France
Highlights So what? Quantifying geopolitical risk just got easier. Why? In this report we introduce 10 proprietary, market-based indicators of country-level political and geopolitical risk. Featured countries include France, U.K., Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Brazil. Other countries, and refinements to these beta-version indicators, will come in due time. We remain committed to qualitative, constraint-based analysis. Our GeoRisk Indicators will help us determine how the market is pricing key risks, so we can decide whether they are understated or overstated. Feature For the past three months we have been tracking a “Witches’ Brew” of political risks that threaten the late-cycle bull market. Some of these risks have abated for the time being: the Fed is on pause, China’s stimulus has surprised to the upside, and Brexit has been delayed. Other risks we have flagged, however, are heating up: Iran And Oil Market Volatility: Surprisingly the Trump administration has chosen not to extend oil sanction waivers on Iran from May 2, putting 1.3 million barrels per day of oil on schedule to be removed from international markets by an unspecified time. It remains to be seen how rapidly and resolutely the administration will enforce the sanctions on specific allies and partners (Japan, India, Turkey) as well as rivals (China, others). Because the decision coincides with rising production risks from renewed fighting in Libya and regime failure in Venezuela, we expect President Trump to phase in the new enforcement over a period of months, particularly on China and India. But official rhetoric is draconian. Hence the potential for full and immediate enforcement is greater than we thought. In the short term, individual political leaders, and very powerful nations like the United States, can ignore material economic and political constraints. Since the Trump administration’s decision exemplifies this point, geopolitical tail risks will get fatter this year and next. Global oil price volatility and equity market volatility will increase with sanction enforcement actions and retaliation. We would think that Trump’s odds of reelection will marginally suffer, though for now still above 50%, as any full-fledged confrontation with Iran will raise the chances of an oil price-induced recession. U.S.-EU Trade War: Neither the Trump administration nor the U.S. has a compelling interest in imposing Section 232 tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts. Nevertheless the risk of some tariffs remains high – we put it at 35% – because President Trump is legally unconstrained. The decision is technically due by May 18 but Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow has said Trump may adjust the deadline and decide later. Later would make sense given the economic and financial risks of the administration’s decision to ramp up the pressure on Iran.1 But the risk that tariffs will pile onto a weak German and European economy will hang over investors’ heads. U.S.-China Talks Not A Game Changer: The ostensible demand that China cease Iranian oil imports immediately and the stalling of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea are not conducive to concluding a trade deal in May. We have highlighted many times that strategic tensions will persist even if Beijing and Washington quarantine these issues to agree to a short-term trade truce. The June 28-29 G20 meeting in Japan remains the likeliest date for a summit between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping, but even this timeframe could be too optimistic. Continued uncertainty or a weak deal will fail to satisfy financial markets expecting a very positive outcome. With a 70% chance that U.S. tariffs on China will not increase this year and, contingent on a U.S.-China deal, only a 35% chance that the U.S. slaps tariffs on German cars, we sound optimistic to some clients. But the Trump administration’s decision on Iran is highly market-relevant and portends greater volatility. We expect to see a geopolitical risk premium creep higher into oil markets as well as a greater risk of “Black Swan” events in strategically critical or oil-producing parts of the Middle East. There is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. We are late in the business cycle and President Trump has emphatically decided to increase rather than decrease geopolitical risk. Quantifying Geopolitical Risk Geopolitical analysis has taken a bigger role in investors’ decision-making over the last decade. Surveys show that geopolitical risks rank among global investors’ top concerns overall. In the oft-cited Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey, geopolitical and related issues have dominated the “top tail risk” responses for the past half-decade (Chart 1). In other surveys, the most worrisome short-term risks are mostly political or geopolitical in nature, ranking above socio-economic and environmental risks (Chart 2). Despite this high level of concern, there is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. Isolating and measuring the range of risks under this umbrella term remains a challenge. As such, for many investors, geopolitics remains an ad hoc, exogenous factor that is often mentioned but rarely incorporated into portfolio construction. For the past four decades the predominant ways of measuring political or geopolitical risk have been qualitative or semi-qualitative. The Delphi technique, developed on the basis of low-quality data sets in social sciences, relies on pooled expert opinions.2 Independently selected experts are asked to provide risk assessments and their responses are then interpreted by analysts to create a measure of risk. Another semi-qualitative method of measuring geopolitical risk ranks countries according to a set of political and socio-economic variables. These variables – such as governance, political and social stability, corruption, law and order, or formal and informal policies – are extremely important but inherently difficult to quantify.3 These results are useful but suffer from dependency on expert opinion, data quality, and institutional biases. More importantly, these methods are slow to react to breaking events in a rapidly changing world. The same goes for bottom-up assessments using political intelligence. The weakness of these methods is that it is highly unlikely that they will produce statistically significant estimates of risk. The odds of getting a “silver bullet” insight from a “key insider” are decent for simple political systems, but not in the complex jurisdictions that host the vast majority of global, liquid investments. Quantitative approaches to measuring geopolitical risk have since become more widespread. The most prominent method is based on quantifying the occurrence of words related to political and geopolitical tensions that appear in international newspapers. These word-counts typically include terms like “terrorism,” “crisis,” “war,” “military action,” etc. As a result, the indices reflect incidents of physical violence or other “Black Swan” events that may not have direct relevance to financial markets. Moreover, while news-based indices accurately capture dramatic one-time peaks at the time of a crisis, they are largely flat aside from these, as they rely on popular topics rather than underlying structural trends (Chart 3). They fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with electoral cycles, protest movements, paradigm shifts in economic policy, or other policy changes.4 Notice, for instance, that the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the resulting chaos in Russia and many other parts of the emerging world hardly register in Chart 3. Chart 3News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments Introducing BCA’s GeoRisk Indicators The past 70 years have taught BCA Research to listen and respect the market. Why would we suddenly follow the media instead? Most quantitative geopolitical indicators begin with the premise that journalists and the news-reading public have accurately emphasized the most relevant risks and uncertainties. They proceed to quantify the terms of these assessments with increasingly sophisticated methods. This approach solves only part of the puzzle. News-based indices ... fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with underlying policy changes. At BCA Geopolitical Strategy, we aim to generate geopolitical alpha.5 This means identifying where financial media and markets overstate or understate geopolitical risks. We do not primarily aim to predict events or crises. As such, traditional news-based indicators that capture only major events, even those ex post facto, are of little relevance to our analysis. What is needed is a better way to quantify how the market is calculating risks. We start with a simple premise: the market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd. Furthermore, it puts its money where its predictions are, unlike other methods of geopolitical risk quantification which have no “value at risk.” Chart 4USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... To this end, we have introduced market-based indicators over the years that rely on currency movements, which are often the simplest and most immediate means of capturing the process of pricing risk. In 2015, for instance, we introduced an indicator that measures Russia’s geopolitical risk premium (Chart 4). It is constructed using the de-trended residual from a regression of USD/RUB against USD/NOK and Russian CPI relative to U.S. CPI. We can show empirically that it captures geopolitical risk priced into the ruble, as the indicator increases following critical incidents. These include the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014; the warnings that Russia aimed to stage a “spring offensive” in Ukraine in 2015; Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War later that year; and the poisoning of former intelligence agent Sergei Skripal in the U.K. in 2018 and subsequent tensions. Using similar methods, we created a proxy to capture geopolitical risk in Taiwan, based on USD/JPY and USD/KRW exchange rates and relative Taiwanese/American inflation (Chart 5). The indicator tracks well with previous cross-strait crises. It jumped upon Taiwan’s election of President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence government in January 2016 – and this was well before any tensions actually flared. It even registered a small increase upon her controversial phone call congratulating Donald Trump upon winning the U.S. election. Chart 5...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan This year we have expanded on this work, constructing a set of ten standardized GeoRisk Indicators for five developed economies and five emerging economies: U.K., France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan. Indicators for the U.S., China, and others will be rolled out in a future report. These indicators attempt to capture risk premiums priced into the various currencies – except for Euro Area countries, where the risk is embedded in equity prices. In each case, we look at whether the relevant assets are decreasing in value at a faster rate than implied by key explanatory variables. The explanatory variables consist of (1) an asset that moves together with the dependent variable while not responding to domestic geopolitical risks, and (2) a variable to capture the state of the economy. This set of indicators differs from our earlier indicators in the following ways: We aim to create a simple methodology that we can apply consistently to all countries, both in the DM and EM universes. We therefore omitted using regression models that can prove to be quite whimsical. Instead, we simply looked at the deviation of the dependent variable from the explanatory variables, all in expanding standardized terms, to create the GeoRisk proxy. We wanted an indicator that would immediately respond to priced-in risks, so we opted for a daily frequency rather than the weekly frequency we used in our initial work. To get as accurate of a signal as possible, we use point-in-time data. Since economic data tends to be released with a one-to-two-month lag, we lagged the economic independent variable to correspond to its release date. All ten indicators are shown in the Appendix. Across all countries, they track well with both short-term events and long-term trends in geopolitical risk. In the case of France, for example, the indicator steadily climbs during the period of domestic tensions and protests in the early 2000s; as the European debt crisis flares up; again during the rise of the anti-establishment Front National and the Russian military intervention in Ukraine; and finally during the U.S. trade tariffs and Yellow Vest protests (Chart 6). Our GeoRisk indicators isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more so than others. Similarly, in Germany, there is a general increase in perceived risk as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implements structural reforms in the early 2000s; another increase leading up to the leadership change as Angela Merkel is elected Chancellor; another during the global and European financial crises; another during the Ukraine invasion and refugee influx; and finally another with the U.S.