chart 6Defaults Will Moderate Next Year, But Long-Run Uptrend Is Still Intact In our view, the current cycle has the most in common with the mid-1990s. Corporate balance sheets are deteriorating and no monetary relief should be expected with the Fed in the midst of a rate hike cycle, albeit a shallow one. However, the prolonged nature of the recovery also means that the rise in corporate defaults will also be shallow and drawn out, with some fluctuations around an upward trend. Chart 7The Reason For Low Recoveries On that note, we forecast that the default rate will moderate during the next twelve months. Our default rate model is shown in the top panel of Chart 6. This model is based on industrial production growth, corporate profit growth, times-interest earned and lending standards. We forecast that both industrial production and corporate profit growth will improve next year, in large part due to the end of the drag from falling oil prices. The red line in the top panel of Chart 6 shows the Moody's baseline forecast for future defaults. This forecast calls for the default rate to be 4.09% during the next 12 months, down from 5.4% during the past 12 months. This forecast is consistent with our own base case expectation that calls for a return to modestly positive growth in both industrial production and corporate profits (on the order of 5% annualized). The thick grey line in the top panel of Chart 6 shows what the default rate would be in a pessimistic scenario where industrial production and corporate profit growth are held flat at current levels. This forecast has the default rate rising to 6.5% during the next 12 months. In order to forecast default losses we also need a forecast for the recovery rate. In the past we have modeled recoveries using the output from our default rate model. This simple observation that recoveries tend to fall when defaults rise, and vice-versa, had been sufficient to capture the major swings in recoveries, but has not performed well during the current cycle (Chart 7). In fact, recoveries have lagged well below levels that would be expected given the number of corporate defaults we have seen. The reasons for the low recovery rate are not well known, but we have collected some bottom-up data that may offer a partial explanation. The bottom two panels of Chart 7 show the Tobin's Q and net debt-to-assets ratio for the bottom decile of firms in our sample going back to 1990.5 We note that the Tobin's Q - the ratio of market value to replacement value of a firm's assets - has fallen to recessionary levels. Meantime, while net debt-to-assets is in a clear uptrend, it does not appear stretched relative to the early stages of past default cycles. This suggests that low recoveries are not the result of too much debt being supported by too few assets, but are the result of a low market value being placed on the assets in question. More fundamentally, we suspect that low recovery rates are actually explained by the divergence between the monetary and credit cycles (Chart 8). In past cycles, Fed tightening has tended to occur alongside a deterioration in corporate health. However, in this cycle corporate balance sheet re-leveraging is well advanced compared to monetary tightening. If we accept the premise that defaults themselves are caused by tighter money and tightening lending standards, while recoveries are more related to the state of corporate balance sheets at the time of default, then it makes sense that recoveries would be lower in this cycle since corporate balance sheets had been aggressively levering-up for several years before monetary conditions began to tighten and defaults started to rise. Chart 8The Diverging Credit And Monetary Cycles In both our baseline and pessimistic forecasts we assume that the recovery rate increases somewhat (from 28% to 35%), but remains low relative to where we would expect it to be based on the default rate alone. Adding it all up, our base case scenario calls for default losses of 266bps during the next 12 months. This results from a default rate of 4.09% and a recovery rate of 35%. Our pessimistic scenario calls for default losses of 423bps during the next 12 months. This results from a default rate of 6.5% and a recovery rate of 35%. The Default-Adjusted Spread & Expected Returns Individually, neither the average junk spread nor future default losses offer much explanatory power when it comes to forecasting high-yield returns. Rather, it is the combination of both - the default-adjusted spread - that explains the bulk of variation in junk returns. The top panel of Chart 9 shows 12-month high-yield returns in excess of duration-matched Treasuries alongside the average option-adjusted spread from the Barclays index, advanced by 12 months. The chart shows that there is some correlation between today's average junk spread and excess returns during the following 12 months, but the correlation is very weak. Chart 9Default-Adjusted Spread Predicts Lower Excess Returns The second panel of Chart 9 adjusts the average junk spread by realized default losses. Here we see a much stronger correlation. In fact, the starting spread on the High-Yield index less realized default losses during the next 12 months explains more than 50% of the variation in excess junk returns. This means that with knowledge of today's junk spread and an accurate forecast of future default losses, we can have a reasonably good idea about what excess junk returns will be during the next year. The bottom panel shows the results of a regression of excess junk returns versus the default-adjusted spread. It also shows what the default-adjusted spread implies in term of excess junk returns using both our base case and pessimistic default loss scenarios. In our base case scenario where the default rate improves during the next year, excess junk returns are predicted to be close to zero. In other words, the anticipated improvement in defaults is not sufficient to offset the low level of starting spreads. In our pessimistic scenario, where the default rate rises to 6.5%, excess returns during the next 12 months are predicted to be deeply negative. Bottom Line: The default outlook is improving alongside a brighter outlook for economic growth, but wider spreads are still required to make the risk/reward trade-off in junk bonds attractive. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching", dated September 13, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The November 2016 Bank Credit Analyst, dated October 27, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Merton, Robert C. 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates." Journal of Finance 29, pp. 449-470. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Rising Risk Of Corporate Default", dated October 20, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 We create a sample consisting of all the firms included in either the Barclays Corporate or High-Yield index (excluding financials) for which bottom-up data are available from Bloomberg. Data are retrieved on a quarterly basis and the sample is adjusted once per year based on changes in the composition of the Barclays indexes. The lowest sample size in any quarter is 53 firms, the largest is 101. On average, the sample size is 68 firms. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights A poor fundamental backdrop for high yield is being offset by easy monetary conditions. A prolonged shallow uptrend in corporate defaults - and therefore spreads - is most likely. The relative performance of equities versus corporate credit has not been distorted by monetary policy: the high-yield debt market will remain a reliable indicator for equity market vulnerability. A December rate hike will not be problematic for the residential real estate market. Plenty of pent-up demand for housing exists, and this will provide long-term support, so long as the labor market remains robust. Feature High-yield (HY) corporate bond spreads have dramatically narrowed throughout 2016 (Chart 1). This trend should not go unnoticed, since beyond being an important asset class in its own right, we have long viewed the high-yield debt market as an early warning system for equities. The current message suggests an all-clear for stocks. Chart 1Dramatic Spread Narrowing In 2016, But... We have had a cautious stance on U.S. high yield since August 2015, based on the view that corporate balance sheet health has deteriorated to the point where defaults would continue to rise on a cyclical basis. This week, we explore whether this remains the right strategy, and also whether junk bond spreads are still a relevant leading indicator for the equity market. Our answer to both questions is: Yes. In our view, the HY comeback can be explained by three main factors. First, the recovery in energy-related junk bonds has led the rally, as rising oil prices have helped diminish the default risks among U.S. shale issuers. Second, the 2015 spike in junk bond yields - mainly due to contagion from energy-sector bankruptcy fears - created tactical value in high-yield. Throughout most of 2016, we have seen an unwinding of these previously oversold positions. And third, the high-yield market benefits from an ongoing and intense search for yield in a world of unattractive higher-quality interest rates. Looking ahead, the first two forces are unlikely to play much of a role in the outcome for junk bonds. Oil prices are likely to trade in narrow range, allowing energy-related company fundamentals to stabilize. The rally in junk bonds over the past several months has removed any perceived value in this sector. Thus, it is only the search for yield/accommodative monetary policy that still supports a narrowing in spreads. Over time, we believe junk bond performance will once again be aligned with balance sheet fundamentals, i.e. high-yield spreads will gradually widen. A Review Of Our HY Indicators Our fixed income strategists have developed three key indicators to gauge major turning points in corporate spreads (Chart 2): Corporate Health Monitor (CHM): An aggregate indicator of non-financial corporate balance sheet health. The CHM deteriorated further in the second quarter, and has reached levels that historically tend to only be seen during recessions. Of the indicator's six components, most of the weakness has occurred in measures of corporate profitability (Chart 3). One caveat is that our measure of leverage in the CHM remains low, but this understates the risks because it measures total debt as a percent of market value of equity. Leverage looks decidedly worse if measured using net debt/book value. Chart 2Key Corporate Credit Indicators Chart 3Corporate Health Monitor Components C&I bank lending standards: A Fed survey that measures how easy/difficult it is for the corporate sector to access bank loans. According to this gauge, banks have already been tightening credit conditions for the past three quarters. Deviation in monetary conditions from equilibrium: We use our Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which incorporates movements in both the dollar and interest rates. Due to a very accommodative Fed, monetary conditions remain very easy according to this measure. At present, two of these three indicators are sending negative signals for corporate spreads. Our corporate health monitor is decidedly bearish, as are lending standards. Indeed, focusing on corporate balance sheets and fundamental credit quality metrics would almost unanimously lead investors to recognize that the credit cycle is in its late stages and to expect spreads to move wider. After all, spreads have widened in every episode of