Fixed Income

Highlights European economic activity will suffer in Q1 from both the Omicron wave and elevated natural gas prices. The Omicron wave will fade quickly and its impact on growth will be short lived. The biggest economic risk related to Omicron is inflation. Inflation is being caused by supply disruptions, a function of China’s zero-tolerance policy toward COVID. An ebbing of COVID will allow cyclicals to breakout relative to defensive equities in the second quarter. Buy banks / sell tech. For the remainder of the winter, European electricity will remain expensive because of elevated natural gas prices. This process creates a drag on growth and prevents the euro from recovering. European PMIs have not yet bottomed; however, they will do so in Q2. While French and UK economic activity has led Europe in recent months, Germany and the Netherlands are likely to continue to lag as the Omicron variant is only starting there. Italian and Spanish spreads have limited upside under these circumstances. Feature At the end of 2021, the European economy was hit by a spike in COVID-19 infections and another surge in natural gas prices. These shocks will continue to affect activity in the first few months of 2022. Understanding the evolution of these shocks will help investors find attractive entry points for the dominant trend that will play out for the remainder of the year. Omicron Spikes Chart 1Omicron Is Different COVID-19 cases are once again spiking across Europe because of the highly contagious Omicron variant. As Chart 1 shows, cases in the UK, France, Spain, and Italy have now eclipsed previous peaks. Cases in Germany and the Netherlands have declined recently, but this improvement reflects the ebbing Delta wave. These two countries are likely to follow the path of their European neighbors in relation to the Omicron variant. The Omicron wave will not have a lasting impact on European economic activity despite its frightening scale. Hospitalizations are rising, but they remain far from levels implied by the number of active cases in France, the UK, and Spain (Chart 1, third panel). Additionally, hospitalizations spans are shorter because the infection seems to be less virulent. Recent data out of France indicates that COVID-induced admissions in ICU are now around 18% with a median length of stay of three days, compared to roughly 30% and seven days in the previous waves. This more positive health outcome also reflects the benefit of elevated vaccination rates in the region. The evolution of the Omicron wave in South Africa also points toward a rapid turnaround of the COVID situation in Europe. Gauteng Province, where Omicron first became dominant, witnessed a sharp rise in new cases that declined less than four weeks after the outbreak began (Chart 1, bottom panel). The number of cases there thus seems to have reached its apex already. There are limited reasons to expect a different trajectory for the Omicron wave in Europe. This wave is also affecting individual behavior. Rules are now being developed to impose vaccinations on swath of the recalcitrant population in Italy and Austria, and the French president is openly defying anti-vaxxers by further limiting their daily lives. Vaccination rates are increasing and booster campaigns have rolled out successfully, as the UK illustrates. Finally, anti-viral drugs such as Pfizer Paxlovid will further limit the severity of infections of contaminated individuals. This background implies that the likelihood is low for long-lasting, severe lockdowns, such as those that prevailed in 2020 and in early 2021. As a result, the impact of the Omicron wave on economic activity and the labor market will be temporary and will wane before the end of Q1 2022. Chart 2Cyclicals Will Breakout... Eventually Financial markets have already adopted this view, as evidenced by European equities that rallied smartly through December—until the release of the Fed’s minutes last week spooked investors. We are inclined to agree with investors and look beyond the impact of COVID at the index level. Nonetheless, as long as the wave remains in place and economic activity bears its footprint, cyclicals will not break out relative to defensives (Chart 2). Omicron, however, is not without risks. China’s commitment to its zero-tolerance policy toward COVID-19 remains firmly in place, which may prove inflationary for the global economy. Entire cities such as Xi’an and Yuzhou have been pushed into lockdowns, and, if Omicron spreads further, more cities will suffer the same fate. If it is sufficiently widespread, then this process will produce global supply-chain bottlenecks again and renew pricing pressures, especially if it expands to Chinese port cities.  Investment Implications The first relevant market implication of a transitory Omicron shock is that, despite its violence and breadth, global markets will avoid a severe sell-off caused by plunging economic activity. As a corollary, cyclical stocks may continue to consolidate in the near-term against their defensive counterparts, but a breakout by the middle of 2022 remains highly likely. Chart 3Utilities Hate Ebbing Waves Tactical traders will also soon benefit from a short-term investment opportunity. Utilities have been outperforming in recent weeks as investors bid up defensive plays. However, the pattern of previous waves indicates that, as soon as this wave of cases peaks, utilities stocks will suffer a significant period of underperformance (Chart 3). Thus, short-term investors should sell European utilities once the seven days moving average of new cases peaks in the UK. Chart 4Banks To Outperform Tech The environment is also likely to remain favorable for banks relative to tech stocks in Europe. The recently released Fed minutes revealed that the FOMC has a strong hawkish bias and that the March meeting will be a live one. It also showed that, if Omicron proved to be inflationary because of its impact on supply chains, the Fed might be even more inclined to raise interest rates and cut its balance sheet size. Thus, a transitory Omicron shock to growth that is likely to have inflationary effects will contribute to higher yields. This will hurt tech stocks relative to banks, especially as European banks forward earnings are rising relative to the tech sector and their relative valuations are extremely favorable (Chart 4). Bottom Line: The number of COVID-19 cases in Europe is spiking rapidly, but we do not expect lengthy lockdowns to become the norm. As a result, the shock to growth caused by the Omicron variant will be ephemeral. Nonetheless, China’s health policy response points to some inflationary risks caused by supply bottlenecks. Investors should expect European markets to continue to take Omicron in stride and cyclicals to breakout later this year. Utilities are soon to be sold relative to the broad market and European banks will benefit at the expense of tech stocks. Natural Gas Remains The Euro’s Foe Chart 5Natural Gas Prices Are High And Volatile Dynamics in the European natural gas market remain a major risk for European economic activity and European currencies over the course of the first quarter of 2022. Natural gas prices on the Title Transfer Facility in the Netherlands spiked to a record close of EUR181/MWh on December 21, 2021, as tensions with Russia rose in Ukraine. Since then, Dutch natural gas prices—the continental European benchmark—have declined by 46% (Chart 5). The following combination of factors explains this sharp retrenchment: Europe, France, and Germany in particular have enjoyed exceptionally clement weather in recent days, stifling demand for heat and electricity. 11 LNG tankers from the US have been rerouted toward Europe, accounting for 800,000 tonnes of natural gas. Tensions between Russia and the West have eased somewhat. Despite this recent decline in the price of natural gas, it remains at elevated levels. BCA’s commodity and energy strategy team expects its volatility to stay high over the remaining winter months. First, Asia is not sitting on its hands as LNG shipments shift toward Europe. Instead, a bidding war is starting in order to attract liquefied gas to the East. Second, Europe’s winter is far from over, which means that demand-boosting cold fronts are still likely. Finally, Russia is sending gas back to its territory to fulfil its own domestic needs (and probably to continue to put pressure on European nations). Chart 6European Electricity Is Dear The continuation of elevated European natural gas prices and the potential for further upsides of volatility remain headwinds to European economic activity this winter, ones we deem comparable to Omicron. The main impact is via electricity prices. As Chart 6 highlights, they are still extremely high in France, Germany, and Spain. The continued surge in the price of CO2 emission quotas is increasing the pressure on electricity prices, as will the upcoming maintenance of many nuclear power plants in France. Gas consumption is contracting on a year-on-year basis in major European markets (Chart 7). This development indicates that elevated natural gas prices are already creating a supply shock to activity and sapping discretionary disposable income from households. The recent decline in European consumer confidence, despite strong employment numbers and growing net worth, confirms that households are feeling the pinch from elevated electricity and natural gas prices (Chart 8). Chart 8Consumers Feel The Pinch Chart 7Gap Consumption Is Slowing High natural gas and electricity prices also create further inflation risks for Europe. The recent spikes to 23.7% in PPI inflation and to 5% for headline CPI inflation show the effect of high-energy costs. Instead, a genuine threat would emerge if household inflation expectations followed energy prices, which could in turn trigger a wage-price spiral in Europe. We are not there yet, but the longer natural gas and electricity prices rise, the greater the likelihood of this scenario. Investment Implications The principal consequence of the strength of the European natural gas market is its euro-bearish impact. The tax on European growth is high, which delays the willingness of the ECB to remove monetary accommodation in a meaningful way. On the western shore of the Atlantic, the Fed is poised to pull the trigger soon and is now discussing a decrease in the size of its balance sheet, something the ECB is nowhere near ready to do. Consequently, although EUR/USD may be cheap and oversold on a cyclical basis, a turnaround is unlikely as long as electricity prices remain this elevated. Chart 9EUR/USD near An Existential Level Bottom Line: European natural gas prices may have come off their Christmas boil, but they remain elevated and will likely experience major bouts of upside volatility over the remainder of the winter. Hence, the drag on growth stemming from demanding electricity prices remains intact, which negatively affects consumer confidence. The euro cannot rally meaningfully until natural gas prices mean-revert, especially as the Fed ramps up its hawkishness. A re-test of EUR/USD long-term trendline around 1.10 is likely before the end of Q1 (Chart 9). The Evolution Of European PMIs European manufacturing activity remains below its June peak, but it has surprised many observers by how well it is withstanding the various shocks hitting the continent. Despite this encouraging behavior, it may take a few more months before the PMIs find a floor. The following three factors best explain why European manufacturing activity will decelerate further: The Chinese economic slowdown is not over. Credit growth is improving, but much of this comes from increasing purchases of banker’s acceptances by financial institutions, which does not in turn provide credit to the economy. Thus, European exports to China and EM will remain on the backfoot. The Omicron crisis remains intact and natural gas remains a drag, as previously discussed. Chart 10Manufacturing Deceleration Will End In Q2 The evolution of the Sentix Global Investor Survey and the ZEW survey, which are a very reliable forecaster of the Manufacturing PMI, points to more economic weakness in Q1 2022 (Chart 10). While these forces will hurt growth in the near term, they also suggest that this deceleration is long in the tooth and that activity will firm anew during the second quarter of the year. The gap between the expectation and current activity components of the Sentix Global Index Survey and the ZEW survey have already bottomed. Moreover, both Omicron and natural gas crises will ebb as winter passes. Finally, Chinese authorities will not let growth collapse and will likely generate a small pickup in activity after the Chinese New Year. Already, the PBoC has ramped up its liquidity injections and Premier Li Keqiang recently highlighted potential tax cuts and support for the corporate sector to help Q1 and Q2 domestic activity. Looking at European countries individually shows that current economic conditions are disparate and largely reflect the different impacts of both Omicron and natural gas prices. To judge economic conditions, we expand the Rotation Methodology introduced two months ago.1 Instead of analyzing financial assets, we examine manufacturing PMIs through this lens, looking at the evolution of the level and momentum of each country’s manufacturing PMIs compared to the overall European level. This approach reveals the following over the past six months (Chart 11): France experienced the greatest relative improvement, moving from a Lagging economy to the Leading economy in Europe. France benefits from limited lockdowns, from the large role of nuclear power in electricity generation, and from its diminished exposure to China’s slowdown compared to Germany. This economic performance explains why French equities have recently performed so much better than sectoral biases would have justified. The UK economy remains in the Leading quadrant despite the ferocity with which the Omicron wave has overtaken the nation. This paradox reflects the health policy chosen by Downing Street, emphasizing voluntary isolation and investing heavily in booster shots. Relative to that of the rest of Europe, Italy’s and Spain’s PMIs are still elevated, but they are losing momentum, which is pulling these two countries into the Weakening quadrant. The Netherlands suffered the greatest decrease in activity, dropping from the Leading quadrant to the Lagging one. The Netherlands is under a severe lockdown to combat the Delta wave. The situation is unlikely to improve meaningfully any time soon as the Omicron wave is starting there. Germany is trying to stage a recovery, moving from the Lagging quadrant into the Improving one. However, we worry that this will not work out and that Germany will shift back into the Lagging quadrant as the government prepares to crackdown further on COVID because the Omicron variant is starting to hit the country. Investment Implications Chart 12Peripheral Spreads To Stay Contained The continuation of the weakness observed in Germany and the Netherlands will force the ECB to remain more dovish than implied by the inflation rate. As a result, Spanish and Italian bond spreads are unlikely to move anywhere close to the levels recorded in the spring of 2020 (Chart 12), especially as their respective economies outperform those of Germany and the Netherlands.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     The “Leading” (“Lagging”) quadrant denotes countries with PMIs performing better (worse) than the benchmark, the European manufacturing PMI, with strengthening (weakening) momentum. The “Improving” (“Weakening”) quadrant denotes countries with PMIs that are performing worse (better) than the benchmark, with strengthening (weakening) momentum. Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

We have entered a new phase of the cycle, with central banks in most developed markets turning more hawkish (the Bank of England surprisingly hiking in December, and the Fed signaling three rate hikes for 2022). How much does this matter for equities and other risk assets? Our view is that, as long as economic growth continues to be strong (and we think it will), and provided that central banks don’t overdo the tightening (and, with inflation likely to come down this year, we think excess tightening is unlikely), the hawkish turn might temporarily raise volatility and cause the occasional correction, but it does not undermine the case for equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. We remain overweight global equities. Economic growth is likely to continue to be well above trend for the next year or two (Chart 1), driven by (1) consumers spending some of the $5 trillion of excess savings they have accumulated in the G10 economies, (2) the unprecedented wealth effect from recent stock and house price rises (Chart 2), and (3) strong capex as companies strive to increase capacity to meet the consumer demand (Chart 3). The upsurge in Covid cases in December (Chart 4) will undoubtedly slow growth temporarily. But the signs are that the now-prevalent Omicron variant is mild, and its rapid spread could help the developed world achieve “herd immunity” thanks to widespread vaccination and natural immunity, though emerging countries – especially China – may continue to struggle. Chart 1Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend Chart 2Growth Will Be Boosted By The Wealth Effect... Chart 3...And Capex To Increase Production With US growth very strong – the Atlanta Fed Nowcast suggests Q4 QoQ annualized real GDP growth was 7.6% – and core PCE inflation 4.1%, it is hardly surprising that the Fed wants to accelerate the rate at which it withdraws accommodation. The FOMC dots, which see three rate hikes this year and another three in 2023, are unexceptional and close to what the futures market has already been (and still is) pricing in (Chart 5). Chart 4Covid Cases Not Leading to Hospitalizations And Deaths Chart 6Fed Hikes Have Usually Caused Only A Short-Lived Selloff Chart 5The Futures Market Is In Line With The FOMC Dots         In the past, the first Fed hike in a cycle has often triggered a mild short-term sell off in stocks (the timing depending on how well the hike was flagged in advance), but the equity market digested the news rapidly, quickly resuming its upward trend as the Fed continued to tighten (Chart 6). The same was true around the tapering and end of asset purchases in 2013-17 (Chart 7). All that depends, though, on whether the Fed is rushed into further rate hikes because inflation surprises even more to the upside. Our view remains that inflation will decline this year. The high inflation prints we are seeing now are mostly the result of exceptional demand for consumer manufactured goods, which the supply side has temporarily been unable to fulfil, causing shortages. This can be seen in the very different pattern of goods and services inflation (Chart 8). As we have argued previously, the supply response is now kicking in for key inputs into manufactured goods, such as semiconductors and shipping and, with demand likely to shift to services this year as the pandemic fades, this should bring inflation down. Chart 7Tapering Didn't Much Affect Stocks Either Chart 8Inflation Probably Will Decline This Year That said, the year-on-year inflation number will continue to look scary for some time, even if month-on-month inflation settles back to its pre-pandemic level of 0.2% (Chart 9). The consensus average forecast of 3.3% core PCE inflation in 2022 is factoring in monthly inflation around this level. The risks to inflation remain to the upside, particularly if wages respond to higher prices (US wage growth is currently 4-6%, significantly lagging behind price inflation – Chart 10), causing companies to raise prices further, triggering a price-wage spiral. Chart 9Year-On-Year Inflation Will Remain High Chart 10Risk Of A Price-Wage Spiral? All this suggests a year of significant volatility and uncertainty. The US stock market has not seen a correction (a drop of more than 10%) in this cycle, and there were no drawdowns last year of more than 5% (Chart 11). This is unusual: There were six 10%-plus corrections in the 2009-2019 bull market. The US equity rally is also looking increasingly narrow, with the run-up to a record-high in December driven by just a few large-cap growth stocks (Chart 12). This – and pricey valuations – makes it vulnerable and, as a hedge to downside risks, we continue to recommend an overweight in cash (rather than government bonds, which offer very asymmetrical returns, with significant downside in the event that inflation proves to be stubborn). Chart 11Where Have All The Corrections Gone? Chart 12Stock Market Has Got Very Narrow The other policy focus remains China. The authorities’ recent cut of the banks’ reserve ratio and more dovish talk does suggest that they are now concerned about how weak growth has become (Chart 13). A slight loosening of monetary policy has probably caused credit growth to bottom (Chart 14). However, our China strategists argue that the easing is likely to be only moderate since policymakers want to continue with structural reforms, such as reducing debt. The next few months may resemble early 2019 when the PBOC engineered a brief injection of liquidity which lasted only a few months. Moreover, the slump in the property market has not run its course (Chart 15), and this will hamper the authorities’ ability to accelerate infrastructure spending, much of which is financed by local governments’ property sales. Even if Chinese credit growth and the property market do pick up a little, the economy – and indeed commodity prices – will not bottom for another 6-9 months (Chart 16). But, when this happens, it would be a signal to turn more risk-on and bullish on cyclical countries and sectors, such as Emerging Markets, Europe, and Value stocks. Chart 13Chinese Data Looks Very Poor Chart 14Is Credit Growth Now Bottoming? Chart 15Slump In China Property Is Not Over Chart 16It Will Take A While For Commodity Prices To Pick Up Equities: While we remain overweight equities, returns this year will be only modest. Returns in 2020 were driven by multiple expansion, and last year by strong margin expansion (Chart 17), as often happens in Years 1 and 2 of a bull market. But this year, while sales growth should remain strong, BCA Research’s US equity strategists’ model points to a small decline in margins, which are at a record high (Chart 18). The PE multiple is likely to fall further too, as it usually does when the Fed is hiking. Even with buybacks and dividends, this amounts to a total return from US equities of only about 8%. Chart 17What Can Drive Returns In 2022? Chart 18Margins Likely To Slip From Record High Chart 19Europe Is More Sensitive To China Slowing... Nonetheless, we continue to prefer the US to other developed markets. Europe is more sensitive to the slowdown in China (Chart 19) and tends to underperform when global growth is slowing and is concentrated in services. Neither is it notably cheap versus the US relative to history (Chart 20). Emerging Markets face multiple headwinds, from the slowdown in China, to rampant inflation that is forcing central banks to hike aggressively (Brazil, for example has raised rates to 9.25% from 2% since April even in the face of weak growth and continuing risks from Covid). Chart 20...And Not Particularly Cheap Chart 22US Treasurys Are Attractive to Europeans And Japanese Chart 21Long Rates Low Given Fed Signaling Fixed Income: Long-term rates are surprisingly low, given the hawkish pivot of the Fed and other central banks (Chart 21). One explanation Fed chair Powell has given is the attractiveness of US Treasurys, after FX hedges, to European and Japanese investors (Chart 22). He is correct about this, but the advantage will wane as the Fed raises rates (while the ECB and BOJ don’t). We continue to forecast the 10-year Treasury yield to rise to 2-2.25% by the time of the first Fed hike. We are underweight duration and expect a moderate steepening of the yield curve. TIPs look richly valued, especially at the short end. We are neutral on US TIPs, where 10-years at least represent a hedge against tail-risk inflation. Inflation-linked bonds in the euro zone are particularly unattractive now (Chart 23).     Chart 23Breakevens Already Pricing In A Lot Of Inflation In credit, we continue to see value in riskier high-yield bonds, where US B- and Caa-rated names are trading at breakeven spreads close to historic averages (Chart 24). Our global fixed-income strategists have also recently turned more positive on US dollar-denominated EM debt, which offers a decent spread pickup versus US corporate debt of the same credit rating and maturity (Chart 25). Currencies: Relative monetary policy between the US and Europe and Japan could mean some further upside for the dollar over the next few months (Chart 26). However, the dollar is expensive relative to fair value, long-dollar is an increasingly crowded trade and, in the second half of the year, a rebound in China would boost growth in Europe and Emerging Markets, which would be positive for commodity currencies. Bearing that in mind, we remain neutral on the USD. Chart 25...As Are Some EM Dollar Bonds Chart 26Dollar To Rise On More Hawkish Fed? Chart 28Gold Is Vulnerable To Rising Real Rates Commodities: Metals prices are likely to suffer further in the first half of the year, as China’s growth continues to slow. This would suggest a further decline in the equity Materials sector. Nonetheless, we continue to have a neutral on commodities as an asset class because of the positive long-term story: Demand for metals for use in alternative energy is not being met by increased supply because investor pressure is stymying capex in the mining sector (Chart 27). It makes sense to have long-term exposure to metals such as copper and lithium which are used in electric vehicles. The oil price is mostly determined currently by Saudi supply. Our energy strategists forecast Brent oil to average $78.50 in 2022 and $80 in 2023, roughly the same as the current spot price. We remain neutral on gold: The bullion is not particularly attractively valued currently and will suffer if, as we expect, real long-term rates rise (Chart 28). Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com   Recommended Asset Allocation 

Highlights Global growth will remain above-trend in 2022, although with more divergence between regions than at any time during the pandemic (US strong, Europe steady, China slowing). Global inflation will transition from being driven by supply squeezes towards more sustainable inflation fueled by tightening labor markets - a shift leading to tighter monetary policies that are not adequately discounted in the current low level of bond yields, most notably in the US. Maintain below-benchmark overall global duration exposure. Diverging growth and inflation trends will lead to a varying pace of monetary policy tightening between countries, resulting in greater opportunities to benefit from relative bond market performance and cross-country yield spread moves. Underweight government bonds in countries where central banks are more likely to hike rates in 2022 (the US, the UK, Canada) versus overweights where monetary policy is more likely to remain unchanged (Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Japan). Deeply negative real bond yields reflect an implied path of nominal interest rates that is too low relative to inflation expectations in the majority of developed countries. Real bond yields will adjust higher in countries where rate hikes are more likely, resulting in more stable inflation breakevens compared to 2021. Stay neutral global inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt. A tightening global monetary policy backdrop and rising real interest rates will weigh on returns in global credit markets, even as strong nominal economic growth minimizes downgrade and default risks. Like government bonds, global growth and policy divergences will create relative investment opportunities between countries, especially later in 2022 when the Fed begins to hike rates and China begins to ease macro policies. Overweight euro area high-yield and investment grade corporates versus US equivalents. Limit exposure to EM hard-currency debt until there are clear signals of China policy stimulus and upside momentum on the US dollar fades. Feature Dear Client, This report, detailing our global fixed income investment outlook for next year, will be our last for 2021. We wish you a very safe, happy and prosperous 2022. We look forward to continuing our conversation in the new year. Rob Robis, Chief Global Fixed Income Strategist BCA Research’s Outlook 2022 report, “Peak Inflation – Or Just Getting Started?”, outlining the main investment themes for the upcoming year based on the collective wisdom of our strategists, was sent to all clients in late November. In this report, we discuss the broad implications of those themes for the direction of global fixed income markets, along with our main investment recommendations for 2022. A Brief Summary Of The 2022 BCA Outlook The tone of the 2022 Outlook report was quite positive on the prospects for global growth, even with the recent development of the rapid spread of the Omicron COVID-19 variant. It remains to be seen how severe this new variant will be in terms of hospitalizations and deaths compared to previous COVID waves. We assume that any negative economic impacts from Omicron in the developed economies will be contained to the first half of 2022, however, given more widespread vaccination rates (including booster shots) and greater access to anti-viral treatments. The baseline economic scenario in 2022 is one of persistent above-trend growth in the developed world (Chart 1) with a closing of output gaps in the US and euro area. The mix of spending in those economies will shift away from goods towards services, although Omicron may delay that transition until later in 2022. Chart 1Another Year Of Above Trend Growth Expected In 2022​​​​​ Chart 2Strong Fundamental Support For US Growth​​​​​ Chart 3China In 2022: Deceleration Leading To Policy Easing The US looks particularly well supported to maintain a solid pace of economic activity. The US labor market is very strong. Monetary policy remains accommodative (although that is slowly changing). Financial conditions are still easy, with the lagged impact of elevated equity and housing values providing a robust tailwind to consumer spending that is already well supported by excess savings resulting from the pandemic (Chart 2). China starts the year as a “one-legged” economy supported only by external demand, and policy stimulus later in the year will eventually be needed for the Chinese government to reach its growth targets (Chart 3).That policy shift will have significant implications for the outlook of many financial assets as 2022 evolves, including emerging market (EM) fixed income, industrial commodity prices and the US dollar (as we discuss later in this report). Global inflation will recede from the overheated pace of 2021 as supply chain bottlenecks become less acute. Inflationary pressures in 2022 will come from more “normal” sources like tightening labor markets, rising wage growth and higher housing costs (rents). This constellation of lower unemployment with still-elevated underlying inflation will look most acute in the US, leading the Fed to begin a tightening cycle that is not fully discounted in US Treasury yields. The broad investment conclusions of the BCA 2022 Outlook are more positive for global equity markets relative to bond markets, although with elevated uncertainty stemming from Omicron and future China stimulus. The views are more nuanced for other assets, like the US dollar (stronger to start the year, weaker later) and oil prices (essentially flat from pre-Omicron levels). Our Four Key Views For Global Fixed Income Markets In 2022 The following are the main implications for global fixed income investment strategy based off the conclusions from the 2022 BCA Outlook. Key View #1: Maintain below-benchmark overall global duration exposure. As we have noted in the title of our report, the investment outlook for 2022 is more complicated for investors to navigate than the relatively straightforward story from this time a year ago. Then, the development of COVID-19 vaccines led to optimism on reopening from 2020 lockdowns, but with no threat of the early removal of pandemic monetary and fiscal policy stimulus. The fixed income investment implications at the time were obvious, in the majority of developed countries - expect higher government bond yields, steeper yield curves, wider inflation breakevens and tighter corporate credit spreads. Today, the story is more complicated, but is still one that points to higher global bond yields. Take, for example, global fiscal policy. According to the IMF, the US is expected to see no fiscal drag in 2022 thanks to the Biden Administration’s spending initiatives, while Europe and EM will see significant fiscal drag (Chart 4). However, in the case of Europe, this should not be viewed negatively as it is the result of expiring pandemic era employment and income support programs that are no longer needed after economies emerged from wholesale lockdowns. So less fiscal stimulus is a sign of a healthier European economy that is more likely to put upward pressure on global bond yields, on the margin. The outlook for global consumer spending is also a bit more complicated, but still one that points to higher bond yields. Consumer confidence was declining over the final months of 2021 in the US, Europe, the UK, Canada and most other developed countries. This occurred despite falling unemployment rates and very strong labor demand, which would typically be associated with consumer optimism (Chart 5). High global inflation, which has outstripped wage gains and reduced real purchasing power, is why consumers have become gloomier in the face of healthy job markets. Chart 4Global Fiscal Policy Divergence In 2022​​​​​​ Chart 5Lower Inflation Will Help Boost Consumer Confidence​​​​​​ The implication is that the expectation of lower inflation outlined in the 2022 BCA Outlook, which sounds bond-bullish on the surface, could actually prove to be bond-bearish if it makes consumers more confident and willing to spend. On that note, there are already signs that the some of the sources of the global inflation surge of 2021 are fading in potency. Commodity price inflation has rolled over, in line with slowing momentum in manufacturing activity and a firmer US dollar (Chart 6). Measures of global shipping costs, while still elevated, have stopped accelerating. The spread of the Omicron variant may delay a further easing of supply chain disruptions in the short-term, but on a rate of change basis, the upward pressure on global inflation from supply squeezes will diminish in 2022. The inflation story will also be more complicated next year. While there will be less inflation from the prices of commodities and durable goods, there will be more inflation from the elimination of output gaps, tightening labor markets and an overall dearth of global spare capacity. Put another way, expect the gap between global headline and core inflation rates to narrow in most countries, but with domestically generated core inflation rates remaining elevated (Chart 7). Chart 6Some Relief On Supply-Driven Inflation On The Way​​​​​​ Chart 7Global Inflation Will Be Lower, But More Sustainable, In 2022 The more complicated investment story for 2022 extends to global bond yields themselves. Longer-maturity government bond yields remain far too low given the mix of very high inflation and very low unemployment in many countries. Chart 8Bond Markets Vulnerable To More Hawkish Repricing Even as major central banks like the Fed are tapering bond purchases and signaling more rate hikes in 2022, and others like the Bank of England (BoE) have actually raised rates, bond yields remain low. The reason for this is that markets are discounting very low terminal rates – the peak level of policy rates to be reached in the next monetary tightening cycle. We proxy this by looking at 5-year overnight index swap (OIS) rates, 5-years forward. A GDP-weighted aggregate of those forward OIS rates for the major developed economies (the US, Germany, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia) is currently 0.9%. This compares to GDP-weighted 10-year government bond yield of 0.8% (Chart 8). Forward OIS rates and 10-year bond yields are typically closely linked, which suggests upward scope for longer-maturity bond yields as markets begin to discount a higher trajectory for policy rates. We see this as the primary driver of higher bond yields in 2022 – an upward adjustment of interest rate expectations as central banks like the Fed, BoE and Bank of Canada (BoC) promise, and eventually deliver, more rate hikes than markets currently expect. We therefore recommend maintaining a below-benchmark stance on overall interest rate (duration) exposure in global bond portfolios in 2022. Government bond yield curves will eventually see more flattening pressure as central banks tighten, most notably in the US, but not before longer-term yields rise to levels more consistent with the most likely peak levels of central bank policy rates. Key View #2: Underweight government bonds in countries where central banks are more likely to hike rates in 2022 (the US, the UK, Canada) versus overweights where monetary policy is more likely to remain unchanged (Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Japan). The more complicated fixed income investing story for 2022 also extends to country allocation decisions, with more opportunities to take advantage of diverging bond market performance and cross-country spread moves. Current pricing in OIS curves shows a very modest expected path for interest rates in the major developed economies (Chart 9). Some central banks, like the BoE, BoC and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) are expected to be more aggressive with rate hikes in 2022 compared to the Fed. Yet there are not many rate hikes discounted beyond 2022, even in the US (Table 1). Chart 9Markets Are Pricing Short, Shallow Hiking Cycles Table 1Only Modest Tightening Expected Over The Next Three Years The US OIS curve is currently priced for an expectation that the Fed will struggle to hike the fed funds rate beyond 1.25% by the end of 2024, even with the latest set of FOMC rate forecasts calling for 75bps of rate hikes in 2022 alone. In the case of the UK, markets are pricing in lower rates in 2024 after multiple rate hikes in 2022/23, indicative of an expectation of a policy error of BoE “overtightening” even with the BoE Bank Rate expected to peak just above 1% The relative performance of government bond markets is typically correlated to changes in relative interest rate expectations. That was once again evident in 2021, where the UK, Canada and Australia significantly underperformed the Bloomberg Global Treasury aggregate in the third quarter as markets moved to rapidly price in multiple rate hikes (Chart 10). That volatility of bond market performance was particularly unusual Down Under, as the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) did not signal any desire to begin hiking rates in 2022, unlike the BoE and BoC. As rate expectations in those three countries stabilized in the fourth quarter, their government bonds began to outperform. On the other hand, relative government bond performance was more stable in the euro area, Japan and the US for most of 2021 (Chart 11). In the case of the US, rate hike expectations only began to move higher in September after the Fed signaled that tapering of bond purchases was imminent. Even then, markets have moved slowly to discount 2022 rate hikes. Now, the pricing in the US OIS curve is more in line with the median interest rate “dot” from the latest FOMC projections, calling for three rate hikes next year starting in June. Chart 10Rate Hike Expectations Driving Relative Bond Returns​​​​​​ Chart 11Stay Underweight US Interest Rate Exposure​​​​​​ Looking ahead to next year, we see the widening divergences on growth, inflation and monetary policies between countries leading to the following investible opportunities on country allocation in global bond portfolios. Underweight US Treasuries Chart 12Cyclical Upside Risk To Longer-Dated UST Yields The Fed has already begun to taper its bond buying, which is set to end by March 2022. As shown in Table 1, 79bps of rate hikes are discounted in the US by the end 2022, but only another 41bps are priced over the subsequent two years. Survey-based measures of interest rate expectations are similarly dovish, even with the US unemployment rate now at 4.2% - within the FOMC’s range of full employment (NAIRU) estimates between 3.5-4.5% - and wage inflation accelerating (Chart 12). Markets are underestimating how much the funds rate will have to rise over the next 2-3 years as the Fed belated catches up to a very tight US labor market and inflation persistently above the Fed’s 2% target. Stay below-benchmark on US interest rate risk, through both reduced duration exposure and lower portfolio allocations to Treasuries. Overweight Core Europe While interest rate markets are underestimating how much monetary tightening the Fed will deliver, the opposite is true in Europe. The EUR OIS curve is discounting 39bps of rate hikes to the end of 2024, even with cyclical growth indicators like the manufacturing PMI and ZEW expectations survey well off the 2021 highs (Chart 13). At the same time, there is little evidence to date indicating that the surge in European inflation this year, which has been narrowly concentrated in energy prices and durable goods prices, is feeding through into broader inflation pressures or faster wage growth. We recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to core European government bond markets (Germany, France), particularly versus underweights in US Treasuries. Our expectation of a wider 10-year US Treasury-German bund spread is one of our highest conviction views for 2022, playing on our theme of widening growth, inflation and monetary policy divergences (Chart 14). Chart 13Stay Overweight European Interest Rate Exposure​​​​​​ Chart 14Expect More US-Europe Spread Widening In 2022​​​​​​ Overweight European Peripherals Chart 15Stay O/W European Peripheral Exposure To Begin 2022 The ECB will be allowing its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, or PEPP, to expire at the end of March 2022. Beyond that, the ECB has announced that the pace of buying in the existing pre-pandemic Asset Purchase Program (APP) will be upsized from €20bn per month to between €30-40bn until at least the third quarter of 2022. This represents a meaningful slowing of the pace of ECB bond purchases, which were nearly €90bn per month under PEPP. Nonetheless, unlike most other developed economy central banks that are ending pandemic-era quantitative easing (QE) programs, the ECB will still be buying bonds on a net basis and expanding its balance sheet in 2022 (Chart 15). The central bank has taken great care in signaling that no rate hikes should be expected in 2022, likely to avoid any unwanted surges in Peripheral European bond yields or the euro. A continuation of asset purchases reinforces that message, leaving us comfortable in maintaining an overweight recommendation on Italian and Spanish government bonds for 2022. Underweight the UK and Canada Chart 16Stay U/W UK & Canadian Interest Rate Exposure A combination of rapidly tightening labor markets and soaring inflation is almost impossible for any inflation-targeting central bank to ignore. That is certainly the case in the UK, where the unemployment rate is 4.2% with two job vacancies available for every unemployed person – a series high for that ratio (Chart 16, top panel). UK headline CPI inflation is at a 10-year high of 5.2% and the BoE expects inflation to peak around 6% in April 2022. Medium-term inflation expectations, both market based and survey based, are also elevated and well above the BoE’s 2% inflation target. The BoE surprised markets a couple of times at the end of 2021, not delivering on an expected hike in November and actually lifting rates in December in the midst of the intense UK Omicron wave. We see the latter decision as indicative of the central bank’s growing concern over high UK inflation becoming embedded in inflation expectation. The BoE will likely have to eventually raise rates to a level higher than the 2023 peak of 1.1% currently discounted in the GBP OIS curve. That justifies an underweight stance on UK interest rate exposure (both duration and country allocation) in 2022. A similar argument applies to Canada. The Canadian unemployment rate now sits at 6.0%, closing in on the February 2020 pre-COVID low of 5.7%. The BoC’s Q3/2021 Business Outlook Survey showed a net 64% of respondents reporting intensifying labor shortages (the highest level in the 20-year history of the survey). Wage growth is accelerating, headline CPI inflation is running at 4.7% and underlying inflation (trimmed mean CPI) is now at 3.4% - the latter two are well above the BoC inflation target range of 1-3%. The CAD OIS curve currently discounts 147bps of rate hikes in 2022, which is aggressively hawkish, but very little is priced beyond that in 2023 (another 19bp hike) and 2024 (a rate cut of 24bps). The BoC estimates that the neutral interest rate in Canada is between 1.75% and 2.75%. Thus, markets do not expect the BoC to lift rates to even the low end of that range over the next three years, despite a very tight labor market and an inflation overshoot. We see this as justifying a continued underweight stance on Canadian interest rate exposure (both duration and country allocation) in 2022, even with markets already discounting significant monetary tightening next year. Overweight Australia and Japan Outside of Europe, we recommend overweights on Australian and Japanese government bonds entering 2022 (Chart 17). The RBA has been quite clear in what needs to happen before it will begin to lift rates. Australian wage growth must climb into the 3-4% range that has coincided with underlying Australian inflation sustainably staying in the RBA’s 2-3% target range. Wage growth and trimmed mean CPI inflation only reached 2.2% and 2.1%, respectively, for the latest available data from Q3/2021. As Australian wage and inflation data is only released on a quarterly basis, the RBA will not be able to assess whether wage dynamics are consistent with reaching its inflation target until the latter half of 2022. The AUD OIS curve is currently discounting 119bps of rate hikes in 2022 and an additional 86bps of hikes in 2023. Those are both far too aggressive for a central bank that is unlikely to begin lifting rates until the end of 2022, at the very earliest. Thus, we recommend an overweight stance on Australian bond exposure in global bond portfolios in 2022. The case for overweighting Japanese government bonds is a simple one. There are none of the inflation or labor market pressures seen in other countries to justify a hawkish turn by the Bank of Japan (bottom panel). Japanese core CPI is shockingly in deflation (-0.7%), bucking the trend seen in other countries and showing no pass-through from rising energy prices of global supply chain disruptions. This makes Japan a good defensive “safe haven” bond market against the backdrop of rising global bond yields that we expect in 2022. Chart 17Stay O/W Australian & Japanese Interest Rate Exposure​​​​​​ Chart 18Our Recommended DM Government Bond Country Allocations​​​​​​ In summary, our government allocations reflect the growing gap between expected monetary policy changes in 2022. This gives us a bias to favor lower-yielding markets, with Australia being the notable exception (Chart 18). However, in an environment where global bond volatility is expected to increase as multiple central banks exit QE and begin rate hiking cycles, carry/yield considerations play a secondary role in determining optimal country allocations. Key View #3: Stay neutral global inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt Another part of the global fixed income universe where the investment story has become more complicated is inflation-linked bonds. Overweighting inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt was the right strategy for bond investors as economies reopened from 2020 COVID lockdowns and global growth recovered. Booming commodity prices and supply chain squeezes added to the positive backdrop for linkers in 2021, as realized inflation soared to levels not seen in over a generation in many countries. Yet now, there is much less upside potential for inflation breakevens from current levels. Our Comprehensive Breakeven Indicators (CBI) are one of our preferred tools to assess the attractiveness of inflation-linked bonds versus nominals within the developed markets. For each country, the CBI reflects the distance of 10-year inflation breakevens from three different measures – the fair value from our breakeven spread model, medium-term survey-based inflation expectations and the central bank inflation target. The further breakevens are from these three measures, the less scope there is for additional increases in breakevens. As can be seen in Chart 19, there is limited upside potential for breakevens in almost all countries. Only Canada has a CBI below zero, with the CBIs for the UK, US, Germany and Italy well above zero. With central banks belated starting to respond to high realized inflation with tapering and rate hikes, it is still too soon to move to a full-blown underweight stance on global inflation-linked bond exposure versus nominal government debt. Instead, we recommend no more than a neutral exposure in countries where our CBIs are relatively lower – Canada, Australia, Japan – and underweight allocations where the CBIs are relatively higher – the UK, Germany, Italy and France (Chart 20). One country where we are deviating from our CBI signal is the US. We are keeping the recommended US TIPS exposure at neutral to begin 2022, but we anticipate downgrading TIPS later in 2022 if the Fed begins to lift rates sooner and more aggressively than expected. We do recommend positioning within that neutral overall TIPS allocation by underweighting shorter maturities versus longer-dated TIPS, A more hawkish Fed and some likely deceleration of realized US inflation should result in a steeper TIPS breakeven curve and a flatter TIPS real yield curve. Beyond looking at inflation breakevens, the outlook for real bond yields may be THE most complicated part of the 2022 investment story. Perhaps no single topic generates a greater debate among BCA’s strategists than real bond yields, which remain negative across the developed world (Chart 21). Determining why real yields are negative is critical for making calls across other asset classes beyond just government bonds. Valuations for equities and corporate credit have become more closely correlated with real yields in recent years. Real yield differentials are also an important factor driving currency levels. Chart 20Our Recommended Inflation-Linked Bond Allocations We see negative real yields as a reflection of persistent central bank policy dovishness that looks increasingly unrealistic. Chart 22 should look familiar to regular readers of Global Fixed Income Strategy. We show real central bank policy rates (adjusted for realized inflation) and the market-implied expectations for those real rates derived from the forward curves for OIS rates and CPI swap rates. Chart 21Negative Real Yields: Global Bonds' Biggest Vulnerability​​​​​​ In the US, UK and Europe, markets are pricing a future path for nominal short-term interest rates that is consistently lower than the expected path of inflation. If markets believe that central banks will be unwilling (or unable) to ever lift policy rates above inflation, or that neutral medium-term real interest rates are in fact negative in most developed countries, then it should come as no surprise that longer-maturity real bond yields should also be negative. We do not subscribe to the view that neutral real rates are negative across the developed world, especially in the US. Even if we did, however, such a view is already reflected in the future pricing of bond yields and interest rates. As outlined earlier, OIS curves in many countries are underestimating how high nominal policy rates will go in the next 2-3 years. The potential for a “real rate shock”, where central banks tighten policy at a faster pace than markets expect, is a significant risk for global financial markets in the coming years. We see this as more of a risk for markets in 2023, with the Fed likely to become more aggressive on rate hikes and even the ECB likely to begin considering an interest rate adjustment. For 2022, however, we do expect global real yields to stabilize and likely begin to turn less negative as central banks continue to tighten policy. Key View #4: Overweight euro area high-yield and investment grade corporates versus US equivalents. Limit exposure to EM hard-currency debt until there are clear signals of China policy stimulus and upside momentum on the US dollar fades. The outlook for global credit markets in 2022 has also become more complicated, particularly for corporate bonds and EM hard currency debt. On the one hand, the levels of index yields (Chart 23) and spreads (Chart 24) for investment grade and high-yield corporate debt in the US, euro area and UK have clearly bottomed. The Omicron threat to global growth may be playing a role in the recent increases, but the more likely culprit is growing central bank hawkishness and fears of tighter monetary policy. Chart 23Global Corporate Bond Yields Have Reached A Cyclical Bottom​​​​​​ Chart 24Global Corporate Bond Spreads Have Reached A Cyclical Bottom​​​​​​ On the other hand, the fundamental backdrop for corporate debt is not conducive to major spread widening. As outlined at the start of this report, nominal economic growth in the major developed economies remains solid, which supports the expansion corporate revenues. Combined with still-low borrowing rates, this creates a relatively positive backdrop that limits risks from downgrades and defaults. Chart 25Monetary Policy Backdrop Turning More Negative For Credit Markets Corporate bond performance, both absolute returns and excess returns versus government debt, has worsened on a year-over-year basis for the latter half of 2021 (Chart 25). That has coincided with slowing growth in the balance sheets of the Fed and other major central banks and, more recently, the flattening trend of government bond yield curves as markets have discounted 2022 rate hikes. This suggests that monetary policy tightening expectations are dominating the still relatively positive fundamental backdrop for corporate credit. Looking ahead to 2022, we see a greater need to focus on relative value and cross-country valuation considerations when allocating to developed market corporate debt – particularly when looking the biggest markets in the US and euro area. We see a strong case for favoring euro area corporates over US equivalents, both for investment grade and particularly for high-yield. Our preferred method of corporate bond valuation is looking at 12-month breakevens. Breakevens measure the amount of spread widening that would need to occur over a one year horizon to eliminate the yield advantage of owning corporate bonds over government bonds of similar duration. We calculate this as the ratio of the index spread to the index duration for a particular credit market, like US investment grade. We then take a percentile ranking of those 12-month breakevens to determine the attractiveness of spreads versus its own history. On that basis, the 12-month breakeven for US investment grade corporates looks very unattractive, sitting near the bottom of the historical distribution (Chart 26). This reflects not only tight spreads but also the high durations of investment grade credit. US high-yield corporate spreads are not as stretched, but are also not particularly cheap, with the 12-month breakeven sitting at the 34th percentile of its distribution. In the euro area, the 12-month breakeven for investment grade is not as stretched as in the US, sitting in the 36th percentile (Chart 27). The euro area high-yield 12-month breakeven looks similar to the US, at the 24th percentile of its historical distribution. Chart 26US Corporate Spread Valuations Are Not Compelling​​​​​​ Chart 27Euro Area Corporate Spread Valuations Are Also Stretched​​​​​​ Our current recommended strategy on US corporate exposure is to be neutral investment grade and overweight high-yield. We see no reason to change that view to begin 2022. However, we do anticipate downgrading US corporate exposure later in the year when the Fed begins to lift interest rates and the US Treasury curve flattens more aggressively. Earlier, we recommended positioning for a wider US Treasury-German bund spread as a way to play for the growing policy divergence between a more hawkish Fed and a still dovish ECB. Another way to do that is to overweight euro area corporate debt versus US equivalents, for both investment grade and especially for high-yield. In terms of potential default losses, the outlook is positive on both sides of the Atlantic. Moody’s is projecting a 2022 default rate of 2.3% in the US and 2.2% in the euro area (Chart 28). The last two times that the default rates were so similar, in 2014/15 and 2017/18, also coincided with a period of euro area high-yield outperforming US high-yield (on a duration-matched and currency-matched performance). We see that pattern repeating in 2022. Chart 28Favor Euro Area High-Yield Over US Equivalents In 2022​​​​​​ When looking within credit tiers, we see the best value in favoring Ba-rated euro area high-yield versus US equivalents when looking at 12-month breakeven percentile rankings (Chart 29). Yet even looking at just yields rather than spread, lower-rated euro area high-yield corporates offer more attractive yields than US equivalents, on a currency-hedged basis (Chart 30). Chart 31Stay Cautious On EM Hard Currency Debt Turning to EM hard currency debt, we recommend a cautious stance entering 2022. EM fundamentals that typically need to in place to produce tighter EM credit spreads are currently not in place. Chinese economic growth is slowing, commodity price momentum is fading and the US dollar is appreciating versus EM currencies (Chart 31). An improvement in non-US economic growth will help turn around all three trends, especially the strengthening US dollar which typically trades off US/non-US growth differentials. The key to any non-US growth acceleration in 2022 will come from China. When Chinese policymakers announce more aggressive stimulus measures in 2022, as we expect, that would represent an opportunity to turn more positive on EM USD-denominated debt. Until that happens, we recommend staying underweight EM hard currency debt, with a slight bias to favor sovereigns over corporates.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Special Report

This is US Bond Strategy’s final report of the year. Our regular publication schedule will resume on January 11th with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for January 2022. Highlights Interest Rate Policy: The Fed will tighten policy in 2022. Our baseline expectation is that the first hike will occur in June 2022 and that rate increases will proceed at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter through the end of the year. An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations would cause the Fed to tighten more quickly. An abrupt tightening of financial conditions would cause the Fed to move more slowly. The Flexible Average Inflation Target: The re-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations suggests that the Fed’s new FAIT framework is viewed as credible and is working as intended. It is likely here to stay. The Long-Run Neutral Rate: We think it’s likely that consensus estimates of a 2.0% to 2.5% long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be too low, but we don’t recommend trading on that view in 2022. The low neutral rate narrative is very well-entrenched, and it will only be questioned after several rate hikes have been delivered and their economic impact is assessed. A Year Of Tightening The Fed started 2021 with three conditions for lifting rates (Table 1). Now, as we head into 2022, the Fed has officially acknowledged that the two conditions related to inflation have been met, and Fed Chair Jay Powell said that the economy is making “rapid progress” toward the final condition of “maximum employment”. Table 1The Fed's Liftoff Criteria Based on this, it looks like rate hikes are imminent. The Fed recently doubled its pace of asset purchase tapering so that net purchases will reach zero by mid-March. This opens up the March 2022 FOMC meeting as the first “live meeting” where a rate hike could occur. Our base case expectation is that the Fed will wait a tad longer, but that liftoff will occur at the June FOMC meeting. Rate hikes will then proceed through the end of the year at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter. Next, we discuss why the Fed has adopted this hawkish posture. We also consider the factors that would cause tightening to proceed more quickly or more slowly in 2022. Reasons For The Fed’s Hawkish Pivot Chart 1Labor Market Indicators It might sound odd to say that the US economy is rapidly approaching maximum employment. After all, the labor market is still 3.9 million jobs short of where it was in February 2020 (Chart 1). What’s more, only 59.2% of the population is employed today compared to 61.1% prior to the pandemic (Chart 1, panel 2). But Fed Chair Powell wasn’t referring to either of those figures when he said that the economy is making “rapid progress” toward maximum employment. Rather, he was referring to the unemployment rate, which currently sits at 4.2% (Chart 1, panel 3). This is only 0.2% above the Fed’s estimate of the natural rate of unemployment and only 0.7% above the pre-pandemic level of 3.5%. The fact that the unemployment rate has declined sharply means that the bulk of the shortfall in the economy-wide number of jobs is the result of people dropping out of the labor force (Chart 1, bottom panel), not the result of an increase in the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed. As recently as the November FOMC meeting, the Fed wasn’t drawing a sharp distinction between these two trends. In fact, Chair Powell said in his post-meeting press conference that “there is still ground to cover to reach maximum employment, both in terms of employment and in terms of participation.” But just one month later, at the December FOMC press conference, Chair Powell struck a much different tone. He said: Chart 2Participation Trends The Demographic Downtrend In Participation But the reality is, we don’t have a strong labor force participation recovery yet and we may not have it for some time. At the same time, we have to make policy now. And inflation is well above target. So this is something we need to take into account. It appears that the Fed is no longer confident that labor force participation is about to rise. There are a few good reasons for this. First, the aging of the US population imparts a structural demographic downtrend to the labor force participation rate as an increasing number of people reach retirement age (Chart 2). In addition, there was a sharp drop in 55+ participation at the onset of the pandemic that has so far not recovered at all (Chart 2, panel 2). It is debatable whether people in this older age cohort will ever return to work. Finally, there is a shortfall in participation for people in their prime working years (ages 25-54) (Chart 2, bottom panel). These people are likely not working because of factors related to the pandemic (e.g. fear of getting sick, caregiving requirements). It is likely that prime-age participation will rise as pandemic concerns fade, but the Fed is no longer confident that these pandemic concerns will fade quickly. Faced with elevated inflation right now, the Fed has decided that it must act against inflation earlier than it had intended, before prime-age labor force participation makes a full recovery. For bond investors, the important takeaway from the recent shift in Fed policy is that a recovery in labor force participation is no longer a pre-condition for liftoff. That being the case, we are very close to the Fed pulling the trigger on rate hikes. Table 2 shows the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth required to reach different target unemployment rates by different future dates, assuming the labor force participation rate remains at its current level. With the participation rate held flat, it only takes average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 224 thousand to reach the pre-COVID unemployment rate of 3.5% by June. That same rate of growth would cause the unemployment rate to fall below the Fed’s 4% natural rate estimate by January. Table 2Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth (Thousands) Required To Reach Unemployment Rate Target By Given Date The message is clear. With rising participation no longer a pre-condition for hikes, the Fed’s “maximum employment” liftoff condition will be met within the next few months. We expect this will lead to the first Fed rate hike at the June 2022 FOMC meeting. What Happened To “Transitory” Inflation? Chart 3Core CPI Components The Fed’s view of the labor force participation rate is very similar to its view of inflation. Both are being influenced by the pandemic, but the Fed is no longer confident that pandemic concerns will fade in a timely manner. Looking at the inflation picture, it’s easy to see the impact of the pandemic. Core goods inflation is running at a year-over-year rate of 9.4%. It was close to 0% prior to COVID (Chart 3). This is obviously the result of pandemic-related supply chain disruptions and the shift in consumer spending away from services and toward goods. Just like with labor force participation, these trends should reverse as pandemic concerns fade. However, given the pandemic’s uncertain duration, the Fed is no longer willing to wait for that to happen. The Fed’s Interest Rate Projections In line with its hawkish shift on the definition of “maximum employment”, FOMC participants revised up their interest rate projections at the December meeting. The median FOMC participant is now looking for three 25 basis point rate hikes in 2022. This is consistent with liftoff in June followed by a pace of one rate hike per quarter (Chart 4). Interestingly, the market is reasonably well priced for this near-term path for rates. The deviation between market pricing and Fed expectations occurs further out the curve. As such, we recommend that US bond investors keep portfolio duration low and favor the 2-year Treasury note over the 10-year.1 Chart 4Rate Expectations What Would Make The Fed Go Faster? Chart 5No Wage/Price Spiral Yet As noted above, our base case forecast is that the Fed will start lifting rates in June 2022 and continue to hike at a pace of 25 bps per quarter. This is roughly consistent with the Fed’s own median projections. However, we acknowledge that the Fed will tighten policy more quickly if it sees evidence of an emerging wage-price spiral. Specifically, the Fed has pointed to the risk that real wage growth might exceed the rate of productivity growth. If that were to occur, the Fed would be worried about a wage-price spiral where firms lift prices to meet wage demands, but that only causes employee inflation expectations to rise further, leading to even greater wage demands. So far, this is not occurring. Real wage growth is negative and long-dated inflation expectations remain well-anchored near the Fed’s target levels (Chart 5). An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations during the next few months would cause the Fed to bring forward the liftoff date and increase the pace of rate hikes in 2022. What Would Make The Fed Go Slower? The main thing that would cause the Fed to tighten more slowly in 2022 would be if its hawkish shift prompted a severe tightening in overall financial conditions. Chart 6 shows that the ends of Fed tightening cycles typically coincide with the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index moving above 100. This tightening in financial conditions also typically precedes a slowdown in economic growth (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 6Watch Financial Conditions And Treasury Slope As The Fed Tightens Financial conditions are incredibly easy at present. But it is conceivable that risky assets will sell-off on fears of Fed rate hikes, and a large enough sell-off would cause the Fed to pause. The slope of the Treasury curve could also be a useful indicator in this regard. The 2/10 slope is usually close to inversion when the Fed ends its rate hike cycles (Chart 6, panel 3). Bottom Line: The Fed will tighten policy in 2022. Our baseline expectation is that the first hike will occur in June 2022 and that rate increases will proceed at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter through the end of the year. An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations would cause the Fed to tighten more quickly. An abrupt tightening of financial conditions would cause the Fed to move more slowly. US bond investors should position for this outcome by keeping portfolio duration low and by favoring the 2-year Treasury note over the 10-year. FAIT Accompli It’s been roughly one year since the Fed concluded its Strategic Review and released a revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.2 One year on, it seems appropriate to consider how much Fed policy actually changed as a result. We focus on what, in our view, are the two most significant changes to the Fed’s Statement. 1.  No More Pre-Mature Tightening First, the Fed changed its strategy to focus on “shortfalls of employment from its maximum level” rather than “deviations from its maximum level”. In the Fed’s words, “this change signals that high employment, in the absence of unwanted increases in inflation […], will not by itself be a cause for policy concern.” In the past, the Fed would tighten policy in response to a low unemployment rate on the expectation that inflation was about to increase. The new strategy is to wait for inflation to emerge before tightening, even if the unemployment rate is very low. Inflation has obviously emerged, so policy tightening is justified even under the new framework. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that the Fed has waited longer than usual to tighten. Chart 7A shows the change in the unemployment rate since the previous trough for the current cycle alongside the previous three cycles. For prior cycles, the lines end when the Fed delivers its first rate hike. While it’s notable that the unemployment rate has improved much more quickly this time around, it’s just as notable that the Fed still hasn’t lifted rates. This is despite the fact that the unemployment rate is only 0.7% above its pre-recession trough. This is more progress than was made before tightening in the 1990 and 2000 cycles, and about the same amount of progress as was made in the 107 months since the unemployment rate troughed before the Great Financial Crisis. A broader measure of labor market utilization, the prime-age (25-54) employment-to-population ratio, tells a similar story (Chart 7B). By this metric, the labor market has already made more progress than it did during the prior two cycles and the Fed still hasn’t increased the funds rate. All in all, even though inflation has emerged earlier this cycle than most expected, it’s pretty clear that the Fed’s new focus on employment “shortfalls” instead of “deviations” has made it act more dovishly. 2. Flexible Average Inflation Targeting (FAIT) The second big change that the Fed made to its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy was the introduction of a Flexible Average Inflation Target (FAIT). Under the FAIT framework, the Fed will no longer view its 2% inflation target as purely forward looking. Rather, the Fed will seek to achieve average 2% inflation over time. This means that, “following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” While the Fed doesn’t specify a period over which it seeks 2% average inflation, it seems clear that the new inflation target has been achieved. PCE inflation is well above where it would have been if it averaged 2% since the new framework was adopted in August 2020 (Chart 8). This is also true if we pick February 2020, the peak of the last cycle, as our starting point. In fact, PCE inflation has almost made up for the entire inflation shortfall since January 2010. Chart 8The FAIT Framework While it’s interesting to look at average inflation over different lookback periods, it’s more important to note that the actual goal of the FAIT framework is to keep long-dated inflation expectations anchored near target levels. In the Fed’s own words: By seeking inflation that averages 2 percent over time this will help ensure that longer-run inflation expectations do not drift down and remain well anchored at 2 percent.3 If we judge the effectiveness of FAIT based on trends in long-term inflation expectations, then the only reasonable conclusion is that it has been a massive success. By any measure, long-term inflation expectations were well below levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% target in fall 2020. Now, they are very close to target levels. This is true whether we look at market-based measures (Chart 9A), survey measures (Chart 9B), trend measures (Chart 9C) or a composite indicator of many different measures (Chart 9D). Chart 9AMarket-Based Inflation Expectations Chart 9BSurvey-Based Inflation Expectations Chart 9CTrend Measures Of Inflation ##br##Expectations Chart 9DThe CIE Index The Fed's New Index Of Common Inflation Expectations (CIE) The Verdict All told, it looks like the Fed has made good on its promises. It refrained from lifting rates as the unemployment rate fell and has only now moved toward tightening in response to extremely high inflation. Also, the re-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations suggests that the Fed’s new FAIT framework is viewed as credible and is working as intended. Neutral Rate Expectations In 2022 Chart 10Neutral Rate Estimates There is one key issue for both Fed policy and bond markets that we have not yet discussed, and that’s the long-run neutral fed funds rate. This is the interest rate that, on average, will be consistent with the Fed’s price stability and maximum employment goals in the long run. As of today, the consensus among central bankers and investors is that the neutral rate is very low compared to history. There is also a widespread belief that it will remain low for the foreseeable future. For example, here is a sentence from the Fed’s Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy: The Committee judges that the level of the federal funds rate consistent with maximum employment and price stability over the longer run has declined relative to its historical average. Therefore, the federal funds rate is likely to be constrained by its effective lower bound more frequently than in the past. The top panel of Chart 10 shows that the Fed has revised its median estimate of the long-run neutral rate substantially lower since 2012, down from 4.3% to 2.5%. And it’s not just the Fed that has done so. The same downward revisions are seen in the Surveys of Market Participants and Primary Dealers (Chart 10, bottom 2 panels). Incidentally, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield – a market-derived proxy for the long-run neutral rate – is below even the survey estimates. This is a key reason for our below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Why Does The Fed Believe That The Neutral Rate Is Low And Will Stay Low? Chart 11The Demographic Effect New York Fed President John Williams has cited three key reasons for the low neutral fed funds rate: demographics, lower productivity growth and a heightened demand for safe and liquid assets.4 Of those factors, Fed research has determined that demographics are particularly important. The trend of increasing life expectancy, specifically, has been shown to be an important factor pushing interest rates down as people increase their savings in anticipation of a longer retirement (Chart 11).5 Could The Fed Be Wrong? We aren’t as confident that the neutral rate will stay low. In fact, we think it’s possible that both Fed and investor estimates understate the current long-run neutral rate. Our own Bank Credit Analyst has observed that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield was very close to trend nominal GDP growth up until the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 12). Then, it dipped below as a protracted period of household deleveraging caused private sector credit demand to dry up. With household balance sheets no longer in disrepair, we are starting to see an increase in household debt, one that could eventually push bond yields back toward trend growth.6 It’s not just our own research that is starting to question the popular narrative of a low neutral fed funds rate. At the most recent Jackson Hole summit, Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi presented a paper that shows that rising income inequality is predominantly responsible for today’s low neutral rate (Chart 13), not the demographic effect previously identified by the Fed.7 Chart 13Rising Income Inequality ##br##Since 1980 Chart 12Household Deleveraging Kept Rates Low Post-2008 This research has important implications for the future evolution of the neutral rate. Unlike demographics, income inequality can be altered by changes in tax policy and by shifts in the power struggle between capital owners and workers. In this regard, our US Investment Strategy service has written several reports demonstrating the ongoing structural shift toward greater labor power.8 If this structural trend continues, it suggests that the long-run neutral rate may also rise. Trading The Neutral Rate While we suspect that the long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be higher than both the market and Fed anticipate, we don’t think it’s wise to trade on that view in 2022. The reason is that expectations of a low neutral fed funds rate are extremely well-entrenched. It will take a lot of contrary evidence to shift those expectations, evidence we probably won’t get next year. As noted above, survey estimates of the long-run neutral rate range roughly from 2.0% to 2.5%. Our sense is that those estimates will only be revised higher if the fed funds rate gets much closer to those levels, say at least above 1%, and the economic data suggest that further rate increases will be required. This is a story for 2023, not 2022. A recent paper documented some interesting facts about the relationship between monetary policy and market expectations.9  It observed that the entire decline in the 10-year Treasury yield since 1990 has occurred during 3-day windows around FOMC meetings (Chart 14). This is not what we would expect to see if the long-run neutral rate was determined by independent macroeconomic factors that are distinct from Fed interest rate decisions. Chart 14Fed Rate Decisions Drive Long-Maturity Bond Yields We find this research very compelling. It suggests that the market changes its neutral rate expectations in response to Fed interest rate moves. In our view, this strengthens our conviction that a series of rate hikes will eventually cause the market to push its neutral rate expectations higher, leading to a sell-off in long-maturity bonds. Bottom Line: We think it’s likely that consensus estimates of a 2.0% to 2.5% long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be too low, but we don’t recommend trading on that view in 2022. The low neutral rate narrative is very well-entrenched, and it will only be questioned after several rate hikes have been delivered and their economic impact is assessed.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For our full set of recommendations please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Key Views 2022: US Fixed Income”, dated December 14, 2021. 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/guide-to-changes-in-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-qas.htm#7 4 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/wil181130#footnote3 5 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2017-27.pdf 6 For more details on this argument please see Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks”, dated March 31, 2021. 7 https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/8337/JH_paper_Sufi_3.pdf 8 Please see January 13, January 20 and February 3, 2020 US Investment Strategy Special Reports, “An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History”, “Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them” and “The Public-Approval Contest”. 9 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3550593 Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Dear Client, Thank you for your continued readership and support this year. This is the last European Investment Strategy report for 2021. In this piece, we review ten charts covering important aspects of the European economy and capital markets. We will resume our regular publishing schedule on January 10th, 2022. The European Investment Strategy team wishes you and your loved ones a wonderful holiday season, and a healthy, happy, and prosperous new year. Best regards, Mathieu Savary   Highlights European growth continues to face headwinds as it enters 2022. The ECB will be slow to remove more accommodation than what is implied by the end of the PEPP. Value stocks and Italian equities will enjoy a modest tailwind from rising Bund yields. The lower quality of European stocks creates a long-term headwind versus US benchmarks. The outperformance of European cyclicals relative to defensives will resume and financials will have greater upside. The relative performance of small-cap stocks will soon stabilize, but a weak euro will create a near-term risk. President Emmanuel Macron’s real contender is the center-right candidate Valerie Pécresse, not populists. Feature Chart 1: Wave Dynamics The current wave of COVID-19 infections continues to surge in Europe. As Chart 1 highlights, Austria and the Netherlands just witnessed intense waves that eclipsed those experienced earlier this year. However, these waves are already ebbing because of the containment measures implemented in recent weeks. In these two severely hit nations, hospitalization rates also increased significantly; however, they did not reach the degree experienced in France or the UK in the first half of 2021 (Chart 1, right panel). Chart 1Wave Dynamics Chart 1Wave Dynamics Europe will experience another test in the coming weeks as the highly contagious Omicron variant becomes the dominant COVID-19 strain. However, data from South Africa continues to suggest that this mutation is much less pathogenic than previous variants and will not place as much strain on the healthcare system as potential case counts would indicate. Nonetheless, it is too early to make this prognosis with great confidence. Importantly, even if a small proportion of infected people is hospitalized, a large enough a pool of infections could cause a rupture in the healthcare system. As a result, politicians will likely remain cautious until a larger share of the population receives its booster dose. Hence, Omicron still represents a near-term risk to economic activity, albeit one that will prove ephemeral. Chart 2: The Economy Is Not Out Of The Woods Yet European growth remains highly dependent on the fluctuations of the global economy because exports and capex account for a large share of the continent’s output. Consequently, global economic trends remain paramount when considering the European economic outlook. In the near-term, Europe continues to face headwinds beyond the uncertainty caused by the potential effects of the Omicron variant. Global economic activity, for instance, is likely to face some further near-term headwinds caused by the supply shock typified by elevated commodity prices and bottlenecks (Chart 2). Not only does this shock limit the ability of producers to procure important inputs, but it also increases the costs of production. Historically, this combination results in downward pressure on global manufacturing activity. Chart 2The Economy Is Not Out Of The Woods Yet Chart 2The Economy Is Not Out Of The Woods Yet The second problem remains the deceleration in the Chinese economy. Declining credit growth in China results in slower European exports, which also hurts the region’s PMI. The recent Central Economic Work Conference suggests that China is ready to inject more stimulus in its economy, which will help Europe. However, the beginning of 2022 will still witness the lagged impact of previous tightening in credit conditions on European economic indicators. Moreover, BCA’s China Investment Strategy team expects the stimulus to be modest at first and only grow in intensity later.  It is unlikely to be as credit-heavy as in the past, which also means it will be less beneficial to Europe. Chart 3: A Careful ECB Last week, the European Central Bank aggressively upgraded its inflation forecast for 2022 and announced the end of the PEPP for March, however, it will increase temporarily the APP program to EUR40bn. Moreover, President Christine Lagarde remains steadfast that the Governing Council will not raise rates in 2022. Our Central Bank Monitor points to the need for tighter policy, yet the ECB continues to adopt a cautious tone, even if the Eurozone HICP inflation has reached 4%—the highest reading in thirteen years. First, the ECB still runs the risk of dislocation in the periphery, where Italian and Spanish spreads may easily explode if monetary accommodation is removed too quickly. Second, European inflationary pressures remain significantly narrower than they are in the US (Chart 3, left panel). Our Eurozone trimmed-mean CPI continues to linger well below core CPI readings, while in the US both measures track each other closely. Third, the decline in energy prices and the ebbing transportation bottlenecks mean that odds are growing that sequential inflation will soon experience an interim peak (Chart 3, right panel). Chart 3A Careful ECB Chart 3A Careful ECB This view of the ECB implies that German yields will not rise as much as US yields next year, which BCA’s US Bond Strategy team expects to reach 2.25% by the end of 2022. Moreover, the more tepid pace of the removal of accommodation and the implicit targeting of peripheral bond markets also warrant an overweight position in Italian bonds. Spreads will be volatile, but any move upward will be self-limiting because of their role in the ECB’s reaction function. As a result, investors should continue to pocket the additional income over German paper. Chart 4: A Murky Outlook For The Euro The market continues to test EUR/USD. Any breakdown below 1.1175 is likely to prompt a pronounced down leg toward 1.07-1.08, near the pandemic lows. The euro suffers from three handicaps. First, Europe’s economic links with China are greater than those of the US with China. Consequently, the Chinese economic deceleration hurts European rates of returns more than it hurts those in the US. Second, the acceleration of US inflation is inviting investors to reprice the path of the Fed’s policy rate, which accentuates the upside pressure on the dollar. Finally, the energy crisis is ramping up anew following Germany’s suspension of the approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the buildup of Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders. Surging European natural gas prices act as a powerful headwind for EUR/USD because they accentuate stagflation risks in the Eurozone (Chart 4, left panel). While these create downside pressures on the euro, the picture is more complex. Our Intermediate-Term Timing Model shows that EUR/USD is one-sigma oversold (Chart 4, right panel). Over the past 20 years, it was more depressed only in 2010 and in early 2015. Such a reading indicates that most of the bad news is already embedded in EUR/USD and that sentiment has become massively negative. Thus, we are not chasing the euro lower, even though we will respect our stop-loss at 1.1175 if it were triggered. Instead, we will look to buy the euro at lower levels in the first quarter of 2021. Chart 4A Murky Outlook For The Euro Chart 4A Murky Outlook For The Euro Chart 5: German Yields Are Key To Value Stocks And Italian Equities The performance of European value stocks relative to that of growth stocks continues to exhibit a close relationship with the evolution of German Bund yields (Chart 5, left panel). Value stocks are less sensitive than growth stocks to higher yields because they derive a smaller proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows; which suffer more from rising discount factors than near-term cash flows. Moreover, value stocks overweight financials, whose profitability increases when yields rise. The same relationship exists between the performance of Italian equities relative to the Eurozone benchmark (Chart 5, right panel). This correlation holds because of Italy’s significant value bias and its large exposure to financials. Chart 5German Yields Are Key To Value Stocks And Italian Equities Chart 5German Yields Are Key To Value Stocks And Italian Equities Based on these observations, BCA’s view that German Bund yields will rise toward 0.25% is consistent with a modest outperformance of value and Italian equities in 2022. For a more robust outperformance by value and Italian stocks, the Chinese economy will have to re-accelerate clearly and the dollar will have to fall significantly. However, these two outcomes could take more time to materialize than our bond view. Chart 6: Europe’s Quality Deficit The gyrations in the performance of European equities relative to US stocks continue to be influenced by China’s economic fluctuations. The deterioration in various measures of China’s credit impulse remains consistent with further near-term underperformance of European equities (Chart 6, left panel). Moreover, if Omicron has a significant impact on consumer behavior (via personal choices or government measures), it will once again hurt spending on services and boost the appeal of growth stocks, which Europe underrepresents. These headwinds will not be long lasting. Europe has an opportunity to outperform next year if global yields rise. However, European equity markets continue to suffer from a potent long-term disadvantage relative to those of the US. American benchmarks are composed of higher quality stocks than European ones. As a result of greater market concentration, more innovative applications of research, and the development of greater moats, US stocks generate wider profits margins than European companies and have a higher utilization of their asset base. Consequently, US shares sport significantly higher RoEs and earnings growth than European large-cap names (Chart 6, right panel). Historically, the quality factor has been one of the top performers and is an important contributor to the current strength of growth equities. Thus, even if Europe’s day in the sun arrives before the middle of 2022, it will again be a temporary phenomenon. Chart 6Europe’s Quality Deficit Chart 6Europe’s Quality Deficit Chart 7: Will the Cyclicals Outperformance Resume? For most of 2021, European cyclicals equities have not performed as well against defensive stocks as many investors hoped. In fact, the relative performance of cyclicals is broadly flat since March. Going forward, cyclicals will resume their uptrend against defensive equities and even break out of their range of the past twenty years. From a technical perspective, cyclicals have expunged many of their excesses. By the spring, European cyclicals had become prohibitively expensive compared to their defensive counterparts (Chart 7, left panel). However, their overvaluation has now passed and medium-term momentum measures are not overbought anymore, which creates a much better entry point for cyclical equities. From a fundamental perspective, cyclicals will also enjoy rising yields after being hamstrung by Treasury yields that have moved sideways for more than nine months (Chart 7, right panel). Moreover, the eventual stabilization of the Chinese economy will create an additional tailwind for these stocks. Chart 7Will The Cyclicals Outperformance Resume? Chart 7Will The Cyclicals Outperformance Resume? The biggest risk to cyclical stocks lies in inflation expectations. Ten-year CPI swaps have stopped increasing despite rising inflation. As the yield curve flattens and long-term segments of the OIS curve invert, markets register their fears that the Fed might tighten too much over the next two years. In other words, markets continue to agonize over the effect of a very low perceived terminal rate. These worries may cause the CPI swaps to decline significantly as the Fed hikes rates next year, creating a headwind for cyclicals. Chart 8: Favor Financials Financials in general and banks in particular have outperformed the European benchmark this year. This trend will persist in 2020. More than the positive impact of higher yields on the profitability of financials justifies this view. One of the key drivers supporting our optimism toward this sector is the continued improvement in the balance-sheet health of the European banking sector (Chart 8, left panel). Capital adequacy ratios remain in an uptrend and NPLs continue to be well-behaved. Meanwhile, both the governments’ liquidity support during the pandemic and the nonfinancial sector’s cash buildup over the past 18 months limit the risk that a brisk rise in insolvencies would threaten the viability of the banking system. European bank lending is also likely to remain superior to that of the post-GFC years. Consumer confidence is still sturdy, despite the recent increase in COVID cases and the tax hike created by rapidly climbing energy prices (Chart 8, right panel). Companies also benefit from an environment of low real rates and limited fiscal austerity. Unsurprisingly, capex intentions are elevated, which should support credit demand from businesses going forward. Chart 8Favor Financials Chart 8Favor Financials These factors imply that the current large discount embedded in European financials’ valuations remains excessive (even if a smaller discount is still warranted). As long as peripheral spreads do not blow out durably, financials will have scope to outperform further. Banks should also beat insurance companies. Chart 9: Small-Caps Are Nearly There Despite a sideways move followed by a 4% dip, the performance of European small-cap stocks remains in a pronounced uptrend relative to large-cap equities. The recent bout of underperformance is likely to end soon, unless a recession is around the corner. Small-cap stocks are becoming oversold (Chart 9, left panel) and will benefit from their pronounced procyclicality, especially if the recent improvement in global economic surprises continues next year. Moreover, above-trend European growth as well as an ECB that will maintain accommodative monetary conditions will combine to prevent a significant widening in European high-yield spreads, particularly once natural gas prices are turned down after the winter. This process will also help small-cap equities. The biggest risk for the European small-caps’ relative performance is the currency market. The relative performance of small-cap names is still closely correlated to the euro (Chart 9, right panel). As a result, if EUR/USD were to falter in the coming weeks, the underperformance of small-cap stocks could deepen. At the very least, small-cap stocks would languish before resuming their uptrend later in the year. Chart 9Small-Caps Are Nearly There Chart 9Small-Caps Are Nearly There Chart 10: A Risk to Macron’s Second Term The emergence of the new populist candidate Éric Zemmour has galvanized the media in recent weeks. However, he is very unlikely to pose a credible threat to French President Emmanuel Macron, unlike center-right candidate Valerie Pécresse, who just won the Les Républicains (LR) primary. In a Special Report published conjointly with our geopolitical strategists last summer, we identified the emergence of a single candidate able to unite the center-right as one of the biggest risks to Macron. As Chart 10 shows, Pécresse has made a comeback in the polls and is now expected to face Macron in the second round. According to an Elabe poll conducted after her victory in the primary, if the second round of the elections were held now, she would beat Macron. Will Pécresse manage to keep her momentum going until April 2022? First, she has to ensure the center-right remains united behind her. Up until the primaries, the center-right was divided. While she won the primary by a wide margin, her main opponent Éric Ciotti won the first round (25.6%), and Michel Barnier as well as Xavier Bertrand came close behind, with 23.9% and 22.7% respectively. Second, Pécresse must work hard to prevent voters from succumbing to the siren songs of Zemmour and Marine Le Pen, or to lean toward former Prime Minister Phillippe Edouard, a declared supporter of Macron. Investors should ignore Le Pen and Eric Zemmour. The real threat to Macron lies in Valerie Pécresse’s ability to keep the center-right united under her banner. Considering that the center-left does not represent an option and that the far-right is entangled in a tug-of-war, there is a high probability that Pécresse will reach the second round.   Footnotes Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Special Report

Highlights Below-Benchmark Portfolio Duration: Bond investors should keep portfolio duration low in 2022. While the market’s pricing of the expected Fed liftoff date and initial pace of rate hikes is reasonable, terminal fed funds rate expectations are far too low. Own Treasury Curve Steepeners: The 2/10 Treasury slope will flatten by less than what is currently discounted in the forward curve in 2022. Investors should position for this by going long the 2-year note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of cash and the 10-year note. Sell Short-Maturity TIPS: Investors should maintain a neutral allocation to long-maturity TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and an underweight allocation to short-maturity TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. We also recommend an outright short position in 2-year TIPS, as short-maturity real yields have a lot of upside in 2022. Overweight Corporate Bonds Versus Treasuries … For Now: We are overweight corporate bonds versus duration-matched Treasuries, for now, but expect to turn more defensive in the first half of 2022 once the yield curve sustainably moves into a flatter regime. Relative valuations suggest that investors should favor high-yield corporates over investment grade. Overweight Emerging Market Bonds Versus US Corporates: EM bonds offer an attractive spread advantage versus US corporates, and a weakening US dollar will help boost returns in 2022. A Maximum Overweight Allocation To Municipal Bonds: Municipal bonds offer exceptional value, especially at the long-end of the curve, and state & local government balance sheets are in excellent shape. Underweight Agency MBS: Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities don’t adequately compensate investors for the likely pace of refi activity in 2021. An up-in-coupon stance is also advisable to take advantage of rising bond yields. Feature BCA published its 2022 Outlook on December 1st. That report lays out the main macroeconomic themes that our strategists see driving markets next year. This Special Report explains how investors can profit from those themes in US fixed income markets. Specifically, we offer seven key US fixed income views for 2022. This report is limited to the seven key investment views, and only discusses Fed policy in the context of how it influences those views. Next week we will publish a more comprehensive “Fed In 2022” report that will delve into our outlook for the Fed next year. Outlook Summary First, a summary of the main economic views presented in BCA’s 2022 Outlook.1   On Economic Growth: The COVID-19 pandemic will recede in importance in 2022 allowing US economic growth to remain above trend. Sizeable household savings and wealth will support consumer spending, the composition of which will shift away from goods and towards services. Corporate capital expenditures also look set to surge. On Inflation: A transition in consumer spending from goods to services and an increase in labor supply will cause US inflation to fall in 2022, though it will remain above the Fed’s target. On Fed Policy: The first Fed rate hike will occur between June and December 2022, depending on the paths of inflation and inflation expectations during the next few months. Fed tightening will continue into 2023. On China and Emerging Markets: Further policy easing in H1 2022 will lead to a reacceleration in Chinese economic activity in the back half of the year. The BCA house view is negative on EM equities for now but will turn more bullish when clearer signs of Chinese policy easing emerge. Risks To The Outlook: The greatest risk to the outlook is that the spread of the Omicron variant leads to the re-imposition of public health measures that will weigh on economic activity. The effect of the Omicron variant remains uncertain, but increasingly widespread vaccination and the advent of anti-viral treatments should help mitigate any negative economic impacts. Key View #1: Below-Benchmark Portfolio Duration Bond investors should keep portfolio duration low in 2022, favoring the 2-year maturity over the 10-year. While the market’s pricing of the expected Fed liftoff date and initial pace of rate hikes is reasonable, terminal fed funds rate expectations are far too low. Our recommendation to keep portfolio duration low in 2022 stems directly from our assessment of Federal Reserve policy. Without going into too much detail – we will do that in next week’s “Fed In 2022” report – the Fed appears to have adopted a more hawkish reaction function during the past month. The Fed’s official forward guidance says that it will not lift rates until the labor market reaches “maximum employment”. However, Fed Chair Jay Powell weakened that commitment in recent Senate testimony. Powell said that persistently high inflation threatens the economic recovery and implied that to reach its maximum employment goal the Fed may need to act pre-emptively to tame inflation. To us, this means that the Fed’s “maximum employment” condition for lifting rates is no longer binding. The Fed will accelerate the pace of tapering when it meets this week and will start lifting rates between June and December of next year, depending on the interim trends in inflation and inflation expectations. After liftoff, Fed rate hikes will proceed at a predictable pace of 75-100 bps per year until economic growth slows significantly. We expect the fed funds rate to reach at least 2% before that occurs, consistent with survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate. Let’s compare our estimate of the future fed funds rate path with what is currently priced in the bond market (Chart 1). Chart 1The Market's Rate Expectations Liftoff The overnight index swap (OIS) curve is priced for Fed liftoff in May 2022. This is a tad early compared to our projections, but not by much. Pace After liftoff, the OIS curve is priced for the fed funds rate to rise 79 bps during the subsequent 12 months. Again, this is roughly consistent with our own expectations that the Fed will deliver three or four 25 basis point rate hikes per year. Terminal Rate It is the market’s pricing of the endpoint of the next tightening cycle – the terminal fed funds rate – that disagrees significantly with our forecast. The OIS curve is priced for the funds rate to reach 1.5% in 2024 and then stabilize. This is too low. It is too low compared to the last tightening cycle when the fed funds rate reached 2.45% in 2019. It is also too low compared to survey estimates from market participants and primary dealers. The median respondent to the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants estimates that the long-run neutral fed funds rate is 2%. The median response to the same question from the Survey of Primary Dealers is 2.25% and the median FOMC participant pegs the long-run neutral rate at 2.5%. Meanwhile, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield – a rough proxy for the long-run neutral interest rate that’s priced in the Treasury market – sits at only 1.73%. Historically, the 5-year/5-year forward yield converges with survey estimates of the long-run neutral rate as the Fed moves toward tightening (Chart 2). This means the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has at least 27-52 bps of upside in 2022. Chart 25y5y Has Room To Rise Treasury Yield Forecasts Chart 3Treasury Yield Forecasts Chart 3 shows the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year Treasury yields along with the expected paths that are discounted in the forward curve for the next 12 months. The shaded regions in each panel represent our fair value estimates of where those yields will trade if the market moves to price-in our expected future path for the fed funds rate. The upper bound of the fair value range represents the most hawkish fed funds rate scenario that we think is feasible. It assumes that Fed liftoff occurs in June, that rate hikes proceed at a pace of 100 bps per year and that the fed funds rate levels-off at a terminal rate of 2.08% (8 bps above the lower-end of a 2%-2.25% target range). The lower bound of the fair value range represents the most dovish fed funds rate scenario that we think is feasible. It assumes that Fed liftoff occurs in December 2022, that rate hikes proceed at a pace of 75 bps per year and that the fed funds rate levels-of at a terminal rate of 2.08%. Chart 3 shows that the 10-year Treasury yield is well below even the lower-end of our fair value range. The 5-year Treasury yield is a bit too low compared to our target range and the 2-year yield is consistent with our fair value range, though at the very upper-end. The investment conclusions are obvious. Bond investors should keep portfolio duration low in 2022. They should avoid the 10-year maturity and allocate most funds to shorter maturities like the 2-year. It should be noted that we used a conservative 2.08% terminal rate estimate in the scenarios presented in Chart 3. This is at the low-end of most survey estimates. What’s more, the BCA Outlook makes a strong case that those survey estimates will be revised higher once it becomes apparent that interest rates will have to rise to well above 2% to contain inflation. We agree that survey estimates of the long-run fed funds rate are probably too low, but we don’t expect them to be revised higher in 2022. Upward terminal rate revisions are probably a story for 2023 or 2024, sometime after the Fed has delivered a few rate hikes and it becomes apparent that more will be needed to slow an overheating economy. Appendix A at the end of this report translates different fed funds rate scenarios into 12-month expected returns for every Treasury maturity. We show scenarios where the liftoff date varies between June 2022 and December 2022, where the pace of rate hikes varies between 75 bps and 100 bps per year and where the terminal fed funds rate varies between 2.08% and 2.58%. The 10-year Treasury note is projected to deliver negative returns in every scenario we tested. Meanwhile, the 2-year Treasury note is projected to deliver a small positive return in every single scenario. These results support our conclusion from Chart 3. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and favor short maturities over long maturities. Risks To The View The first risk to our bearish view on US Treasuries is a resurgence of the pandemic. The 10-year Treasury yield continues to track the “pandemic trade” in the stock market. That is, the 10-year yield rises when a basket of equities that benefit from economic re-opening outperforms a basket of equities that benefit from lockdowns, and vice-versa (Chart 4). So far, the news about the virulence of the Omicron COVID variant has been encouraging, and our base case scenario assumes a further easing of pandemic concerns over the course of 2022. The second risk to our view is that the Fed moves too aggressively toward rate hikes causing an abrupt tightening of financial conditions that weighs on economic growth and sends long-dated bond yields lower. The shaded region in Chart 5 shows that this exact dynamic played out in 2018. Fed rate hikes started to pressure the dollar higher and weigh on equities. This led to tighter financial conditions and slower economic growth. The impact of tighter financial conditions was not immediately evident in the bond market, but slower growth eventually caused the Fed to back away from rate hikes leading to a late-2018 peak in the 10-year yield. Chart 410yr Tracks The "Pandemic Trade" Chart 5Watch Financial Conditions In 2022 Compared to the 2018 scenario, we see less risk of Fed over-tightening in 2022 mainly because the fed funds rate is starting out at a much lower level. However, it will be important to track financial conditions as the Fed moves toward liftoff. Undue tightening would cause us to reverse our positioning. Key View #2: Own Treasury Curve Steepeners The 2/10 Treasury slope will flatten by less than what is currently discounted in the forward curve in 2022. Investors should position for this by going long the 2-year note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of cash and the 10-year note. We also recommend buying the 20-year bond versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 10-year note and 30-year bond as an attractive duration-neutral carry trade. The scenarios presented in the prior section show that the 2-year Treasury yield is priced within the bounds of our estimated fair value range while the 10-year Treasury yield looks too low. Logically, it makes sense to position for a steepening of the 2/10 Treasury curve to profit from this divergence. Chart 6 illustrates the implications of the prior section’s fair value estimates for different Treasury slopes. Our fair value range projects that the 2/10 Treasury slope will be between 38 bps and 89 bps in 12 months, above the 37 bps that is currently priced into the forward curve. The forward curve is also priced for too much flattening in the 2/5 Treasury slope, while the 5/10 slope is consistent with the lower end of our fair value range.   The conclusion is that investors should implement 2/10 Treasury curve steepeners in 2022 on the expectation that the 2/10 slope will flatten by less than what is currently discounted in the forward curve. A comparison of the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield with a target range based on survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate also supports the case for 2/10 steepeners. Historically, an increase in the 5-year/5-year forward yield towards its target range corresponds with a steepening of the 2/10 slope (Chart 7). Bear-flattening moves in the 2/10 slope only occur when the 5-year/5-year forward is within its target band, as was the case in 2017/18. Given that the 5-year/5-year forward yield is currently well below its survey-derived target range, there is room for some 2/10 steepening as yields rise. Chart 6Treasury Slope Forecasts Chart 7A Rising 5y5y Will Steepen The Curve One way to position for a steeper 2/10 curve is to go long the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. Presently, this trade looks very attractive. The 2/5/10 butterfly spread shows a significant yield advantage in the 5-year bullet over the 2/10 barbell, both in absolute terms and relative to our fair value model (Chart 8). While we view this as a good trade, we don’t think it’s the best way to position for 2/10 steepening. We prefer a position long the 2-year note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of cash and the 10-year note. This trade gives you long exposure at the 2-year maturity instead of the 5-year maturity which will boost returns if the 2/5 slope steepens, as we anticipate it will (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 8Curve Steepeners Are Cheap In addition to our recommended 2/10 steepener, we advise clients to favor the 20-year bond versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 10-year note and 30-year bond. While we’d expect some flattening of the 10/30 slope in 2022, this trade should still perform well because of its huge carry advantage. The tables in Appendix A show that the 20-year bond earns a massive 12-month carry (income plus rolldown return) of 3.05% compared to 1.85% for the 10-year note and 1.80% for the 30-year bond. Key View #3: Sell Short-Maturity TIPS Chart 9TIPS Breakevens Investors should maintain a neutral allocation to long-maturity TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and an underweight allocation to short-maturity TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. Other attractive positions include: an outright short position in 2-year TIPS, an inflation curve steepener (short 2yr TIPS/long 2yr nominal/long 10yr TIPS/short 10yr nominal), and a TIPS curve flattener (short 2yr TIPS/long 10yr TIPS). As noted at the beginning of this report, we see inflation trending down in 2022. Inflation will remain high enough for the Fed to feel comfortable lifting rates, but it won’t match the elevated readings that are currently discounted in TIPS. Interestingly, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates are roughly consistent with the Fed’s 2.3%-2.5% target range (Chart 9). The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is a bit too low, at 2.13%, and the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 2.47%. With long-dated TIPS breakevens so close to the Fed’s target, we recommend a neutral allocation to long-maturity TIPS versus long-maturity nominal Treasuries heading into 2022. In our view, the mispricing in TIPS lies at the front-end of the curve. The 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has risen to 3.23%, well above the Fed’s 2.3%-2.5% target range. This year’s surge in short-maturity TIPS breakevens has also resulted in a deeply inverted inflation slope (Chart 9, bottom panel). Table 1Regression of Monthly Changes In CPI Swap Rate Versus Monthly Changes In 12-Month Headline CPI Inflation (2010 - Present) Short-maturity inflation expectations are highly sensitive to changes in CPI inflation, much more so than long-maturity expectations. In fact, monthly changes in the 2-year CPI swap rate are more than twice as sensitive to headline inflation than are monthly changes in the 10-year CPI swap rate (Table 1). This means that the cost of short-maturity inflation compensation will decline as inflation moderates in 2022. We recommend an underweight allocation to short-maturity TIPS versus short-maturity nominal Treasuries. We also think an outright short position in 2-year TIPS will be highly profitable in 2022. If we assume that the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate falls to the middle of the Fed’s target range during the next 12 months, and additionally that the 2-year nominal Treasury yield converges with our fair value estimate using the scenario of a September Fed liftoff, 100 bps per year hike pace and 2.08% terminal rate, then we calculate that the 2-year TIPS yield will rise from its current -2.56% to -0.98% during the next 12 months (Chart 10). Chart 10A Lot Of Upside In Short-Maturity Real Yields Short 2-Year TIPS Chart 10 also shows that the anticipated rise in the 2-year TIPS yield greatly outpaces the modest expected increase in the 10-year TIPS yield. This means that a position in 2/10 TIPS curve flatteners will turn a profit in 2022 (Chart 10, bottom panel). Key View #4: Overweight Corporate Bonds Versus Treasuries … For Now We are overweight corporate bonds versus duration-matched Treasuries, for now, but expect to turn more defensive in the first half of 2022 once the yield curve sustainably moves into a flatter regime. Relative valuations suggest that investors should favor high-yield corporates over investment grade. A key pillar of our corporate bond investment process is to split the economic cycle into three phases based on the slope of the yield curve (Chart 11). Phase 1 of the cycle is defined as the period from the end of the last recession until the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope breaks below 50 bps. Phase 2 of the cycle spans the period when the slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps. Phase 3 lasts from when the yield curve inverts until the start of the next recession. Chart 11The Three Phases Of The Economic Cycle Our historical analysis shows that excess corporate bond returns versus duration-matched Treasuries tend to be strongest in Phase 1. They are usually positive, but much lower, in Phase 2 and are often negative in Phase 3 (Table 2). Table 2Corporate Bond Returns Across The Three Phases Of The Cycle We have been firmly in Phase 1 since April 2020 and, as we would expect, excess corporate bond returns have been strong. However, we will not remain in Phase 1 much longer. The 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is currently 50 bps, right on the precipice between Phase 1 and Phase 2. We recommend an overweight allocation to corporate bonds versus Treasuries for now, but we will adopt a more defensive posture toward corporates once we transition into Phase 2. We expect this will happen sometime in the first half of 2022. Why Are We Not In Phase 2 Already? Chart 12Curve Flattening Is Overdone The 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is hovering right around 50 bps. However, as is noted earlier in this report, we think that recent yield curve flattening is overdone and expect it to reverse somewhat in the coming months. Chart 12 shows the 3-year/10-year slope along with an expected fair value range. This range is based on a 100 bps Fed rate hike pace, a 2.08% terminal rate and varying the liftoff date between June 2022 and December 2022. This fair value range only breaks below 50 bps between March and September of next year. Given our yield curve view, we are positioned for one last period of strong corporate bond outperformance during the next few months. But we will turn more defensive once we judge that we have sustainably transitioned into a Phase 2 environment. Why Turn More Defensive In Phase 2? Chart 13IG Corporate Valuations It’s correct to point out that excess corporate bond returns are still generally positive in Phase 2 environments, so ideally, we would remain overweight corporate bonds versus Treasuries throughout Phase 2. This makes sense theoretically, but strategically we think it will be wise to adopt a different approach this cycle. The main reason to err on the side of caution is that corporate bond valuations are extremely stretched. The 12-month breakeven spread for the investment grade corporate bond index is at its 6th percentile since 1995. This means that the investment grade corporate bond index has only been more expensive than today 6% of the time since 1995 (Chart 13). Tight spreads mean that expected returns will be modest, even in a favorable cyclical environment. In other words, we are not sacrificing much expected return by reducing exposure early in the cycle. Given that we can’t predict the start of the next Phase 3 period with exact precision, we think it makes sense to be more defensive this cycle. We will sacrifice some modest expected returns to ensure that we are well positioned for the next period of significant spread widening. Our corporate bond strategy is supported by an empirical study of historical returns. Table 3A shows average 12-month excess returns for the investment grade corporate bond index after certain combinations of the 3/10 Treasury slope and average index option-adjusted spread (OAS) are observed. Table 3B shows 90% confidence intervals for the averages presented in Table 3A. The tables show that a strategy of remaining overweight corporate bonds versus Treasuries after the yield curve transitions into Phase 2 only works when the corporate index OAS is above 100 bps. A transition into Phase 2 portends negative excess corporate bond returns when the OAS is below 100 bps, as it is today. Favor High-Yield Over Investment Grade Chart 14HY Corporate Valuations While investment grade corporate bonds look extremely expensive compared to history, high-yield corporate bonds look somewhat expensive, but much less so. The average High-Yield index OAS is 1 bp below its pre-COVID low, but investors still get a nice spread pickup for moving out of the Baa-rated credit tier and into the Ba-rated tier (Chart 14). Our prior research has shown that high-yield corporates tend to outperform duration-matched Treasuries when the excess index spread after accounting for default losses is above 100 bps.2 If we assume a minimum required excess spread of 100 bps and a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, we can calculate that the junk index is priced for a default rate of 3.4% during the next 12 months (Chart 14, bottom panel). All available evidence suggests that the default rate will come in below 3.4% during the next 12 months, leading to positive excess returns for high-yield corporate bonds. The default rate came in at 1.8% for the 12-month period ending in November and it has been dropping like a stone, consistent with the reading from our Default Rate Model (Chart 15). We also recently wrote about the exceptionally good health of corporate balance sheets.3 We expect the default rate will be in the mid-2% range in 2022, below what is priced into the junk index. Chart 15Corporate Defaults Will Stay Low In 2022 Junk’s valuation advantage leads us to recommend that investors maintain a preference for high-yield corporates over investment grade. We will turn more defensive on both investment grade and high-yield corporates once we transition into a Phase 2 environment, but we may still retain our preference for high-yield over investment grade at that time, as long as junk stays relatively cheap. Key View #5: Overweight Emerging Market Bonds Versus US Corporates Investment grade USD-denominated Emerging Market bonds (both sovereigns and corporates) will outperform US corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration in 2022. EM bonds offer an attractive spread advantage versus US corporates, and 2022 returns will be boosted by a weakening US dollar. We see an opportunity in Emerging Market (EM) bonds for US investors in 2022. Note that we are only referring to investment grade EM bonds denominated in US dollars. We consider both investment grade USD-denominated EM sovereign bonds and investment grade USD-denominated EM corporate & quasi-sovereign bonds. EM Sovereigns Chart 16EM Sovereigns EM sovereigns have modestly outperformed Treasuries so far this year (see Appendix B for a complete breakdown of year-to-date performance for different corporate bond sectors), and yet the sector remains attractively valued in the sense that the average index OAS has still not recovered its pre-COVID low (Chart 16). A look at recent performance trends shows that EM sovereigns outperformed credit rating and duration-matched US corporates in H2 2020 when the sector benefited from a huge yield advantage and a rapidly depreciating US dollar.4 This year, EM sovereigns lagged US corporates as the dollar strengthened. Looking ahead to 2022, we think that the recent bout of dollar strength is close to its end as the bond market has already moved to price-in an extremely hawkish Fed outlook at the front-end of the curve. A flat or depreciating dollar will benefit EM bonds in 2022, as will the yield advantage in EM sovereigns versus credit rating and duration-matched US corporates (Chart 16, panel 4). This yield advantage will only look more attractive as the Treasury curve flattens and the outlook for US corporate spreads deteriorates. At the country level, we see the best EM sovereign opportunities in Mexico, Russia, Chile, UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The bonds of all these countries outperformed credit rating and duration-matched US corporate bonds during the past 12 months, and they continue to offer a sizeable spread advantage (Chart 17). EM Corporates & Quasi-Sovereigns The investment grade USD-denominated EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index shows a similar relative return pattern to the EM Sovereign index, though overall performance has been better (Chart 18). We see that the index outperformed credit rating and duration-matched US corporates dramatically in H2 2020 when the dollar was under pressure. Relative returns have been more stable this year as the dollar has strengthened. Chart 18EM Corporates & Quasi-Sovereigns EM corporates & quasi-sovereigns should continue to outperform credit rating and duration-matched US corporates in 2022. A weaker dollar will certainly help, but the main driver of outperformance will be the very attractive yield advantage (Chart 18, panel 4). Key View #6: A Maximum Overweight Allocation To Municipal Bonds Municipal bonds offer exceptional value, especially at the long-end of the curve, and state & local government balance sheets are in excellent shape. US bond investors should favor tax-exempt municipal bonds relative to both Treasuries and equivalently-rated corporate bonds. Long-maturity tax-exempt municipal bonds continue to be one the most attractively priced assets in the US fixed income space. As we discussed in a recent report, one big reason for the attractive valuation is that municipal bonds tend to pay premium coupon rates.5 This significantly reduces the duration risk in long-dated munis. The first two columns of Table 4 show the yield ratios and breakeven tax rates between different municipal bond sectors and duration-matched Treasury securities. We see that the breakeven tax rate – the tax rate that equalizes after-tax yields between the two sectors – is a mere 11% for 12-17 year general obligation munis. The breakeven tax rate between 12-17 year revenue munis and duration-matched Treasuries is only 3%, and the longest-maturity munis actually offer a before-tax yield advantage versus Treasuries! Table 4Muni/Treasury And Muni/Credit Yield Ratios Table 4 shows that munis also offer excellent value compared to corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration, especially at the long-end of the curve. Breakeven tax rates between munis and corporate credit range from 3% to 21% for maturities longer than 12 years. What’s even more impressive about municipal bonds is that their attractive valuations are buttressed by extremely high credit quality. State & local government balance sheets have received a huge boost from federal stimulus during the past two years, and this has sent net state & local government savings (revenues minus expenditures) surging into positive territory (Chart 19). But it’s not just federal stimulus that has aided state & local governments. Even if we exclude transfer payments altogether, we find that the difference between tax receipts and consumption expenditures is rising sharply relative to interest expense (Chart 19, panel 2). Ratings agencies have noticed the improvement in state & local government budgets and ratings upgrades have far outpaced downgrades during the past year (Chart 19, bottom panel). Chart 19State & Local Balance Sheets In Good Shape Key View #7: Underweight Agency MBS Chart 20Poor MBS Performance Will Continue Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities don’t adequately compensate investors for the likely pace of refi activity in 2021. An up-in-coupon stance is also advisable to take advantage of rising bond yields. We noted in a recent report that Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities have performed poorly in 2021.6 The main reason for the poor performance is that the compensation for prepayment risk embedded in MBS spreads (aka option cost) started the year at a very low level, but mortgage refinancing activity has been much higher than expected (Chart 20). The conventional 30-year MBS option cost has been rising, but it is still only back to where it was in 2019 (Chart 20, panel 2). This is not sufficiently attractive for us to advocate buying MBS. While rising bond yields will be a tailwind for refi activity in 2022, we still expect the pace of refinancings to be relatively strong because the rapid run-up in home prices has made it extremely enticing for households to tap the equity in their homes through cash-out refis. Within a recommended underweight allocation to MBS, we recommend that investors favor higher coupon securities over lower coupon ones. Higher-coupon MBS carry less duration than lower-coupon MBS and also wider OAS and greater convexity. This means that high-coupon MBS will outperform low-coupon MBS if bond yields rise in 2022, as we expect they will. Appendix A: Treasury Return Forecasts   Appendix B: US Bond Sector Year-To-Date Performance Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2022: Peak Inflation – Or Just Getting Started?”, dated December 1, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed’s Inflation Problem”, dated November 23, 2021. 4 A weaker dollar tends to benefit USD-denominated EM bonds because it makes it easier for foreign issuers to service their dollar denominated debts. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Best & Worst Spots On The Yield Curve”, dated October 26, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Omicron Impact”, dated November 30, 2021. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Highlights The risk to European stocks from higher yields is overstated for 2022. Not only do equities possess a valuation cushion compared to bonds, but also the stock returns/bond yields correlation remains positive. This positive correlation is only two decades old, and it is a consequence of the stabilization of inflation and inflation expectations, which caused bond yield changes to mostly reflect adjustment in anticipated economic activity. As long as the recent inflation upsurge peters off next year, the equity/yield correlation will remain positive in 2022. Despite this sanguine short-term view, the long-term outlook is fraught with risks because next year’s inflation decline will be temporary; inflation is on a secular uptrend. The equity returns/bond yield correlation will become negative toward the middle of the decade, which will create a major headwind for the secular returns of both stocks and bonds. Feature Extremely low yields and elevated valuations constitute a potentially toxic mix for the equity outlook next year. The logic is straightforward: if yields rise enough, nosebleed multiples will become unjustifiable and the stock market will crash. Chart 1Protection Against Higher Yields The picture is more complex and instead, European equities are likely to withstand higher yields. To begin with, BCA Research’s US Bond strategists anticipate a modest rise in Treasury yields to 2.25% in 2022,  and our Global Fixed-Income strategists foresee an even more limited increase in German rates. Moreover, as we showed in our 2022 Key Views piece published last week, European equities embed a large valuation cushion in the form of a significant premium in their dividend yield relative to Bund yields (Chart 1). The correlation between yields and equities is another facet that will impact the effect of higher yields on the equity bull market. For now, it is premature to conclude that the positive correlation between yields and the absolute performance of European equities is poised to turn negative again in 2022. However, over the next couple of years, such a correlation reversal will take place, because inflation expectations are increasingly likely to become unmoored to the upside. Stocks Like Higher Yields Over the past two decades, one of the major financial market paradoxes has been the relationship between equity prices and bonds yields. Since 1998, the weekly returns of the MSCI Euro Area equity benchmark have correlated positively with the change in 10-year German yields (Chart 2). However, prior to the late 1990s, changes in bond yields and stocks prices were negatively correlated. Chart 2For Two Decades, Bond Yields And Stocks Prices Have Moved Together The key to the shifting relationship between stocks and bonds is the link between yields and economic activity. Stock returns have always been procyclical because earnings are the most important driver of equity returns (Chart 3). However, bond yields have become increasingly pro-cyclical over time. Today, Bund yields and the German LEI move in tandem, but, prior to 1986, their five-year rolling correlation was negative (Chart 4). Chart 3Stocks Follow Earnings Who Follow Growth Chart 4Shifting Link Between Bunds And German Growth The positive correlation between German growth and German yields sheds light on why the correlation between yields and stocks is now positive, but it does not explain why this positive link emerged in the late 1990s and not earlier. Financial asset prices reflect global phenomena. Stock indices in advanced economies overrepresent multinationals which are affected by global economic fluctuations. Meanwhile, capital is fungible and flows freely across borders. As a result, German bond yields are not the unique factor that matters to the correlation between equities and stock. Instead, the behavior of global yields and equities is critical. Chart 5Living In The Shadow Of The Asian Crisis According to this logic, the correlation between global yields and global growth becomes important. As Chart 5 illustrates, the relationship between global bond returns and global economic activity became much closer around 1998 than it was prior to this date. The key turning point was the Asian crisis of 1997/98. Why was the Asian crisis so fundamental? It was the end state of the disinflationary trend started under Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker. After the Asian crisis, the region’s newly industrialized economies switched from chronic current account deficits to chronic surpluses, which added to the global supply of savings. Moreover, Asian economies became hypercompetitive because of severely devalued exchange rates, which limited pricing power around the world. Finally, the Chinese economy became a force to be reckoned with and its share of global trade expanded massively. Together, these forces amplified competitive pressure around the world and made every inflation uptick self-limiting. The impact of the shock is visible in the inflation data. As Chart 6 shows, core inflation in the US and in the G7 has been stable since 1998, capped near 2.5%, except for 2021. Additionally, after the Asian crisis, the volatility of core inflation collapsed among both the G7 and Eurozone economies (Chart 7). Chart 62.5%, A 20-Year Old Ceiling Chart 71998: RIP CPI Volatility The effect of this steady inflation was to stabilize inflation expectations. Thus, after 1998, the most important driver of bond price annual changes has been fluctuations in anticipated real economic activity, which explains why the relationship between global bond returns and the global LEI became much tighter afterward (Chart 5, on page 4). This result is crucial to understand the impact of higher yields for equities. It suggests that, if rising yields reflect improving economic growth, then the correlation between yields and stocks will remain positive and equities may climb higher along with mounting long-term interest rates. Bottom Line: Higher yields do not necessarily portend the end of the equity bull market. Stock prices and bond yields have been positively correlated since the Asian crisis of 1997/98 because fluctuating growth expectations drive most of the change in yields. As long as this remains the case, equities can handle higher yields. Can The Correlation Shift Sign Again? The correlation between equities and bonds is not static. There are threats that could restore both temporarily or permanently the negative correlation between changes in bond yields and stock returns that prevailed prior to 1998. A Temporary Correlation Shift? Since their March 2020 lows, 10-year yields have increased 94bps and 51bps in the US and Germany, respectively. Meanwhile, the MSCI Eurozone equity benchmark is up 78%. We are clearly not yet in an environment in which rising long-term interest rates hurt stocks. In the short term, the correlation between yield changes and equity returns may turn negative if yield moves into constraining territory—this is to say, if they rise enough to risk a recession. In more academic terms, this equates to rates moving above the neutral rate of interest, or r-star. Chart 8A Long Way To Go Before Policy Becomes Tight There is little indication that interest rates are moving above this level in the short term. US and European policy rates remain well below Taylor rule estimates of equilibrium (Chart 8), which suggests that policies are still highly accommodative. The most worrisome signal comes from the slope of the yield curve. Since March 2021, the US 2-/10-year yield curve has flattened by 76bps to 81bps and, since October 2021, the same yield curve has flattened by 23bps to 35bps in Germany. Moreover, the 20-/30-year US yield curve became inverted in October 2021. These dynamics may indicate that policy is already on the verge of becoming too tight, even if only five interest rate hikes are expected in the US over the next two years.  Chart 9Term Premia Are Still Negative A curve flattening episode is the normal course of events when central banks become less accommodative; it is not a sign of impending doom. Instead, an inverted yield curve is the indication that the policy rate is above r-star. After all, if interest rates genuinely constrain growth, they will slow economic activity in the future, which will necessitate lower rates and generate a negative curve slope. We are not there yet. Moreover, the term-premium remains negative across major advanced economies, which suggests that a recessionary signal will come from a deeper yield-curve inversion than in the past (Chart 9). Chart 10Upside To The Terminal Rate Another factor likely to allow yields to rise without killing the equity market is that the expected terminal rate of interest remains too low, as we wrote in our 2022 Key Views piece last week. Historically, it is common for the expected terminal rate to rise as central banks begin to lift interest rates, especially if the economy handles the first hikes well. Today, the expected terminal rate is below the levels that prevailed after the GFC, despite a much firmer economy unburdened by private sector deleveraging and excessive fiscal tightening (Chart 10). As such, we anticipate the expected terminal rate to increase, which will limit how quickly the yield curve will flatten next year even if the Fed elevates interest rates and the ECB aggressively downshifts its pace of asset purchases once the PEPP ends. Chart 11Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not A Concern, Yet Under this aperture, the biggest risk for stocks remains inflation. Further acceleration in inflation, especially if it pushes the 5-year/5-year forward inflation breakeven rate above the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 11), could hurt stocks. Essentially, investors would price in a shift in the monetary policy environment whereby risks of a severe tightening would increase. However, as we recently wrote, the odds are mounting that short-term inflation will soon peak. Oil inflation is ebbing, while transportation costs are declining and supply bottlenecks are beginning to ease. Moreover, money growth in the US and the Eurozone, which proved relevant variables to explain inflation this year, is also waning (Chart 12). Finally, a mounting number of global central banks are tightening policy, which implies that maximum accommodation is behind us (Chart 13) In this context, we expect the positive correlation between stock returns and yield changes to remain broadly positive. A short-term rise in yields could easily contribute to equity market volatility and may even cause a deeper stock market correction than any experienced since April 2020. However, this will prove to be a temporary phenomenon, and thus we remain buyers of the dip. Chart 12Slowing Money Supply Growth, At Last Chart 13Global Policy Is Becoming Less Easy A Longer-Term Correlation Shift? A shift in the long-term correlation between equity returns and bond yield changes is a much more meaningful risk to stocks than short-term changes. BCA expects inflation to peak in the short term, but this will only be part of a stop-and-go process. Inflation is on a structural uptrend and so, any decline in 2022 and early 2023 will morph into renewed pressure, after the global output gap becomes positive again by the end of next year. Chart 14A Deflationary Tailwind Is Gone Many structural forces are moving away from deflationary to inflationary. True, technological progress remains a deflationary anchor. However, this downward pressure on inflation is no longer buttressed by a deepening of globalization (Chart 14). Moreover, because of the rise of populism around the world over the past five years, fiscal policy is unlikely to move back to the austere Washington Consensus that dictated governance from President Reagan up to the moment President Trump took power. Additionally, ageing across advanced economies and China, as well as the so-called “Great Resignation,” will constrain the expansion of the global supply side. This background suggests that the period of flat inflation that prevailed from 1998 to 2020 is ending. As a corollary, inflation expectations will embark on a multi-year upward drift. This process is likely to loosen the correlation between economic activity and yields. As a result, the period of positive correlation between yield changes and equity returns is in its last innings. This will represent a major difficulty for asset allocators over the next ten to twenty years, as it points to poor long-term real returns for both bonds and stocks. Bottom Line: The correlation between stock returns and bond yield changes is likely to remain positive in 2022, which implies that European stocks will eke out another year of positive returns, despite BCA’s house view that yields will rise. However, the long-term outlook is more problematic. The growing likelihood that inflation is making a secular upturn means that the two-decades old positive correlation between equity returns and bond yield change will become negative again around the middle of the decade. This shift will have a profound and deleterious impact on both stocks’ and bonds’ secular returns.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Highlights The helicopter drops are over, … : The economic impact payments and supplemental unemployment insurance benefits may have stopped, but their full impact has yet to be felt.  … but fiscal and monetary policy will continue to support demand, … : US households are sitting on more than $2 trillion of excess pandemic savings. If they were to spend just half of their stash over the next two or three years, the economy would gain a steady tailwind.  … and the macro backdrop will remain equity-friendly, … : Monetary policy will be less accommodative going forward but it will remain solidly supportive of markets and the economy across all of 2022.  … so investors should stick around for one last round: Equities and spread product outperform when monetary policy is easy. As long as COVID-19 doesn’t spring a nasty surprise, the expansion will continue and risk assets will once again generate positive excess returns over Treasuries and cash. Feature BCA editors’ annual sit-down with Mr. and Ms. X provides a welcome opportunity to gather our thoughts for the coming year and review how this year’s calls panned out. Looking back to this time last year,1 our risk-friendly recommendations performed well as the rationale behind them proved to be sound. Financial markets thrived in the wake of monetary and fiscal policy measures intended to err on the side of providing too much accommodation. The policy efforts were massive, and their support for markets and the economy has yet to be fully exhausted; indeed, their lengthy half-life is a key pillar of our sanguine 2022 outlook. Unlike last December, investors cannot look forward to peak accommodation in the year ahead; the peak is behind us and monetary and fiscal stimulus will be throttled back. The Fed is currently deliberating how much to accelerate its taper timetable, with an eye toward gaining the flexibility to hike rates sooner than previously planned. The hawkish turn foreshadowed by Chair Powell two weeks ago in Congressional testimony unsettled markets somewhat, but it is important to note that monetary policy settings are merely on track to become less accommodative – they are nowhere near crossing the line to restrictive and will not approach it anytime soon. Investors can be certain that markets will enjoy ample policy support across all of 2022 and we expect that equities will still be in a bull market when Mr. and Ms. X return to discuss the outlook for 2023. We are on board with the BCA consensus as detailed in the Bank Credit Analyst’s 2022 outlook.2 Early indications suggest that the Omicron variant will not be enough of a threat to provoke a negative growth surprise and we expect that the pandemic will recede in importance as the year unfolds. As it fades, supply chains should become less snarled, easing the near-term pressures that have been pushing prices higher. We expect that markets are overestimating inflation in the near term and that growth will be robust in the US and other developed economies. Despite the dialing back of some accommodation, monetary policy will remain easy, supporting economic activity and market valuations. We foresee another year of solidly positive excess returns for risk assets. The Economy Is Firing On All Cylinders You wouldn’t necessarily know it to talk with investors, much less consumer confidence survey respondents, but aggregate demand is surging and ought to remain robust going forward. Households are in fantastic shape. Although their net worth growth slowed in the third quarter, its 13% annualized seven-quarter (1Q20 through 3Q21) pace is within a whisker of all-time highs (Chart 1). They have accumulated $2.3 trillion of excess savings since the pandemic began and have plenty of capacity to borrow to augment their spending power. Just about anyone who wants a job can have one: the ratio of job openings to unemployed workers is making new highs (Chart 2) and the share of people in the labor force filing initial jobless claims is approaching the all-time lows set before the pandemic (Chart 3). Chart 1The Wealth Effect Will Support Consumption​​​​​​ Chart 2More Jobs Than People Without Them ...​​​​​​ Businesses are on a solid financial footing, as well. Debt as a share of net worth is near the lower end of its typical range since the high yield bond market got going in the late ‘80s (Chart 4). Borrowing costs are scraping all-time lows (Chart 5) and profit margins are wide (Chart 6). Banks and fixed income asset managers are falling all over themselves to lend to businesses and will continue to do so while default rates remain low. Chart 3... And Almost No Layoffs​​​​​​ Chart 4Corporations Have Less Debt And More Equity, ...​​​​​​ Chart 5... But Debt Has Never Cost Less ...​​​​​​ Chart 6... And Profit Margins Are Wide​​​​​​ Financial conditions will remain highly accommodative despite the Fed’s and other major developed world central banks’ moves to make them less easy at the margin. Below-equilibrium policy rates will continue to encourage financed purchases of homes, autos and other durable goods and entice investment via low hurdle rates. If sovereign bond yields rise modestly in 2022 in line with our high-conviction base case, governments won’t feel any pressure to tighten the fiscal screws. That may nourish modern monetary theory fantasies to the ultimate detriment of public finances, but it should ensure that all three engines of domestic demand – households, businesses and government – will hum in 2022. Omicron has reminded everyone that the pandemic is not over, but the shadow it casts on public health and economic activity is set to shrink. Booster shots of the Pfizer vaccine apparently provide effective protection, and Omicron’s mutations will not allow it to evade Merck’s and Pfizer’s soon-to-be-approved antiviral pills. The availability of pills to treat those who contract COVID could possibly be a game-changer in terms of neutralizing its global threat. Distributing shelf-stable pills is vastly simpler than delivering vaccines that need to be transported at temperatures below -70 degrees Fahrenheit. The Earnings Bar Has Been Set Very Low Our constructive view would not translate into risk friendly investment strategy if asset prices already discounted it or were expecting something even better. Just as the economy is on a better path than consumers seem to perceive and investors believe can persist, S&P 500 earnings per share are poised to grow over the next four quarters by more than the bottom-up analyst consensus expects. As compared to the simple annualized run rate of last quarter’s earnings ($215.76, or $53.89 times 4), the analyst consensus is calling for effectively no growth ($215.87) over the four quarters through 3Q22. That is a surprising prediction based on two sets of empirical evidence. First, earnings typically rise outside of recessions (Chart 7). Second, analysts have consistently forecast that forward four-quarter earnings would top the run rate of the last reported quarter’s earnings for four decades (Chart 8). This year, though, analysts have repeatedly called for quarter-over-quarter declines in earnings (Table 1), only to have reported numbers shred their estimates by jaw-dropping margins, just as they have in all six full quarters since COVID-19 arrived (Chart 9). We interpret the phase shift in the magnitude of earnings beats as evidence that companies have surprised themselves by how much they’ve been able to increase efficiency and/or cut costs during the pandemic. Our interactions with the investment community suggest that it has also been surprised but views the gains as one-off events that are unlikely to continue. Chart 7Earnings Declines Outside Of Recessions Are Rare Chart 8This Has Been An Odd Time To Expect 40-Year Lows In Earnings Growth Table 1Grim Expectations Expectations of sequentially declining earnings would fit if the economy were flirting with falling below stall speed, as it regularly did during the sluggish post-GFC expansion. But they are completely at odds with the Bloomberg economist consensus that GDP will grow at a 5% real annualized rate this quarter and 3.9% in calendar 2022 (Table 2). Over time, S&P 500 revenue growth should converge with nominal GDP growth, so the current expectations for around 10% and 7% annualized nominal GDP growth in 4Q21 and 2022, respectively, are a decent starting point for estimating S&P 500 revenue growth over those periods. While we expect that S&P 500 profit margins have peaked, we do not foresee a sharp decline in 2022, and operating leverage should ensure that high single-digit revenue growth will translate into healthy earnings gains. ​​​​​​ Table 2Above-Trend Growth Ahead​​​​​​ Bottom Line: The S&P 500 should have no trouble topping consensus estimates that foresee next to no growth in earnings over the next four quarters. There is ample room for corporate earnings to surprise to the upside. Our Major Disagreement With Markets Differences of opinion make markets and our biggest one pertains to the future direction of interest rates. We think the widespread conviction that the Fed will be unwilling or unable to raise the fed funds above 2%, if that, lest it crush financial markets and the real economy is way off base. The majority of investors seem to have taken the decade between the crisis and the pandemic as evidence that rates will remain very low for very long. Many of them must be buying the longer end of the Treasury curve in anticipation that an expedited liftoff date is the first step on the path to the next recession (Chart 10). Chart 10The Bond Market Sees Ice, Not Fire The risk asset selloff that ensued in December 2018 after the FOMC marched the fed funds rate up to 2.5% looms large in the markets’ minds and feeds the widespread view that an ambitious program of rate hikes will pull the rug out from under financial assets and the economy. Many investors have also been conditioned by the post-crisis decade to assume that inflation cannot exceed 2% for a sustained period. The market view is rooted in honest-to-goodness evidence, but we think it is of little relevance now, given the way the massive pandemic fiscal stimulus programs have altered the backdrop. In the space of thirteen months from March 2020 through March 2021, Congress passed bills injecting over $5 trillion of aid – 25% of a year’s GDP – into the economy. The Herculean effort contrasted sharply with the skittish disbursement of less than 5% of GDP on the Bush and Obama administrations’ watch from 2008 through 2010. The aftermath of the crisis demonstrated that even multiple rounds of QE do not by themselves trigger inflation, especially if demoralized households and businesses are disinclined to borrow money to consume or invest, and chastened banks are subjected to regulatory strictures forcing them to maintain sizable new capital buffers and discouraging them from making any but plain-vanilla loans to highly rated borrowers. The Bernanke Fed’s three rounds of QE presumably tamped down interest rates, but the cash that bought the Treasury and agency securities barely tiptoed into the wider world before the primary dealer banks sent it right back to the Fed as excess reserves. With banks hiding their QE money under the mattress, the money supply didn’t expand in any notable way after the crisis. Thanks to Congress’ series of 2020-21 helicopter drops, the money supply has been growing at rates that would make the late Paul Volcker’s head spin (Chart 11). Inflation is fiendishly more complicated than Milton Friedman’s always-and-everywhere dictum suggests, but there’s now a whole lot of money chasing a limited amount of goods, services and assets. We expect that a receding pandemic will allow greater quantities of goods and services to be produced, and that securities underwriters and their clients are hard at work ramping up asset supply, but inflation has far more of a chance to gain traction now than it did in the decade before the pandemic. Chart 11Bringing "Always And Everywhere" Back Into Vogue? We therefore think the lower-for-longer and lower-for-ever crowd will find itself offsides at some point in the next few years. We do not think it will get its comeuppance in 2022, however, as we see long yields rising only modestly, with the 10-year Treasury yield ending next year at 2-2.25%. Though we expect the fed funds rate will end the upcoming hiking cycle well north of 2%, bringing about the end of the bull markets in equities and credit, and quite possibly inducing the next recession, we do not think markets will abandon their new-normal rates view by the end of next year. This story will be continued, likely with a greater sense of urgency, in our 2023 outlook. Investment Recommendations Consistent with the foregoing, we make the following recommendations for 2022: Overweight equities in multi-asset portfolios. Although they are not cheap, and may experience a turbulent ride in 2022 as inflation concerns wax and wane, COVID-19 infections periodically surge and the Fed tries to adjust its messaging and actions on the fly, stocks should continue to generate sizable positive excess returns over Treasuries and cash. Overweight cyclical sectors and underweight defensive sectors within equity portfolios. If we’re right to be constructive on the global economy, Energy, Industrials, Materials and Financials are better positioned to benefit than Health Care, Staples and Utilities. Overweight small-cap equities versus large-cap equities. The S&P 600 SmallCap Index has greater exposure to our cyclicals-over-defensives call and our US Equity Strategy colleagues highlight that its constituents are cheaper than the S&P 500’s and are projected to have better earnings growth. Adding small-cap exposure to equity portfolios aligns with our constructive view on the economy and markets. Underweight fixed income in multi-asset portfolios. Underweight Treasuries within bond portfolios. Maintain below-benchmark duration within bond portfolios. Though we do not expect the bond market to see things entirely our way next year, we think the long end of the yield curve will shift out somewhat. We therefore have little appetite for duration and Treasuries and expect spread product will outperform Treasuries and high-yield corporate bonds will outperform investment-grade corporates. Consider hybrid alternatives to traditional fixed income securities. When we roll out our multi-asset ETF portfolio next month, it will include a hybrid bucket of income-generating assets to help multi-asset investors seeking income find low-beta destinations with a fighting chance of generating positive real total returns.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see the December 14, 2020 US Investment Strategy Report, "2021 Key Views: It’s The Policy, Stupid." 2     Please see the December 2021 Bank Credit Analyst, "OUTLOOK 2022: Peak Inflation – Or Just Getting Started?"