-China trade war (Chart 7). Chart 6Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Chart 7Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War We have annotated each country’s GeoRisk indicator heavily in the appendix so that readers can see for themselves the correspondence with political events. The indicators are affected by international developments – like the Great Recession – but we have done our best to isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more than other countries. (As a consequence, the Great Recession is muted in some cases.) What are the indicators telling us now? Most obviously, they highlight the extreme risk we have witnessed in the U.K. over the now-delayed March 29 Brexit deadline. We would bet against this risk as the political reality has demonstrated that a “hard Brexit” is very low probability: the U.K. has the ability to back off unilaterally while the EU is willing to extend for the sake of regional stability. In this sense the pound is a tactical buy, which our foreign exchange strategist Chester Ntonifor has highlighted.6 Our U.K. risk indicator has been fairly well correlated with the GBP/USD since the global financial crisis and it suggests that the pound has more room to rally (Chart 8). Chart 8Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Meanwhile, Spanish risks are overstated while Italy’s are understated. As for the emerging world, Turkish risks should be expected to spike yet again, as divisions emerge within the ruling coalition in the wake of critical losses in local elections and a failure to reassure investors over monetary policy and the currency. Brazilian risks will probably not match the crisis points of the impeachment and the 2018 election, at least not until controversial pension reforms reach a period of peak uncertainty over legislative passage. Both our new Russian indicator and its prototype are collapsing (see Chart 4 above). This captures the fact that we stand at a critical juncture in Russian affairs, where President Putin is attempting to shift focus to domestic stability even as the U.S. and the West maintain pressure on the economy to deter Russia from its aggressive foreign policy. Given that both Putin’s and the government’s approval ratings are low amid rising oil prices, the stage is set for Russia to take a provocative foreign policy action meant to distract the populace from its poor living conditions. Venezuela is the obvious candidate, but there are others. Moscow will want to test Ukraine’s newly elected, inexperienced president; it may also make a show of support for Iran. With Russia equities having rallied on a relative basis over the past year and a half, and with the Iranian waiver decision already boosting oil prices as we go to press, the window of opportunity to buy Russian stocks is starting to close. (We remain overweight relative to EM on a tactical horizon; our Emerging Markets Strategy is also overweight.) Going forward, we will update these risk indicators regularly as needed and publish the full appendix at the end of every month along with our long-running Geopolitical Calendar. We will also fine-tune the indicators as new information comes to light. In other words, here we present only the beta version. We hope that these indicators will help inform investors as to the direction, and even magnitude, of political risks as the market prices them. Our GeoRisk indicators are not predictive, as establishing a trend is not a prediction. The main purpose of this exercise is to answer the critical question, “What is already priced in?” How is the market currently calculating geopolitical risk for a country? After that, it is the geopolitical strategist’s job to unpack this question through qualitative, constraint-based analysis. It is when our qualitative assessments disagree with what is priced in that we can generate geopolitical alpha. Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Sean Higgins, “Auto tariffs decision could be delayed, Kudlow says,” Washington Examiner, April 3, 2019, www.washingtonexaminer.com. 2 Norman C. Dalkey and Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts,” Management Science, Vol. 9, Issue: 3 (April 1963) pp. 458- 467. 3 Darryl S. L. Jarvis, “Conceptualizing, Analyzing and Measuring Political Risk: The Evolution of Theory and Method,” Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper No. LKYSPP08-004 (July 2008). William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary, "Political Forecast For International Business," Planning Review, Vol. 11 Issue: 3 (1983) pp.14-23. The PRS Group, “Political Risk Services”™ (PRS) or the “Coplin-O’Leary Country Risk Rating System”™ Methodology. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430 (September 2010). 4 Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 131, Issue 4, November 2016 (July 2016) pp.1593–1636. Dario Caldara and Matteo Iacoviello, “Measuring Geopolitical Risk,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Working Paper (January 2018). 5 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Five Myths On Geopolitical Forecasting,” dated July 9, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “Not Out Of The Woods Yet,” April 5, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Appendix France Appendix U.K. Appendix Germany Appendix Italy Appendix Spain Appendix Russia Appendix Korea Appendix Taiwan Appendix Turkey Appendix Brazil What’s On The Geopolitical Radar? Geopolitical Calendar
Dear Client, I am travelling this week so this report is a joint effort juxtaposing two contrasting observations about France. The ‘opulence’ part highlights France as the world’s dominant producer of luxury goods, and makes the case that some of the French luxury goods companies should form a core part of a long-term investment portfolio. The ‘rebellion’ part borrows from a recent Special Report on French politics penned by my colleague Jeremie Peloso. It analyses the recent yellow vest protests in France, and assesses whether they are a cause for concern. Best regards, Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist Feature Opulence Made In France Global luxury goods sales amount to a quarter of a trillion dollars, and Europe dominates in the production of these luxury goods. Measured by the number of companies, the leading luxury goods country is Italy. But on the more important metric of share of total global sales, the undisputed world leader is France. In fact, just four French companies produce a quarter of the world’s luxury goods sales. The four are: LVMH, Kering, L’Oreal, and Hermes1 (Chart of the Week, Chart I-2, and Table I-1). France’s luxury goods sector is an excellent diversifier for investors. This is because, compared to other goods and services, luxuries follow very different laws of economics: The demand for luxuries has a positive elasticity to price. Put more simply, the desirability of a luxury increases as its price goes up. This is opposite to the demand for non-luxuries which has a negative elasticity to price: for non-luxury items, the demand declines as the price goes up. By definition, you cannot compete with a luxury item by undercutting its price. Given that a luxury implies fine-craftsmanship rather than mass production, the sector is highly resilient to the existential threats confronting other European industries that emanate from out-sourcing to lower cost economies and from automation. Luxury demand is also relatively insensitive to exchange rate movements. The barrier to entry into the luxuries sector is extremely high. It takes years, or even decades, for a luxury item to acquire its premium status based on consistent high quality in materials and craftsmanship. This high barrier to entry makes it much harder for other economies to challenge the European and French dominance in providing these luxury products. Despite these attractive characteristics the sector does still require a source of structural demand. Our premise, expounded in our Special Report “Buying European Clothes: An Investment Megatrend”, is that the feminisation of consumer spending, particularly in Europe, is providing a strong structural tailwind to the demand for ‘soft’ luxury goods. A recent industry study by Deloitte corroborates this thesis, pointing out that the strongest growth in the luxury sector is to be found in cosmetics, fragrances, bags and accessories. On this premise, the four leading French companies are big beneficiaries.2,3 Are market valuations already aware of, and fully discounting, the thesis of feminisation of consumer spending? We think not, as most investors are surprised by the thesis and unaware of the on-going dynamics behind it. On this basis, three of the four French luxury companies, trading on forward PE multiples in the 20s or below, still appear reasonably valued for their growth prospects (Table I-2). The exception is Hermes which, on a multiple of 40, does seem richly priced. The bottom line is that the three other leading French luxury goods companies – LVMH, Kering, and L’Oreal – do deserve to be a core part of a long-term investment portfolio. Rebellion Made In France The yellow vest protest movement is not a coherent force led by a clear leadership. What started on the social media as a protest against the fuel tax in rural areas has evolved into a movement against President Macron. This transition occurred in part because a large segment of the population believes that Macron’s reforms have mainly benefited the wealthy. 77 percent of respondents in a recent poll view him as the “president of the rich.” The modification of the ‘wealth tax’ – which mostly shifts the focus toward real estate assets instead of financial assets – was highly criticized for favouring the wealthiest households. It resonated strongly with the perception that past governments helped the wealthiest households to accumulate more wealth on the back of the middle class. But it is not clear how intense or durable this popular sentiment will be, given that this type of inequality is not extreme in France and has not been rising (Chart I-3). Chart I-3What Income Inequality? Public support for the protests has hovered consistently around 70 percent since they started in November 2018 (Chart I-4). However, there are now more respondents who think that the protests should stop as that they should continue (Chart I-5). As a sign of things to come, a demonstration against the yellow vests and in support of Macron and his government – held by the “red scarves” – managed to gather more people on the streets of Paris than the regionally based yellow vests have done in the capital city.4 Who are the yellow vests? They are mostly rural, mostly hold a high school degree (or less), and overwhelmingly support anti-establishment political leaders Marine Le Pen (right-wing leader of the National Rally) or Jean-Luc Mélenchon (left-wing leader of La France Insoumise). This suggests that the movement has failed to cross the ideological aisle and win converts from the centre (Diagram I-1). How many French people are actually protesting? Although there was a slight pickup in protests at the beginning of January, the numbers countrywide are not high. In fact, they are far from what they were back in November and therefore would have to get much larger for markets to become concerned anew (Chart I-6). If we are to compare these protests to those in 1995 or 2010, the numbers pale in comparison (Table I-3). For instance, the protest of December 1995 brought a million people onto the streets while the demonstrations