deteriorating balance sheet health since the mid-1990s. Or to put it more simply, a default cycle - leading to spread widening - has occurred each time that year-on-year profit growth has gone negative since 1984 (Chart 4). Chart 4Profit Contraction Spells Trouble For Junk Bonds Our Bank Credit Analyst service came to the same conclusion earlier this year. In a Special Report, our colleagues analyzed financial ratios for 770 companies from across the industrial and quality spectrum. Their work uncovered that the corporate re-leveraging cycle is far more advanced than is widely believed and that key financial ratios and overall corporate health look only mildly better excluding the troubled energy and materials sectors. Of course, there is an important salve this cycle at work and it is captured in our third indicator - monetary policy. As shown in Chart 2, easy monetary conditions have never persisted for this long and low rates have driven a colossal search for yield, causing high-yield bonds to become ever more divorced from fundamentals. This divergence between corporate bond spreads and balance sheet fundamentals is likely to persist for as long as monetary conditions remain supportive. Adding it up, a poor fundamental backdrop for high-yield is being offset by easy monetary conditions. This combination argues for a cautious long-term bias toward lower-quality corporate credit because a prolonged shallow uptrend in corporate defaults (and spreads) is most likely. Nimble investors may look to tactically buy junk bonds when spreads overshoot our forecast of default losses, although such an opportunity is not present at the moment (Chart 5). The equity market is suffering from the same dynamic. Chart 5No Value Here Will Junk Bond Yields Still Warn Of Stock Bear Markets? Junk bond yields have long been one of our early warning indicators for equity bear markets. Since the 1980s, junk yields (shown inverted in Chart 6) have consistently broken out to new highs 3-6 months before stock bear markets take hold. This is because in a typical cycle, junk yields tend to respond more quickly to an erosion in corporate health fundamentals and/or a credit event. Chart 6Junk Bonds Provide Early Warning For Stocks Chart 7Typical Behavior Here But, as we note above, in the current cycle, the reaction to worsening corporate health fundamentals has been far more subdued than historical relationships would have predicted, due to the salve effect of easy monetary policy. If corporate bonds are in a "bubble", does it mean that the behavior of junk bond spreads will no longer be an early predictor of stocks returns? We believe corporate bonds will still be a useful timing tool for equities. If equities are experiencing the same divorcing from fundamentals, courtesy of central bank largesse, then it stands to reason that what pops the bond bubble will also burst the equity balloon. The search for yield has affected the behavior of investors, and therefore returns, in a fairly systematic way. Due to the current extended period of ultra-low interest rates and central bank asset purchases, government bond prices have been pushed sky high (yields have sunk to rock-bottom lows). As a shortage of government bonds has taken hold, investors have sought to invest in "Treasury-like" products, first seeking out the safest corporate bonds, but eventually reaching further out on the risk spectrum to include high-yield bonds and (dividend yielding) stocks. Indeed, asset prices of all stripes have been distorted by the search for yield, which has fueled a broad inflation in all asset classes. The behavior of stocks relative to corporate bonds is telling (Chart 7). Since 2010, and until very recently, stocks outperformed junk bonds on a total return basis. Junk bonds outperformed investment-grade bonds over roughly the same period (although junk underperformed investment-grade in most of 2015 due to the collapse in energy prices and related energy company defaults). This is exactly what has occurred during every recovery phase since the 1980s. Over the past forty years, investment-grade bonds tended to outperform junk bonds and equities during economic recessions. Junk bonds beat equities during the early phases of recovery (i.e. when economic growth turns positive) and for as long as companies continue to repair balance sheets. And equity returns trump both investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds when our Corporate Health Monitor is deteriorating, i.e. in the latter half of the economic cycle, such as now. This suggests that the relative performance of equities versus corporate credit has not been distorted by monetary policy. One key takeaway is that, although very easy monetary conditions mean that corporate credit performance is becoming divorced from fundamentals, monetary policy has had a similar effect on equity prices (we have written at length in past reports about equity market performance diverging from profit indicators). As in past cycles, once the monetary cover fades, it is most likely that corporate credit markets will once again respond most quickly to balance sheet fundamentals. The bottom line is that we believe the high-yield debt market will remain a reliable indicator for equity market vulnerability. The current message is that a bear market in stocks will be averted, although as we have written in recent reports, earnings disappointments amid dollar strength represent a potential trigger for a near-term correction. Housing Outlook: Room To Expand Over the past quarter, residential real estate data has been slightly disappointing. September housing starts slipped to the bottom end of the range that has held this year and are only marginally above year-ago levels. House price inflation, as measured by the Case Shiller index, is negative on a 3-month basis. Despite this mild disappointment, we continue to believe the housing market is a relative bright light and will continue to be a significant positive contribution to GDP growth. Most indicators show that the housing market continues to recover along the typical path of the classic boom/bust real estate cycle (Chart 8). Chart 8Housing And Its History Chart 9First-Time Homebuyers Entering The Market Moreover, both supply and demand conditions are supportive of further construction activity and upward pressure on house prices over the next several quarters. On the demand side, household formation and a pick-up in interest from first-time buyers are the largest positives. Household formation: The number of households being formed is the most basic measure of marginal new demand for housing units. Household formation was suppressed during the Great Recession and early recovery years, because very poor job prospects and restricted access to credit sorely limited prospective new households from entering both the rental and ownership market. From 2007-2013, the annual household formation rate was 625,000, compared to over 1.1 million in the pre-crisis period.1 Now that the unemployment rate is at 5% and job security is improving, household formation rates are accelerating, particularly among young adults who have hitherto delayed moving out on their own. Monthly numbers are choppy, but household formation could easily run on average at 1.1 million per year for the next few years, simply to make up for muted rates post-housing crisis. First-time buyers: After years of putting off purchases, first-time buyers appear to be finally coming back to the housing market (Chart 9). According to the National Association of Realtors, the proportion of first-time homebuyers for existing home sales has reached its highest mark since July 2012 (34%). But there is still room for this share to improve, as prior to 2007, first-time homebuyers averaged about 40% of total purchases. Once again, persistent income gains and job security will be the driving factors behind first-time homebuyers' decisions. Could a Fed interest rate rise slow housing demand? We don't think so. Mortgage payments relative to income will remain well below their long-term average even if rates are increased by 200bps, an extreme case scenario. Even under this scenario, housing affordability would still be above average, conservatively assuming that income is held constant (Chart 10). Income and employment prospects will continue to trump mortgage rates for consumers making housing decisions; the current employment backdrop is positive for continued housing market activity. Chart 10December Rate Hike Won't Bother The Housing Market Chart 11Supply Is Tight From a supply perspective, conditions remain ripe for more robust construction activity. As Chart 11 shows, the supply of new homes remains low both in absolute, and in terms of months of supply. The bottom line is that we do not fear that a December rate hike will be particularly onerous for the residential real estate market. Plenty of pent-up demand for housing still exists, and this will provide long-term support, so long as the labor market remains robust, as we expect. The recent soft patch in housing will give way to stronger home building activity in the coming months, helping to boost real GDP growth in 2017. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 The State Of the Nation's Housing 2016, Joint Centre For Housing Studies of Harvard University http://jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/state-nations-housing-2016
Recommended Allocation Central Banks Still In The Driving Seat Markets continue to obsess about every move from the three major DM central banks. With two of them (the Fed and the ECB) likely to withdraw accommodation cautiously over the coming 12 months, the upside for risk assets is limited. The Fed is signaling that it will probably hike in December and the futures market is pricing in a 70% probability of that happening (roughly the probability one month before the rate rise in December last year). Inflation expectations have picked up recently (Chart 1) and core PCE inflation ticked up to 1.7% in August, within "hailing distance", as Fed vice-chair Stanley Fischer put it, of the Fed's 2% target. There is a political angle, too: having forecast four rate rises for the year, the Fed would endanger its credibility (and risk an audit from Congress) if it failed to deliver even one. At the same time, with growth in the Eurozone running a little above trend, the ECB is likely to announce in December an extension to its asset purchase program beyond March 2017 but eventually at a slower pace (a "tapering"). Reflecting these factors, government bond yields have moved up in recent months (Chart 2), and the trade-weighted dollar has strengthened by 4% since mid-August. None of these moves are good for risk assets, which have consequently moved sideways since August. But neither do they presage a big selloff since central banks will err on the side of caution. Inflation in the U.S. is unlikely to jump: wage growth will be kept under control by a gradual rise in the participation rate, which will prevent unemployment falling much further (Chart 3). The Fed's leaders continue to sound dovish. Janet Yellen even raised the question in a recent speech of "whether it might be possible to reverse these adverse supply-side effects [from the 2007-9 Global Financial Crisis] by temporarily running a 'high-pressure economy'", though she emphasized this was a suggestion for further economic research not her view. More practically, the FOMC will have a more dovish tilt in 2017, as the three regional Fed presidents who voted for a hike in September rotate out. Chart 1Have Inflation Expectations Bottomed? Chart 2Bond Yields Moving Higher Chart 3Core