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Special Report Highlights The EM carry trade - supported by a commodity price rally, falling bond yields, and a weak USD - have propped up South African assets; Investors have largely ignored politics and focused on personalities instead of political fundamentals; South Africa's socio-economic factors - governance, middle class wellbeing, productivity, and unemployment - have all regressed; The "median voter" has therefore turned more radical and left-wing; Stay short ZAR versus USD and MXN, stay underweight stocks, sovereign credit, and domestic bonds, and bet on yield-curve steepening. Feature Why do investors in Europe and the U.S. continue to invest in South Africa? - Every client in South Africa Our recent week-long trip to South Africa was revealing for two reasons. First, it reminded us of the promise and opportunity of this amazing country and its people. Second, it impressed upon us the deep pessimism of its entire financial community. As the quote at the top of this report suggests, every client we met over seven days was deeply puzzled by continued resilience of foreign inflows. Clients were surprised that foreign investors continued to find value in South Africa's fixed income and currency markets amidst a continued growth downtrend, soft commodity prices, and the ongoing political imbroglio (Chart I-1). The answer to the puzzle is simple: the main driving force behind EM risk assets, year-to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart I-2). Weak inflation data and policy disappointments as the pro-growth, populist, economic policy of the Trump Administration stalled have supported the ongoing EM carry trade. The actual emerging market growth fundamentals and politics are therefore unimportant. Chart I-1ZAR Rally Amidst Economic##br## And Commodity Downturn Chart I-2EM Carry Trade Is ##br##Alive And Well How likely is it that the carry trade can continue? BCA's Global Investment Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy both argue that U.S. growth will soon accelerate.1 The U.S. financial conditions have eased thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart I-3). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, the relative U.S. growth underperformance versus DM is late and will turn around very soon (Chart I-5). As U.S. economic growth surprises pick up, investors will bid up the 10-year Treasury yield and the greenback, ushering in the end of the carry trade. Chart I-3U.S. Financial Conditions Have Eased... Chart I-4...U.S. Growth Should Therefore Sharply Rebound Chart I-5U.S. Underperformance Is Long-In-The-Tooth How resilient are South Africa's economic fundamentals and politics? In this report, we argue that they are not resilient at all. The country is facing considerable structural problems on both economic and political fronts. Even its sole silver lining - that it retains cyclical maneuvering room, i.e., it can adopt fiscal stimulus - will only encourage its leaders to double-down on a populist growth model that has already run out of steam. Cyclical Outlook: A Dark Cloud With A Silver Lining The cyclical outlook for South Africa has darkened as of late. All the drivers that pushed the rand to appreciate over the last 12 months are now showing signs of a reversal: The rand's rally in the past six months or so - a period when it decoupled from commodities prices - is often attributed to its higher interest rates. However, Chart I-6 demonstrates that higher local interest rates historically did not prevent the rand's selloff when metal prices fell. In short, we believe the last six months is an aberration rather than a new norm. Remarkably, hedged yields in South Africa are no longer attractive within the EM space. South Africa already offers the worst hedged returns, after Turkey and China, for the U.S. dollar and euro-based investors (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8).2 The situation will only get worse as the U.S. dollar appreciates and Treasury yields rise. Chart I-6High Local Interest Rates ##br##Are No Panacea For ZAR The drop in precious metal prices will force the rand to selloff (Chart I-9). The unprecedented resilience in the rand was supported by increasing financial flows. Now that these are decreasing, the historic correlation with precious metals should reemerge. The decoupling between the ZAR and AUD since early this year is unprecedented (Chart I-10). Both economies are leveraged to industrial and precious metals as well as coal prices, making both exchange rates correlated. Needless to say, Australia commands much better governance and politics than South Africa. In fact, higher interest rates in South Africa have never precluded the rand's depreciation when the AUD dropped. Chart I-9Is The Divergence With Precious Metals... Chart I-10...And AUD Sustainable? Therefore, we conclude that the rand's strength has not been warranted by any of its historic drivers. It has been due to nothing else than the blind search for yield. Over the medium and long run, the outlook for the rand remains bleak. The ongoing dynamic of high wage growth and negative productivity growth will assure a lingering stagflationary environment (Chart I-11). This is bearish for the rand. Surprisingly, despite a rising currency and falling bond yields over the last 12 months, the South African economy is still showing signs of weakness. The household sector, which represents 61% of the economy, is not showing signs of a recovery yet. Credit growth to households is still falling and private consumption is abysmal. (Chart I-12). On the corporate side, the situation is not reassuring either. Firms are not investing and business confidence has not shown any signs of a significant recovery (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Productivity Is Weak But Wages Are Strong Chart I-12Household Consumption Is Declining Chart I-13No Confidence, No Investment The one positive is that the government has fiscal room to maneuver. South African gross government debt is at a comfortable 51% of GDP. However, we suspect that the nature of fiscal spending will likely result in transfers to appease the population - especially ahead of key elections in late 2017 and 2018 - rather than investments that can genuinely improve productivity. In fact, fiscal spending in the form of transfers could very well entice consumers to import more and consequently widen the current account deficit, putting more downward pressure on the rand. Bottom Line: The commodity price rally in 2016 and falling bond yields failed to buoy the economy. While policymakers do retain fiscal room to stimulate, the problem is that such efforts will likely merely rekindle populist policies that have failed South Africa thus far. Structural Outlook: Late Innings Of The Crisis Of Expectations South Africa is not alone in the EM universe in having failed to improve governance over the past decade. Most EM economies have squandered the commodity bull market and Chinese industrialization, allowing their governance to stagnate or even worsen during the good times (Chart I-14).3 However, South Africa does stand alone when it comes to a tepid rise in middle class, as percent of total population (Chart I-15), and continued high income inequality (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Quality Of EM Governance Declined##br## Amidst The Good Times Chart I-15Middle Class Has ##br##Barely Budged... The data is clear: South Africa is as unequal overall, and its middle class unchanged relative to overall population, as it was at the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. Governance in the country has continued to deteriorate, and while it remains higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap has astonishingly begun to narrow from both ends (Chart I-17). Chart I-17Governance Gap With Sub-Saharan ##br##Africa Is Closing! A major reason for the deterioration in governance is the "state capture" thesis that has become a popular one in characterizing President Jacob Zuma's rule.4 This process began early, as the country shifted its developmental program in 1996 away from a top-down, state-led, developmental model to one that encouraged a free-market economy balanced with welfare spending. This was a natural result of the global rise of laissez-faire capitalism, the Washington Consensus, and "Third Way" politics of left-leaning parties. A commitment to laissez-faire capitalism and free markets, combined with a strong welfare state, were seen as hallmarks of a successful economy. The problem with this approach is that it confused the symptoms of developed economies with their catalysts. South Africa needed a much more state-led approach to development, one that would have harnessed the resources of the state for productivity-enhancing investments. As such, the laissez-faire approach unsurprisingly failed to address the inequalities of the apartheid system and the country saw a decline in the middle class as percent of total population under both Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. This pivot towards free-market capitalism ended with the 2007 "Polokwane moment," which saw President Mbeki's free-market, reactive, attempt to address inequality between the white and black populations replaced with the proactive policy of Jacob Zuma. Zuma's more radical approach was to complement welfare transfers and high wage growth with an activist use of state owned enterprises (SOEs) as a vehicle for redistribution. This proactive policy meant using the government's tender system to doll out lucrative contracts to well-connected insiders, under the auspices of helping enfranchise black entrepreneurs and businesses. While the media has focused on the role that the Indian-born Gupta family has played in this process, it is highly unlikely that they are the only beneficiaries. Zuma's administration has, in the name of black enfranchisement and the fight against inequality, essentially rigged the entire government tender system for the sake of its own political preservation. The results of this process are unsurprising. First, government wages have outpaced those in both manufacturing and mining sectors (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, productivity has declined precipitously since 2007 and has been negative since 2012. South Africa has a lower productivity rate than both Latin American EM economies and its neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Government Wages Have Outpaced All Others Chart I-19South African Productivity Has No Peer Financial media and investment research have continued to focus on the intricacies of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) politics. And we do so as well below. However, investors have to understand that South Africa's ills will not be fixed by the appointment of a pro-market finance minister or even the removal of Jacob Zuma from rule. South Africa has failed to develop inclusive economic institutions that engender creative destruction, which is at the heart of all successful development stories.5 South Africa ranked 74th in the World Bank's annual Doing Business report in 2017, an astonishing fall from grace over the past decade (Chart I-20). Compared to regional averages, South Africa barely beats the Sub-Saharan "distance to frontier" scores in several World Bank categories (Chart I-21). This is not due to the gross failure of the Zuma administration to do the "right thing." Rather, it exhibits a structural failing of South African political institutions. This development path is not unique to South Africa. Most sub-Saharan African states experienced a similar regression within 10-20 years of decolonization. Political scientist Robert Bates famously documented how African leaders co-opted colonial-era extractive economic institutions - such as the state marketing boards that purchased all cash crops and exported them on the global market - in order to generate enough revenue to industrialize their economies.6 While their intentions may have originally been noble, if misplaced, they quickly began to use control over marketing boards for political purposes. The rent generated from marketing boards became an immense source of political power for African leaders and they held on to it to the detriment of the economic development of their state. South Africa is far more developed than its sub-Saharan peers were in the 1970s. Nevertheless, its leaders are exhibiting similar rent-seeking behavior, albeit at a much higher level of development. It is also entering a dangerous period in its post-apartheid history: it has now been twenty years since South Africa's effective decolonization and it is facing its first serious economic downturn. Bottom Line: We doubt that anyone in the current leadership elite will be able to fully abandon the rent-seeking behavior of the Zuma administration and improve South Africa's economic institutions. The crisis of expectations among the country's voters is palpable and demands for greater redistribution are rising. This is not a context for pro-market reforms that will encourage creative destruction. Instead, we would expect a doubling-down of populism and greater emphasis on proactive redistribution, which will, at the same time, encourage greater out-migration of talent out of the country and rent seeking behavior from political elites. Can Any One Man Or Woman Fix South Africa? The African National Congress (ANC) will meet in December 2017 to decide the party candidate that will contest the 2019 general election (Diagram I-1). Given the ANC's stranglehold on the country's politics, it is likely that whoever emerges at the upcoming ANC Congress will be the next president of South Africa. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy subscribes to the idea that policymakers are price takers in the political marketplace, not price makers. This is particularly the case in democracies, but it is also the case in some authoritarian regimes where public opinion is relevant. As such, the puzzle investors have to resolve is not what policymakers stand for, but rather what the median voter wants. In South Africa, the median voter lives in a rural area, works in the agriculture or service industry, and is a black citizen. The polls indicate that the main concerns of the median voter are a high structural unemployment rate (Chart I-22), endemic corruption (Chart I-23), poor healthcare infrastructure, and a desire for aggressive, and targeted, redistributive economic policies. Chart I-22Crisis Of Expectations Is this the profile of a median voter about to elect a pro-market reformer willing to pursue painful structural reforms? We do not think so. The two candidates vying for the ANC presidency are the ex-wife of Jacob Zuma and former Chair of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and former Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa. Ramaphosa is the darling of the international investment community. This is because he has abandoned his previous union credentials - he founded the country's largest trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers in addition to founding the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) - and turned into a successful businessman. As such, the narrative among South Africa bulls (who are exclusively found in Europe and the U.S.) is that he would be able to bridge the divide between the demands for redistribution and pro-market reforms. To the median voter, however, Ramaphosa is alleged to be involved in the Marikana Massacre. Acting as the Deputy President, he ordered increased police presence at the mines and called for the use of force, which resulted in 47 deaths in August-September 2012. Dlamini-Zuma, on the other hand, speaks the language of the median voter while also not being seen as part of Zuma's corrupt entourage. Her credentials are bolstered by a successful tenure as Chair of the African Union and as a woman independent and strong enough to divorce President Zuma. She has not amassed personal wealth and does not hold strong loyalties to a particular faction within the ANC. However, she has begun to parrot Zuma's line that the country requires "radical economic transformation," which is a signal to left-leaning members of the ANC that she will continue much of economic policies begun under Zuma. Both the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues, which are left leaning, support her. The problem that investors face in South Africa is that there is no clear demand for pro-market reforms. Investors cheered the results of the August 2016 municipal election, for example, because the ANC lost in several key cities and saw its total vote share fall by 8%. However, few in the media or investment research community raised the obvious point that the centrist Democratic Alliance only saw its vote total rise by 3% compared to the 2011 election. It was the radically left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters, led by ex-Youth League leader Julius Malema, which saw the largest increase in vote share, by over 8%. In other words, ANC voters that did abandon Zuma most likely fell behind Malema, who is far more redistributionist. As such, we stick to our long-held view that Zuma and the ANC leadership are unlikely to do what investors want them to do given that the South African median voter is swinging further to the left. There is no demand for pro-market reforms and thus policymakers are more likely to double-down on populism. Bottom Line: Dlamini-Zuma is the likely winner of the upcoming ANC Congress, which will effectively decide the next president of South Africa. She has the sufficient left-leaning economic credentials to satisfy the demands for redistribution of the median voter. There is also a chance that she will attempt to clean up the corruption that has become endemic under Zuma, which would undoubtedly be a good thing for the country. However, it is unlikely that the macroeconomic context she will face will be positive, or that she will have the mandate to balance redistributive policies with painful pro-market reforms that would rebuild institutions required for creative destruction. Investment Implications South African assets are ultimately at the mercy of foreign inflows. When the dollar is weakening, U.S. bond yields falling, and Chinese growth stable, even the election of Julius Malema to the presidency would not dent foreign enthusiasm for yield in South African assets. Given the expected improvement in U.S. growth and the transitory nature of the drop in the U.S. inflation rate, we expect the global macro backdrop to worsen substantially for carry trades in general, and for South Africa in particular. China remains the wild card in our analysis, but its credit and fiscal impulse has rolled over, suggesting slower import growth over the next six months (Chart I-24). Even if Chinese policymakers react by re-stimulating the economy, the effects will only be felt in early 2018 given lead times. When the global carry trade reverses, it will not matter who is in charge of South Africa. Investors will realize that the country has failed to address serious socio-economic ills that have plagued South Africa since the end of apartheid. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy continues to recommend the following investment positions: Chart I-24China Slowdown Is A Risk To EM Chart I-25Yield Curve Will Steepen Continue shorting ZAR versus USD and MXN. Underweight South African stocks, sovereign credit and domestic bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: bet on yield-curve steepening (Chart I-25). The short end of the curve will be steady but populist politics, larger fiscal deficits/higher public debt, and an inflationary backdrop will push up long-end yields. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Beement Alemayehu, Research Assistant beementa@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stocks Are From Mars, Bonds Are From Venus?" dated June 23, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Contradictions And A Resolution," dated June 14, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "EM Local Bonds: Looking At Hedged Yields," dated May 10, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 'Governance' is a catchall term that attempts to capture the quality of public service delivery, broadly defined. In essence, investors can consider governance as a factor that underpins the quality of political institutions. We rely on the World Bank's Development Indicators because the World Bank aggregates the work of several credible surveys on governance. These indicators are also useful because the World Bank standardizes the results in a way that allows cross-country/region comparisons. We then aggregate the scores across five different variables and look for trends and changes over time. 4 Please see State Capacity Research Project, "Betrayal Of The Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen," dated May 2017, available at pari.org.za. 5 Please see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 6 Please see Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2014 edition). Geopolitical Calendar
Special Report Highlights The EM carry trade - supported by a commodity price rally, falling bond yields, and a weak USD - have propped up South African assets; Investors have largely ignored politics and focused on personalities instead of political fundamentals; South Africa's socio-economic factors - governance, middle class wellbeing, productivity, and unemployment - have all regressed; The "median voter" has therefore turned more radical and left-wing; Stay short ZAR versus USD and MXN, stay underweight stocks, sovereign credit, and domestic bonds, and bet on yield-curve steepening. Feature Why do investors in Europe and the U.S. continue to invest in South Africa? - Every client in South Africa Our recent week-long trip to South Africa was revealing for two reasons. First, it reminded us of the promise and opportunity of this amazing country and its people. Second, it impressed upon us the deep pessimism of its entire financial community. As the quote at the top of this report suggests, every client we met over seven days was deeply puzzled by continued resilience of foreign inflows. Clients were surprised that foreign investors continued to find value in South Africa's fixed income and currency markets amidst a continued growth downtrend, soft commodity prices, and the ongoing political imbroglio (Chart I-1). The answer to the puzzle is simple: the main driving force behind EM risk assets, year-to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart I-2). Weak inflation data and policy disappointments as the pro-growth, populist, economic policy of the Trump Administration stalled have supported the ongoing EM carry trade. The actual emerging market growth fundamentals and politics are therefore unimportant. Chart I-1ZAR Rally Amidst Economic##br## And Commodity Downturn Chart I-2EM Carry Trade Is ##br##Alive And Well How likely is it that the carry trade can continue? BCA's Global Investment Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy both argue that U.S. growth will soon accelerate.1 The U.S. financial conditions have eased thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart I-3). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, the relative U.S. growth underperformance versus DM is late and will turn around very soon (Chart I-5). As U.S. economic growth surprises pick up, investors will bid up the 10-year Treasury yield and the greenback, ushering in the end of the carry trade. Chart I-3U.S. Financial Conditions Have Eased... Chart I-4...U.S. Growth Should Therefore Sharply Rebound Chart I-5U.S. Underperformance Is Long-In-The-Tooth How resilient are South Africa's economic fundamentals and politics? In this report, we argue that they are not resilient at all. The country is facing considerable structural problems on both economic and political fronts. Even its sole silver lining - that it retains cyclical maneuvering room, i.e., it can adopt fiscal stimulus - will only encourage its leaders to double-down on a populist growth model that has already run out of steam. Cyclical Outlook: A Dark Cloud With A Silver Lining The cyclical outlook for South Africa has darkened as of late. All the drivers that pushed the rand to appreciate over the last 12 months are now showing signs of a reversal: The rand's rally in the past six months or so - a period when it decoupled from commodities prices - is often attributed to its higher interest rates. However, Chart I-6 demonstrates that higher local interest rates historically did not prevent the rand's selloff when metal prices fell. In short, we believe the last six months is an aberration rather than a new norm. Remarkably, hedged yields in South Africa are no longer attractive within the EM space. South Africa already offers the worst hedged returns, after Turkey and China, for the U.S. dollar and euro-based investors (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8).2 The situation will only get worse as the U.S. dollar appreciates and Treasury yields rise. Chart I-6High Local Interest Rates ##br##Are No Panacea For ZAR The drop in precious metal prices will force the rand to selloff (Chart I-9). The unprecedented resilience in the rand was supported by increasing financial flows. Now that these are decreasing, the historic correlation with precious metals should reemerge. The decoupling between the ZAR and AUD since early this year is unprecedented (Chart I-10). Both economies are leveraged to industrial and precious metals as well as coal prices, making both exchange rates correlated. Needless to say, Australia commands much better governance and politics than South Africa. In fact, higher interest rates in South Africa have never precluded the rand's depreciation when the AUD dropped. Chart I-9Is The Divergence With Precious Metals... Chart I-10...And AUD Sustainable? Therefore, we conclude that the rand's strength has not been warranted by any of its historic drivers. It has been due to nothing else than the blind search for yield. Over the medium and long run, the outlook for the rand remains bleak. The ongoing dynamic of high wage growth and negative productivity growth will assure a lingering stagflationary environment (Chart I-11). This is bearish for the rand. Surprisingly, despite a rising currency and falling bond yields over the last 12 months, the South African economy is still showing signs of weakness. The household sector, which represents 61% of the economy, is not showing signs of a recovery yet. Credit growth to households is still falling and private consumption is abysmal. (Chart I-12). On the corporate side, the situation is not reassuring either. Firms are not investing and business confidence has not shown any signs of a significant recovery (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Productivity Is Weak But Wages Are Strong Chart I-12Household Consumption Is Declining Chart I-13No Confidence, No Investment The one positive is that the government has fiscal room to maneuver. South African gross government debt is at a comfortable 51% of GDP. However, we suspect that the nature of fiscal spending will likely result in transfers to appease the population - especially ahead of key elections in late 2017 and 2018 - rather than investments that can genuinely improve productivity. In fact, fiscal spending in the form of transfers could very well entice consumers to import more and consequently widen the current account deficit, putting more downward pressure on the rand. Bottom Line: The commodity price rally in 2016 and falling bond yields failed to buoy the economy. While policymakers do retain fiscal room to stimulate, the problem is that such efforts will likely merely rekindle populist policies that have failed South Africa thus far. Structural Outlook: Late Innings Of The Crisis Of Expectations South Africa is not alone in the EM universe in having failed to improve governance over the past decade. Most EM economies have squandered the commodity bull market and Chinese industrialization, allowing their governance to stagnate or even worsen during the good times (Chart I-14).3 However, South Africa does stand alone when it comes to a tepid rise in middle class, as percent of total population (Chart I-15), and continued high income inequality (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Quality Of EM Governance Declined##br## Amidst The Good Times Chart I-15Middle Class Has ##br##Barely Budged... The data is clear: South Africa is as unequal overall, and its middle class unchanged relative to overall population, as it was at the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. Governance in the country has continued to deteriorate, and while it remains higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap has astonishingly begun to narrow from both ends (Chart I-17). Chart I-17Governance Gap With Sub-Saharan ##br##Africa Is Closing! A major reason for the deterioration in governance is the "state capture" thesis that has become a popular one in characterizing President Jacob Zuma's rule.4 This process began early, as the country shifted its developmental program in 1996 away from a top-down, state-led, developmental model to one that encouraged a free-market economy balanced with welfare spending. This was a natural result of the global rise of laissez-faire capitalism, the Washington Consensus, and "Third Way" politics of left-leaning parties. A commitment to laissez-faire capitalism and free markets, combined with a strong welfare state, were seen as hallmarks of a successful economy. The problem with this approach is that it confused the symptoms of developed economies with their catalysts. South Africa needed a much more state-led approach to development, one that would have harnessed the resources of the state for productivity-enhancing investments. As such, the laissez-faire approach unsurprisingly failed to address the inequalities of the apartheid system and the country saw a decline in the middle class as percent of total population under both Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. This pivot towards free-market capitalism ended with the 2007 "Polokwane moment," which saw President Mbeki's free-market, reactive, attempt to address inequality between the white and black populations replaced with the proactive policy of Jacob Zuma. Zuma's more radical approach was to complement welfare transfers and high wage growth with an activist use of state owned enterprises (SOEs) as a vehicle for redistribution. This proactive policy meant using the government's tender system to doll out lucrative contracts to well-connected insiders, under the auspices of helping enfranchise black entrepreneurs and businesses. While the media has focused on the role that the Indian-born Gupta family has played in this process, it is highly unlikely that they are the only beneficiaries. Zuma's administration has, in the name of black enfranchisement and the fight against inequality, essentially rigged the entire government tender system for the sake of its own political preservation. The results of this process are unsurprising. First, government wages have outpaced those in both manufacturing and mining sectors (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, productivity has declined precipitously since 2007 and has been negative since 2012. South Africa has a lower productivity rate than both Latin American EM economies and its neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Government Wages Have Outpaced All Others Chart I-19South African Productivity Has No Peer Financial media and investment research have continued to focus on the intricacies of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) politics. And we do so as well below. However, investors have to understand that South Africa's ills will not be fixed by the appointment of a pro-market finance minister or even the removal of Jacob Zuma from rule. South Africa has failed to develop inclusive economic institutions that engender creative destruction, which is at the heart of all successful development stories.5 South Africa ranked 74th in the World Bank's annual Doing Business report in 2017, an astonishing fall from grace over the past decade (Chart I-20). Compared to regional averages, South Africa barely beats the Sub-Saharan "distance to frontier" scores in several World Bank categories (Chart I-21). This is not due to the gross failure of the Zuma administration to do the "right thing." Rather, it exhibits a structural failing of South African political institutions. This development path is not unique to South Africa. Most sub-Saharan African states experienced a similar regression within 10-20 years of decolonization. Political scientist Robert Bates famously documented how African leaders co-opted colonial-era extractive economic institutions - such as the state marketing boards that purchased all cash crops and exported them on the global market - in order to generate enough revenue to industrialize their economies.6 While their intentions may have originally been noble, if misplaced, they quickly began to use control over marketing boards for political purposes. The rent generated from marketing boards became an immense source of political power for African leaders and they held on to it to the detriment of the economic development of their state. South Africa is far more developed than its sub-Saharan peers were in the 1970s. Nevertheless, its leaders are exhibiting similar rent-seeking behavior, albeit at a much higher level of development. It is also entering a dangerous period in its post-apartheid history: it has now been twenty years since South Africa's effective decolonization and it is facing its first serious economic downturn. Bottom Line: We doubt that anyone in the current leadership elite will be able to fully abandon the rent-seeking behavior of the Zuma administration and improve South Africa's economic institutions. The crisis of expectations among the country's voters is palpable and demands for greater redistribution are rising. This is not a context for pro-market reforms that will encourage creative destruction. Instead, we would expect a doubling-down of populism and greater emphasis on proactive redistribution, which will, at the same time, encourage greater out-migration of talent out of the country and rent seeking behavior from political elites. Can Any One Man Or Woman Fix South Africa? The African National Congress (ANC) will meet in December 2017 to decide the party candidate that will contest the 2019 general election (Diagram I-1). Given the ANC's stranglehold on the country's politics, it is likely that whoever emerges at the upcoming ANC Congress will be the next president of South Africa. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy subscribes to the idea that policymakers are price takers in the political marketplace, not price makers. This is particularly the case in democracies, but it is also the case in some authoritarian regimes where public opinion is relevant. As such, the puzzle investors have to resolve is not what policymakers stand for, but rather what the median voter wants. In South Africa, the median voter lives in a rural area, works in the agriculture or service industry, and is a black citizen. The polls indicate that the main concerns of the median voter are a high structural unemployment rate (Chart I-22), endemic corruption (Chart I-23), poor healthcare infrastructure, and a desire for aggressive, and targeted, redistributive economic policies. Chart I-22Crisis Of Expectations Is this the profile of a median voter about to elect a pro-market reformer willing to pursue painful structural reforms? We do not think so. The two candidates vying for the ANC presidency are the ex-wife of Jacob Zuma and former Chair of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and former Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa. Ramaphosa is the darling of the international investment community. This is because he has abandoned his previous union credentials - he founded the country's largest trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers in addition to founding the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) - and turned into a successful businessman. As such, the narrative among South Africa bulls (who are exclusively found in Europe and the U.S.) is that he would be able to bridge the divide between the demands for redistribution and pro-market reforms. To the median voter, however, Ramaphosa is alleged to be involved in the Marikana Massacre. Acting as the Deputy President, he ordered increased police presence at the mines and called for the use of force, which resulted in 47 deaths in August-September 2012. Dlamini-Zuma, on the other hand, speaks the language of the median voter while also not being seen as part of Zuma's corrupt entourage. Her credentials are bolstered by a successful tenure as Chair of the African Union and as a woman independent and strong enough to divorce President Zuma. She has not amassed personal wealth and does not hold strong loyalties to a particular faction within the ANC. However, she has begun to parrot Zuma's line that the country requires "radical economic transformation," which is a signal to left-leaning members of the ANC that she will continue much of economic policies begun under Zuma. Both the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues, which are left leaning, support her. The problem that investors face in South Africa is that there is no clear demand for pro-market reforms. Investors cheered the results of the August 2016 municipal election, for example, because the ANC lost in several key cities and saw its total vote share fall by 8%. However, few in the media or investment research community raised the obvious point that the centrist Democratic Alliance only saw its vote total rise by 3% compared to the 2011 election. It was the radically left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters, led by ex-Youth League leader Julius Malema, which saw the largest increase in vote share, by over 8%. In other words, ANC voters that did abandon Zuma most likely fell behind Malema, who is far more redistributionist. As such, we stick to our long-held view that Zuma and the ANC leadership are unlikely to do what investors want them to do given that the South African median voter is swinging further to the left. There is no demand for pro-market reforms and thus policymakers are more likely to double-down on populism. Bottom Line: Dlamini-Zuma is the likely winner of the upcoming ANC Congress, which will effectively decide the next president of South Africa. She has the sufficient left-leaning economic credentials to satisfy the demands for redistribution of the median voter. There is also a chance that she will attempt to clean up the corruption that has become endemic under Zuma, which would undoubtedly be a good thing for the country. However, it is unlikely that the macroeconomic context she will face will be positive, or that she will have the mandate to balance redistributive policies with painful pro-market reforms that would rebuild institutions required for creative destruction. Investment Implications South African assets are ultimately at the mercy of foreign inflows. When the dollar is weakening, U.S. bond yields falling, and Chinese growth stable, even the election of Julius Malema to the presidency would not dent foreign enthusiasm for yield in South African assets. Given the expected improvement in U.S. growth and the transitory nature of the drop in the U.S. inflation rate, we expect the global macro backdrop to worsen substantially for carry trades in general, and for South Africa in particular. China remains the wild card in our analysis, but its credit and fiscal impulse has rolled over, suggesting slower import growth over the next six months (Chart I-24). Even if Chinese policymakers react by re-stimulating the economy, the effects will only be felt in early 2018 given lead times. When the global carry trade reverses, it will not matter who is in charge of South Africa. Investors will realize that the country has failed to address serious socio-economic ills that have plagued South Africa since the end of apartheid. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy continues to recommend the following investment positions: Chart I-24China Slowdown Is A Risk To EM Chart I-25Yield Curve Will Steepen Continue shorting ZAR versus USD and MXN. Underweight South African stocks, sovereign credit and domestic bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: bet on yield-curve steepening (Chart I-25). The short end of the curve will be steady but populist politics, larger fiscal deficits/higher public debt, and an inflationary backdrop will push up long-end yields. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Beement Alemayehu, Research Assistant beementa@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stocks Are From Mars, Bonds Are From Venus?" dated June 23, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Contradictions And A Resolution," dated June 14, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "EM Local Bonds: Looking At Hedged Yields," dated May 10, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 'Governance' is a catchall term that attempts to capture the quality of public service delivery, broadly defined. In essence, investors can consider governance as a factor that underpins the quality of political institutions. We rely on the World Bank's Development Indicators because the World Bank aggregates the work of several credible surveys on governance. These indicators are also useful because the World Bank standardizes the results in a way that allows cross-country/region comparisons. We then aggregate the scores across five different variables and look for trends and changes over time. 4 Please see State Capacity Research Project, "Betrayal Of The Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen," dated May 2017, available at pari.org.za. 5 Please see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 6 Please see Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2014 edition). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Special Report Dear Client, We hope that you will find value in this report, a product of collaboration between BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy and EM Equity Sector Strategy. My colleagues Oleg Babanov and Matt Gertken look for investment opportunities in the recent geopolitical changes on the Korean Peninsula. The election of President Moon Jae-in will be a boon for domestic consumer sentiment and relations with China. This will produce a tailwind for the consumer-oriented South Korean stocks, which have high exposure to the country’s trade with China. We deliver this report to you both for its investment value and as an example of BCA Research commitment to seek alpha in the intersection of economics, markets, and geopolitics. Kindest Regards, Marko Papic Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Overweight South Korea Consumer Staples We are recommending an overweight position in select South Korean consumer staples on a long-term (one year-plus) time horizon. A decline in geopolitical tensions between South Korea and China, and a potential improvement on the Korean peninsula, will provide tailwinds to the performance of Korean consumer staples, which have high exposure to China. We expect Chinese tourist numbers to Korea to recover gradually, and sales of South Korean products in mainland China to pick up over the rest of the year. Presidential elections in South Korea and a slowly improving economy are bolstering consumer sentiment and aiding a turnaround in retail sales in the country, with companies in the consumer space displaying better earnings momentum and trading at more attractive valuations than their EM peers (Table 1). Sector Backdrop We are turning cautiously positive on consumer staples in South Korea. We believe the following factors will trigger a turnaround in consumer sentiment and support share price performance of consumer-oriented South Korean stocks. Geopolitics The election of President Moon Jae-in by a wide margin, as well as a geopolitical shift toward more accommodative policy on China, will alleviate geopolitical risks and help consumer sentiment. Moon has already kicked off his administration's tenure with considerable political capital. For one, his administration represents a return to stable and legitimate government after over a year of turmoil surrounding the scandal, impeachment and removal of former President Park Geun-hye - a relief for South Korean voters. What's more, voter turnout was higher than usual, at 77%, and Moon's margin of victory over his closest contender was over 15%, the second-highest since South Korea became a full-fledged democracy in 1987 (Chart 1). There are also institutional factors playing to Moon's advantage. He was the leading contender for the presidency even without Park being removed from office - but if she had not been removed, he would have taken office in January 2018. Now, Moon has half a year longer in office than he otherwise would have had before he faces his first serious political hurdle in the April 2020 legislative elections. This half year could make a difference. Since Korean presidents serve a single, five-year term, they often become lame ducks in the second half of their term, and therefore move rapidly on policy in the first half while their political capital is high. The only significant domestic political constraint on Moon is the rival left-of-center party, the People's Party. It holds the kingmaker position in the legislature, with the ability to give a majority to either Moon's ruling Democratic Party or to the conservative opposition (Chart 2). However, the People's Party has serious weaknesses and has been compelled by its voting base to cooperate on much of Moon's platform of expanding social spending and thawing relations with North Korea and China. Moreover, the conservative opposition is discredited and fractured. Thus, Moon has limited political constraints. Given that his administration is competent - i.e. the clear populist elements are not joined with a lack of experience or pragmatism - the key question is what policies he will prioritize while his political capital is high. Chart 3THAAD Deployment Hurt ##br##Bilateral China-Korea Trade It is our view that China-exposed companies stand to benefit in the short term as China eases sanctions over the recently deployed U.S. THAAD missile defense system (Chart 3), and as better relations with China benefit the economy more broadly (Chart 4). However, if Moon prioritizes China and North Korea excessively, he risks squandering his political capital. Korea remains stuck in the middle of U.S.-China tensions that are growing on a secular basis. Tensions with the U.S. will rise as a result of Moon's orientation, and North Korean political risks will remain elevated over the medium and long term. Moon's attempts to engage with North Korea will collide with Trump's efforts to ratchet up pressure against it. Therefore, Moon is likely to find the most success in his domestic agenda of increasing government spending, hiring more public workers, raising wages and instilling worker protections, expanding the social safety net and subsidizing small- and medium-sized enterprises. These measures will boost both public and private consumption. We do not have particularly high hopes for Moon's ability to reform the so-called 'chaebol', a South Korean term denoting large, typically family-owned corporate conglomerates, but his attempt to do so will add a modicum of corporate governance and competitiveness improvements that markets will likely cheer. Macroeconomics With improvement in the geopolitical situation, stabilization in the local political system following the Park Geun-hye scandal and new elections has aided in a recovery in consumer sentiment (Chart 5). Meanwhile, a rebound in total employment numbers together with a decline in household debt is providing support to consumer spending (Charts 6A, 6B, 6C). Chart 5Consumer Confidence Is ##br##Back To A Five-Year High Chart 6ANumber Of Employed ##br##Higher Than In 2015... Chart 6B...While The Household Debt ##br##Burden Is Slowly Declining... Chart 6C...Aiding A Recovery##br## In Retail Sales Sector Specifics From a sector perspective, South Korean consumer staples remain highly competitive, outperforming their EM peers (Chart 7). At the same time, valuations are attractive for South Korean companies (Charts 8A & 8B). Chart 7South Korean Consumer Stocks Outperforming EM Consumer Staples' Aggregate... Chart 8ASouth Korean Companies Trading At Cheaper ##br##Valuations Since Mid-2016... Chart 8B...And At One Standard Deviation Below ##br##Their Seven-Year Average Furthermore, bottom-line expansion of South Korean companies remains strong, supported by solid margin trends (Charts 9A, 9B, 9C). Chart 9A...Earnings Growth In South Korea##br## Is Outperforming EM Peers Chart 9B...With Gross Margin Nearly Twice ##br## The EM Industry Average... Chart 9C...And EBTIDA Margin Is Steadily ##br## Above EM Peers We also like the fact that the net debt level for South Korean consumer staples companies is low to negative, while companies have managed to generate excess free cash flow. One undesirable implication, however, is notoriously low dividend yields, which are discouraging investors and raising corporate governance issues (Charts 10A, 10B, 10C). Taking into account the factors listed above, we have created a portfolio of six South Korean consumer staples stocks (Table 2). Chart 10ADebt Levels Have Fallen Significantly ##br## Over The Past Seven Years... Chart 10B...While Cash Generation ##br## Has Recovered... Chart 10C...But Dividend Yields ##br## Remain Disappointing Low The Overweight Basket Chart 11Performance Since June 2016: ##br## Amorepacific Corp Vs. MSCI EM Amorepacific Corp (090430 KS): A leading beauty and cosmetics producer in South Korea (Chart 11). Founded in the 1940s by Yun Dok-jeong as a company distributing camellia oil for hair treatment, the company was inherited by Yun's son and later grandson, who became the second-richest man in South Korea, controlling directly 10% of the company's free float. Today, Amorepacific is the world's 14th largest cosmetics company, with oversight of some 33 brands around the world such as Etude House, Sulwhasoo and others. In terms of revenue, the bulk is generated by beauty and cosmetic products (91%), where luxury cosmetics constitute 43%, followed by premium brands with 18%. Personal care products contribute 9% to total revenue. Geographically, 70% of revenues are generated in South Korea, and another 19% in China. Amorepacific reported weaker-than-expected first-quarter 2017 financial results on April 24. Revenue increased by 5.7% year over year, with falling Chinese tourist numbers weighing on local sales, and weaker sales in mainland China. At the same time, cost of sales went up by 10.6% year over year, which resulted in gross margin compression by 100 basis points. As a result of an operating cost increase of 8.4% year over year, mainly driven by SG&A expansion (increased labor costs and one-off bonus payments), operating profit fell 6.2% year over year. Operating margin finished at 20.2% compared to 22.8% same period last year, while EBTDA margin contracted to 17.8% from 19.5% last year. Weak operating performance and disproportionate expense growth led to the bottom line falling 15% year over year. Amorepacific is currently trading at a forward P/E of 30.0x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 13% over the next three years. We believe the share price will continue to recover strongly, taking into account that easing tensions with China will restore demand and organic volume growth as well as strong momentum in overseas sales, supporting an earnings recovery. Chart 12Performance Since June 2016: ##br## E-Mart Vs. MSCI EM E-Mart (139480 KS): Number one hypermarket brand in South Korea (Chart 12). E-Mart was established in 1993 and has grown into the largest hypermarket and discount store chain in South Korea, operating over 148 branch locations locally and another 16 in China. In 2006 the company also acquired its largest competitor in the country - Wal-Mart Korea - strengthening its market share. Additionally, E-Mart runs speciality shops such as "Emart" discount stores, the "Emart Mall" online store, "Emart Traders," an everyday low-price store, as well as pet and sports/outdoor stores. In terms of revenue breakdown, the flagship E-Mart brand is responsible for 78% of total revenue, followed by the food distribution and supermarket segment with 7% each respectively. From a geographic perspective, 98% of revenue originates in South Korea and only 2% in China. E-Mart reported first-quarter 2017 financial results on May 11, missing estimates. Revenue growth was solid, up 7.4% year over year, helped by 1% same-store sales growth in the main hypermarket segment, while cost of sales increased by 6.5% year over year, which resulted in gross margin falling slightly by 20 basis points to 28.2%. Operating profit increased by 2.8% year over year, weighed on by a year-on-year jump in operating expenses of 11.1%. Operating margin stood at 4.1%, down from 4.3% in 2016, while EBITDA margin finished virtually flat at 6.7%. Thanks to better operating performance, the bottom line improved by 5% year over year. The main detraction to performance came from one-off store opening expenses and a negative calendar effect. E-Mart is currently trading at a forward P/E of 14.0x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 9% over the next three years. A store restructuring program is currently underway, and management has done well in accelerating closures of non-performing stores, which has already led to cost savings and margin turnaround. We expect this process to continue. Together with strong performance of the discount and online segments, this should warrant a further re-rating of the share price. Chart 13Performance Since June 2016: ##br## GS Retail Vs. MSCI EM GS Retail (007070 KS): Number one convenience store chain in South Korea (Chart 13). GS Retail is part of the GS Group, a former part of LG Group and the sixth-largest conglomerate in South Korea, which controls just under 66% of the company. GS Retail was incorporated back in 1971 and today operates GS25 - the largest convenience store brand in South Korea - as well as other brands such as GS Supermarkets, Watsons - a health and beauty chain, and Parnas Hotel. The largest contributor to total revenue is the convenience store segment, with 77%, followed by the supermarket business with 20% and the hotel operation with 3%. Geographically, all the revenue originates in South Korea. GS Retail reported first-quarter 2017 financial results on May 11. Revenue displayed strong growth, up 12.5% year over year, driven by solid performance in the convenience store segment (+21% year over year), while cost of sales increased by 12.3% year over year, which brought gross margin up by 20 basis points to 18.4%. A 15% year-over-year increase in operating costs due to the ongoing consolidation of the Watsons business brought operating income down slightly by 1.5% year over year, suppressing operating margin by 20 basis points to 1.4%. EBITDA margin stood at 5.9% compared to 6.2% a year ago. Despite weak operating performance, the bottom line grew by 18.8%, helped by a non-operating gain and lower interest expenses. GS Retail is currently trading at a forward P/E of 19.6x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 14% over the next three years. We expect the non-convenience store segments to contribute more to performance in the second part of the year. Furthermore, non-performing supermarket store closedowns together with seasonally strong second and third quarters, where the summer weather typically helps sales, should support stock performance. Chart 14Performance Since June 2016: ##br## H&H Vs. MSCI EM LG Household & Healthcare (051900 KS): Producer of the very first cosmetic products in Korea (Chart 14). LG H&H was incorporated in 1947 by Koo In-Hwoi, the founder of LG Corp., and had the initial name Lucky Chemical Industrial Corp. The company produced the first-ever Korean cosmetic product, "Lucky Cream," followed by "Lucky Toothpaste." From 1995 to 2001, LG H&H was part of LG Chem before being spun off. In addition to the cosmetics and household goods businesses, the company also acquired Coca Cola Beverage in 2007, turning itself into an exclusive bottler and distributor of Coca Cola products in South Korea. In terms of revenue breakdown, the cosmetics business contributes 53% to overall revenue, followed by personal products with 27% and the soft drink division with 20%. Geographically, 84% of revenue originates in South Korea, followed by China with 8% and Japan with 4%. LG H&H reported better-than-expected first-quarter 2017 financial results on April 28. Revenue expanded by 5.3% year over year, driven by strong sales in the luxury cosmetics and beverage segments, while cost of sales grew by 4% year over year, bringing gross margin 50 basis points higher to 60.9%. Furthermore, operating income displayed strong growth, up 11.3%, helped by good management of operating expenses (+4.5% year over year). As a result, operating margin improved by 90 basis points to 16.2% and EBITDA margin finished at 16.9%, up from 15.7% last year. The bottom line increased by 11.9% year over year, helped by strong operating performance. LG H&H is currently trading at a forward P/E of 24.1x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 8% over the next three years. As with Amorepacific, the trigger to a re-rating in the share price of LG H&H is the improving geopolitical situation. We expect tourist numbers to South Korea to gradually increase, which will aid in both sales recovery and earnings revisions, while strong momentum in the luxury cosmetics segment will contribute to further margin expansion. Chart 15Performance Since June 2016: ##br## KT&G Vs. MSCI EM KT&G Corp (033780 KS): Korea Tobacco & Ginseng (Chart 15). Initially founded as a government monopoly with the name "Korea Tobacco & Ginseng," the company was later privatized and rebranded as the "Korea Tomorrow & Global Corporation." Today, the company is the largest tobacco company in South Korea, controlling the majority of the local market. The company also has extensive exposure to Eastern European countries. In addition to the tobacco business, KT&G also has a pharma arm, the Korea Ginseng Corp. The revenue stream is broken down into the cigarette business, which contributes 60% to overall revenue, followed by the ginseng-pharma segment, adding another 30%. KT&G reported in-line first-quarter 2017 financial results on April 27. Revenue increased by a solid 8% year over year, helped by strong ginseng sales, which expanded despite a market contraction and were also alleviated by market share gain and higher prices. Cost of sales, meantime, were up 12.7%, bringing gross margin down to 59.4% from 61.1% previously. Due to a strong increase in operating costs (+11.3% year over year), driven by higher SG&A expenses, operating income edged up only 0.6% year over year. Operating margin fell 45 basis points from last year, while EBITDA margin stood at 35.5%, or 80 basis points lower compared to the same period last year. The bottom line fell by 17.5% year over year, weighted on by higher foreign exchange losses. KT&G is currently trading at a forward P/E of 12.8x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 6.5% over the next three years. Several factors have been weighing on the company's share price recently, including the introduction of warning messages on cigarette packages and the introduction of e-cigarettes in the domestic market - making the stock one of the cheapest among its global peers (~20% discount). We believe that worries regarding e-cigarette introduction and projections of the Japanese experience are overstated due to differences in law (e.g. prohibition of smoking indoors), as well as the age composition of the market. Furthermore, we expect a strong revival in overseas sales in the second part of the year, with less headwinds from foreign exchange swings and double-digit growth due to low base effects - as well as an offset to flat local market expansion via higher selling prices. Chart 16Performance Since June 2016: ##br## Nongshim Vs. MSCI EM Nongshim (004370 KS): Farmer's Heart (Chart 16). Nongshim, or Farmer's Heart, was founded in 1965 under the name Lotte Food Industrial Company, and later changed its name. The company first focused on ramyun (instant noodle) production, later expanding into snacks - it was the first to introduce the "Shrimp Cracker" as well as beverages. Today, Nongshim is the largest ramyun and snack company in South Korea, selling to over 100 countries, with production facilities in Korea, China and the U.S. From a revenue perspective, ramyun products contribute 67% to total revenue, followed by other food products with 17.5% and snacks with 15.6%. Geographically, most sales occur in South Korea, with 80%, followed by the U.S. with 10% and China with 8%. Nongshim reported slightly better-than-expected first-quarter 2017 financial results on May 15. Revenue declined slightly by 2.2% year over year due to a fall in domestic ramyun sales by 9%, while cost of sales actually declined by 5% year over year, which led to a gross margin improvement by 190 basis points to 33.7% (helped by price increases.) Operating income was virtually flat year over year, as operating costs increased by 4%. Operating margin stood at 5.85% compared to 5.70% in 2016, while EBITDA margin declined to 7.9% from 9.4% last year. Nongshim is currently trading at a forward P/E of 18.5x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 5.6% over the next three years. We expect a reversal of weak sales in China (-5% year over year) due to an easing of the geopolitical situation. Furthermore, Nongshim has already begun to claw back market share, helped by new starts and forced price hikes among its competition, which will continue to help turn around margins and improve profitability. How To Trade? The EMES team recommends gaining exposure to the sector through a basket of listed equities consisting of six overweight recommendations. The main goal is active alpha generation by excluding laggards and including out-of-benchmark plays, to avoid passive index-hugging via an ETF. Direct: Equity access through the tickers (Bloomberg): Amorepacific Corp (090430 KS); E-Mart (139480 KS); GS Retail (007070 KS); LG Household & Healthcare (051900 KS); KT&G Corp (033780 KS); Nongshim (004370 KS). ETFs: At the moment, there are no ETFs with significant consumer staples sector exposure for South Korea. Funds: At the moment, there are no funds with significant consumer staples sector exposure for South Korea. Please note this trade recommendation is long term (1Y+) and based on an overweight trade. We do not see a need for specific market timing for this call (for technical indicators please refer to our website link). For convenience, the performance of both market cap-weighted and equal-weighted equity baskets will be tracked (please see upcoming updates as well as the website link to follow performance). Risks To Our Investment Case We believe that one of the main risks is the geopolitical situation and further developments surrounding North Korea. Although the usual springtime tensions have passed, the underlying dynamic remains highly precarious. North Korea has not moderated its behavior despite President Moon's olive branch and U.S. President Trump continues to prioritize the issue and threaten bolder action. Any kind of escalation in tensions, whether they be driven by North Korea or the U.S., would negatively affect both Chinese interests and the new South Korean administration's attempts at engagement. Given that South Korea has not yet fully reversed the THAAD missile deployment, for instance, it is possible that China could maintain or intensify its informal sanctions on South Korea, such as travel and product bans, and that renewed tensions could depress overall consumer sentiment in South Korea. We are also cognizant that debt levels in the South Korean manufacturing sector as well mass layoffs in shipyards and a slowdown in exports could continue to create pressure on household disposable income levels and, in turn, spending. However, President Moon's efforts for a supplementary budget to support employment in the public sector, if approved, should alleviate some pain from layoffs. On a company level, we see increased price competition as one of the main risks to our investment case. Since many of the companies in the basket are market leaders, they will need to defend their market share aggressively in case of increased competition. Furthermore, for companies operating abroad, we see increased expansion costs as one of the risk factors for future performance. Finally, Chinese economic policy pose a risk to our view. The fiscal spending and credit impulse in China have rolled over, suggesting that demand will slow in the coming months. Moreover, the Communist Party’s ongoing “deleveraging campaign” – a crackdown on various risky financial practices and the shadow banking sector – raises the risks of a policy mistake. A slowdown in China would have negative repercussions for the South Korean companies most exposed to China and the broader Korean economy. Nevertheless, we think Chinese authorities are willing and able to meet their growth target this year. Oleg Babanov, Senior Editor obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.co.uk
Highlights Fed Policy Loop: Low inflation is preventing rate hike expectations from being revised higher, prolonging the current rally in spread product. We expect rate hike expectations to move up as inflation recovers, eventually leading to a correction in spread product. Such a correction will prove fleeting as long as inflation stays below target. High-Yield: High-yield valuation is consistent with its historical average, after accounting for expected default losses. Current valuation levels should translate into excess returns of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months. Aaa Spread Product: Non-agency CMBS offer the most spread pick-up of any Aaa-rated sector. However, we prefer to focus our Aaa-rated spread product allocation in Agency CMBS and credit card backed consumer ABS. Feature Chart 1The Fed Policy Loop In Action One of this publication's main themes during the past few years has been the Fed Policy Loop.1 In essence, the Loop describes the feedback mechanism between monetary policy and financial markets, a relationship that results from both investors' sensitivity to the Fed's policy stance and the Fed's reliance on financial conditions as a predictor of economic growth. In practice, the Loop works as follows: Easier Fed policy causes spread product to outperform Treasuries. Tighter credit spreads lead to easier financial conditions, which the Fed interprets as a sign that economic growth will accelerate. An improved economic outlook causes the Fed to step up the pace of tightening. Tighter Fed policy causes spread product to underperform Treasuries. Wider credit spreads lead to tighter financial conditions, which the Fed interprets as a sign that economic growth will moderate. A worse economic outlook causes the Fed to slow its expected pace of tightening. Rinse, repeat. Chart 2 provides a graphical description of the Loop, and its most recent iteration can be seen in Chart 1 above. Chart 1 shows that corporate bonds outperformed Treasuries leading up to the March rate hike, but then rate expectations rose too far. In mid-March the market was discounting a fed funds rate of 1.86% by the end of 2018. These overly stringent rate hike expectations caused corporate bonds to underperform, and this underperformance led rate hike expectations to be revised lower. The market now expects a fed funds rate of only 1.47% by the end of 2018, and these depressed rate expectations have fueled the rally in corporate bonds that started in mid-April. Normally at this stage of the Fed Policy Loop we would expect rate hike expectations to move higher until they eventually prompt a correction in corporate spreads. However, extremely disappointing core inflation prints during the past three months have caused the market to keep its rate hike expectations depressed. This has extended the most recent rally in spread product. This is why we have consistently pointed to core inflation and the cost of inflation protection embedded in long-maturity bond yields as the main factors to watch to determine how much life is left in the corporate bond trade. As long as inflation stays below target, the Fed absolutely needs it to rise. It will therefore be quick to respond to any tightening of financial conditions/widening of credit spreads. Table 1 shows average monthly excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds relative to duration-matched Treasuries. These returns are split into buckets based on the reading from the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure (PPM). The PPM is a composite of 104 economic indicators designed to measure the probability that inflation will exceed 2.5% during the next 12 months. As can be seen, average monthly excess returns are strongest when inflation pressures are low, but they gradually decline as inflation heats up and the Fed's reaction function becomes less supportive for markets. At present, the PPM gives a reading of only 4.8%. Table 1Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Under Different ##br## Ranges Of Price Pressures Measure** (January 1990 To Present) Similarly, Table 2 shows that it is difficult to get a long-lasting correction in an environment with low inflation pressures and a responsive Fed. This table shows the results of a "buy the dips" trading strategy where if the average junk spread widens by 20 basis points we buy the junk index versus duration-matched Treasuries and hold it for a period of 1, 2 or 3 months. Just as in Table 1, this strategy works well when inflation pressures are muted, but starts to fail as inflation ramps up. Table 2High-Yield Corporate Bond Returns* Achieved By Holding The Junk Index ##br## Following A 20 BPs Widening In High-Yield Corporate OAS** Under Different Ranges Of ##br## The St. Louis Fed Price Pressures Measure*** (February 1994 To Present) Beatings Will Continue Until Morale Improves So when will the Fed staunch the current rally? That depends on how quickly inflation rebounds,2 and also on how much emphasis Fed policymakers place on financial conditions versus the actual inflation data. At the moment, most indexes are sending the message that financial conditions are easier than average and that the Fed should continue to tighten (Chart 3). However, as was noted above, inflation gauges are sending the opposite signal (Chart 3, panel 2). For now, the Fed is downplaying low inflation as transitory. It decided to leave its median projected rate hike path unchanged at the June FOMC meeting. But the Fed's refusal to capitulate in the face of weaker inflation has caused the yield curve to flatten, the cost of inflation protection to plummet (Chart 3, bottom panel) and investors to grow increasingly concerned about a policy mistake (Chart 4). Chart 3Financial Conditions Are Supportive Chart 4Should The Fed Keep Tightening? This brings up an interesting flaw in the financial conditions approach to policymaking. Most indexes of financial conditions are at least partially driven by long-maturity Treasury yields (lower yields = easier financial conditions, and vice-versa). This makes some sense. Lower yields do in fact indicate that the financing back-drop is more supportive and tend to translate into higher growth in the future (Chart 5). Chart 5Financial Conditions Lead Economic Growth However, what if lower long-maturity Treasury yields are the result of excessively tight Fed policy? This would appear to be the case at the moment. Investors are revising their long-run inflation forecasts lower on the view that the Fed is not doing enough to allow prices to rise. In such a situation it would be incorrect to interpret lower Treasury yields as a signal that policy needs to tighten further. On the contrary, tighter policy would only exacerbate the downtrend in yields. For this reason we do not include the level of yields in the financial conditions component of our Fed Monitor (Chart 3, top panel). As a result, this financial conditions indicator is not as deep in "easing territory" as most other indicators. However, it is still above the zero line, suggesting that policy should be biased tighter at the margin. Bottom Line: Low inflation is preventing rate hike expectations from being revised higher, prolonging the current rally in spread product. We expect rate hike expectations to move up as inflation recovers, eventually leading to a correction in spread product. Such a correction will prove fleeting as long as inflation remains below the Fed's target. The key risk is that inflation stays low but the Fed continues to focus exclusively on "easy" readings from financial conditions indexes, and proceeds on its current tightening path. In that scenario cries of "policy mistake" will grow louder and spread product will sell off, converging with lower rate hike expectations. We view this scenario as a low-probability tail risk. Junk Valuation Update At 378 bps, the average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is only 55 bps above its post-crisis low, but still more than 100 bps above the level where it tends to settle in the late stages of the economic cycle when the Fed is tightening policy (Chart 6, top panel). Higher debt levels than are typical for this stage of the cycle suggest that somewhat wider spreads are justified,3 but the idea that junk spreads are extremely tight compared to history does not hold up to scrutiny. Chart 6High-Yield Default-Adjusted Spread Our preferred measure of junk valuation, the default-adjusted high-yield spread, paints an even rosier picture. The second panel of Chart 6 shows an ex-post measure of the default-adjusted spread (the option-adjusted spread of the high-yield index less actual default losses over the subsequent 12 months). The most recent reading from this indicator is based on our forecast of default losses for the next 12 months, and is shown as a dashed line. The message from the default-adjusted spread is that, assuming our default loss forecast is correct, junk bonds currently offer compensation for default risk that is in line with the historical average. That level of compensation would be consistent with an excess return of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months (Chart 6, panel 3), and is contingent on the speculative grade default rate falling to 2.68%, in line with Moody's baseline forecast (Chart 6, bottom panel). We expect a decline in the default rate to materialize in the coming months as commodity sector defaults continue to work their way out of the data. Moody's did not record any commodity-related defaults in May, the first month this has occurred since January 2015. The risk going forward is that defaults start to emerge in the increasingly stressed retail sector. So far, Moody's has recorded two retail defaults this year. However, more are probably on the way. This will be especially true if inflationary pressures start to mount and the Fed tightens policy, giving banks less incentive to extend credit. We will be monitoring the situation in retail closely going forward. Bottom Line: High-yield valuation is consistent with its historical average, after accounting for expected default losses. Current valuation levels should translate into excess returns of just over 200 bps during the next 12 months. Aaa Roundup As can be inferred from the previous two sections, we are still reasonably comfortable taking credit risk in U.S. bond portfolios. However, this week we also look at the compensation offered by Aaa-rated spread product. For investors who desire some Aaa-rated allocation outside of the Treasury market, Chart 7 provides a snapshot of where the most additional spread is available. The first thing that jumps out is that Agency bonds offer very little spread compared to other Aaa-rated instruments. Agency residential mortgage-backed securities also offer relatively little compensation, unless one is willing to extend into premium coupons (4% and above). Agency CMBS, auto ABS and credit card ABS all offer more spread than Aaa-rated corporate bonds. Non-agency CMBS offer much more attractive spreads than the other Aaa sectors, but we see potential for capital losses in that segment, as is discussed below. Agency MBS Only agency MBS carrying coupons of 4% or above offer interesting compensation relative to other Aaa-rated sectors, and even there we see potential for spread widening in the coming months. Nominal MBS spreads are already very tight compared to history (Chart 8) and appear even tighter relative to trends in net issuance (Chart 8, panel 2). While refinancing activity will likely stay depressed (Chart 8, panel 3), we see potential for option-adjusted spreads to follow net issuance higher, even as the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) remains low. A similar scenario played out in 2007 (Chart 8, bottom panel). The Fed's exit from the MBS market, which could occur as early as September, represents an additional upside risk for spreads. Chart 8MBS Spreads Biased Wider Chart 9Avoid Non-Agency CMBS CMBS As noted above, non-agency CMBS look very attractive compared to other Aaa-rated spread products. But we see potential for spread widening in this sector. Commercial real estate lending standards are tightening and property prices are decelerating, both should pressure non-agency CMBS spreads wider (Chart 9). Agency CMBS offer somewhat lower spreads than their non-agency counterparts. But this sector should be more insulated from spread widening. For one thing, Agency CMBS are mostly backed by multi-family loans. Multi-family property prices have been stronger than those in the retail or office segments (Chart 9, panel 3), and multi-family properties have also experienced much lower delinquencies (Chart 9, bottom panel). Consumer ABS Chart 10Credit Cards Greater Than Autos While Chart 7 shows that Aaa-rated auto ABS offer a slight spread advantage over Aaa-rated credit card ABS, we are inclined to view credit card ABS more favorably. Rising auto loan net loss rates pose a risk for auto ABS spreads, while credit card charge-offs remain historically low (Chart 10). Auto lending standards have also moved deep into "net tightening" territory, while credit card lending standards have dipped back into "net easing" territory. The small extra compensation available in auto ABS relative to credit card ABS does not seem to be worth the extra risk. Bottom Line: Non-agency CMBS offer the most spread pick-up of any Aaa-rated sector. However, we view the risk of a further widening in non-agency CMBS spreads as substantial. We prefer to focus our Aaa-rated spread product exposure in Agency CMBS and credit card backed consumer ABS. Both sectors offer reasonably attractive spreads, and should remain insulated from capital losses going forward. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Caught In A Loop", dated September 29, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Our view is that core inflation will rebound fairly quickly. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights The rollover in the economic surprise index is not sending a near-term recession signal and should trough in the next month or so, as decent economic data begins to surpass now lowered expectations. Investors should be prepared for a mild recession in 2019, but odds of a recession are low in the next 12-18 months. Oil prices will move higher from the mid $40s per barrel as investors start to see the inventory drawdowns we expect in the coming months. We expect that the Fed will stick to its plan to begin shrinking its balance sheet in September and hike rates again in December. Still, a stubbornly low inflation rate in the next few months would likely see the Fed postpone any further tightening until early 2018. Small cap stocks have underperformed large caps this year, but investors should not interpret this as a sign of that start of sell-off in risk assets. Feature The Citi Economic Surprise Index (CESI) is not sending a near-term recession signal and should trough in the next month as decent economic data begin to surpass lowered economic expectations. The index is nearly two standard deviations below its mean after peaking in early March in the wake of the election and has been falling for 71 days. It typically takes 90 days for the surprise index to find a footing after readings above 40. Moreover, the mean reverting nature of the index suggests a rebound at two standard deviations, absent a recession that we do not foresee (Chart 1). Chart 1Economic Surprise Index Approaching A Turning Point CESI is composed of two components, whose composition and recent behavior are crucial to interpreting the weakness in the overall surprise metric. A positive reading on the "consensus change" index, which tracks economists' forecasts, means that expectations have improved relative to their one-year average. A positive reading on the "data change" component suggests that economic releases have been stronger than their one-year average. The overall surprise index combines these two elements/factors (Chart 2). Chart 2Post Election, Economic Expectations For Soft Data Hit An Eight Year High Lofty expectations, rather than poor data, account for much of CESI's weakness in the past three months. This is most pronounced in the soft economic surprise index, where outlooks moved sharply in the wake of the U.S. election when forecasters were swept up in Trump euphoria. By early March 2017, the economic consensus index for soft data was at its highest in seven years, topping out just shy of the all-time record set in late 2009. Prognosticators also ratcheted up their forecasts for the hard data, but not by nearly as much. The inevitable result of elevated expectations, combined with economic reports that signaled that overall growth remained close to 2%, was a prolonged spell of economic disappointment. This type of divergence between heightened expectations and weakness in the overall surprise index has occurred several times in the past 13 years (2004, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2017). Each episode took place before a bottom in the economic surprise index and our view is that this time is no different (Chart 2). Despite the dismal surprise index, forecasts for U.S. and global GDP in 2017 and 2018 have held up, which is a positive sign for profits (Chart 3). The stability of these forecasts is in sharp contrast to 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016 when global growth estimates sunk at the same time as the economic surprise index. As we stated in our recent report,1 GDP growth in 1H 2017 in the U.S. is on track to match the Fed's modest 2.1% target for the year. Moreover, in years when Q1 GDP is weak, 2H growth is faster than 1H growth 70% of the time. Chart 3U.S. & Global GDP Estimates For 2017 & 2018 Have Held Up Well Falling oil prices are another worry for investors concerned that global growth is on the wane. We take a different view and expect oil prices to increase in the coming months. In a recent report,2 our Energy Sector Strategy team noted that investors are confused about conflicting supply signals in oil markets. Traders do not see the physical shortage that the IEA/EIA/OPEC and BCA's top-down supply & demand analyses argue should prevail (Chart 4). Investors are cautious amid the uncertainty. We view the investment environment as overly pessimistic and anticipate that oil prices (and oil-focused upstream equities) will improve as inventory withdrawals escalate in the coming months. The latest 3.5% year-over-year reading on LEI for May points to low odds of a near-term recession (Chart 2, panel 3). However, BCA's Global Investment Strategy service has raised the possibility of a U.S. recession commencing in 2019. Financial markets would move ahead of a recession, thus investors should begin to adjust their portfolios3 for a recession scenario in the latter half of 2018, as economic and profit growth begins to weaken. Until then, we favor stocks over bonds, but we remain vigilant for any signs of imbalances that typically precipitate a recession. Our Global Investment Strategy service points out that in the post-war era the unemployment rate's three-month moving average has never risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession. A good leading indicator of the unemployment rate is the weekly unemployment claims data, and they suggest continued tightening in the labor market (Chart 5). Chart 4We Expect The Oil Balance To Tighten Later This Year Chart 5Claims Not Even Close To Sending A Recession Signal A tighter labor market will lead to the familiar vicious cycle of a more aggressive Fed, a margin squeeze, slower and eventually falling profits, rising corporate defaults and layoffs. The resulting economic downturn would be mild compared with the 2007-2009 recession because the current imbalances are not as severe as those in 2007. Even so, with valuations stretched, the pain of the recession may be most felt in the financial markets, with a likelihood of a 20-30% equity bear market. Bottom Line: Despite signs to the contrary, the sweet spot that has buoyed risk assets remains in place: a beneficial combination of moderate economic growth, healthy corporate profit growth, stable margins, low inflation and a Fed prepared to only gradually hike rates. We remain overweight stocks versus bonds in the next 6-12 months. Threats to this risk-asset friendly environment include a further drop in core inflation, an over-aggressive central bank, and signs that negative economic shocks are leading to a significant markdown of global growth prospects. Is The Fed's Inflation Target Credible? The recent drop in oil prices has undermined our short-duration recommendation. But more than that, investors are questioning whether the Fed even has the ability to reach its inflation goals, following the surprising May CPI report and the softening in some of the wage data. Is it possible that the U.S. is following Japan's roadmap where even an over-heated labor market is insufficient to generate any meaningful inflation? The sharp flattening of the Treasury curve indicates that the bond market has already rendered its judgement. As we noted last week, the energy component pulled down the headline CPI rate again in May, but the softening of inflation this year is widespread in the index. This is contrary to Fed Chair Yellen's assertion that recent weak readings are due largely to special factors, such as wireless telecommunications prices. The deceleration in inflation began around the start of the year. The 3-month rate of change of the headline index fell by more than five percentage points between January and May, of which energy accounts for 3.3 percentage points. The deceleration in the core rate was a less severe, but still substantial, 2.8 percentage points. Table 1 presents the components of the CPI that made the largest contribution to the deceleration in core inflation. Motor vehicles, owners' equivalent rent, apparel, recreation, wireless telecom and medical care services accounted for 1.2 percentage points as a group. However, many other sectors contributed in a small way to the overall deceleration of core inflation in the first five months of the year. Table 1Key Drivers Of Core Inflation Deceleration In 2017 Some special factors were at play. The moderation in rent inflation likely reflects the bottoming of the vacancy rate. Discounting in the auto sector is not a surprise given weak sales. Wireless prices can be viewed as a special case as well. Nonetheless, the breadth and suddenness of the deceleration in core inflation across such diverse sectors, some unrelated to labor markets, commodity prices, the weak dollar or on-line shopping, is startling. The disinflation this year in the Fed's preferred measure, the PCE price index, is not as extended but the data lag the CPI by roughly a month. A diffusion index made up of the components of the PCE index is still in positive territory, unlike the CPI's diffusion index (Chart 6). Nonetheless, the CPI data suggest that core PCE inflation will edge lower when the May data are released at the end of June. There has also been a moderation in some of the wage inflation data, such as average hourly earnings (Chart 7). The slowdown has been fairly widespread across manufacturing and services. The good news is that the soft patch appears to be over; 3-month rates of change have firmed almost across the board (retail is a major exception). Chart 6CPI, PCE Diffusion##BR##Indices Are Mixed Chart 7Wages Have Accelerated##BR##Over Past Three Months There is no slowdown evident at all in the better-constructed Employment Cost Index (ECI) as of the first quarter (Chart 8). The related diffusion indexes also remain constructive. The ECI is adjusted to avoid compositional effects that can distort the aggregate index. We conclude from these and other wage measures that the Phillips curve is still operating. Admittedly, the curve appears to be quite flat, which means it is difficult to generate inflation even when the labor market overheats. Nonetheless, the relationship between the ECI and measures of labor market tightness, such as the quit rate, the "jobs plentiful" index and NFIB compensation plans, does not appear to have broken down (Chart 9). The percentage of U.S. states with unemployment below the Fed's estimate of full employment is above 70%. Anything over 60% in the past has been associated with wage pressure (Chart 10). The percentage jumped from 58% in March to 71% in April, blasting through the 60% threshold. Chart 8No Slowdown##BR##In ECI Data Chart 9Labor Market Tight Enough##BR##To Push Up Inflation The bottom line is that, while we are concerned about the breadth of the soft patch in the consumer price data, we are in agreement with the Fed that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. We are willing at this point to chalk up the recent drop in core inflation partly to randomness in the data, and partly to lagged effects of the slowdown in real GDP growth in the first half of 2016 (Chart 11). The PPI for services and for core goods are not suggesting there is deflationary pressure in the pipeline (Chart 8). Chart 10Rise In State Level Diffusion Indices Consistent With Higher Compensation Costs Chart 11Inflation Lags Economic Growth By 18 Months What Will The Fed Do? The CPI data have rattled some on the FOMC. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Kaplan, for example, believes that the Fed needs to be patient to ensure that the inflation pullback is temporary. However, the June FOMC Statement and Yellen's press conference suggested that the consensus is determined to stick with the current tightening timetable in terms of rate hikes and balance sheet adjustment. FOMC Vice Chairman Dudley echoed this view in comments he made last week to the press. The Fed has been quick to ease or back away from planned rate hikes at the first hint of trouble since the Lehman shock. However, it appears that the reaction function has changed, now that the labor market is at full employment. This is especially the case because financial conditions have eased further since the June rate hike. Unemployment will edge further below the full-employment level if the FOMC does not slow the economy. Policymakers know that the Fed has had little success in the past when it tried to nudge unemployment higher in order to relieve inflation pressure and achieve a soft landing; these attempts almost always ended in recession. Dudley added that "...pausing policy now could raise the risk of inflation surging and hurting the economy." Other FOMC members are worried that financial stability risk will rise if the low-rate environment extends much further. The bottom line is that we expect the Fed will stick with the game-plan for now. The FOMC will begin shrinking the balance sheet in September, but will wait until December for the next rate hike. That said, a stubbornly low inflation rate in the coming months would likely see the FOMC postpone the next rate increase into next year. Where Next For Bonds? Our fixed-income strategists see three possible scenarios for the bond market:4 Base Case: Weak recent inflation readings are nothing more than a lagged response to last year's deceleration in economic growth. U.S. growth accelerates in the second half, unemployment falls further and both wage growth and inflation pick up. Oil inventories begin to contract and prices head higher. The FOMC is vindicated in its inflation view and proceeds with the current rate hike and balance sheet adjustment agenda. Investors receive a "wake up call" from the Fed, bond prices get hit and recent curve-flattening trend reverses. Fed Capitulates: The U.S. labor market continues to tighten, but core PCE inflation is still close to 1½% by the September FOMC meeting. We would expect the Fed to lower its forecasted rate hike path, signaling that no further rate hikes are likely in 2017. Long-maturity real yields would fall in this scenario, although long-term inflation expectations could rise to the extent that the Fed's more dovish tilt will weaken the dollar and generate more inflation in the medium term. Nominal yields may not end up moving much in this scenario. A Policy Mistake: If core inflation remains low between now and the September FOMC meeting and the Fed continues to write-off low inflation as transitory, signaling its intention to stick to its current projected rate hike path, then the market would price-in a policy mistake scenario. The yield curve would flatten and long-maturity nominal yields would fall, led by tighter TIPS breakevens. In terms of likelihoods, we would characterize Scenario 1 as our base case scenario, Scenario 2 as unlikely and Scenario 3 as a tail risk. The bottom line is that short-duration positions have been a "pain trade" in recent weeks, but it appears to us that the rally is overdone. We remain short-duration. No Signal From Small Caps Chart 12Small Caps Are No Longer Expensive The underperformance of small cap stocks since December is not sending a signal about the broader equity market. In fact, small cap relative performance has a mixed track record calling the peak in large cap equities. We maintain our view from a 2014 report:5 There is no basis for concluding that small cap underperformance heralds a fragile economy, stock market weakness or heightened risk aversion. Investors should note the sector/compositional, domestic/international, cyclical/defensive, and valuation discrepancies between small and large cap stocks before drawing any conclusions about the signals from small caps. The S&P 500 small cap index has more exposure to financials, industrials and materials than its large cap cousins, and has lower weights in energy, staples and healthcare. This mix makes small caps more cyclically oriented. Moreover, small caps have less exposure to overseas economies and, therefore, less sensitivity to fluctuations in the U.S. dollar. Plus, our small cap valuation indicator has moved even further into undervalued territory since our discussion of small cap equities in this publication on April 246 (Chart 12). Chart 13Small Caps Are Not Great##BR##Market Prognosticators Small-cap stocks outperformed large cap by 12% from November 8 through December 8, 2016, but have lagged since, as investors unwound the Trump trade. The implication is that the recent sell-off in small caps is not a signal that the broader market is poised for a downturn. Instead, it reflects the market's view that Trump's pro-small business agenda has stalled. Moreover, history shows that the relative performance of small caps versus large caps is not a good predictor of the future performance of risk assets versus bonds. The small-to-large ratio sent plenty of mixed signals in the '80s and '90s when the economy was in a long expansion, fostered by low inflation and a gradualist Fed (Chart 13, panels 1 and 2). On the other hand, local peaks and troughs in small cap performance provided solid signals for turns in stock versus bond performance from the early '70s through the mid-80s, a period characterized by soaring inflation that is not present today (Chart 13, panel 1). Small-cap outperformance starting in late 2008 did presage an upturn in the stock-to-bond total return ratio in 2009, and captured a few of the risk on/risk off periods from 2010 through 2012, while the Fed engineered QE2, Operation Twist and QE3. More recently, the relative performance of small versus large has been range-bound and has not provided a consistent signal for turns in the overall market (Chart 13, panel 3). Bottom Line: The underperformance of small caps to large is a reaction to the market's perception that Trump's pro-small business agenda will disappoint, not a sign that U.S. growth is waning. While several planned policies of the Trump administration have been delayed, a legislative agenda that appears to be pro-business is in place. As such, our view is that it is too early to abandon a bullish bias towards small cap stocks, especially given the major improvement in relative valuation noted above. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Can The Service Sector Save The Day?", June 5, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Views From The Road", June 21, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Timing Of The Next Recession", June 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "On The Road Again", June 2, 2014, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Spring Snapback", April 24, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Swap consumer staples into financials in our pair trade versus the tech sector. Relative profit fundamentals signal that this relative share price ratio will soon come alive. Global growth tailwinds argue for lifting the air freight & logistics index to high-conviction overweight status. Recent Changes S&P Financials/S&P Tech - Switch the long side of the S&P Consumer Staples/S&P Tech pair trade from S&P Consumer Staples to S&P Financials. S&P Consumer Staples - Remove from the high-conviction overweight list. S&P Air Freight & Logistics - Add to the high-conviction overweight list. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature Equities broke out to new highs early last week, and there are good odds that a playable rally will unfold. Investors' jitters have recently focused on the bear market in oil prices and weak core CPI, which have joined forces to push down inflation expectations (Chart 1). However, we have a more bullish interpretation. Unlike in late-2015/early-2016, oil and stock prices have decoupled. True, energy stocks are plumbing multi-decade lows relative to the broad market, but the energy sector comprises less than 6% of the S&P 500's market cap. In fact, the two largest S&P 500 constituents have a greater weight than the 34 stocks in the S&P energy index combined. In other words, the energy sector's broad market influence has been severely diluted. We think it is unlikely that the positive correlation between oil and stock prices reasserts itself. Rather, our sense is that this is likely an energy/commodity-centered deflation that will not have a serious contagion on the rest of the corporate sector. High yield energy spreads continue to widen, but the overall junk spread is flirting with cyclical lows. This stands in marked contrast with the summer of 2014 and late-2015, the last time oil prices melted (second panel, Chart 1). Chart 2 shows that the nonfarm business sector and the GDP implicit price deflators, both of which are reliable corporate sector pricing power proxies, are positively deviating from core CPI. These deflators have historically been excellent leading indicators of inflation and signal that the recent poor inflation prints will likely prove transitory. Importantly, the U.S. is a large closed economy that benefits greatly from lower oil prices, via a boost to discretionary income. Lower energy costs are adding to an already stimulative backdrop owing to the decline in the U.S. dollar and Treasury yields. At the margin, the broad corporate sector also benefits from oil price deflation: energy is a non-trivial input cost. Our more optimistic overall economic and market outlook is also borne out by survey data: economists revised higher their U.S and global GDP growth expectations both for 2017 and 2018, according to Bloomberg estimates (bottom panel, Chart 1). Finally, real yields, the bond market's gauge for economic growth expectations, have climbed close to a 2-year high, and suggest that GDP growth will soon pick up steam (Chart 1). Our view remains that this is a goldilocks scenario for equities, as it may keep the Fed at bay for a while longer and sustain easy financial conditions. This thesis also assumes that the corporate sector will maintain its pricing power gains, and likely pull consumer prices out of their lull. On that front, we have updated our corporate pricing power proxy and while it has lost some steam of late, it continues to expand at a healthy clip (Chart 3). Chart 1Decoupled Chart 2Implicit Price Deflators Lead Core CPI Chart 3Corporate Pricing Power Is Fine Table 2 shows our updated industry group pricing power gauges, which are calculated from the relevant CPI, PPI, PCE and commodity growth rates for each of the 60 industry groups we track. The table also highlights shorter term pricing power trends and each industry's spread to overall inflation in order to identify potential profit winners and losers. Table 2Industry Group Pricing Power Our analysis concludes that still ¾ of the industries we cover are enjoying rising selling prices and 43% are also beating overall inflation rates. Admittedly, the inflation rates have come down since our April update, and there was a tick up in the number of deflating industries from 14 to 16, but that figure is still down from the 19 registered in January. Importantly, 27 out of 60 industries have clocked a rising pricing power trend down from 31 in April, but still up from 20 in January, 14 have a flat trend and 19 are falling. Encouragingly, corporate sector selling prices are still comfortably outpacing wage inflation, which suggests that the positive momentum in profit margins has staying power (Chart 3). One theme that stands out from our analysis is that commodity related industries have either falling or flat inflation trends, with the exception of aluminum and chemicals. We take this as confirmation that resources are at the epicenter of deflation/disinflation pressures. Similarly, the majority of tech sub-sectors are still fighting deflation and suffer from a flat or down trend in selling prices. Adding it all up, the recent mild slowdown in corporate sector selling prices is transitory, mostly commodity related and unlikely to infect the broad business sector. There are high odds that an earnings-led playable break out phase in the equity market will develop from here. This week we promote an industrials sub-sector to our high-conviction overweight list and swap a safe haven sector out, and also tweak our long/short pair trade. Pair Trade Tweak: Long Financials/Short Tech Over the past month, we have reduced the extent of our consumer staples overweight, downgrading soft drinks to underweight and hypermarkets to neutral. In contrast, in May we boosted the S&P financials index to overweight on the back of improving earnings fundamentals. As a result, swapping out consumer staples for financials in our existing pair trade versus the tech sector makes sense. This relative share price ratio is at a critical juncture and has dropped to its long term support level (top panel, Chart 4). Importantly, the relative market capitalization differential is at its widest gap since the tech bubble (Chart 5) and a renormalization is in order. Chart 4Long Term Support Should Hold Chart 5Unsustainable Gap The valuation case is equally compelling: financials are deeply undervalued and unloved compared with the tech sector (Chart 4), such that even a modest shift in sentiment would drive a large relative price swing. The macro outlook is rife with catalysts to trigger a renormalization. Our respective Cyclical Macro Indicators (CMI) signal that financials profits will best tech sector earnings in the coming quarters (top panel, Chart 6). Historically, relative performance has moved in lockstep with relative profitability. The message from our CMIs is that relative earnings will move decisively in favor of the financials sector, thereby producing positive price momentum (bottom panel, Chart 6). A simple relative demand indicator concurs with our CMIs message: bank loan growth should outpace tech capital expenditures in the back half of the year. The middle panel of Chart 6 shows our recently published bank loans and leases regression model compared with our U.S. Capex Indicator (a good proxy for tech spending) and the message is to expect a catchup phase in relative share prices. If our thesis proves accurate, then relative demand will soon show up in relative top line figures. On that front, our forward looking relative sales per share models argue that the budding recovery in relative revenue is sustainable (Chart 7). Relative pricing power dynamics provide another source of support, both in terms of sales and operating profit margins. Firming financials pricing power is the mirror image of chronically deflating tech selling prices (Chart 7). Keep in mind that overall mild price inflation is a boon for financials because it will keep monetary conditions from becoming overly tight, which would undermine credit quality and availability. Using the nonfarm business sector's implicit price deflator as a proxy for overall inflation, the (third panel, Chart 7) shows that relative share prices move in lockstep with overall corporate sector prices. In terms of economic undercurrents, if geopolitical risks remain muted and financial conditions reasonably accommodative, then a further boost in economic and investor sentiment is likely. History shows that the financials/tech share price ratio has benefited when risk premia recede. The same relationship is also evident in the positive correlation with our U.S. sentiment indicator and real 10-year bond yield (Chart 8), and inverse correlation with corporate bond spreads (not shown). Chart 6Heed The Relative##br## CMI Signal Chart 7Financials Have##br## The Upper Hand Chart 8Improving Economy = ##br##Go Long Financials/Short Tech Finally, recent positive bank sector news suggests that financials have the upper hand in this share price ratio. Banks passed the Fed's stringent stress test with flying colors and should become more shareholder friendly, i.e. boost dividend payouts and reinstate/augment share retirement. In addition, even a modest watering down of Dodd-Frank will also lift the appeal of banks and financials at the expense of tech stocks in the coming quarters. Adding it up, we recommend swapping consumer staples with financials in our pair trade versus the tech sector. Relative profit fundamentals suggest that this relative share price ratio will soon spring into action. Bottom Line: Switch consumer staples out and sub financials in the pair trade versus tech stocks. We are also removing the S&P consumer staples index from our high-conviction overweight list for a modest gain of 0.1% since the early-January inclusion. The latter move makes room for an upgrade to high-conviction of a transportation sub-group that has caught fire since our recent upgrade to overweight. Air Freight Stocks Achieve Liftoff! We raised the S&P air freight & logistics group to overweight two months ago, reflecting a lack of recognition in either valuations or earnings estimates that a global trade revival was unfolding and washed out technical conditions. Since then, this transportation sub-group has regained its footing, and firming profit fundamentals now embolden us to add air freight stocks to our high-conviction overweight list. The relative share price ratio has smartly bounced off its GFC lows. Similarly, our Technical Indicator found support at one standard deviation below the historical mean, a typical launch point for playable rallies. Importantly, deeply discounted valuations remain in place, both in terms of P/S and P/E ratios (Chart 9). We expect the rebound in global growth to help unlock excellent value in air freight equities. Global trade is reviving. The synchronized DM and EM economic recovery has buoyed the global manufacturing PMI, which continues to trend well above the boom/bust line. Both global export volumes and prices are expanding. Yet buoyant global trade expectations are still not reflected in tumbling relative sales expectations (Chart 10). Chart 9Unwarranted ##br##Grounding Chart 10Buoyant Trade Growth Is Neither Reflected##br## In Collapsing Sales Expectations... Chart 11 highlights two additional Indicators to gauge the stage of the global trade recovery. Korea and Taiwan are two small open economies: exports in both countries are accelerating. Meanwhile, our Global Trade Activity Indicator, comprising the economically-sensitive Baltic Dry Index and lumber prices, is also waving a green flag. The upshot is that a number of Indicators confirm that a durable pickup in trade is underway, which should ultimately translate into a recovery in relative earnings expectations (Chart 11). Domestically, business shipments-to-inventories ratios are expanding comfortably in all three major segments: manufacturing, wholesale and retail (bottom panel, Chart 10). Anecdotally, recent news that FedEx beat both top and bottom line estimates also reinforces a firm global activity backdrop. All of this serves as reliable evidence that the budding recovery in global (and domestic) growth has morphed into a sustainable advance. The implication is that air freight pricing power has ample room to grow. Wholesale price momentum has reached a 5-year high. If our thesis plays out, more pricing power gains are in store, which will boost profit margins given the industry's impressive labor cost restraint and high operating leverage (Chart 12). Chart 11...Nor In Depressed##br## Forward EPS Chart 12Margin Expansion##br##Phase Looms Finally while investors are digesting the Walmart in-store pick up option and Amazon's push for its own delivery service plans, the persistent ascent in online shopping suggests that the structural increase in rapid delivery services will remain intact. Investors should expect pricing power to gravitate toward the long-term trend (bottom panel, Chart 12). Tack on the recent corrective action in the commodity pits and this group also benefits from the fall in fuel costs. Taken together, profit margins should resume expanding. In sum, appealing relative valuations along with a durable synchronized global growth rebound argue for increasing conviction in our overweight position in this transportation sub-group. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P air freight & logistics group (UPS, FDX, CHRW, EXPD), and bump it to the high-conviction overweight list. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Dear client, This week, we are sending you an abbreviated Weekly Report as we co-authored a Special Report on Wednesday with our sister Geopolitical Strategy service. In our Special Report, available on our website, we argue that Italy's flirtation with leaving the euro area is rooted in its positive experience with devaluations in the 1990s. However, we note that this time is different and devaluing the euro through exit will not be a panacea, as financial market linkages would cause a deep domestic recession that could be brought forward by the mere reality of a referendum on the topic. As such, we think that Italy is unlikely to leave the Euro Area, but that it will remain a drag on the Eurozone - one that will force the European Central Bank to stay a bit more dovish than warranted by conditions in the broader Euro Area. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Feature Chart I-1The Dollar At A Critical Spot Since the end of last week, the dollar has staged a small rebound. This rebound was of the utmost importance as it materialized at an important level. Had DXY punched below the 96 level, the dollar could have sold off toward 93 in a matter of weeks. However, if the dollar can remain above 96, the greenback is likely to have formed a trough for the remainder of 2017 as it will rest above an important congestion zone that has been in place since early 2015 (Chart I-1). What are the odds of the greenback moving back to 93? We think that right now the balance of probability is in favor of a continued rebound. A call on DXY is first and foremost a call on the euro, as EUR/USD represents 60% of this index. We'll thus focus on the dynamics in this pair. Currently, nominal short rate differentials remain in the dollar's favor. As Chart I-2 illustrates, interbank rate spreads between the Euro Area and the U.S. are broadly supportive of the USD. Additionally, in both the late 1990s and in 2005-06, this spread had been much more negative than at present. BCA still expects the spread to grow more negative as the Federal Reserve continues on its intended policy path, while we also believe it will take a few more years before the ECB can begin lifting rates.1 Real rate differentials paint a similar picture. The euro's strength in the second quarter has emerged in spite of a move in real rate spreads in favor of the USD. As Chart I-3 shows, this divergence has mostly reflected dynamics at the short end of the yield curve, but over the past month and a half the real interest rate difference at the 10-year maturity has also diverged from the EUR/USD's path. Chart I-2EUR/USD Short Rate Differentials ##br##Can Grow Deeper Chart I-3EUR/USD Has Dissociated##br## From A Key Driver Technically, the dollar is beginning to look attractive against the euro as well. Our positioning indicator - based on sentiment, net speculative positions, and the euro's advanced/decline line - shows that investors are already positioned the most euro bullish since 2012 (Chart I-4). Our intermediate-term technical indicator is also at highly overbought levels, highlighting the euro's limited upside potential. Most importantly though, these moves have happened as the Euro Area economic surprise index massively beat the U.S. one (Chart I-4, bottom panel). This means that Europe's economic outperformance has been driving the euro's strength, unlike in 2015 when the surge in the European surprise index relative to the U.S. was reflective of the euro's 2014 collapse. This paints a picture where much good European news has been priced into EUR/USD during the recent rally. At current levels, the mean-reverting nature of the relative surprise index suggests that European surprises are unlikely to continue to beat U.S. ones by such a margin going forward. This means that the already overbought euro is likely to lose a key support. Finally, as we highlighted two weeks ago, global analysts have already ratcheted up their year-end estimates for EUR/USD (Chart I-5). Not only are their forecasts at levels that have in recent years been indicative of a peak, but the speed and magnitude of their adjustments has also been exceptional. This corroborates that the positive momentum in the Eurozone vis-à-vis the U.S. has already been internalized by market participants. If anything, this favorable relative economic momentum must only grow going forward for the euro to rally further. However, European LEIs have already rolled over relative to the U.S. as the latter looks set to exit its soft patch in the coming months (Chart I-6). Chart I-4Good News Already ##br##In The Euro Chart I-5Investors Have Already##br## Bought The Euro Chart I-6The Economic Tailwinds For The ##br##Euro Are Beginning To Fade Bottom Line: DXY has rebounded at a crucial level. If it can stay above 96, this would suggest that its correction is over. We are willing to make this bet as the euro - the key component of the DXY - has dissociated from rate differentials on strong optimism toward the economic outlook for Europe - at the exact time that investors have become more incredulous of the Fed's intentions. Due to these dynamics, EUR/USD is now massively overbought and at risk of a further pullback. Cutting Loose Short USD/JPY Last week, we closed our short USD/JPY position at a 4.2% gain. We did so because we see an increasingly less-supportive environment for the yen. To begin with, the U.S. Treasury notes' fair-value model used by our U.S. Bond Strategy service highlights that U.S. bond yields are currently quite expensive, and could be set to rise anew (Chart I-7). Because JGBs possess a very low beta relative to U.S. yields, an environment where global rates rise tends to be associated with rate differentials moving in favor of USD/JPY, often prompting a rally in the latter. Also, the Bank of Japan is keenly aware that it will be very difficult to achieve its 2% inflation target. The yen's recent strength has exerted a significant tightening in Japanese financial conditions that will drag down inflation (Chart I-8). Hence, the BoJ will continue to be among the most dovish central banks in the world. Additionally, while Japanese industrial production has been strong, it looks set to soften in the coming months, which will give further reason to the BoJ to talk down the yen: Japanese industrial production is very much a function of financial conditions. We are entering a window where the recent tightening in Japanese financial conditions should begin to bite industrial production. The growth rate of the Japanese shipments-to-inventories ratio has rolled over, historically a precursor of a slowdown in industrial production (Chart I-9). Chart I-7T-Notes Are Expensive Chart I-8Japanese FCI Points To Lower Inflation Chart I-9Japanese IP Will Turn Finally, the annual growth rate of Japan's industrial production is heavily influenced by China's economic dynamics, as EM represents 43% of Japanese exports. Two months ago, the Keqiang index - a barometer of strength for the Chinese economy based on credit growth, railway freight volumes, and electricity production - hit its highest level since June 2010, levels only recorded in early 2007, early 2005, and early 2004. Even though we do not anticipate it to crater, we do expect its recent rollover to deepen further in response to the recent wave of policy tightening in China. This should result in some weakness for Japan's industrial production. In practice there is little additional actions the BoJ can implement to ease policy further. However, because investors are currently so negative on the prospects for further Fed rate increases, with only 40 basis points priced in over the next 24 months, a re-assurance by the BoJ that easy policy is here to stay could put upward pressure on USD/JPY. While we remain worried about EM assets, we think that shorting the AUD or the NZD against the yen represents better portfolio protection than shorting USD/JPY. Bottom Line: USD/JPY has a generous amount of upside from here. Investors are too pessimistic regarding the Fed's ability to increase rates over the next 24 months. Meanwhile, the recent tightening in Japanese financial conditions is a headache for the BoJ, as it points to weaker inflation and a slowdown in industrial production. Hence, we expect the BoJ will try to talk down the yen over the coming months. EUR/NOK At An Interesting Spot Chart I-10If Brent Doesn't Fall Below,##br## EUR/NOK Is A Short The price action in EUR/NOK caught our eye this week. EUR/NOK is at a critical level and has rallied as investor optimism toward the Euro Area economy continues to grow. Meanwhile, oil prices have collapsed to US$45/bbl. Since Norway is an economy heavily geared to oil-price gyrations, this bifurcation created an ideal combination to generate a EUR/NOK rally. However, by discounting these developments, EUR/NOK has now entered massively overbought territory. Additionally, as Chart I-10 illustrates, the cross has only traded at higher levels at the depth of the financial crisis in the first quarter of 2009 and the early days of 2016. In both instances, Brent was trading below US$40/bbl. A selling opportunity could soon emerge. Our Commodity And Energy Strategy service continues to expect a deepening of the adjustment in global oil inventories as the OPEC 2.0 deal remains in vigor and compliance stays in place.2 This means a move below US$40/bbl for Brent is very unlikely, and the upside in EUR/NOK is extremely limited. While in the coming weeks a move in Brent to between US$44/bbl and US$42/bbl could happen, we think this limited downside points to an attractive risk-reward ratio to shorting this cross. We are currently long CAD/NOK and short EUR/CAD, with the latter having greater potential downside than EUR/NOK. However, due to Canada's deep integration with the U.S. economy, the EUR/CAD trade is often affected by dynamics in the U.S. dollar. Shorting EUR/NOK is thus a cleaner play on oil and removes much of the risk associated with the greenback's fluctuations. Finally, yesterday, the Norges Bank policy release displayed less dovish tone than anticipated by the market. This kind of surprise would create an additional support to being short EUR/NOK. Bottom Line: EUR/NOK looks set to weaken. Over the past 10 years, it has only traded above current levels when Brent prices were below US$40/bbl. Based on our commodity team's analysis, such a move is very unlikely. Thus, any short-term weakness in oil prices should be used to sell EUR/NOK. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Central Banks Are Sticking To Their Guns", dated June 6, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Time For "Whatever It Takes" In Oil?", dated June 2, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The divergence between global bond yields and equity prices is not as puzzling as it may first appear. Thus far, lower inflation has dampened the need for central banks to tighten monetary policy. This has caused bond yields to fall, lifting stocks in the process. Looking out, the combination of faster growth and dwindling spare capacity will cause inflation to rise. This is particularly the case for the U.S., where the economy has already reached full employment. The "blow-off" phase for the U.S. economy is likely to last until mid-2018. The dollar and Treasury yields will move higher over this period. The euro and the yen will suffer the most against a resurgent greenback, the pound less so. China's economy will remain resilient, helping to boost commodity prices. This will support the Canadian and Aussie dollars. Stronger global growth will provide a tailwind to emerging markets. However, at this point, most of the good news is already reflected in EM asset valuations. Feature Stocks And Bonds: A Curious Divergence Chart 1Global Growth: Increasing Optimism One could be forgiven for thinking that equity and bond investors are living on different planets. Global bond yields have been trending lower thus far this year, while stocks have been setting new highs. Are bonds signaling an imminent slowdown which equity investors are willfully ignoring? Not necessarily. Almost all of the decline in bond yields has been due to falling inflation expectations. Real yields have remained reasonably steady, suggesting that growth worries are not foremost on investors' minds. The fact that consensus global growth estimates for 2017 and 2018 have continued to grind higher is consistent with this observation (Chart 1). A quiescent inflation picture has given investors more confidence that the Fed will not need to raise rates aggressively. This has pushed down bond yields, weakened the dollar, and fueled the rally in stock prices. The decline in headline inflation, in turn, has been largely driven by lower commodity prices. In the U.S., several one-off factors - including Verizon's decision to move to unlimited data plans, a temporary lull in health care inflation, and a drop in airline fares - have helped keep core inflation in check. The U.S. Economy: It Gets Better Before It Gets Worse Looking out, global growth is likely to remain firm. This should ultimately translate into higher inflation, particularly in the U.S., where the economy has already achieved full employment. Granted, as we discussed last week,1 the U.S. business cycle expansion is getting long in the tooth. However, history suggests that the transition between boom and bust is often accompanied by a revelry of sorts where things get better before they get worse. Call it a "blow-off" phase for the business cycle. The example of the late 1990s - the last time the U.S. unemployment rate fell below NAIRU for an extended period of time - comes to mind. Chart 2 shows that final domestic demand accelerated to 8.3% in nominal terms in Q1 of 2000. Personal consumption growth surged, reaching 8.4% in nominal terms and 5.7% in real terms. Obviously, there are many differences between now and then. However, there is at least one critical similarity: The unemployment rate stood at 4.3% in January 1999. This is exactly where it stands today. And if it keeps falling at its current pace, the unemployment rate will dip below its 2000 low of 3.8% by next summer. As was the case in the past, an overheated labor market will lead to faster wage growth. In the U.S., underlying wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% at present (Chart 3). Chart 2The Late 1990s: An End-Of-Cycle Blow-Off Chart 3Stronger Labor Market Is Leading To Faster Wage Growth Granted, this is still well below the levels seen in 2000 and 2007. However, productivity growth has crumbled over the past decade while long-term inflation expectations have dipped. Real unit labor costs - a measure of compensation which adjusts for shifts in productivity growth and inflation - are rising at a faster rate than in 2007 and close to the pace recorded in 2000 (Chart 4). In fact, real wage growth in the U.S. has eclipsed business productivity growth for three straight years (Chart 5). As a result, labor's share of national income is now increasing. Chart 4Real Unit Labor Cost Growth: Back To Its 2000 Peak Chart 5Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity What happens to aggregate demand when the share of income going to workers rises? The answer is that at least initially, demand goes up. Companies typically spend less of every marginal dollar of income than workers. This is especially the case in today's environment where the distribution of corporate profits has become increasingly tilted towards a few winner-take-all firms which, for the most part, are already flush with cash (Chart 6). Thus, a shift of income towards workers tends to boost overall spending. In addition, an overheated labor market typically generates the biggest gains for workers at the bottom of the income distribution. Wages for U.S. workers without a college degree have been rising more quickly than those with a university education for the past few years (Chart 7). Such workers often live paycheck-to-paycheck and, hence, have a high marginal propensity to consume. Chart 6A Winner-Take-All Economy Chart 7Tighter Labor Market Boosting Wages Of Less Educated Workers Let's Get This Party Started The discussion above suggests that U.S. aggregate demand could accelerate over the next few quarters. There is some evidence that this is already happening (Chart 8). Despite a moderation in auto purchases, real PCE growth is still tracking at 3.2% in the second quarter according to the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model. And with the personal saving rate still stuck at an elevated 5.3%, there is scope for consumer spending to grow at a faster rate than disposable income. Chart 9 shows that the current saving rate is well above the level one would expect based on the ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income. Chart 8Solid Near-Term Outlook For U.S. Consumers Financial conditions have eased over the past six months thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart 10). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart 11). This could make the coming blow-off phase even more explosive than in past business cycles. Some commentators have noted that while financial conditions have eased, bank lending has slowed significantly. If true, this would imply that easier financial conditions are not boosting credit growth in the way one might expect. The problem with this argument is that it takes a far too limited view of the U.S. financial system. Although bank lending to companies has indeed slowed, bond issuance has soared. In fact, total nonfinancial corporate debt rose by $212 billion in the first quarter according to the Fed's Financial Accounts database, the largest increase in history (Chart 12). Chart 10Financial Conditions Have Been Easing... Chart 11...Which Will Support Growth Chart 12Nonfinancial Corporate Debt Surged In Q1 All Good Things Must Come To An End Unfortunately, the burst of demand that often occurs in the late stages of business cycle expansions contains the seeds of its own demise. Initially, when consumer spending accelerates, firms tend to react by expanding capacity. This translates into higher investment spending. However, as labor's share of income keeps rising, an increasing number of firms start incurring outright losses. This causes them to dismiss workers and cut back on investment spending. Such a souring in corporate animal spirits is not an immediate risk for the U.S. economy. Hiring intentions remain solid and businesses are still signaling that they expect to increase capital spending over the coming months (Chart 13). Profit margins are also quite high by historic standards, which gives firms greater room for maneuver. This will change over time, however. Margins are already falling in the national accounts data (Chart 14). History suggests that S&P 500 margins will follow suit. This raises the risk that capex and hiring will start to slow late next year, potentially sowing the seeds for a recession in 2019. We remain overweight global equities on a cyclical 12-month horizon, but will be looking to significantly pare back exposure next summer. Chart 13Corporate America Feeling Great Again Chart 14Economy-Wide Margins Have Slipped The Dollar Bull Market Is Not Over Yet Chart 15Historically, A Rising Labor Share Has Pushed Up The Dollar Until U.S. growth does decelerate, the path of least resistance for bond yields and the dollar will be to the upside. Chart 15 shows the strikingly close correlation between labor's share of income and the value of the trade-weighted dollar. As noted above, the initial effect of accelerating wage growth is to put more money into workers' pockets. This results in higher aggregate demand and, against a backdrop of low spare capacity, rising inflation. Historically, such an outcome has prompted the Fed to expedite the pace of rate hikes, leading to a stronger dollar. This time is unlikely to be any different. The market is currently pricing in only 21 basis points in Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months. This seems far too low to us. Other things equal, a stronger dollar implies a weaker euro and yen. Improved export competitiveness will lead to better growth prospects and higher inflation expectations in the euro area and Japan. Unless the ECB and the BoJ respond by tightening monetary policy, short-term real rates will fall. This, in turn, could put further downward pressure on the euro and the yen. The ECB And The BoJ Will Not Follow The Fed's Lead Many commentators have argued that better growth prospects will cause the ECB and the BoJ to follow in the Fed's footsteps and take away the punch bowl. We doubt it. Labor market slack is still considerably higher in the euro area than was the case in 2008. Outside of Germany, the level of unemployment and underemployment in the euro area is about seven points higher than it was before the Great Recession (Chart 16). If anything, the market has priced in too much tightening from the ECB. Our months-to-hike measure has plummeted from a high of 65 months in July 2016 to 28 months at present (Chart 17). Investors now expect real rates in the U.S. to be only 23 basis points higher than in the euro area in five years' time. This is well below the 76 basis-point gap in the equilibrium rate between the two regions that Holston, Laubach, and Williams estimate (Chart 18). Chart 16Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Is Still High Outside Of Germany Chart 17ECB: Markets Are Pricing In Too Much Tightening Chart 18The Neutral Rate Is Lowest In The Euro Area As for Japan, while it is true that the unemployment rate has fallen to 2.8% - a 22-year low - this understates the true amount of slack in the economy. Output-per-hour in Japan remains 35% below U.S. levels. A key reason for this is that many Japanese companies continue to pad their payrolls with excess labor. This is particularly true in the service sector, which remains largely insulated from foreign competition. In any case, with both actual inflation and inflation expectations in Japan nowhere close to the BoJ's target, this is hardly the time to be worried about an overheated economy. And even if the Japanese authorities were inclined to slow growth, it would be fiscal policy rather than monetary policy that they would tighten first. After all, they have been keen to raise the sales tax for several years now. The Pound Will Rebound Against The Euro, But Weaken Further Against The Dollar Chart 19Pound: Unloved And Underappreciated While we continue to maintain a strong conviction view that the euro and yen will weaken against the dollar, we are more circumspect about other currencies. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney played down speculation this week that the BoE would raise rates later this year, noting in his annual speech at London's Mansion House that "now is not yet the time to begin that adjustment." U.K. growth has been the weakest in the G7 so far in 2017, partly because of growing angst over the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. Nevertheless, U.K. inflation remains elevated and fiscal policy is likely to be eased in the November budget, as Chancellor Hammond confirmed in a BBC interview on Sunday. Sterling is already quite cheap based on our metrics (Chart 19). Our best bet is that the pound will weaken against the dollar over the next 12 months but strengthen against the euro and the yen. We are currently long GBP/JPY. The trade has gained 7.2% since we initiated it in August 2016. CAD Has Upside We went long CAD/EUR in May. Despite the downdraft in oil prices, the trade has managed to gain 2.6% thus far. We are optimistic on the Canadian dollar over the coming months. Our energy strategists remain convinced that crude prices are heading higher. They expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, compared to 1.5 MMB/d growth in consumption. Consequently, oil inventories should fall over the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will lead to a rebound in oil prices (Chart 20). The Bank of Canada has also turned more hawkish. Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins suggested last week that interest rates are likely to rise later this year. The market is now pricing in a 84% chance of a rate hike in 2017, up from only 18% earlier this month. The Canadian economy continues to perform well (Chart 21). Retail sales are growing briskly, the unemployment rate is close to its lowest level in 40 years, and goods exports are recovering thanks to a weak loonie and stronger growth south of the border. While the bubbly housing market remains a source of concern, this is as much a reason to raise interest rates - to prevent further overheating - as to cut them. Chart 20Falling Oil Inventories Should Lead To Higher Crude Prices Chart 21Canadian Economy: Chugging Along China Will Drive The Aussie Dollar And EM Assets After a very strong start to the year, Chinese growth has slipped a notch. Housing starts slowed in May, as did gains in property prices. M2 growth decelerated to 9.6% from a year earlier, the first time broad money growth has fallen into the single-digit range since the government began publishing such statistics in 1986. Still, the economy is far from falling off a cliff, as evidenced by the fact that the IMF upgraded its full-year 2017 GDP growth forecast from 6.6% to 6.7% last week. Real-time measures of industrial activity such as railway freight traffic, excavator sales, and electricity production remain upbeat. Export growth is accelerating thanks to a weaker currency and stronger global growth. The PBoC's trade-weighted RMB basket has fallen by over 8% since it was introduced in December 2015. Retail sales continue to expand at a healthy clip. The percentage of households that intend to buy a new home has also surged to record-high levels. This should limit the fallout from the government's efforts to cool the housing market. The rebound in exports and industrial output is helping to lift producer prices. Higher selling prices, in turn, are fueling a rebound in industrial company profits (Chart 22). A better profit picture should support business capital spending in the coming months. The government also remains cognizant of the risks of tightening policy too aggressively, especially with the National Party Congress slated for this autumn. The PBoC injected 250 billion yuan into the financial system last Friday. This was the single biggest one-day intervention since January, when demand for cash was running high in the lead up to the Chinese New Year celebrations. Fiscal policy has also been eased (Chart 23). So far, the "regulatory windstorm" of measures designed to clamp down on financial speculation has largely bypassed the real economy. Medium and long-term lending to nonfinancial corporations - a key driver of private-sector capital spending - has actually accelerated over the past eight months (Chart 24). Chart 22China: Higher Selling Prices Fuelling A Rebound In Profits Chart 23Fiscal Spending Is On The Mend Chart 24China: Credit To The Real Economy Is Accelerating The key takeaway for investors is that Chinese growth is likely to slow over the next few quarters, but not by much. Considering that fund managers surveyed by BofA Merrill Lynch in June cited fears of a hard landing in China as the biggest tail risk facing financial markets for the second month in a row, the bar for positive surprises out of China is comfortably low. If China can clear this bar, as we expect it will, it will be good news for the Aussie dollar and other commodity plays. Strong Chinese growth should provide a tailwind for EM assets. However, EM stocks and currencies have already had a major run, which limits further upside. The fact that serial-defaulter Argentina could issue a 100-year bond this week in an offering that was three times oversubscribed is a testament to that. The fundamental problems plaguing many emerging markets - high debt levels, poor governance, and lackluster productivity growth - remain largely unaddressed. Until they are, the long-term outlook for EM assets will continue to be challenging. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Timing Of The Next Recession," dated June 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Italy cannot rely on currency devaluation to make up for poor competitiveness, as it did before the euro; Italian voters are becoming more Euroskeptic - the elections due by May 2018 pose a serious risk, as do elections thereafter; Necessary structural reforms, not in the cards at present, would be painful and could exacerbate the Euroskeptic trend in Italy; The mere suggestion of a referendum on the euro would cause a banking crisis ... though voters would likely decide to stay in the Euro Area; The ECB will surprise on the dovish side; EUR/USD will weaken slightly below parity by mid-2018; European equities will continue to outperform U.S. equities. Feature European politics have been a boon to investors in 2017 (Chart 1). Instead of destabilizing populism, investors have gotten promises of pro-market reforms. This positive development is as we expected: we dubbed European politics "a trophy red herring" in our 2017 Strategic Outlook1 and predicted the pro-market turn in France.2 Alas, Italy remains a Sword of Damocles hanging over Europe's head. Whereas public sentiment in Europe has turned decisively in favor of integration since 2013, it remains indecisive in Italy (Chart 2). The Italian "median voter" continues to flirt with Euroskepticism, which explains why the country's anti-establishment parties have not softened their Euroskepticism to the same degree as their peers elsewhere in Europe. Chart 1European Stocks Outperform American Chart 2Italians Doubting The Euro Monetary Union In this report, we attempt to answer several questions concerning Italy: What is structurally wrong with Italy? Why is Euroskepticism appealing to Italian voters? What would happen if Euroskeptics won the upcoming election and called a referendum on Euro Area membership? What would happen if Italy left the Euro Area? Italy's Purgatory: Aversion To Creative Destruction Italy has a structural productivity problem (Chart 3). Given weak labor force and productivity growth, Italy will be in and out of recessions for much of the next decade as its growth rate oscillates around zero. Particularly concerning is the steep decline in the country's total factor productivity, which suggests that Italians struggle to make use of technological innovation and that the economy is extremely inefficient. There is a vast literature detailing the structural problems of the Italian economy.3 We focus on the three most important impediments: The unproductive South, the Mezzogiorno, remains Europe's backwater; The public sector is riven with inefficiencies; Education and innovation remain sub-par. The first problem with Italy is that it remains an extremely bifurcated economy. Its northern regions, particularly Lombardy, are as wealthy as any in Europe (Map 1). Productivity rates and education standards are on par with core Europe (Chart 4). However, the Mezzogiorno has consistently pulled the aggregate Italian averages down (Chart 5). As the industrialized North was rebuilt after the Second World War, and as productivity and labor force growth rates surged, the backwardness of the Mezzogiorno was conveniently ignored. Since the late 1990s, however, productivity rates have declined in all of the developed world. For Italy, this means that the one-third of the population that lives in the unproductive South is no longer a rounding error. At its root, Italy's problem is that its unification in 1861, the Risorgimento, never went far enough to integrate the south and thus left a bifurcated economy that exemplifies the north-south divide in Europe as a whole.4 Several of the reform efforts undertaken by the Matteo Renzi-led Democratic Party (PD) government have sought to address the disparity between the North and the Mezzogiorno. However, these reforms will take time to bear fruit. Previous efforts have fallen short due to half-hearted implementation. The second structural problem is that Italy's public sector is large, riven with inefficiencies, and largely funded via corporate taxes due to poor overall tax collection. Italy's social security contributions are high, accounting for about 13% of GDP. Of this burden, the employer contribution rate is one of the highest in the world, only surpassed by France and Germany (Chart 6). Despite a developed-world tax burden, Italy has a developing-world system of tax collection. For example, its VAT revenue ratio is well below the OECD average, at the level of an emerging market (Chart 7).5 If the VAT revenue ratio was improved to the OECD average, Italy would see its VAT receipts rise by about €45 billion per year (enough to recapitalize all of its banks, for example, or reduce employers' social security contributions by a third). Not only is tax collection of poor quality, but paying taxes is exorbitantly difficult. The World Bank's "Paying Tax" indicator - which measures the cost and time of paying taxes - nestles Italy between Kenya and São Tomé at 126th out of 190 spots! For comparison sake, its Mediterranean peers Spain and Portugal are 37th and 38th respectively on the same index while even Greece is significantly better at 64th.6 Italy again ranks with EM countries on the World Bank's overall "Doing Business" report (Chart 8). It scores extremely low in the category of "enforcing contracts," where it finds itself sandwiched between the Gambia and Somalia, at the 108th rank! It takes more time - three years - to enforce a contract in Italy than in Pakistan, Egypt, and Mozambique. Public sector inefficiencies are not a result of nostalgia for Roman-era bureaucracy. Instead, Italy's administrative hurdles are a means to stifle domestic creative destruction and protect its numerous small and medium-sized businesses - many family-owned - from competition. Instead of fostering competition through innovation and investment, Italian industrial policy since the Second World War has largely relied on currency depreciation to boost competitiveness. This strategy ceased to be effective with the adoption of the euro, but the country never pushed through painful reforms to adjust to the new reality. While it is difficult to prove a counterfactual, we are not sure that even currency devaluation would have saved Italy from the onslaught of Asian manufacturing in the late 1990s. Euro Area imports from EM Asia have surged from less than 2% of total imports to nearly 10% in the last twenty years. Italy began losing market share to Asia well before the euro was introduced on January 1, 1999, as Chart 9 illustrates. Finally, Italy's educational system is in need of a massive overhaul. Some improvement in educational attainment was apparent by 2015 (Chart 10). However, the quality of Italian education is still woefully inadequate if measured by the results of post-secondary and tertiary education on literacy proficiency (Chart 11). Chart 9Italy Lost Market Share Amid Globalization Italian firms are not making up for the poor educational attainments of the labor force with higher investment in knowledge-based capital - software, research, training, or management (Chart 12). There are likely three reasons for this outcome. First, low productivity begets low potential GDP growth, which hurts firms' top line prospects and incentives to invest. Second, decades of reliance on currency devaluation for competitiveness has discouraged Italian corporates from investing in R&D. Third, a plethora of small Italian family-owned businesses lack the resources to leverage their intellectual property with management and technology to become globally competitive. Last time Italy faced a painful recession - 1992-1995 - it did what had worked best since the Second World War: it devalued its way out of trouble (Chart 13A). Yet a comparable devaluation did not work for Italy in recent years, with exports failing to lead the way to recovery despite a 20% drop in EUR/USD since mid-2014 (Chart 13B). Why? Chart 13ACurrency Devaluation Has Not ##br##Worked This Time Around (I) Chart 13BCurrency Devaluation Has Not ##br##Worked This Time Around (II) Many of Italy's exports go to Euro Area peers. In 1995, the percentage was 48%, today it is 41%. As such, the devaluation in the 1990s was against those peers, allowing Italian exports to the EU Common Market to surge. Nonetheless, the lack of any growth in exports still does not make sense, given the large depreciation in the euro and the fact that 60% of Italy's exports are still destined for non-Euro Area markets. Bottom Line: Italy has failed to keep up in competitiveness over the past twenty years precisely because its reliance on devaluation worked wonders for the economy in the pre-euro era. Instead of committing itself to structural reforms, Italy has preserved its post-Second World War institutions that were expressly designed to limit creative destruction and domestic competition. Unlike France, which has largely an arithmetic problem, Italy has a genuine productivity problem. For Italy to boost economic growth, it will have to do a lot more than adjust a few labor laws or raise the retirement age (both of which it has already done!). It needs deep structural reforms that are impossible without a strong electoral mandate that gives the next government sufficient political capital for reforms. Such a mandate is unlikely to come in the next election, leaving Italy in a purgatory of its own making. Political Risks: An Assessment Current polls show that the ruling, center-left PD is running neck-and-neck with the anti-establishment and Euroskeptic Five Star Movement (M5S) (Chart 14). Also in the mix are the center-right Forza Italia (FI), of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, which has itself flirted with mild Euroskepticism, and the staunchly anti-EU Lega Nord (LN). The power of Italy's establishment and Euroskeptic parties is perfectly balanced (Chart 15) ahead of the general election, which has to take place before May 20, 2018. The exact date is as yet unclear, with President Sergio Mattarella insisting that it take place after parliament passes a new electoral law that will make the electoral system uniform for both houses of parliament. A recent agreement between the main four parties on an electoral bill broke down, again pushing the date to the second quarter of next year. With the election now likely a year away - and with European populists in retreat across the continent - should investors breathe a sigh of relief? Chart 14Euroskeptic Five Star Movement Challenges Ruling Democrats Chart 15Euroskeptics Roughly Equal To Establishment Parties In Polls No. Italy remains the political risk in Europe. There are three broad reasons we remain concerned about Italian politics: The Median Italian Voter Is Flirting With Euroskepticism Policymakers are not price makers in the political marketplace, but price takers. The price maker is the median voter.7 In Europe, the Euroskepticism of the median voter has been massively overstated by the media and markets. Across the Euro Area, support for the common currency has surged since 2013 (Chart 16), likely reflecting an improving economy and the deeply held belief among European voters that continental integration is an intrinsic good. It took some time for anti-establishment politicians to sound off the median voter, but when they did, they adjusted their stances. As such, initially Euroskeptic anti-establishment parties across the continent - from Greece's SYRIZA and Spain's Podemos to Finland's "Finns Party" - have abandoned overt Euroskepticism and moved towards the middle ground on European integration. Politicians who have refused to be price takers - and insisted on campaigning from an inflexible, Euroskeptic position - were punished by the political marketplace (case in point: Marine Le Pen). Italy, however, has not seen a recovery in support for European integration. This is in large part due to the fact that the Italian economy has remained a laggard since 2012 (Chart 17). But it may also reflect the fact that the siren song of currency depreciation remains appealing to a large segment of the Italian electorate. Both M5S and Lega Nord have been vociferously arguing that Italy was far more competitive before joining the Euro Area and that simple currency devaluation would turn Italy from a land of locusts into a land of milk and honey. Chart 16Support For The Euro Has Risen Everywhere Else Chart 17Lagging Economy Has Hurt Support For The Euro Italy's Relationship With The EU Is Transactional We have long contended that both European patricians and plebeians support further integration.8 Chart 18 shows that a strong majority of Europeans is outright pessimistic about the future of their country outside of the EU. Why? Because, as Chart 19 suggests, the EU stands for geopolitical stability and a stronger say in the world. Chart 18Most Europeans Fear Life Outside The EU For a majority of Europeans, the European project is essential for peace and stability in Europe. We would argue that this is not just a product of two world wars in the twentieth century. It is also a product of newfound Russian assertiveness, migration crisis, and a growing ideological distance between Europe and its former security guarantor, the U.S. Italians, on the other hand, appear to be significantly more "transactional" than their European peers. For example, Chart 19 shows that Italians stand apart in being significantly less concerned about "peace" and having a "stronger say in the world." A plurality of Italians has also become confident in the country's future outside of the EU (Chart 20). Italians also appear to have the most negative perception of immigrants, perhaps due to the fact that they are at the frontline of Europe's migration crisis (Chart 21). Chart 20Italians Not So Afraid Of Life Outside The EU Why such a discrepancy in views between Italy and the rest of the continent? First, Italians have traditionally had a much more parochial view of the world. Regional differences matter a lot more to Italians than continental ones. Italians are already being asked to subsume one identity (regional) for another (national), so going a step further (supranational) may be too much. Data suggests that about half of all Italians are unwilling to go further (Chart 22). Second, Italy joined the EU as a considerably less developed economy than its core European peers. As such, membership was always sold to Italians from a transactional perspective and thus they do not give supremacy to geopolitical over economic forces. Chart 22Italians Less Likely To See Themselves As Europeans Elections Are Unlikely To Be Cathartic Italian Euroskeptics have consistently performed well in the polls for well over a year. Short of a significant surge in support for Matteo Renzi's PD, which we doubt will happen, polls are likely to continue to be tight until the election. The anti-establishment M5S performed extremely poorly in the June 11 municipal elections, failing to make the second-round run-off of the mayoral election in any of the major cities. However, we would fade the significance of this result given the national polls. As such, the best hope for investors is that anti-establishment forces suffer a modest defeat in next year's election. Short of a strong economic recovery that significantly reduces unemployment, an election win for the Italian establishment will not be as cathartic as the just-concluded election in France. And what are the odds of an outright Euroskeptic win? They are low, below 20%. M5S has no incentive to form a weak minority government, support an establishment-led government, or enter a risky coalition with Euroskeptic Lega Nord. It understands that remaining in the opposition would allow it to reap the benefits when the eventual coalition between establishment parties loses steam. The most likely scenario in next year's election is either an establishment Grand Coalition (40%), or a minority center-left government led by the ruling PD and supported on a case-by-case basis by the other parties (40%).9 Neither outcome is likely to survive the entire length of the mandate. Bottom Line: The long-term problem for investors is that the Euroskeptic narrative appears to be quite appealing to a large proportion of the Italian public. As such, even if the market avoids a crisis in 2018, one will likely emerge by 2020. The only way to avoid it would be a strong electoral mandate for deep structural reforms that boost productivity, which is not a likely outcome of the next election. But even if such reforms were initiated, we assume that their short-term consequences would be economic and political pain, which would sour support for establishment parties further and potentially deepen Euroskeptic sentiment in the country. As such, in the rest of the report, we examine what investors should expect in case the anti-establishment parties eventually take power in Italy. While such an outcome is unlikely in 2018, it may happen eventually. Leaving The Euro Is A Panacea... The political analysis above begs a simple question: Why are Italians more likely to be lured by the sirens of leaving the Euro Area than the French or Spanish have been? Fundamentally, the Italian experience is one of relatively successful devaluations. In the early 1990s, Italy was also suffering from a period of un-competitiveness, which prompted the current account to move from a 0.6% of GDP surplus in 1987 to a 2.5% of GDP deficit in 1992 (Chart 23). This deterioration reflected two factors. One was the notorious European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which forced European currencies to move in lockstep with each other. The second was the fact that Italian unit labor costs had been in a bull market relative to the rest of the European community countries, rising by 380%, 140%, and 370% against German, France, and the Netherlands, respectively, between 1970 and 1991. Thanks to this confluence of events, Italy was in a bind. By early 1992, Italian real wages were contracting. More than a surge in inflation, this contraction reflected intensifying competitive pressures and the implementation of fiscal austerity (Chart 24). Investors ended up punishing Italian assets; Italian yields moved up, with spreads relative to Germany widening from 350 basis points to 750 basis points by September 1992. Chart 23Lack Of Competitiveness Caused Current Account Deficits... Chart 24...And Contributed To Falling Real Wages By that point, Italian authorities chose to let the previously stable lira fall, resulting in a 30% devaluation versus the deutschemark by the end of Q1 1993. Thanks to this easing, by the beginning of 1994 Italian spreads had fallen back below 300 basis points. However, the Italian economy was still under duress, real wages were still contracting, and financial markets revolted again. By February 1995, Italian spreads had gone back up to 480 basis points. In the spring of 1995, the pressures came to a boiling point and the lira was once again devalued versus the deutschemark, suddenly plunging by an additional 20% or so. After this painful adjustment, real wage growth moved back into positive territory, the current account deficit morphed into a surplus, and the economy recovered. Moreover, thanks to the previous wave of fiscal austerity and the rebound of the economy, the government's primary balance, which stood at a deficit of nearly 4% of GDP in 1987, hit a 5% surplus by 1998. Chart 25Domestic Demand Never Recovered From Financial Crisis So why is this experience so important? Today, Italy already runs a large current account surplus of 2.5% of GDP. But unlike in the 1990s, this improvement reflects first and foremost a contraction in imports, itself the symptom of an ill domestic economy. However, like in the early 1990s, the Italian economy remains tired. Real GDP is still 7% below its 2008 peak, while domestic demand continues to linger at a stunning 8.5% below its pre-GFC levels (Chart 25). Real wages are contracting at a 1.4% pace as the unemployment rate remains more than 2.5% above the OECD's estimate of NAIRU. Real estate prices, after having contracted from 2012 to 2016, are only growing in the low single digits. Capex generally is also tepid. This situation suggests that Italy needs even easier monetary policy than what it is getting from the ECB. As the argument goes, if Italy were to devalue its currency today, it would be able to boost its exports, ease domestic monetary conditions, and create the ideal circumstances for generating growth. Moreover, to push the argument to its extreme - something populist politicians are prone to do - Italy should ditch the euro and re-dominate its debt in lira. The Bank of Italy could then monetize this debt to keep interest rates low. Since Italy runs a primary fiscal surplus of 1.4% of GDP, Italy does not need to access the debt market for a few years, and thus it would be irrelevant if it loses access to the market. In other words, outside of the euro, a world of Chianti and creamy cannolis awaits the Italians. ... Well, Maybe Not If this seems too nice to be true, that is because it is. The exit-and-devalue narrative misses the point that financial markets and conditions matter a great deal. The problem with this story is the banking sector. The Italian banking sector is presently saddled with NPLs of €330bn, representing 74% of the banking system's capital and reserves (Chart 26). In and of itself, this is a big problem. However, it is a manageable one, especially with the backstops created by European institutions, notably the support of the ECB. However, without Europe's backstop, this debt load becomes a lot harder to manage. And that's only part of the problem. A deeper issue is the large holdings of treasury bonds (BTPs) of Italian banks. Currently, Italian banks hold 10% of their assets in BTPs, an amount equivalent to 90% of their capital and reserves (Chart 27). In 2011, when the Euro Area crisis was raging, Italian 10-year yields hit 7%, or a spread of more than 500 basis points over German bunds. This was equivalent to an implied probability of breakup - as estimated by Dhaval Joshi who writes our European Investment Strategy sister service - of 20% over the subsequent five years (Chart 28).10 Chart 26Italian Banks Carry Loads Of Bad Loans Chart 27Italian Banks Also Hold Too Many BTPs Chart 28Italian Spreads Signal Euro Break-Up Threat Now, if Italy comes to be governed by Beppe Grillo's M5S, markets will move fast to discount an eventual referendum on Italy's euro membership - even if only a non-binding and consultative referendum, which would still have a powerful political effect.11 In this environment, it is unlikely that the ECB would support Italian assets. The ECB has already played an active role in Italian politics. It was a September 2011 letter by Mario Draghi and Jean-Claude Trichet that prompted the resignation of Berlusconi in November 2011. It was only after Italian policymakers committed to structural reforms that Draghi was willing to utter his famous "whatever it takes" pledge of ECB support. There is practically no chance that the ECB would extend such a guarantee to an M5S-led government looking to play chicken with the Euro Area and default on Italian debt. Chart 29A Drop In Credit Impulse Would Herald Recession This is why the situation could become nasty, and fast. With only 53% of Italians in favor of the euro, pricing in a 50% probability of Italy leaving the Euro Area would result in BTP-bund spreads of around 900 basis points! In the process, Italian bonds could lose 40% to 50% of their value - assuming that German bunds rally on risk aversion flows - which would result in a potential 35% to 45% hit to Italian banks' capital and reserves. Even if markets remained relatively calm, and BTP prices only fell by 25% to 30%, investors would discount bank capital by around 25%. With the large overhang of NPLs, Italian banks would be for all intent and purposes insolvent. We already expect the Italian credit impulse to become a drag on Italian growth in 2018, but if banks are threatened with insolvency as a result of political dynamics, this same credit impulse is likely to fall at rates not experienced since the GFC. This would result in yet another recession in Italy (Chart 29). Like in Greece in 2015, we would expect that this economic pain would prompt Italian voters to rethink their inclination to leave the Euro Area. In other words, the mere thought of exiting the Euro Area would bring forward the cost of such a strategy, giving voters essentially a preview of their future pain. Moreover, with 45% of BTPs held in private hands outside of Italy, and Italy's foreign debt hanging at 126% of GDP, Europeans outside of Italy have a lot of Italian exposure. This suggests that the financial channel of transmission would cause stress in the European banking sector outside of Italy as well. As a result, in all likelihood, this threat would prompt the return of dovish language by the ECB that could weigh on the euro. The fall in the euro would also nullify Italians' need to exit the Eurozone. Even if the scenario above looks remote, the euro could fall as soon as markets begin discounting an M5S victory. For example, in Canada, the Parti Quebecois won the 1994 election promising a referendum on the question of Quebec independence. As a result of that electoral victory, the loonie quickly dipped by 6%. A move back to EUR/USD 1.05 in case of a Beppe Grillo victory thus sounds reasonable as the market would quickly move to discount some probability of an eventual euro referendum in Italy. Bottom Line: The mere suggestion of a referendum on the euro in Italy would have immediate market consequences. The result would be the almost instantaneous insolvency of large portions of the country's banking system, the loss of ECB support, deposit flight, and an almost certain recession. The relationship between politics, markets, and the economy is therefore dynamic, with non-linear outcomes. As markets discount a higher probability of Italian Euro Area exit, voters will discount a higher probability of non-optimal economic outcomes. As such, we highly doubt that Italian voters - who remember, are only flirting with Euroskepticism - would commit to a future outside of the Euro Area. What If Italy Says Arrivederci? What if we have misjudged Italian voters and they vote to exit the Euro Area regardless of the costs? Based on the IMF's External Sector Report's Individual Economy Assessments, the Italian real effective exchange rate is overvalued by around 25% against Germany alone and around 15% against a GDP-weighted average of Germany, France, Spain, Netherlands, and Belgium. However, these amounts grossly underestimate the potential fall in the lira. These estimates are based on competitiveness measures alone, and they do not take into account the negative domestic economic developments associated with falling BTP prices and impairments to banks' balance sheets. Such economic malaise would prompt a massive easing of policy by the newly empowered Bank of Italy, which would also weigh on the lira. Additionally, the Bank of Italy would have little credibility. This would be doubly so in a M5S-led government intent on pursuing unorthodox policy choices. Historically, Italy has been tolerant of elevated inflation, which means that investors would likely bid up inflation protection on Italian assets, a process that would weigh on Italian real interest rates. Additionally, Italian households and businesses would likely ratchet up their own inflation expectations. As a result, this would drive Italian inflation higher and prompt even more downward pressure on real rates. This is the perfect recipe for a downward spiral in the lira against the euro. In this kind of environment, the lira could fall 75% against the euro. Would Italy become a trade champion with this magnitude of currency devaluation? Doubtful. As we have mentioned, Italy's competitiveness problems are not just a function of domestic labor costs relative to those of the rest of the Euro Area. They also reflect the fact that Italy has not moved up the value chain and is competing head-to-head with EM nations that have a much lower cost base. Additionally, the purpose of the euro was to prevent precisely the kind of competitive currency devaluation that plagued Europe in the post-war period. If Italy ditches the euro and devalues its currency by 50% or more, then the other European nations are likely to punish Italy with tariffs, defeating one of the key reasons to re-introduce the lira in the first place. The last thing Europeans would want to establish is a precedent of a major European economy massively devaluing against its Common Market peers for economic gain. This would be the undoing of not just the Euro Area, but European integration itself. In fact, Italy is contractually obligated - as is every EU member state other than Denmark and the U.K. - to obtain EMU membership under the Maastricht Treaty that establishes the European Union. While such a contractual obligation is irrelevant in the face of a sovereign nation's decision to abrogate an international treaty, it does give Italy's EU peers the legal cover to evict Italy from the Common Market should it break its Maastricht pledges. What about the dynamics of the euro itself? After all, without its weakest major member, the Euro Area will be stronger and the euro will become more competitive. However, the early 1990s experience is once again instructive. During the first phase of devaluation of the lira from 1992 to 1994, the deutschemark too came under pressure. This pressure also reflected the fact that the USD was rising between Q3 1992 and the beginning of 1994. However, by early 1995 the deutschmark had recouped all its loss versus the USD (Chart 30). We would expect similar dynamics to be at play, and again, a lot will depend on the dollar's trend. We expect the dollar index (DXY) to peak in 2018 around 108-110, or a bit more than 10% above current levels. This would hurt the euro. Moreover, the likely need for a dovish ECB to ease the blow to the European banking system (from potentially large losses on any Italian assets) would add to the downward pressure on the euro. As a result, an Italian exit should result in a fall to EUR/USD 0.9. However, this would represent a massive buying opportunity. The euro would be extremely cheap, and the economy would ultimately handle the Italian shock (Chart 31). Chart 30Lira Devaluation Temporarily Dragged Down The Deutschemark Chart 31An Italian-Inspired Drop In The Euro Would Present A Buying Opportunity Additionally, the pain that Italy would incur as it faced currency collapse, runaway inflation, and loss of market access to the EU Common Market should act as a strong deterrent for future Euro Area exit attempts. As such, while the probability of Italy's Euro Area exit may be higher than zero, the probability of any subsequent exits is essentially zero. We would therefore expect any euro selloff to be violent but brief. Chart 32Italian Public Debt: Stuck In Muck Bottom Line: We doubt Italy will ever leave the euro. In all likelihood, the economic pain caused by the mere thought of a referendum would be enough to deter Italians from voting for what would amount to economic suicide. Instead, we would expect Italy to muddle through: its public debt dynamics will worsen, but it will not implode. The IMF expects the government debt-to-GDP ratio to fall toward 125% of GDP by 2022 (Chart 32). We think this is too optimistic. It relies on a big drop in the private sector's investment-saving gap. We think that Italy's entrenched productivity deficit and lack of investment opportunities south of the Alps will ensure that savings remain in excess of investment by a similar degree as today. This would cause the public debt-to-GDP ratio to move toward 140% of GDP by the middle of next decade. This is not a great scenario, but it is not a catastrophe either. In exchange for modest reforms, the ECB would continue to support Italy with dovish monetary policy and unfettered access to emergency liquidity. As a result, we expect European interest rates to remain slightly below what average Eurozone numbers would justify. As such, we continue to anticipate no hike in the ECB's repo rate for the foreseeable future. This, along with greater labor market slack in Europe than the U.S., underpins our view that EUR/USD will ultimately weaken slightly below parity. Investment Conclusions All other things being equal, currency devaluation is a valuable reflationary tool. In Italy's case, however, there are two impediments to using it. First, Italy has lost competitiveness precisely because it relied on the FX lever in the past. Its governance, education, and economic institutions have atrophied as domestic interest groups favored protecting themselves against creative destruction. Second, when it comes to politics, "all other things are rarely equal." It is highly unlikely that the rest of Europe would idly stand back while Italy switched to the lira and devalued it against the euro. This is for three reasons: First, it would set a dangerous precedent for other EU member states if Italy, the Euro Area's third-largest economy and the world's eighth largest, was allowed to reflate via competitive devaluation. Second, it is unlikely that Euro Area peers would accept Italy's devaluation amidst a globally low growth context where export market share is already tough to come by. Third, Italy's government would likely be led by populist, anti-establishment policymakers who would represent a domestic political threat to Italy's European neighbors. As such, it would be in the interest of the rest of Europe to ensure that a M5S-led Italy collapsed after leaving the Euro Area, and then begged to re-enter the core European club. The investment conclusions from the analysis above are very state dependent and represent a playbook for investors going forward. Right now, with the probability of an outright M5S victory low, our base case scenario remains unchanged. The euro will weaken by mid-2018 to slightly below parity as the ECB will maintain a more dovish policy stance than the Fed. European equities are likely to continue to outperform U.S. equities. However, if Beppe Grillo manages to eke out a majority in 2018 or later, investors might be in for a bumpy ride. The euro's fall from grace is likely to be much swifter and European assets could suffer a period of volatility and underperformance relative to the U.S. Ultimately, European stocks will resume their upward relative trajectory as any Italian referendum is likely to result in Italy staying in the euro. Finally, in the highly unlikely case that Italy votes to leave the Euro Area, the euro could plunge to EUR/USD 0.9; European assets, banks especially, could suffer greatly against their U.S. counterparts; and bund yields would likely fall below 0%. The lira would fall by 75% against the euro and Italian bonds would suffer losses north of 50%, in local currency terms. As Italy plunged to its post-Euro Area Inferno, however, we would expect European assets to represent the buying opportunity of a lifetime. Italy's fall from grace would only tighten European integration going forward. 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see OECD, "Economic Surveys: Italy 2017," available at oecd.org; and Sara Calligaris, et al.,"Italy's Productivity Conundrum," European Commission, dated May 2016, available at ec.europa.eu. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 The VAT revenue ratio (VRR) is defined as the ratio between the actual value-added tax (VAT) revenue collected and the revenue that would theoretically be raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate to all final consumption. This ratio gives an indication of the efficiency and the broadness of the tax base of the VAT regime in a country compared to a standard norm. 6 Please see World Bank Group and PwC, "Paying Taxes 2017," available at www.pwc.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Geopolitical Gambit: Relevance Through Integration," dated November 3, 2011, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 A minority government would, however, have to obtain a confidence vote in both chambers of the Italian Parliament in order to govern, as per Article 94 of the Italian Constitution. 10 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Threats And Opportunities In The Bond Market," dated April 7, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 11 According to Article 75 of the Italian Constitution, referendums are not permitted in the "case of tax, budget, amnesty and pardon laws, in authorization or ratification of international treaties." Nonetheless, a Euroskeptic government could still call for a non-binding referendum on the euro. While its result would not create a legal reality for Italian exit from the Euro Area, it would create a political one. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com We Read (And Liked) ... Why Nations Fail - The Origins Of Power, Prosperity, And Poverty Why Nations Fail is as much about why nations succeed as why they fail.1 World history is replete with examples of the latter, whereas the former is a rarity even today. Economist Daren Acemoglu and political scientist James A. Robinson seek to answer why that is so. Distilling the book to its bottom line is challenging. There is no neat theory of how the world works. Instead, the authors tell their story through case studies replete with "critical junctures," "path dependency," and "small differences." Acemoglu and Robinson do not peddle in false parsimony, but rather try to develop a narrative that explains a complex process. While they never make the point explicitly, the authors define success as a combination of geopolitical relevance (power), escaping the "middle income trap" (prosperity), and some level of equality (escaping poverty). A country that achieves some semblance of all three, and maintains it for a long time, is "successful." At the heart of successful economies is the process of creative destruction. And at the heart of each example of failed states - from the Roman Empire to the Soviet Union - are impediments to such destruction. The recipe to success therefore boils down to "having an idea, starting a firm, and getting a loan." The discipline of economics - and its disciples at the IMF and the World Bank - would appear to be more than capable of taking it from there. But they are not. Why? For Acemoglu and Robinson, the empirical evidence is overwhelmingly stacked against economics and its practitioners. Armies of developmental economists have failed to bring billions of people out of poverty and many of their suggestions have in fact been detrimental. Economics is incapable of resolving the problem of development because it "has gained the title Queen of the Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems as its domain."2 And societal development is a political problem. The first such political problem that Acemoglu and Robinson attempt to explain is the paradox of development. Why don't leaders always choose prosperity? History is replete with examples of how elites actively subvert creative destruction, which is paradoxical given that it would make their societies wealthier and more powerful in the collective sense. From the patricians of Rome, elites of Venice, the szlachta of Poland, the samurai of Japan, to the landed aristocracy of England prior to the Glorious Revolution, those in positions of power consciously limit economic progress. The answer lies in political institutions. When political power is exclusive, unchecked, and limited to a select-group, its value increases. The more power one gains, the greater the political, economic, and societal rewards one can extract from it. The reverse is true when political institutions are inclusive, checked, and open to upwardly mobile entrepreneurs. In that case, the value of political power declines and thus elites are less likely to expend resources to protect their access to it. As such, the key conditions for economic development are inclusive political institutions that allow non-elites to petition the government, keep it in check through an independent judiciary, call it to account with free media, and eventually participate in governing directly. These inclusive political institutions are, in turn, more likely to give rise to inclusive economic institutions, which enshrine the process of creative destruction at the heart of the country's political and economic system. Why is it so difficult to engineer development? Because most trained economists working for international developmental agencies are focused on changing economic institutions. They take the politics of a country as an a priori. However, it is politics that determines economics, not the other way around. A powerful example in the book is the process of de-colonization in Africa. Despite a dramatic change of political leadership, post-colonial governments preserved the extractive economic institutions set up by their former colonial masters. Why? Because they never bothered to truly enfranchise their citizens. In other words, they kept the exclusive political institutions of colonialism largely in place. Once that decision was made, it was inevitable that extractive economic institutions would remain in place as well. In fact, in most examples, economic institutions became more extractive and political institutions more exclusive. Acemoglu and Robinson published their book in 2012, at the height of the "Beijing Consensus" narrative. It is easy to see how most of their examples are applicable to China today, particularly the chapter dealing with the decline of the Soviet Union. The message is that rapid economic growth under exclusive political institutions is possible, but unsustainable. China will therefore either evolve its political institutions or face the fate of the Soviet Union. We generally tend to agree with this analysis, but time horizons are difficult to gauge. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson themselves admit that the Soviet Union grew rapidly for 40 years before it faced limits and 60 years before it collapsed. By those measures, Chinese policymakers may still have decades before crisis forces their hand. A much more interesting question, one that Acemoglu and Robinson spend very little time discussing, is what happens to societies where elites capture political institutions and alter them from inclusive to exclusive? Two examples they detail briefly are the Roman and Venetian republics. In both, relatively inclusive political systems with inclusive economic institutions were captured by rapacious elites who then proceeded to limit access to both with the particular intention of limiting creative destruction. For global investors, this is the process that will have greater implications than the run-of-the-mill collapse of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. The entire global financial system today depends on the domestic stability of countries like the U.S. and the U.K., perhaps the most successful political systems in the world. And yet, voters in both are itching for radical change as a reaction to elite overproduction and growing income inequality. On one hand, voter discontent could lead to a messy political process, if not an outright revolution, that reestablishes the inclusive institutions that have underpinned their prosperity and power for centuries. On the other, it could lead to the collapse of the inclusive republic and the rise of an exclusive empire. 1 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 2 Economist Abba Lerner, quoted at the end of Chapter 2 by the authors. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com
Special Report Highlights The European Central Bank's ultra-dovish policies have depressed the value of the euro and, by extension, boosted German manufacturing. Germany has diffused its inflationary pressures by outsourcing jobs and production to central Europe. As a result of this and labor shortages, wages in central Europe are rising rapidly, and inflation is accelerating. The Polish and Czech central banks will be forced to hike rates sooner than later. Hungary's central bank will lag behind. Go long the PLN versus the IDR. Stay long the CZK versus the euro and the PLN against the HUF. Feature Inflation in central Europe is picking up and will continue to rise (Chart I-1). The main driver is surging wage growth in central Europe. Considerable acceleration in wage growth, in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic signifies genuine inflationary pressures that could very well spread. Based on this, our primary investment recommendation is to be long the PLN and CZK versus the euro and/or EM currencies. Labor Shortages There is a shortage of labor in the central European manufacturing economies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This partially reflects similar trends in Germany and its increased use of outsourcing to central European countries. Escalating wage growth (Chart I-2) in central European economies denotes widening labor shortages. Chart I-1Inflation Is Rising In CE3 Chart I-2Labor Shortages = Higher Wages Indeed, our proxy for labor shortages - calculated as the number of job vacancies divided by the number of unemployed looking for a job - has surged of late across all central European countries (Chart I-3). The same measure for Germany is at a 27-year high (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B illustrate both components of the ratio: the number of job vacancies has skyrocketed to all-time highs and the number of unemployed people has dropped to multi-decade lows as well. Chart I-3Labor Is Scarce In CE3 And Germany Chart I-4AA Breakdown Of Labor Shortage Proxy Chart I-4BA Breakdown Of Labor Shortage Proxy Importantly, it is not the case that labor shortages are occurring because people are discouraged and giving up on their search for work. The participation rate for all these countries has risen to its highest level since data have been available. In brief, a rising share of the population in these countries is either working or actively looking for a job. (Chart I-5). Finally, their working age population is shrinking (Chart I-6), with Germany being the exception because of immigration inflows (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Labor Participation Rate Is ##br##High In CE3 And Germany... Chart I-6...While Working Age ##br##Population Is Declining In CE3 Robust labor demand has been occurring in central Europe because of the ongoing manufacturing boom in the region. Given central Europe's extensive supply chain linkages to German manufacturing, the artificial cheapness of the euro that the ECB engineered has boosted the German economy and by extension central Europe's manufacturing boom. Germany: A Cheap Currency And Export Boom The ECB's ultra-accommodative policy has suppressed the value of the euro, and caused German exports to mushroom (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-7ECB Policies Have Been ##br##A Boon For German Exports A cheap common European currency has boosted Germany's manufacturing competitiveness and has led to rising demand for German exports. An overflow of manufacturing orders in Germany in turn has led to labor shortages in central Europe via increased German outsourcing. Currency appreciation is the conventional economic adjustment in a country with a flexible exchange rate and an export boom coupled with a large current account surplus. However, this has not occurred in Germany in recent years. This is because of the ECB's ultra-easy policies. The euro has depreciated even as the German and euro area overall current account has mushroomed (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Since the currency has not been allowed to appreciate in nominal terms, the real effective exchange rate will inevitably appreciate via inflation - rising wages initially and broader inflation increases later. In our opinion, the best currency valuation measure is the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. Our basis is that this measure reflects both changes in productivity and wages - i.e. it reflects genuine competitiveness. Chart I-8 demonstrates Germany's real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs in absolute terms compared to other advanced manufacturing competitors like the U.S., Japan, Switzerland and Sweden. Based on this measure, it is clear that Germany continues to enjoy a significant comparative advantage on the manufacturing world stage among advanced manufacturing economies. It is only less competitive versus Japan. Chart I-8Germany Is Very Competitive Based On Real Effective Exchange Rates Bottom Line: The ECB's ultra-dovish policies have depressed the value of the euro and boosted German manufacturing. This has boosted central European manufacturing and demand for labor. Germany Is Passing The Inflation Baton To Central Europe Despite a historic low in the unemployment rate and ongoing labor shortages, German wages have not risen by much (Chart I-9). Our hunch is that German companies faced with some labor shortages have been increasing their use of outsourcing. Central European economy's export to Germany have boomed, especially after the euro started depreciating circa 2010 (Chart I-10). Chart I-9German Wage Inflation Is Muted Chart I-10Growing Dependence On ##br##Germany For CE3 Growth Being the lower marginal cost producer in the region, central European economies have benefited from German competitiveness and the cheap euro. Outsourcing is economically justified because German wages are still four times higher than in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. (Chart I-11). Even though Germany's productivity is higher than in central Europe, manufacturing wages adjusted for productivity are still higher than in central European economies (Chart I-12). Therefore, it still makes sense for German businesses to outsource more to lower-cost producers in central Europe. Chart I-11CE3 Wage Bill Is Cheaper ##br##Than That Of Germany... Chart I-12...Even After Adjusting ##br##For Productivity Faced with strong orders as well as a lack of available labor, businesses in central European countries have been competing for labor by raising wages. Unlike in Germany, manufacturing and overall wages in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have recently surged (Chart I-2 on page 3). Wages are rising more so in Hungary and the Czech Republic since they have smaller labor pools compared to Poland. Notably, wage growth has exceeded productivity growth, and unit labor costs have been rising rather rapidly (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Unit Labor Costs Are Rising Rapidly In CE3 Higher unit labor costs amid rising output denote genuine inflationary pressures. Producers faced with rising unit labor costs and shrinking profit margins will attempt to raise prices. Given that income and demand are strong, they will partially succeed - meaning genuine inflationary pressures in central Europe are likely to intensify. Since the beginning of the ECB's accommodative monetary policy, Germany has been able to avoid the fallout of higher wages because it has been able to outsource a portion of its production to other countries, namely central Europe. The problem is that the supply of labor in central Europe is now drying out, so its price will naturally rise. If Germany did not have the labor pool of CE3 available as a resource, German wage inflation would be significantly higher by now because companies would have been forced to employ Germans more rapidly, paying more in labor costs. Bottom Line: Germany has diffused its inflationary pressures by outsourcing jobs and production to central Europe. Overheating In Central Europe Various inflation measures are showing signs that inflation is escalating in CE3. With rising wages and unit labor costs, these trends will continue. Consequently, output gaps in central European economies are closing or have closed, warranting further increases in inflation (Chart I-14). Money and credit growth are booming, which is further facilitating the rise in inflation (Chart I-15). Finally, employment growth is very robust and retail sales are strong (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Inflation Will Remain On An Up Trend In CE3 Chart I-15Money & Credit Will Facilitate Path To Inflation Chart I-16Employment & Retail Sales Growth Is Robust Bottom Line: A cheap euro has supercharged German demand for central European labor at the time when the pool of available labor in CE3 is shrinking. This has generated genuine inflationary pressures in the region. Conclusions And Investment Recommendations 1. The Polish and Czech central banks will hike rates sooner than later. This will boost their currencies. The Hungarian central bank will lag and the HUF will underperform its regional peers. CE3 currencies are set to appreciate, especially the CZK and the PLN: stay long the PLN versus the HUF, and the CZK versus the euro. We recommended going long PLN/HUF and long CZK/EUR on September 28 2016 due to stronger growth and rising inflationary pressures. This week's analysis reinforces our conviction on these trades. In the face of rising inflationary pressures, the Czech National Bank (CNB) and the National Bank of Poland (NBP) will be less reluctant to tighten policy than the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) and the ECB. This will drive the PLN and CZK higher relative to the EUR and HUF. The NBH is unlikely to tighten policy while credit growth is still weak. Given strong political pressure for faster economic growth, our bias is that the NBH is more interested in ending six years of non-existent credit growth rather than containing inflation. The ECB is unlikely to tighten policy either, given the still-poor structural growth outlook among the peripheral European economies. A new currency trade: go long the PLN versus the IDR, while closing our short IDR/long HUF trade with a 9% loss. This is based on our expectations that central European currencies will appreciate versus their EM peers, and the PLN will do better than the HUF. 2. Relative growth trajectory favors Central European economies relative to other EM countries. Such economic outperformance and resulting currency appreciation will be a tailwind to CE3 equity performance versus EM in common currency terms. Continue overweighting CE3 equity markets within the EM benchmark. We recommended equity traders go long CE3 banks / short euro area banks on April 6, 2016. This position has not worked out due to a significant rally in euro area banks since Brexit. However, euro area banks remain less profitable and overleveraged compared to their central European counterparts. As such they will likely underperform in the coming months. 3. In fixed income, we have the following positions: Overweight Hungarian sovereign credit within an EM sovereign credit portfolio. Long Polish and Hungarian 5-year local currency bonds / short South African and Turkish domestic bonds. A new trade: Receive 1-year Hungarian swap rates / Pay 10-year swap rates. As structural inflationary pressures become rampant in the Hungarian economy, the market will start pricing in rate hikes further down the curve, and the yield curve will consequently steepen (Chart I-17). Polish and Czech bonds offer better value relative to bunds as investors stand to gain from currency appreciation as well as an attractive spread. (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Bet On Yield Curve ##br##Steepening In Hungary Chart I-18Polish & Czech Bond Offer Value ##br##Relative To German Bunds Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations