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Media reports warn of a "Robot Apocalypse" that is already laying waste to jobs and depressing wages on a broad scale. Technological advance in the past has not prevented improving living standards or led to ever rising joblessness over the decades, but pessimists argue that recent advances are different. The issue is important for financial markets. If structural factors such as automation are holding back inflation by more than in previous decades, then the Fed will have to proceed very slowly in raising rates. We see no compelling evidence that the displacement effect of emerging technologies is any stronger than in the past. Robot usage has had a modest positive impact on overall productivity. Despite this contribution, overall productivity growth has been dismal over the past decade. If automation is increasing 'exponentially' and displacing workers on a broad scale as some claim, one would expect to see accelerating productivity growth, robust capital spending and more violent shifts in occupational shares. Exactly the opposite has occurred. Periods of strong growth in automation have historically been associated with robust, not lackluster, wage gains, contrary to the consensus view. The Fed was successful in meeting the 2% inflation target on average from 2000 to 2007, when the impact of the IT revolution on productivity (and costs) was stronger than that of robot automation today. This and other evidence suggest that it is difficult to make the case that robots will make it tougher for central banks to reach their inflation goals than did previous technological breakthroughs. For investors, this means that we cannot rely on automation to keep inflation depressed irrespective of how tight labor markets become. Recent breakthroughs in technology are awe-inspiring and unsettling. These advances are viewed with great trepidation by many because of the potential to replace humans in the production process. Hype over robots is particularly shrill. Media reports warn of a "Robot Apocalypse" that is already laying waste to jobs and depressing wages on a broad scale. In the first in our series of Special Reports focusing on the structural factors that might be preventing central banks from reaching their inflation targets, we demonstrated that the impact of Amazon is overstated in the press. We estimated that E-commerce is depressing inflation in the U.S. by a mere 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. This Special Report tackles the impact of automation. We are optimistic that robot technology and artificial intelligence will significantly boost future productivity, and thus reduce costs. But, is there any evidence at the macro level that robot usage has been more deflationary than technological breakthroughs in the past and is, thus, a major driver of the low inflation rates we observe today across the major countries? The question matters, especially for the outlook for central bank policy and the bond market. If structural factors are indeed holding back inflation by more than in previous decades, then the Fed will have to proceed very slowly in raising rates. However, if low inflation simply reflects long lags between wages and the tightening labor market, then inflation may suddenly lurch to life as it has at the end of past cycles. The bond market is not priced for that scenario. Are Robots Different? A Special Report from BCA's Technology Sector Strategy service suggested that the "robot revolution" could be as transformative as previous General Purpose Technologies (GPT), including the steam engine, electricity and the microchip.1 GPTs are technologies that radically alter the economy's production process and make a major contribution to living standards over time. The term "robot" can have different meanings. The most basic definition is "a device that automatically performs complicated and often repetitive tasks," and this encompasses a broad range of machines: From the Jacquard Loom, which was invented over 200 years ago, on to Numerically Controlled (NC) mills and lathes, pick and place machines used in the manufacture of electronics, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), and even homicidal robots from the future such as the Terminator. Our Technology Sector report made the case that there is nothing particularly sinister about robots. They are just another chapter in a long history of automation. Nor is the displacement of workers unprecedented. The industrial revolution was about replacing human craft labor with capital (machines), which did high-volume work with better quality and productivity. This freed humans for work which had not yet been automated, along with designing, producing and maintaining the machinery. Agriculture offers a good example. This sector involved over 50% of the U.S. labor force until the late 1800s. Steam and then internal combustion-powered tractors, which can be viewed as "robotic horses," contributed to a massive rise in output-per-man hour. The number of hours worked to produce a bushel of wheat fell by almost 98% from the mid-1800s to 1955. This put a lot of farm hands out of work, but these laborers were absorbed over time in other growing areas of the economy. It is the same story for all other historical technological breakthroughs. Change is stressful for those directly affected, but rising productivity ultimately lifts average living standards. Robots will be no different. As we discuss below, however, the increasing use of robots and AI may have a deeper and longer-lasting impact on inequality. Strong Tailwinds Chart II-1Robots Are Getting Cheaper Factory robots have improved immensely due to cheaper and more capable control and vision systems. As these systems evolve, the abilities of robots to move around their environment while avoiding obstacles will improve, as will their ability to perform increasingly complex tasks. Most importantly, robots are already able to do more than just routine tasks, thus enabling them to replace or aid humans in higher-skilled processes. Robot prices are also falling fast, especially after quality-adjusting the data (Chart II-1). Units are becoming easier to install, program and operate. These trends will help to reduce the barriers-to-entry for the large, untapped, market of small and medium sized enterprises. Robots also offer the ability to do low-volume "customized" production and still keep unit costs low. In the future, self-learning robots will be able to optimize their own performance by analyzing the production of other robots around the world. Robot usage is growing quickly according to data collected by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) that covers 23 countries. Industrial robot sales worldwide increased to almost 300,000 units in 2016, up 16% from the year before (Chart II-2). The stock of industrial robots globally has grown at an annual average pace of 10% since 2010, reaching slightly more than 1.8 million units in 2016.2 Robot usage is far from evenly distributed across industries. The automotive industry is the major consumer of industrial robots, holding 45% of the total stock in 2016 (Chart II-3). The computer & electronics industry is a distant second at 17%. Metals, chemicals and electrical/electronic appliances comprise the bulk of the remaining stock. Chart II-2Global Robot Usage Chart II-3Global Robot Usage By Industry (2016) As far as countries go, Japan has traditionally been the largest market for robots in the world. However, sales have been in a long-term downtrend and the stock of robots has recently been surpassed by China, which has ramped up robot purchases in recent years (Chart II-4). Robot density, which is the stock of robots per 10 thousand employed in manufacturing, makes it easier to compare robot usage across countries (Chart II-5, panel 2). By this measure, China is not a heavy user of robots compared to other countries. South Korea stands at the top, well above the second-place finishers (Germany and Japan). Large automobile sectors in these three countries explain their high relative robot densities. Chart II-4Stock Of Robots By Country (I) Chart II-5Stock Of Robots By Country (II) (2016) While the growth rate of robot usage is impressive, it is from a very low base (outside of the automotive industry). The average number of robots per 10,000 employees is only 74 for the 23 countries in the IFR database. Robot use is tiny compared to total man hours worked. Chart II-6U.S. Investment In Robots In the U.S., spending on robots is only about 5% of total business spending on equipment and software (Chart II-6). To put this into perspective, U.S. spending on information, communication and technology (ICT) equipment represented 35-40% of total capital equipment spending during the tech boom in the 1990s and early 2000s.3 The bottom line is that there is a lot of hype in the press, but robots are not yet widely used across countries or industries. It will be many years before business spending on robots approaches the scale of the 1990s/2000s IT boom. A Deflationary Impact? As noted above, we view robotics as another chapter in a long history of technological advancements. Pessimists suggest that the latest advances are different because they are inherently more threatening to the overall job market and wage share of total income. If the pessimists are right, what are the theoretical channels though which this would have a greater disinflationary effect relative to previous GPT technologies? Faster Productivity Gains: Enhanced productivity drives down unit labor costs, which may be passed along to other industries (as cheaper inputs) and to the end consumer. More Human Displacement: The jobs created in other areas may be insufficient to replace the jobs displaced by robots, leading to lower aggregate income and spending. The loss of income for labor will simply go to the owners of capital, but the point is that the labor share of income might decline. Deflationary pressures could build as aggregate demand falls short of supply. Even in industries that are slow to automate, just the threat of being replaced by robots may curtail wage demands. Inequality: Some have argued that rising inequality is partly because the spoils of new technologies over the past 20 years have largely gone to the owners of capital. This shift may have undermined aggregate demand because upper income households tend to have a high saving rate, thereby depressing overall aggregate demand and inflationary pressures. The human displacement effect, described above, would exacerbate the inequality effect by transferring income from labor to the owners of capital. 1. Productivity It is difficult to see the benefits of robots on productivity at the economy-wide level. Productivity growth has been abysmal across the major developed countries since the Great Recession, but the productivity slowdown was evident long before Lehman collapsed (Chart II-7). The productivity slowdown continued even as automation using robots accelerated after 2010. Chart II-7Productivity Collapsed Despite Automation Some analysts argue that lackluster productivity is simply a statistical mirage because of the difficulties in measuring output in today's economy. We will not get into the details of the mismeasurement debate here. We encourage interested clients to read a Special Report by the BCA Global Investment Strategy service entitled "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians." 4 Our colleague Peter Berezin makes the case that the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, radio, indoor plumbing and air conditioning. He argues that the real reason that productivity growth has slowed is that educational attainment has decelerated and businesses have plucked many of the low-hanging fruit made possible by the IT revolution. Cyclical factors stemming from the Great Recession and financial crisis are also to blame, as capital spending has been slow to recover in most of the advanced economies. Some other factors that help to explain the decline in aggregate productivity are provided in Appendix II-1. Nonetheless, the poor aggregate productivity performance does not mean that there are no benefits to using robots. The benefits are evident at the industrial level, where measurement issues are presumably less vexing for statisticians (i.e., it is easier to measure the output of the auto industry, for example, than for the economy as a whole). Chart II-8 plots the level of robot density in 2016 with average annual productivity growth since 2004 for 10 U.S. manufacturing industries (robot density is presented in deciles). A loose positive relationship is apparent. Chart II-8U.S.: Productivity Vs. Robot Density Academic studies estimate that robots have contributed importantly to economy-wide productivity growth. The Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) estimated that labor productivity growth rises by 0.07 to 0.08 percentage points for every 1% rise in the rate of robot density.5 This implies that robots accounted for roughly 10% of the productivity growth experienced since the early 1990s in the major economies. Another study of 14 industries across 17 countries by the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) found that robots boosted annual productivity growth by 0.36 percentage points over the 1993-2007 period.6 This is impressive because, if this estimate holds true for the U.S., robots' contribution to the 2½% average annual U.S. total productivity growth over the period was 14%. To put the importance of robotics into historical context, its contribution to productivity so far is roughly on par with that of the steam engine (Chart II-9). It falls well short of the 0.6 percentage point annual productivity contribution from the IT revolution. The implication is that, while the overall productivity performance has been dismal since 2007, it would have been even worse in the absence of robots. What does this mean for inflation? According to the "cost push" model of the inflation process, an increase in productivity of 0.36% that is not accompanied by associated wage gains would reduce unit labor costs (ULC) by the same amount. This should trim inflation if the cost savings are passed on to the end consumer, although by less than 0.36% because robots can only depress variable costs, not fixed costs. There indeed appears to be a slight negative relationship between robot density and unit labor costs at the industrial level in the U.S., although the relationship is loose at best (Chart II-10). Chart II-9GPT Contribution To Productivity Chart II-10U.S.: Unit Labor Costs Vs. Robot Density In theory, divergences in productivity across industries should only generate shifts in relative prices, and "cost push" inflation dynamics should only operate in the short term. Most economists believe that inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon in the long run, which means that central banks should be able to offset positive productivity shocks by lowering interest rates enough that aggregate demand keeps up with supply. Indeed, the Fed was successful in meeting the 2% inflation target on average from 2000 to 2007, when the impact of the IT revolution on productivity (and costs) was stronger than that of robot automation today. Also, note that inflation is currently low across the major advanced economies, irrespective of the level of robot intensity (Chart II-11). From this perspective, it is hard to see that robots should take much of the credit for today's low inflation backdrop. Chart II-11Inflation Vs. Robot Density 2. Human Displacement A key question is whether robots and humans are perfect substitutes. If new technologies introduced in the past were perfect substitutes, then it would have led to massive underemployment and all of the income in the economy would eventually have migrated to the owners of capital. The fact that average real household incomes have risen over time, and that there has been no secular upward trend in unemployment rates over the centuries, means that new technologies were at least partly complementary with labor (i.e., the jobs lost as a direct result of productivity gains were more than replaced in other areas of the economy over time). Rather than replacing workers, in many cases tech made humans more productive in their jobs. Rising productivity lifted income and thereby led to the creation of new jobs in other areas. The capital that workers bring to the production process - the skills, know-how and special talents - became more valuable as interaction with technology increased. Like today, there were concerns in the 1950s and 1960s that computerization would displace many types of jobs and lead to widespread idleness and falling household income. With hindsight, there was little to worry about. Some argue that this time is different. Futurists frequently assert that the pace of innovation is not just accelerating, it is accelerating 'exponentially'. Robots can now, or will soon be able to, replace humans in tasks that require cognitive skills. This means that they will be far less complementary to humans than in the past. The displacement effect could thus be much larger, especially given the impressive advances in artificial intelligence. However, Box II-1 discusses why the threat to workers posed by AI is also heavily overblown in the media. The CEP multi-country study cited above did not find a large displacement effect; robot usage did not affect the overall number of hours worked in the 23 countries studied (although it found distributional effects - see below). In other words, rather than suppressing overall labor input, robot usage has led to more output, higher productivity, more jobs and stronger wage and income growth. A report by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI)7 takes a broader look at automation, using productivity growth and capital spending as proxies. Automation is what occurs as the implementation of new technologies is incorporated along with new capital equipment or software to replace human labor in the workplace. If automation is increasing 'exponentially' and displacing workers on a broad scale, one would expect to see accelerating productivity growth, robust capital spending, and more violent shifts in occupational shares. Exactly the opposite has occurred. Indeed, the report demonstrates that occupational employment shifts were far slower in the 2000-2015 period than in any decade in the 1900s (Chart II-12). Box II-1 The Threat From AI Is Overblown Media coverage of AI/Deep Learning has established a consensus view that we believe is well off the mark. A recent Special Report from BCA's Technology Sector Strategy service dispels the myths surrounding AI.8 We believe the consensus, in conjunction with warnings from a variety of sources, is leading to predictions, policy discussions, and even career choices based on a flawed premise. It is worth noting that the most vocal proponents of AI as a threat to jobs and even humanity are not AI experts. At the root of this consensus is the false view that emerging AI technology is anything like true intelligence. Modern AI is not remotely comparable in function to a biological brain. Scientists have a limited understanding of how brains work, and it is unlikely that a poorly understood system can be modeled on a computer. The misconception of intelligence is amplified by headlines claiming an AI "taught itself" a particular task. No AI has ever "taught itself" anything: All AI results have come about after careful programming by often PhD-level experts, who then supplied the system with vast amounts of high quality data to train it. Often these systems have been iterated a number of times and we only hear of successes, not the failures. The need for careful preparation of the AI system and the requirement for high quality data limits the applicability of AI to specific classes of problems where the application justifies the investment in development and where sufficient high-quality data exists. There may be numerous such applications but doubtless many more where AI would not be suitable. Similarly, an AI system is highly adapted to a single problem, or type of problem, and becomes less useful when its application set is expanded. In other words, unlike a human whose abilities improve as they learn more things, an AI's performance on a particular task declines as it does more things. There is a popular misconception that increased computing power will somehow lead to ever improving AI. It is the algorithm which determines the outcome, not the computer performance: Increased computing power leads to faster results, not different results. Advanced computers might lead to more advanced algorithms, but it is pointless to speculate where that may lead: A spreadsheet from 2001 may work faster today but it still gives the same answer. In any event, it is worth noting that a tool ceases to be a tool when it starts having an opinion: there is little reason to develop a machine capable of cognition even if that were possible. Chart II-12U.S. Job Rotation Has Slowed The EPI report also notes that these indicators of automation increased rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period that saw solid wage growth for American workers. These indicators weakened in the two periods of stagnant wage growth: from 1973 to 1995 and from 2002 to the present. Thus, there is no historical correlation between increases in automation and wage stagnation. Rather than automation, the report argues that it was China's entry into the global trading system that was largely responsible for the hollowing out of the U.S. manufacturing sector. We have also made this argument in previous research. The fact that the major advanced economies are all at, or close to, full employment supports the view that automation has not been an overwhelming headwind for job creation. Chart II-13 demonstrates that there has been no relationship between the change in robot density and the loss of manufacturing jobs since 1993. Japan is an interesting case study because it is on the leading edge of the problems associated with an aging population. Interestingly, despite a worsening labor shortage, robot density among Japanese firms is falling. Moreover, the Japanese data show that the industries that have a high robot usage tend to be more, not less, generous with wages than the robot laggard industries. Please see Appendix II-2 for more details. Chart II-13Global Manufacturing Jobs Vs. Robot Density The bottom line is that it does not appear that labor displacement related to automation has been responsible in any meaningful way for the lackluster average real income growth in the advanced economies since 2007. 3. Inequality That said, there is evidence suggesting that robots are having important distributional effects. The CEP study found that robot use has reduced hours for low-skilled and (to a lesser extent) middle-skilled workers relative to the highly skilled. This finding makes sense conceptually. Technological change can exacerbate inequality by either increasing the relative demand for skilled over unskilled workers (so-called "skill-biased" technological change), or by inducing companies to substitute machinery and other forms of physical capital for workers (so-called "capital-biased" technological change). The former affects the distribution of labor income, while the latter affects the share of income in GDP that labor receives. A Special Report appearing in this publication in 2014 focused on the relationship between technology and inequality.9 The report highlighted that much of the recent technological change has been skill-biased, which heavily favors workers with the talent and education to perform cognitively-demanding tasks, even as it reduces demand for workers with only rudimentary skills. Moreover, technological innovations and globalization increasingly allow the most talented individuals to market their skills to a much larger audience, thus bidding up their wages. The evidence suggests that faster productivity growth leads to higher average real wages and improved living standards, at least over reasonably long horizons. Nonetheless, technological change can, and in the future almost certainly will, increase income inequality. The poor will gain, but not as much as the rich. The fact that higher-income households tend to maintain a higher savings rate than low-income households means that the shift in the distribution of income toward the higher-income households will continue to modestly weigh on aggregate demand. Can the distribution effect be large enough to have a meaningful depressing impact on inflation? We believe that it has played some role in the lackluster recovery since the Great Recession, with the result that an extended period of underemployment has delivered a persistent deflationary impulse in the major developed economies. However, as discussed above, stimulative monetary policy has managed to overcome the impact of inequality and other headwinds on aggregate demand, and has returned the major countries roughly to full employment. Indeed, this year will be the first since 2007 that the G20 economies as a group will be operating slightly above a full employment level. Inflation should respond to excess demand conditions, irrespective of any ongoing demand headwind stemming from inequality. Conclusions Technological change has led to rising living standards over the decades. It did not lead to widespread joblessness and did not prevent central banks from meeting their inflation targets over time. The pessimists argue that this time is different because robots/AI have a much larger displacement effect. Perhaps it will be 20 years before we will know the answer. But our main point is that we have found no evidence that recent advances in robotics and AI, while very impressive, will be any different in their macro impact. There is little evidence that the modern economy is less capable in replacing the jobs lost to automation, although the nature of new technologies may be affecting the distribution of income more than in the past. Real incomes for the middle- and lower-income classes have been stagnant for some time, but this is partly due to productivity growth that is too low, not too high. Moreover, it is not at all clear that positive productivity shocks are disinflationary beyond the near term. The link between robot usage and unit labor costs over the past couple of decades is loose at best at the industry level, and is non-existent when looking across the major countries. The Fed was able to roughly meet its 2% inflation target in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, despite IT's impressive contribution to productivity growth during that period. For investors, this means that we cannot rely on automation to keep inflation depressed irrespective of how tight labor markets become. The global output gap will shift into positive territory this year for the first time since the Great Recession. Any resulting rise in inflation will come as a shock since the bond market has discounted continued low inflation for as far as the eye can see. We expect bond yields and implied volatility to rise this year, which may undermine risk assets in the second half. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Brian Piccioni Vice President Technology Sector Strategy Appendix II-1 Why Is Productivity So Low? A recent study by the OECD10 reveals that, while frontier firms are charging ahead, there is a widening gap between these firms and the laggards. The study analyzed firm-level data on labor productivity and total factor productivity for 24 countries. "Frontier" firms are defined to be those with productivity in the top 5%. These firms are 3-4 times as productive as the remaining 95%. The authors argue that the underlying cause of this yawning gap is that the diffusion rate of new technologies from the frontier firms to the laggards has slowed within industries. This could be due to rising barriers to entry, which has reduced contestability in markets. Curtailing the creative-destruction process means that there is less pressure to innovate. Barriers to entry may have increased because "...the importance of tacit knowledge as a source of competitive advantage for frontier firms may have risen if increasingly complex technologies were to increase the amount and sophistication of complementary investments required for technological adoption." 11 The bottom line is that aggregate productivity is low because the robust productivity gains for the tech-savvy frontier companies are offset by the long tail of firms that have been slow to adopt the latest technology. Indeed, business spending has been especially weak in this expansion. Chart II-14 highlights that the slowdown in U.S. productivity growth has mirrored that of the capital stock. Chart II-14U.S. Capex Shortfall Partly To Blame For Poor Productivity Appendix II-2 Japan - The Leading Edge Japan is an interesting case study because it is on the leading edge of the problems associated with an aging population. The popular press is full of stories of how robots are taking over. If the stories are to be believed, robots are the answer to the country's shrinking workforce. Robots now serve as helpers for the elderly, priests for weddings and funerals, concierges for hotels and even sexual partners (don't ask). Prime Minister Abe's government has launched a 5-year push to deepen the use of intelligent machines in manufacturing, supply chains, construction and health care. Indeed, Japan was the leader in robotics use for decades. Nonetheless, despite all the hype, Japan's stock of industrial robots has actually been eroding since the late 1990s (Chart II-4). Numerous surveys show that firms plan to use robots more in the future because of the difficulty in hiring humans. And there is huge potential: 90% of Japanese firms are small- and medium-sized (SME) and most are not currently using robots. Yet, there has been no wave of robot purchases as of 2016. One problem is the cost; most sophisticated robots are simply too expensive for SMEs to consider. This suggests that one cannot blame robots for Japan's lack of wage growth. The labor shortage has become so acute that there are examples of companies that have turned down sales due to insufficient manpower. Possible reasons why these companies do not offer higher wages to entice workers are beyond the scope of this report. But the fact that the stock of robots has been in decline since the late 1990s does not support the view that Japanese firms are using automation on a broad scale to avoid handing out pay hikes. Indeed, Chart II-15 highlights that wage deflation has been the greatest in industries that use almost no robots. Highly automated industries, such as Transportation Equipment and Electronics, have been among the most generous. This supports the view that the productivity afforded by increased robot usage encourages firms to pay their workers more. Looking ahead, it seems implausible that robots can replace all the retiring Japanese workers in the years to come. The workforce will shrink at an annual average pace of 0.33% between 2020 and 2030, according to the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training. Productivity growth would have to rise by the same amount to fully offset the dwindling number of workers. But that would require a surge in robot density of 4.1, assuming that each rise in robot density of one adds 0.08% to the level of productivity (Chart II-16). The level of robot sales would have to jump by a whopping 2½ times in the first year and continue to rise at the same pace each year thereafter to make this happen. Of course, the productivity afforded by new robots may accelerate in the coming years, but the point is that robot usage would likely have to rise astronomically to offset the impact of the shrinking population. Chart II-15Japan: Earnings Vs. Robot Density Chart II-16Japan: Where Is The Flood Of Robots? The implication is that, as long as the Japanese economy continues to grow above roughly 1%, the labor market will continue to tighten and wage rates will eventually begin to rise. 1 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "The Coming Robotics Revolution," dated May 16, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 2 Note that this includes only robots used in manufacturing industry, and thus excludes robots used in the service sector and households. However, robot usage in services is quite limited and those used in households do not add to GDP. 3 Note that ICT investment and capital stock data includes robots. 4 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 Centre for Economic and Business Research (January 2017): "The Impact of Automation." A Report for Redwood. In this report, robot density is defined to be the number of robots per million hours worked. 6 Graetz, G., and Michaels, G. (2015): "Robots At Work." CEP Discussion Paper No 1335. 7 Mishel, L., and Bivens, J. (2017): "The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On," Economic Policy Institute. 8 Please see BCA Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "Bad Information - Why Misreporting Deep Learning Advances Is A Problem," dated January 9, 2018, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Rage Against The Machines: Is Technology Exacerbating Inequality?" dated June 2014, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 10 OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 05 (2016): "The Best Versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence Across Firms and the Role of Public Policy." 11 Please refer to page 27.