Workers Reentering The Labor Force Meanwhile, economic data remain somewhat sluggish. The U.S. manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISMs both rebounded sharply in September, suggesting that the very weak August prints were, as we suggested, an anomaly. Q3 U.S. real GDP growth come in at 2.9%, but the New York Fed's NowCast points to a slowdown to 1.4% in Q4. The Citi Economic Surprise Index (Chart 4) has also turned down again recently, with notable weakness in consumer spending and housebuilding. We expect this sluggish pace to continue through 2017: consumption should hold up as wage rises come through, but it is hard to forecast a strong recovery in capex, given the low capacity utilization rate (Chart 5), even if investment in the mining and energy sectors bottoms out next year. Eurozone growth could stutter too. It is driven substantially by credit growth, but historically European banks have tended to curtail lending after their share prices have fallen, as has been the case recently (Chart 6). Chinese growth has stabilized (at least in the GDP data, which seems to come in regularly at 6.7%, bang in the middle of the government's target range), thanks to the government's reflation policy from earlier this year. While the Chinese authorities have now reined back a little on stimulus, given their worries about the run-up in house prices,1 they offer an option since they would undoubtedly reflate again should growth slow. Chart 4Data Surprising Negatively Again Chart 5Hard To See More CAPEX Indeed Chart 6Share Prices Influence Lending All this suggests that returns from investment assets will be low, but positive, over the coming 12 months. With economic growth anemic but stable, bond yields prone to drift up, and equities expensive (but not as expensive as bonds), we expect risk-adjusted returns from the major asset classes to be broadly similar. We continue to recommend therefore a neutral weighting between bonds and equities, and suggest that investors look to pick up extra return through tilts to investment-grade corporate credit, inflation-linked over nominal bonds, and alternative assets such as real estate and private equity. Equities: Our preference remains for U.S. equities over European ones in USD terms. The dollar is likely to strengthen further, and the worst is not over for Eurozone banks - the time to buy into them will be at the point of maximum pain, which may come if German or Italian banks have to be bailed out by their governments. We continue to recommend a small (currency-hedged) overweight on Japan. The Bank of Japan's new policy to cap 10-year government bond yields at 0% has worked so far: the yen has weakened to JPY 104 to the dollar and equities have risen moderately. We expect further fiscal or wage-control measures from the government to give inflation an extra push. We remain wary of EM equities: earnings growth is negative, loan growth has started to slow (with the credit impulse having a high correlation with earnings and economic growth), and there is still little sign of structural reform. Some sectors in EM - notably IT and Healthcare - are attractive, however. Fixed Income: U.S. Treasury bond yields are likely to rise further - our model suggests fair value is a little below 2% (Chart 7) - and so we remain underweight duration. A moderate pickup in inflation suggests that TIPs will outperform nominal bonds (as described in detail in our recent Special Report).2 We lowered our recommendation in high-yield corporate debt to neutral last month because, at 65 BPs, the default-adjusted spread no longer offers sufficient return to justify the risk. At the start of the year it was 400 BPs (Chart 8). We continue to like investment-grade debt, where the spread over government bonds is 120 BPs in the U.S. and 100 BPs in the Eurozone, higher than at any point in 2005-2006 during the last expansion. Chart 7Treasury Yields Could Rise Further Chart 8Junk No Longer Offers Enough Return Currencies: We expect the U.S. dollar to continue to appreciate given the differential in growth and monetary conditions between the U.S. and other developed economies. The dollar looks expensive, but is nowhere near the over-bought levels it got to at the peak of previous rallies in 1985 and 2002 (Chart 9). China seems likely to allow a further weakness of the RMB against the dollar, repegging it to a trade-weighted currency basket. This could push down other emerging market currencies too particularly if, like Brazil recently, they try to cut rates to boost growth. Chart 9USD Not As Overvalued As In The Past Commodities: Oil has probably overshot in the short-term on expectations that Saudi Arabia and Russia will cap, or even cut, production. We think this talk has been overhyped and that the OPEC meeting in November could prove a disappointment. Nonetheless, we still see the equilibrium level for crude over the next two years at USD 50 a barrel, the marginal cost for U.S. shale producers. Industrial commodities are likely to fall further (they peaked in June) if we are right that the dollar appreciates. We continue to like gold as an inflation hedge, but short-term are nervous because it, too, is negatively correlated with the dollar. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy "Housing Tightening: Now And 2010" dated October 13, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "TIPS For Inflation-Linked Bonds," dated October 28, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)
Special Report Highlights With inflation probably having bottomed, especially in the U.S., investors are starting to worry about inflation tail-risk and wonder whether inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) are an efficient way to hedge this risk. This Special Report explains how ILBs work in different countries and analyzes their performance characteristics over time. We find that ILBs, a rapid growing asset class, can be a beneficial addition to a balanced global portfolio even though recent history does not show as strong portfolio diversification benefits as a longer history. The lower nominal duration of ILBs is a useful feature for portfolio duration management. ILBs have proven to be a good inflation hedge in a rising inflationary environment, but they underperform nominal bonds in a disinflationary environment. As such, the balance between ILBs and nominal bonds should be managed tactically based on an investor's views on inflation dynamics and valuation. Overweight U.S. TIPS; avoid U.K. linkers. Australian TIBS are a cheap yield enhancer, but higher yielding Mexican Udibonos are a dangerous yield trap. Feature BCA's view is that the 35-year bull market in bonds is ending and that the path of least resistance for bond yields globally is up.1 Even though the level of inflation in the U.S. is still below the Fed's target of 2%, we think it's clear that U.S. inflation has bottomed for this cycle. Globally, loose monetary policy together with the likelihood of more fiscal stimulus, present the risk of higher inflation down the road. Global Asset Allocation has recommended investors to overweight U.S. TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Securities) relative to nominal U.S. government bonds throughout 2016. Many clients have asked for details on how TIPS work, whether there are similar securities in other countries, and how ILBs fit into a balanced global portfolio. In this Special Report, we take a detailed look at inflation-linked bond markets globally and recommend some strategies for asset allocators to use them to help navigate a world of low returns and possibly higher inflation. 1. What Are Inflation-Linked bonds (ILBs)? Inflation Protection: Inflation-linked bonds are designed to hedge inflation risk by indexing the bonds' principal to the official inflation index in the issuer country. While the methodology and what the bonds are called differ from country to country, the underlying concept is the same: the holders of ILBs will get the stated real return even in an inflationary environment since both the nominal face value and the nominal coupon payments change based on an official inflation measure. Deflation Floor: In the case of sustained deflation such that the final nominal face value falls below the initial face value, however, the repayment of principal at maturity is guaranteed in the majority of the countries, but not, for example, in the U.K., Canada, Brazil, or Mexico (Table 1). Table 1Basic Information Of Global ILB Markets Inflation Measure: ILBs are linked to actual inflation with a time lag. As shown in Table 1, the inflation measure used varies slightly by country: in the U.S. it's the non-seasonally adjusted CPI; in the U.K. it's the retail price index (RPI); while in the euro area, France and Italy both have ILBs linked to local CPI ex tobacco and EU HICP ex tobacco, with the former primarily for domestic retail investors. The time lag is three months in most countries, but can vary from one to eight months as shown in Table 1. A Rapidly Growing Asset Class: The earliest recorded ILBs were issued by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 17802 during the Revolutionary War. Finland introduced indexed bonds in 1945, Israel and Iceland in 1955. Brazil introduced its indexed bonds in 1964 and has become the largest ILB market in the emerging markets and the third largest globally. When the U.K. issued its first "linkers", it originally used eight months of inflation lag to make sure the next coupon payment is known at the current coupon payment date. In 1991 Canada issued its first ILBs and the "Canadian Model", which uses a three-month lag to the inflation index and calculates a daily index ratio using linear extrapolation, has been adopted widely since; even the U.K. adopted it in 2005. The largest ILB market now is the U.S. TIPS with a market cap of USD 1.2 trillion. TIPS were first issued in 1997, using the Canadian model. Chart 1 shows the evolution of the ILB markets globally. Since the Bloomberg Barclays Universal Government Inflation-linked Bond Index was constructed in July 1997, the market cap has increased to over USD 3.2 trillion from a mere USD 145 million at the end of 1997. It's worth noting that the actual amount of ILBs outstanding globally is slightly larger than this because not all debts are included in the index.3 Even though many countries have issued ILBs, and emerging markets (EM) grew very fast in the 2000s, the global market is still dominated by the top three countries (the U.S., U.K., and Brazil) with a combined share of 70% of global market cap. Chart 1ILBs: A Fast Growing Asset Class Chart 2U.S. BEI Vs. Inflation Expectations Country Differentiation: Nominal government bonds come with different features in different countries, and the same is true with ILBs. Table 2 shows that even though the U.S. accounts for 43.6% of the developed markets (DM) index in terms of market cap, it contributes only 28.8% to overall duration while the U.K. accounts for 53% of the overall duration, because the U.K. linkers have much longer duration than the U.S. TIPS. The Canadian real return bonds (RRBs) have the second longest average duration at 16 years. Table 2Key Features of the Bloomberg Barclays Government ILB Indexes* 2. How Do ILBs Compare To Nominal Bonds? Break-Even Inflation (BEI) And Inflation Expectations: The difference between the yield on a nominal bond and the yield on a comparable ILB (a comparator) is defined as the BEI, the market-based inflation rate at which an investor is indifferent between holding a real or a nominal bond. If realized inflation over an ILB's life turns out to be higher than the BEI at