against the Woerth pension reform in 2010 lasted for seven months and gathered close to nine million protesters across eight different events (Chart I-7). We would compare the yellow vest protests to the 15-month long Spanish Indignados in 2011, which gathered between six and eight million protesters overall, and the U.S. Occupy Wall Street protests that same year. The two movements were similarly disorganized and combined disparate and often contradictory demands. In both cases, the governments largely ignored the protesters. Thus the yellow vests should not have a major impact on Macron’s reform agenda. As expected, Macron has not mentioned changing course on his most business-friendly reforms, which we see as a signal to investors that, despite the recent chaos, the plan remains the same. There is no strategic reason why Macron would reverse course. His popularity is already in the doldrums. His only chance at another term is to plough ahead and campaign in 2022 on his accomplishments. Nevertheless, to ensure that he does not plough into a rock, Macron will adjust course to calm the protesters. For example, the recent increase in the minimum wage that the government announced in response to the demonstrations was not supposed to be implemented until later in the presidential term. In a similar vein, pension reforms will likely be postponed given the ongoing protests. Macron hoped to introduce a universal, unified pension system by the middle of 2019 to replace an overly complex and fragmented system in which 42 different types of pension coexist, each one having its own rules of calculation. Though protests (both yellow vest and otherwise) have been unimpressive by historical standards, it might be too risky for the government to push the pension reform so close to these events. Such adjustments to the reform agenda should help reduce the protest movement’s fervour or otherwise its support. The bottom line is that the yellow vest protests were to be expected – they are the natural consequence of Emmanuel Macron’s push to reform the French economy and state. However, when compared to previous efforts to derail government reforms, the numbers simply do not stack up. Their disunited and broad objectives are likely to limit the effectiveness of the movement going forward.5 Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In the case of L’Oreal this refers to the L’Oreal Luxe division. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy “Buying European Clothes: An Investment Megatrend”, dated December 6, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Deloitte: Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2018, Shaping the future of the luxury industry 4 According to the government, 10,500 “red scarves” marched in Paris on January 27, 2018. 5 For the full report, please see the Geopolitical Strategy Special Report “France: La March A Suivre?”, dated February 27, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Cutting the size of the state might be what Macron needs to get out of that zone over the course of his term. Unlike the last two presidents, Macron’s term has begun with a whirlwind. If he stops now, it is highly unlikely that his support level will recover.…
The yellow vest movement is not a coherent force led by a clear leadership. The demands of the group are many: lower taxes, better services, less of the current reforms (specifically in education), and more of other reforms. Despite this lack of clarity, the…
The European economic slowdown shows no sign of ending. This morning, both the German Ifo and the Belgian business confidence decelerated further, with the former falling to 98.5 from 99.3, and the latter weakening from -1.5 to -1.7. Interestingly, as the…
Highlights The global economic mini-cycle is set to weaken while the euro is set to grind higher. Upgrade Telecoms to overweight. Also overweight Healthcare and Airlines. Underweight Banks, Basic Materials and Energy. Overweight France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Underweight Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway. The Eurostoxx50 will struggle to outperform the S&P500. Feature We are strong believers in Investment Reductionism, a philosophy synthesized from the Pareto Principle and Occam's Razor.1 Investment reductionism offers a liberating thesis - the incessant barrage of investment research, newsfeeds and ten thousand word commentaries is largely superfluous to the investment process. What seems like a complexity of investment choice usually reduces to getting a few over-arching decisions right. Chart of the WeekIn Quadrant 4, Overweight Domestic Defensives And Underweight International Cyclicals For equity sector and country allocation, two over-arching decisions dominate: Whether the global economic mini-cycle is set to strengthen or weaken (Chart I-2). Whether the domestic currency is set to strengthen or weaken. Chart I-2The Empirical Evidence For Credit And Economic Mini-Cycles Is Irrefutable The four permutations of these two decisions create the four quadrants of cyclical investing (Chart of the Week). Right now, European investors find themselves in quadrant four: the global economic mini-cycle is set to weaken while the euro is set to grind higher. This favours an overweight stance to defensives, especially domestic-focused defensives. Therefore today, we are upgrading Telecoms to overweight. We also recommend an underweight stance to the most cyclical sectors, especially international-focused cyclicals such as Basic Materials and Energy. Country allocation then just drops out of this sector allocation. The Global Economic Mini-Cycle Is Set To Weaken We can predict the changes of the seasons and the tides of the sea with utmost precision. How? Not because we have an ingenious leading indicator for the seasons and tides, but because we recognise that these phenomena follow perfectly regular cycles. Regular cycles create predictability. Significantly, global bank credit flows also exhibit remarkably regular cycles with half-cycle lengths averaging around eight months. Recognizing these mini-cycles is immensely powerful because, just as for the seasons and the tides, it creates predictability. Furthermore, if most investors are unaware of these cycles, the next turn will not be discounted in today's price - providing a compelling investment opportunity for those who do recognise the predictability. The empirical evidence for credit mini-cycles is irrefutable. The theoretical foundation is also rock solid, based on an economic model called the Cobweb Theory.2 This states that in any market where supply lags demand, both the quantity supplied and the price must oscillate. Given that credit supply clearly lags credit demand, the quantity of credit supplied and its price (the bond yield) must experience mini-cycles (Chart I-3). And as the quantity of credit supplied is a marginal driver of economic activity, economic activity will also experience the same regular oscillations. Today, the global 6-month credit impulse is turning from mini-upswing to mini-downswing, with all three subcomponents - the euro area, the U.S. and China - now in decline (Chart I-4). This is exactly in line with prediction. Mini half-cycles average eight months, and the latest mini-upswing started eight months ago. Chart I-3The Global Economic Mini-Cycle##br## Is Set To Weaken Chart I-4All Three Subcomponents Of The Global 6-Month ##br##Credit Impulse Are Now Declining More importantly, as we enter a mini-downswing, we can also predict that global growth is likely to experience at least a modest deceleration through the coming two to three quarters. The Euro Is Set To Grind Higher, Except Versus The Yen Chart I-5Lost In Translation Nowadays, mainstream stock markets tend to be eclectic collections of multinational companies which happen to be quoted on bourses in Frankfurt, Paris, New York, and so on. For example, BASF is not really a German chemical company, it is a global chemical company headquartered in Germany. For operational hedging, multinational companies like BASF will intentionally diversify their sales and profits across multiple major currencies, say euros and dollars. But of course, the primary stock market quotation will be in the currency of its home bourse, euros. Therefore, when the euro strengthens, the company's multi-currency profits, translated back into a stronger euro, will necessarily weaken (Chart I-5). Clearly, more domestic-focused companies like telecoms will not experience such a strong currency-translation headwind. We expect the main euro crosses to continue strengthening over the next 8 months, with the exception being the cross versus the Japanese yen. Our central thesis is that the payoff profile for a foreign exchange rate just tracks the bond yield spread. This means that when a central bank has already taken bond yields close to their lower bound, its currency possesses a highly attractive asymmetry called positive skew. In essence, as the ECB is at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy, long-term expectations for the ECB policy rate possess an asymmetry: they cannot go significantly lower, but they could go significantly higher. Exactly the same applies to long-term expectations for the BoJ policy rate. In contrast, long-term expectations for the Fed policy rate possess full symmetry: they could go either way, lower or higher. This stark asymmetry of central bank 'degrees of freedom' favours the euro and the yen over the dollar. Which Sectors And Countries To Own And Which To Avoid? Pulling together the preceding two sections, the global economic mini-cycle is set to weaken while the euro is set to grind higher. This puts Europe in quadrant four of our four quadrant framework for cyclical investing. Unsurprisingly, the relative performance of the most cyclical sectors - Banks, Basic Materials and Energy - very closely tracks the regular mini-cycles in the global 6-month credit impulse. In a mini-downswing these cyclical sectors always underperform (Chart I-6, Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Accordingly, underweight these three sectors on a two to three quarter horizon. Chart I-6In A Mini-Downswing, ##br##Banks Always Underperform Chart I-7In A Mini-Downswing,##br## Basic Materials Always Underperform Chart I-8In A Mini-Downswing,##br## Energy Always Underperforms Conversely, overweight the relatively defensive Healthcare sector. Also overweight the Airlines sector. Airlines' performance is a mirror-image of the oil price cycle, given that aviation fuel comprises the sector's main variable cost. Furthermore, as aviation fuel is priced in dollars, it also insulates European Airlines against a strengthening euro. Today, we are also upgrading the Telecoms sector to overweight given its relative non-cyclicality (Chart I-9), its domestic-focus, and the excessively negative groupthink towards it (Chart I-10). Chart I-9In A Mini-Downswing, ##br##Telecoms Always Outperform Chart I-10Telecoms Are Due ##br##A Trend Reversal In summary: Overweight: Healthcare, Telecoms, and Airlines Underweight: Banks, Basic Materials and Energy Then to arrive at a country allocation, just combine the cyclical view on the major sectors with the country sector skews in Box 1. The result is the following unchanged European equity market allocation. Overweight: France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark Neutral: Germany and Netherlands Underweight: Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway Lastly, what is the prognosis for the Eurostoxx50 relative to the S&P500? Essentially, this reduces to a battle between the multinational cyclicals - especially banks - that dominate euro area bourses and the multinational technology giants that dominate the U.S. stock market. With the global economic mini-cycle set to weaken and the euro set to grind higher, the Eurostoxx50 will struggle to outperform the S&P500. Box 1: The Vital Few Sector Skews That Drive Country Relative Performance For major equity indexes in the euro area, the dominant sector skews that drive relative performance are as follows: Germany (DAX) is overweight Chemicals, underweight Banks. France (CAC) is underweight Banks and Basic Materials. Italy (MIB) is overweight Banks. Spain (IBEX) is overweight Banks. Netherlands (AEX) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Ireland (ISEQ) is overweight Airlines (Ryanair) which is, in effect, underweight Energy. And for major equity indexes outside the euro area: The U.K. (FTSE100) is effectively underweight the pound. Switzerland (SMI) is overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy. Sweden (OMX) is overweight Industrials. Denmark (OMX20) is overweight Healthcare and Industrials. Norway (OBX) is overweight Energy. The U.S. (S&P500) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The Pareto Principle, often known as the 80-20 rule, says that 80% of effects come from just 20% of causes. Occam's Razor says that when there are many competing explanations for the same effect, the simplest explanation is usually the best. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' published on January 11, 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommended trade is to short the Helsinki OMX versus the Eurostoxx600. Apply a profit target of 3% with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, we are pleased to report that short Japanese Energy versus the market achieved its 8% profit target at which it was closed. This leaves four open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights French labor reforms stack up well against German and Spanish predecessors; We remain bullish on French industrials versus German industrials; Populism is overrated in Germany - European integration may not accelerate, but it will continue; The U.K.'s position remains weak in Brexit talks ... don't expect much from sterling. Feature On recent travels across Asia Pacific, the U.K., and the U.S., Europe has rarely featured in our conversations with clients. We proclaimed European politics a "trophy red herring" in our annual Strategic Outlook.1 Following the defeat of populists in Austria, the Netherlands, Spain, and particularly France, the market now agrees with us (Chart 1). Chart 1European Political Risk Was Overstated In this report, we ask whether there is anything left to say about Europe. First, we provide an update on French structural reforms, which we predicted with enthusiasm in February.2 Second, we give a post-mortem of the German election. Third, we dissect U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May's speech in Florence. We remain positive on near-term and mid-term prospects for European assets. We have recently closed our unhedged long Euro Area equities trade for a 7.88% gain (open from January 25 to September 6). We have reopened the position on September 6 with a currency hedge given our view that there is some downside risk for the euro in the near term. We also remain long French industrials / short German industrials, with gains of 9.30% since February 3. The French Revolution Continues President Emmanuel Macron has ignored tepid union protests and signed five decrees overhauling French labor rules on September 22. While there is more to be done, Macron's swift action just five months after assuming office justifies our optimism about France earlier this year. As we posited in February, investors are surprised every decade by a developed market that defies all stereotypes and catches the markets off guard with ambitious, pro-market and pro-business structural reforms. Margaret Thatcher's laissez-faire reforms pulled Britain out of the ghastly 1970s. Sweden surprised the world in the 1990s. At the turn of the century, Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) defied its own "socialist" label and moved the country to the right of the economic spectrum. Finally, the past decade's reform surprise came from Spain, which undertook painful labor and pension reforms that have underpinned its impressive recovery. How do French labor reforms stack up against the German and Spanish efforts? Table 1 surveys the measures and classifies them into three categories. On unemployment benefits, Macron's effort falls short of the considerable cuts implemented as part of the Hartz reforms in Germany. However, while benefits will still be generous, France's unemployed will now be cut off if they refuse job offers that pay within 25% of the salary they previously held. On increasing labor market flexibility, we give France high marks. Reforms will simplify the termination process for economic reasons and cap damages that can be awarded to employees, in line with the Spanish experience. Macron has also managed to neuter the power of national unions by allowing firm-level collective bargaining to take precedence. France's labor bargaining reform is also a carbon copy of the Spanish effort and both are attempts to create a more German-like management-employee context. Table 1Measuring French Reforms Against German And Spanish Reforms What should investors expect as a result? Spain is instructive. While its unemployment rate remains 5.8% above the Italian rate and 7.3% above the French rate, it still fell from a high of 26.3% in 2013 to 17.1% today. Meanwhile, Italian and French unemployment rates remain stubbornly high (Chart 2). In addition, Spain's export competitiveness has had one of the sharpest recoveries in Europe since 2008, whereas Italy and France continue to languish (Chart 3). Spain accomplished this feat via a considerable reduction in labor costs relative to peers (Chart 4). Chart 2Italy, France: Unemployment Still High Chart 3Spain Regained Competitiveness Chart 4Spain Cut Labor Costs The key pillar of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy's reforms was to create a more flexible labor market so as to restore competitiveness to the economy by aligning labor costs with productivity. Reforms, passed in February 2012, removed stringent collective bargaining agreements and replaced them with firm-level agreements. This has made it easier for firms to negotiate their own labor conditions, including reducing wages as an alternative to termination of employment. France is now on the path to do the same. True, it is difficult to establish a clear causal connection between Rajoy's structural reforms and Spain's economic performance since 2008. Nevertheless, reforms also work as a signaling mechanism, encouraging investment and unleashing animal spirits by affirming the government's commitment to a pro-business agenda. Under Rajoy's leadership, Spain has moved from 62nd in the World Bank "Ease of Doing Business" survey in 2009 to 32nd in 2017, 18 spots above Italy. Given the speed and commitment of the Macron administration, we would expect an even stronger signaling effect in France. German Hartz reforms are easier to assess because more time has passed since 2005 (when the final stage, Hartz IV, was implemented). Prior to the reforms, Germany's GDP growth rate was falling and unemployment was rising (Chart 5). At least on these two broad measures, it appears that reforms were positive. Chart 5Hartz Reforms Marked Turning Point In Germany Chart 6German Long-Term Unemployment Benefits Were Cut Down To OECD Average Germany's problem prior to the Hartz reforms was that generous unemployment benefits discouraged unemployed workers from finding employment. Long-term benefits could be as high as 53% of the terminated salary and eligible for indefinite renewal! The Hartz IV reforms specifically targeted these benefits, with the intention of forcing the unemployed to get back to work. Germany brought these benefits into line with the OECD average (Chart 6). The long-term impact of the Hartz reforms was a dramatic decline in the unemployment rate from a bottom of 9.2% in 2001 to the still falling 3.7% of today! Reforms have also seen a steady increase in wage growth, despite the conventional view saying the opposite. Wages have been steadily rising since implementation in 2005, only slowing down during the global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis (Chart 7). This does not mean that labor reforms failed. The intention of the Hartz reforms was to push people back into the labor force, not necessarily suppress their wages. Chart 8 shows the effect on the hours worked in the economy, with a clear uptrend after the reform was enacted. Chart 7German Wages Recovered... Chart 8...While Working Hours Increased In line with the previous labor reform efforts in Europe, we think that investors should expect three broad developments from French labor reforms: Competitiveness: As Chart 3 suggests, Spain and Germany have had the best export performance in Europe. By allowing companies some flexibility in setting costs, these economies were able to regain export competitiveness. As a play on this theme, we are long French industrials relative to German peers. Unemployment: Forcing the unemployed back to the labor market by ending their unemployment benefits if they refuse a job offer within 25% of the previous income level should encourage workers to get back to the labor force. Confidence: Macron's labor reforms are only the beginning of a packed agenda that also includes reducing the size of the public sector, reducing the wealth tax on productive assets, and cutting corporate taxes significantly. What of the opposition to the reform effort? What if the French leadership backs down in the face of protest? First, we must ask, what protest? The labor union response has been underwhelming. In part, this is because Macron's reforms are packed with pro-union clauses. The intention is to empower union activity at the firm level in order to neuter its activity at the national level. Second, Macron's electoral victory was overwhelming, both the presidential and legislative. Yes, turnout was low. And yes, many voted for Macron just so that Marine Le Pen would not become president. But the fact remains that 85% of the seats in the National Assembly are held by pro-reform parties, including the pro-business, right-wing Les Républicains, who want even stricter reforms. Bottom Line: Our clients, colleagues, friends, and family all tell us that France will not reform. But we have seen this film before, with Germany in the 2000s and Spain in the 2010s. One day, investors will wake up and France will be more competitive. Fin. A German Election Post-Mortem The media narrative before and after the German election tells of the rise of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a far-right party that campaigned on an anti-EU and anti-immigration platform. Indeed, the performance of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and center-left Social-Democratic Party (SPD), which have dominated German politics since the Second World War, was historically poor (Chart 9). Chart 9Germany's Dominant Parties Underperformed... Despite the media hysterics, there were no surprises this year. The AfD performed in line with its polls, only outperforming their long-term polling average by around 2%. Meanwhile, the historic underperformance of the CDU and SPD was also due to the solid performance of the other two establishment parties, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the center-left Greens (Chart 10). The FDP stormed back into the Bundestag by more than doubling their performance from 2013, while the Greens maintained their roughly 9% performance. Die Linke, a left-wing party whose Euroskeptic tendencies have dissipated, also gained around 9% of the vote. From a historical perspective, the combined CDU and SPD performance was bad, but roughly in line with their 2009 election result. Chart 10... While Minor Parties Outperformed That said, there was no once-in-a-lifetime global recession this time around to excuse the poor performance of the two establishment parties. German GDP growth is set to be 2.1% in 2017 and the unemployment rate is at a historic 3.7%. Meanwhile, support for the euro is at 81% (Chart 11), which begs the question of why 12.6% voters decided to entrust AfD with their votes. Chart 11Germans Love The Euro The simple answer is immigration and the 2015 asylum crisis. The more complex answer is that AfD's performance was particularly strong in East Germany, where the party is now the second largest after the CDU. The same forces that fueled the Brexit referendum and the election of President Donald Trump are at work in Germany. Voters who feel left behind by the transition to a globalized, service-oriented economy have rebelled against a system that favors the educated and mobile voters. In Germany, the angst is particularly notable in the East, where economic progress has lagged that of the rest of the country. On the other hand, it is ludicrous to compare AfD to Brexit and Trump. After all, AfD received only 12% of the