Highlights While bullish sentiment for copper remains high, concerns that policymakers' attempts at a managed slowdown in China this year goes too far will weigh on the market. Fundamentally, support for copper prices from potential supply shortfalls at both the mining and refining levels will be offset by a stronger USD and slower growth in China this year (Chart of the Week). Despite our expectation a slight physical supply deficit will emerge this year, we remain neutral copper. We do not believe this will be enough to rally prices in a meaningful way. Energy: Overweight. Ministers from Saudi Arabia and Russia confirmed OPEC 2.0 - the oil-producer coalition led by these states - will survive beyond the expiry of their production-management deal at the end of this year. What and how they will manage the production of coalition members, however, remains unknown. Base Metals: Neutral. Positive fundamentals for copper are at risk if the USD rallies on the back of Fed tightening this year or China's managed economic slowdown is too severe (see below). Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices remained well bid, despite expectations for three or four Fed rate hikes this year, suggesting the market is pricing in either fewer rate hikes and lower real rates, or geopolitical risk - most prominently in Venezuela or North Korea. We remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Soybean has been gaining ground on concerns about yield damage due to droughts in parts of Argentina. Expectations of a bumper year for Brazil will mitigate the impact on global supply. Feature Bullish copper sentiment is at a multi-year high, with four bulls for every bear in the market (Chart 2). The strong global economy, weak USD, and elevated risk of further supply-side disruptions - at mines as well as at the refining level - are feeding into buyers' optimism. Chart of the WeekChina Fears Weighing##BR##On Copper Prices Chart 2Bullish Sentiment Remains##BR##At Multi-Year Highs Our outlook for 2018 calls for another, albeit smaller, refined copper deficit (Chart 3). This will come on the back of escalated risks from supply side disruptions at mines in Chile and Peru, and potential constraints on primary and secondary refined output from China, the largest refined copper producer (Table 1). Chart 3A (Smaller) Deficit##BR##In 2018 Table 1China Is Significant For##BR##Copper Supply And Demand China also is the world's largest refined-copper consumer, which makes the risk of a more severe downturn in China arising from too much policy-driven restraint in the metal's top consumer acute. In the following sections, we present our expectations for the fundamentals: copper mine output, refined copper production, and refined copper consumption. Industrial Action Will Threaten Mine Output Again In 2018 Copper had an exceptional year in 2017. The synchronized global upturn and weak USD set the stage for a memorable performance. On the supply-side, disruptions at some of the world's largest mines pushed prices up 8% in 1H17. Although the risk of further production shocks had subsided by 2H17, copper gained another 22% on the back of restrictive Chinese scrap import policies and better than expected demand fundamentals. Last year, the copper market registered a physical deficit, mainly on the back of a decline in copper mine supply. A 0.3% yoy fall in copper ores and concentrate output in the first eleven months of the year kept production broadly unchanged compared to the same period last year. In fact, this was the first yoy decline for that period since 2002, and contrasts with an average 5% expansion in ore and concentrate output for that period since 2012 (Chart 4). The most notable supply side disruptions last year were: Chart 4Supply Disruptions Put##BR##Copper In Deficit Last Year A 9% yoy decline in output from top producer Chile in 1H17. Chile accounts for more than a quarter of global ore & concentrate supply. The decline is a result of strikes at the Escondida mine as well as lower output from Codelco mines. The Indonesian government's ban on exports of copper ores in the first four months of the year led to a 6% yoy decline in production in the first eleven months. U.S. output, which accounts for~7% of global copper ores & concentrates supply is down 12% yoy in the first eleven months of 2017. In fact, the last time the U.S. recorded a positive yoy growth rate was in October 2016. The decline in U.S. output came mainly on the back of lower grade ores, a fall in mining rates, and poor weather conditions. The majority of these disruptions occurred in 1H17 - the first five months of the year witnessed a 1.6% yoy fall in output, while the Jun-Oct period experienced a 0.7% yoy increase. Nonetheless, the ramp up in second part of the year is significantly slower than the 6% yoy and 5% yoy increases in the same period in 2015 and 2016. Global supply was partially supported by Peruvian and European production. Peruvian output grew 3.6% yoy in the first eleven months of the year. However this rate is dwarfed in comparison to previous years. Output grew almost 40% yoy in 2016 and 23% yoy in 2015. Similarly, European output - which accounts for 8% of global supply - seems to be continuing its uptrend. It expanded by 2.4% in the first eleven months of 2017 to record the highest level of output for that period. In fact, growth in output is above the average 0.8% yoy pace in the same period in 2014-2016. We expect a small rebound in mine production in 2018. According to the International Copper Study Group, temporarily shut down capacity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia will resume operations, supporting mine supply this year. Supply-side disruptions pose a significant risk to mine supply again this year. An estimated more than 30 labor contracts, representing ~5mm MT of mined copper - a quarter of global production - will expire this year.1 While surely not all of these negotiations will result in strikes and supply disruptions, the figure is noteworthy as it is significantly above the average 1.7mm MT worth of annual copper supply at risk from contract renewal between 2011 and 2016. The most significant of these renewals is that which was most damaging last year. The 44-day strike at BHP Billiton's Escondida mine in Chile last year, which resulted in a 7.8% yoy fall at the world's most productive copper mine, ended without agreement. Although the contracts were extended, they are due for renegotiation in June. In fact, one of the unions at Escondida held a day long "warning strike" in November, an indication that they do not intend to back down from their demands. Unless management gives in, this implies a heightened risk of disruptions. Bottom Line: Supply disruptions negatively impacted mine supply in some of the world's top producers in 1H17. Although European and Peruvian supply has been somewhat supportive, global supply stagnated in 2017. Industrial action remains the major risk to mined copper this year. 5mm MT worth of copper ores and concentrates are at risk of supply side disruptions in 2018 - the highest figure since 2010. Environmental Reforms Limit Refined Production From China Chart 5China's Scrap Imports Cushion##BR##Against High Prices World refined production grew 1.3% yoy in the first eleven months of 2017, the slowest growth rate for that period since 2009. This reflects significant declines in refined copper production in Chile and the U.S. Supply disruptions at mines in Chile - the world's second-largest producer of refined copper - led to a 182k MT fall in refined output in the first eleven months of 2017, compared to the same period in 2016. Refined output from the U.S. fell by 91.4k MT in that period. However, the downside pressure on refined output from lower ore production was mitigated by increased secondary production from scrap, which accounts for ~20% of global refined copper production. Chinese copper producers took advantage of the oversupply in global scrap and ramped up their production. According to the ICSG global secondary output expanded by almost 10% yoy in the first ten months of last year. China's copper scrap imports increased 9% yoy in the first eleven months of last year, following four years of declines (Chart 5). China makes up less than 10% of global mined copper, but it is the largest producer of refined copper in the world, accounting for 36% of the global production. China is expected to remain the main contributor to world refined production growth (Chart 6). However, Beijing's environmental reforms, and measures to curb the imports of "foreign trash" will limit secondary refined production. Chart 6China Remains Most Significant Factor In Refined Production Growth New policies affecting refined output in China are supportive of copper prices this year: 1. In relation to scrap copper, Beijing recently imposed two policy changes, in line with its environmental reforms. First, since the start of 2018, only copper scrap end-users and processors will be granted import licenses. Second, a proposal to limit the hazardous impurity levels in scrap copper imports to 1% by March. Both these policies will curtail China's scrap copper imports. China imports an estimated 3mm MT of scrap copper annually, accounting for roughly half of its total scrap copper supply. Such limitations would severely dent China's scrap supply. Furthermore, scrap copper imports play a significant role in China. They act as a buffer against high prices, soaring during periods of high prices and dwindling when prices are low - as they were between 2013 and 2016. If China does in fact go through with the tighter regulations on scrap imports, Chinese copper consumers would not be able to fall back on the secondary metal when prices rise - as they have been over the past year - leading to greater demand for imports of primary products, chasing prices higher. However, over the long term, we are likely to see Chinese scrap traders move their businesses offshore, notably in Southeast Asia, where they will process the scrap until it meets the regulations necessary to be imported by China.2 In fact, this has already started to happen in the case of the category 7 scrap - derived from end-of-life electronics, households, cars and industrial products - which is widely believed will be banned by year-end. Nevertheless, these recycling plants do not yet exist. Thus, the transition cannot occur overnight, and we expect the tighter policies on scrap imports to support prices in the interim as China increases its imports of ores and refined copper in order to fill the supply gap. 2. China's environmental reforms also pose a risk on refined supply this year. Smelters and refiners risk being shut down if they do not comply with tighter pollution controls. This could limit copper output this year. Similar to the winter production cuts occurring at steel and aluminum producers, China's second largest copper smelter - Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group - announced plans to reduce its smelter capacity by up to 30% during the winter.3 In addition, late last month, China's largest smelter - Jiangxi Copper Co. - was forced to curb output while local pollution levels were assessed.4 The extent to which these measures are adopted by other producers will interrupt refined output this year. Given the more elevated pollution levels during the winter months, this risk is most notable in the November to March period. Bottom Line: The major risk to refined copper supply is China's environmental reforms which will likely constrain copper scrap imports, and could lead to temporary shutdowns of polluting smelters and refineries. If Beijing tightens these regulations, we are likely to witness disruptions in both primary and secondary refined output, while the copper supply chain readjusts to be able to comply with these policies. Slowdown In China Would Temper Copper World refined copper consumption grew 0.8% yoy in the first eleven months of 2017. Weaker consumption was mainly in the 1H17, during which global consumption fell 1.8% yoy, whereas consumption in the July-to-November period accelerated by 3.9% yoy. Weaker demand in the first half of the year came on the back of weaker demand from China, which accounts for half of global consumption. China recorded a 7.7% yoy fall in consumption of refined copper in the January-to-April period. However, Chinese copper demand subsequently strengthened, accelerating by 7.4% yoy in the May-to-November period. While demand from the rest of the world muted the impact of weaker Chinese consumption in the first half of the year, it weakened in the second half of the year, falling 3.3% yoy in the May-to-October period. This fall in copper demand was driven by a 5.5% yoy fall in the U.S., and to a lesser extent, a 2.0% yoy fall in demand in Japan in the May-to-November period. According to China Customs data, China's refined copper imports fell 5.1% in 2017 after growing 3.7% in 2016 (Chart 7). However, what is noteworthy is that while imports fell 18.3% yoy in H1, they picked up in H2, increasing by 11.3% yoy, mainly on the back of strong demand in Q3. This is in line with strong economic performance in China in 2H17 - an upside surprise which supported copper prices. Going into 2018, we expect a managed deceleration in China - and in China's demand for copper - to be mitigated by stronger demand from the rest of the world. In fact, the IMF revised up its 2018 and 2019 global growth forecasts in the latest WEO Update earlier this week (Table 2). Global growth is now forecast to reach 3.9% in 2018, up from the estimated 3.7% last year. Chart 7China's Q4 Imports Were Strong Table 2Upward Revisions To IMF Growth Projections Chart 8Speed Bump Ahead For China? That said, our China construction Indicator - which includes several variables measuring construction activity in China - shows strong growth in the main end-user for copper (Chart 8). Given that building construction accounts for 43% of copper end-use in China, this indicates demand for copper should remain healthy in the near term. Furthermore, despite concerns of a slowdown, China's manufacturing PMI still points to a healthy economy. Even so, a decline in the Li Keqiang Index, which tracks industrial activity, warrants caution and could be signaling trouble ahead for the Chinese economy. In addition, government spending has decelerated significantly from its mid-2017 peak. Against these risks, the global economy is expected to remain strong. Thus the biggest risk to our assessment is a pronounced deceleration in China which would hit demand for the red metal. Bottom Line: The major risk to refined copper demand this year is a slowdown from China. Downside Risk From A Stronger USD In addition to the fundamental variables highlighted above, U.S. monetary policy - and its effect on the USD - will also be an important driver of the copper market. We expect the Fed to embark on its interest rate normalization process more aggressively this year, hiking its policy rate up to four times. This would see copper prices weaken as the red metal becomes more expensive in USD terms. The USD is significant because a weaker dollar means that dollar-based commodities are cheaper for foreign buyers. Thus, foreigners tend to buy dollar-denominated commodities when the USD is weak, and sell when the USD is strong, in order to also benefit from exchange rate differentials. Continued weakness of the USD has been supportive of copper prices since the beginning of 2017. A risk to our outlook is an unexpectedly dovish Fed, which would keep the dollar muted and be favorable to copper. Bottom Line: We expect the copper market to record a small physical deficit this year. A stronger USD and deceleration in China will prevent a repeat of 2017's performance. However supply side disruptions at the mine and refined levels will provide opportunities for some upside in the market. Synchronized global demand will be a tailwind throughout the year. In the near term, we expect copper to continue gyrating around its current level of $3.10/lb. Absent a marked slowdown in China, we expect a rally into mid-year as contract renegotiations get underway. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Copper soars to 4-year high as funds bet on shortages," dated December 28, 2017, available at reuters.com. 2 Please see "As China restricts scrap metal companies look to process copper abroad," dated January 8, 2018, available at reuters.com. 3 Please see "Chinese Copper Smelter Halts Capacity to Ease Winter Pollution," dated December 7, 2017, available at Bloomberg.com. 4 Please see "Copper Rallies to Three-Year High as China Plant Halts Output," dated December 26, 2017, available at Bloomberg.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017

Highlights Global Duration Strategy: Global bond yields continue to move higher, driven by rising inflation expectations and falling investor risk aversion. With global interest rates still not at levels that will restrict growth or draw capital away from booming equity markets, the path of least resistance for yields remains upward. Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance, with a bearish curve steepening bias in the U.S. and core Europe. U.K. Gilts: The momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. Stay overweight Gilts. Feature Revisiting Our Duration Strategy After The Rise In Yields Global government bond markets have started 2018 in a grumpy mood. The price return on the overall Barclays Global Treasury index is already down -0.6% so far in January, and yields are up for almost every country and maturity bucket within the developed market universe. Only longer-dated Peripheral European debt (Italy, Spain, Portugal, even Greece) has seen lower yields month-to-date, as the powerful growth upturn in the Euro Area has resulted in sovereign credit upgrades and narrowing spreads to core European bonds. The global sell-off has been led by the U.S., with the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury yield climbing all the way to 2.66% last week, already surpassing the 2016 high seen last March. Rising inflation expectations are the biggest culprit, with the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate climbing to 2.07%, the highest level since 2014. Chart of the WeekNo Good News For Bonds Right Now The relentless surge in global stock markets - driven by faster worldwide economic growth and an absence of volatility - is also helping fuel the bearishness in government bond markets. The economic growth momentum is showing no signs of abating. The IMF just raised its global growth forecast for both 2018 and 2019 to 3.9% in both years - the fastest pace since 2011 - largely because of the impact of the U.S. tax cuts but also because of much faster expected growth in Europe.1 The IMF noted that "the cyclical rebound could prove stronger in the near term as the pickup in activity and easier financial conditions reinforce each other." We could not agree more. With robust growth pushing a majority of economies to operate beyond full employment, and with financial conditions remaining highly accommodative, global bond markets are now pricing in both higher inflation expectations and less accommodative monetary policy (Chart of the Week). While we only expect actual rate increases in the U.S. and Canada in 2018, the pressures on global central banks to respond to the coordinated growth upturn with hawkish talk will keep government bond markets on the defensive - especially if global inflation rates are moving up at the same time. Diminishing demand for government bonds from recently reliable sources may also act to push up yields in the months ahead. A reduced pace of asset purchases from the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ), combined with the Fed reducing the reinvestments of its maturing Treasury holdings, means that the private sector must now absorb a greater share of bond issuance, on the margin. In the U.S. in particular, the biggest swing factor for the Treasury market could end up being the retail investor. Households have been notably risk-averse in the years since the Great Financial Crisis, keeping relatively high allocations to fixed income and relatively low allocations to equities after suffering such steep losses in the 2008 crash. Those attitudes are changing, however, with the U.S. equity market continuing to hit new all-time highs amid increased media coverage of the rally (as well as the bullish Tweets from the White House taking credit for it). The latest University of Michigan U.S. consumer confidence survey showed that the expected probability of another year of rising stock prices is now at the highest level (66%) in the fifteen years that question was asked. U.S. investment advisors are also very optimistic, with the Investors' Intelligence bull/bear ratio back to the highest level since 1987! (Chart 2) Yet actual equity returns over the past three years have lagged those seen during periods of elevated investor sentiment, like in 1987, 2005 and 2014 (Chart 2). What is missing now is a big surge of retail investor money into equities that can fuel the next leg of the equity rally, particularly through mutual funds and ETFs. Chart 2The Bond-Bearish Equity Party##BR##Is Just Getting Started This is starting to happen. The rolling 12-month total of net flows into U.S. equity mutual funds and ETFs is about to accelerate into positive territory for the first time since 2012, according to data from the Investment Company Institute (3rd panel). This could soon pose a problem for U.S. bond markets as, since 2008, there has been a reliable negative correlation between U.S. retail flows into equity funds and flows into fixed income funds, especially at major turning points (bottom panel). For example, after that 2012 bottom in net equity flows, the rolling total of net flows into bond funds collapsed from over $400bn to zero in a span of 18 months, with the vast majority of the outflow from bonds going into equities. An exodus of U.S. retail investors from fixed income would be a major problem for bond markets, especially at a time when net Treasury issuance is expected to increase due to wider fiscal deficits and the Fed will be buying fewer bonds as it begins to unwind its massive balance sheet. Other buyers like commercial banks and global reserve fund managers can pick up some of the slack if the retail bid fades from U.S. Treasuries. However, in an environment of strong global growth, rising inflation and more hawkish central banks, it may require higher yields to entice those buyers to ramp up their allocations. In the near-term, the next wave of global bond-bearish news will have to come from upside surprises in inflation, not growth. The Citi Global Economic Data Surprise index - which has historically correlated with swings in global bond yields - is now at elevated levels which should raise the odds of data disappointments as growth expectations get revised up (Chart 3). The Citi Global Inflation Data Surprise index, however, remains just below zero after last year's plunge, but is showing signs of stabilizing (bottom panel). U.S. inflation is already starting to bottom out, but Euro Area core inflation has been underwhelming of late. It will likely take a rise in the latter to trigger the next move higher in global yields, as the market will begin to more aggressively price in less accommodative monetary policy from the ECB. For now, U.S. Treasuries are driving the path of yields, with the "leadership" of the bond bear market expected to switch to Europe later on in 2018. In terms of our recommend duration strategy and country allocations, we are sticking with our current positions which are finally beginning to move in favor of our forecasts (Chart 4): Chart 3The Next Leg Higher In Global Yields##BR##Must Be Driven By Inflation Surprises Chart 4Our Recommended##BR##Country & Curve Allocations Underweights to countries where we expect central banks to hike rates (U.S., Canada) or more openly discuss a tapering of asset purchases (Germany, France). Overweights to countries where we expect no change in policy rates (U.K., Australia) or only modest changes to asset purchase programs (Japan). Positioning for steeper yield curves in countries where growth is strong, economies are at or beyond full employment, but where inflation expectations remain far enough below central bank targets to prevent policymakers from turning more hawkish faster than expected (U.S., Germany, Japan). Bottom Line: Global bond yields continue to move higher, driven by rising inflation expectations and falling investor risk aversion. With global interest rates still not at levels that will restrict growth or draw capital away from booming equity markets, the path of least resistance for yields remains upward. Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance, with a bearish curve steepening bias in the U.S. and core Europe. U.K. Gilts: The BoE's Hands Are Tied In our final report of 2017, we updated our recommended allocations in our Model Bond Portfolio based on the key views stemming from the 2018 BCA Outlook.2 We upgraded our country allocation to U.K. Gilts to overweight, primarily as a "defensive" position within a portfolio positioned for an expected rise in global bond yields. That may sound surprising given the current elevated level of inflation and low unemployment rate in the U.K. Yet our view is based on the notion that the Bank of England (BoE) will have a very difficult time trying to raise interest rates at all in 2018 when other major global central banks are likely to take a more hawkish turn. The main reason that the BoE will be unable to do much on the interest rate front is that the U.K. economy is likely to slow in the coming quarters. The OECD leading economic indicator is decelerating steadily, and is pointing to a real GDP growth rate below 2% in 2018 (Chart 5). The updated IMF forecast for the U.K. calls for growth to only reach 1.5% in both 2018 and 2019. The biggest factors that will weigh on growth will be a sluggish consumer and softer capex. Household consumption growth has already been slowing since early 2017, driven by diminishing consumer confidence (Chart 6, top panel). High realized inflation which has sapped the purchasing power of U.K. workers who have not seen matching increases in wages, is weighing on confidence (3rd panel). Consumers were able to maintain a decent pace of spending during a period of stagnant real income growth by drawing down on savings, but that looks to be tapped out now with the saving rate down to a 19-year low of 5.5% (bottom panel). Chart 5U.K. Growth Set To Slow Chart 6The U.K. Consumer Looks Tapped Out Making matters worse, U.K. consumers are not seeing much of a wealth effect from the housing market. The December 2017 readings of the year-over-year growth rate of U.K. house prices from the Halifax and Nationwide house prices came in at 1.1% and 2.5% respectively (Chart 7, top panel). In addition, the net balance of national house price expectations from the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) survey has steadily declined since mid-2016 and now sits just above zero (i.e. equal number of respondents expecting higher prices and falling prices). The same indicator for London was a staggering -54% in November 2017. U.K. homeowners have had to take a lot of hits over the past couple of years. A 2016 hike in the stamp duty for second homes and buy-to-let properties prompted a plunge in more "speculative" property transactions. The squeeze on real household incomes that has damaged consumer spending has also made homes less affordable, even with very low mortgage rates. Most importantly, the 2016 Brexit vote and subsequent uncertainty over the U.K.'s future relationship with Europe has placed an enormous cloud over housing demand - both from potential reduced immigration to the U.K. and businesses and jobs potentially relocating to European Union countries. The Brexit uncertainty is also weighing on U.K. business investment spending. U.K. capital expenditure growth slowed to 4.3% year-over-year in nominal terms in Q3 2017, and is even lower in real terms (Chart 8, top panel). Capex is generally import-intensive, and the rise in import costs due to the depreciation of the Pound after the 2016 Brexit vote raised the cost of investment. Chart 7No Growth In##BR##U.K. Housing Chart 8Brexit Gloom Trumps Export##BR##Boom For U.K. Companies This explains why U.K. capital spending has lagged even with manufacturing indicators in decent shape, such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) survey which shows the highest readings on total industrial orders and export orders since 1988 and 1995, respectively (2nd panel). Yet non-financial credit growth stalled out in the latter half of 2017, while the CBI survey of business optimism has turned into negative territory. Brexit uncertainties are clearly trumping strong export demand, thus U.K. capital investment is likely to remain sluggish in 2018 even with robust global growth. With U.K. economic growth likely to slow in 2018, the lingering problem of high inflation should start to fade. Already, both headline and core CPI inflation have stabilized, with the latter actually drifting a touch lower in the latter half of 2017 (Chart 9). The small gap between the two can be explained by the rise in global oil prices seen over the past year. The impact of oil on U.K. inflation expectations is relatively modest compared to other countries with much lower realized inflation rates, as we discussed in last week's Weekly Report.3 What is far more relevant is the path of British pound. The 16% plunge in the trade-weighted sterling index after the 2016 Brexit vote was a major reason why U.K. realized inflation blew through the BoE's 2% target last year. The currency has since stabilized at a depressed level and traded in a relatively narrow range in 2017. The trade-weighted index is now 3% above year-ago-levels, which should help U.K. inflation rates drift lower in the next 6-12 months - especially if U.K. growth underwhelms at the same time. Already, the more stable currency has allowed the inflation rates of import prices and producer prices to fall sharply last year (bottom panel), which should soon start to feed through into overall inflation rates. Lower realized inflation would be a welcome boost for the spending power of U.K. households and businesses, but will likely be dwarfed by the impact of oil prices in the near term. More importantly, the slowing momentum of economic growth, now fueled more by Brexit uncertainty than high inflation, will limit the BoE's ability to continue normalizing the very low level of U.K. interest rates. Our 12-month U.K. discounter shows that markets are pricing in 25bps of rate hikes over the next twelve months (Chart 10). The forward path of interest rates shown in the U.K. Overnight Index Swaps curve suggests that the hike could come by October. That is unlikely to happen given the slump in leading economic indicators, and peaking in currency-fueled inflation, currently underway. Chart 9Currency-Fueled U.K. Inflation Is Peaking Out Chart 10Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts A stand-pat BoE, combined with more stable and potentially falling U.K. inflation, will limit the ability for U.K. Gilt yields to rise by as much as we are expecting in the U.S., and even core Europe, over the next 6-12 months. Gilts have become a relative safe haven within a global bond bear market in the developed markets, with a yield beta of around 0.5 to U.S. Treasuries and German government bonds. This has already allowed Gilts to outperform the Barclays Global Treasury index (in currency-hedged terms) since the most recent cyclical low in global bond yields last September (bottom panel). We continue to expect Gilts to outperform in 2018. Stay overweight. Bottom Line: The momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. Stay overweight Gilts. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst Ray@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/01/11/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2018 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Our Model Bond Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves", dated December 19th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Importance Of Oil", dated January 16th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Trade #1: Go Short The December 2018 Fed Funds Futures Contract. The trade has gained 64 bps since we initiated it. We are lifting the stop to 60 bps and targeting a profit of 75 bps. Trade #2: Go Long Global Industrial Stocks Versus Utilities. The trade is up 13.1%. We are targeting a profit of 15%, and are tightening the stop further to 12%. Trade #3: Go Short 20-Year JGBs Relative To Their 5-Year Counterparts. The trade is up 0.7%. We see this as a multi-year trade with significant upside potential. The unwinding of heavy short positions could cause the yen to strengthen temporarily. The euro is vulnerable to negative growth surprises. A retracement of some of its recent gains is likely. Feature Looking Back, Thinking Forward I had the pleasure of speaking at BCA's Annual Investment Conference held in New York on September 27th of last year where I offered three "tantalizing" trade ideas. Chart 1 reviews their performance. They were the following: Trade #1: Go Short The December 2018 Fed Funds Futures Contract We argued last summer that U.S. growth was likely to accelerate, taking rate expectations higher. That has indeed happened. Aggregate hours worked rose by 2.5% in Q4 over the previous quarter. Assuming that productivity increased by 1.5% in Q4 - equal to the pace recorded in Q3 - real GDP probably increased by nearly 4%. A variety of leading indicators point to continued above-trend growth in the months ahead (Chart 2). Chart 1Three Tantalizing Trades: ##br##An Update Chart 2Leading Indicators Pointing ##br##To Above-Trend U.S. Growth We think the Fed will raise rates four times this year, one more hike than projected by the dots and roughly 35 bps more in tightening than implied by current market expectations. The median Fed dot calls for an unemployment rate of 3.9% by end-2018, only marginally lower than today's rate of 4.1%. We have been saying for a while that above-trend growth will take the unemployment rate down to a 49-year low of 3.5% by the end of this year. If the unemployment rate falls this much, the Fed will probably turn more hawkish. Stronger inflation numbers should also give the Fed confidence to keep raising rates once per quarter. Core inflation surprised on the upside in December. We expect this trend to continue in the coming months, as the ISM manufacturing index, the New York Fed's Inflation Gauge, and our own proprietary pipeline inflation index are already foreshadowing (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Inflation ##br##Should Accelerate Chart 4A Pick-Up In Wage Growth ##br##Would Put Upward Pressure On Service Inflation As we noted two weeks ago,1 service sector inflation should get a lift from faster wage growth this year (Chart 4). Goods inflation should also rise on the back of higher oil prices and the lagged effects of a weaker dollar (Chart 5). In addition, health care inflation is likely to pick up from its current depressed level, especially if the Congressional Budget Office is correct that insurance premiums will rise due to the elimination of the individual mandate (Chart 6). Housing inflation will moderate, but this is unlikely to stymie the Fed's tightening plans since excessively low interest rates could lead to even more overbuilding in the increasingly vulnerable commercial real estate sector. Chart 5Higher Oil Prices And A Weaker Dollar ##br##Are A Tailwind For Inflation Chart 6Health Care Inflation ##br##Should Move Higher Granted, four rate hikes equal four opportunities to defer raising rates. It is easy to imagine scenarios where the Fed stands pat, but hard to conjure scenarios where the Fed has to raise rates five times or more this year. Thus, the risk to our four-hike view is to the downside. As such, we will be looking to take profits of 75 bps on the trade, and are putting in a stop of 60 bps. Trade #2: Go Long Global Industrial Stocks Versus Utilities Capital spending tends to accelerate in the late innings of business-cycle expansions. We are in such a phase now, as evidenced by capital goods orders, capex intention surveys, and our global capex model (Chart 7). Increased capital spending will benefit industrial companies. Conversely, rising bond yields will hurt rate-sensitive utilities. Valuations in the industrial sector have gotten stretched, but are not at extreme levels (Chart 8). Based on enterprise value-to-EBITDA, industrials are still only slightly more expensive than utilities compared to their post-1990 average. Chart 7Capex Is Shifting Into ##br##Higher Gear Chart 8Industrial Stocks: Valuations Are Stretched, ##br## But Not Yet Extreme While we do think global growth will slow this year from the heady pace of 2017, it should remain firmly above-trend. A bigger-than-expected slowdown - especially if it is concentrated in China - would undoubtedly hurt industrials. A stronger dollar could also be a headwind. Thus, we are keeping this trade on a short leash, with a target of 15% and a stop of 12%. Trade #3: Go Short 20-Year JGBs Relative To Their 5-Year Counterparts The Japanese economy is on fire. Growth almost reached 2% in 2017 and leading indicators suggest a solid start to 2018 (Chart 9). The unemployment rate has fallen to 2.7%, a full point below 2007 levels. The ratio of job openings-to-applicants has surpassed its bubble peak. The Tankan Employment Conditions Index is pointing to an exceptionally tight labor market. Wages excluding overtime pay are rising at the fastest pace in twenty years (Chart 10). Chart 9Japanese Growth Momentum Is Positive Chart 10Signs Of A Tight Labor Market Inflation is low but is starting to edge up. The most recent release surprised on the upside. Inflation expectations moved higher on the news, benefiting our long Japanese 10-year CPI swap trade recommendation (Chart 11). A simple scatterplot between the unemployment rate and core inflation suggests the Phillips curve remains intact in Japan -- amazingly, it even looks like Japan (Chart 12)! Chart 11Inflation Expectations Have Edged Higher Chart 12The Phillips Curve In Japan Looks Like Japan Still, with core inflation excluding food and energy running at only 0.3%, there is a long way to go before inflation reaches the BoJ's target -- and even longer if the BoJ honours its promise to generate a meaningful overshoot to compensate for the below-target inflation of prior years. This suggests the BoJ will not meaningfully water down its Yield Curve Control regime anytime soon. As such, five-year yields are likely to stay put while yields with maturities in excess of ten years should move higher. Our "tantalizing trade" being short 20-year JGBs versus their 5-year counterparts still has a long way to run. Too Risky To Short The Yen The exceptionally strong correlation between USD/JPY and U.S. Treasury yields has broken down this year (Chart 13). Had the relationship held, the yen would have actually weakened against the dollar. Still, we are reluctant to get too bearish on the yen (Chart 14). The yen real effective exchange rate is close to multi-decade lows. Positioning on the currency is heavily short. The current account surplus has mushroomed from close to zero in 2014 to 4% of GDP at present. And even if the BoJ keeps the Yield Curve Control regime in place, investors may still anticipate its demise, leading to a temporary bout of yen strength. Chart 13Strong Correlation Is Broken Chart 14Too Risky To Short The Yen What's Propping Up The Euro? The euro has been on a tear since last week, egged on by the ECB minutes, which hinted at a faster pace of monetary normalization. Growing confidence that Angela Merkel will be able to form a grand coalition also helped the common currency, along with hopes that the new government will loosen the fiscal purse strings. The euro is often thought of as the "anti-dollar." And sure enough, the euro's strength has been reflected in a broad-based decline in the dollar index in recent days. BCA's Global Investment Strategy service went long the dollar on October 31, 2014. We "doubled up" on this call in the fall of 2016, controversially arguing that "Trump will win and the dollar will rally." Obviously, in retrospect, I should have rung the register and declared victory on our long dollar view when I had the chance. EUR/USD fell to 1.04 on December 2016, within striking distance of our parity target. Bullish dollar sentiment had reached unsustainably lofty levels. That was the time to sell the greenback. But hubris got the best of me. While our other currency trade recommendations have delivered net gains of 11% since the start of 2017, the long DXY trade has stuck out like a sore thumb. Hindsight is 20/20. The key question is what to do today. EUR/USD is still trading below the level it was at when we went long the DXY. Relative to the IMF's Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate of 1.32, the euro is 7% undervalued. That said, PPP exchange rates may not be a reliable benchmark in this case. Given current market expectations, EUR/USD would need to strengthen to 1.41 over the next ten years just to cover the carry cost of being short the dollar. Even assuming lower inflation in the euro area, that would still leave the euro trading above its long-term fair value. It is possible, of course, that rate differentials will narrow further, but the scope for this is more limited than it might appear. The market currently expects policy rates ten years out to be 95 basis points higher in the U.S., down from a spread of nearly 180 basis points in late December (Chart 15). Given that euro area inflation expectations are 40-to-50 bps lower than in the U.S., this implies a real spread of about 50 bps - broadly in line with our estimate of the real neutral rate gap between the two regions. Ultimately, the fate of the euro in 2018 will rest on the same question that drove the currency in 2017: Will euro area growth surprise on the upside, prompting investors to price in a faster pace of monetary normalization? The bar for success is certainly higher at present. Chart 16 shows that euro area consensus growth estimates have risen significantly since the start of last year. The expected lift-off date for policy rates has also shifted in by more than a year to mid-2019. Considering that Jens Weidmann stated earlier this week that he thinks current market pricing is broadly consistent with when the ECB expects to hike rates, there is little scope for the lift-off date to move forward. Chart 15Little Scope For Rate Differentials ##br## To Narrow Further Chart 16Euro Area Growth Estimates Have Been Revised Up ##br##Since The Start Of 2017 Meanwhile, financial conditions have tightened significantly in the euro area relative to the U.S., the euro area credit impulse has turned negative, and the U.S. economic surprise index has jumped above that of the euro area (Chart 17). Euro area inflation has also dipped. Especially worrying is that core inflation in Italy has fallen back to a near record-low of 0.4% (Chart 18). How is Italy supposed to navigate its way out of its debt trap if nominal growth stays this weak? On top of all that, long speculative euro positions have soared to record-high levels (Chart 19). Given the choice of betting whether EUR/USD will first hit 1.30 or 1.15, we would go with the latter. If our bet turns out to be correct, we will use that opportunity to shift to neutral on the dollar. Chart 17The Euro Is Vulnerable ##br##To Negative Growth Surprises Chart 18Euro Area Core Inflation ##br##Has Dipped Chart 19Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short ##br##To Record Long Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Four Key Questions On The 2018 Global Growth Outlook," dated January 5, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Slower global demand growth, coupled with surging production from the U.S. shales and higher OPEC 2.0 production, risks reversing the progress made in draining global commercial oil storage and tanking prices in 2019.1 Our updated balances modelling is in agreement with the backwardation in forward Brent and WTI curves, but, if anything, indicates the backwardation should be more pronounced: We are forecasting Brent and WTI prices next year will average $55 and $53/bbl, respectively, vs. $62.80/bbl and $57.40/bbl average prices for 2019's forward curves. For 2018, we are maintaining our $67 and $63/bbl expectation for Brent and WTI, although our modelling indicates higher prices are a distinct possibility, given our fundamental assumptions of falling supply and rising demand this year (Chart of the Week). Energy: Overweight. We liquidated our May and July Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads last week with gains of 110.1% and 129.0%. We will be liquidating our Dec/18 Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads at tonight's close; they were up 62.3% and 82.1% as of Tuesday. We remain long Jul/18 vs. Dec/18 WTI (up 47.4%), and long the S&P GSCI (up 8.5%), expecting backwardation. We will get long $55 Brent Puts vs. short $50 Brent Puts in 4Q19 at tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. We continue to expect base metals to remain well supported in 1H18 by environmental reforms in China, and supply uncertainty around contract renegotiations at the copper mines. The global expansion underpinning demand will compensate for slower Chinese growth in 2H18. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 8.5% since inception in May/17. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Soybean markets rallied following last week's USDA WASDE report, but grains fell amid data indicating these markets will remain oversupplied. Feature If there is one truth in commodity markets it is this: The best cure for high prices is high prices, and vice versa. This is being dramatically demonstrated by OPEC 2.0 in its collective action to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market following disastrously low prices in 2015 - 16. Higher prices in 4Q17 and 1H18 oil futures are incentivizing a surge in U.S. shale output, and will give OPEC 2.0 comfort in slowly feeding output taken offline at the beginning of 2017 back into the market in 2H18 and 2019 (Chart 2). Higher prices and tightening monetary conditions globally will slow the rate of growth in demand next year (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekFundamentals##BR##Support Oil In 2018 Chart 2Non-OPEC Production##BR##Will Surge Chart 3Strong Consumption Growth In 2018,##BR##Tempered By Higher Prices In 2019 Given these fundamental inputs, we expect to see Brent averaging $55/bbl next year, and WTI averaging $53/bbl next year. Our forecast is highly uncertain, given the actual evolution of prices will, once again, depend on actions taken by OPEC 2.0 and the forward guidance provided by its leadership, KSA and Russia. Our forecast for 2018 - $67/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI - remains unchanged. If anything, our unconstrained models (Chart of the Week) have more upside risk than our forecast suggests, largely from falling production and surging demand - not to mention unplanned production outages. Looking to the end of 2019 from today, the backwardation we expect is greater than what is being priced into the Brent and WTI forward curves presently. Growth In U.S. Shales Dominates Non-OPEC Gains We are expecting U.S. crude oil production growth will dominate the increase in non-OPEC output in 2018 and 2019 (Chart 2, top panel). U.S. shale-oil output rises by 970k b/d and another 1.18mm b/d, respectively, this year and in 2019. By our reckoning, this will lift total U.S. crude oil production to 10.22mm b/d this year, a record level of output, and to 11.44mm b/d on average next year. Total U.S. crude and liquids output therefore rises from just under 17mm b/d in 2018 to 18.5mm b/d by the end of 2019. If our estimates are correct, the U.S. will join Russia in producing more than 11mm b/d of crude oil next year, and may even exceed it. Russia is expected to raise production slightly. As one of the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, we expect Russia to maintain its 300k b/d production cut in 1H18, which will keep its overall liquids production steady at ~ 11.17mm b/d through June. In 2H18, Russia will gradually restore production to an average of 11.24mm b/d, reaching 11.4mm b/d by December. For 2019, we expect total Russian liquids production to average 11.35mm b/d, up ~ 140k b/d yoy. OPEC's return will be led by the Cartel's Gulf producers, which are expected to raise crude production 450k b/d this year and 350k b/d next year (Chart 2, bottom panel). Total production in Gulf OPEC states will reach 25.25mm b/d on average in 2019. This will, of course, be dominated by KSA, which we expect will lift crude production to ~ 10.36mm b/d in 2H18 after holding crude output steady at ~ 10mm b/d in 1H18 over-delivering vs. its quota under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement. For 2019, we expect KSA to maintain production above 10.1mm b/d.2 Non-Gulf OPEC producers, on the other hand, will see their production fall 140k b/d this year, and another 240k b/d next year, leaving it at 7.49mm b/d on average in 2019, in our estimation. The contribution of these states to the OPEC 2.0 production cuts has been "managing" their respective decline curves. It is highly unlikely they will see production surge following the expiration of the OPEC 2.0 agreement at the end of this year. Overall, we expect global crude and liquids production to reach 100mm b/d this year, and 102.2mm b/d next year (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Oil Demand Surges This Year, But Slows In 2019 The global economic expansion will lift oil demand above 100mm b/d this year to 100.3mm b/d. This will be led, as always, by non-OECD growth, which we expect to increase 1.24mm b/d this year to 52.8mm b/d (Chart 3, top panel). DM demand - i.e., OECD consumption - will increase 440k b/d this year, to 47.5mm b/d, based on our estimates. Overall global demand rises 1.68mm b/d this year, by our reckoning (Chart 3). We expect tighter financial conditions this year and next will, with the lags typical of monetary policy, slow the rate of growth in oil demand next year. This will be delivered by tightening monetary policy, led by the U.S. Fed, and a mild recession next year, most likely in 2H19. We expect global demand to grow 1.57mm b/d next year, rising to just under 102mm b/d. EM demand will grow 1.21mm b/d, while DM demand will be up 360k b/d next year. Tightening Balances Will Reverse In 2H18 The yeoman effort put forth by OPEC 2.0 in reducing output and draining commercial inventories globally will reach its apotheosis by the end of 1H18 (Charts 4). Thereafter, as production grows and demand begins to slow, our balances indicate inventories will start to grow again (Chart 5). Chart 4Supply-Demand Balances##BR##No Longer Tightening In 2019 ... Chart 5... Leading To##BR##Inventory Accumulation Markets likely will start focusing on the implications of OPEC 2.0 returning production to the market and the surge in shale in 2H18 and during 2019. Non-forecastable events notwithstanding - e.g., a breakdown in Venezuela's production and exports - markets will be looking to OPEC 2.0 leadership for guidance on how the coalition will manage member-state production from 2H18 forward. If the OPEC 2.0 coalition is allowed to dissolve - something we do not expect - and a production free-for-all resumes similar to that of 2015 - 16, another round of supply destruction, brought about by lower prices, likely will ensue. This would greatly restrict E&P and services companies' access to capital, should it occur, and would, once again, imperil the economies of OPEC 2.0. In addition, because such volatility would discourage investment once again, it would set up a powerful price rally in the early 2020s following the attendant collapse in capex and E&P spending, as occurred in the previous down-cycle. We doubt this is the desired outcome of the OPEC 2.0 leadership, particularly KSA, as the Kingdom will be looking to IPO Saudi Aramco later this year to fund its Vision 2030 diversification efforts. We also doubt this is the desired outcome of Russia, given the economic pain it endured in the 2015 - 16 episode. More Frequent OPEC 2.0 Guidance Expected Given these considerations, we expect KSA and Russia to increase the frequency of forward guidance, directing market participants toward a preferred price band. Right now, this looks like a $50 to $60/bbl range - the 2018 forecast given by Russia's Energy Minister Alexander Novak earlier this week.3 It would be incumbent on OPEC 2.0 leadership to guide markets to expect production and inventory responses consistent with such guidance. We think the combination of OPEC 2.0 production restraint and the powerful synchronized global growth already in place puts Energy Minister Novak's guidance out of range for this year, and we are sticking with our forecasts for Brent and WTI. However, beginning in 2H18, a 2019 Brent forecast in Novak's range appears reasonable, based on the fundamentals discussed above. And, our WTI forecast of $53/bbl also is reasonable, given the average marginal cost of producing in the most prolific fields in the U.S. are at or below $50/bbl, according to the Dallas Fed's periodic Energy Survey.4 We believe the massive drawdown in global oil inventories to be the first step in a longer-term strategy by OPEC 2.0 countries. Lower OECD commercial inventory levels will diminish their shock-absorbing capacity, leading to a higher responsiveness of oil prices to supply-demand shocks. This will allow the coalition to exert greater control over oil prices via rapid, flexible storage adjustments and spare capacity management. Therefore, this year's out-of-range prices will be tolerated by Russia and KSA to achieve their optimal level of global inventories. A $50-to-$60/bbl Brent range for OPEC 2.0 would be consistent with a longer-term strategy to maximize the period of time hydrocarbons are the primary transportation fuel in the world. This is the only way to achieve the development goals set out by leaders of various oil-exporting states seeking to diversify the economic underpinnings of these economies. To do so, they have to keep oil-based transportation competitive for decades. Too much volatility - i.e., frequent excursions between very high and very low prices - will severely limit the access to capital these societies need to pull off this diversification. Managing production in a way that limits this volatility and keeps oil competitive in transport markets therefore is critical. Bottom Line: High prices will cause crude oil production to surge this year and next, particularly in the U.S. shales, and demand growth to slow. We expect Brent prices to average $67/bbl this year and $55/bbl next year. WTI prices will average $63/bbl this year and $53/bbl next year. We expect OPEC 2.0 to increase the frequency of its forward guidance - and to follow through on production and inventory adjustment in a manner that supports a desired price range for Brent prices in 2019 and into the 2020s. Right now, that range looks like $50 to $60/bbl. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is a name we coined to describe the oil-producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which was formed at the end of 2016 to rein in out-of-control global oil production by cutting production some 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d last year (vs. a target of 1.8mm b/d). The coalition has been remarkably successful in maintaining production discipline in 2017 and extending their deal to the end of 2018 with an option to review quotas in June. We expect OPEC 2.0 to gradually return production taken off the market over the course of 2H18, which will, by next year, most likely reverse the draws seen in global inventories. 2 KSA's production should lift next year as pipeline repairs at its giant Manifa field are completed. Corrosion problems took some 300k of 900k b/d total production offline. In addition, there is another 500k b/d of capacity offline in the Neutral Zone shared with Kuwait. KSA's capacity likely will remain ~ 11.7mm b/d, versus its historical 12.5mm level, but as Energy Intelligence notes, it will have to balance actual production with spare capacity for the next year or so. Please see "A Headache for Aramco," published July 2017 by Energy Intelligence on its website. 3 Please see "CORRECTED-UPDATE 5-Brent oil falls by $1 but demand underpins near $70/barrel," published by uk.reuters.com on January 16, 2018. 4 In its December 2017 Dallas Fed Energy Survey, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas reported the WTI price shale operators needed to profitably drill a new well in Texas and Oklahoma averaged $49/bbl (simple, unweighted survey average). The lowest cost was in the Permian Midland formation ($46/bbl) and the highest costs was in so-called Other U.S. (shale) at $55/bbl. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017

ハイライト ビットコインの「合成」供給が金融デリバティブを通じて増加し、大手既存テクノロジー企業によるビットコイン類似の代替通貨の立ち上げが加わると、暗号通貨市場は自らの重みで崩壊するでしょう。 今後数年で供給増に起因する圧力を受け得る他の分野としては、原油、ハイイールド債、世界の不動産、低ボラティリティ取引が挙げられます。 対照的に、米国株式市場は自社株買いと自発的な上場廃止により株式供給の減少が観察されています。 投資家はハイイールド債に対して米国株をロングすることを検討しつつ、ボラティリティ上昇に備えるべきです。 このような結果は1990年代後半に起きた状況に類似している可能性があり、その期間はVIXとクレジットスプレッドが上昇傾向にある一方で株式は史上最高値を更新し続けました。 NAFTA交渉の決裂はカナダドルとメキシコ・ペソにとって依然として主要なリスクです。 特集 供給過剰でバブルが崩壊する 価格上昇の「治療法」はさらなる価格上昇である。ドットコムと住宅バブルは完全に自然消滅したわけではない。その崩壊は市場に新たな供給が波のように押し寄せたことで促進された。ドットコム・バブルの場合、2000年には新規公開（IPO）や二次公募による株式の洪水が投資家を圧倒し（チャート1）、インターネット株の価格に大きな下押し圧力を与えた。住宅ブームも同様に新規建設の急増によって覆された。住宅投資は2006年にGDP比6.6%と55年ぶりの高水準に達した（チャート2）。 チャート1 供給過剰による崩壊：例1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 チャート2 供給過剰による崩壊：例2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 ビットコインは同様の運命をたどろうとしているのだろうか？表面的には「いいえ」のように見えるかもしれない。より多くのビットコインが「マイニング」されるにつれ、追加生産の計算上のコストは指数関数的に上昇する。理論上、流通可能なビットコインは2100万枚に制限され、その約80%は既に生成されている（チャート3）。しかし、表面の下を見れば、ビットコインはさまざまな「供給側」要因に脆弱である可能性がある。 チャート3 ビットコイン：大部分は既に採掘済み ビットコイン：大部分はすでにマイニング済み ビットコイン：大部分はすでにマイニング済み まず第一に、ビットコインの価値に連動する金融デリバティブの拡大は、暗号通貨の「合成」供給を生み出す脅威となる。 株式のコールオプションを売る（ライトする）とき、オプションの売り手は実質的に弱気の賭けをし、買い手は強気の賭けをしている。オプションを売るという行為自体が追加のロング・ポジションを生み、それは追加のショート・ポジションによってちょうど相殺される。さらに、特定のコールオプションを売る決定が類似のコールオプションの価格を押し下げる程度に、基礎となる株価も押し下げられるだろう。これは単純に、株式に対するロングエクスポージャーは現物株を保有するかそのコールオプションを保有することで得られるからである。後者の価格を傷つけるものは前者の価格も傷つける。 ビットコイン先物が取引され始めると、ビットコインに対して弱気の投資家はショートポジションを作り、結果として流通するビットコインの実質的な数量を増加させることができる。これは公式の発行枚数が同じままであっても起こり得る。 模倣は最大の賛辞 ビットコインの合成的な供給増はビットコイン投資家の懸念の一つである。もう一つの懸念は、ビットコイン類似の代替通貨からの競争の増大である。現在、数百もの暗号通貨が存在し、その多くはビットコインを支えるブロックチェーン技術のわずかな変形を使用している。 チャート4 政府は取り分を要求するだろう 政府は取り分を求めるだろう 政府は取り分を求めるだろう これまで新通貨の拡散は主に寝室やガレージで働く技術に精通した起業家によって牽引されてきた。しかし今や企業も参入している。営業しているらしいコダックの株価は、今週自社の暗号通貨を発表したことで3倍になった。これはこれから起こることのほんの一例に過ぎない。 フェイスブック、アマゾン、ネットフリックス、グーグルのような巨大企業が自社の暗号通貨を発行するのを妨げるものは何だろうか。彼らはすでに安全なグローバルネットワークを持っている。アマゾンは販売ごとに数コインを配り始め、消費者が新通貨で同社のオンラインストアから商品を購入できるようにすることもできる。やり方は簡単だ。1 唯一のもっともらしい制約は法的なものである：政府が自国の法定通貨への需要が落ちることを恐れて新興の暗号通貨を潰す脅威だ。数週間前に述べたように、米政府は通貨を印刷しその資金で財やサービスを購入する能力から年間約$100 billion、約1000億ドルのシニョレッジ収入を得ている（チャート4）。2 大企業が暗号通貨分野に参入すると、政府は遅かれ早かれ厳しい対応を取る可能性が高い。今週の韓国政府が取引所での暗号通貨取引禁止を検討するという報道は、その兆候である。 他にどの分野が？ 新規供給の津波に脆弱な他の分野はどこか？四つが思い浮かぶ： 原油：BCAの強気の原油見通しは大当たりだった。ブレントは昨年6月の44ドルから現在の69ドルまで上昇した。しかし今後の追加上昇はそれほど容易ではないかもしれない。当社のエネルギー・ストラテジストは米国シェール生産者の損益分岐点を50ドル台前半と見積もっている。3 現在はその水準を大きく上回っており、シェール供給は加速するだろう。これは短期的に価格がさらに上昇し得ないという意味ではないが、原油の長期的な上昇余地を制限する。 不動産：世界の多くで超低金利が住宅価格の急増を後押しした。カナダ、オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、および欧州の一部では、インフレ調整後の住宅価格は大不況前の水準を大きく上回っている（チャート5）。米国の実質住宅価格はまだ2006年のピークを下回っているが、商業用不動産（CRE）価格は新高値に達している（チャート6）。米国のCREセクター内の賃料上昇は鈍化し始めており、供給が徐々に需要に追いつきつつあることを示唆している（チャート7）。 チャート5 低金利が##br##住宅価格を押し上げた地域 低金利が住宅価格を押し上げた地域 低金利が住宅価格を押し上げた地域 チャート6 商業用不動産価格が##br##不況前の水準を上回った 商業用不動産の価格は景気後退前の水準を上回っている 商業用不動産の価格は景気後退前の水準を上回っている チャート7 賃料の伸びは鈍化している 家賃の伸びが鈍化している 家賃の伸びが鈍化している 企業債務：低金利は企業にクレジットを活用させた。米国および多くの国で企業債務の対GDP比はほぼ過去最高水準にある（チャート8A およびチャート8B）。クレジットスプレッドは依然として非常にタイトだが、これも企業債が市場に出てくるにつれて変わる可能性がある。 チャート8A 企業債務の対GDP比が##br##過去最高水準に近い 企業債務対GDP比は過去最高水準に迫っている 企業債務対GDP比は過去最高水準に迫っている チャート8B 企業債務の対GDP比が##br##過去最高水準に近い 企業債務の対GDP比は記録的高水準に迫っている 企業債務の対GDP比は記録的高水準に迫っている 低ボラティリティ取引：最近のブルームバーグの見出しは「ショート・ボラティリティ・ファンドに史上最多の資金が流入」と叫んでいた。4 Cboeで取引されるボラティリティ契約の数は2012年以降で10倍以上に増加した。ネットのショート投機ポジションは現在史上最高水準にある（チャート9）。トレーダーはここ数年、ボラティリティが低下することに賭けて巨額の利益を上げてきた。問題は、ボラティリティが上昇し始めると、同じトレーダーがポジションを一斉に手放す可能性があり、さらにボラティリティが高まる懸念があることだ。 前掲の分野とは対照的に、株式市場は自社株買いと自発的な上場廃止により株式供給の侵食を受けている。S&Pの除数（ディバイザー）は2005年以降8%以上低下している。米国の上場企業数は1990年代後半以降ほぼ半減している（チャート10）。この傾向がすぐに逆転する可能性は低く、利益率の高止まりと多くの企業が法人税減税を利用して自社株買いを加速させる誘惑があることを考えれば、なおさらである。 チャート9 低ボラティリティへの需要が高い 低ボラティリティへの需要が高まっている 低ボラティリティへの需要が高まっている チャート10 株式市場における供給の減少 株式市場における供給の侵食 株式市場における供給の侵食 株価上昇に賭ける一方、ボラティリティとクレジットスプレッドの上昇も見込む 前述の議論は、今後数か月で株価とボラティリティ、クレジットスプレッドの関係が変化する可能性を示唆している。これは初めてのことではない。チャート11は、1990年代後半にVIXとクレジットスプレッドが上昇傾向に転じた一方でS&P500は史上最高値を更新し続けたことを示している。今、我々は類似の局面に入る可能性がある。 米国でのトレンド超過の成長継続とインフレ上昇は米国債利回りを押し上げるだろう。我々は2016年7月5日に「35年間の債券ブルマーケットの終焉」と宣言したが、これはちょうど10年物米国債利回りが終値で史上最安の1.37%を記録したその日だった。5 利上げは資金繰りに苦しむ借り手を苦しめ、クレジットスプレッドを拡大させる。企業の業況が悪化し次の景気後退の時期が近づくにつれて株式のボラティリティも上昇するだろう。我々の基本シナリオでは、米国および世界は2019年後半に景気後退に陥ると見ている。 金融市場は景気後退を実際に起こる前に嗅ぎつける。ただし歴史が示すように、それは景気後退開始の約6か月前にしか起こらないことが多い（表1）。これは、世界の株式は今後12か月程度は上昇を続け得ることを示唆する。これを念頭に、我々はS&P500のロング対ハイイールド債を新規トレードとして開始する。 チャート11 株価が上昇する中でもボラティリティは上昇し、スプレッドは##br##拡大し得る 株価が上昇すると、ボラティリティが高まり、スプレッドが拡大する可能性があります。 株価が上昇すると、ボラティリティが高まり、スプレッドが拡大する可能性があります。 表1 手仕舞いにはまだ早い ビットコインはDeFANG化されるか？ ビットコインはDeFANG化されるか？ 通貨に関するクイック・ヒット（4点） 今週は4つの項目が通貨およびフィクスト・インカム市場を揺るがした。第一は中国が米国債の購入を減速または停止するという報道だ。中国の国家外為管理局（SAFE）はその報道を「フェイクニュース」と非難した。 騒ぎの中で見落とされがちなのは、中国の保有する米国債残高が2011年以降ほぼ横ばいで推移しているという事実である（チャート12）。中国は依然として高度に管理された通貨を持つ。資本流出がもはや発生していないため、中国人民銀行（PBoC）は外貨準備の再構築を始めるだろう。米国債市場が世界で最大かつ最も流動的であることを考えれば、中国が余剰外貨の多くを米国に置かざるを得ないのは避けがたいように思える。 第二は日本銀行が保有する国債の買入目標を引き下げると発表したことだ。これは既に1年以上続いている動きを形式化したに過ぎない。日本銀行のJGB買入は過去12か月で急減しており、主因は80兆円という目標が国債の年間ネット発行額30〜35兆円のほぼ2倍であるためだ（チャート13）。 チャート12 中国の米国債保有：##br##2011年以降ほぼ横ばい 中国の米国債保有高：2011年以降ほぼ横ばい 中国の米国債保有高：2011年以降ほぼ横ばい チャート13 日銀は国債買入を##br##削減している 日本銀行（BoJ）は国債の買入を縮小している 日本銀行（BoJ）は国債の買入を縮小している 最終的には、これらはそれほど重要ではないはずだ。日本銀行は価格（JGBの利回り）をターゲットにすることも、数量（保有国債の枚数）をターゲットにすることもできるが、両方を同時にターゲットにすることはできない。日銀がすでに前者を行っているという事実は後者を無意味にする。そして長期インフレ期待が日銀の目標からほど遠い現状では、前者が変わる見込みは低い。 では円には何を意味するのか。円は割安であり、経常収支の黒字はGDP比で4%に膨らんでいる（チャート14）。投機筋の円ショートも非常に大きい（チャート15）。これは短期的な上昇の可能性を高めるが、同僚のMathieu Savaryが今週指摘したように、6世界の国債利回りが上昇する一方で日本の利回りが据え置かれる場合、円が大きく上昇して持続するのは難しい。総合的には、今年はUSD/JPYがやや強含むと予想している。 チャート14 円は既に割安... 円はすでに安い… 円はすでに安い… チャート15 ...かつ不人気 ...そして愛されない ...そして愛されない 第三の項目はECBの12月議事録で、中央銀行が2018年初めにコミュニケーション方針を見直すと示唆された点だ。市場が織り込んでいるより速くECBが金融政策を正常化するという憶測がある。もしそうなればEUR/USDはさらに強含むだろう。 もちろんこれは起こり得るが、それにはユーロ圏の成長が上振れサプライズを出す必要があるだろう。それは決して確実ではない。ユーロ圏の経済サプライズ・インデックスは下落に転じ始めており、相対的には米国に対して急落している（チャート16）。米国とは異なり、ユーロ圏のクレジット・インパルスは現在マイナスである（チャート17）。ユーロ圏の金融環境も米国に比べて大幅に引き締まっている（チャート18）。 チャート16 ユーロ圏の経済サプライズが##br##下落に転じ始めている ユーロ圏の経済サプライズが小幅に低下 ユーロ圏の経済サプライズが小幅に低下 チャート17 ユーロ圏のクレジット・インパルスのマイナスは##br##成長の重しとなる ユーロ圏のマイナスのクレジット・インパルスが成長を圧迫するだろう ユーロ圏のマイナスのクレジット・インパルスが成長を圧迫するだろう チャート18 金融環境の乖離は##br##米国をユーロ圏より有利にする 金融環境の乖離は米国をユーロ圏よりも有利にする 金融環境の乖離は米国をユーロ圏よりも有利にする 一方で、EUR/USDは2016年以降、金利差の変化から予想される以上に上昇している（チャート19）。ユーロに対する投機的ポジショニングも、2017年初頭の大幅ショートから今日では大幅ロングへと変化している（チャート20）。妥当な割安感と健全な経常収支の黒字はユーロに有利に働くが、我々の最良の見立てはEUR/USDが今後数か月で上昇分の一部を手放すだろうというものである。 チャート19 金利差で説明される以上にユーロは##br##強含んだ ユーロは金利差で正当化される以上に上昇している ユーロは金利差で正当化される以上に上昇している チャート20 ユーロのポジショニング：大幅ショートから##br##史上最高のロングへ ユーロ・ポジショニング：大幅にショートから過去最高のロングへ ユーロ・ポジショニング：大幅にショートから過去最高のロングへ 最後に、今週は米国がNAFTA交渉から撤退するという報道を受けてカナダドルとメキシコ・ペソが圧迫された。ここで述べた4項目のうち、これが我々にとって最も懸念材料である。グローバルなサプライチェーンは高度に統合されている。それを破壊するものは大きな混乱を招くであろう。ある程度、トランプはこれを理解しているが、支持基盤は貿易に厳しくあってほしいと望んでおり、そうしなければ再選の見込みはさらに厳しくなることも彼は知っている。最終的には新たなNAFTA合意が成立すると期待しているが、そこに至る道のりはでこぼこだろう。 事務連絡 当社のグローバル・インダストリアルのロング／ユーティリティのショートのトレードは、9月29日に開始して以来12.4%の利益が出ている。利益保護のためストップを10%に引き上げる。2年物USD/サウジ・リヤルのフォワード契約のロングは損失2.9%で満了とし、サウジアラビアの財務状況が最近改善していることを踏まえ、同トレードは再導入しない。 ピーター・ベレジン, チーフ・グローバル・ストラテジスト グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 本トピックに関する貴重な示唆を頂いたSHIG Partners LLC代表イゴール・ヴァッセルマン氏に感謝する。 2 グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー・スペシャル・レポート「ビットコインのマクロ的影響（Bitcoin's Macro Impact）」、2017年9月15日付；およびグローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー・ウィークリー・レポート「フラット化したイールドカーブを恐れるな（Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve）」、2017年12月22日付を参照されたい。 3 エネルギー・セクター・ストラテジー・ウィークリー・レポート「損益分岐点分析：シェール企業が自立するには約50ドルの原油が必要（Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient）」、2017年3月15日付を参照。 4 Dani Burger, "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash," Bloomberg, 2017年11月6日。 5 グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー・スペシャル・アラート「35年間の債券ブルマーケットの終焉（End Of The 35-year Bond Bull Market）」、2016年7月5日付を参照。 6 フォーリン・エクスチェンジ・ストラテジー「円：QQEは死んだ！YCC万歳！（Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!）」、2018年1月12日付を参照。 タクティカル・グローバル・アセット・アロケーションの推奨 ストラテジー & マーケット・トレンド タクティカル・トレード 戦略的推奨 クローズド・トレード

特別レポート

Feature The existence of 'mini-cycles' in economic and financial variables is an empirical fact. We encourage readers to plot for themselves the change in global bank credit flows, the global bond yield, global inflation, and metal price inflation. The very clear and regular mini-cycles should shout out at you (Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart-5). Feature ChartThe Cobweb Theory Explains The Regular Mini-Cycles In Economic And Financial Variables Chart I-2Mini-Cycles In Global Credit Flows Chart I-3Mini-Cycles In The Global Bond Yield Chart I-4Mini-Cycles In Global Inflation Chart I-5Mini-Cycles In Metal Price Inflation Identifying these mini-cycles is very useful because it helps us to predict the future. Just as we know when the tide will go out and come back in, we can predict the mini-cycle's downswings and upswings. And if most market participants are unaware of the next turn in the mini-cycle, it will not be discounted in today's price - providing a compelling investment opportunity. The obvious question is: if the existence of mini-cycles is an empirical fact, what is its theoretical foundation? Dusting Down The Cobweb Theory A likely answer comes from an economic model called the Cobweb Theory, first proposed in the 1930s by several economists, among them Althus Hanau and Nicholas Kaldor. The Cobweb Theory is so called because when its predicted pattern of price and output mini-cycles is traced out on a standard price/quantity diagram, it resembles a cobweb (Chart I-6, Chart 7, Chart I-8). Chart I-6Cobweb Theory Case 1: ##br## Regular Mini-Cycles Chart I-7Cobweb Theory Case 2: ##br##Divergent Mini-Cycles Chart I-8Cobweb Theory Case 3: ##br##Convergent Mini-Cycles The Cobweb Theory is based on a simple premise: lagging supply. The demand for an item depends on its price in the current period, but the supply of the item depends on its price in the previous period. Or equivalently, the price in the current period influences the supply in the next period. In the 1930s, economists used the theory to explain the mini-cycles in agricultural output and prices. Most crops can be sown and reaped only once a year. Therefore, an unanticipated increase in demand will cause a sharp rise in price - because there can be no immediate increase in supply. This high price may lure farmers to increase their output more than is justified by future demand. So when this supply eventually comes on the market, it will cause a sharp fall in price. In turn this will result in a decrease in output for the next period to a greater extent than is justified. And so on. More generally, the Cobweb Theory applies in any market where supply lags demand. Under this simple premise, the market price will produce a two-period oscillation with the actual price being alternately above and below the equilibrium price. When the price is above equilibrium, it falls in the next period as supply adjusts upwards; and when the price is below equilibrium, it rises in the next period as supply adjusts downwards. But supply tends to over-adjust, causing both the quantity and price to overshoot and undershoot equilibrium repeatedly - effectively creating a mini-cycle (see Box I-1). Box I-1The Cobweb Theory Of Cycles The Cobweb Theory Of Credit Demand And Supply We now come to a key point: credit demand and supply often meet the conditions of the Cobweb Theory. Chart I-9 illustrates that the credit demand cycle is perfectly coincident with the bond yield cycle. Whereas Chart I-10 and Chart I-11 demonstrate that the credit supply cycle can often lag the credit demand cycle - and therefore the bond yield cycle - by several months. One obvious explanation is that unless you have an (unexpended) existing credit line to draw upon, there will be a lag between applying for credit and receiving it. Chart I-9The Credit Demand Cycle Is Coincident ##br##With The Bond Yield Cycle... Chart I-10...But The Credit Supply Cycle Lags ##br##The Credit Demand Cycle... Chart I-11...And The Bond ##br##Yield Cycle With credit demand and supply meeting the conditions of the Cobweb Theory, both the quantity and the price of credit (the bond yield) should exhibit mini-cycles. And as the charts in this report attest, they do. What about the mini-cycles in commodity inflation and broader CPI inflation? Given that these closely track the credit impulse mini-cycle (Feature Chart), we can deduce that they must be mostly a reflection of the mini-cycle in global demand growth. Still, could the commodity inflation mini-cycle also be impacted by the supply-side, as postulated for agricultural prices in the original Cobweb Theory? Interestingly, a recent paper, "The cobweb theorem and delays in adjusting supply in metals" markets,1 does "link the dynamics of raw material markets and commodity price fluctuations to a delayed adjustment of supply." However, the supply lags mentioned in the paper are too long to explain the half-cycle lengths typically observed in the commodity inflation mini-cycle. This would confirm that this mini-cycle is mostly a demand-side phenomenon. But the paper does also point out that speculation on futures markets may lead to higher volatility. This implies that while the phases of the mini-cycles should stay closely aligned, the amplitudes of the commodity inflation and credit impulse mini-cycles can deviate. Which is precisely what we observe in the data (Chart I-12). Chart I-12The Various Mini-Cycles Have Similar Periods But Different Amplitudes What Is The Current Message? Chart I-13The Bond Yield Cycle Explains##br## The Sector Selection Cycle To sum up, global credit flows, the global bond yield, global inflation, and metal price inflation exhibit clear and regular mini-cycles with a consistent half-cycle length averaging around 8 months, but not necessarily a consistent amplitude. We propose that all of these mini-cycles will continue indefinitely, and that they are manifestations of the lagging supply of credit and the Cobweb Theory. In the context of these clear and regular mini-cycles, the current mini-upswing in activity which started last May is getting long in the tooth, and we would expect it to end in early 2018. Having said that, given that the recent upswing in the global bond yield is quite modest, the next mini-downswing in the global credit impulse, and thereby activity, should be quite shallow. Nevertheless, in terms of investment implications, any mini-upswing in price since last May that has displayed an outsize amplitude would be more vulnerable to a setback. Industrial metal prices might be in this vulnerable category. Furthermore, the mini-cycle framework has been an important driver of cyclical versus defensive sector performance over the past few years (Chart I-13), and likely will continue to be an important driver. On a 6-9 month horizon, the current message would be to pare back exposure to cyclical sectors and to tilt towards defensive-biased equity markets such as Switzerland and Denmark. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 System Dynamics Review, April 2017: 'The cobweb theorem and delays in adjusting supply in metals' markets' by Glöser-Chahoud, Hartwig, Wheat and Faulstich. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to expect a countertrend reversal in S&P500 versus Eurostoxx50 performance. Set a profit target of 2.0% with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, long IBEX35 / short Eurostoxx50 closed in profit while short WTI crude closed at its stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 14 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Question #1: Will global growth remain above trend? Yes. Question #2: Will growth continue to outperform outside the U.S.? No. Question #3: Will productivity growth pick up? Yes, but only cyclically. The structural outlook remains bleak. Question #4: Will continued strong global growth finally deliver higher inflation? Yes, although the increase in inflation will be gradual and concentrated in economies that already have little spare capacity. Feature Global Growth In Focus We wish all our readers a joyous and prosperous 2018. As the new year begins, four questions about the global growth outlook loom large. Question #1: Will global growth remain above trend? Our answer: Yes. It is likely that global growth will come down a notch from its current elevated pace. However, it should remain firmly above trend. For one thing, the global economy continues to exhibit a lot of positive momentum. Real-time measures of economic activity, such as the Goldman Sachs Current Activity Indicator (CAI), highlight that global real GDP is rising at a robust pace (Chart 1). Our global leading indicator, as well as a wide swath of PMI data, suggest that this trend has legs (Chart 2). Chart 1APositive Global Growth Momentum Can Be Seen Here Chart 1BPositive Global Growth Momentum Can Be Seen Here Since 1980, above-trend global growth in one year has been accompanied by above-trend growth in the following year nearly three-quarters of the time. This bodes well for 2018. Chart 2... And Here Too Chart 3Financial Conditions Tend To Lead Growth By Six-To-Nine Months Global financial conditions eased significantly in 2017, thanks mainly to higher equity prices and narrower credit spreads. Easier financial conditions tend to benefit growth with a 6-to-9 month lag (Chart 3). The 6-month global credit impulse, which tends to lead activity, is also positive (Chart 4). Fiscal policy should remain stimulative. The fiscal thrust moved into positive territory in advanced economies in 2016-17 and this should remain the case in 2018 (Chart 5). Tax cuts will add about 0.3 percentage points to U.S. growth, while hurricane reconstruction spending and a likely congressional agreement to raise the cap on federal discretionary spending will add another 0.2 points. Chart 4Positive Credit Impulse Is Another Tailwind For Growth Chart 5Fiscal Policy Has Turned More Stimulative Our political strategists expect further fiscal easing in Japan this year. They also believe that German coalition talks will produce more government spending, with the SDP extracting concessions from Merkel on public investment and the CSU securing a commitment for more defense expenditure. On the flipside, our strategists expect some fiscal tightening in France as President Macron takes steps to trim France's bloated welfare state. Question #2: Will growth continue to outperform outside the U.S.? Our answer: No. Global revisions were more favorable outside the U.S. in the first nine months of 2017, which helps explain why the dollar came under downward pressure (Chart 6). More recently, U.S. growth estimates have begun to drift higher. As a result, the U.S. surprise index has surged relative to those of other economies (Chart 7). Chart 6U.S. Growth Expectations Were Lagging... ##br## But Not Anymore Chart 7U.S. Economic Surprise Index Increased ##br## Relative To Those Of Other Countries We expect the data to continue to favor the U.S. Aggregate U.S. hours worked in November was up 3.4% at an annualized rate over Q3 levels. If we add in productivity growth, Q4 GDP growth was probably in excess of 4% - well above current consensus estimates. Financial conditions have eased a lot more in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. Fiscal policy is also set to loosen relatively more in the U.S. Euro area growth is likely to tick lower next year from its current stellar pace, as the impact of a stronger euro begins to bite. The 6-month credit impulse has already turned negative there. Japanese growth should also cool somewhat from the heady pace of 2.7% seen over the past two quarters. The Chinese economy will decelerate modestly in 2018. The authorities are tightening the screws on the shadow banking system, expediting efforts to reduce excess capacity in the industrial sector, and clamping down on corruption. All of these reforms will pay off in the long run, but they could dent growth in the short run. Question #3: Will productivity growth pick up? Our Answer: Yes, but only cyclically. The structural outlook remains bleak. U.S. nonfarm productivity rose by 1.5% over the prior year in Q3, well above the post-2010 average of 0.8%. This improvement occurred despite the fact that low-skilled workers continue to re-enter the labor market - dragging down output-per-hour in the process - a phenomenon that is not well captured by the official productivity data. Productivity growth elsewhere in the world also appears to be on the upswing (Chart 8). Increased business investment should support productivity in 2018. Corporate surveys indicate that a rising percentage of companies anticipate boosting capital budgets (Chart 9). This often happens in the last few innings of business-cycle expansions, as more companies begin to experience capacity constraints. Chart 8Productivity Growth Showing Signs Of ##br## A Tentative Recovery Chart 9Surveys Are Signaling Acceleration ##br## In Capex Unfortunately, while the cyclical outlook for productivity is improving, the structural backdrop remains downbeat. As we have discussed in the past, flagging educational achievement, decreased creative destruction, and a shift in technological innovation towards consumers and away from businesses all augur poorly for future productivity trends.1 The much-hyped Amazon effect makes for good news stories, but is not borne out by the data.2 Question #4: Will continued strong global growth finally deliver higher inflation? Our answer: Yes, although the increase in inflation will be gradual and concentrated in economies that already have little spare capacity. Chart 10A Pick-Up In Wage Growth Would Put Upward Pressure ##br## On Service Inflation Going into 2017, the Fed had expected core PCE inflation to end the year at 1.9%. It is likely to have finished the year at only 1.5%. We expect core PCE inflation to move toward 2% by the end of 2018. Wage growth should accelerate as the labor market continues to tighten. This should put upward pressure on service inflation (Chart 10). Goods price inflation should also recover due to the lagged effects of a weaker dollar and the bleed-through of higher energy prices into several core components of the CPI (airline fares being a notable example). Slower rent growth will dampen inflation. However, this will be partially offset by higher health care prices. The cost control measures introduced in the Affordable Care Act helped push down PCE health care services inflation from 3% in late 2010 to less than 0.5% in early 2016 (Chart 11). Many of these measures have been realized, and as a consequence, health care inflation has begun to revert to its long-term trend (though in level terms, the savings to consumers remain). The Republican tax bill could put some upward pressure on health care costs. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the repeal of the Individual Mandate will raise premiums on health care exchanges by 10% because a larger share of healthy individuals will decide to forgo buying health insurance.3 Japanese inflation should move modestly higher in 2018, but from extremely depressed levels. The Japanese unemployment rate is now a full percentage point lower than in 2007 and the ratio of job opening-to-applicants has reached the highest level since 1974 (Chart 12). Chart 11U.S. Inflation Breakdown Chart 12Japan's Tightening Labor Market Euro area inflation will be held down by the lagged effects of a stronger euro and continued high levels of slack across southern Europe. Outside Germany, labor market underutilization is still 6.3 percentage points higher than it was in 2008 (Chart 13). U.K. inflation should edge lower as the spike in import prices stemming from the post-Brexit pound depreciation dissipates. Chart 13There Is Still Labor Market Slack Outside Of Germany Investment Conclusions A shift in global growth leadership back towards the U.S. would benefit the beleaguered U.S. dollar. Higher U.S. inflation will prompt the Fed to raise rates four times in 2018, one more hike than implied by the dots and two more hikes than implied by current market expectations. Rising inflation should also keep Treasury yields on an upward trajectory. We expect the 10-year yield to finish 2018 at around 3%. As long as inflation is rising in response to stronger growth, and from below-target levels, both U.S. and global risk assets should continue to rally. Only once U.S. inflation rises above 2% in 2019, and growth begins to slow on the back of binding supply-side constraints, will equities flounder. Stay long stocks for now, but look to significantly trim exposure towards the end of the year. Regionally, we favor euro area and Japanese equities over U.S. stocks for the next 12 months on a currency-hedged basis. Both the euro area and Japanese stock markets are dominated by large multinational companies whose prospects are geared more towards global growth than demand in their own regions. Above-trend global growth and rising capital spending should disproportionately benefit European and Japanese bourses, given that they have a greater tilt towards cyclically-sensitive companies. Valuations also tend to favor non-U.S. stocks. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?," dated May 31, 2017; Weekly Report, "A Secular Bottom In Inflation," dated July 28, 2017; and Weekly Report, "Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant?" dated September 22, 2017. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?" dated September 1, 2017. 3 Please see "Repealing the Individual Health Insurance Mandate: An Updated Estimate," Congressional Budget Office, dated November 8, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights A "decision tree" for the allocation to Chinese stocks highlights several key questions for investors over the coming year. The equity allocation decision hinges on the condition of the global economy, the stance of monetary policy, the pace of structural reforms, and the character of the ongoing economic slowdown. Despite several identifiable risks, our "decision tree" suggests that investors should be overweight Chinese vs global stocks. Feature Unlike in past years, BCA's China Investment Strategy service published its 2018 themes report in December, as an addendum to BCA's special year end Outlook report.1 Our final report for 2017 echoed our key themes by recapping some of the most important developments in China last year, as well as their longer-term implications.2 These reports outline our framework for evaluating China's economy in 2018, and will serve as an important reference point over the coming months relating to the pace of China's economic slowdown, policymakers' actions and priorities, and investor attitudes toward Chinese assets. In today's brief report, we begin the New Year by walking through the Chinese equity "decision tree" that flows from the framework that we detailed in our themes piece noted above (Chart 1). The chart presents a set of questions that should be answered over the coming 6-12 months in order to decide on the ideal allocation to Chinese equities within a global portfolio. We elaborate on the decision tree below. Chart 1The Chinese Equity "Decision Tree" Is The Global Economy Slowing Significantly?: Developments in China need to be considered within a global context. We have noted in previous reports that a synchronized global economic slowdown was a key factor behind China's economic slowdown in 2015.3 If global growth were to slow significantly this year, it would bode poorly for the relative performance of Chinese stocks. Next week's report will discuss the evolution of the alpha and beta characteristics of China's investable stock market; while our research is still ongoing, the evidence suggests that Chinese equities in US$ terms have become a high-beta market that would likely suffer in relative terms if the global equity market stumbles. Chart 1 highlights that the appropriate allocation to Chinese equities vs global stocks is underweight if the answer to this first question is yes, with the upgrade/downgrade bias determined simply by whether there has been an appropriate response from Chinese and global policymakers. Is Significant Further Monetary Policy Tightening Likely?: Overly tight monetary policy was the second ingredient that contributed to the 2015 slowdown. Monetary conditions tightened somewhat in the first half of 2017 (Chart 2), but the overall stance is not restrictive. Taken alone, hawkish rhetoric from the PBOC would imply that significant further tightening is imminent. However our sense is that the bark of monetary authorities will be worse than their bite over the coming months, especially since growth momentum and house price appreciation has already peaked. Is The Pace Of Renewed Structural Reforms Likely To Be Aggressive?: October's Party Congress heralded stepped-up reform efforts in 2018 and beyond, which we have highlighted is a risk to a constructive stance towards Chinese stocks. While the "status quo" scenario of no significant reforms is highly unlikely, the intensity of reforms pursued over the coming year will have to be closely monitored by policymakers to avoid a repeat of the 2015 experience. Even if policymakers feel that their threshold for pain will be higher in 2018 than has previously been the case, they are very likely to avoid a significant slowdown as it would raise the risk of returning to the exact set policies that they are trying to turn away from. In other words, an intense pace of reform would risk turning a "two steps forward, one back" situation into a full-blown retreat from structural reform momentum. For now, our China Reform Monitor continues to suggest that reform intensity will be consistent with a rising equity market (Chart 3). Chart 2Chinese Monetary Conditions ##br##Have Tightened Chart 3Investors Don't Believe That Reforms##br## Will Upset The Apple Cart Is The Existing Slowdown In China's Growth Momentum Metastasizing? Our view of China's significant growth slowdown in 2015 suggests that the end of the recent economic "mini-cycle" is likely to be benign and controlled, absent a policy mistake or a major global shock. However, it is possible that the lagged effect of a deceleration in export growth and tighter monetary policy, both of which have already occurred, could cause a broader or deeper slowdown in economic growth beyond what we have already observed. In order to gauge this risk, we tested a wide range of commonly-watched macro data series for signs that they reliably lead economic activity in China,4 using the Li Keqiang index as our proxy for the business cycle. We concluded that measures of money & credit are among the most important predictors, and presented a composite leading indicator of the Li Keqiang index based on six series that passed our test criteria (Chart 4). For now, our indicator suggests that the Chinese economy will continue to slow over the coming months, but that the pace and magnitude of the decline will be benign and controlled. The first question in our decision tree is the easiest to answer: The highly synchronized nature of global economic growth suggests that a significant slowdown is not imminent, even if the pace of growth becomes narrower or slows modestly (Chart 5). While our decision tree highlights that answering "yes" to any of the last three questions means that investors should have a negative bias towards Chinese investable stocks (and should downgrade them in response to a technical breakdown), these questions are still addressing risks rather than probable events. This supports our current recommendation of being overweight Chinese investable equities with a positive bias. Chart 4The Chinese Economy##br## Will Gradually Slow Chart 5No Sign Of A Significant ##br##Global Economic Slowdown As a final point, some investors and market participants have noted that investable Chinese stocks experienced a non-trivial selloff at the end of 2017, with some questioning whether it is a harbinger of a more pronounced economic slowdown. Our answer is no, for two reasons. First, there is some evidence to suggest that the selloff was technical in nature, as the sectors that had experienced the largest gains prior to the selloff also experienced the largest declines (Chart 6). Second, the timing of the relative selloff in Chinese stocks coincided exactly with a relative selloff in the global tech sector (Chart 7), which is strongly indicative of a common, global, factor. But given the underlying strength in the global economy, we regard this event as idiosyncratic and do not view it as a threat to the relative performance of Chinese vs global stocks over the coming year. Chart 6The Late-Year Selloff Was Partially ##br##Driven By Technical Conditions Chart 7Global Tech Also Drove The Selloff##br## In Chinese Relative Performance Bottom Line: While there are several identifiable risks that need to be monitored in 2018, for now our "decision tree" for the relative allocation to Chinese equities suggests that investors should be overweight within a global equity portfolio. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, and Weekly Report, "Three Themes For China In The Coming Year", dated December 7, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Legacies Of 2017", dated December 21, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The End Of China's Mini-Cycle", dated October 12, 2017, and "China's Economy - 2015 vs Today (Part 1): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Global bourses celebrated solid earnings growth and the passage of U.S. tax cuts heading into year-end. The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. It could be more, depending on the impact on animal spirits in the business sector and any fresh infrastructure spending. The good news on global growth continue to roll in. Real GDP growth is accelerating in the major advanced economies, driven in part by a surge in capital spending. Nonetheless, record low volatility and a flat yield curve in the U.S. highlight our major theme for 2018; policy is on a collision course with risk assets because output gaps are closing and monetary policy is moving away from "pedal to the metal" stimulus. We expect inflation to finally begin moving higher in the U.S. and some of the other advanced economies. This will challenge the consensus view that "inflation is dead forever", and that central banks will respond quickly to any turbulence in financial markets with an easier policy stance. The S&P 500 would suffer only a 3-5% correction if the VIX were to simply mean-revert. But the pain would likely be more intense if there is a complete unwinding of 'low-vol' trading strategies. We will be watching inflation expectations and our S&P Scorecard for signs to de-risk. Government yield curves should bear steepen, before flattening again later in 2018. Stay below benchmark in duration for now and favor bonds in Japan, Italy, the U.K. and Australia versus the U.S. and Canada (currency hedged). Interest rate differentials in the first half of the year should modestly benefit the U.S. dollar versus the other major currencies. Investors should remain exposed to oil and related assets, and bet on rising inflation expectations in the major bond markets. The intensity of forthcoming Chinese reforms will have to be monitored carefully for signs they have reached an economic 'pain threshold'. We do not view China as a risk to DM risk assets, but even a soft landing scenario could be painful for base metals and the EM complex. Bitcoin is not a systemic threat to global financial markets. Feature Chart I-1Policy Collision Course? Global bourses celebrated solid earnings growth and the passage of U.S. tax cuts heading into year-end. Ominously, though, a flatter U.S. yield curve and extraordinarily low measures of volatility hover like dark clouds over the equity bull market (Chart I-1). The flatter curve could be a sign that the Fed is at risk of tightening too far, which seems incompatible with depressed asset market volatility. This combination underscores the major theme of the BCA Outlook 2018 that was sent to clients in November; policy is on a collision course with risk assets because output gaps are closing and monetary policy is moving away from "pedal to the metal" stimulus. Analysts are debating how much of the decline in volatility is due to technical factors and how much can be pinned on the macro backdrop. For us, they are two sides of the same coin. Betting that volatility will remain depressed has reportedly become a yield play, via technical trading strategies and ETFs. Trading models encourage more risk taking as volatility declines, such that lower volatility enters a self-reinforcing feedback loop. The danger is that this virtuous circle turns vicious. On the macro front, many investors appear to believe that the structure of the advanced economies has changed in a fundamental and permanent way. Deflationary forces, such as Uber, Amazon and robotics are so strong that inflation cannot rise even if labor becomes very scarce. If true, this implies that central banks will proceed slowly in tightening, and that the peak in rates is not far away. Moreover, below-target inflation allows central banks to respond to any economic weakness or unwanted tightening in financial conditions by adopting a more accommodative policy stance. In other words, investors appear to believe in the "Fed Put". Implied volatility is a mean-reverting series. It can remain at depressed levels for extended periods, especially when global growth is robust and synchronized. Nonetheless, we believe that the "outdated Phillips curve" and the "Fed Put" consensus views will be challenged later in 2018, leading to an unwinding of low-vol yield plays. For now, though, it is too early to scale back on risk assets. Global Growth Shifts Up A Gear... The good news on global growth continue to roll in. Easy financial conditions and the end of fiscal austerity provide a supportive growth backdrop. A measure of fiscal thrust for the G20 advanced economies shifted from a headwind to a slight tailwind in 2016 (Chart I-2). Our short-term models for real GDP growth in the major countries continue to rise, in line with extremely elevated purchasing managers' survey data (Chart I-3). The major exception is the U.K., where our GDP growth model is rolling over as the Brexit negotiations take a toll. Chart I-2Fiscal Austerity Is Over Chart I-3GDP Growth Models Are Upbeat Much of the acceleration in our GDP models is driven by the capital spending components. Animal spirits appear to be taking off and it is a theme across most of the advanced economies. G3 capital goods orders pulled back a bit in late 2017, but this is more likely due to noise in the data than to a peak in the capex cycle (Chart I-4). Industrial production, the PMI diffusion index and advanced-economy capital goods imports confirm strong underlying momentum in investment spending. Chart I-4Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth In the U.S., tax cuts will give business outlays and overall U.S. GDP growth a modest lift in 2018. The House and Senate hammered out a compromise on tax cuts that is similar to the original Senate version. The new legislation will cut individual taxes by about $680 billion over ten years, trim small business taxes by just under $400 billion, and reduce corporate taxes by roughly the same amount (including the offsetting tax on currently untaxed foreign profits). The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. However, much depends on the ability that the tax changes and immediate capital expensing to further lift animal spirits in the business sector and bring forward investment spending. Any infrastructure program would also augment the fiscal stimulus. The total impact is difficult to estimate given the lack of details, but it is clearly growth-positive. ...But The U.S. Yield Curve Flattens... Bond investors are unimpressed so far with the upbeat global economic data. It appears that long-term yields are almost impervious as long as inflation is stuck at low levels. In the U.S., a rising 2-year yield and a range-trading 10-year yield have resulted in a substantial flattening of the 2/10 yield slope (although some of the flattening has unwound as we go to press). Investors view a flattening yield curve with trepidation because it smells of a Fed policy mistake. It appears that the bond market is discounting that the Fed can only deliver another few rate hikes before the economy starts to struggle, at which point inflation will still be below target according to market expectations. We would not be as dismissive of an inverted yield curve as Fed Chair Yellen was during her December press conference. There are indeed reasons for the curve to be structurally flatter today than in the past, suggesting that it will invert more easily. Nonetheless, the fact that the yield curve has called all of the last seven recessions is impressive (with one false positive). The good news is that, in the seven episodes in which the curve correctly called a recession, the signal was confirmed by warning signs from our Global Leading Economic Indicator and our monetary conditions index. At the moment, these confirming indicators are not even flashing yellow.1 Our fixed-income strategists believe that the curve is more likely to steepen than invert over the next six months. If inflation edges higher as we expect, then long-term yields will finally break out to the upside and the curve will steepen until the Fed's tightening cycle is further advanced. If we are wrong and inflation remains stuck near current levels or declines, then the FOMC will have to revise the 'dot plot' lower and the curve will bull-steepen. In other words, we do not think the FOMC will make a policy mistake by sticking to the dot plot if inflation remains quiescent. Rising inflation is a larger risk for stocks and bonds than a policy mistake. A clear uptrend in inflation would shake investors' confidence in the "Fed Put" and thereby trigger an unwinding of the low-vol investment strategies. A sharp selloff at the long end of the curve in the major markets would send a chill through the investment world because it would suggest that the Phillips curve is not dead, and that central banks might have fallen behind the curve. ...As Inflation Languishes For now there is little evidence of building inflation pressure in either the CPI or the Fed's preferred measure, the core PCE price index. The latter edged up a little in October to 1.4% year-over-year, but the November core CPI rate slipped slightly to 1.7%. For perspective, core CPI inflation of 2.4-2.5% is consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the core PCE index. The Fed has made no progress in returning inflation to target since the FOMC started the tightening cycle. A risk to our view is that the expected inflation upturn takes longer to materialize. The annual core CPI inflation rate fell from 2.3 in January 2017 to 1.7 in November, a total decline of 0.55 percentage points. The drop was mostly accounted for by negative contributions from rent of shelter (-0.31), medical care services (-0.13) and wireless telephone services (-0.1). These categories are not closely related to the amount of slack in the economy, and thus might continue to depress the headline inflation rate in the coming months even as the labor market tightens further. Recent regulatory changes, for example, suggest that there is more downside potential in health care services inflation. We have highlighted in past research that it is not unusual for inflation to respond to a tight labor market with an extended lag, especially at the end of extremely long expansion phases. Chart I-5 updates the four indicators that heralded inflection points in inflation at the end of the 1980s and 1990s. All four leading inflation indicators are on the rise, as is the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Indicator (not shown). Importantly, economic slack is disappearing at the global level. The OECD as a group will be operating above potential in 2018 for the first time since the Great Recession (Chart I-6). Finally, oil prices have further upside potential. Higher energy prices will add to headline inflation and boost inflation expectations in the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart I-5U.S. Inflation: Indicators Point Up Chart I-6Vanishing Economic Slack The bottom line is that we are sticking with the view that U.S. inflation will grind higher in the coming months, allowing the FOMC to deliver the three rate hikes implied by the 'dot plot' for 2018. In December, the FOMC revised up its economic growth forecast to 2.5% in 2018, up from 2.1%. The projections for 2019 and 2020 were also revised higher. Growth is seen remaining above the 1.8% trend rate for the next three years. The FOMC expects that the jobless rate will dip to 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, before ticking up to 4.0% in 2020. With the estimate for long-run unemployment unchanged at 4.6%, this means that the labor market is expected to shift even further into 'excess demand' territory. If anything, these forecasts look too conservative. It is unreasonable to expect the unemployment rate to stabilize in 2019 and tick up in 2020 if the economy is growing above-trend. This forecast highlights the risk that the FOMC will suddenly feel 'behind the curve' if inflation re-bounds more quickly than expected, at a time when the labor market is so deep in 'excess demand' territory. The consensus among investors would also be caught off guard in this scenario, resulting in a rise in bond volatility from rock-bottom levels. How Vulnerable Are Stocks? How large a correction in risk assets should we expect? One way to gauge this risk is to estimate the historical 'beta' of risk asset prices to mean-reversions in the VIX. The VIX is currently a long way below its median. Major spikes to well above the median are associated with recessions and/or financial crises. However, as a starting point, we are interested in the downside potential for risk asset prices if the VIX simply moves back to the median. Table I-1 presents data corresponding to periods since 1990 when the VIX mean-reverted from a low level over a short period of time. We chose periods in which the VIX surged at least to its median level (17.2) from a starting point that was below 13. The choice of 13 as the lower threshold is arbitrary, but this level filters out insignificant noise in the data and still provides a reasonable number of episodes to analyze.2 Table I-1Episodes Of VIX 'Mean Reversion' The episodes are presented in ascending order with respect to the starting point for the 12-month forward P/E ratio. This was done to see whether the valuation starting point matters for the size of the equity correction. The "VIX Beta" column shows the ratio of the percent decline in the S&P 500 to the change in the VIX. The average beta over the 15 episodes suggests that stocks fall by almost a half of a percent for every one percent increase in the VIX. Today, the VIX would have to rise by about 7½% to reach the median value, implying that the S&P 500 would correct by roughly 3½%. Investment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds would underperform Treasurys by 22 and 46 basis points, respectively, in this scenario. Interestingly, the equity market reaction to a given jump in the VIX does not appear to intensify when stocks are expensive heading into the shock. The implication is that a shock that simply returns the VIX to "normal" would not be devastating for risk assets. The shock would have to be worse. Chart I-7Market Reaction To 1994 Fed Shock The episodes of VIX "mean reversion" shown in Table I-1 are a mixture of those caused by financial crises and by monetary tightening (and sometimes both). The U.S. 1994 bond market blood bath is a good example of a pure monetary policy shock. It was partly responsible for the "tequila crisis", but that did not occur until late that year. Chart I-7 highlights that the U.S. equity market reacted more violently to Fed rate hikes in 1994 than the average VIX beta would suggest. The VIX jumped by about 14% early in the year, coinciding with a 9% correction in the S&P 500. Investors had misread the Fed's intension in late 1993, expecting little in the way of rate hikes over the subsequent year. A dramatic re-rating of the Fed outlook caused a violent bond selloff that unnerved equity investors. We are not expecting a replay of the 1994 bond market turmoil because the Fed is far more transparent today. Nonetheless, the equity correction could be quite painful to the extent that the VIX overshoots the median as the large volume of low-volatility trades are unwound. A 10% equity correction in the U.S. this year would not be a surprise given the late stage of the bull market and current market positioning. Yield Curves To Bear Steepen Upward pressure on inflation, bond yields and volatility will not only come from the U.S. We expect inflation to edge higher in the Eurozone, Canada, and even Japan, given tight labor markets and diminished levels of global spare capacity. The European economy has been a star performer this year and this should continue through 2018. Even the periphery countries are participating. The key driving factors include the end of the fiscal squeeze in the periphery and the recapitalization of troubled banks. The latter has opened the door to bank lending, the weakness of which has been a major growth headwind in this expansion. Taken at face value, recent survey data are consistent with about 3% GDP growth (Chart I-3). We would dis-count that a bit, but even continued 2.0-2.5% GDP growth in the euro area would compare well to the 1% potential growth rate. This means that the output gap is shrinking and the labor market will continue tightening. Despite impressive economic momentum, the ECB is sticking to the policy path it laid out in October. Starting in January, asset purchases will continue at a reduced rate of €30bn per month until September 2018 or beyond. Meanwhile, interest rates will remain steady "for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of the net asset purchases." If asset purchases come to an end next September, then the first rate hike may not come until 2019 Q1 at the earliest. Thus, rate hikes are a long way off, but the deceleration of growth in the Eurozone monetary base will likely place upward pressure on the long end of the bund curve (shown inverted in Chart I-8). Chart I-8ECB Tapering Will Be Bond-Bearish Canada is another economy with ultra-low interest rates and rapidly diminishing labor market slack. The Bank of Canada will be forced to follow the Fed in hiking rates in the coming quarters. In Japan, strong PMI and capital goods orders are hopeful signs that domestic capital spending is picking up, consistent with our upbeat real GDP model (Chart I-3). Recent data on industrial production and retail sales were weak, but this was likely due to heavy storm activity; we expect those readings to bounce back. Nonetheless, it is still not clear that the Japanese economy has moved away from a complete dependency on the global growth engine. We would like to see stronger wage gains to signal that the economy is finally transitioning to a more self-reinforcing stage. It is hopeful that various measures of core inflation are slightly positive, but this is tentative at best. That said, the BoJ may be forced to alter its current "yield curve control" strategy by modestly lifting the target on longer-term JGB yields later in 2018, in response to pressures from robust growth and rising global bond yields. Thus, the pressure for higher bond yields should rotate away from the U.S. in the latter half of 2018 towards Europe, Canada and possibly Japan. This could eventually see the U.S. dollar head lower, but we still foresee a window in the first half of 2018 in which the dollar will appreciate on the back of widening interest rate differentials. We are less bullish than we were in mid-2017, expecting only about a 5% dollar appreciation. China: Long-Term Gain Or Short-Term Pain? The Chinese cyclical outlook remains a key risk to our upbeat view on risk assets. Significant structural reforms are on the way, now that President Xi has amassed significant political support for his reform agenda. These include deleveraging in the financial sector, a more intense anti-corruption campaign focused on the shadow-banking sector, and an ongoing restructuring in the industrial sector. The reforms will likely be positive for long-term growth, but only to the extent that they are accompanied by economic reforms. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 19, highlights that 2018 will be pivotal for China's long-term investment outlook. In the short term, reforms could be a net negative for growth depending on how deftly the authorities handle the monetary and fiscal policy dials. We witnessed this tension between growth and reform in the early years of President Xi's term, when the drive to curtail excessive credit growth and overcapacity caused an abrupt slowdown in 2015. Managing the tradeoff means that China's economy will evolve in a series of growth mini cycles. China is in the down-phase of a mini cycle at the moment, as highlighted by the Li Keqiang Index (LKI; Chart I-9). The LKI is a good proxy for the business cycle. BCA's China Strategy service recently combined the data with the best leading properties for the LKI into a single indicator.3 This indicator suggests that the LKI will end up retracing about 50% of its late 2015 to early 2017 rise before the current slowdown is complete. The good news is that broad money growth, which is a part of the LKI leading indicator, has re-accelerated in recent months. This suggests that the current economic slowdown phase will not be protracted, consistent with our 'soft landing' view. The intensity of forthcoming reforms will have to be monitored carefully for signs they have reached an economic pain threshold. We will be watching our LKI leading indicator and a basket of relevant equity sectors for warning signs. We do not view China as a risk to DM risk assets, but even a soft landing scenario could be painful for base metals and the EM complex (Chart I-10). Chart I-9China: Where Is The Bottom? Chart I-10Metals At Risk Of China Soft Landing Equity Country Allocation For now we continue to recommend overweight positions in stocks versus bonds and cash within balanced portfolios. We also still prefer Japanese stocks to the U.S., reflecting our expectation for rising bond yields in the latter and an earnings outlook that favors the former. Chart I-11 updates our earnings-per-share growth forecast for the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone. We expect U.S. EPS growth to decelerate more quickly in 2018 than in Japan, since the U.S. is further ahead in the earning cycle and is more exposed to wage and margin pressure. European earnings growth will also be solid in 2018, but this year's euro appreciation will be a headwind for Q4 2017 and Q1 2018 earnings. European and Japanese stocks are also a little on the cheap side versus the U.S., although not by enough to justify overweight positions on valuation grounds alone. We have extended our valuation work to a broader range of countries, shown in Chart I-12. All are expressed relative to the U.S. market. These metric exclude the Financials sector, and adjust for both differing sector weights and structural shifts in relative valuation. Mexico is the only one that is more than one standard deviation cheap relative to the U.S. Nonetheless, our EM team is reluctant to recommend this market given uncertainty regarding the NAFTA negotiations. Russia is not as cheap, but is in the early stages of recovery. Our EM team is overweight. Chart I-11Top-Down EPS Projection Chart I-12Valuation Ranking Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. A Note On Bitcoin Finally, we have received a lot of client questions regarding bitcoin. The incredible surge in the price of the cryptocurrency dwarfs previous asset price bubbles by a wide margin (Chart I-13). As is usually the case with bubble, supporters argue that "this time is different." We doubt it. Chart I-13Bitcoin Bubble Dwarfs All The Rest BCA's Technology Sector Strategy weighed into this debate in a recent Special Report.4 In theory, blockchain technology, including cyber currencies, can be used as a highly secure, low cost, means of transfer value from one person to the next without an intermediary. However, the report highlights that bitcoin is highly subject to fraud and manipulation because it is unregulated. Liquidity and accurate market quotes are questionable on the "fly by night" exchanges. Its use as a medium of exchange is very limited, and governments are bound to regulate it because cryptocurrencies are a tool for money laundering, tax evasion and other criminal activities. Another fact to keep in mind is that, although the supply of new bitcoins is restricted, the creation of other cryptocurrencies is unlimited. Would the bursting of the bitcoin bubble represent a risk to the economy? The market cap of all cryptocurrencies is estimated to be roughly US$400 billion (US$250 billion for bitcoin alone). This is tiny compared to global GDP or the market cap of the main asset classes such as stocks and bonds. The amount of leverage associated with bitcoin is unknown, but it is hard to see that it would be large enough to generate a significant wealth effect on spending and/or a marked impact on overall credit conditions. The links to other financial markets appear limited. Investment Conclusions Our recommended asset allocation is "steady as she goes" as we move into 2018. The policy and corporate earnings backdrop will remain supportive of risk assets at least for the first half of the year. In the U.S., the recently passed tax reform package will boost after-tax corporate cash flows by roughly 3-5%. Cyclical stocks should outperform defensives in the near term. Nonetheless, we expect 2018 to be a transition year. Stretched valuations and extremely low volatility imply that risk assets are vulnerable to the consensus macro view that central banks will not be able to reach their inflation targets even in the long term. The consensus could be in for a rude awakening. We expect equity markets to begin discounting the next U.S. recession sometime in early 2019, but markets will be vulnerable in 2018 to a bond bear phase and escalating uncertainty regarding the economic outlook. If risk assets have indeed entered the late innings, then we must watch closely for signs to de-risk. One item to watch is the 10-year U.S. CPI swap rate; a shift above 2.3% would be consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the PCE measure of inflation. This would be a signal that the FOMC will have to step-up the pace of rate hikes and aggressively slow economic growth. We will also use our S&P Scorecard Indicator to help time the exit from our overweight equity position (Chart I-14). The Scorecard is based on seven indicators that have a good track record of heralding equity bear markets.5 These include measures of monetary conditions, financial conditions, value, momentum, and economic activity. The more of these indicators in "bullish" territory, the higher the score. Currently, four of the indicators are flashing a bullish signal (financial conditions, U.S. unemployment claims, ISM new orders minus inventories, and momentum). We demonstrated in previous research that a Scorecard reading of three or above was historically associated with positive equity total returns in the subsequent months. A drop below three this year would signal the time to de-risk. Our thoughts on the risks facing equities carry over to the corporate bonds space. Our Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes that uncertainty about future growth has the potential to increase interest rate volatility that can also push corporate credit spreads wider (Chart I-15).6 Elevated leverage in the corporate sector adds to the risk of a re-rating of implied volatility. For now, however, investors should continue to favor corporate bonds relative to governments for the (albeit modest) yield pickup. Chart I-14Watch Our Scorecard To Time The Exit Chart I-15Higher Uncertainty & ##br##Vol To Hit Corporate Bonds Overall bond portfolio duration should be kept short of benchmark. We may recommend taking profits and switching to benchmark duration after global yields have increased and are beginning to negatively affect risk assets. While yields are rising, investors should favor bonds in Japan, Italy, the U.K. and Australia within fixed-income portfolios (on a currency-hedged basis). Underweight the U.S. and Canada. German and French bonds should be close to benchmark. Yield curves should steepen, before flattening later in the year. Interest rate differentials in the first half of the year should modestly benefit the U.S. dollar versus the other major currencies. Finally, investors should remain exposed to oil and related assets, and bet on rising inflation expectations in the major bond markets. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 28, 2017 Next Report: January 25, 2018 1 Please see BCA Global ETF Strategy service, "A Guide to Spotting And Weathering Bear Markets," August 16, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 2 Note that we are not saying that a rise in the VIX "causes" stocks to correct. Rather, we are assuming that a shock occurs that causes stocks to correct and the VIX to rise simultaneously. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle," November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?" December 12, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 5 Market Timing: Holy Grail Or Fool's Gold? The Bank Credit Analyst, May 26, 2016. 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy service, "Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tail Of Two Halves," December 19, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com II. A Long View Of China 2018 is a pivotal year for China, as it will set the trajectory for President Xi Jinping's second term ... and he may not step down in 2022. Poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent threats to China's political stability. The new wave of the anti-corruption campaign is part of Xi's attempt to improve governance and mitigate political risks. Yet without institutional checks and balances, Xi's governance agenda will fail. Without pro-market reforms, investors will face a China that is both more authoritarian and less productive. Hearts rectified, persons were cultivated; persons cultivated, families were regulated; families regulated, states were rightly governed; states rightly governed, the whole world was made tranquil and happy. - Confucius, The Great Learning Comparisons of modern Chinese politics with Confucian notions of political order have become cliché. Nevertheless, there is a distinctly Confucian element to Chinese President Xi Jinping's strategy. Xi's sweeping anti-corruption campaign, which will enter "phase two" in 2018, is essentially an attempt to rectify the hearts and regulate the families of Communist Party officials and civil servants. The same could be said for his use of censorship and strict ideological controls to ensure that the general public remains in line with the regime. Yet Xi is also using positive measures - like pollution curbs, social welfare, and other reforms - to win over hearts and minds. His purpose is ultimately the preservation of the Chinese state - namely, the prevention of a Soviet-style collapse. Only if the regime is stable at home can Xi hope to enhance the state's international security and erode American hegemony in East Asia. This would, from Beijing's vantage, make the whole world more tranquil and happy. Thus, for investors seeking a better understanding of China in the long run, it is necessary to look at what is happening to its governance as well as to its macroeconomic fundamentals and foreign relations.1 China's greatest vulnerability over the long run is its political system. Because Xi Jinping's willingness to relinquish power is now uncertain, his governance and reform agenda in his second term will have an outsized impact on China's long-run investment outlook. The Danger From Within From 1978-2008, the Communist Party's legitimacy rested on its ability to deliver rising incomes. Since the Great Recession, however, China has entered a "New Normal" of declining potential GDP growth as the society ages and productivity growth converges toward the emerging market average (Chart II-1). In this context, Chinese policymakers are deathly afraid of getting caught in the "middle income trap," a loose concept used to explain why some middle-income economies get bogged down in slower growth rates that prevent them from reaching high-income status (Chart II-2).2 Chart II-1The New Normal Chart II-2Will China Get Caught In The Middle-Income Trap? Such a negative economic outcome would likely prompt a wave of popular discontent, which, in turn, could eventually jeopardize Communist Party rule. The quid pro quo between the Chinese government and its population is that the former delivers rising incomes in exchange for the latter's compliance with authoritarian rule. The party is not blind to the fate of other authoritarian states whose growth trajectory stalled. The threat of popular unrest in China may seem remote today. The Communist Party is rallying around its leader, Xi Jinping; the economy rebounded from the turmoil of 2015 and its cyclical slowdown in recent months is so far benign; consumer sentiment is extremely buoyant; and the global economic backdrop is bright (Chart II-3). Yet these positive political and economic developments are cyclical, whereas the underlying political risks are structural and persistent. China has made massive gains in lifting its population out of poverty, but it is still home to 559 million people, around 40% of the population, living on less than $6 per day, the living standard of Uzbekistan. It will be harder to continue improving these workers' quality of life as trend growth slows and the prospects for export-oriented manufacturing dry up. This is why the Xi administration has recently renewed its attention to poverty alleviation. The government is on target in lifting rural incomes, but behind target in lifting urban incomes, and urban-dwellers are now the majority of the nation (Chart II-4). The plight of China's 200-250 million urban migrants, in particular, poses the risk of social discontent. Chart II-3China's Slowdown So Far Benign Chart II-4Urban Income Targets At Risk Moreover, while China knows how to alleviate poverty, it has less experiencing coping with the greatest threat to the regime: the rapid growth of the middle class, with its high expectations, demands for meritocracy and social mobility, and potential for unrest if those expectations are spoiled (Chart II-5). Democracy is not necessarily a condition for reaching high-income status, but all of Asia's high-income countries are democracies. A higher level of wealth encourages household autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Today, China has reached the $8,000 GDP per capita range that often accompanies the overthrow of authoritarian regimes.3 The Chinese are above the level of income at which the Taiwanese replaced their military dictatorship in 1987; China's poorest provinces are now above South Korea's level in that same year, when it too cast off the yoke of authoritarianism (Chart II-6). Chart II-5The Communist Party's Greatest Challenge Chart II-6China's Development Beyond Point At Which Taiwan And Korea Overthrew Dictatorship This is not an argument for democracy in China. We are agnostic about whether China will become democratic in our lifetime. We are making a far more humble point: that political risk will mount as wealth is accumulated by the country's growing middle class. Several emerging markets - including Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil - have witnessed substantial political tumult after their middle class reached half of the population and stalled (Chart II-7). China is approaching this point and will eventually face similar challenges. Chart II-7Middle Class Growth Troubles Other EMs The comparison reveals that an inflection point exists for a society where the country's political establishment faces difficulties in negotiating the growing demands of a wealthier population. As political scientists have shown empirically, the very norms of society evolve as wealth erodes the pull of Malthusian and traditional cultural variables.4 Political transformation can follow this process, often quite unexpectedly and radically.5 Clearly the Chinese public shows no sign of large-scale, revolutionary sentiment at the moment. And political opposition does not necessarily result in regime change. Nevertheless, it is empirically false that the Chinese people are naturally opposed to democracy or representative government. After all, Sun Yat Sen founded a Republic of China in 1912, well before many western democratic transformations! And more to the point, the best survey evidence shows that the Chinese are culturally most similar to their East Asian neighbors (as well as, surprisingly, the Baltic and eastern European states): this is not a neighborhood that inherently eschews democracy. Remarkably, recent surveys suggest that China's millennial generation, while not wildly enthusiastic about democracy, is nevertheless more enthusiastic than its peers in the western world's liberal democracies (Chart II-8)! Chart II-8Chinese People Not Less Fond Of Democracy Than Others China is also home to one of the most reliable predictors of political change: inequality. China's economic boom is coincident with the rise of extreme inequalities in income, wealth, region, and social status. True, judging by average household wealth, everyone appears to be a winner; but the average is misleading because it is pulled upward by very high net worth individuals - and China has created 528 billionaires in the past decade alone. A better measure is the mean-to-median wealth ratio, as it demonstrates the gap that opens up between the average and the typical household. As Chart II-9 demonstrates, China is witnessing a sharp increase in inequality relative to its neighbors and peers. More standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, also show very high readings in China. And this trend has combined with social immobility: China has a very high degree of generational earnings elasticity, which is a measure of the responsiveness of one's income to one's parent's income. If elasticity is high, then social outcomes are largely predetermined by family and social mobility is low. On this measure, China is an extreme outlier - comparable to the U.S. and the U.K., which, while very different economies, have suffered recent political shocks as a result of this very predicament (Chart II-10). Chart II-9Inequality: A Severe Problem In China Chart II-10China An Outlier In Inequality And Social Immobility "China does not have voters" unlike the U.S. and U.K., is the instant reply. Yet that statement entails that China has no pressure valve for releasing pent-up frustrations. Any political shock may be more, not less, destabilizing. In the U.S. and the U.K., voters could release their frustrations by electing an anti-establishment president or abrogating a trade relationship with Europe. In China, the only option may be to demand an "exit" from the political system altogether. Note that there is already substantial evidence of social unrest in China over the past decade. From 2003 to 2007, China faced a worrisome increase in "mass incidents," at which point the National Bureau of Statistics stopped keeping track. The longer data on "public incidents" suggests that the level of unrest remains elevated, despite improvements under the Xi administration (Chart II-11). Broader measures tell a similar story of a country facing severe tensions under the surface. For instance, China's public security spending outstrips its national defense spending (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Chinese Social Unrest Is Real Chart II-12China Spends More On ##br##Domestic Security Than Defense In essence, Chinese political risk is understated. This conclusion may seem counterintuitive, given Xi's remarkable consolidation of power. But is ultimately structural factors, not individual leaders, that will carry the day. The Communist Party is in a good position now, but its leaders are all-too-aware of the volcanic frustrations that could be unleashed should they fail to deliver the "China Dream." This is why so much depends upon Xi's policy agenda in the second half of his term. To that question we will now turn. Bottom Line: The Communist Party is at a cyclical high point of above-trend economic growth and political consolidation under a strongman leader. However, political risk is understated: poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent and the long-term potential growth rate is slowing. If we assume that China is not unique in its historical trajectory, then we can conclude that it is approaching one of the most politically volatile periods in its development. Chart II-13Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign The Governance And Reform Agenda Since coming to office in 2012-13, President Xi has spearheaded an extraordinary anti-corruption campaign and purge of the Communist Party (Chart II-13). The campaign has understandably drawn comparisons to Chairman Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Yet these are not entirely fair, as Xi has tried to improve governance as well as eradicate his enemies. As Xi prepares for his "re-election" in March 2018, he has declared that he will expand the anti-corruption campaign further in his second term in office: details are scant, but the gist is that the campaign will branch out from the ruling party to the entire state bureaucracy, on a permanent basis, in the form of a new National Supervision Commission.6 There are three ways in which this agenda could prove positive for China's long-term outlook. First, the regime clearly hopes to convince the public that it is addressing the most burning social grievances. Corruption persistently ranks at the top of the list, insofar as public opinion can be known (Chart II-14). Public opinion is hard to measure, but it is clear that consumer sentiment is soaring in the wake of the October party congress (see Chart II-3 above). It is also worth noting that the Chinese public's optimism perked up in Xi's first year in office, when the policy agenda on offer was substantially the same and the economy had just experienced a sharp drop in growth rates (Chart II-15). Reassuring the public over corruption will improve trust in the regime. Second, the anti-corruption campaign feeds into Xi's broader economic reform agenda. Productivity growth is harder to generate as a country's industrialization process matures. With the bulk of the big increases in labor, capital, and land supply now complete in China, the need to improve total factor productivity becomes more pressing (Chart II-16). Unlike the early stages of growth, this requires reaching the hard-to-get economic conditions, such as property rights, human capital, financial deepening, entrepreneurship, innovation, education, technology, and social welfare. Chart II-14Chinese Public Grievances Chart II-15Anti-Corruption Is Popular Chart II-16Productivity Requires Institutional Change On this count, the Xi administration's anti-corruption campaign has been a net positive. The most widely accepted corruption indicators suggest that it has made a notable improvement to the country's governance. Yet the country remains far below its competitors in the absolute rankings, notably its most similar neighbor Taiwan (Chart II-17 A&B). The institutionalization of the campaign could thus further improve the institutional framework and business environment. Chart II-17AAnti-Corruption Campaign Is A Plus... Chart II-17B...But There's A Long Way To Go Third, the anti-corruption campaign can serve as a central government tool in enforcing other economic reforms. Pro-productivity reforms are harder to execute in the context of slowing growth because political resistance increases among established actors fighting to preserve their existing advantages. If the ruling party is to break through these vested interests, it needs a powerful set of tools. Recently, the central government in Beijing has been able to implement policy more effectively on the local level by paving the way through corruption probes that remove personnel and sharpen compliance. Case in point: the use of anti-corruption officials this year gave teeth to environmental inspection teams tasked with trimming overcapacity in the industrial sector (Chart II-18). And there are already clear signs that this method will be replicated as financial regulators tackle the shadow banking sector.7 Chart II-18Reforms Cut Steel Capacity, ##br##Reduced Need For Scrap These last examples - financial and environmental regulatory tightening - are policy priorities in 2018. The coercive aspect of the corruption probes should ensure that they are more effective than they would otherwise be. And reining in asset bubbles and reducing pollution are clear long-term positives for the regime. Ideally, then, Xi's anti-corruption campaign will deliver three substantial improvements to China's long-term outlook: greater public trust in the government, higher total factor productivity, and reduced systemic risks. The administration hopes that it can mitigate its governance deficit while improving economic sustainability. In this way it can buy both public support and precious time to continue adjusting to the new normal. The danger is that these policies will combine to increase downside risks to growth in the short term.8 Bottom Line: Xi's anti-corruption campaign is being expanded and institutionalized to cover the entire Chinese administrative state. This is a consequential campaign that will take up a large part of Xi's second term. It is the administration's major attempt to mitigate the socio-political challenges that await China as it rises up the income ladder. Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely? The problem, however, is that Xi may merely use the anti-corruption campaign to accrue more power into his hands. As is clear from the above, Xi's governance agenda is far from impartial and professional. The anti-corruption campaign is being used not only to punish corrupt officials but also to achieve various other goals. Xi has even publicly linked the campaign to the downfall of his political rivals.9 In essence, the campaign highlights the core contradiction of the Xi administration: can Xi genuinely improve China's governance by means of the centralization and personalization of power? Chart II-19China's Governance Still Falls Far Behind Over the long haul, the fundamental problem is the absence of checks and balances, i.e. accountability, from Xi's agenda. For instance, the National Supervision Commission will be granted immense powers to investigate and punish malefactors within the state - but who will inspect the inspectors? Xi's other governance reforms suffer the same problem. His attempt to create "rule of law" is lacking the critical ingredients of judicial independence and oversight. The courts are not likely to be able to bring cases against the party, central government, or powerful state-owned firms, and they will not be able to repeal government decisions. Thus, as many commentators have noted, Xi's notion of rule of law is more accurately described as "rule by law": the reformed legal system will in all probability remain an instrument in the hands of the Communist Party. Likewise, Xi's attempt to grant the People's Bank of China greater powers of oversight in order to combat systemic financial risk suffers from the fact that the central bank is not independent, and will remain subordinate to the State Council, and hence to the Politburo Standing Committee. This is not even to mention the lamentable fact that Xi's campaign for better governance has so far coincided with extensive repression of civil society, which does not mesh well with the desire to improve human capital and innovation.10 Thus it is of immense importance whether Xi sets up relatively durable anti-corruption, legal, and financial institutions that will maintain their legitimate functions beyond his term and political purposes. Otherwise, his actions will simply illustrate why China's governance indicators lag so far behind its peers in absolute terms. Corruption perceptions may improve further, but there will be virtually no progress in areas like "voice and accountability," "political stability and absence of violence," "rule of law," and "regulatory quality," each of which touches on the Communist Party's weak spots in various ways (Chart II-19). Analysis of the Communist Party's shifting leadership characteristics reinforces a pessimistic view of the long run if Xi misses his current opportunity.11 The party's top leadership increasingly consists of career politicians from the poor, heavily populated interior provinces - i.e. the home base of the party. Their educational backgrounds are less scientific, i.e. more susceptible to party ideology. (Indeed, Xi Jinping's top young protégé, Chen Miner, is a propaganda chief.) And their work experience largely consists of ruling China's provinces, where they earned their spurs by crushing rebellions and redistributing funds to placate various interest groups (Chart II-20). While one should be careful in drawing conclusions from such general statistics, the contrast with the leadership that oversaw China's boldest reforms in the 1990s is plain. Chart II-20China's Leaders Becoming More 'Communist' Over Time Bottom Line: Xi's reform agenda is contradictory in its attempt to create better governance through centralizing and personalizing power. Unless he creates checks and balances in his reform of China's institutions, he is likely to fall short of long-lasting improvements. The character profiles of China's political elite do not suggest that the party will become more likely to pursue pro-market reforms in Xi's wake. Xi Jinping's Choice Xi is the pivotal player because of his rare consolidation of power, and 2018 is the pivotal year. It is pivotal because it will establish the policy trajectory of Xi's second term - which may or may not extend into additional terms after 2022. So far, the world has gained a few key takeaways from Xi's policy blueprint, which he delivered at the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18: Xi has consolidated power: He and his faction reign supreme both within the Communist Party and the broader Chinese state; Xi's policy agenda is broadly continuous: Xi's speech built on his administration's stated aims in the first five years as well as the inherited long-term aims of previous administrations; China is coming out of its shell: In the international realm, Xi sees China "moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind"; The 2022 succession is in doubt: Xi refrained from promoting a successor to the Politburo Standing Committee, the unwritten norm since 1992. Markets have not reacted overly negatively to these developments (Chart II-21), as the latter do not pose an immediate threat to the global rally in risk assets. The reasons are several: Chart II-21Market Not Too Worried About ##br##Party Congress Outcomes Maoism is overrated: While the Communist Party constitution now treats Xi Jinping as the sole peer of the disastrous ruler Mao Zedong, the market does not buy the Maoist rhetoric. Instead, it sees policy continuity, yet with more effective central leadership, which is a plus. Reforms are making gradual progress: Xi is treading carefully, but is still publicly committed to a reform agenda of rebalancing China's economic model toward consumption and services, improving governance and productivity, and maintaining trade openness. Whatever the shortcomings of the first five years, this agenda is at least reformist in intention. China's tactic of "seeking progress while maintaining stability" is certainly more reassuring than "progress at any cost" or "no progress at all"! Trump and Xi are getting along so far: Xi's promises to move China toward center stage threaten to increase geopolitical tensions with the United States in the long run, yet markets are not overly alarmed. China is imposing sanctions on North Korea to help resolve the nuclear missile standoff, negotiating a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea, and promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will marginally add to global development and growth. Trump is hurling threatening words rather than concrete tariffs. 2022 is a long way away: Markets are unconcerned with Xi's decision not to put a clear successor on the Politburo Standing Committee, even though it implies that Xi will not step down at the end of his term in five years. Investors are implicitly approving Xi's strongman behavior while blissfully ignoring the implication that the peaceful transition of power in China could become less secure. Are investors right to be so sanguine? Cyclically, BCA's China Investment Strategy is overweight Chinese investible equities relative to EM and global stocks. Geopolitical Strategy also recommends that clients follow this view and overweight China relative to EM. Beyond this 6-12 month period, it depends on how Xi uses his political capital. If Xi is serious about governance and economic reform, then long-term investors should tolerate the other political risks, and the volatility of reforms, and overweight China within their EM portfolio. After all, China's two greatest pro-market reformers, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, were also heavy-handed authoritarians who crushed domestic dissent, clashed with the United States from time to time, and hesitated to relinquish control to their successors. However, if Xi is not serious, then investors with a long time horizon should downgrade China/EM assets - as not only China but the world will have a serious problem on its hands. For Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin always reaffirmed China's pro-market orientation and desire to integrate into the global economic order. If Xi turns his back on this orientation, while imprisoning his rivals for corruption, concentrating power exclusively in his own person, and contesting U.S. leadership in the Asia Pacific, then the long-run outlook for China and the region should darken rather quickly. Domestic institutions will decay and trade and foreign investment will suffer. How and when will investors know the difference? As mentioned, we think 2018 is critical. Xi is flush with political capital and has a positive global economic backdrop. If he does not frontload serious efforts this year then it will become harder to gain traction as time goes by.12 If he demurs, the Chinese political system will not afford another opportunity like this for years to come. The country will approach the 2020s with additional layers of bureaucracy loyal to Xi, but no significant macro adjustments to its governance or productivity. It is not clear how long China's growth rate is sustainable without pro-productivity reforms. It is also not clear that the world will wait five years before responding to a China that, without a new reform push, will appear unabashedly mercantilist, neo-communist, and revisionist. Bottom Line: The long-run investment outlook for China hinges on Xi Jinping's willingness to use his immense personal authority and concentration of power for the purposes of good governance and market-oriented economic reform. Without concrete progress, investors will have to decide whether they want to invest in a China that is becoming less economically vibrant as well as more authoritarian. We think this would be a bad bet. Matt Gertken Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Marko Papic Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Geopolitical Strategy 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Chinese policymakers are expressly concerned about the middle-income trap. Please see the World Bank and China's Development Research Center of the State Council, "China 2030: Building A Modern, Harmonious, And Creative Society," 2013, available at www.worldbank.org. Liu He, who is perhaps Xi Jinping's top economic adviser, had a hand in drafting this report and is now a member of the Politburo and shortlisted to take charge of the newly established Financial Stability and Development Commission at the People's Bank of China. 3 Please see Indermit S. Gill and Homi Kharas, "The Middle-Income Trap Turns Ten," World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 7403 (August, 2015), available at www.worldbank.org 4 Please see Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 5 For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring, as well as the downfall of communist regimes writ large, were completely unanticipated. 6 Specifically, Xi is creating a National Supervision Commission that will group a range of existing anti-graft watchdogs under its roof at the local, provincial, and central levels of administration, while coordinating with the Communist Party's top anti-graft watchdog. More details are likely to be revealed at the March legislative session, but what matters is that the initiative is a significant attempt to institutionalize the anti-corruption campaign. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 China has recently drafted top anti-graft officials, such as Zhou Liang, from the powerful Central Discipline and Inspection Commission and placed them in the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which is in charge of overseeing banks. Authorities have already imposed fines in nearly 3,000 cases in 2017 affecting various kinds of banks, including state-owned banks. On the broader use of anti-corruption teams for economic policy, please see Barry Naughton, "The General Secretary's Extended Reach: Xi Jinping Combines Economics And Politics," China Leadership Monitor 54 (Fall 2017), available at www.hoover.org. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Gao Shan et al, "China's President Xi Jinping Hits Out at 'Political Conspiracies' in Keynote Speech," Radio Free Asia, January 3, 2017, available at www.rfa.org 10 Xi has cranked up the state's propaganda organs, censorship of the media, public surveillance, and broader ideological and security controls (including an aggressive push for "cyber-sovereignty") to warn the public that there is no alternative to Communist Party rule. This tendency has raised alarms among civil rights defenders, lawyers, NGOs, and the western world to the effect that China's governance is actually regressing despite nominal improvement in standard indicators. This is the opposite of Confucius's bottom-up notion of order. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Xi faces politically sensitive deadlines in the 2020-22 period: the economic targets in the thirteenth Five Year Plan; the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021; and Xi's possible retirement at the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. At that point he will need to focus on demonstrating the Communist Party's all-around excellence and make careful preparations either to step down or cling to power. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equity indexes remained on a tear heading into year-end on the back of robust earnings growth in the major countries and U.S. tax cuts. There are some dark clouds hanging over this rally, as discussed in the Overview section. The technicals are stretched, but none of our fundamental indicators are warning of a market top. Implied equity volatility is very low, which can be interpreted in a contrary fashion. Investor sentiment is frothy and our Speculation Indicator is very elevated. Moreover, our equity valuation indicator has finally reached one standard deviation, which is our threshold of overvaluation. Valuation does not tell us anything about timing, but it does highlight the downside risks. Our monetary indicator also deteriorated a little more in December, although not by enough on its own to justify downgrading risk assets. On a positive note, earnings surprises and the net revisions ratio are not sending any warning signs for profit growth (although net revisions have edged lower recently). Moreover, our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) continued on its bullish equity signal in November for the fifth consecutive month. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are also bullish on stocks in the U.S., Europe and Japan. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The small dip in the Japanese WTP in December is a little worrying, but we need to see more weakness to confirm that flows no longer favor Japanese equities. In contrast, Europe's WTP rose sharply in December, suggesting that investors are allocating more to their European equity holdings. We are overweight both Europe and (especially) Japan relative to the U.S. (currency hedged). U.S. Treasury valuation is still very close to neutral, even following December's backup in yields. There is plenty of upside potential for yields before they hit "inexpensive" territory. Similarly, our technical bond indicator suggests that technical factors will not be headwind to a further bond selloff in 2018. Little has change for the dollar. The technicals are neutral. Value is expensive based on PPP, but less so by other valuation metrics. We see modest upside for the greenback in 2018. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart II-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart II-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart II-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart II-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart II-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart II-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart II-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart II-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart II-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart II-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart II-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart II-20Euro Technicals Chart II-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart II-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart II-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart II-24Commodity Prices Chart II-25Commodity Prices Chart II-26Commodity Sentiment Chart II-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart II-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart II-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart II-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart II-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart II-32U.S. Labor Market Chart II-33U.S. Consumption Chart II-34U.S. Housing Chart II-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart II-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart II-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart II-38Global Economic Snapshot: China