purchase, then holding the ILB is better than holding its nominal counterpart. BEI on its own is not an accurate gauge of inflation expectations, because it is the sum of inflation expectations, the inflation risk premium, and the liquidity premium. One of the long-term inflation expectation measures that the U.S. Fed keeps track of is the five-year forward five-year inflation calculated using the Fed's own fitted yield curves.4 Even this measure, however, contains the inflation term premium and the relative supply/demand of 10-year BEI vs 5-year BEI. Three important observations from Chart 2 for investors to pay attention to when assessing the inflation outlook are: U.S. breakeven inflation rates have been consistently below the Fed's inflation target of 2% since 2014 (panel 4); The CPI swaps markets priced in a much higher inflation rate than the TIPS market and the Fed's measure derived from fitted curves (panels 2 & 3), largely caused by the supply and demand imbalance in the inflation swaps market: there is excess demand to receive inflation, but no natural regular payer of inflation other than the U.S. Treasury via TIPS, therefore a higher fixed rate has to be paid to receive inflation; The 10-year inflation expectation from the Cleveland Fed's model5 (panel 1), exhibits very different behavior from the other measures. It has been below the 2% target since 2011. This model attempts to combine survey-based inflation expectations and that derived from the CPI swaps market. It's intended to be a "superior" measure of inflation expectations from a monetary policy perspective.6 For investors, however, it's advisable to take into account all these measures when assessing inflation dynamics. Duration and Yield Beta: Duration is measured as the bond price change in relation to the yield change. Chart 3 shows that ILBs have higher duration than their nominal counterparts. These two durations, however, are not directly comparable because ILB duration is related to "real yield" while nominal bond duration is related to "nominal yield". The conversion from one to another is not straightforward because the relationship between real and nominal yields can be complex.7 In practice, however, we can run a simple regression to get ILB's yield beta to change in nominal yield.8 Some practitioners simply assume 0.5 in the emerging market.9 Our research shows that in the developed market the relationship between real yield and nominal yield can vary over different time periods and in different countries, but the moving 3-year and 5-year yield betas are always less than 1 and mostly above 0.5, which is the full sample average.(Chart 4). This is a useful feature for duration management and curve positioning. For example, everything else being equal, 1) replacing nominal government bonds with comparable ILBs can reduce portfolio duration, and 2) replacing a short-dated nominal bond with a longer-dated ILB could maintain the same duration. Chart 3Average Government Bond Duration Chart 4ILBs' Yield Beta Total Return: By design, ILBs should do well in an inflationary environment and they should outperform their nominal bonds when realized inflation is higher than the break-even inflation rate. How have ILBs performed in the real world? Unfortunately, we do not have a long enough data history to cover different inflation cycles. Chart 5 confirms that in nominal terms ILBs outperform their nominal counterparts when inflation rate trends higher. What's interesting, however, is that it is disinflation, rather than deflation, that hurts ILBs the most. Within the available data history, only 2009 experienced a brief deflation scare globally, yet the rebound in ILBs actually led economies out of the deflationary environment. Over the long run, U.K. linkers have underperformed nominal gilts since their first issuance in 1981 when inflation was running at 12%. Since 1997 when the Bloomberg/Barclays ILB indexes were constructed, however, ILBs have performed slightly better than their nominal comparable bonds in most countries, with the exception of the euro area where ILBs have fared slightly worse (Chart 5). Risk-Adjusted Return: On a risk-adjusted basis, the available data history shows that ILBs performed slightly better in the U.S. and Australia, and also the DM aggregate on a hedged basis, but slightly worse in the euro area, the U.K. and Canada. It's worth emphasizing, however, that in either case the difference is not significant (Table 3). Chart 5ILB Performance Vs Inflation Table 3ILBs Approximately Equal To Nominal Bonds 3. What's The Role Of ILBs In A Balanced Portfolio? Bridgewater Associate showed that adding ILBs to a balanced euro zone stock/bond portfolio significantly improved the efficient frontier over the very long run, from 1926 to 2010.10 Since there were no ILBs in the early part of that history, ILB returns were calculated based on inflation. Our research, based on data from the Bloomberg/Barclays Inflation-Linked Government Bond Index with a much shorter history, however, does not yield the same results, probably because the much shorter recent history does not include any highly inflationary periods from which ILBs benefit the most. Table 4 shows the statistics of replacing a certain portion of the nominal bonds with comparable ILBs in a DM 60/40 stocks/bonds portfolio. On a standalone basis, the hedged USD DM ILBs are less volatile and have the best risk-adjusted return of 1.3 in the sample period (Portfolio 8). When combined with equities, however, the nominal bonds are a slightly better diversifier than the ILBs. Why? The answer lies in the correlation. Chart 6 shows that the ILBs have much higher correlation with equities than the nominal bonds do with equities. This makes sense because equities could rise in an inflationary environment if the higher inflation were driven by stronger growth, while inflation is always bad for nominal bonds. Again, the differences in risk-adjusted returns are not significant, varying from 0.77 to 0.7 (Portfolios 2-6) in line with the findings in Section 2. Table 4Balanced Global Portfolio Statistics* Chart 6Global Stocks-Bonds Correlations 4. Inflation Has Bottomed BCA's Fixed Income Strategy team has written extensively about the outlook for U.S. and global inflation.11 We concur with their view that, even though inflation in most DM countries is still below the targets set by their central banks (Chart 7), in most countries it has probably bottomed (top three panels in Chart 7), and especially in the U.S., where all indicators point to rising wage pressures as labor market slack diminishes (Chart 8). Chart 7Inflation Still Below Target Chart 8Accelerating Wage Pressure 5. Investment Implications Overweight U.S. TIPS Over Nominal Treasuries: We have shown that ILBs outperform comparable nominal bonds in a rising inflation environment and have argued that inflation has bottomed in the U.S. These views support our recommendation to overweight U.S. TIPS relative to nominal U.S. Treasuries. In addition, our TIPS valuation models (Chart 9) show that breakeven inflation rates in the U.S. are still below fair values based on underlying economic and financial drivers. Being the largest ILB market with a market cap of over USD 1.2 trillion, TIPS are very easy to trade. Currently, only five-year TIPS have a negative yield, so there are plenty of opportunities for investors to preserve real purchasing power by holding longer maturity TIPS. Avoid U.K. Linkers: The U.K. linkers market is the second largest after the U.S., with a market cap of about USD 810 billion. Unfortunately, these linkers are among the most expensively priced real return bonds, with negative yields at all maturities (Chart 10, panel 3). For example, 10-year linkers are currently yielding -1.98%, which means that investors are guaranteed to lose 18% of real purchasing power in 10 years by holding the bonds to maturity. Granted, the U.K. linkers have always traded at a premium to U.S. TIPS and many other ILB markets due to the nature of the U.K. pension schemes which link pension liabilities to inflation (CPI or RPI). With insatiable appetite from pension funds, demand greatly exceeds what the linkers and inflation swaps markets can supply. U.K. real yields have been driven lower and lower, causing an increasing funding gap which in turns drives yield further down.12 In addition, our fair value model (Chart 10, panels 1 and 2) shows that the U.K. linkers' current breakeven rates are above fair value. The collapse in the linkers' yields after the Brexit vote is also consistent with a skyrocketing in the CPI swaps rate, indicating that the probable rise in inflation due to the collapse of the GBP has now largely been priced in (panel 4). Investors who are not constrained by U.K. pension regulations should avoid U.K. linkers. Chart 9Overweight U.S. TIPS Chart 10Avoid U.K. Linkers Yield Enhancement From Australia, Not From Mexico: The U.S. TIPS market is liquid but yields are low, albeit higher than U.K. linkers. Among the smaller markets with higher yields, we prefer Australian Treasury Indexed Bonds (TIBS) over Mexican Udibonos, even though the 10-year Udibonos have a higher yield of 2.8% compared to the 10-year TIBS yield of 0.62%. As shown in Chart 11 and Chart 12, the Australian TIBS are very cheap while the Mexican Udibonos are very expensive. The BEI in Mexico is above the central bank's target of 3% while in Australia it's still at the lower end of the target range of 2-3%. Chart 11 Australian TIBS: A Cheap Yield Enhancer Chart 12 Mexico ILBS: Too Expensive 6. ETFs Some of our clients always want to know if there are ETFs for the asset classes we cover. For ILBs, the most liquid ETF is the iShares TIPS Bond ETF with an AUM of USD 19 billion and an expense ratio (ER) of 20 bps. For non-U.S. global ILBs, the SPDR Citi International Government Inflation-Protected Bond ETF has an AUM of USD 620 million and an expense ratio of 50bps. The Appendix on page 14 gives a sample list of the exchange traded ILB funds. For more information about ETFs, please see BCA's newly launched Global ETF Strategy service. AppendixSample List Of ILB ETFs*** Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The End of the 35-year Bond Bull Market," July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Robert Shiller, "The Invention of Inflation-Linked Bonds in Early America," NBER Working Paper 10183, December 2003. 3 Barclays Index Methodology, July 17, 2014. 4 Refet S. Gurkaynak et al., "The TIPS Yield Curve and Inflation Compensation," May 2008, Federal Reserve publication. 5 Joseph G Haubrich et al., "Inflation Expectations, Real Rates, and Risk Premia: Evidence from Inflation Swaps," Working Paper 11-07, March 2011, Federal Reserve Bank Of Cleveland. 6 Joseph G. Haubrich And Timothy Bianco, "Inflation: Nose, Risk, and Expectations," Economic Commentary, June 28, 2010, Federal Reserve Bank Of Cleveland. 7 Francis E. Laatsch and Daniel P. Klein, "The nominal duration of TIPS bonds," Review of Financial Economics 14 (2005). 8 Mattheu Gocci, "Understanding the TIPS Beta," University of Pennsylvania, 2013. 9 Thor Schultz Christensena and Eva Kobeja, "Inflation-Linked Bond from emerging markets provide attractive yield opportunities," Danske Capital, May 2015. 10 Werner Kramer, "Introduction to Inflation-Linked Bonds," Lazard Asset Management, 2012.