vote. This is in line with, or slightly trails, the performance of other right-wing parties in Europe (Chart 12). Yes, it is disturbing to see a far-right party back in the Bundestag, but it was also naïve to believe that Germany could remain a European outlier forever. In fact, like other right-wing parties in Europe, the party is beset with internal rivalries. Party chairwoman Frauke Petry, who represents the moderate wing of the party, decided to quit one day after the election.3 We would suspect that the party will struggle going forward, particularly now that the influx of asylum seekers has trickled down to insignificance (Chart 13). Chart 12German Far Right Performed In Line With Other European Anti-Establishment Parties Chart 13Refugee Crisis Is Over In Germany And Europe Going forward, Chancellor Angela Merkel will retain her hold on power. However, she will likely have to do so via a "Jamaica coalition" with the FDP and the Greens.4 Forming such a challenging coalition could take until the New Year. Particularly problematic are the positions of the FDP and the Greens on Europe. The former are mildly Euroskeptic, the latter are rabidly Europhile. Merkel's 2009-13 coalition with the FDP was similarly challenging. The FDP moved towards soft Euroskepticism after the Great Financial Crisis. It combined with CDU's Bavarian sister party - the Christian Social Union (CSU)5 - to vote against a number of European rescue efforts and institutional changes (Chart 14). Merkel had to rely on the opposition SPD, which is staunchly Europhile, to push several European reforms through the Bundestag. More broadly, both the FDP and the CSU were a brake on Merkel during this period, leading to Berlin's halting response to the Euro Area crisis. Chart 14The FDP Hampered German Rescue Efforts Amid Euro Crisis Going forward, a Jamaica coalition is investment-relevant for three reasons: First, it would likely pour cold water on recent enthusiasm about accelerated European integration spurred by the election of President Emmanuel Macron in France. But investors should not read too much into it. As Chart 11 clearly illustrates, Germans are not Euroskeptic. The Euro Area works for Germany. If there is a future crisis, Germany will react to it in an integrationist fashion, shoving aside any coalition agreements to the contrary. And if Merkel has to rely on opposition SPD votes to push through the evolving European agenda, she will do so, regardless of what is said between now and December. Second, Merkel will have to respond to the poor performance of her party. She has to give in to the right wing on illegal immigration. Investors should expect to see tighter border enforcement on Europe's external borders. More relevant to the markets, we expect mildly Euroskeptics critics in her own party, as well as in the FDP and CSU, to be satisfied by officially pushing for Jens Weidmann's presidency at the ECB. Weidmann has recently toned down his criticism of ECB policies - publically defending low interest rates - which is likely a strategy to make himself palatable as the next president. Third, it is widely being discussed that the FDP will demand the finance ministry from Merkel, replacing Wolfgang Schäuble. This would definitely complicate any future efforts to deal with Euro Area sovereign debt crises, were they to emerge. However, the FDP is making a mistake. If they take the finance portfolio, they will be signing off on bailouts in the future. That is a guarantee. Europe is full of moderately Euroskepic finance ministers who have done the same (see: Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands in particular). Finally, the election was a clear failure by Merkel to defend her brand. While she has not signaled a willingness to resign, it is highly likely that she will try to groom her successor over the next four years. The 63 year-old has been in power since 2005. At the moment, the list of potential names for CDU leadership is long, but devoid of star power (Box 1). The one quality of all the potential candidates, however, is that they are pro-Europe. Bottom Line: In the short term, markets have read German elections overly negatively. The euro reacted on the news as if the currency bloc breakup risk premium had risen. It hasn't. In fact, the election could prove to be a long-term bullish euro outcome, given that Merkel will likely have to acquiesce to Jens Weidmann's candidacy for the ECB presidency. The German Bundestag remains overwhelmingly pro-Europe. The now-in-opposition SPD is pro-integration, as are the likely new coalition members, the Greens. Die Linke has evolved from anti-capitalist, soft Euroskeptics to left-of-SPD Europhiles. While FDP remains committed to a mildly Euroskeptic line (pro-Europe, but opposed to further integration), its members will likely have to sacrifice this position in order to be in government in the long term. They won't say that they are doing that, but trust us, they are. The performance of Germany's populist right wing is largely in line with that of other European countries. As such, it signals that Germany is a "normal country," not that there is something particularly disturbing going on. Box 1 Likely Successors To German Chancellor Angela Merkel If Merkel decides to retire, who are her potential successors? Ursula von der Leyen (CDU): Leyen, who has served most recently as defense minister, is often cited as a likely replacement for Merkel. However, she is not seen favorably by most of the population: she has not won first place in her district in any of the past three general elections. She is a strong advocate of further European integration and has supported the creation of a "United States of Europe." Leyen has argued that the European refugee crisis and debt crisis are similar in that they will ultimately force Europe to integrate further. As a defense minister, she has promoted the creation of a robust EU army. She has also been a hardliner on Brexit, saying that the U.K. will not re-enter the EU in her lifetime. The markets and pro-EU elites in Europe would love Leyen, who handled U.S. President Trump's statements on Germany, Europe, Russia and NATO with notable tact. Thomas De Maizière (CDU): Maizière, who has served as minister of interior and minister of defense, is a close confidant of Chancellor Merkel. He was her chief of staff from 2005 to 2009. Like Schäuble, he is somewhat of a hawk on euro area issues (he drove a hard bargain during negotiations to set up a fiscal backstop, the European Financial Stability Fund, in 2010) and as such could become a compromise candidate between the Europhiles and Eurohawks within CDU ranks. Though he has been implicated in scandals as defense minister, he has remained popular by drawing a relatively hard line on immigration policy and internal security. Julia Klöckner (CDU): A CDU deputy chairwoman from Rhineland-Palatinate, Klöckner is a socially conservative protégé of Merkel and a hence a likely candidate to replace her. While remaining loyal to Merkel, she has taken a more right-wing stance on the immigration crisis. She is a staunch Europhile who has portrayed the Euroskeptic AfD as "dangerous, sometimes racist," though she has insisted that AfD voters are not all "Nazis" but are mostly in the middle of the political spectrum and need to be won back by the CDU. We think that she would be a very pro-market choice as she combines a popular, market-irrelevant wariness about immigration with a market-relevant centrism that favors further European integration. Hermann Gröhe (CDU): Gröhe last served as minister of health and is a former CDU secretary general. He is very close to Merkel. He is a staunch supporter of the euro and European integration. Markets would have no problem with Gröhe, although they may take some time to get to know who he is! Volker Bouffier (CDU): As Minister President of Hesse, home of Germany's financial center Frankfurt, Bouffier is in a position to capitalize on Brexit. He is a heavyweight within the CDU's leadership and a staunch Europhile. He has already declared he will run for the top state office again in 2018, though he will be 67 years old by then. The U.K.: Fall In Florence Prime Minister Theresa May tried to reset Brexit negotiations with the EU recently by giving a speech in Florence. We were told by clients and colleagues that it would be an important event, so we tuned in and listened. The speech was largely a dud. It confirmed to us the constraints on London's negotiating position as well as the challenges that Brexit poses to the British economy. May's team is struggling to navigate both. There are three things that investors should take from the speech - most which we have been emphasizing for over a year: The EU exit bill: The U.K. will pay. The one concrete point that Prime Minister May agreed with, for the first time ever, is that London will continue to pay into the current EU seven-year budget period (2014-2020). This should never have been in doubt. Britain's refusing to pay would be the equivalent of a tenant giving notice that he is ending his lease in 24 months, then refusing to pay in the interim. What May did not say is whether the U.K. would pay anything beyond its share of contribution to the EU budget. At the moment, the answer appears to be no, but we don't expect that to be the final word. Services really (really) matter: The U.K. has a competitive advantage in services. This is why May has tried to signal that she wants the broadest trade deal possible, since regular free trade agreements (FTAs) do not provide for deep integration in services. What will the U.K. give in return? May appears to want a Norway-type EU trade agreement with Canada-type liabilities. This won't fly in Brussels. The transition deal will last two years at minimum: This was never in doubt. But due to domestic political pressures, May was afraid of voicing it in public until today. Below we provide excerpts of the most relevant (or irrelevant, but comical) parts of May's speech.6 Our running commentary is in brackets. Theresa May's Florence Speech On Brexit, September 2017: A Reinterpretation By GPS It's good to be here in this great city of Florence today at a critical time in the evolution of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union. It was here, more than anywhere else, that the Renaissance began - a period of history that inspired centuries of creativity and critical thought across our continent and which in many ways defined what it meant to be European. [GPS: Strong opening by May. Odd location for the speech, however. Unless she was looking to ingratiate herself with Matteo Renzi, former mayor of Florence, former prime minister of Italy, and current leader of the ruling Democratic Party]. * * * The British people have decided to leave the EU; and to be a global, free-trading nation, able to chart our own way in the world. For many, this is an exciting time, full of promise; for others it is a worrying one. I look ahead with optimism, believing that if we use this moment to change not just our relationship with Europe, but also the way we do things at home, this will be a defining moment in the history of our nation. [GPS: This is a crucial argument by proponents of Brexit, that leaving the EU is not just about leaving the bloc's oversight, but also about domestic renewal. At the heart of this view is the belief that the EU has shackled the U.K.'s potential economic output with its regulatory oversight and protectionist trade policies. For this to be true, the U.K. has to replace significance labor force growth - from the EU Labor Market - with even greater productivity growth. If the U.K. fails to do this, its potential GDP growth rate will be substantively lower in the future. We do not buy the optimism. For one, the EU has not been a drag on the U.K.'s World Bank Ease Of Doing Businness rankings, where the country ranks seventh. Second, several other EU member states are in the top 20, including Sweden, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Germany, Ireland and Austria. Third, developed economies have been dealing with sub-standard productivity growth for over a decade, both EU members and non-members. As such, we are pretty certain that the U.K.'s potential GDP growth rate will be lower over the next decade, not higher.] And it is an exciting time for many in Europe too. The European Union is beginning a new chapter in the story of its development. Just last week, President Juncker set out his ambitions for the future of the European Union. [GPS: A nod to the reality that without the U.K. stalling its integration, Europe is now better able to build its "ever closer union." May is essentially conceding here to Charles de Gaulle's argument, articulated in the 1960s, that letting Britain into the club would ultimately be a mistake.]7 There is a vibrant debate going on about the shape of the EU's institutions and the direction of the Union in the years ahead. We don't want to stand in the way of that. [GPS: Reality check: it has literally been the foreign policy of the U.K. to "stand in the way of" of a united Europe for at least six hundred years ...] * * * Our decision to leave the European Union is in no way a repudiation of this longstanding commitment. We may be leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe. Our resolve to draw on the full weight of our military, intelligence, diplomatic and development resources to lead international action, with our partners, on the issues that affect the security and prosperity of our peoples is unchanged. Our commitment to the defence - and indeed the advance - of our shared values is undimmed. Our determination to defend the stability, security and prosperity of our European neighbours and friends remains steadfast. [GPS: As we have argued repeatedly, the U.K. and EU share crucial geopolitical and economic links. As such, it is difficult to see negotiations devolving into the sort of acrimony that many have expected. May understands this and is reminding Europe of how important the U.K. role is, and will continue to be, geopolitically for Europe.] * * * The strength of feeling that the British people have about this need for control and the direct accountability of their politicians is one reason why, throughout its membership, the United Kingdom has never totally felt at home being in the European Union. [GPS: A not-so-slight dig at Europe. Basically, May is saying that U.K. voters live in a democracy. EU voters live in something else.] And perhaps because of our history and geography, the European Union never felt to us like an integral part of our national story in the way it does to so many elsewhere in Europe. [GPS: This is true and can be empirically measured (Chart 15).] Chart 15Brits Have A Strong Sense Of National Identity * * * For while the UK's departure from the EU is inevitably a difficult process, it is in all of our interests for our negotiations to succeed. If we were to fail, or be divided, the only beneficiaries would be those who reject our values and oppose our interests. [GPS: This is all true and very well put. But it also appears to be a line of argument designed to tug at Europe's emotional strings. Like a husband asking his wife to take it easy on him in a divorce "for the sake of the children."] So I believe we share a profound sense of responsibility to make this change work smoothly and sensibly, not just for people today but for the next generation who will inherit the world we leave them. [GPS: Literally the line about the kids followed immediately!] * * * But I know there are concerns that over time the rights of EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens overseas will diverge. I want to incorporate our agreement fully into UK law and make sure the UK courts can refer directly to it. Where there is uncertainty around underlying EU law, I want the UK courts to be able to take into account the judgments of the European Court of Justice with a view to ensuring consistent interpretation. On this basis, I hope our teams can reach firm agreement quickly. [GPS: An important concession - the first in the speech so far, and we are more than halfway through: London will apparently take into account ECJ rulings when dealing with EU citizens living in the U.K. That is a huge concession to Europe and an arrangement unlike anywhere else in the world.] * * * The United Kingdom is leaving the European Union. We will no longer be members of its single market or its customs union. For we understand that the single market's four freedoms are indivisible for our European friends. We recognise that the single market is built on a balance of rights and obligations. And we do not pretend that you can have all the benefits of membership of the single market without its obligations. [GPS: As we have said in the past, May's decision to concede this point in January was a major concession to the EU and is the reason that the negotiations are not and will not be acrimonious. If the U.K. demanded access to the Common Market without accepting the "four freedoms," it would have received an acrimonious response, given that its request would have been construed as "special treatment."] So our task is to find a new framework that allows for a close economic partnership but holds those rights and obligations in a new and different balance. But as we work out together how to do so, we do not start with a blank sheet of paper, like other external partners negotiating a free trade deal from scratch have done. In fact, we start from an unprecedented position. For we have the same rules and regulations as the EU - and our EU Withdrawal Bill will ensure they are carried over into our domestic law at the moment we leave the EU. [GPS: May is correct. The EU-U.K. trade negotiations should be relatively smooth given that the U.K. is not starting from scratch in negotiating the relationship. The Canada-EU FTA took seven years because they were starting from scratch.] So the question for us now in building a new economic partnership is not how we bring our rules and regulations closer together, but what we do when one of us wants to make changes. One way of approaching this question is to put forward a stark and unimaginative choice between two models: either something based on European Economic Area membership; or a traditional Free Trade Agreement, such as that the EU has recently negotiated with Canada. I don't believe either of these options would be best for the UK or best for the European Union. European Economic Area membership would mean the UK having to adopt at home - automatically and in their entirety - new EU rules. Rules over which, in future, we will have little influence and no vote. [GPS: We pointed out why such an arrangement would be illogical in March 2016. Essentially, the U.K. would leave the EU due to its onerous regulation and infringement on sovereignty only to accept the onerous regulation as a fait accompli with no room for British sovereignty (Diagram 1)!] Diagram 1The Central Paradox Of Brexit Such a loss of democratic control could not work for the British people. I fear it would inevitably lead to friction and then a damaging re-opening of the nature of our relationship in the near future: the very last thing that anyone on either side of the Channel wants. As for a Canadian style free trade agreement, we should recognise that this is the most advanced free trade agreement the EU has yet concluded and a breakthrough in trade between Canada and the EU. But compared with what exists between Britain and the EU today, it would nevertheless represent such a restriction on our mutual market access that it would benefit neither of our economies. [GPS: This is, by far, the most critical part of May's speech. She is essentially saying that a Canadian FTA deal would benefit the EU more than it benefits the U.K., a point we have made for nearly two years now. This is true. The U.K. needs access to the EU services market, where British exporters have a comparative advantage. Were they to secure an FTA deal with the EU instead, they would be giving Europe a massive advantage, given the bloc's comparative advantage in tradable goods (Chart 16). However, this takes us back to Diagram 1. What kind of a relationship does May expect to get from the EU when she is unwilling to accept any of the liabilities inherent in such a deep trade deal? That is precisely what the Common Market is for.] Chart 16Brexit Hinders U.K.'s Comparative Advantage Bottom Line: Prime Minister May's Florence speech has shown the limits of the U.K.'s negotiating position. May set a friendly tone with Europe, but she has nothing to bargain with. Much of the speech reiterated British commitment to Europe's security and its capacity to defend the continent from external threats. In exchange, May argues, the U.K. ought to receive the deepest and most expansive access to the EU Common Market without any of the liabilities that go with it. In particular, she wants access to the EU's services market, where U.K. exporters have a comparative advantage. The problem with the tradeoff between U.K. geopolitical benefits and EU economic benefits is that it suggests that London has an alternative to being a geopolitical ally to Europe! As if it could suddenly shift its geopolitical, military, and diplomatic focus elsewhere. Berlin, Brussels, and Paris will call London's bluff. The U.K. is not in North America, it is in Europe. As such, Europe's problems are the U.K.'s problems, and the U.K. must defend against them even if it receives little in return. We expect the U.K. to succumb to the reality that the EU holds most of the cards in the negotiations. The U.K. will have a lower potential GDP growth rate after Brexit. But before Brexit is solidified, we expect considerable domestic political upheaval. In the short term, there is some upside for the pound. In the long term, it is a sell. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Although she has herself played a role in kicking out the original, even more moderate, founders of the party. 4 The CDU, FDP, and Greens coalition is dubbed the "Jamaica coalition" because of their traditional colors - black, yellow, and green - which combine to make the colors of the Jamaican flag. 5 The CSU does not directly compete against the CDU on the federal level. It only fields candidates in Bavaria, where the CDU does not compete. 6 For the full transcript, please see "Theresa May's Florence speech on Brexit, full text," The Spectator, September 22, 2017, available at blogs.spectator.co.uk. 7 In turn, this will allow the EU to build up its power, develop a navy, and finally conquer the British Isles with a new armada somewhere around 2066! Geopolitical Calendar
Highlights Even isolated North Korean attacks are unlikely to lead to a full-scale war; The USD sell-off will start to reverse once Trump makes Gary Cohn his official pick for Fed chairman; Europe is not a risk for investors ... even Italy is only a longer-term risk; France is reforming; stay long French industrials versus German. Feature Last week, in London, we were scheduled to give a talk on Sino-American tensions, East Asian geopolitical risks, and North Korea specifically. We submitted our topic of choice about a month ahead of the event, when tensions between Pyongyang and Washington were at their height. As tensions temporarily subsided following Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un's decision to delay the planned missile launch towards Guam, several colleagues wondered if the topic was still a pertinent one. We stressed in our research that tensions would not dissipate and would continue to be market-relevant, if not critical for S&P 500.1 Unfortunately, we have been proven right. Forecasting geopolitics requires insight, multi-disciplinary methodology, and a treasure trove of empirical knowledge. But sometimes it also just comes down to using Google and looking at a calendar. For example, given the present context of heightened tensions, the annual U.S.-South Korean military exercises - Key Resolve, which occurs normally in the spring, and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, which occurs in August - are obvious dates to monitor. They are provocations that North Korea has to respond to for both foreign and domestic audiences. Pyongyang has chosen to do so by firing an ICBM across Japan and testing a sixth nuclear device, allegedly a miniaturized hydrogen bomb. While both these actions qualitatively expand on previous acts (missile and nuclear tests), neither cross a threshold. We are still in the realm of "territorial threat display." President Trump and Supreme Leader Kim are angling their "swords," but have not dared to cross them yet. Nonetheless, our clients have pointed out that our "arch of diplomacy" approach leaves a lot to imagination. Therefore, the first insight from the road of this week is that we need to put our thinking cap on and imagine a scenario where tensions do blow over into open conflict. How do we imagine such a scenario occurring and why would it not devolve into full out war that forces the U.S. to attack the North Korean mainland? Is North Korea About To Become A Praying Mantis? We can imagine a scenario where North Korea commits an act that takes us beyond the nuanced thresholds set by recent history (Chart 1). For example, we have cited to clients that an attack against international shipping in the Yellow Sea or Sea of Japan by North Korean submarines would be an unprecedented act that the U.S. and Japan would likely retaliate against.2 We could see the U.S. following the script from 1988 Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf - the largest surface engagement by the U.S. Navy since the Second World War - when the U.S. sunk half of Iran's navy in retaliation for the mining of the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts. In the case of North Korea, this would primarily mean taking out its approximately 20 Romeo-class submarines and an unknown number of domestically-produced - Yugoslav-designed - newly built submarines.3 Chart 1North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long Such an increase in tensions is not our baseline case, but we assign much higher probability to it than to an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula (which we still see as highly unlikely). How would the markets react to the sinking of North Korean submarines? How would Pyongyang react? The answer to the former (market's reaction) depends on the answer to the latter (what does Pyongyang do?). Our best guess is that Pyongyang would do nothing. In fact, we may never know that North Korean submarines were sunk. We would suspect that North Korean military strategists would chalk the subs as a loss and quietly move on to more missile tests. Leadership in Pyongyang is massively constrained by its quantifiable military inferiority. This part requires a bit of "order-of-battle" analysis, so bear with us for a few paragraphs. North Korea has around 6 million military personnel, about 25% of the total North Korean population, ready to fight. Which would be great if it were preparing to charge Verdun in WWI. Unfortunately for Pyongyang, it is arrayed against one of the most sophisticated defenses ever constructed by man. To burst through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), its mammoth ground forces would have at their disposal about 2000 T-55s (designed in the 1950s) and an unknown number of T-72s (designed in the 1970s). The former are obsolete, but the latter are solid main battle tanks that could do damage ... that is, in a world where war was not airborne. The problem is that North Korea would lose air superiority within hours of any serious engagement leaving its tanks and ground troops vulnerable to death-from-above. Since North Korean troops would have to enter about 20 miles into South Korea to threaten Seoul with occupation, they would have to exit the range of most of their air defenses. Choosing to turn on the most powerful of their systems - such as the KN-06 with a 150km range - would leave them vulnerable to the U.S. AGM-88 HARM missiles that sniff out active radar antenna or transmitters. To protect its invading forces, North Korea would have at its disposal only about 20-30 Mig-29s. Countering two dozen jets would be South Korea's combined 177 F-15 and F-16s, plus American forces that would vary in size depending how many aircraft carriers were deployed in the vicinity and whether U.S. forces in Japan were deployed to counter the attack. Given that a single American aircraft carrier holds up to 48 fighter jets, North Koreans would likely quickly find themselves fighting a losing battle. Once the North Korean fighter jets were destroyed, the South Korean air force would turn the invasion into a massacre. The reality is that North Korea's ground forces are just for show. Its tanks and fighter jets will never see battle. North Korea really only has two gears: P & N. The first is for "Provocation" and the second is for "Nuclear Armageddon." This is why we highly doubt that we will see our Praying Mantis scenario play out, or lead to full-scale war if it does. North Korea is constrained by its technological inferiority. It does not have the ability to conduct war across a full spectrum of engagement. Neither did Iran in 1988, which is why it never retaliated for the loss of its navy, put all its revolutionary zeal and chest-thumping aside, and sued the U.S. at the International Court of Justice instead.4 The U.S. has a range of limited military engagements, particularly at sea, that could hurt Pyongyang's ability to project what little power it has. Given our constraint-based methodology, which requires one to have some understanding of military affairs, we have a fairly high conviction view that North Korea will continue to toe-the-line of the expected and thus accepted provocations along the lines of the history surveyed in Chart 1. Going beyond that list would threaten to expose the paucity of North Korea's military capabilities. Bottom Line: We are still in for a wild ride with North Korea. As we expected, regional safe haven assets continue to perform well. We will hold on to our safe haven basket of Swiss bonds and gold, up 2.6% since August 16. Nonetheless, we expect North Korea to steer clear of provoking a war. Gary Cohn Will Collapse The USD! (But What If He Already Did?) Several fast-money clients - both in the U.S. and Asia - have a theory for why the greenback continues to suffer: Gary Cohn. The theory goes that Cohn is an ultra-dove whose job as the next Fed Chair will be to stay "behind the curve" and drive down the USD. This would accomplish President Trump's lofty nominal GDP growth goals despite legislative hurdles to his fiscal policy. It would also keep risk assets well bid and help begin rebalancing the U.S. trade deficit. What do we know of Mr. Cohn's views on monetary policy? Not much: He defended the Trump administration goal of a 3% GDP growth target, suggesting that he has a far more optimistic view of U.S. growth than the current Fed projection;5 He believes that monetary policy is "globalized," intoning at a conference in Florida quickly after the election that the Fed policy of raising rates before the rest of the world is ready to do the same would be a mistake;6 In a January 2016 Bloomberg TV interview, he said that both the U.S. and Chinese currencies were overvalued and would both have to devalue.7 People who know and have worked with Gary Cohn (including one colleague at BCA!) speak highly of his pragmatism, work ethic, and focus. Most agree that he would likely be dove-ish, but there is not a single person we have spoken to who thinks that he will be Trump's puppet. As such, his disconnected statements largely say nothing about his potential style of leadership. His most ultra-dovish, USD-slaying comment comes from January 2016, with DXY 6.9% down since then (Chart 2). Mission Accomplished Mr. Cohn? The real reason for the USD slide, aside from a persistently disappointing inflation print, has been a realization by the market that President Trump's bark has no bite. On a slew of measures, President Trump's initial bravado has dissipated into flabby rhetoric. Chart 3 shows the initial surge in optimism regarding growth, tax reform, infrastructure spending, Mexico's comeuppance, and bi-partisanship (measured as support among independents). Each data point has not only fallen back to pre-election levels, but appears to have now been desensitized to any news that would have excited it in the past. For example, NAFTA negotiations are off to a poor start, President Trump continues to bash the trade deal, and yet the peso has rallied since Trump's inauguration! Chart 2Mission Accomplished, Mr. Cohn? Chart 3Trump's Bark Has No Bite? The Fed itself has lost faith in the president. The number of FOMC members who see upside risks to inflation and GDP growth, not unrelated to fiscal policy, has fallen after a brief surge after the election (Chart 4). Chart 4The Fed Also Doubts Trump What chances are there for the White House and Congress to re-write the fiscal narrative over the final quarter of 2017? As we wrote last week, Hurricane Harvey will ensure that a debt ceiling breach and government shutdown are avoided. However, Congress is likely to spend September making one last attempt at Obamacare repeal and replace, thus largely wasting the month before returning to tax reform in earnest in the new fiscal year. We expect some form of tax legislation to take shape by the end of December. Will it be comprehensive tax reform? Unlikely. It will now almost certainly be merely a tax-cutting exercise, with some revenue offsets attached to it. With the Republicans in Congress now leading the tax reform effort, it is unlikely that the budget deficit hole will be as wide as President Trump would have wanted. The problem is that both Trump's July tax reform proposal and the House GOP August plan come short of revenue-neutrality by around $3-3.5 trillion (over the decade-long period) (Table 1). Given that such a massive increase in the deficit would be unacceptable to fiscal hawks (or Democrats) in the House, we would expect tax rates to be cut by a much more modest degree. Table 1By How Much Will Republican Tax Cuts Widen The Deficit? Table 1 gives a detailed survey of the preferences (Tax Cuts) and constraints (Revenue Offsets). It is difficult to see how all the constraints are overcome through the legislative process. This will force Republicans to modify their preferences on the scale of tax cuts. We would expect that a corporate tax cut from 35% to around 27-28% could be possible, along with a minimal middle-class tax cut. Anything beyond that would be overly complicated. Therein lies the paradox for Chair Cohn. The only way that he can be "behind the curve" is if the curve gets "in front of him." But why would it if any coming tax legislation has very little stimulative effect on the economy? Currently, the expected change in the Fed Funds Rate over the next two years stands at a measly 40 bps (Chart 5). That is just barely two rate hikes until September 2019. How can Mr. Cohn get the expectations any lower at this point? Bottom Line: The appointment of Gary Cohn will be a classic "sell the (USD on the) rumor, buy (the USD) on the news." We expect his appointment in late November or early December, if President Trump goes by the lead time from the past two nominations (Chart 6). That may be the time to pare back USD shorts for those investors who have been bearish on the greenback. Chart 5Hard To Drive Expectations##BR##Lower For Rate Hikes Chart 6How Long Does It Take To##BR##Confirm The Fed Chair? Europe Is Not A Risk Chart 7Europe's Economy Zooming Along One clear insight from our five weeks on the road this summer is that Europe is no longer on anyone's radar. We had hardly any questions regarding the upcoming German or Italian elections. And while most investors were somewhat pessimistic regarding French structural reforms, none expressed any interest in betting against them either. The obvious reason is that Europe's economy has genuinely recovered (Chart 7). Consumer and business confidence are holding up while the manufacturing PMI and industrial production remain strong. That said, uniformity of view among clients across several geographies makes us nervous. On the future of the Euro Area, investors have swung wildly from morose to resigned that it is here to stay. Nonetheless, we generally agree with the consensus. Unlike at the beginning of this year, when we boldly claimed that European risks would turn out to be a "trophy red herring," we have no alpha to generate by disagreeing with the market.8 Here is why: German Election: We have a policy of not wasting our client's time by covering major geopolitical events that have no market-relevance. Germany is the world's fourth-largest economy and it will hold an election on September 24. However, we see no investment relevance in the election and therefore no reason to spend time covering it. Polls show that the center-left opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) has arrested its decline and may force another Grand Coalition (Chart 8). The only moderately interesting question is whether Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will be able to get its favored coalition ally, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), into government instead. The FDP has turned towards soft Euroskepticism since 2009. Its parliamentarians voted against several bills dealing with the Euro Area crisis during their 2009-2013 coalition with the CDU. That said, Chancellor Merkel has turned much more forcefully pro-Europe since the dark days of Greek bailouts and bond market rioting. The Chancellor can read the polls: Germans support the common currency at 81%, compared to 66% average between 2009-2013 (Chart 9). We expect the FDP to play along with the Europhile conversion by the CDU. Chart 8Another Grand Coalition? Chart 9Merkel Knows Germans Support The Euro If there is any significance to the calm ahead of the German election, it is that the country is at "peak normal." Its policymakers have dealt with a massive migration crisis, geopolitical crises to the East, terrorist attacks, and severe political and economic stresses in its sphere of influence, all with a near-complete absence of internal drama. This looks like either "as good as it gets," or the start of a new Golden Age in Europe, with Berlin in the lead. It is probably neither, but given European asset prices, and gearing to the growing global economy, we would remain overweight Euro Area equities going forward. Italian Election: Polls remain too-close-to-call in the upcoming Italian election, with Euroskeptic parties continuing to poll well (Chart 10). However, we are not sure one can truly call these parties Euroskeptic anymore. Despite a high level of Euroskeptic sentiment in the country (Chart 11), its Euroskeptic parties have been scared off by the failures of peers in Austria, the Netherlands, and France. Chart 10Italy: Euroskeptic Parties Poll Well... Chart 11...Reflecting Broader Euroskepticism Luigi Di Maio, leader of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing, populist Lega Nord, both reversed positions on the euro this month. Di Maio will be 5SM candidate for prime minister in the upcoming elections - which must be held by May and will likely take place in February or March. He reiterated a position, which 5SM hinted at in the past, that leaving the Euro Area would only be the "last resort" if Brussels refused to relax strict budget rules. Meanwhile, the firebrand, populist, Salvini hid behind Italy's constitution, claiming that a referendum on the euro would be illegal. In the short term, this means that the election in 2018 is no longer a risk. In the long term, it does not change the fact that Italy is ripe for a bout of Euroskeptic crisis at some later stage. Migration Crisis: Bad news for right-wing populists everywhere: the migration crisis is over and in quite a dramatic fashion. This is an empirical fact (Chart 12). Europe's enforcement efforts and collaboration with Libyan authorities (such as they are) have now forced even the humanitarian agencies to abandon the Mediterranean route. One of the largest such agencies - the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) - recently announced that it was packing its mothership, the Phoenix, for Myanmar. The group is the fourth to stop patrols for migrants. Medecins sans Frontieres, Save the Children, and Germany's Sea Eye all cited hostile actions taken by Libyan authorities towards their vessels as the main reason to stop rescuing migrants in Libyan waters. Chart 12The 'Migration Crisis' Is Definitively Over To be clear, what is happening in the Mediterranean is a result of European enforcement efforts, not any sudden awakening of Libyan capacity or sovereignty. The European Union and Italy are training and funding the Libyan Coast Guard, which has started to intercept humanitarian vessels, threaten them with force (often right in front of the Italian Navy!), and force them to return migrants to Libya, where they are subjected to extremely cruel internment. Prior to this development, human smugglers would launch barely seaworthy "crafts" towards humanitarian ships waiting literally yards away in Libyan waters to "rescue" the "migrants" to Europe. As such, humanitarian agencies were aiding and abetting human smuggling, by making it a lucrative enterprise with no downside risk for the smugglers. We expect the step-up in enforcement in Libyan waters to severely impair the cost-benefit calculus of attempting a Mediterranean crossing for a would-be migrant. Instead of a welcoming NGO vessel many will find themselves in Libyan Internment camps. Word will spread fast and the migration crisis will abate further. We have now come full circle on the migration crisis, which we predicted back in September 2015 would end precisely in such an illiberal fashion.9 Europe has a vicious streak ... who knew? Structural Reforms In France: In February, we penned a bullish report on France, arguing with high conviction that Marine Le Pen would lose and that structural reforms would follow.10 What is the status of the latter forecast? Despite a decline in President Emmanuel Macron's popularity (Chart 13), he is expending his political capital early in his term. He understands our "J-curve of Structural Reform" (Diagram 1). Policymakers who understand how the reform J-curve works know that they have to spend their political capital while they have it, at the beginning of their term, in order to reap the benefits, if there are any, while they are still in power. Chart 13Macron's Popularity Slips Diagram 1The J-Curve Of Structural Reform How do Macron's reforms compare with previous efforts? Generally speaking, Macron's reforms (Table 2) compare favorably with both the 2012 Mariano Rajoy reforms in Spain and the 2003 Hartz reforms in Germany. The Hartz reforms were instrumental in expanding temporary work contracts and restructured generous unemployment benefits. Similarly, the Rajoy reforms in Spain clarified economic grounds for dismissal and created more flexible "entrepreneur contracts." Macron's reforms fit these efforts, especially the proposals to put in place "project contracts" - an open-ended contract lasting for the duration of a project - and to establish a floor and a ceiling for allowances in cases of unfair terminations, and make termination for economic reasons easier. Table 2French Labor Reforms: The Key Bits The two criticisms of the reform efforts we most often hear are that France has not had a crisis to spur reforms and that unions will launch vicious protests. The first criticism is dubious, given that France is itself emerging from the low-growth doldrums of the post-Great Financial Crisis. It is simply false to say that France has had no crisis. The French public is acutely aware that its real per-capita GDP growth has been closer to Greek levels than German ones over the last two decades (Chart 14) and that it has lost competitiveness in the global marketplace (Chart 15). One cannot have a conversation with a French friend, colleague, or client without wanting to order a strong drink!11 Chart 14France's Lost Millennium Chart 15France's Lost Competitiveness Besides, what monumental crisis was it that propelled Germany into reforms in the early 2000s? A vicious recession? A massive bank crisis? It was neither. Germany was simply weighed down for a decade by fiscal transfers to East Germany and sensing that its export-oriented industry was facing a massive challenge from the Asian move up the value chain. It was this acute sense of competitive pressure, of falling behind, that spurred Germany to reform. With France, the acute sense of falling behind Germany (Chart 16) is at the heart of today's effort. Chart 16German Competition Puts A Fire Under France The second criticism, that the unions will hold protests, misjudges the political capital arrayed behind Macron. Despite his sagging popularity, 85.9% of the seats in the National Assembly are of pro-reform orientation (Diagram 2). The second-largest party in the parliament is Les Republicains, an even more zealously pro-reform group. This is a unique situation in French history and will allow the government to ignore protests on the street. Diagram 2The Balance Of Power In France's National Assembly In fact, two of the largest unions in France - Force Ouvrière and CFDT - have both said they would not protest the labor reforms. This leaves only the more militant CGT to protest, along with the left-wing presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The reason investors will still fret about protests this month is because CGT retains a strong representation in heavy industry and infrastructure sectors like energy and railways. As such, their industrial action could grind the country to a halt. We suspect that a repeat of the 1995 general strike or the 2010 French pension reform unrest - both of which CGT spearheaded - will be the final nail in the coffin of "Old France." Unlike those previous reform efforts, President Macron's effort has been clearly signaled ahead of the election and thus retains considerable democratic legitimacy. As such, any repeat of the 1995 or especially 2010 unrest would delegitimize the unions and give President Macron even more political capital. Bottom Line: We agree with the now conventional view that all is well in Europe. Stability ahead of the German election reminds investors of what a healthy country is supposed to look like. Italian election risks have dissipated. And our French structural reforms call remains on track. This gives us an opportunity to do some house-cleaning regarding our calls. First, we are closing our long French 10-year bond / short Italian 10-year bond trade for a gain of only 1 bps. Second, we are closing our overweight Euro Area equities relative to U.S. equities call for a gain of 7.88%. Given our euro-bullishness, we never recommended that this call be currency hedged. We are now reinstating it with a currency hedge. We are also closing our long German 10-Year CPI Swap for a gain of 45.5 bps. We will stick with our long French industrial equities / short German industrials, which is currently up 9.25%. This is a way we have chosen to articulate our bullish view on the reforms, although clients with greater sophistication in European sectors could come up with a more direct way to articulate the view. Separately, we are also booking profits on our long China volatility trade (CBOE China ETF Volatility Index) for a gain of 16.82%. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?" dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 A North Korean submarine sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010, but that was still within the norm of behavior for the two countries that are still effectively at war and have contested maritime borders. 3 Romeo-class submarines are nearly 70 years old. As much as we harken back to Yugoslav engineering with pride at BCA's Geopolitical Strategy, Belgrade was never much of a naval power. Nonetheless, diesel-powered submarines are quite proficient in staying undetected and could present a problem for the U.S. Navy. At least until they had to resurface or get back to base, where nuclear-powered U.S. Virginia-class attack-subs would lie in wait for them. 4 Tehran won the court case in 2003! And the ICJ forced the U.S. to compensate Iran for its lost ships or else face invasion by the United Nations army. (We are just kidding obviously. Iran did win, but it got nothing.) Please see Pieter H.F. Bekker, "The World Court Finds that U.S. Attacks on Iranian Oil Platforms in 1987-1988 Were Not Justifiable as Self-Defense, but the United States Did Not Violate the Applicable Treaty with Iran," American Society of International Law Volume 8, Issue 25, dated November 11, 2003, available at: asil.org. 5 Please see CNBC, "Tax reform is coming in September, Trump economic advisor Gary Cohn says," dated June 29, 2017, available at cnbc.com. 6 Please see Wall Street Journal, "How Donald Trump's New Top Economic Adviser Views the World," dated December 14, 2016, available at wjs.com. 7 Please see Business Insider, "Trump and his top economic adviser have had completely different views on China," dated January 3, 2017, available at businessinsider.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Great Migration - Europe, Refugees, And Investment Implications," dated September 23, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Thankfully for France, the choice would still be French wine!