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Special Report Highlights The U.S. basic balance is the strongest it’s been in decades. However, the White House’s profligacy threatens this positive. The euro area basic balance is also healthy. Now that the European Central Bank has ended its asset purchasing program, aggregate portfolio flows in Europe have much scope to improve, creating long-term support for the euro. Australia, Canada and New Zealand are likely to suffer deteriorating balance-of-payments trends, which will hamper their performance. Norway is the commodity driven economy that is likely to buck this trend. Stay positive the NOK against the SEK and the EUR as well as against other commodity currencies. Feature Balance-of-payments dynamics can often be overplayed when forecasting G10 FX. While their capacity to forecast FX moves is small on a 12-month horizon, the state of the balance of payments can occasionally take primacy over any other consideration. This is particularly true when global liquidity conditions deteriorate, as it makes financing current account deficits more expensive, often requiring sharp adjustment in currency valuations. Since we have experienced a period of rising financial market volatility and global liquidity has deteriorated, this gives us a momentous occasion to review balance-of-payments conditions across the G10. While the balance-of-payments situation for the U.S. is not as dire as is often argued, the deteriorating fiscal balance suggests that this situation is temporary. This means that balance-of-payments risks are likely to grow for the dollar over the coming years. Meanwhile, depressed portfolio flows into the euro area have a lot of scope to improve, which point to a bullish long-term outcome for the euro. Finally, other than Norway, the commodity currency complex sports tenuous balance-of-payments dynamics, which are likely to deteriorate. This suggests that the CAD, AUD and NZD have downside. As a long-term allocation, selling these currencies against the NOK makes sense as well. The U.S. Despite a strong economy that is lifting import growth, the U.S. trade and current account balances have remained stable since 2014, hovering near -3% of GDP and -2.3% of GDP, respectively. This stability is a consequence of the shale revolution, which has curtailed U.S. oil imports by 3.3 million bpd since 2006. However, thanks to robust growth due in large part to the Trump administration’s deregulatory push as well as last year’s tax cut, the U.S. has been the recipient of large FDI inflows, amounting to 1.4% of GDP, the highest level since 2006. Consequently, the U.S.’s basic balance of payments has rebounded, hitting a record high (Chart 1). Chart 1U.S. Balance Of Payments A strong basic balance of payments has been an important factor behind the greenback’s strength this cycle as net portfolio flows in the U.S. have not been particularly strong, having mostly been driven by weaker official purchases. In this context, the current M&A wave bodes well for the dollar as the U.S. has historically been the recipient of such flows. The U.S. equity market’s overweight towards tech and healthcare stocks strengthens this view. From a balance-of-payments perspective, the biggest risk for the dollar is Washington’s profligacy, which is forcing the world to digest a large stock of USD-denominated liabilities. However, if history is any guide, this risk is likely to drive the dollar lower only once U.S. real rates begin to become less appealing compared to their peers. Since BCA expects U.S. real rates to increase more, widening real rate differentials in the process, the dollar should continue to remain supported this year, especially as investors continue to expect a shallower path for rates than we do. The Euro Area After peaking at 2.4% of GDP, the euro area trade balance has softened to 1.8% of GDP. Rebounding economic activity in the European periphery explains this small deterioration as rising domestic demand tends to lift imports growth, hurting trade balances in the process. Despite this worsening trade balance, the euro area current account surplus remains as wide as ever, clocking in at 3.4% of GDP. This reflects both recent improvements in the European net international investment position as well as the fact that low European rates are curtailing the costs of liabilities. Poor FDI performance mitigates the benefits of the large European current account surplus. Hampered by low rates of return, lingering worries about European cohesion and banks’ health, long-term investors have flown out of the euro area – not in. Nonetheless, despite this negative, the euro area basic balance remains in surplus, creating a small positive for the euro (Chart 2). Chart 2Euro Area Balance Of Payments The biggest problem for the euro in recent years has been portfolio outflows, especially in the fixed income sphere. While the weakness in portfolio flows has been a crucial factor preventing the good value in the euro – EUR/USD trades at a 12% discount to its purchasing-power parity equilibrium – from realizing itself, the outlook on this front is improving. The European Central Bank’s negative interest rate policy coupled with its Asset Purchase Program have created a powerful repellent for private fixed-income investors. However, the APP is now over, and European policy rates should move back above zero by year-end 2020. As a result, euro area portfolio flows have room to improve considerably. Once this happens, since the basic balance is already in surplus, the euro will have scope to rally significantly. Japan Burdened by slowing exports to both China and emerging markets, the Japanese trade balance is vanishing quickly. However, it still remains at a wide 3.8% of GDP. This is a direct artefact of Japan’s extraordinarily large net international investment position of 60% of GDP, which generates such large net investment income that even when Japan runs a trade deficit of more than 2% of GDP, as it did in 2014, the current account remains balanced (Chart 3). Chart 3Japanese Balance Of Payments The flipside of Japan’s structural current account surplus is an FDI balance constantly in deficit. The Japanese private sector generates more savings than the country can use, even after the profligacy of the government is satiated. Essentially, Japanese firms are reluctant to expand capacity in ageing, expensive and deflationary Japan. They prefer to do so outside of the national borders, closer to potential new customers. As a result of this dichotomy between the current account surplus and FDI deficit, Japan’s basic balance of payments is a much more modest 1.1% of GDP. Thus, the long-term and stable components of the Japanese balance of payments are mildly positive for the yen. In terms of stock and bond flows, Japan is currently experiencing significant outflows, driven by Japanese investors moving funds outside the country. Historically, these portfolio flows have been a poor indicator for the yen’s direction, often moving into deficit territory as the yen strengthens. This is because Japanese investors are often hedging their foreign asset purchases. Consequently, money market flows will likely once again determine the yen’s fate. For now, the Bank of Japan remains firmly on hold and U.S. rates are rising, suggesting USD/JPY has room to rally this year. However, the JPY’s cheapness and the favorable balance-of-payments picture of Japan argue that the yen’s weakness is in its final innings. The next big structural move in the yen is higher. The U.K. Despite the post-referendum cheapening of the pound, the U.K. continues to run a massive trade deficit of 6.7% of GDP. The current account looks a bit better but remains at a large deficit of 3.9% of GDP. A current account deficit is not a problem for a currency so long as it can be financed cheaply. Historically, the U.K. has been attractive to long-term foreign investors, with a widening current account deficit often met with a growing net FDI balance, leaving only a small basic balance to finance through other channels (Chart 4). Chart 4U.K. Balance Of Payments This time around, the current account remains wide but net FDI flows have collapsed, from 8% of GDP in 2017 to 1.8% of GDP today. The uncertainty surrounding Brexit explains this deterioration. The financial services sector accounts for more than 50% of the stock of inward foreign investments in Great Britain. As financial services will suffer the brunt of Brexit, those investments have also melted. This means the U.K. will have to depend on portfolio flows to finance its current account deficit. Portfolio investments in the U.K. have grown since mid-2017, explaining the stability in the pound. However, this masks some heightened short-term volatility for the GBP against both the dollar and the euro. In the short-term, as the Brexit deadline quickly approaches, this volatility in both flows and the currency will remain high. On a long-term basis, we expect a benign resolution to Brexit. While large FDIs into the financial sector are forever something of the past, flows into British market securities are likely to improve, as the Bank of England will have room to increase rates once economic activity picks up again after the Brexit fog lifts. Canada The Canadian trade balance never recovered from its pre-Great Financial Crisis health. The rebound in oil prices since January 2016 has done little to help the Canadian trade balance, as Canadian oil trades at a large discount to global benchmarks – a consequence of a lack of pipeline capacity that has trapped Canadian oil where it is not needed. The Canadian current account balance offers little solace, and at -2.7% of GDP is in even worse shape than the trade balance (Chart 5). However, the Canadian basic balance is currently in better condition, as Canada continues to attract net FDIs equal to 2% of GDP. The problem for the country is that FDI inflows have become much more limited by the fact that Canadian oil sands generate little profits at current oil prices – a problem amplified by the lack of exporting capacity. This trend is unlikely to change anytime soon. Chart 5Canadian Balance Of Payments Portfolio flows remain positive, but at 1.1% of GDP, they are falling sharply. The poor profitability of Canadian resources stocks is obviously a problem there, but the growing risks to the Canadian housing market are also likely to hurt banks’ profitability as well as the aggregate financial sector, which accounts for nearly 40% of the country’s stock market capitalization. As a result, with Canadian yields still lagging the U.S., portfolio flows could also deteriorate further. This combination implies that the balance-of-payments picture for Canada is becoming a growing headwind. Australia Two factors are lifting the Australian trade balance, which stands at a surplus of 0.6% of GDP. As the exploitation of Australia’s large mineral deposits mature, the need for mining capex has declined, which has been limiting the growth of Australian machinery imports. On the other hand, this same maturity means that more minerals are being exported out of Australia. Consequently, since iron ore prices have rebounded 88% since their December 2015 lows, representing a generous boost to Australian terms of trade, the country’s trade balance has significantly improved. The current account balance has mimicked this improvement; however, it remains at a deficit of 2.6% of GDP (Chart 6). Much of the investment required to develop the mineral deposits present in the country came from outside Australia’s borders. As a result, foreign investors are receiving large amounts of income from their investment, generating a negative income balance for the country. Nonetheless, the Australian basic balance is now positive as net FDI flows represent more than 3% of GDP. Chart 6Australian Balance Of Payments Going forward, we worry that China’s slowdown has not fully played out. This means that Australia’s nominal exports could suffer under the weight of falling metals prices, generating a deterioration in the trade balance, the current account and the basic balance. Worryingly, portfolio inflows into the country would also suffer. Finally, Australian households’ high indebtedness, coupled with pronounced overvaluation evident in key cities like Sydney and Melbourne, could further impede capital inflows into the country. This suggests that from a balance-of-payments perspective, the AUD could witness further depreciation, especially as AUD/USD still trades 10% above its purchasing-power-parity fair value. New Zealand The New Zealand trade balance has fallen to -1.8% of GDP, its lowest level in 10 years. This principally reflects stronger imports growth, as exports are currently growing at a 11% annual rate. A consequence of this worsening trade balance has been a widening current account deficit, which now stands at 3.6% of GDP. New Zealand has not been able to attract enough FDI to compensate for its structural current account deficit. As a result, its perennially negative basic balance currently stands at 2.6% of GDP (Chart 7). This lack of structural funding for its current account deficit is linked to its interest rates, which always stand above the G10 average. Thanks to immigration, New Zealand has an economy with an elevated potential growth rate, and thus a higher neutral rate. This means that on average it tends to run a capital account surplus that is matched by a current account deficit. Inversely, the perennial current account deficit requires higher interest rates in order to be financed via capital inflows. Chart 7New Zealand Balance Of Payments The problem facing the NZD is that kiwi rates, both at the long and short end of the curve, currently stand below U.S. rates. With a negative basic balance of payments, this creates a natural downward bias to the NZD. The kiwi needs to cheapen enough today that its future returns will be expected to be large enough to compensate for the lower yields offered by domestic securities. Since the real trade-weighted NZD currently trades at a 7% premium to its long-term fair value, so long as the interest rate handicap remains, the path of least resistance points south. Only a sustained rebound in global activity will be able to revert this trend in a durable manner. So far, a sustained rebound in global growth is not in the cards. Consequently, any tactical rally in the kiwi will be temporary. Switzerland The Swiss trade surplus may have declined, but it still remains at a very healthy 4.2% of GDP. This deterioration reflects a pick-up in imports, which have been boosted by a rebound in domestic activity in place since late 2015, as well as the expensive nature of the CHF. The Swiss current account surplus is even larger, standing at 10% of GDP. This large surplus is mainly the consequence of Switzerland’s extremely large net international investment position, which stands at almost 120% of GDP. Such a large pool of foreign assets yields a large income balance, which boosts the current account. After a sudden pickup in net FDI flows last year to 10% of GDP, these flows have violently morphed into a net outflow of 8.3% of GDP. Last year’s positive FDI balance was odd, as countries like Switzerland, which run persistent large positive current account balances, tend to export capital, not import it. A consequence of this sudden reversal was to push the basic balance from a surplus of 17% of GDP to a small surplus of 1.5% of GDP (Chart 8). Chart 8Switzerland Balance Of Payments In contrast, Swiss portfolio flows have moved back into a very small surplus, reflecting investors’ desire for safety in a 2018 year full of volatility and global growth disappointments. These flows suggest that generally, investors have been parking their funds in Switzerland, explaining the strengthening of the CHF last year against the EUR. Now that global financial conditions are easing, setting the stage for stabilization in global growth, the expensive CHF is likely to depreciate. The more dovish tone of the Swiss National Bank is likely to catalyze this change. Sweden Since 2016, the Swedish trade balance has been in negative territory, currently standing at 0.6% of GDP. This is a phenomenon not experienced in this country for more than three decades. Two forces have hurt the trade balance. On one hand, boosted by negative interest rates, Swedish consumers have taken on debt and consumed aggressively. This has lifted domestic demand, propping up imports in the process. On the other hand, Sweden is very sensitive to global trade and industrial activity. The slowdown witnessed at the end of last year has dampened Swedish exports. In response to these developments, the Swedish current account balance has declined meaningfully, from 8.3% of GDP in 2007 to 2.2% today. Since Sweden’s net FDI balance is at zero, the basic balance stands at 1.8% of GDP. However, this is toward the low end of its historical distribution (Chart 9). If the deterioration in the current account continues, something we expect as the Riksbank is keeping interest rates at extraordinarily accommodative levels of -0.25%, thus ensuring that import growth will remain robust, the krona will face an increasingly onerous balance-of-payments backdrop. Chart 9Swedish Balance Of Payments The saving grace for the SEK is likely to come from portfolio flows into securities. The trade-weighted krona is cheap, trading at a nearly 2-sigma discount to its long-term fair value, implicitly boosting expected returns from holding SEK-denominated assets. Moreover, the combination of a Riksbank having finally abandoned its efforts to dampen the krona, and some signs of rebound in economic domestic economic activity such as strong PMI readings, points to a high probability of funds flowing into the country. Norway Thanks to rebounding oil prices since 2016, the Norwegian trade balance has also recovered, having moved from a low of 3.8% of GDP to 6.9% of GDP today. This is still well below the levels that prevailed from 2001 to 2013, when the trade balance averaged 14% of GDP. Meanwhile, the Norwegian current account has followed the trend in the trade balance. However, since Norway sports a massive net international investment position equal to 207% of GDP, the current account stands at 7.9% of GDP, boosted by a large income stream from foreign investments. As a country sporting a structural current account surplus, Norway is also an exporter of capital, which means its FDI balance is normally negative. Even though net FDIs today are -4.6% of GDP, the basic balance is nonetheless in surplus at 3% of GDP (Chart 10). This is still a much smaller basic balance than what prevailed from 2001 to 2013. This means that the long-term component of the balance of payments is not as supportive to the NOK as it once was. Chart 10Norway Balance Of Payments Norway also tends to suffer from portfolio outflows. This again is a consequence of the country’s large current account surplus, which is a channel outward via Norway’s massive sovereign wealth fund. Today, the portfolio balance is quite narrow, a consequence of declining oil receipts. However, Norwegian oil production is expected to increase by 50% by 2022. This means that the Norwegian current account will rebound, and portfolio outflows will once again grow. But since portfolios outflows are the mirror image of the current account dynamics, this is likely to be a neutral force for the NOK. Ultimately, we like the NOK because it is very cheap: the real trade-weighted NOK enjoys a one-sigma discount to its long-term fair value. Due to trade-weights, this means the NOK is cheap versus both the EUR and the SEK. Hence, with BCA’s positive view on oil prices and the positive outlook for Norwegian oil production, we would anticipate the NOK performing well against these two currencies on a 12- to 18-month basis.   Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Stay tactically overweight to equities for the time being. Close the overweight to industrial commodities versus equities. The financials, basic resources, and industrials equity sectors can continue to outperform for a few months longer. EM can also continue to outperform DM for a few months longer. Overweight Germany’s DAX versus German bunds. The second half of the year is going to be much tougher than the first half. Feature Chart of the WeekPessimism Was Overdone: The Classical Cyclicals And EM Are Rebounding Locked In An Intimate Embrace Last week, we highlighted a frustrating truth: for the past 16 months the broad equity market has been on a journey to nowhere. Yet the journey has been far from boring. There have been exciting detours of 10-15 percent in both directions, albeit these moves have been short-lived, lasting no more than three months at a time. The same truth applies to the broad bond market: for the past sixteen months the global long bond yield – defined here as the average of the yields on the 30-year German bund yield and 30-year T-bond – has also ended up going nowhere. On this journey too, there have been exciting detours of up to 50 basis points in both directions, but these moves have also lasted no more than three months before retracing. It follows that for the past 16 months, the strategic allocation to equities, bonds and cash has had zero impact on investment performance, but the tactical allocation to the asset classes has had a huge impact. Yet here’s the thing: the sharp tactical moves in the bond market and in the stock market have been intimately embraced. When the global long bond yield has approached the top of its range, it has catalysed a sharp sell-off in equities; and when the bond yield has approached the bottom of its range, it has catalysed a sharp rally in equities (Chart I-2). In fact, over the past 16 months, asset allocation has boiled down to a very simple trading rule based on the global long bond yield: above 2.2 percent, sell equities; below 1.95 percent, buy equities. Today, the yield stands at 1.85 percent, suggesting a tactically overweight stance to equities. Chart I-2The Sharp Tactical Moves In The Bond Market And Stock Market Are Intimately Connected The Persistent Trends Are In Sectors Some investors cannot shift their portfolios quickly enough to exploit the tactical opportunities in the markets. They need trends that persist for at least six months to a year. The good news is that these more persistent trends do exist, but to find them you have to look at equity sectors, and specifically the classically cyclical sectors (Chart of the Week). The financials and basic resources sectors were in strong relative downtrends through most of 2018; but for the last four months these classically cyclical sectors have flipped into very clear uptrends (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). The same is true for industrials, albeit the end of the downtrend has happened more recently (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Financials Are Rebounding Chart I-4Basic Resources Are Rebounding Chart I-5Industrials Are Rebounding For the avoidance of doubt, technology is not a classically cyclical sector because the sales of technology products – particularly to consumers – are relatively insensitive to short-term fluctuations in the economy. In fact, the relative performance of technology is an almost perfect mirror-image of financials (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Technology Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical Neither is the chemicals sector a classical cyclical. Given that raw material prices are an input cost for chemical manufacturers, the chemicals sector can underperform when raw material prices are rising in a cyclical up-oscillation (Chart I-7). It follows that the three true classically cyclical sectors are: financials, basic resources and industrials. Chart I-7The Chemicals Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical What if your investment process does not allow you to invest in sectors and benefit from their well-defined and longer trends? The good news is that you can play these same trends through regional and country stock market indexes. We refer readers to previous reports for the details, but the crucial message is that regional and country relative performances stem from nothing more than the stock markets’ defining sector skews combined with sector relative performances.1 This revelation of what truly drives regional and country relative performance is bittersweet. It is sweet because it simplifies an investment process that can be very complicated. But it is also bitter because it highlights that the investment industry is still replete with unnecessary layers of complexity. Still, just to drive home the point, we would like the charts to do the talking. The relative performance of financials, the relative performance of Italy’s MIB, and the relative performance of Emerging Markets (EM) versus Developed Markets (DM) are all effectively one and the same story (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8One And The Same Story: Financials And Italy... Chart I-9...And Financials And EM Versus DM What Are The Markets Telling Us, And Do We Agree? Another very common question we get is: what is our forecast for economic growth and profits growth? For example, two questions on everyone’s lips right now are: can Germany avoid a technical recession, and what is our forecast for Germany’s growth from here? These are indeed important questions, but for investors they are not the most important questions. Financial markets are a discounting mechanism. So for investors, the most important question should always be: what is discounted in the current market price, and is that too optimistic or too pessimistic? Over-optimism and over-pessimism on the economy are especially important for the classically cyclical sectors because their profits have a very high operational gearing to their sales: a small change in the sales outcome has a huge impact on the profit outcome and, therefore, the price.  If the price is discounting a booming economy and what actually transpires is that the economy grows modestly, then a seemingly benign outcome of respectable growth will paradoxically cause the price to slump. Conversely, if the price is discounting a very pessimistic outcome and what actually transpires is anything better than the ultra-pessimism, then even a bad outcome will paradoxically cause the price to soar. In this regard, the recent underperformance of Germany’s DAX versus German bunds is at an extreme not far from that during the euro sovereign debt crisis in 2011-12 (Chart I-10). So the important question for investors is: will the actual economic outcome transpire to be as extreme as that? Our answer is that the extreme underperformance of the DAX versus bunds is discounting an overly pessimistic outcome, and on that basis the correct stance is to be overweight the DAX versus bunds.   Chart I-10Overly Pessimistic: The DAX Versus Bunds Turning to the classical cyclicals, these sectors have rebounded because their embedded assumptions for growth reached peak pessimism in October. Since then, the pessimism has abated at the margin because of improving short-term impulses from Chinese stimulus, lower global bond yields, and sharply lower energy prices. Given that positive (and negative) impulse phases reliably tend to last for six to eight months, our expectation is that this tailwind for the classical cyclical sectors – financials, basic resources, and industrials – can continue for a few months longer. Which means that the outperformance of EM versus DM can also continue for a few months longer. In terms of asset allocation, long industrial commodities versus equities worked very powerfully at the end of last year, but the relative merits of the two asset classes are now more evenly balanced. Hence, we are now closing this position in profit. Finally, our major concern is for later in the year when the aforementioned improving short-term impulses will inevitably fade, and even potentially reverse. Bear in mind that the impulses arise from the short-term changes in credit flows, bond yields, and the oil price. It follows that to recreate these positive impulses for later in the year, bond yields and/or the oil price have to keep falling. This is not our base case, so enjoy the positive impulses while they last! As the year progresses the investment environment is going to get much tougher. Fractal Trading System* The sharp underperformance of the Nikkei 225 versus the Hang Seng is at the limit of tight liquidity that has signaled all of the recent trend reversals in this relative position. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to go long the Nikkei 225 versus the Hang Seng. Set a profit target of 4.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. We now have seven open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnote 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Oil, Banks, And Bonds: The Oddities Of 2018”, dated November 29, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
According to the Riskbank Resources Utilization Indicator, the Swedish economy is at full capacity, pointing toward growing inflationary pressure. In fact, inflation is already at target, yet real rates are deeply negative and the Swedish Krona is cheap.…
Highlights We always strive to develop new analytical methods to complement our focus on judging currencies based on global liquidity conditions and the business cycle. This week, we introduce a ranking method based strictly on domestic factors: We call it the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking. Using this method alone, the USD, the NZD, the AUD, and the NOK are the most attractive currencies over the coming three months, while the JPY, the GBP, the EUR and the CHF are the least attractive ones. If we further filter the results using a valuation gauge, the USD, the NOK and the CAD are the most attractive currencies over the coming three months, while the CHF, the JPY and the GBP are the least attractive ones. Ultimately, the message is clear: if the dollar corrects, domestic factors suggest it will be shallow. However, buying pro-cyclical commodity currencies at the expense of countercyclical ones makes sense no matter what. Feature This publication places significant emphasis on understanding where we stand in the global liquidity and business cycle in order to make forecasts for G-10 currencies. However, we also like to refer to other methods to add supplementary dimensions to our judgment calls. In this optic, we have focused on factor-based analyses such as understanding momentum, carry and valuation considerations. This week, we take another approach: We build a ranking methodology using domestic economic variables only, intentionally excluding global business cycle factors. Essentially, we want to create an additional filter to be used independently of our main method. This way, we can develop a true complement to our philosophy rooted in understanding the global business cycle. With this approach, we rank currencies in terms of domestic growth, slack, inflation, financial conditions, central bank monitors, and real rates. We look at the level of these variables as well as how they have evolved over the past 12 months. After ranking each currency for each criterion, we compute an aggregate attractiveness ranking incorporating all the information. We then compare the attractiveness of each currency to their premiums/discounts to our Intermediate-Term Timing Models. Based on this methodology, the USD, the NOK and the CAD are the most attractive currencies over the coming three months, while the CHF, the JPY, and the GBP are the least attractive ones. Building A Domestic Attractiveness Ranking Domestic Growth The first dimension tries to capture the strength and direction of domestic growth. We begin by looking at the annual growth rate of industrial production excluding construction, as well as how this growth rate has evolved over the past 12 months. Here, the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. As Chart I-1 illustrates, Sweden is performing particularly well on this dimension, while the euro area, Switzerland, the U.K, and Japan are not. The U.S. stands toward the middle of the pack. When aggregating this dimension on both the first and second derivative of industrial production, Sweden ranks first, followed by the U.S. and Norway (Chart I-2). The U.K. and the euro area rank at the bottom. When trying to gauge the impact of domestic growth on each currency’s attractiveness, we also look at the forward-looking OECD leading economic indicator (LEI). As with industrial production, the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. This changes the ranking. New Zealand exhibits the highest annual growth rate, followed by the U.S. Meanwhile, when looking at how the annual rate of change has evolved over the past 12 months, Australia shows the least deterioration, and the euro area the most (Chart I-3). Putting these two facets of the LEI together, Australia currently ranks first, followed by the U.S. and New Zealand. Switzerland and the U.K perform the most poorly (Chart I-4). Slack Then, we focus on slack, observing the dynamics in the unemployment gap, calculated using the OECD estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Here, the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are least attractive, while those at the bottom left are most attractive. Switzerland enjoys both a very negative and rapidly falling unemployment gap (Chart I-5). The U.K. also exhibits a clear absence of slack, but in response to the woes surrounding Brexit, this tightness is decreasing. Interestingly, the euro area looks good. Despite its high unemployment rate of 7.9%, the unemployment gap is negative, a reflection of its high NAIRU. Combining the amount of slack with the change in slack, Switzerland, New Zealand and the euro area display the best rankings, while the U.S. and Sweden exhibit the worst (Chart I-6). The poor rankings for both the U.S. and Sweden reflect that there is little room for improvement in these countries. Inflation When ranking currencies on the inflation dimension, we look at core inflation and wages. We assume that rising inflationary pressures are a plus, as they indicate the need for tighter policy. We begin with core inflation itself; the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. Canada and the U.S. both sport higher core inflation than the rest of the sample, as well positive inflationary momentum (Chart I-7). Switzerland displays both a very low level of inflation as well as declining momentum. U.K. inflation displays the least amount of momentum. On the core CPI ranking, the Canadian dollar ranks first, followed by the USD. Unsurprisingly, Japan and Switzerland rank at the bottom of the heap (Chart I-8).   We also use wages to track inflationary conditions as G-10 central banks have put a lot of emphasis on labor costs. Similar to core inflation, we measure each country’s level of wage growth as well as its wage-growth momentum. The currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. This time, the U.S. and the U.K. display both the highest annual growth rate of wages as well as the fastest increase in wage inflation (Chart I-9). Meanwhile, Norwegian wage growth is very poor, but improving. The U.S. and the U.K. rank first on this dimension, while Switzerland and Canada rank last, the latter is impacted by its very sharp deceleration in wage growth (Chart I-10). Financial Conditions The Financial Conditions Index (FCI) has ample explanatory power when it comes to forecasting a country’s future growth and inflation prospects. This property has made the FCI a key variable tracked by G-10 central banks. Here we plot the level of the FCI relative to the annual change in FCI. A low and easing FCI boosts a nation’s growth prospects, while a high and tightening FCI hurts the outlook. Consequently, the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are least attractive, while those at the bottom left are most attractive. While Switzerland has the highest level of FCI – courtesy of an overvalued exchange rate – the U.S. has experienced the greatest tightening in financial conditions (Chart I-11). Combining the level and change in FCI, we find that New Zealand currently possess the most pro-growth conditions, followed by both Sweden and Norway. On the other end of the spectrum, Japan and the U.S. suffer from the most deleterious financial backdrop (Chart I-12). Central Bank Monitors   We often use the Central Bank Monitors devised by our Global Fixed Income Strategy sister publication as a gauge to evaluate the most probable next moves by central banks. It therefore makes great sense to use this tool in the current exercise. The only problem is that we currently do not have a Central Bank Monitor for Switzerland, Sweden and Norway. Nonetheless, using this variable to create a dimension, we compare where each available Central Bank Monitor stands with its evolution over the past 12 months. The currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. Currently, Canada and the U.S. show a clear need for tighter policy, without a pronounced fall in their respective Central Bank Monitors (Chart I-13). However, while the U.K. could stand higher rates right now, the British Central Bank Monitor is quickly falling, suggesting the window of opportunity for the Bank of England is dissipating fast. The euro area and Australia do not seem to justify higher rates right now. On this metric, Canada and the U.S. stand at one and two, while Australia and the euro area offer the least attractive conditions for their currencies (Chart I-14). Real Interest Rates   The Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) hypothesis has been one the workhorses of modern finance in terms of forecasting exchange rates. To conduct this type of exercise, our previous work has often relied on a combination of short- and long-term real rates, a formulation with a good empirical track record.1 Accordingly, in the current exercise, we use this same combination of short- and long-term real rates to evaluate the attractiveness of G-10 currencies. This dimension is created by comparing the level of real rates to the change in real rates over the past 12 months. The currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. The U.S. dollar is buoyed by elevated and rising real rates, while the pound is hampered by low and falling real rates (Chart I-15). This results in the dollar ranking first on this dimension, and the pound ranking last (Chart I-16). Interestingly, the yen ranks second because depressed inflation expectations result in higher-than-average and rising real rates. Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking and Investment Conclusions   Once we have ranked each currency on each dimension, we can compute the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking as a simple average of the ranking of the eight different dimensions. Based on this method, domestic fundamentals suggest that the USD, the NZD, the NOK and the AUD are the most attractive currencies over the next three months or so, while the JPY, the GBP, the EUR and the CHF are the least attractive ones (Chart I-17). Interestingly, this confirms our current tactical recommendation espoused over recent weeks to favor pro-cyclical currencies at the expense of defensive currencies. However, it goes against our view that the U.S. dollar is likely to correct further over the same time frame. This difference reflects the fact that unlike our regular analysis, the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking does not take into account the global business cycle, momentum and sentiment. We can refine this approach further and incorporate valuation considerations. We often rely on our Intermediate-Term Timing Model to gauge if a currency is cheap or not. Chart I-18 compares the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking of G-10 currencies to their deviation from their ITTM. Countries at the bottom left offer the most attractive currencies, while those at the upper right are the least attractive currencies. This chart further emphasizes the attractiveness of the dollar: not only do domestic factors support the greenback, so do its short-term valuations. The CAD, the NOK and the SEK also shine using this method, while the less pro-cyclical EUR, CHF and JPY suffer. The pound too seems to posses some short-term downside. Ultimately, this tells us that if the global environment is indeed unfavorable to the U.S. dollar right now, we cannot ignore the strength of U.S. domestic factors. Consequently, we refrain from aggressively selling the USD during the tactical anticipated correction. Instead, if the global environment favors the pro-cyclical commodity currencies on a three-month basis, it is optimal to buy them on their crosses, especially against the CHF and JPY. Meanwhile, the pound has very little going for it, and selling it against the SEK or the NOK could still deliver ample gains.   Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "In Search Of A Timing Model" dated July 22, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: January U.S. consumer confidence index surprised to the downside, coming in at 120.2.  U.S. unemployment rate in January increased to 4.0%, from a previous 3.9% reading; however, this data point was likely distorted by the government shutdown Non-farm payrolls in January surprised to the upside, coming in at 304k. The DXY index rebounded by 0.9% this week. Tactically, we remain bearish on the dollar, as we believe that the current easing in financial conditions will help global growth temporarily surprise dismal investor expectations. Nevertheless, we remain cyclical dollar bulls, as the Fed will ultimately hike more than what is currently priced this year, and as China’s current reflation campaign is about mitigating the downside to growth, not generating a new upswing in indebtedness and capex. Report Links: Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 So Donald Trump Cares About Stocks, Eh? - January 9, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The recent data in euro area has been negative: The Q4 euro area GDP on a year-over-year basis fell to 1.2%, in line with expectations. Euro area headline inflation in January on a year-over-year basis decreased to 1.4%, from the previous 1.6% in December 2018, core inflation rose to 1.1%. January Markit euro area composite PMI fell to 51.0. Euro area retail sales in December fell to 0.8% on a year-over-year basis, from the previous 1.8%. In response to this poor economic performance, EUR/USD has fallen by 0.8% this week. We remain cyclically bearish on the euro, as we believe that the Fed will hike more than anticipated this cycle and that Europe is more negatively impacted by China’s woes than the U.S. is. Hence, slowing global growth will force the ECB to stay dovish much longer than expected. Moreover, our Intermediate Term Timing Model, is showing that the euro is once again trading at a premium to short term fundamentals. Report Links: 2019 Key Views: The Xs And The Currency Market - December 7, 2018 Six Questions From The Road - November 16, 2018 Evaluating The ECB’s Options In December - November 6, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Annual inflation increased to 0.4% from previous 0.3%, core inflation increased to 0.7% from 0.6%, and inflation ex fresh food increased to 1.1% from 0.9%. December retail trade weakened to 1.3% from the previous 1.4%. Japanese unemployment rate in December has fallen to 2.4%. January consumer confidence index fell to 41.9, underperforming the expectations. USD/JPY has risen by 0.3% this week. We remain bearish on the yen on a tactical basis. The recent FOMC meeting kept the U.S. key interest rate unchanged, so did many other central banks. The resulting ease in global financial conditions could be a headwind for safe havens, like the yen. Moreover, U.S. yields are likely to rise even after the easing in financial conditions is passed, as BCA anticipates the Fed to resume hiking in the second half of 2019. This will create additional downside for the yen. Report Links: Yen Fireworks - January 4, 2019 2019 Key Views: The Xs And The Currency Market - December 7, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 The recent data in Britain has been negative: Markit U.K. composite PMI has surprised to the downside, falling to 50.3 in January; service PMI dropped to 50.1 while construction PMI fell to 50.6.  Halifax house prices yearly growth, surprised to the downside, coming in at 0.8%. Finally, Markit Services PMI also underperform, coming in at 50.1. The Bank of England rate decided to keep rates on hold at 0.75%. GBP/USD has lost 0.8% this week. On a long-term basis, we remain bullish on cable, as valuation for the pound are attractive. However, we believe that the current stalemate in Westminster, coupled with the hard-nose approach of Brussels has slightly increase the probability of a No-deal Brexit. This political uncertainty implies that short-term risk-adjusted returns remains low. Report Links: Deadlock In Westminster - January 18, 019 Six Questions From The Road - November 16, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been negative: Building permits in December has surprised to the downside, coming in at -8.4% on a month-over-month basis.  December retail sales has slowed down, coming in at -0.4%. Finally, in December, with exports contracted at a -2% pace, and imports, at -6% pace. The RBA decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 1.5%. While it was at first stable, AUD/USD ultimately has fallen by 2% this week. Overall, we remain bearish on the AUD in the long run. The unhealthy Australian housing market coupled with very elevated debt loads, could drag residential construction and household consumption down. Moreover, the uncompetitive Australian economy could fall into a potential liquidity trap as the credit conditions tighten further. Report Links: CAD And AUD: Jumping Higher To Plunge Deeper - February 1, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The recent data in New Zealand has been negative: The participation rate underperformed expectations, coming in at 70.9%. Moreover, employment growth also surprised to the downside, coming in at 0.1%. Finally, the unemployment rate surprised negatively, coming in at 4.3%. NZD/USD has fallen by 2.3% this week. Overall, we remain bullish on the NZD against the AUD, given that credit excesses are less acute in New Zealand than in Australia. Moreover, New Zealand is much less exposed to the Chinese industrial cycle than Australia. This means that is China moving away from its current investment-led growth model will likely negatively impact AUD/NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Clashing Forces: The Fed And EM Financial Conditions - October 19, 2018 In Fall, Leaves Turn Red, The Dollar Turns Green - October 12, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The recent data in Canada has been negative: GDP has fallen to 1.7% on a year-over-year basis from the previous 2.2%. The December industrial production growth came in at -0.7% month-on-month, a negative surprise. Canadian manufacturing PMI in January decreased to 53. On the back of these poor data and weaker oil prices, USD/CAD rose by 1.6% this week, more than undoing last week’s fall. We expect the CAD to outperform other commodity currencies like the AUD and the NZD, oil prices are likely to outperform base metals on a cyclical basis. Moreover, the Canadian economy is more levered to the U.S. than other commodity driven economies. Thus, our constructive view on the U.S. implies a positive view on the CAD on a relative basis. Report Links: CAD And AUD: Jumping Higher To Plunge Deeper - February 1, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Clashing Forces: The Fed And EM Financial Conditions - October 19, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2   Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Real retail sales yearly growth improved this month, coming in at -0.3% versus -0.6% last month. However, the SVME Purchasing Manager’s Index underperformed expectations, coming in at 54.3. EUR/CHF has fell 0.2% this week. Despite this setback, we remain bullish on EUR/CHF. Last year’s EUR/CHF weakness tightened Swiss financial conditions significantly and lowered inflationary pressures. Given that the Swiss National Bank does not want a repeat of the deflationary spiral of 2015, we believe that it will continue with its ultra-dovish monetary policy and increase its interventionism in the FX market, in order to weaken the franc, and bring back inflation to Switzerland. Moreover, on a tactical basis, the ease in financial conditions should hurt safe havens like the franc. Report Links: Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been negative: The December retail sales missed the consensus estimates, coming in at -1.80%. December credit indicator decreased to 5.4%. Registered unemployment rate in January has increased to 2.6%, surprising to the downside. USD/NOK has risen by 1.8% this week. We are positive on USD/NOK on a cyclical timeframe. Although we are bullish on oil prices, USD/NOK is more responsive to real rate differentials. This means, that a hikes later this year by the Fed will widen differentials between these two countries and provide a tailwind for this cross. Nevertheless, the positive performance of oil prices should help the NOK outperform non-commodity currencies like the AUD. We also expect NOK/SEK to appreciate and EUR/NOK to depreciate. Report Links: Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been negative: Consumer confidence surprised to the downside, coming in at 92. Moreover, retail sales yearly growth also underperformed expectations, coming in at 5.6%. Finally, manufacturing PMI came in line with expectations at 51.5. USD/SEK has risen by 2.2% this week. Overall, we remain long term bullish on the krona against the euro, given that Swedish monetary policy is much too easy for the current inflationary environment, a situation that will have to be rectified. However, given our positive view on the U.S. dollar on a cyclical basis, we are cyclically bullish on USD/SEK, since krona is the G-10 currency most sensitive to dollar moves. Report Links: Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
By curtailing its forecasts, the BoE acknowledged reality: The British economy is slowing. Like other central banks around the world, the BoE recognized the deterioration in global trade as a key headwind. However, it also emphasized the role of weakening…
Highlights Since 2008, no developed economy central bank has been able to hike interest rates sequentially by more than 2 percent before needing to take a breather… and then reverse course. The current vulnerability to further tightening emanates from stock markets and risk spreads. Through the next couple of years U.S. long bonds will strongly outperform German bunds… …and USD/EUR will trend lower. Since October 2017, no stock market rally or sell-off has lasted more than three months. Overweight equities tactically, but don’t get too comfortable. The broad stock market will remain trendless, but offer excellent tactical opportunities in both directions. Feature More than a decade has passed since the Global Financial Crisis. Yet through the past ten years, no developed economy central bank has been able to hike interest rates sequentially by more than 2 percent before needing to take a breather… and then swiftly reverse course. 2019 is a pivotal year for monetary policy because it will answer a fundamental question: will the 2 percent limit for monetary tightening that has held since 2008 continue to hold, or finally break? (Chart of the Week). The answer will have a huge bearing on European investment strategy for equities, bonds and currencies. Chart of the WeekSince 2008, The Limit For Sequential Rate Hikes Has Been 2 Percent... So Far A History Of Policy Reversals Swedish interest rates peaked near 5 percent in 2008 before collapsing to the zero bound in the financial crisis. But when the Riksbank started its so-called ‘policy normalisation’ in 2010, the interest rate could only reach 2 percent before the central bank had to backtrack; Norway could manage just 1 percent of tightening before its volte-face. Admittedly, Sweden and Norway were caught in the maelstrom of the euro debt crisis in 2011-12. But on the other side of the world and relatively immune to the crisis in Europe, New Zealand could achieve a tightening of only 1 percent; Korea could manage just 1.25 percent (Chart I-2); the Reserve Bank of Australia marched interest rates up by 1.75 percent before taking a breather… and then marched them down again.   Chart I-2Since 2008, The Limit For Sequential Rate Hikes Has Been 2 Percent The Federal Reserve has sequentially raised interest rates by 2 percent, and guess what? It has just decided to take a breather! Last week, Chairman Jay Powell was asked the question as plainly as possible: is the next move in interest rates as likely to be up as down? And his answer: “we don’t have a strong prior… we will patiently wait and let the data clarify.”1 There is no requirement at BCA for strategists to agree. In fact, the opposite is true in that we encourage independent thinking and diverse ways of looking at the world. BCA’s house view is that the Fed will resume its sequential hiking later in the year. But I believe this takes a too rosy view on the global financial system’s capacity to tolerate further tightening. The Vulnerability Is In Stock Markets And Risk Spreads   Monetary policy operates on an economy by adjusting its financial conditions: its bond yields, credit availability, currency, stock market, and risk spreads. And the neutral monetary policy stance – the so-called ‘neutral real interest rate’ – is the policy stance consistent with the economy growing at trend. In the past, a simple rule of thumb was that real rates, over time, should approximate to the real growth in the economy. But some studies argue that the neutral real rate may now be close to zero. All the Fed has done is bring the real interest rate out of negative territory to barely above zero. Yet its recent hikes have been blamed for extreme volatility in stock markets and risk spreads. Last week, Powell acknowledged that if there is a sustained change in financial conditions through any one or more of its components then “that has to play into our thinking.” Furthermore, “the policy stance is now in the range of the Committee’s estimates of neutral… and when you get to that (neutral) range we have to put aside our own priors and let the data speak to us.” All of which raises a salutary observation from my colleague Martin Barnes, BCA Chief Economist: if a real interest rate that is barely above zero is enough to trigger extreme market volatility and threaten the economic expansion, then the system is much more vulnerable than generally assumed.2  Martin has hit the nail on the head. At the current level of tightening, the system is much more vulnerable than generally assumed. But the vulnerable components of financial conditions are not bond yields, credit availability, or currency; the vulnerability emanates from stock markets and risk spreads, and specifically their potential for extreme volatility. Previous reports have focused on the source of this vulnerability. To recap, at low yields, bond prices develop the same unattractive negative asymmetry as equities. Therefore, an extended period of ultra-low interest rates removes the need for an equity risk premium, and justifies sharply higher valuations for equities and other risk-assets. But when the 10-year global bond yield rises back to around 2 percent, the process viciously reverses: bond prices lose their negative asymmetry, re-requiring an equity risk premium and sharply lower valuations for risk-assets.3 Put simply, when interest rates rise from low levels they undermine the support for elevated risk-asset valuations in a viciously non-linear way. The consequent plunge in risk-asset prices aggressively tightens financial conditions and thereby sets an unusually low ceiling for nominal interest rates and bond yields. This dynamic proved to be the major feature of the financial market landscape in 2018 and will loom large in 2019 too. It also solves the riddle as to why the neutral real rate may now be close to zero. An unusually low ceiling for the nominal interest rate combined with inflation hovering around 2 percent, translates into a neutral real interest rate that is not much higher than zero. The Investment Implications When the Riksbank paused after its near 2 percent of hiking, it proved to be a good structural entry point for Swedish long bonds, and a good structural exit point for the Swedish krona (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Likewise, when the Reserve Bank of Australia paused after its near 2 percent of hiking, it was an excellent moment to buy Australian long bonds and to sell the Australian dollar (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-3When The Riksbank Paused, It Was A Good Structural Entry Point In To Swedish Bonds... Chart I-4...And A Good Structural Exit Point Out Of The Swedish Krona Chart I-5When The RBA Paused, It Was A Good Structural Entry Point In To Australian Bonds... Chart I-6...And A Good Structural Exit Point Out Of The Australian Dollar Will the the 2 percent limit for monetary tightening that has held since 2008 continue to hold? If, as we expect, the answer is yes the implication is that through the next couple of years U.S. long bonds will strongly outperform German bunds. Over the same time frame, USD/EUR will trend lower (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8).  Chart I-7A Good Structural Entry Point In To Long T-Bonds/Short Bunds Chart I-8A Good Structural Exit Point Out Of USD/EUR Finally, as regards the broad stock market, a quick glance at the MSCI all country world index shows a striking feature. Since October 2017, no rally or sell-off has lasted more than three months (Chart I-9). Given the current highly non-linear relationship between equities and bond yields, this pattern is set to continue. Chart I-9Since October 2017, No Rally Or Sell-Off Has Lasted More Than Three Months In essence, the broad stock market will remain trendless, but offer excellent tactical opportunities in both directions. The current stance is tactically long, but don’t get too comfortable! Fractal Trading System* The sharp recent rally in government bonds has hit a point where tight liquidity conditions could trigger a temporary reversal. Accordingly, the 65-day trade is to go short 30-year T-bonds, setting a profit target at 3 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. All of the five other open positions are in healthy profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions.   Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com  * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Federal Reserve has raised the federal funds rate by a total of 2.25 percent comprising an isolated 0.25 percent hike at the end of 2015 and a sequential 2 percent hike from December 2016 through December 2018. 2 Please see the BCA Special Report “A Grumpy View Of The Outlook” January 28, 2019 available at www.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance”, October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com  Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Our diffusion indices show that the vast majority of euro area countries are now suffering slowing real GDP growth and falling PMIs, flashing levels normally recorded during recessions. Yet the actual pullbacks in real GDP growth and the PMIs have been…
Highlights So What? The late-cycle rally faces non-trivial political hurdles. Why? The rally is based on a too-sanguine view of the Fed, China, and the trade war. Other issues – like Brexit and the U.S. border showdown – are also problematic. Venezuela still has the potential to push oil prices sharply upwards. Feature All is well. Global equities are on the path of recovery, as should be the case at the end of an economic cycle. The U.S. S&P 500 has gained 16% since the bottom on December 24, with healthy technicals suggesting a breakout is ahead (Chart 1). The S&P 500 may be entering one of its typical late-cycle rallies, which tend to be the second best-performing decile of a bull market (Chart 2).1 Meanwhile, emerging market equities and currencies are outperforming developed market peers (Chart 3), a reversal from 2018 Chart 1Late Cycle Rally Ahead?   Chart 3...As Does Current Global Outperformance Typically, global risk assets outperform American risk assets at the end of an economic cycle. While institutional investors can use these rallies to lighten the load ahead of a recession, most investors cannot afford to miss such a rally. As such, BCA (and others) are calling for investors to play what is expected to be a yearlong rally in global risk assets and the S&P 500. Our view at BCA Geopolitical Strategy is more cautious, perhaps because it is informed by a methodological bias rooted in geopolitics. We believe that the reversal in U.S. outperformance relative to global risk assets rests on three pillars: The Federal Reserve remains dovish throughout 2019; China begins a major reflationary effort;  The U.S.-China tariff truce results in a trade deal. In addition, a consensus is emerging that a “no deal” Brexit will not occur, that U.S. polarization cannot get worse, and that President Trump eschews foreign interventionism. While we hold a nuanced view on each of these assertions, the mix is far less bullish than investors may think. We see a witches’ brew of factors that is murky at best and bearish at worst. The Three Pillars Of The Bullish View Before we turn to geopolitics, let us examine the three pillars underpinning the bullish view. Our colleague Peter Berezin, BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, remains bullish on the U.S. economy and expects the Fed to resume hiking rates by mid-year.2 The Conference Board’s Leading Credit Index remains in expansionary territory (Chart 4). While business capex intention surveys have come off their highs, they still point to robust spending plans over the next few quarters (Chart 5). Chart 4Little Sign Of A Looming Credit Crunch Chart 5Capex Plans Still Solid It is no surprise that the BCA Fed Monitor continues to suggest that “tighter monetary policy is required” (Chart 6). This is a far cry from 2016, when our indicator was in deeply “tightening” territory and the Fed paused for 12 months. If we compare 2019 to 2016, it is difficult to see how the market expectation of 4.72 bps of rate cuts will occur over the next 12 months (Chart 7). Of the three components that make up the BCA Fed Monitor, only the financial conditions have fallen into “easing required” territory (Chart 8), and they are already shifting back to “tightening required” territory with the stock market rally underway (Chart 9). Chart 6A Hawkish Fed Is Needed Chart 8BCA Fed Monitor Calls For Tighter Policy Chart 9Financial Conditions Starting To Ease In addition, in 2016 the Fed was not contracting its balance sheet. Today it is doing so, although the pace has moderated. As such, the Fed’s rate hike pause is occurring amidst an ongoing effort to normalize monetary policy and to transfer rate risks back to the private sector. By chance, this is also occurring at a time when the Treasury Department must issue more debt to cover a larger deficit, a process that could significantly pull U.S. rates higher and, by extension, yields on assets further down the risk curve. This would be a particular problem for global risk assets given the exposure of several EM economies to dollar-denominated debt.  The bottom line for investors is that a rate hike pause is not a pause in the overall hawkish policy of the U.S. Fed, which acts as a global central bank. The fall in the amount of dollars available for the international financial system acts as a brake on growth. Over the past 10 years, each time money supply growth fell below the loan uptake of the U.S. corporate sector, BCA’s Global Industrial Activity Nowcast, BCA’s Global Leading Economic Indicator, Korean exports, and global export prices all deteriorated considerably (Chart 10). Chart 10Deteriorating Excess Liquidity Hurts Global Growth Our muted view on Chinese reflation is unnecessary to repeat here. There is no doubt that Chinese policymakers are stimulating the economy, but the question is whether they are willing to pull the credit lever as aggressively as they have done in the past (Chart 11).So far, all of the evidence we have reviewed point to a cautious effort to stabilize growth, not reflate the entire planetary economy as Beijing did in 2016. If our BCA House View on the Fed is correct, a tepid Chinese effort to stimulate the domestic economy will fall short of lighting the flame of a global risk rally in 2019. Chart 11Compare Any Stimulus To Previous Efforts The BCA China Play Index, which in the past has tracked EM vs. DM equity outperformance, is sending mixed signals today (Chart 12). Enthusiasm for global risk assets has not been confirmed by the most China-sensitive plays. Chart 12Mixed Signals From China-Sensitive Plays Finally, there is the trade truce that should produce a trade deal. The logic is clear: President Trump sets aside the political constraints working against a deal and focuses on ensuring that he wins 2020 by avoiding a recession. The near bear market in the S&P 500 was a game changer that focused the White House on averting any further downside to markets and the economy from the trade war. But if the current rally proves that the selloff in December was a temporary pullback, the White House may be emboldened to play hard-to-get with China. After all, the electorate is generally supportive of getting tough on China (Chart 13) and there is no demand from either Trump voters or Democrats for a quick deal. The Fed pause and lower oil prices also give Trump some space to push negotiations a bit harder. Already there are leaks from the negotiations that the U.S. is asking for a lot from China, which could prolong the talks. This includes genuine structural changes to the economic relationship that would address long-standing U.S. concerns of forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft, and foreign investor access to the Chinese domestic market. It also includes U.S. demands that these changes be verifiable and enforceable. China is likely to balk at some of the U.S. demands, particularly if the U.S. is indeed pushing for regular reviews of China’s progress, a condition that implicitly creates a hierarchy between the two economies and would thus represent a loss of face for Beijing.3 Table 1 presents our latest expectations of where the U.S. and China will be on March 1. We assign only 10% each to “black and white” outcomes, a “Grand Compromise” and “No deal, with major escalation.” The remaining 80% is divided between “mushy” outcomes, including a 25% probability that negotiations simply continue. Table 1Updated U.S.-China Trade War Probabilities How would the market react to such uncertain outcomes? We think that almost anything other than a “Grand Compromise” would be greeted with limited relief, if not outright market correction. A vaguely positive meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi, and a memorandum of understanding, would not remove long-term risks in the relationship, especially if the parallel “tech war” is not resolved. On top of the ongoing U.S.-China negotiations, there is one remaining trade issue that investors should keep in mind: auto tariffs. The Section 232 investigation into whether auto imports are a national security threat is ongoing and U.S. authorities are expected to present their conclusions on February 17. We fear that the Trump administration could still stage a surprise and impose tariffs on auto imports. This is because the just-concluded NAFTA deal likely raised the cost of vehicle production within the trade bloc, necessitating import tariffs in order for the deal to make sense from President Trump’s set of political priorities. An extended truce with China could provide the opportunity. The Trump administration may not have the stomach for a long-term trade war with Europe, but the timing of this decision could upset the market’s perception of Trump’s commitment to free trade once again. Bottom Line: The conventional narrative is that global markets are experiencing a late-cycle rally, one that is worth playing given its usual duration and amplitude. This view rests on three pillars: that the Fed has backed off from tightening, that China is stimulating in earnest, and that the trade deal will produce a definitive outcome. We fear that all three pillars are shaky. First, the Fed is not easing. Its balance sheet contraction process, which is ongoing, is a form of tightening. And the U.S. economy remains healthy. As such, the expectation of a 12-month Fed pause is overly optimistic. Second, China is stimulating, but only tepidly. Third, “black and white,” definitive outcomes are unlikely in the U.S.-China negotiations. In fact, more protectionism could be around the corner if U.S.-China tech issues continue to flare or if the U.S. announces the conclusion of its investigation into auto imports. Geopolitical Factors To Monitor Aside from shaky pillars, markets will also have to contend with several uncertain geopolitical processes this year. While we are not necessarily bearish on each one, we are concerned that the collective investment community is overly bullish. Take Brexit. We agree with the conventional view that the chances of a no-deal Brexit outcome are below 10%. Political betting markets have only priced in an actual exit on March 29, which is in ink in British legislation, at just above 30% (Chart 14). Chart 14Online Betters Expect A Brexit Delay The problem is not with the conventional view but with its timing. While Prime Minister Theresa May will ultimately be forced to extend the Article 50 deadline, it may take a lot of brinkmanship and eleventh hour negotiations to do so. Getting from here – collective bullishness – to there – an actual extension of Article 50 – may require a downturn in GBP/USD or other U.K. assets. Furthermore, several scenarios could produce a downturn in GBP/USD (Diagram 1). For example, the Labour Party remains neck-and-neck with the Tories in the polls, despite being led by the most left-leaning leader since the 1970s. Although a new election that produces a Labour government would likely reduce the odds of Brexit eventually occurring, it would raise the odds of Corbyn pursuing unorthodox economic policy while also trying to negotiate his own version of Brexit with the EU. Diagram 1Brexit: The Path To Salvation Remains Fraught With Dangers The point is that it is tough to recommend that investors close their eyes and buy GBP/USD, no matter how cheap the currency may look, unless one has a very long time horizon and a high threshold for pain. The second issue where we take a more nuanced position is the ongoing U.S. executive-legislative standoff over the border. The government shutdown is only on pause until February 15. The House Democrats are demanding that a solution be found by Friday, February 8 if it is to be voted on in time. Meanwhile President Trump’s popularity is in the doldrums (Chart 15). His supporters note that President Reagan was even less popular at this point in his term, but that is because unemployment hit 10.4% in January 1983 (Chart 16). The grave risk for President Trump is that he is as unpopular as Reagan, even though unemployment is at 4% and the U.S. economy is on fire. Chart 15President Trump Is Unpopular... Chart 16...And It Can't Be Blamed On Unemployment As such, the real risk is not another shutdown, but rather political dysfunction in Congress that imperils the legislative process. The current two-year budget deal, which raised spending levels in January 2018, is set to expire when the FY2019 ends. Democrats and Trump have to come to an agreement to avert the “stimulus cliff” expected in 2020 (Chart 17). If they cannot conclude the border issue and the FY2019 appropriations, then Trump may declare a national emergency (or act unilaterally in other ways) and spark a new conflict with the courts. He could also threaten not to raise the debt ceiling in spring or summer. This is not an atmosphere in which a FY2020 deal looks very easy. Chart 17Stimulus Cliff Ahead Ultimately, we expect Democrats to succumb to the pressure from their voters for more spending. But a total failure to cooperate is a risk. Furthermore, the greatest political risk in the U.S. is that the 2020 election will not be contested on the same issues as in 2016: trade and immigration. Instead, income inequality is rearing its head, as Democratic candidates jostle for attention and as they test various messages on focus groups. If income inequality catches fire as the issue of 2020, we will know it soon. And it may begin to impact the markets as Democrats begin to campaign on, for instance, reversing President Trump’s income tax cuts. While the market may ignore headline election risks for some time, we do not think that non-financial corporates can do the same. Any hint that President Trump’s pro-business policies will be reversed could send shivers down the spines of CEOs and negatively impact capex intentions, hurting the real economy well before the next election. Finally, there is the issue of foreign policy. President Trump has abandoned his maximum pressure tactic on Iran and has begun withdrawing the remaining troops in the Middle East. These trends are likely to continue in 2019 as President Trump focuses on China and lesser issues like Venezuela. There is one important area of alignment between him and the defense and intelligence community, notwithstanding recent scuffles: less focus on the Middle East means more focus on Asia and specifically China. However, President Trump is facing a dilemma. Despite an extraordinary economic performance, his popularity remains in the doldrums. When faced with similar situations in the past, presidents far more orthodox than Trump have sought relevance abroad, by means of military interventions. A convenient opportunity has presented itself in Venezuela, where a revolution against Chavismo could give the U.S. an opening to intervene. On paper, we see how such a scenario could look appealing for a quick, and relatively painless, intervention. The problem is that it could also get messy and, in the analysis of BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy, raise oil prices to nearly $100 per barrel by mid-year if a total loss of Venezuelan production ensues (Chart 18). This is a non-negligible risk. Chart 18A Venezuela Collapse Could Send Brent Crude Prices Toward $100/Bbl Bottom Line: Geopolitical risks still abound. We are not alarmist. However, there is little reason to believe that Brexit, U.S. polarization, U.S.-China tensions, or a potential U.S. intervention in Venezuela will end painlessly for the market. An unpopular U.S. president is seeking to remain relevant and a global populist wave is continuing to create unorthodox and anti-establishment policy prescriptions. Given that the current rally is supported by three shaky pillars, any one of these geopolitical risks could catalyze a relapse, the history of late-cycle rallies be damned.   Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Late-Cycle Blues,” dated October 29, 2018, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Patient Jay,” dated January 18, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see Reuters, “Exclusive: U.S. demands regular review of China trade reform,” dated January 18, 2019, available at reuters.com.   Geopolitical Calendar
Highlights Fed Policy: The Fed’s move to a more dovish posture is positive for global risk assets in the near-term. This is setting up for a revival of volatility later in 2019, however, with U.S. growth unlikely to slow enough to justify a continuation of the Fed’s dovish stance. With the market now discounting no change in Fed policy rates over the next year, the risks for U.S. Treasury yields are now tilted to the upside. ECB Policy: Growth has slowed in Europe, but the ECB is limited in its ability to ease policy further given tight labor markets and rising wage growth. Policy rates will stay on hold over at least the next year. U.S. & European Duration: Keep global duration exposure below benchmark, with a more defensive stance on U.S. Treasuries over German Bunds given that the Treasury-Bund spread has overshot to the downside. Feature “In fact, our policy works through changing financial conditions, so it’s sort of the essence of what we do” – Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell Have central bankers now turned TOO dovish? That is a question that will be answered in the coming weeks and months after the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (ECB) signaled a more cautious outlook on growth and inflation. Both central banks cited common causes for the increased caution, such as financial market instability related to geopolitical uncertainty (U.S.-China trade tensions, Brexit, the U.S. government shutdown). Importantly, neither the Fed nor ECB expressed conviction that monetary policy settings were now too restrictive. The sharp selloff in global stock and credit markets at the end of 2018 did tighten financial conditions which, in and of itself, should result in slower growth on either side of the Atlantic in the first half of 2019 (Chart of the Week). Yet we do not expect a move to a below-trend pace of growth that would trigger rising unemployment and weaker inflation pressures. Chart of the WeekFed Too Dovish, ECB Not Dovish Enough The shift to a more dovish posture by the Fed and ECB has already induced some easing of financial conditions to help support growth in the U.S. and Europe until the uncertainties over geopolitics and the Chinese economy are resolved. This appears to be providing more stimulus to economies that may not necessarily need it. That is a risk that policymakers have decided to take to protect against the downside tail risks to economic growth and confidence from global uncertainty. In terms of fixed income markets, more dovish policymakers have created a pro-risk backdrop that will support the outperformance of corporate bonds versus government debt over the next 3-6 months. Without a deeper slowdown of global growth beyond what is currently expected, however, this will only be a temporary respite as central banks revert back to fighting inflation pressures instead of calming financial markets. The result will be a return to monetary tightening and higher bond yields, although that is a far more likely scenario in the U.S. than in Europe over the next 6-12 months given the relative signals from our Central Bank Monitors (bottom panel). Fed Outlook – A Temporary Dovish Turn, Nothing More The quote at the beginning of this report was taken from Fed Chair Powell’s press conference after last week’s FOMC meeting, in response to a question on how the Fed thinks about financial conditions. We can think of no cleaner way to explain the Fed’s understanding of how its monetary policy actions get transmitted to the real economy. By inducing changes in financial asset values (equity prices, corporate bond yields, the value of the U.S. dollar) through adjustments in the fed funds rate – and perceptions about its forward path – the Fed is able to impact the cost of financing across much of the U.S. economy. The goal is either to slow or stimulate growth, as needed, to allow the Fed to reach its dual mandate of maximizing employment while keeping inflation stable. Viewed from this perspective, the Fed’s “dovish” turn last week was a necessary step to not only stabilize financial markets, but to induce a pro-growth rally in risk assets that had sold off too aggressively. On that front, the Fed can say “Mission Accomplished”. Year-to-date, the S&P 500 is up 8% while U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporate bond spreads have fallen by 26bps and 110bps, respectively. The U.S. dollar is also down 1.6% since the start of the year, providing further stimulus to the U.S. economy. U.S. Treasury yields, which had fallen thanks to lower real and inflation components, have also helped ease financial conditions. Real yields have declined as the market has moved to price out all Fed rate hikes for 2019 in response to some signs of cooling U.S. growth (i.e. housing) and the big fall in asset prices. At the same time, inflation expectations have drifted lower as markets now expect the plunge in oil prices seen in 2018 to filter though more broadly into lower realized inflation (Chart 2). Chart 2Too Much Pessimism In UST Yields The ability for yields to decline further is now limited, however, with U.S. economic growth likely to continue at an above-trend pace in the next few quarters, based on the readings from reliable indicators. The ISM Manufacturing index rebounded to 56.6 in January, still well above the 50 level indicating an expanding U.S. economy, even after the decline that began last September. Within the sub-components of the index, the New Orders series also rose last month by 6.9 points, suggesting that the bounce in the overall ISM series could persist. The 10yr UST yield broadly tracks the ISM Manufacturing index (Chart 3), with the post-crisis relationship indicating that the bond yield will have difficulty falling below 2.5% if the ISM remains above 55. Chart 3U.S. Treasuries Vulnerable To Better U.S. Data U.S. economic data continues to broadly meet expectations, and the momentum in U.S. Treasury yields has overshot to the downside versus data surprises (bottom panel). Admittedly, there have been far fewer data releases of late because of the U.S. government shutdown last month. Yet even if the bulk of the unreleased data was weak, Treasury yields at current levels already seem to be discounting very soft growth. Forward-looking indicators of growth - the Conference Board leading economic indicator and BCA’s U.S. employment and capital spending models – are all pointing to the U.S. economy continuing to expand at a solid, above-trend pace in the coming months (Chart 4). Chart 4No Signs Pointing To Slower U.S. Growth The U.S. labor market remains tight, as evidenced by continued low unemployment and solid growth in wage measures like Average Hourly Earnings and the Wages and Salaries component of the Employment Cost Index (Chart 5). At the same time, readings from leading inflation indicators like the New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge remain elevated (bottom panel). The combined message is that U.S. core inflation rates will remain surprisingly sticky in the coming months, even given the lagged impact of last year’s drop in oil prices. Chart 5Persistent U.S. Inflation Pressures Many have made the case that the current cycle looks a lot like the Fed’s 2016 pause on policy tightening, which ended up lasting one full year after the December 2015 initial post-QE rate hike. Back then, the Fed’s more dovish posture helped generate easier financial conditions through a weaker U.S. dollar, tighter U.S. corporate credit spreads and higher U.S. equity values. U.S. Treasury yields fell sharply as the market aggressively covered a large bearish tilt towards U.S. interest rates while removing all rate hikes that were discounted for 2016 (Chart 6). There is one major difference between then and now, however – the U.S. economy is growing at a much faster pace, with far less spare capacity (bottom panel). Chart 6This Is NOT A Repeat Of 2016 When looking at all the U.S. data objectively, we conclude that the Fed’s latest dovish turn will not last anywhere near as long as the 2016 episode. The current easing of U.S. (and global) financial conditions alongside still-solid U.S. growth will eventually set up a return to the Fed rate hiking cycle, at a time when no interest rate increases are discounted in U.S. money markets. This supports our current recommendation to be tactically overweight U.S. corporate debt versus U.S. Treasuries on a 3-6 month horizon, during this window when the Fed is deliberately easing financial conditions by being overly dovish. On a more medium term 6-12 month horizon, however, we are maintaining a below-benchmark stance on U.S. duration exposure. The only way Treasury yields can move lower from here is if a Fed rate cutting cycle starts to be discounted – a highly unlikely scenario given the signals from leading growth and inflation indicators. Bottom Line: The Fed’s move to a more dovish posture is positive for global risk assets in the near-term. This is setting up for a revival of volatility later in 2019, however, with U.S. growth unlikely to slow enough to prevent inflation pressures from surfacing. With the market now discounting a stand-pat Fed over the next year, with minimal expected inflation, the risks for U.S. Treasury yields are now tilted to the upside. ECB Outlook – Firmly Neutral The euro area is currently facing a fairly significant growth slowdown. The manufacturing PMI has fallen for 13 consecutive months and now sits just above the 50 line indicating expanding growth. The OECD’s leading economic indicator (LEI) has also declined over that same period. Both indicators are now back to levels last seen prior to the 2009 and 2012 recessions (Chart 7). Chart 7Euro Area LEI and PMI Overstating The Downturn? Yet at the same time, surveys of business and consumer confidence from the European Commission suggest that the current downturn is nothing like those previous slumps. Even the Commission’s indicator of exporter order books (bottom panel) suggests that things do not appear as bad as indicated by the PMI and LEI. So where does the truth lie about the euro area economy? When looking at the hard data on exports (using the IMF’s Direction of Trade statistical database that includes both goods and services), it is obvious that there was a sharp slowing of euro area exports last year (Chart 8). Slumping Chinese demand was a major reason for that slowdown, but exports to the rest of the world also took a major hit. For the more export-intensive economies of Europe, last year’s global growth deceleration was a major punch to the gut. Chart 8European Export Shock Should Bottom Out Later In 2019 Looking ahead, there is still likely to be some pain coming from weaker export demand in the first half of 2019. The Chinese credit impulse (measured as a 12-month change in Total Social Financing as a % of GDP) is still negative, while our global LEI measure continues to drift lower. However, there are some tentative signs that things may be stabilizing. The shorter 6-month China credit impulse has hooked up (the “x’ in the top panel of Chart 8). Our diffusion index of countries within our global LEI – itself a leading indicator of the global LEI – has also begun to move higher, meaning there are fewer countries within the euro area with falling LEIs. While it is still too early to draw firm conclusions, there is a chance that euro area export growth will bottom out by mid-year. This is especially true if a U.S.-China trade detente is soon reached and Chinese policymakers deliver some additional growth stimulus measures, which is BCA’s base case scenario. ECB President Mario Draghi noted last week that a stabilization of global trade tensions would reduce much of the perceived uncertainty within the euro area economy. The U.S.-China trade spat has not been the only thing weighing on euro area growth, though. In our framework for analyzing the ECB’s policy decisions, we look at how broad-based are the trends in growth and inflation within the euro area to determine the next likely move on monetary policy. The way we do that is by looking at diffusion indices of economic data, constructed using figures from as many euro area countries as possible, given data availability. We show those diffusion indices for real GDP growth, manufacturing PMIs, headline inflation and core inflation in the euro area in Chart 9. Chart 9No Pressure On The ECB To Adjust Interest Rates The diffusion indices show that the vast majority of euro area countries are now suffering slowing real GDP growth and falling PMIs, with levels seen during recessions. Yet the actual pullbacks in real GDP growth and the PMIs have been shallower than those past episodes. It is as if today, all countries are suffering a slump, but no deep downturn. This is consistent with the ECB’s belief that Europe has suffered a bunch of one-off triggers for slowing growth – cutbacks in German auto production related to new emission standards, large-scale French street protests, the Italian fiscal policy debate with the EU, slowing exports from global trade tensions – but no broad-based decline that can be attributed to, or solved by, monetary policy. This is especially true with the diffusion index for core euro area inflation which now rising, suggesting that core inflation could remain surprisingly sticky in the coming months. The diffusion indices for euro area labor markets provide additional information as to why the ECB has not shifted to an even more dovish stance, despite the signs of weaker growth. Not only is the overall euro area unemployment rate now below the OECD’s estimate of the full employment NAIRU, the vast majority of countries within the euro area are at full employment (Chart 10). That diffusion index correlates strongly with a traditional Taylor Rule estimate of the equilibrium ECB policy rate, and suggests that the ECB should be raising rates right now. That can also be seen in the diffusion index for wage growth (bottom panel), which shows that the majority of euro area countries are seeing higher wage inflation. Chart 10Tightening Labor Markets In Europe Given the readings on the core inflation and labor market related diffusion indices, the current backdrop is not one where the ECB should be shifting to a more dovish posture. Yet when looking at market-based measures of inflation expectations like CPI swaps, investors clearly do not believe that the ECB’s optimistic inflation forecasts will be achieved over the next two years – typically a sign of policy settings that appear too tight (Chart 11). Chart 11Bund Yields Will Stay Subdued Without More Euro Area Inflation It will require some signs of euro area growth reacceleration, and maybe some upside surprises on core inflation and wage growth, before inflation expectations (and Bund yields) begin rising again. Those are unlikely to become visible until at least the latter half of 2019, and the ECB is likely to keep policy rates unchanged over the balance of the year. Given our relative views on the Fed and ECB, we see the scope for the yield spread between the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury and German Bund to widen from current levels. That spread is wide on a long-term basis because of the relative policy stance of the two central banks, with the current 255bps gap roughly equal to the gap between the fed funds rate and ECB refi rate. Yet the momentum of that spread is closely correlated to the difference in the data surprise indices for the U.S. and euro area, and a divergence has opened up between those two measures on the back of better U.S. growth (Chart 12). Chart 12UST-Bund Spread Has Overshot To Downside With the forward curves currently pricing in some additional tightening of the Treasury-Bund spread, betting on some renewed spread widening is a positive carry trade that also makes sense on a fundamental basis. Bottom Line: Growth has slowed in Europe, but the ECB is limited in its ability to ease policy further given tight labor markets and rising wage growth. Policy rates will stay on hold over at least the next year.   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Feature Half Way Back Since BCA went overweight global equities in late December, the MSCI ACWI index has rallied by 8% and the S&P 500 is back to only 8% off its September historical high. So far, this has been little more than a technical rally from the extreme oversold position in Q4. But with U.S. economic growth still resilient, earnings likely to grow healthily again this year (albeit more slowly than in 2018), and the valuation of risk assets (both equities and credit) no longer a headwind, we expect the rally to continue for some time, and so reiterate our overweight on equities. Recommendations True, there have been some disappointments in U.S. data in recent weeks. In particular, the December manufacturing ISM fell sharply to 54.3 from 59.3, raising fears that the U.S. is starting to decelerate in line with other regions (Chart 1). But the ISM may have been affected by the government shutdown and, overall, U.S. data still look solid, with the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index beginning to rebound, and stronger than in other regions (Chart 2). The residential housing market, which was exhibiting signs of stress last year, with existing home sales -6.4% YoY in December, is showing the first signs of stabilization, helped by mortgage interest rates that are now 50 BPs off their recent peak (Chart 3). Chart 1How Worrying Is The U.S. Slowdown? Chart 2U.S. Data Surprisingly Positive Chart 3Housing Market Should Stabilize In particular, the outlook for consumption looks healthy, with average hourly earnings growing at 3.3% YoY, consumer confidence close to an historic high, and the savings rate above 6%. Unsurprisingly, then, retail sales have boomed in recent months (Chart 4). Unless consumer confidence is dented by a repetition of the government shutdown or some other shock, consumption (68% of GDP, remember) should grow strongly this year. Add to this a residual positive impact of close to 0.5% of GDP coming from last year’s fiscal stimulus, and it is hard to imagine the U.S. going into recession over the next 12 months. Chart 4Consumption Booming The Fed will probably go on hold for now, however, given the market jitters in Q4. We are likely back to a situation like that in 2015-2016, where the Fed Policy Feedback Loop becomes the key factor for markets (Chart 5). When financial conditions tighten, with stock prices falling and the dollar appreciating, the Fed turns more dovish. However, this triggers a rally in risk assets and loosens financial conditions, allowing the Fed to start hiking again. With the tightening in financial conditions over the past six months, the Fed is likely to err on the side of caution for now (Chart 6). However, if our macro view is correct – and as inflation starts to pick up again after April, partly due to the base effect – the Fed will want to continue withdrawing accommodation over the course of this year. The Fed Funds Rate, at around 2.4% is still two hikes below what the FOMC sees as the neutral level of interest rates (the 2.8% terminal rate in the FOMC dots). We see the Fed, therefore, raising rates in June and perhaps hiking two or even three times this year. By contrast, the futures market assigns only a 25% probability of even one rate hike this year, and is even pricing in a small probability of a cut. Chart 6Tighter Conditions Mean More Cautious Fed Clearly, there are plenty of risks to the scenario of growth continuing. But those in the hands of President Trump, especially the trade war with China and the fight over funding of the wall on the border with Mexico, we don’t see as being serious impediments. Trump is fully aware that he is unlikely to be reelected in November 2020 if the U.S. is in recession by then. Every incumbent U.S. president since World War Two who fought for reelection during a recession failed to be reelected (Chart 7). The view of BCA’s geopolitical strategists, therefore, is that the White House and Congressional Democrats will agree to concessions to end the shutdown before the end of the current three-week stop-gap period. Less likely, Trump will declare a national emergency that will cause much controversy but have little impact on the economy. Our strategists also argue that there is a 45% probability of trade negotiations with China producing a result (at least a short-term one the president can boast about) before the March 1 deadline, and a further 25% probability of the deadline being extended without further sanctions being imposed.1 Chart 7Trump Won't Be Reelected In A Recession Equities: Analysts have become overly pessimistic about the earnings outlook for this year, cutting 2019 U.S. EPS growth to 7% (and only 2% YoY in Q1). Our top-down model (based on, admittedly optimistic, U.S. growth assumptions, but also headwinds from a stronger dollar) indicates 12% growth. If analysts are forced to revise up their numbers as better earnings come through, that should be a catalyst for further equity performance (Chart 8). We continue to prefer U.S. over European equities. The steady slowdown in European growth over the past 12 months has not yet bottomed, banks in Europe remain troubled, the earnings picture is less positive, and valuations relative to the U.S. are not especially attractive. We also remain underweight on EM equities: they may produce a positive return in a risk-on environment, but we see them underperforming DM as rising U.S. interest rates and a stronger USD put pressure on EM borrowers with excess foreign-currency debt. Chart 8Analysts Have Overdone Downward Revisions Fixed Income: The recent fall in U.S. Treasury yields was mainly caused by the inflation expectation component, itself very sensitive (if rather illogically so) to the oil price (Chart 9). As the oil price recovers (see below), inflation picks up moderately, and the Fed hikes by more than the market expects, we see the 10-year Treasury yield rising to 3.5% during the course of the year. BCA’s fixed-income strategists recently raised their recommendation on global credit to overweight, given more attractive spreads and the likelihood that the Fed will be on hold for the next six months.2 Their recommendation is for 3-6 months, and the Fed restarting the hiking cycle, say in June, might terminate the positive story. We are following their lead, by raising both high-yield and investment-grade bonds to overweight within the (underweight) fixed-income asset class. That means we are neutral credit in the overall portfolio. We would warn, though, that this is a somewhat short-term call: we still prefer equities as a way to play the continuing risk-on rally. Given the high level of U.S. corporate leverage, and the over-owned nature of the credit market, this is likely to be an asset class that performs very poorly in the next recession (Chart 10). Chart 9Inflation Expectations Should Recover Chart 10Corporate Leverage Is A Concern Currencies: Currencies will continue to be driven by relative monetary policy. With the growth desynchronization between the U.S. and other DMs set to continue (to a degree), we see modest further USD appreciation this year. The Fed (as argued above) will probably hike more than the market expects. But, given slow European growth, the ECB is unlikely to be able to hike in Q4 this year, as it currently is guiding for and the futures market implies (Chart 11). We see the ECB reopening the Targeted Long-Term Repo Facility (TLTRO), which expires soon. Italy and Spain have been big borrowers from this facility, and bank loan growth is likely to slow as it ends (Chart 12). A renewed TLRTO would be seen as a dovish move. Tighter dollar liquidity conditions also point to a stronger USD. U.S. credit growth continues to accelerate (to 12% YoY – Chart 13) in an environment where the monetary policy has tightened: credit growth is outpacing U.S. money supply growth by 7%. Historically this has been negative for global growth (mainly because the deteriorating liquidity is a problem for EM dollar borrowers) and positive for the dollar (Chart 14).3 Chart 11Can ECB Really Hike In 2019? Chart 13...U.S. Loan Growth Accelerating... Chart 14... Which Will Tighten Liquidity Further Commodities: The supply/demand situation for oil should improve over coming months. With Saudi Arabia and Russia committed to cut supply by 1.2 million barrels/day, U.S. shale production growth slowing given the low one-year forward price for WTI, Canada reducing production, and Venezuela on the verge of collapse (which alone could remove 700-800k b/d from the market), our energy strategists see the crude oil balance in deficit over the next four quarters (Chart 15). Given this, they forecast Brent crude rebounding to above $80 a barrel. Other commodity prices are mostly driven by Chinese demand. We see China continuing to slow, until the accumulated effects of its fiscal and mild monetary stimulus start to come through in H2 and stabilize growth. Our analysis suggests that China remains very disciplined about the size and nature of its stimulus: it is not turning on the liquidity taps as it did in early 2016. Bank loan growth has stabilized, but shadow banking activity continues to contract, as the authorities persist with their crackdown and their emphasis on deleveraging (Chart 16). Industrial commodities prices are therefore likely to weaken over the next six months.  Chart 15Oil Balance In Deficit This Year Chart 16China Sticking To Credit Crackdown   Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com   GAA Asset Allocation Footnotes 1      Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “So Donald Trump Cares About Stocks, Eh?”, dated 9 January 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Enough With The Gloom: Upgrade Global Corporates On A Tactical Basis,” dated 15 January 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3      For a detailed explanation, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But…,” dated 25 January 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com