Special Report Highlights Clinton has a 65% chance of victory. She wins the election with 334 electoral votes. Trump has low odds of winning key swing states Virginia and Colorado. A Trump win requires a shock; it is not impossible by the historical record. A Clinton win is initially bullish and could bring some compromise. However, the median voter is moving to the left. The 1990s are gone. Feature BCA's Geopolitical Strategy made its initial U.S. general election forecast thirteen months ago in September 2015.1 We argued that the two most likely outcomes were: GOP Sweep Scenario: a Republican sweep (presidency and Congress) with a moderate candidate at the head of the party ticket; Democratic President / GOP Sweep of Congress: a Democrat win in the White House and a GOP that holds onto the House and Senate. Both outcomes would be positive for the markets given that (1) a GOP sweep would entail pro-market reforms (corporate taxes, de-regulation, entitlement reform, and modest fiscal spending) and (2) a divided government has historically produced a market-positive outcome. In December, we updated our forecast with a call that Hillary Clinton was a clear frontrunner given that a Trump nomination would greatly reduce the probability of a GOP sweep.2 Our reasoning then was that an anti-establishment Republican would fail to gather enough votes in the ideological middle of the American electorate. Although Trump has given Clinton a hardly believable run for her money, we continue to believe that misogynistic, racist, and narcissistic rhetoric are off-putting to the median American voter and distract from Trump's policy message (such as it is).3 In this final extended forecasting effort ahead of the election, our intention is to add value on three fronts: Get the final forecast right. Introduce the investment implications of our forecast. Ask what we have learned from this election so far. Quant Election Model: Trump Is A Red Herring Until very recently, the electoral polls showed a close race between Secretary Hillary Clinton and Mr. Donald Trump (Chart 1). However, our "Polls-plus" model, built using historical macroeconomic and election data since 1980, has been projecting a strong Clinton victory for some time. Based on our latest forecast, Hillary Clinton will win the 2016 presidential election in a landslide, with a projected electoral vote count of 334 (Chart 2). In the following section, we introduce our model, its results, and explain why the predicted Clinton victory is so comfortable. To be clear, our model has favored Clinton well before the most recent series of gaffes by Mr. Trump. Part I: Structural Econometric Model Our econometric work combines state-level election and economic data as well as trends in national politics and opinion. The model's dependent variable is the difference in the share of the vote received by the Republicans and Democrats in each state. The explanatory variables break down into the following categories: Voting Patterns: Each state's previous election results, back to 1980, are computed as the differential between Republican and Democratic vote share, and used to gauge voter predisposition. We also include a momentum variable which measures the change in the differential between the two previous elections. Economic Variables: We use changes in state and national economic conditions prior to the elections to capture the macroeconomic context. These include national GDP, oil prices, and state-level disposable income. Political Intangibles: We include three different qualitative variables to capture political attitudes. "Polarization" is computed to factor in the likelihood that the incumbent party will be voted out after staying in power for multiple terms. The "alternative choice" measures the presence of a prominent third party. We also include current presidential approval ratings. Using these variables, and strictly avoiding any advantage of hindsight, our model correctly predicted the winner of every election since 1984 (Table 1 and Appendix 1): 2012 - Obama v. Romney: The model slightly overestimated President Obama's support in West Virginia, Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee. 2008 - Obama v. McCain: The model produced an accurate forecast on an aggregate level, but again underestimated Obama's support. It misallocated electoral votes in 7 states. 2004 - Bush v. Kerry: Our analysis was only off by giving two extra electoral votes to Bush, but once more misallocated votes in 7 states. The Third Party Vote In 1992, 1996, and 2000: The model accurately predicted the winner in each contest but produced more volatile results as our sample started to shrink. In addition, the strong third-party candidacy in 1992 and 1996 distorted the results. These two elections were a key bellwether for the success of our model in 2016, as this year also features prominent third-party choices. Gary Johnson of the Libertarian Party is currently polling around 6.3%. 1984 and 1988: Our earliest set of elections produced results that were quite close to reality despite a limited sample size. Although this is somewhat surprising, it is to be expected given the landslide victories that occurred in both instances. Part II: Econometric Modeling Meets Polls Most of the components from our econometric model are slow-moving structural factors. Opinion polls, on the other hand, change based on periodical surveys. They are more volatile, but provide a good indication of the day-to-day pulse of the electorate. For this reason, we created an augmented version of our econometric model using probabilities constructed from polls. First, we transformed our econometric forecasts into probabilities by using two scenarios and the historical volatility of our estimates. The two scenarios are based on the potential impact of the third parties: one in which they gather 5-10% of the popular vote, and the other in which they fail to reach that threshold. From there, we calculated the historical standard deviations for each scenario, getting the lower and upper limits of the election forecasts. Giving the two limits equal chances of occurring, we calculated the GOP's chances to win each state. We then added opinion polls to this model. We used the election probabilities from FiveThirtyEight, which are computed using simulations from a collection of weighted and adjusted polls, to add a shorter-term dimension to our forecast.4 We give a 60% weight to the probabilities from the polls and 40% to our structural econometric model to ensure that we capture the momentum effect. Part III: 2016 Election - All Hype, No Fight Our polls-plus model suggests that Clinton has a 65.4% chance of winning the election (Table 2). This is somewhat lower than the probability derived by other polls-plus models - such as FiveThirtyEight and the New York Times. Further, our model shows that Clinton already has 279 electoral votes in states where she has more than a 70% chance of winning (Chart 3). By the same standards, Trump has secured only 170 votes. These results mean that even under the unlikely scenario where the GOP wins all the remaining swing states (North Carolina, Arizona, Florida, Ohio, and Iowa), if all else stays the same, the Democrats still win with 279 electoral votes. Intriguingly, our "White Hype" model back in March produced the same result using an entirely different method (it asked simply what share of the white vote Trump needed to win the swing states). At that time we argued that Trump had a very good chance to win Florida, Ohio, and Iowa, but that it would still be insufficient to win the election.5 In other words, our White Hype model correctly forecast in March the ultimate probabilities that our polls-plus model is now gauging from the combination of econometric results and opinion polls in October. Put differently, after winning the swing states (North Carolina, Arizona, Florida, Ohio, and Iowa), where the odds of winning are between 32% and 57%, the GOP would still need to steal the electoral votes in Virginia or Colorado (the latter in combination with Nevada or New Hampshire), away from the Democrats, where they are favored to win at 71.6% and 79.7%, respectively.6 This remains as unlikely now as it was in March.7 Bottom Line: Given the structural economic and political dynamics currently in place, our quantitative estimates show that Clinton is the clear favorite. Clinton has a 65.4% chance of winning the 2016 election, with an expected 334 electoral votes. Qualitative Election Model: Time To Dump Trump Thanks largely to the analysis of our colleague Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist of the BCA Global Investment Strategy, we took Donald Trump seriously long before most.8 We analyzed his electoral strategy - boosting the share of the white vote accruing to the GOP and away from the Democratic Party - and concluded that Trump did have a path to victory, albeit a very narrow one. Our research showed that Trump's strategy of increasing the Republican share of the white vote was mathematically the correct strategy for a GOP candidate to pursue, at least in 2016 when the white share of the total population remained large enough. We specifically showed that Trump would only need to increase white voters' support by 1.7% and 2.9% in Florida and Ohio, respectively, to flip those states, which seems quite reasonable and feasible.9 We also pointed out that getting a 5.7% swing in Iowa could be feasible. On the other hand, we showed that "flipping" Midwest states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin would require a very large swing of white voters in Trump's favor: 13.9%, 7.8%, and 8.1% respectively. At those numbers, Trump would have to win nearly 70% of Michigan's white voters, 65% of Pennsylvania's, and 58% of Wisconsin's. Of the three, Wisconsin looks the most feasible. On the other hand, the GOP only managed to pick up 52% of the state's white share in 2004, the last time a Republican candidate for president won an actual majority of the popular vote since 1988. So, getting to 58% is a high bar given Wisconsin's recent electoral history. How did our model hold up in terms of state-by-state polling? It did quite well! As we predicted, Trump has been doing relatively well in Iowa, Florida, and Ohio (Chart 4). In Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, Clinton's lead has remained higher than 5% through most of the election cycle and even through the periods where the media narrative shifted against her (Chart 5). Bottom Line: Despite a narrowing in the polls in mid-September - particularly following Clinton's September 11 health scare - we still concluded in our September Monthly Report that "the presidential race is Clinton's to lose."10 This is because both our quant (polls-plus) and qualitative (White Hype) models have correctly predicted that Trump's path to victory is extremely narrow. He would have to hold all of the swing-states where the White Hype model makes him competitive, and then also win either Virginia or Colorado plus Nevada, where he has struggled in the polls. Risks To Our View - A Trump Surprise! What scenario could occur between now and November 8 that throws off our forecast of a Hillary Clinton victory? As we have claimed from the beginning of the contest, Trump requires an exogenous factor to push him over the finish line. Given that Clinton's lead is now 6% in the polls, and that Trump is running out of time, he may need an act of God. That said, Trump has come a lot closer to winning the election than our polls-plus model suggests. Were it not for his idiosyncratic personality, the Democrats would have been a lot more vulnerable in 2016 than our predicted election outcome indicates. Why? Research by Professor Allan Lichtman, who has accurately predicted every U.S. presidential election since 1984, is instructive. Lichtman has called the election for Trump.11 His so-called "Keys" method - first outlined in a 1981 article and in his 1990 book, The Thirteen Keys To The Presidency - is a simple true or false quiz with thirteen propositions. If six or more of the answers are "false," the incumbent party loses the Oval Office (Table 3). For instance, if it is true that the average GDP growth per capita is higher in the past four years than the preceding four years, then that fact favors the incumbent. Today, this "long-term economic key" favors Hillary (Chart 6). In 2016, at least five of Lichtman's keys clearly favor the GOP: In the House of Representatives, the incumbent Democrats lost seats in the 2014 midterm elections, relative to the 2010 midterms (Chart 7). The Democrats do not have an incumbent candidate advantage. Obama achieved no major policy initiative in the second term. There was nothing comparable in effect to the Affordable Care Act, his signature legislation (Chart 8). Obama achieved no major foreign policy success. The Iran nuclear deal is too controversial to satisfy this key, although we suspect that history will judge it as a major success. Instead, the public focus has been on the disastrous intervention in Libya and the dithering in Syria. Hillary Clinton is not charismatic, which is an understatement (Chart 9). In addition, Gary Johnson, of the Libertarian Party, is a third-party candidate who could garner more than 5% of the vote (Chart 10). Under Lichtman's methodology, this is a key that hurts the incumbent. Of course, Libertarians may suck more votes away from Trump than Clinton. But Lichtman has signaled this issue as a crux of the election, and thinks it favors Trump. Moreover, in our view, Lichtman's keys could predict an even worse outcome for Clinton than Lichtman himself admits. Lichtman is very forthright about the fact that the keys require subjective judgment of the sort that professional historians make all the time. We would note, first, that the contest in the Democratic primary was serious. Sanders performed nearly as well as Clinton herself did in 2008, and better than other second-rank Democratic contenders going back to 1984 (Chart 11). Second, social unrest has likely risen in Obama's second term, or at least is perceived to have done so (Chart 12). Thus the primary contest and social unrest could trigger two more strikes against the incumbent party, without even debating whether Obama administration scandals or Trump's charisma qualify as keys against the Democrats.12 We think that Lichtman's model speaks volumes about the built-in vulnerability that the Democratic Party has faced throughout 2016. It also supports our initial September 2015 forecast, which gave largely even odds to both a moderate GOP presidential candidate and Hillary Clinton. As such, Trump's defeat will be a disaster for the Republican Party and will initiate a period of introspection - if not civil war - within the organization. Bottom Line: Trump does have good odds of winning the election if Clinton's lead in the polls drops below 3% between now and Election Day. If Trump gets back within striking distance, it will suggest that Clinton cannot shake him even after the media narrative and GOP establishment turned against him. With a 3% gap in the polls, the "turnout thesis" would become a lot more cogent. This is the thesis that Clinton will struggle to get members of the "Obama coalition" (millennials and minorities) to come out and vote, while Trump will motivate the registered but non-voting white population to turn out for him. At this point in the cycle, however, we doubt that Trump will re-test this level of competitiveness. Investment Implications: More Bullish Than Priced-In A Trump surprise would trigger a correction in equity markets, which is already due based on valuations, earnings, and other factors. We would expect the USD, as a key safe haven, to rally sharply both on Trump policy uncertainty and heightened geopolitical risk. We would also expect bond yields to fall initially, as part of a broad risk-off move, but then sell off due to the implication of more inflationary fiscal policies. Trump's policy proposals suggest a budget deficit blowout at least comparable to that under George W. Bush, which went from 2% to almost -4% of GDP. A combination of more spending and less tax revenue would blow the top off the bond market. What about the expected Clinton victory? First, markets love divided government (Table 4). Why? Because spending remains in check and no new onerous policies are likely. This will likely be the case if the GOP keeps the House of Representatives. However, we also think a Republican House could be conducive to dealing with Clinton, particularly on a modest fiscal stimulus: Clinton is not Obama: She will enter the Oval Office unpopular and without a strong mandate. She may not win over 50% of the popular vote. The Senate is in play, with polls at RealClearPolitics suggesting that the Democrats would win at least the four seats they need (leaving Vice-President Tim Kaine to cast the tie-breaking vote on legislation). The House is unlikely to be in play. Thus, unlike Obama in 2009, she will have a slim Senate majority at best (not filibuster-proof) and a GOP-held House. She will have to cut deals to advance her agenda. The Grand Coalition Lives: In the past few years, Congress has passed a number of important bills because establishment Republicans voted alongside Democrats (Chart 13). This coalition would remain in place, cemented by the populist threat to both camps represented by Trump and Sanders. The Knives Will Be Out For The Tea Party: Trump's rise and fall would be seen as an infamous debacle that cost the Republicans a highly significant election well within their reach. The Republican establishment will be determined to regain the reins of the party apparatus and brand. The Tea Party and other populist or anti-establishment Republicans will be blamed not only for giving Clinton the keys to the White House but also for giving the Democrats the advantage on the Supreme Court for a generation. True, Republicans could take away a narrow reading of the election results. They could blame the entire loss on Trump, not the party, given that Trump and the party had a bad relationship and Trump endorsed various positions at odds with conservative platforms and principles. They could therefore draw the conclusion that the correct strategy for the future is not to change policies or compromise with Democrats, but simply avoid running inexperienced, flamboyant mavericks for president. This view would be supported by the fact that, with a Clinton victory, moderate Republicans in more competitive districts, not arch-conservatives in bright red ones, are more likely to lose seats in the House. Ironically, this means that House Republicans could be just as zealous in opposition as they were under Obama, or more, and thus poised to resume the game of obstruction. This is possible, but we think the anti-establishment will be on the defensive, at least initially. Clinton will receive some kind of honeymoon period after dealing a devastating blow to the GOP. There will be Republicans ready to compromise, under the leadership of Paul Ryan, who did not accept the House speakership in order not to compromise. And the far-right will have at least some waverers in their midst. As such, we can see the potential for modest corporate tax reform (broadening the tax base without lowering the effective corporate tax rate). Even though such reform is not extraordinary, it should boost economic growth by helping small and medium-sized businesses grow. We can also see the GOP under Paul Ryan agreeing to modest increases in fiscal spending in return. Our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou, Chief Strategist of BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, cogently argues that fiscal spending only comes amidst recessions. Chart 14 shows that mentions of "fiscal stimulus" in the news media are positively correlated with junk bonds and VIX, and negatively correlated with the yield curve. As such, fiscal stimulus only begins being contemplated when the pain of a recession hits. Could this time be different? Yes. 55% of Americans think the economy has not recovered from the Great Recession, and some polls suggest that over half think the U.S. is still in recession. As such, while a recession may not be occurring in reality, it may as well be as far as politicians are concerned. Moreover, the public apparently cares less about the deficit and debt than in the recent past: the number of Americans naming deficits as the "top priority" has fallen from 72% to 56% in the past few years. And again, the populist groundswell will reinforce the need to lift growth through policy. Beyond an immediate relief rally, we would fade any idea that Clinton's victory means a return to the Bill Clinton-environment for corporate profits and stock performance. A structural shift to the left is underway in American politics, both generational and economic, as we argued in June.13 Clinton will not be able to betray her pledges to Bernie Sanders supporters if she wants to be a two-term president. Thus, on a sectoral basis, we would expect Clinton to have quite a few negatives (Table 5). First, she would portend greater state involvement in healthcare, especially Big Pharma, despite the idea that repealing the Affordable Care Act would cause more uncertainty than keeping and changing it. We also would not expect her to be as favorable to the financial community as her list of donors suggests, given the challenges she faces on her left regarding financial regulation. On energy, she will benefit renewable energy companies more so than conventional ones, given her commitment to turning the U.S. into a "twenty-first century clean energy superpower." We would expect her to be good for defense stocks, both because she has a lifetime of foreign policy hawkishness and because of the global trend of multipolarity, which increases both the number of global conflicts and the risks of additional conflicts.14 For Trump, there is little reason to speculate - he has no experience governing, has flip-flopped on many policy stances, and is generally unorthodox and impossible to predict (e.g. his healthcare "plan"). If we had to venture a guess, we would say that, like Clinton, he will be positive for defense stocks. His aggressively anti-regulatory positions on the financial and energy sectors should be a boon for both. A critical thing to remember is that recent American presidents do not have a bad track record of getting what they want (Box 1). Like all leaders, they are at the mercy of constraints and structural factors, whether political, military, economic, or social. Yet they also command a powerful (and increasingly so) executive branch of government in the world's most powerful country. If Clinton wants higher taxes on the wealthy and a stronger state hand in healthcare, she will most likely get them. If Trump wants tougher border security and deep corporate tax cuts, he will likely get those as well. Congress is a check, but only that. BOX 1 U.S. Presidents: Promises And Performance Over the past 28 years, each new president has generally succeeded in passing the signature items on his agenda. George Bush Sr. is the major exception. He took office in 1988 with a pledge of keeping growth rates constant, creating 30 million new jobs over eight years, keeping the peace abroad, and improving the budget deficit without raising taxes. Instead, after only one year in office, he faced a recession that caused a 1.2 percentage point drop in the growth rate from Reagan's average, resulting in only 2.6 million increase in the civilian labor force his first term, 12.4 million wide of the mark. He was famously forced to raise taxes, despite saying "read my lips: no new taxes," and the budget deficit expanded from 2.7% to 4.5%. Finally, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait drew him into the Gulf War. Bill Clinton got luckier. His chief pledge was to raise wages, shift government investment from defense to the domestic economy, make healthcare more affordable, and reform welfare. He failed in healthcare, but generally succeeded in other initiatives. Wages admit of some debate - average earnings grew faster than under Reagan-Bush, though median earnings did not. Still, Clinton presided over a longer more stable period of wage growth than his predecessors (Chart 1). Non-defense investment rose 19% (defense barely grew) and its share in federal spending rose from 10% to 12%. The participation rate in cash assistance and food stamp programs declined sharply, as did the length of time on the dole. George W. Bush came to power on the promise of reforming social policy - health, education, social security - and essentially transferring the Clinton budget surplus to voters through tax cuts. He succeeded in taxes, education (No Child Left Behind Act), and health (Medicare expansion), aided by Republican majorities and popular support after the September 11 attacks. He failed to partially privatize social security, however. Barack Obama promised to make the tax code more progressive, make healthcare accessible and affordable, reduce energy dependency on the Middle East, and phase out the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has generally achieved these goals: the number of uninsured adults fell from 18% to 11%, healthcare price inflation has slowed from about 4% under Clinton and Bush to 3% per year, and U.S. energy imports have fallen from 33% to 25% of total consumption. However, while Obama succeeded broadly in withdrawing troops from the Middle East (Chart 2), he has failed to "finish" the war in Afghanistan. There are three chief takeaways: First, circumstances can overrule any president's plans, as occurred with George Bush Sr. Second, winning an election in reaction to a recession, as did Clinton and Obama, or suffering a crisis early in one's term, like Bush Jr., provides a tailwind for a president's initiatives. The flipside is that inheriting strong economic growth on the coattails of a popular two-term president may put an administration at risk of a cyclical downturn or general failure to meet expectations. (Warning for a Hillary Clinton administration!) Third, Congress can block some but probably not all of a president's plans. Clinton, Bush, and Obama each began with their own party controlling the legislature, which gave an early advantage that was later reversed. Clinton lost on healthcare but achieved bipartisan welfare reform. For Obama, legislative obstructionism halted various initiatives, but his core objectives were either already met (healthcare), not reliant on Congress (foreign policy), or achieved through compromise after his reelection (expiration of Bush tax cuts for upper income levels). For Bush Jr., the legislature switched after six years of his administration, yet social security had already proved to be the "third rail" of politics that he feared - he failed to reform it despite his own party's control of Congress. Final Thoughts: Lessons From 2016 The 2016 election has taught us some critical lessons. First, the world never would have believed, in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, that populism would be more disruptive in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in continental Europe. But that is what has happened. The United States and the United Kingdom have both seen an explosion of pent-up forces as a result of decades - particularly the past 16 years in the U.S. - of declining middle classes, rising inequality, and weak median incomes.15 The consequences are only just beginning to be felt, and are of far greater global significance coming from the U.S. than the relatively small U.K. The chief of these is that, in the U.S., the median voter has clearly moved to the left on economic policy. Trump's victory over an army of seasoned, relatively orthodox GOP contenders in the primary exposed the fact that the party's grassroot voters no longer care deeply about fiscal austerity and no longer wish to tolerate the corporate incentive for importing cheap labor. Rather, they want government to give them more goodies and protections. This fact, taken along with the demographic trends favoring millennials and minorities (who tend to vote left on economic policies), portends a shift by which the GOP attempts to capture left-leaning voters in a way that Bill Clinton and the "New Democrats" shifted to capture right-leaning centrist voters in the wake of Ronald Reagan and the collapse of the USSR. Part of this process will involve a political alignment in the U.S., now that the GOP's deep fractures have been exposed for all the world to see. Trump's candidacy could never have occurred if there had not first been a power vacuum at the center of the party. If Trump wins, it will be a veritable revolution for both parties. Fiscal conservatism (and social conservatism, for that matter) will have little to show by way of official party machinery. The global consequences will be highly disruptive as well since the executive branch has extensive power over all actions of the federal bureaucracy, trade, and foreign policy, and since the GOP will not obstruct Trump initially (whatever happens in the aftermath of any radical policy changes). If Trump loses, as mentioned above, the anti-establishment trend in the Republican Party will suffer the brunt of the blame - whether Tea Party or other. Though messy, this result could in fact be bullish for the U.S. in the long run, since it would discredit populism in the party and give a boost to reformers who seek to re-brand and redesign the party to respond to changes in the electorate. Thus, in 2020, either Clinton's policies will be working and Americans will not be demanding change, or they will not be working, and Americans will have a reformed GOP as an alternative. Alternatively, Trump's loss could fuel populism by showing the way for a similar candidate with similar policies yet who does not lack in charisma, oratory, and party backing. Trump's strategy of boosting white support for the GOP is demographically and mathematically possible at least until 2024. Or perhaps a different kind of Republican (or Democratic) candidate could attempt to capture aspects of Trumpism, given his left-tilt on economic policy, while appealing to the Democratic coalition of women, millennials, and minorities. The GOP shakeup should be watched closely. Lastly, the 2016 election has amplified a point that we have long emphasized: the news media works in narratives. These narratives work as a filter that preempts and distorts the presentation and, to some extent, reception of facts. This phenomenon was influential in Trump's rise - the first "Twitter" candidacy - as well as his recent decline. Similarly, it made the race competitive when Clinton's various scandals were "trending." As a result, investors cannot be too wary of what the mainstream press or financial "smart money" says about any particular political trend or event. It is essential to separate the wheat from the chaff by using empirics and looking at macro and structural factors to identify the constraints rather than the preferences of candidates or politicians. Trump's constraints, as we have contended, are too high. Appendix 1 shows the state-by state performance of the econometric model (without polls) for each of the past 8 elections. It compares the model's forecast (no hindsight bias) with actual results. APPENDIX 1 Back-testing GPS's Econometric Election Model 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election - Forecast & Investment Implications," dated September 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Bank Credit Analyst Strategic Outlook, "Stuck In A Rut," dated December 17, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 #shocker. 4 For a more detailed explanation of FiveThirtyEight's methodology, please see "A User's Guide To FiveThirtyEight's 2016 General Election Forecast," dated June 29, 2016, available at http://www.fivethirtyeight.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: The Great White Hype," dated March 9, 2016, available at gps.bcareseach.com. 6 The Democrats' probability of winning Nevada and New Hampshire are 74.4% and 80% respectively. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "U.S. Election: Is The Election Over?" in Monthly Report, "Who's Afraid Of Big Bad Trump?" dated August 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," September 4, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 The assumption being that the turnout, non-white vote share, and white turnout do not change from 2012. In other words, our model only focuses on the white share of the vote for the Republican candidate. We assume that Clinton will not benefit from an anti-Trump tailwind among minorities, which is a big assumption given the pernicious effects of the "White Hype" strategy on the minority support of a Republican candidate. On the other hand, we also do not change the white voter turnout, which is unfair to Trump as he would likely be able to boost the white turnout as he increases the GOP share of the vote. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "U.S. Election Update - The Home Stretch," in Monthly Report, "Transformative Vs. Transactional Leadership," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see our book review below for a discussion of Lichtman's latest book. See also Peter W. Stevenson, "Trump Is Headed For A Win, Says Professor Who Has Predicted 30 Years Of Presidential Outcomes Correctly," Washington Post, September 23, 2016, available at www.washingtonpost.com. 12 Lichtman addresses the issues of Sanders, scandals, and Trump's charisma in Peter W. Stevenson, "This Professor Has Predicted Every Presidential Election Since 1984. He's Still Trying To Figure Out 2016," Washington Post, May 12, 2016, available at www.washingtonpost.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, and "Annus Horribilis," dated January 20, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Dear Client, This week, I am currently on the road visiting clients across Europe. We are sending you an abbreviated weekly report as well as a Special Report from our Geopolitical Strategy team entitled “U.S. Election: Final Forecast & Implications”. Not only does this report encompass a detailed analysis of the upcoming U.S. presidential election and its implications for the future of U.S. politics, it also introduces GPS’s poll-plus model, a model which currently forecasts a Clinton victory. I trust you will find this piece very informative. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights The U.S. dollar is consolidating its recent gains, but it offers more upside in the months ahead A Trump victory would supercharge any dollar strength, but is likely to hurt the dollar in the long-term. In Japan, no more fiscal drag and a tightening in the labor market will ultimately result in a lower yen, courtesy of higher inflation expectations and falling real rates. The Australian labor market points to weaknesses in the domestic economy. Any EM turmoil could launch an AUD bear phase. Feature The U.S. dollar continues to consolidate its recent gains. While the dollar is expensive, it still offers upside potential. Monetary divergences remain in favor of the U.S. economy. U.S. labor market slack is disappearing and the rising share of salaries and wages in the national income pie is likely to further support consumption. Shifting the distribution of economic gains toward workers signifies that the middle class is gaining ground relative to households at the summit of the income ladder. This process should help consumption because the middle class has a much higher marginal propensity to consume than the top 1% (Chart I-1). If consumption growth remains healthy, job creation is likely to fan additional wage pressures, creating a virtuous circle for U.S. households and consumption. This virtuous cycle is likely to help the Fed increase rates over the next two years, providing a source of support for the dollar (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Shifting Income To The Middle Class Will Support Consumption Chart I-2A Virtuous Cycle For The Dollar In terms of the presidential election outcome, the shift of the median voter to the left signifies that redistributionist policies are likely to become an ever growing part of the U.S. political discourse. This reality is likely to provide another source of support for the U.S. dollar, at least for now. While a Clinton victory will not halt these trends, a Trump victory would likely supercharge any dollar bull market. While vague in details, Trump's economic plan involves much more infrastructure spending financed with debt issuance, i.e. a large amount of fiscal stimulus that would remove the need for any dovish tilt to the Fed's stance. Moreover, by raising the specter of protectionism, a Trump victory could revive inflationary forces in the U.S. economy. Protectionism, while negative for profits, would decrease the trade deficit, temporarily lifting U.S. GDP. Since the supply side of the economy has been hampered by tepid levels of investment (Chart I-3), we could see a situation where demand is in excess of supply. This would prompt an even more hawkish Fed. However, although a Trump victory would be a dream for dollar bulls, caution is warranted. In the long-term, a Trump administration implies a falling fair value for the dollar. For one, by lifting inflation, a Trump victory would hurt the PPP value of the greenback. Second, a Trump victory would also ultimately lead to a degradation of the USD's role as the global reserve currency, making the -40% of GDP net international investment position of the U.S. more difficult to sustain (Chart I-4). Finally, by shielding the economy from the competitive pressures of globalization, a Trump victory would likely result in a deterioration of U.S. productivity vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Chart I-3Low Capital Stock Growth Would Crystalize The##br## Inflationary Effect Of A Trump Presidency Chart I-4The Dollar Needs Its ##br##Reserve-Currency Status Yen Signs pointing toward a strong wave of yen weakness are slowly coming together. In recent years, the yen has closely followed real rates differentials (Chart I-5). With the BoJ guaranteeing a limit on the upside for nominal rates, any improvement in the economy is likely to cause inflation expectations to increase, and thus real rates, to fall. What are the signals pointing toward higher inflation expectations and a lower yen? First, the labor market is tightening. The job-opening-to-applicants ratio is at a 15 year high and employment growth remains healthy (Chart I-6). Meanwhile, the participation rate of women in the labor force is at all-time highs, and at 73.5%, the employment-to-population ratio for prime-age women is already above U.S. levels. In fact, it is at similar levels to those experienced in the U.S. during the boom years of the late 1990s. Thus, the declining likelihood that more women will enter the labor force eliminates a wage-suppressing factor. Chart I-5USD/JPY: A Function Of##br## Real Rate Differentials Chart I-6Japan: Female Labor Participation Now Exceeds ##br##The U.S. Japanese Wages Can Now Rise Second, the Japanese shipment-to-inventory ratio is improving. Thanks to lean-inventory techniques, this ratio tends to be most elevated at the bottom of economic slowdowns, reflecting depressed sales rather than bloated inventories. Historically, growing shipments relative to inventories are associated with rising inflation expectations (Chart I-7). Third, the drag from fiscal policy is dissipating. Budget tightening is leveling off, lifting a big brake on domestic demand (Chart I-8). Moreover, we expect fiscal stimulus to gather momentum in 2017, especially in the form of wage policy. This provides an additional support for Japanese inflation expectations. If no further fiscal stimulus comes to fruition in Japan, we expect USD/JPY to rally toward 110-115 in the next 18-months. If aggressive fiscal stimulus and a wage policy are implemented, the upside for USD/JPY could be much greater, in the order of 120 or more. Chart I-7Japanese Shipment-To-Inventory##br## Ratio And CPI Expectations Chart I-8The Dissipating Japanese ##br##Fiscal Drag Yet, while the cyclical outlook for the yen is bearish, the shorter-term outlook is more nuanced. Any EM-selloff triggered by tightening global liquidity conditions could prompt downward pressures on Japanese inflation expectations. This would mechanically lift Japanese real rates and the yen. Hence, we recommend investors sell the yen on a long-term basis but hedge this position by buying JPY volatility over the next 3-6 months. Australian Dollar The Australian dollar is at a tricky spot. Technically, the AUD has been forming a tapering wedge, a pattern that often heralds a large move in this currency. How will this pattern resolve itself? We expect a bearish outcome. The domestic economy is displaying some worrying signs. Not only is full-time employment contracting, but so are total hours worked (Chart I-9). This is likely to weigh on household income and on consumption. This is especially problematic as Australian gross fixed capital formation continues to contract at a 4.5% annual pace. The result is that inflationary pressures in Australia will be kept at bay. In the process, the RBA could adopt a more dovish bias. Chart I-9Australian Domestic Conditions ##br##Are Deteriorating Chart I-10Australian Exports To ##br##China Are Still Falling... Additionally, despite a stabilization in Chinese growth, Chinese imports from Australia continue to contract (Chart I-10). Not only has this happened as iron ore prices have rebounded, but also, as economic conditions have improved in EMs that are highly levered to the Chinese cycle (Chart I-11). Our expectation is that the Chinese industrial sector is likely to experience a slowdown in the months ahead, courtesy of a falling fiscal impulse (Chart I-12), which begs a question: What does the future hold for Australian exports? Chart I-11...Despite Rising Taiwanese##br## Industrial Production Chart I-12Tightening Global Liquidity Is A Headwind##br## For EM Financial Conditions And Growth Finally, our bullish U.S. dollar stance is a tough hurdle for commodity prices to overcome (Chart I-13). Weakness in commodities would represent a negative terms-of-trade shock for Australia and the AUD. Moreover, the PBOC continues to use a lower RMB as an engine of reflation, and we stand by our bearish JPY forecast. Because of these two developments KRW, SGD, and TWD, are very likely to experience further downside. Historically, Asian currency weakness correlates closely with a weak AUD (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Commodities And The Dollar:##br## Joined At The Hip Chart I-14AUD Performs Poorly When ##br##Asian Currencies Sell Off We are already shorting AUD/USD in the context of a short commodity currencies trade. We are considering buying EUR/AUD, as the euro is less sensitive to the dollar, EM spreads, and commodity prices versus the AUD. Also, EUR/AUD is more attractive from a valuation perspective, trading 5% below its PPP fair value. This cross is also supported by a favorable balance-of-payments backdrop, with the euro area registering a 7.7% of GDP current-account differential relative to Australia. Buying EUR/AUD represents a way for investors to bet on a weaker AUD while decreasing their exposure to the U.S. dollar risk factor. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "There are risks of hanging around zero too long. And if the economy can withstand [a hike], I think it's appropriate to move" - Philadelphia Fed President Patrick Harker (October 26, 2016) Report Links: Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "In the euro area, we have a long way to go before we exhaust the productivity improvements that have already taken place in the U.S" - ECB President Mario Draghi (October 25, 2016) Report Links: Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Since the employment situation has continued to improve, no further easing of monetary policy may be necessary... at any rate, I would like to discuss this thoroughly with other board members at our monetary policy meeting" - BoJ Board Member Yutaka Harada (October 12, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Our judgment in the summer was that we could have seen another 400,000-500,000 people unemployed over the course of the next few years...So we're willing to tolerate a bit of overshoot in inflation over the course of the next few years in order to avoid that situation, to cushion the blow" - BOE Governor Mark Carney (October 14, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We have never thought of our job as keeping the year-ended rate of inflation between 2 and 3 percent at all times...Given the uncertainties in the world, something more prescriptive and mechanical is neither possible nor desirable" - RBA Governor Philip Lowe (October 17, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "There are several reasons for low inflation - both here and abroad. In New Zealand, tradable inflation, which accounts for almost half of the CPI regimen, has been negative for the past four years. Much of the weakness in inflation can be attributed to global developments that have been reflected in the high New Zealand dollar and low inflation in our import prices" - RBNZ Assistant Governor John McDermott (October 11, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Fed is Trapped Under Ice - September 9, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: ""Given the downgrade to our outlook, Governing Council actively discussed the possibility of adding more monetary stimulus at this time, in order to speed up the return of the economy to full capacity" - BoC Governor Stephen Poloz (October 19, 2016) Report Links: Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We don't have a fixed limit for growing the balance sheet; it's a corollary of our foreign exchange market interventions - which we conduct to fulfill our price stability mandate" - SNB Vice-President Fritz Zurbruegg (October 25, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "A period of low interest rates can engender financial imbalances. The risk that growth in property prices and debt will become unsustainably high over time is increasing. With high debt ratios, households are more vulnerable to cyclical downturns" - Norges Bank Governor Oystein Olsen (October 11, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "[On Sweden's financial stability]...it remains an issue because we are mismanaging out housing market. Our housing market isn't under control in my view" - Riksbank Governor Stefan Ingves (October 17, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Dazed And Confused - July 1, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades