Policy

Highlights The latest reading from all the indicators confirms that the growth improvement in the manufacturing sector since early last year has moderated, while the sharp recovery in producer prices has stalled. However, it is premature to be overly alarmed by a pending Chinese growth relapse. Betting on a material Chinese slowdown solely based on some sort of credit "impulse" estimate misses the big picture. The dramatic decline in real interest rates rather than an increase in new lending is what played a pivotal role in Chinese reflation since last year. Strategically we lean against being overly bearish. The Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, but the downside risk appears low at the moment and overall business activity will remain buoyant. Feature Investors have become less sanguine on China's growth outlook in recent weeks, as the latest macro numbers are no longer unanimously positive. Concerns about a significant relapse in the Chinese economy are re-emerging, and the authorities' recent policy tightening has further heightened investors' anxiety levels. Judging from our recent conversations with clients, "China risk" is now clearly back on the radar. China's growth recovery since early last year played a major role in boosting some global risk assets such as commodities prices and emerging market equities. By the same token, will a China slowdown end the global reflation trade? The Divergence In Manufacturing PMIs Chart 1The Divergences In PMIs Investors' anxiety over China's cyclical trend has been amplified by the recent divergence between the official manufacturing Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) and the one compiled by Caixin Media group, a private source. The official survey for May still showed expansion, while the private PMI dropped slightly below the critical 50 threshold (Chart 1, top panel). Historically such divergences are not uncommon, and the private PMI appears to show sharper swings than its official counterpart, probably due to its smaller sample size and its focus on smaller private firms. Meanwhile, there were some commonalities: the sub-indices of output and new orders for both surveys remained above the expansionary threshold, while input costs and output prices for both dropped into contractionary territory. Taken together, the latest reading from all the indicators confirms that the growth improvement in the manufacturing sector since early last year has moderated, while the sharp recovery in producer prices has stalled - consistent with other recent macro variables. Meanwhile, the service industry is still showing solid expansion, according to both surveys, underpinning overall business activity (Chart 1, bottom panel). In short, it is premature to be overly alarmed by a pending Chinese growth relapse. Credit "Price" Versus "Volume": What Matters More? A common narrative to describe the reason behind China's ongoing growth moderation is policy tightening on both the monetary and fiscal fronts. As the argument goes, last year's growth recovery was driven by a massive increase in credit and fiscal spending, which has since been scaled back. As this credit and fiscal "impulse" fades away, the Chinese economy will tumble, sending shockwaves across the world. In our view, betting on a material Chinese slowdown solely based on some sort of credit "impulse" estimate misses the big picture, and is dangerously misguided. At BCA, we have long paid close attention to credit cycles and their impact on the growth outlook. However, there is no evidence that China's growth recovery since early last year was due to a massive increase in credit expansion and fiscal spending. In fact, total new credit provided by commercial banks and the "shadow banking sector" has been largely stable in recent years, and last year's credit "impulse," measured as the annual change in credit flows, was fairly modest - especially compared with previous bouts of sharp spikes (Chart 2). Similarly, Chinese fiscal spending actually decelerated sharply throughout last year, and dropped by over 10% in December, compared with a year earlier. Even if last year's fiscal retrenchment impacts the economy with a time lag, it is important to note that fiscal spending has already rebounded in recent months, which will become a tailwind for growth down the road. In our view, China's growth recovery since last year has a lot more to do with the "price" of credit rather than "volume." (Chart 3) Real interest rates dropped from double-digit levels that prevailed between 2012 and early 2016 to negative, thanks to a sharp increase in producer prices, while credit growth remained in a broad downtrend. In other words, the dramatic decline in real interest rates rather than an increase in new lending is what played a pivotal role in Chinese reflation. Chart 2Not Much 'Impulse' Chart 3Credit: 'Price' Matters More Than 'Volume' China's PPI has rolled over, which together with the authorities' attempts to tighten has begun to lift real interest rates. This will likely continue to generate some growth headwinds - a risk that clearly warrants close attention. However, monetary conditions currently are still very accommodative, and there is no reason to expect an overkill to choke off the economy. Why Growth Will Not Falter? Moreover, the bearish argument on China's cyclical outlook is fundamentally rooted in the assumption that the country's economy is dangerously imbalanced1 - a shaky house of cards propped up by policy stimulus that will immediately fall down once the policy pump-priming stops. While the structural profile of the Chinese economy will remain a major global macro issue subject to heated debates going forward, the bearish argument underestimates the economy's resilience, and therefore exaggerates the downside risks. First, it is important to note that China's growth challenges in previous years were to a large extent due to excessively tight monetary conditions, a costly policy mistake that amplified deflationary pressures. Real interest rates were kept at double digits for 5 consecutive years between 2012 and early 2016 while other major central banks were all trying desperately to lower borrowing costs within their respective economies. Furthermore, the trade-weighted RMB appreciated by 20% between 2012 and 2015. In fact, the RMB was the only major currency that appreciated in trade-weighted terms during this period (Chart 4), essentially shouldered deflationary stress for the rest of the world. In addition, Chinese regulators tried hard to block credit flows in an ill-conceived attempt to de-lever - which only prolonged credit intermediation channels and pushed loan demand to even costlier "shadow" institutions.2 All of these factors inflicted dramatic deflationary pain on Chinese manufacturers. Indeed, that the Chinese economy did not implode under the double-whammy of weak global demand and draconian domestic policy tightening - and staged a quick turnaround when monetary conditions eased - underscores the surprising resilience of the Chinese corporate sector. Second, the growth recovery since early last year has significantly improved financial conditions within the corporate sector and eased its balance sheet stress. Overall, companies have increased earnings, reduced inventories and beefed up cash positions (Chart 5). The situation can certainly deteriorate, but the sector is also better prepared for deflationary shocks than in previous years. Chart 4The RMB Shift Chart 5Inventory Is Still Very Low Third, even if China's corporate sector, especially industrial enterprises, are indeed as fragile as some bearish analysts claim, Chinese households and the service sector have much healthier fundamentals and therefore are less vulnerable. Consumer confidence has improved significantly in recent months following the growth acceleration, which should further help household consumption. The service sector now accounts for 52% of Chinese GDP, 30% larger than manufacturing. Household consumption and the service sector will provide an important anchor for business activity and prevent a major relapse in economic growth, even if the industrial sector slows more than we currently expect. Finally, the global growth environment is also largely supportive for the Chinese economy. The European economy has been showing some remarkable strength of late, and U.S. growth is likely to pick up after the recent soft patch, as per our U.S. specialists - both of which should bode well for Chinese exports. It is worth noting the recent weaker macro numbers out of China have followed growth disappointments in the U.S. (Chart 6). In fact, the ebbs and flows of "growth surprises" in the world's two largest economies in recent years have been largely in sync, albeit with China experiencing more pronounced volatility. In addition, the risk of an immediate escalation of protectionist backlash between the U.S. and China has also been lowered following President Xi's state visit to the U.S. in April.3 Overall, the Chinese economy is unlikely to slow materially, if the U.S. economy does reasonably well. Chart 6U.S. And China: Synchronized 'Surprises' All in all, we expect the Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, but the downside risk appears low at the moment. In a reported titled "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead," dated April 6th, we warned that "growth figures coming out of China in the coming months may be viewed as less market friendly."4 Recent Chinese data and investor reactions confirm this judgment. Nonetheless, we maintain the view that the Chinese economy's growth improvement remains largely intact, which will reinforce the upturn in the global business cycle and support global risk assets. Strategically we lean against being overly bearish, and we remain cyclically positive on Chinese equities, particularly H shares. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports, "The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings?" dated March 23, 2017, and "More On The Chinese Debt Debate," dated April 20, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports, "Reflecting On The Trump-Xi Summit," dated April 13, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Growth: Testing Time Ahead," dated April 6, 2017 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights 'Super Thursday' June 8 brings three potentially high-impact events for financial markets: a U.K. General Election; a ECB monetary policy meeting; and former FBI Director James Comey's testimony to the U.S. Senate intelligence committee. Each of these events has the potential to move markets - especially currencies - abruptly in either direction. Medium-term investors should use Super Thursday and its aftermath as follows: If the pound sells off, use it to buy pound/dollar. If the euro sells off, use it to buy both euro/pound and euro/dollar. Use any associated underperformance of FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 to buy this relative equity position. Feature Traders will be salivating at the prospect of three potentially high-impact events for financial markets in the space of a day: a U.K. General Election; a ECB monetary policy meeting; and former FBI Director James Comey's testimony to the U.S. Senate intelligence committee about possible collusion between the campaign of President Donald Trump and Russian officials. This report will focus on the first two of these 'Super Thursday' events. Chart of the WeekRelative Interest Expectations Must Follow Relative Economic Performance 300-340 Conservative Seats = Short-Term Pain For The Pound Chart I-2The Pound Is Where It Was When##br## The Election Was Called The U.K. General Election result has the potential to move the pound abruptly in either direction. Therefore, it also has the potential to drive FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 relative performance which is just an inverse currency play. But treat the U.K. election result as a trading opportunity rather than as a game changer for any investment position. Theresa May admits that she called the snap election to strengthen her narrow parliamentary majority ahead of Brexit negotiations. When she called the election, the Conservatives were riding high in the polls, and markets expected May easily to achieve her aim. Reasoning that a much strengthened majority would reduce the influence of the hard Brexiters in her party, the pound rallied (Chart I-2). But as the polls have tightened, it has given back this gain. If the number of Conservative seats does not meaningfully move up from the current 330, or worse, if the result increases uncertainty, the pound is vulnerable to a further snap sell-off. A parliamentary majority requires 326 MPs, but around 320 is enough for an effective majority because Sinn Fein MPs,1 the speaker and deputy speakers do not vote. 315 might just scrape a Conservative minority government supported by its Northern Ireland Unionist allies. Hence, if the Conservatives win 300-340 seats, a knee-jerk sell-off in the pound is likely. Chart I-3The Brexit Vote Depressed The Pound Because##br## It Depressed U.K. Interest Rate Expectations If the Conservatives win well above 340 seats, the pound should knee-jerk rally - as May's effective majority would strengthen enough to marginalize the hard Brexiters. If the Conservatives win well below 300 seats, the pound might also settle higher - as this is the territory of a Labour minority government supported by the Scottish National Party and Liberal Democrats, and thereby a softer Brexit. But any major moves in the pound after the election will prove to be transient, because the over-arching driver of currencies is the interplay of interest rate expectations. Chart I-3 illustrates that last year's Brexit vote depressed the pound because the shock outcome precipitated a base rate cut and depressed expectations for Bank of England interest rate policy. In contrast to the Brexit vote, the General Election result per se will not have a lasting impact on the pound because it is unlikely to change the interest rate setting calculus for the BoE relative to other central banks. The BoE has been one of the most inert central banks when it comes to changing interest rates in either direction. Last year's emergency rate cut, forced by the shock vote for Brexit, has been the BoE's only policy rate move in 8 years! We expect the BoE to continue with its policy rate inertia because U.K. real consumption is highly correlated (inversely) to inflation. When inflation is too high, real consumption is undermined, making it difficult to hike rates; when inflation is too low, real consumption tends to grow strongly, making it difficult to cut rates (Chart I-4). This mirror image performance of inflation and real consumption has tied the hands of the BoE for 8 years, and will continue to do so. Chart I-4Why The Bank Of England's Hands Are Tied With the BoE's hands tied, relative interest rate expectations - and therefore the medium-term direction of the pound - will depend on the other central bank in the respective cross rate. Which brings us neatly to the ECB. The ECB Must Follow The Hard Data Years of extreme and experimental central bank intervention have left markets hyper-sensitive to the slightest change of nuance in central bank communication. We have now come to a ridiculous state of affairs where reducing two instances of the sentence "the balance of risks remain tilted to the downside" in the March 9 ECB press conference introductory statement to just one instance in the April 27 statement is regarded as de facto monetary tightening! The slightest change of nuance in central bank communication can powerfully drive markets over a timeframe of a few weeks or months. As Peter Praet, the ECB Chief Economist, warns: "After a prolonged period of exceptional monetary policy accommodation, financial markets are particularly sensitive to any perceived change in the future course of monetary policy. (Therefore) any substantial change in communication needs to be motivated by some more evidence in the hard data." On this basis, we expect the ECB to acknowledge the hard data showing euro area growth is solid and broad, and downside risks are diminishing; but that the required upward adjustment in inflation remains sluggish. For euro/dollar, a mixed message such as this might create a near-term setback of around 2%, given that it has rallied strongly in the past 65 days and is now technically overbought (see page 8). We would regard a 2% setback for the euro as a medium-term buying opportunity. As Peter Praet points out, central banks' data-dependency means that policy must follow the hard data over a timeframe of six months or longer. The Chart of the Week, Chart I-5 and Chart I-6 should make this crystal clear. Relative interest rate expectations and bond yield spreads ultimately follow relative economic performance. Chart I-5Bond Yield Spreads Must Follow The Hard Data On Economic Growth Differentials... Chart I-6...And Inflation Differentials If, as we expect, euro area growth2 continues to perform in line with or better than the U.S. and U.K. - and inflation differentials continue to narrow - then relative interest rate expectations will also continue to converge. Even the ECB admits that its main growth worry comes not from the euro area economy itself but rather from "the considerable uncertainty surrounding the new U.S. Administration's policies." In this regard, observe that the post-Trump spike in U.S. interest rate expectations has barely unwound (Chart I-7). We think it should unwind more. And who knows, perhaps James Comey will be the immediate catalyst. Chart I-7The Trump Spike In U.S. Interest Rate Expectations Hasn't Unwound What To Do After Super Thursday Chart I-8Pound/Euro (Inversely) Drives ##br##FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 In summary, policy rate expectations - in relative terms - will structurally continue to: Get less dovish in the euro area. Remain broadly unchanged in the U.K. Get more dovish in the U.S. Hence, our structural preference for currencies is euro first, pound second, dollar third. Which brings us finally to what medium-term investors should do after Super Thursday. If the pound sells off, use it to buy pound/dollar. If the euro sells off, use it to buy both euro/pound and euro/dollar. And use any associated underperformance of FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 to buy this relative equity position (Chart I-8). Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Sinn Fein MPs are not eligible to vote because they refuse to pledge allegiance to the Queen. 2 Growth must be adjusted for different demographics. Our preference is to use real GDP per head based on working age (15-64) population. Fractal Trading Model* Euro/dollar is technically overbought, so traders can play a countertrend move. Target a 2% retracement. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Crude oil prices will find support from stronger EM trade volumes, which broke out of an extended low-growth period at the end of last year and finished 1Q17 on a very strong note. Sustained growth in EM trade volumes will boost inflation at the consumer level in the U.S. and Europe, and will lift the Fed's preferred inflation gauge, provided the Fed does not constrict the growth of money supply this year and next. Energy: Overweight. We remain long Dec/17 WTI and Brent vs. short Dec/18 WTI and Brent, expecting the extended OPEC 2.0 production cuts and stronger oil demand to drain inventories this year. Base Metals: Neutral. China's Caixin manufacturing PMI for May fell below 50, indicating the manufacturing sector may be contracting. We will wait to see if this is confirmed this month and next, but for now this keeps us neutral with a negative tilt on the base metals complex. Precious Metals: Neutral. A weaker USD, and market expectations the Fed will be constrained in lifting interest rates later this year is supporting our strategic gold portfolio hedge, which is up 5.1% since it was initiated May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Front-month corn is trading through the top of the $3.55 to $3.75/bushel range it has occupied since the beginning of the year. We are not inclined to play the momentum. Feature EM import and export volumes moved sharply higher in 1Q17 after breaking out of an extended low-growth funk late last year (Chart of the Week). The year-on-year (yoy) increase in the volume of imports and exports for EM economies reported by the CPB World Trade Monitor were up on average 8.74% and 5.29% in 1Q17, respectively, versus 12-month moving average levels of 2.2% and 2.5%.1 EM trade volumes are highly correlated with EM oil demand (Chart 2), particularly in the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) era, when EM import and export growth made significant gains relative to DM trade volumes (Chart 3).2 Indeed, EM imports and exports both grew at twice the rate of DM trade between the end of 2010 and the end of 1Q17: EM import volumes grew 22% vs. DM growth of 10% over the period, while EM export volumes grew 21% vs. DM growth of 11%. Chart of the WeekEM Imports And Exports##BR##Surge In 1Q17 Chart 2EM Oil Demand Closely##BR##Tracks Trade Volumes Chart 3EM Trade-Volume Growth##BR##Surpasses DM Growth We expect EM demand will account for some 80% of ~1.53mm b/d of global oil demand growth this year. If the strong 1Q17 performance in EM trade were to carry into 2Q, we will be raising our estimated oil-demand growth for the year significantly. We will be updating our global supply-demand balances next week. Coupled with the extension to end-March 2018 of the 1.8mm-barrel-per-day crude-oil production cuts recently agreed by the OPEC 2.0, the strong EM oil-demand growth could accelerate the draw-down in global storage levels, putting the WTI and Brent forward curves into backwardation sooner than the late-2017/early-2018 timeframe we currently expect.3 EM Trade Growth Will Stoke Oil Prices And Inflation Because EM demand is the driving force of global oil-demand growth, a continuation of the strong trade performance from this sector will support oil prices going forward, and likely will lift inflation as the year progresses. In the post-GFC period, we would expect a 1% increase in EM import and export volumes to boost oil prices by a little more than 2%, and vice versa.4 This is almost twice the effect an increase in trade produces in estimates beginning pre-GFC in 2000; most likely, it reflects the increase in EM trade volumes relative to DM trade volumes post-GFC.5 Our modeling confirms key inflation gauges - particularly the Fed's preferred gauge, the core PCE; the U.S. CPI; and EMU Harmonized CPI - all are highly sensitive to EM oil demand, as expected, and, no surprise, to EM trade volumes.6 In the post-GFC period, a 1% increase (decrease) in EM oil demand can be expected to lift (drop) core PCE and the U.S. CPI by a little more than 50bps; for the EMU CPI, a 40bps increase (decrease) can be expected.7 In addition, we have found the EM trade data also is a highly explanatory variable for these inflation gauges. Imports explain ~ 84%, 91% and 89% of core PCE (Chart 4), U.S. CPI (Chart 5), and EMU CPI (Chart 6), respectively, in the post-GFC period, while exports explain 94%, 93% and 81% of these inflation gauges. The elasticities for the U.S. gauges is ~ 50bps, similar to the EM oil demand estimates, and ~35bps for the EMU CPI. Chart 4Core PCE Is Highly Sensitive To EM Trade Volumes... Chart 5...As Is U.S. CPI... Chart 6...And EMU CPI A continued expansion of EM trading volumes this year can be expected to lift inflation in the U.S. and Europe. We also would expect this to hold for China as well, given the results of our earlier research.8 Fed Could Kill The Party Chart 7U.S. M2 Is Important To EM Trade Volumes One variable we are watching closely is U.S. money supply, M2 in particular, vis-à-vis EM trade volumes (Chart 7). We find that in the post-GFC world, EM trade volumes are highly sensitive to M2, with M2 explaining 92% of EM exports and 82% of imports. This relationship did not exist in the pre-GFC world, or in estimates starting pre-GFC and extending to the present day. This no doubt is related to massive monetary accommodation and QE experiments post-GFC, but, as of this writing, we are not at all sure how this relationship will evolve going forward. Bottom Line: EM trade volumes have broken out of a long-term funk, which will be supportive of crude oil prices and will lift inflation going forward. Strong EM trade growth at the pace at which it ended 1Q17 would cause us to lift our expectation for global oil demand significantly for this year. This, combined with the extension of the OPEC 2.0 production cuts to March 2018 could normalize global inventories faster than markets currently expect. EM trade is, importantly, highly exposed to U.S. monetary policy, particularly to what happens to U.S. M2 money supply. This is a feature of the global trade picture that was not present pre-GFC. Our research affirms our conviction on the bullish oil exposure we have on - chiefly the long Dec/17 Brent and WTI vs. short Dec/18 Brent and WTI backwardation trades. Our results also support remaining long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk, and remaining long commodity-index exposure. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 The CPB World Trade Monitor is published monthly by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Please see https://www.cpb.nl/en/worldtrademonitor for data and documentation. We use CPB's volumetric data for EM imports and exports in our analysis, which are indexed to 2010 = 100; we converted these data to USD values to see how the composition of imports and exports was changing so as to better see how the relative shares of EM and DM are evolving. 2 EM export and import volumes are cointegrated with non-OECD oil consumption, our proxy for EM oil demand, in regressions starting pre- and post-GFC, meaning they share a common trend and are in a long-term equilibrium. The adjusted R2 coefficient of determination for EM oil demand as a function of EM export volumes is 0.91 for estimates starting in 2003 and 2010 (the pre- and post-GFC periods); for EM imports, it is 0.84 post-GFC, and 0.90 pre-GFC. Post-GFC, we estimate a 1% increase (decrease) in EM import and export volumes translates to an 88bp and 85bp gain (decline) in EM oil demand. The read-through on this is EM trade volumes are closely tied to income growth, given the income-elasticity of demand for oil is ~ 1.0 in non-OECD economies, according to the OECD. Please see "The Price of Oil - Will It Start Rising Again?" OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1031, p. 6 (2013). In our modeling, we assume the GFC ended in 2010. 3 Please see our discussion of this production-cut extension in the joint report we did with BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy on June 1, 2017, entitled "Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories." It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 The R2 coefficients of determination for the cointegrating regressions of Brent prices on EM export and import volumes are 0.90 and 0.93, respectively, for post-GFC estimates. For estimates beginning in 2000, the R2 coefficients are 0.88, while the elasticities are ~1.20 for the EM trade variables. These models also include a parameter for the broad trade-weighted USD, which, post-GFC, has become more important to the evolution of Brent prices: A 1% increase in the currency parameter translates to a price decline of more than 5%, which is approximately twice the value of the estimates starting pre-GFC. 5 Our estimates for WTI produce similar results for the pre- and post-GFC periods. 6 We examined this in our August 4 and 11, 2016, in "Memo To The Fed: EM Oil, Metals Demand Key To U.S. Inflation," and "Global Inflation And Commodity Markets." Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 The R2 coefficients of determination for the core PCE, U.S. CPI and EMU CPI estimates as a function of EM oil demand are 0.97, 0.94 and 0.85, respectively. It is interesting to observe that prompt measures of inflation are not correlated to oil prices, but that 5-year 5-year CPI swaps remain highly correlated with oil prices, the 3-year forward WTI futures contract in particular; the R2 for the estimate of the 5y5y CPI swap as a function of the 3-year WTI contract is 75%. 8 In the August 11, 2016, article "Global Inflation And Commodity Markets," we found Chinese inflation to be equally sensitive to EM oil demand. We will be exploring this further when we look at base metals demand vis-à-vis EM trading volumes in forthcoming research. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Although it is tempting to argue that emerging markets are in a new era where past correlations no longer matter, our belief is that it is only a matter of time until fundamentals reassert themselves. Several measures of equity markets have reached or are close to their previous structural peaks. In the second half of 1990s, booming U.S. and European growth as well as the tech mania, did not preclude a bear market in commodities and EM financial markets. Overall, EM risk assets will not be immune to selling off considerably from the current overbought levels if Chinese growth and commodities prices surprise to the downside, as we expect. Falling commodities prices will weigh on Indonesia's terms of trade. Equity investors should maintain an underweight position in this market and currency traders should continue shorting the rupiah. Feature A New Era? Money has been flowing into EM financial markets, irrespective of the evolution of many economic and financial variables that have in the past shaped markets dynamics. Indeed, EM share prices and currencies have refused rolling over despite a relapse in a number of variables they have historically been correlated with. EM share prices have continued to surge, even though the aggregate EM manufacturing PMI has rolled over (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Unsustainable Decoupling The recent relapse in the EM manufacturing PMI has not hurt EM currencies either (Chart I-2, top panel). In addition, EM currencies have diverged from commodities prices, an unprecedented historical occurrence (Chart I-2, bottom panel). The same applies to EM versus DM relative equity performance. Chart I-3 demonstrates that EM share prices have outperformed their DM counterparts year to date, even though the EM manufacturing PMI considerably underperformed DM's. Chart I-2Untenable Divergence Chart I-3Relative Share Prices And Relative PMIs Notably, EM stock prices have even defied the recent setback in EM net earnings revisions (Chart I-4). Typically, the latter correlate with swings in share prices, but this time both variables have diverged. Finally, it is important to note that this phenomena of decoupling cannot be explained by the performance of technology stocks. EM share prices excluding technology companies have still rallied, albeit much less, despite the decline in EM net earnings revisions and the EM manufacturing PMI. Remarkably, China's H shares - the index that does not include U.S.-listed Chinese internet/social media companies and is instead "heavy" in banks and "old economy" stocks - have still ignored both the drop in China's manufacturing PMI and rising local interest rates (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Even Analysts' Net EPS ##br##Revisions Have Rolled Over Chart I-5Puzzling... One could argue that the dominant macro drivers of EM in recent months have been the U.S. dollar and U.S. bond yields, both of which have downshifted since mid-December 2016. If the greenback and expectations of Federal Reserve policy continue to shape EM performance, the outlook is not much better. The basis is that the Fed will likely continue to hike interest rates if global stocks continue to rally. Notably, U.S. corporate bond yields/spreads are very low, the dollar is already down quite a bit, U.S. asset prices are reflating and U.S. economic growth is decent. If the Fed does not normalize interest rates now, when and under what conditions will it? Similarly, investor sentiment on the U.S. dollar is no longer bullish, and the market expects only 44 basis points in Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months. The latter is a low bar. We maintain that the dollar's selloff - even though it has lasted longer than we previously expected - is late, especially versus EM currencies. Bottom Line: Although it is tempting to argue that emerging markets are in a new era where past correlations no longer matter, our belief is that it is only a matter of time until fundamentals reassert themselves. As and when this happens - our hunch is that it is a matter of weeks not months - EM risk assets will sell off materially and underperform their DM counterparts. Signs Of A Top? Or Is This Time Different? The EM equity rally has been facilitated by the tech mania occurring worldwide as well as by falling financial market volatility and risk premia - leading investors to bet on EM carry trades. A relevant question is whether these trends are close to the end or have much further to go. We have the following observations: EM share prices in local currency terms, as well as the KOSPI and Taiwanese TSE indexes in U.S. dollar terms, all are testing their previous highs which they have never broken out from (Chart I-6). The question we would ask is: Why should this time be different, or why would these indexes break out this time around? In our opinion, EM fundamentals, including the outlook for EPS growth, remain poor. We have elaborated on this issue at length in previous reports1 and stand by our assessment. On many metrics, the U.S. equity market is expensive, and the rally is overstretched (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Facing A Major ##br##Technical Resistance Chart I-7U.S. Stocks Are Expensive ##br##And Overstretched These charts do not provide clues for the timing of a reversal, but when all these ratios reach their previous secular tops, investors should be critically examining the investment outlook. Our take is as follows: Without a broad-based U.S. corporate profit recession, a major bear market in the S&P 500 is not likely, but share prices could soon hit a major resistance and correct meaningfully from the current expensive and overbought levels. While EM stocks are not expensive, the outlook for their share prices is negative because we expect EM earnings to shrink again by early next year1. Finally, not only is U.S. equity market volatility extremely muted but EM equity as well as U.S. bond market volatility are testing their previous lows (Chart I-8). When implied volatility reached these low levels in the past, it marked a major market reversal. Bottom Line: Several measures of equity market performance have reached or are close to their previous structural peaks and financial markets volatility is at record lows. While one can make the case that this time is different and this EM equity rally will persist, we continue to err on the side of caution. Tech Mania And EM In The 1990s A recent narrative in the marketplace has been as follows: given the share of tech stocks' market cap has risen to 26%, and commodities sectors presently account for only 14% of the EM MSCI benchmark, it makes sense that EM equities have decoupled from commodities prices and have become correlated with tech stocks and DM growth. In this respect, it is instrumental to revisit what happened in the second half of the 1990s, when global tech/internet and telecom stocks were in the midst of a mania like social media/tech stocks nowadays. We have the following observations on this matter: EM share prices, currencies, and bonds plunged in the second half of the 1990s, even though U.S. and European real GDP growth was extremely strong - 4.5% and 3% on average, respectively (Chart I-9, top panel) - and the S&P 500 was in a full-fledged bull market. Chart I-8Volatility: As Low As It Gets Chart I-9EM Stocks And DM Growth In The 1990s EM share prices collapsed in 1997-'98, even though U.S. and European import volumes were expanding at a double-digit rates (Chart I-9, middle panel). Furthermore, the crises originated in emerging Asian countries such as Thailand, Korea and Malaysia that were large exporters to advanced economies. Besides, the share and importance of the U.S. and European economies was much larger 20 years ago than it is now. Back then, China was negligible in terms of its impact on EM in general and commodities in particular. The question is, if an economic boom in the U.S., and Europe in the second half of the 1990s did not preclude crises in export-oriented economies in East Asia, why would moderate DM growth today - as well as their much smaller share of global trade - boost EM share prices from already elevated levels. Twenty years ago, EM share prices fell along with declining U.S. bond yields (Chart I-10). The Fed hiked rates only once by 25 basis points in March 1997. In the past 18 months, the Fed has already hiked 3 times. In fact, the U.S. dollar was in a bull market in the second half of the 1990s, despite falling U.S. bond yields during that period. EM stocks collapsed along with falling commodities prices in 1997-'98 (Chart I-11, top panel) even though the S&P 500 was in the midst of a major bull market (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Chart I-10The 1990s: EM Bear Market ##br##Was Not Due To Rising U.S. Bond Yields Chart I-11EM Stocks, Commodities And The S&P 500 Importantly, the mania sectors of the late 1990s - technology and telecom - accounted for approximately 33% of EM market cap in January 2000. Presently, following an exponential rally and outperformance, technology and social media/internet stocks make up 27% of the EM MSCI benchmark. In addition, the market cap of energy and materials companies stood at 19% of the MSCI EM equity benchmark in January 2000, compared with 14% presently (Chart I-12). Hence, the market cap of commodities sectors was not substantially larger in the late 1990s than today. Finally, Korean and Taiwanese bourses have historically had a high positive correlation with both oil and industrial metals prices (Chart I-13). The reason for this relationship is that both economies are leveraged to the global business cycle, and commodities prices are often driven by global trade cycles. Chart I-13Asian Bourses And Commodities Prices Bottom Line: In the late 1990s, EM crises/bear markets occurred despite booming U.S. and European growth, and at a time when these economies were much more important to EM than they are today. The EM bear market also occurred amid the S&P 500 bull market and falling U.S. bond yields. To be sure, we are not suggesting that everything is identical between today and the 1990s, but all the above suggests to us that EM risk assets will not be immune to selling off considerably from the current overbought levels if Chinese growth and commodities prices surprise to the downside, as we expect. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "EM Profits, China And Commodities Redux", dated May 31, 2017, link available on page 16. Indonesia: Facing Commodities Headwinds (Again) Decelerating Chinese growth and falling commodities prices will weigh on Indonesia's exchange rate (Chart II-1). In turn, not only will the currency depreciation undermine foreign currency returns to investors in stocks and local bonds, but it will also exert upward pressure on local rates. The latter will extend the credit downturn and weigh on domestic demand. Chinese imports of Indonesian coal have begun falling in volume terms (Chart II-2). Consistently, Chinese thermal coal prices - the type of coal that China buys from Indonesia - have also rolled over decisively after rallying sharply in 2016. Chart II-1Indonesia Currency ##br##And Commodities Prices Chart II-2Indonesia's Coal Exports ##br##To China And Coal Prices Indonesia's exports of base metals and oil/gas to China are also declining in U.S. dollar terms. Commodities exports account for around 30% of Indonesia's total exports. As such, falling commodities prices will lead to negative terms of trade for this nation. On the domestic front, consumer demand remains sluggish. Although auto sales have revived, motorcycles sales are still declining for a fourth consecutive year (Chart II-3). Meanwhile, capital expenditures are tame. Capital goods imports are no longer contracting, but there has been no recovery so far (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Consumer Spending: ##br##Auto And Motorcycle Sales Chart II-4Indonesia: Capex Is Sluggish Bank loan growth has not recovered much (Chart II-5) despite low interest rates and a benign external backdrop since early 2016, specifically the revival in commodities prices and large foreign portfolio inflows. NPLs on banks' balance sheet will rise further due to weak growth and lower commodities prices. That, in turn, will dent banks' willingness to grow their loan book. In regard to the credit cycle, Indonesia might be following India's example with a several year lag. In India's banking system, high NPLs have curtailed public banks' desire to lend and, consequently, capital spending has been in disarray. Similarly, Indonesia's credit-sensitive consumer spending and investment expenditure growth will disappoint in the next 12 months as credit growth slows anew. Finally, at a trailing price-earnings ratio of 19.6, equity valuations are not attractive. The poor growth outlook that we foresee does not justify such high multiples. Besides, relative performance of this bourse versus the overall EM equity benchmark is stuck between technical support and resistance (Chart II-6). We are biased to believe that it will relapse from the current juncture. Chart II-5Indonesia's Credit Cycle Is Not Out Of The Woods Chart II-6Indonesian Equity Relative Performance Bottom Line: Weaker commodities prices emanating from slower Chinese growth will hurt Indonesia's currency. We recommend equity investors to keep an underweight position in this bourse. Also, we remain short IDR versus the U.S. dollar and underweight local currency bonds within the EM universe. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Will Trump's trade rhetoric damage the U.S. service sector's abilities to generate a trade surplus and create high-paying jobs? Our assessment of the latest Beige Book via the BCA Beige Book Monitor supports the Fed's view that Q1 weakness was an anomaly and inflation is headed higher. This will keep the Fed on track to tighten in June and again later this year. GDP growth in 2017 is poised to exceed the Fed's forecast for the first time in seven years if the recent pattern of 2H GDP beating 1H GDP growth is repeated. Global oil inventories are set to move lower and drive oil prices higher. The odds of a recession remain low even with the economy at full employment. Feature The May employment report fell short of expectations, but the average gain of 121,000 jobs per month over the past 3 months and the drop in the unemployment rate are still enough to tighten the labor market and keep the Fed on track to tighten later this month. The unemployment rate dipped to 4.3% in May and is now 0.4% below the Fed's view of full employment. Wage growth remains stagnant despite the state of health of the labor market, as year-over-year average hourly earnings growth remained at just 2.5% in May (Chart 1). Chart 1Labor Market Still Tightening##BR##Despite Disappointing May Taking a broader view, the job picture in the service sector remains robust and wages in the export-oriented service industries remain well above wages in the goods sector. In this week's report we examine the impact of trade on the labor market and highlight areas where Trump's rhetoric may hurt trade-related job growth. Trump At Your Service The large trade surplus in the U.S. service sector is a hidden source of strength for the economy and labor market. Trump campaigned on his ability to create high paying manufacturing jobs, but his America First rhetoric is threatening jobs in the high paying service sector. Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has imported more than it has exported, acting as a drag on GDP growth. The trade gap reflects a large and persistent goods deficit, which more than offsets a growing trade surplus on the service side. U.S. imported goods exceeded exports by $1.3 trillion in 2016. Service exports totaled an all-time high of $778 billion in 2016, $270 billion more than imports. Exports of services have increased by 7% per year on average since 2000, which is nearly twice as fast as nominal GDP (Charts 2A & 2B). Chart 2AThe U.S. Runs Trade##BR##Surplus In Services... Chart 2B...But It's Not Large Enough To Offset##BR##The Big Trade Deficit In Goods The trade surplus in services added 0.07% to GDP in Q1 2017, 0.04% in 2016, and has consistently added to GDP growth over the past few decades, although it is swamped by the large drag on GDP as a result of the trade deficit on goods. Industries where the U.S. enjoys a trade surplus have experienced job growth that is more than seven times faster than in industries where the U.S. runs a deficit. In addition, median wages ($29 as of April 2017) among surplus-producing industries are more than 20% higher than in industries in the goods sector ($24) where there is a trade deficit, even though wages are rising quicker in the goods-producing sector in the past year (Chart 3). U.S. service sector exports tend to compete on quality (not on price) and, therefore, will not be as affected as U.S. goods exports if the dollar meets BCA's forecast of a 10% rise in the next 6-12 months (Chart 4). Chart 3Wages In Export Led Service Industries##BR##20% Higher Than In Goods Sector Chart 4Service Sector Export Orders##BR##At New High Despite Strong Dollar However, Trump's trade policies may threaten to reduce the U.S.'s global dominance in services. The U.S. has the largest trade surpluses in travel (which includes education), intellectual property, financial services, and legal, accounting and consulting services (Table 1). The U.S. also runs a large surplus in areas such as intellectual property, software and advertising. In 2015, foreigners spent $92 billion more to travel to, vacation in and be educated in America compared with what U.S. residents spent for those services overseas. Anecdotal reports note that travel to the U.S. is down by as much as 15% since the start of the year, and that 40% of U.S. colleges and universities have seen a decline in foreign applications, putting the nearly $100 billion trade surplus at risk. Other Trump policies, such as the proposed travel ban and some of his "America First" campaign-style rhetoric, could jeopardize the trade surpluses in financial services ($77 billion), software services ($30 billion), TV and film right ($13 billion), architectural services ($10 billion) and advertising ($8) billion. Table 1Key Components Of U.S. Trade Surplus In Services Trump's trade rhetoric potentially threatens U.S. service exports to NAFTA countries (Canada and Mexico), the Eurozone and the emerging markets. President Trump campaigned on renegotiating NAFTA, supporting Brexit and pulling the U.S. out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Trade in services are key to all of those treaties, although trade in goods gets more attention. At $56 billion in 2015, Canada is the U.S.'s second largest service export market, and Mexico is a top 10 destination ($31 billion). Forty percent of U.S. service exports go to Europe, and at $66 billion in 2015, the U.K. is the single largest market for U.S. service exports. The U.S. sends half of its service exports to EM nations, with markets in Asia accounting for just under 30% of all U.S. service exports. Thus investors should carefully monitor the progress of all three of these trade deals to help better assess the impact on U.S. trade and jobs in the service sector. Bottom Line: The U.S.'s large trade surplus in services fosters faster job creation and better pay than in the goods-producing area where the U.S. has a trade deficit. The Trump administration's rhetoric and actions on trade and globalism potentially risks America's dominance in the service sector. In theory, U.S. trade restrictions could add to U.S. GDP growth as long as there is no retaliation from its trading partners (which is unlikely). But any gains on the manufacturing trade front could be largely offset by damage to the U.S. surplus in services trade. Beige Book Backs The Fed For the Fed, policymakers are treating any potential changes to trade and fiscal policy as risks to their outlook. At the moment, they are judging the need for tighter policy based on the evolution of the labor market and inflation. The Beige Book released on May 31 confirmed the FOMC's base-case outlook. It keeps the Fed on track to tighten in June and then again later this year as it begins to trim its balance sheet. Our quantitative assessment of the qualitative Beige Book that we introduced in April 17 found that the economy had rebounded from a weak Q1 and that inflation was in an uptrend despite recent soft readings.1 The dollar seems to have faded as a key concern for small businesses and bankers. Business uncertainty around government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) remained elevated. Our analysis of the Beige Book also shows that commercial and residential real estate, the former a surprise source of strength in Q1 GDP, remains stout more than halfway through Q2. Chart 5 shows that the BCA Beige Book Monitor ticked up to 71% in May 2017 from 64% in April. The metric is in line with its cycle highs recorded in mid-2014 as oil prices peaked. "Inflation" words in the Beige Book hit a new peak in May and are in sharp contrast to the recent soft readings on CPI and the PCE deflator. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may be turning up soon. Chart 5May Beige Book Points To Solid Growth In Q2 In Chart 5, panel 4 we track mentions of "strong dollar" in the report. The May Beige Book saw the same number of references to a strong dollar as the May 2016 report. This suggests that the dollar is not as big a concern for business owners as it was from early 2015 through early 2016. Housing added 0.5 percentage points to growth in Q1, and business spending on structures added 0.7 percentage points. The latest Beige Book suggests that both sectors remain robust here in Q2 (Chart not shown). The implication is that the U.S. economy is poised to clear the low hurdle in 2017 set for it by the FOMC in late 2016. The Fed's economic growth target for 2017 (set at the December 2016 FOMC meeting) was just 2.1%, the lowest year ahead forecast since 2009. The projection incorporates the Fed's lowered trajectory for potential output, but may also reflect the fact that actual GDP growth has not exceeded the Fed's forecast every year since 2009 (Chart 6). GDP growth in 1H 2017 is tracking between 2% and 2.5% despite the weak start to the year. In late May, Q1 GDP growth was revised to +1.2% from the 0.7% reading reported in late April. Based on the Atlanta Fed's GDP Now, the NY Fed's Nowcast and readings on ISM, vehicle sales and the Beige Book, GDP in Q2 is tracking to near 3%. If the economy rebounds from the lackluster first quarter as we expect, then real output will be on course to match or exceed the Fed's forecast for the first time since the recession. We expect an acceleration for fundamental reasons and due to poor seasonal adjustment. In 5 of the past 7 years, real GDP growth in Q3 and Q4 was the same or stronger than the pace of expansion in the first half of the year (Table 2). During that period, 2H output growth averaged 2.4%, while 1H growth was an anemic 1.8%. In the years when Q1 GDP was weak,2 as it was this year, real economic output in the second half of the year accelerated from 1H growth nearly every time. Table 2GDP Growth In 2H Has Met Or Exceeded 1H Growth In 5 Of Past 7 Years Bottom Line: The latest Beige Book (prepared for the June 13-14 FOMC meeting) confirms policymakers' assessment that the weak growth in Q1 was transitory and inflation is in an uptrend. The economy remains on target to hit or exceed the Fed's growth objectives. The FOMC is poised to raise rates in June and one more time by year end. This view is not discounted in the bond market, implying that Treasury yields are too low. Equity prices could be undermined by higher yields and the dollar, but this will be offset by rising growth (and profit) expectations if our base-case view pans out. Oil Prices: Fade The Recent Weakness A pickup in U.S. growth will also be positive for oil prices, although it is OPEC's efforts to curtail excess inventories that is the main driver of our bullish view. Our commodity strategists believe that OPEC 2.0's recent production cut extension will be successful in bringing OECD inventories down to normalized levels, even assuming some compliance fatigue (cheating).3 Shale production is bouncing back quickly. OPEC's November 2016 agreement signaled to the world that OPEC (and Russia) would abandon Saudi Arabia's professed commitment to a market share war, and would instead work together to support a ~$50/bbl floor under the price of oil. Such a price floor dramatically reduced the investment risk for shale drilling, and emboldened producers to pour money into vastly increased drilling programs. Nonetheless, global oil demand continues to grow robustly. Moreover, production is eroding for oil producers outside of (Middle East) OPEC, Russia and U.S. Shale, which collectively supply half the market. The cumulative effects of spending constraints during 2015-18 will result in falling output in the coming years for this group of producers. Adding it all up, we expect demand to exceed supply for the remainder of 2017, which will result in a significant drawdown in oil inventories (Chart 7). Our strategists think the inventory adjustment will push the price of oil up to US$60 by year end. They expect a trading range of US$45-65 to hold between now and 2020. Chart 8 shows a simple model for oil prices, based on global industrial production, oil production, OECD oil inventories and oil consumption in the major countries and China. If OPEC is successful in reducing inventories to their 5-year moving average, the model implies that oil prices will surge by more than US$10! The coefficient on oil inventories in the model is probably overly influenced by the one major swing in inventories we have seen in the last couple of decades, suggesting that we must take the results with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, our point is that oil prices have significant upside potential if the excessive inventory problem is solved. Chart 7Significant Drawdown##BR##In Inventories Is Coming Chart 8Upside Potential For Oil##BR##If Inventory Issue Is Resolved Bottom Line: The extension of OPEC 2.0 production cuts reinforces our bullish view for oil prices. Revisiting The Odds Of A Recession It seems odd at first glance to be discussing recession risks at a time when growth is poised to accelerate. Nonetheless, BCA's Global Investment Strategy service recently noted that investors should be on watch for recession now that the economy has reached full employment.4 Historically, once the unemployment rate reached estimates of full employment, the odds of a recession in the subsequent 12 months increased four-fold. In last week's report, we maintained that the lack of progress on fiscal policy by the Trump administration may actually be positive for risk assets in the medium term because it would stretch out the cycle and thus lower recession risks.5 The economic data have disappointed so far this year, as highlighted by the economic surprise index (Chart 9). Despite this, there is not much talk of recession in the news media and various models also show slim chances of recession this year (Chart 10). Only one of eight components in our BCA model is flashing recession: the three-year moving average of the Fed funds rate is rising because the Fed rate hike cycle began in late 2015. Chart 9Economic Data Still Disappointing, But Does Not Signal A Recession Chart 10Odds Of A Recession This Year Remain Low In a prior report we dismissed the rollover in commodity prices as a recessionary signal and noted that Trump's political woes would only slow the GOP's legislative agenda. Nonetheless, even without fiscal stimulus, the U.S. economy will still grow above its long-term potential, tighten the labor market and push up wages and inflation in the coming quarters. Bottom Line: The odds of recession remain low despite the U.S. economy being at full employment. The delay in Trumponomics' will prolong the expansion and will support risk assets over the next 6-12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Growth Inflation And The Fed", dated May 8, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories", dated June 1, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Fiscal Policy In The Spotlight", dated May 26, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Corporate Earnings Versus Trump Turbulence", dated May 29, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The global economy remains awash in massive amounts of oversupply, reflecting extraordinary levels of capex in emerging markets. This will weigh on global inflation. Thanks to a tighter labor market, the U.S. is likely to suffer less from this force than the euro area or commodity producers. In this context, the tightening in Chinese and U.S. policy could represent a severe blow to the recent improvement in global trade. Continue to hold some yen and some dollars but stay short commodity and European currencies. Feature The U.S. is in its eighth year of recovery, yet core PCE is clocking in at a paltry 1.5% despite the headline unemployment rate standing 0.3% below its long-term equilibrium and despite incredibly low interest rates. The phenomenon is not unique to the U.S., euro area core CPI remains a meager 1% and even Germany, despite experiencing an unemployment at 26 year lows, is incapable of generating core inflation beyond 1.6%. Let us not even broach the topic of Japan... So what lies behind this low inflation environment? Not Enough Capex Or Too Much Capex? Capex in advanced economies has averaged 21% of GDP since 2008, compared to an average of 24% of GDP between 1980 and 2007, suggesting that the supply side of the economy is not expanding as fast as before (Chart I-1). Historically, countries plagued by low investment rates have tended to experience higher inflation. Simply put, these low investment rates mean these economies do not enjoy high labor productivity growth rates, causing severe bottlenecks. When these capacity constraints are hit, inflation emerges. This time around, the low investment rate in advanced economies is not yielding this development. Why? One reason is that demand has been hampered by the rise in savings preferences that emerged following the financial crisis (Chart I-2). But another phenomenon is also at play. Global capex has remained very elevated. Chart I-1Low Investment In DM ##br##Should Create Bottlenecks Chart I-2Post 2008: ##br##Marked Preference For Savings As Chart I-3 illustrates, global capex has averaged 25.2% of world GDP since 2010, well above the international average from 1980 to 2009. This is simply a reflection of the massive amount of capacity expansion that continues to materialize in the EM space, where investment has equaled more than 30% of GDP for eight years in a row. This matters because since the 1990s, the world has experienced a massive outward shift in the aggregate supply curve, resulting in an extended period of falling inflation and then, low inflation, independent of the state of growth or of long-term inflation expectations (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Global Capex Is High Chart I-437 Years Of Inflation History At A Glance In the 1990s, this expansion of global production capacity reflected the addition of billions of potential workers to the international capitalist system, but this phenomenon slowed massively in the 2000s and is now over (Chart I-5). Instead, the driver of the expansion of the global supply curve has since become the rampant investment taking place in developing economies, which has resulted in a massive increase in the capital-to-GDP ratio for the entire planet (Chart I-6). Chart I-62000s To Present: Capital Drives##br## The Supply Expansion In the first decade of the millennium, this massive increase in the level of global capacity was still manageable. Global real GDP growth expressed in purchasing-power parity terms averaged 7% from 2000 to 2008 and was able to absorb some of the productive capacity being added to the world economy. As a result, core inflation average 2% in the OECD while short-term and long-term interest rates averaged 2.9% and 4.1%, respectively. However, since 2009, global GDP growth expressed in purchasing-power parity terms has only averaged 4.6%, despite a continued robust pace of investment globally, suggesting that now, supply growth is outstripping demand growth by a greater margin than in the previous cycle. This means that to achieve an average core inflation rate of 1.8% in the OECD, short-term and long-term interest rates have needed to average 0.7% and 2.4%, respectively. Going forward, the problem is that global excess capacity has not been expunged. With credit growth still limited in the G10 and in a downtrend in China (Chart I-7), deflationary tendencies are likely to remain a prevalent feature of the global economy for the rest of the business cycle. Thus, central banks the world over will find it very difficult to tighten monetary policy by much without re-invigorating downward spirals in inflation. While this problem applies to the Fed - a case cogently described by Lael Brainard this week - this is even truer for many other economies. The global trend in inflation is a function of this global expansion in supply, but domestic dynamics can still affect the dispersion of national inflation rates around this depressed global level. As Chart I-8 shows, countries with an unemployment rate substantially below equilibrium - a negative unemployment gap - do experience higher levels of inflation. Today, this puts the U.S. on a path toward higher inflation relative to the euro area. This suggests that there remains a valid case to expect a tightening of monetary conditions in the U.S. vis-à-vis the euro area. Chart I-7Low Credit Growth Harms Demand Growth In this vein, Japan is an interesting case. Japan does have one of the most negative unemployment gaps among major economies, yet it experiences one of the lowest inflation rates. Japan is such an outlier that if it were excluded from the chart above, the explanatory power of the employment gap on inflation would double. This is because Japan has to grapple with another, even more pernicious problem: chronically depressed inflation expectations. Hence, the BoJ has to commit to an "irresponsibly easy" monetary policy and keep the economy growing above its potential for an extended period of time to genuinely shock inflation expectations upwards if it ever wants to remotely approach its 2% inflation target. Thus, we should remain negative the yen on a cyclical basis, only buying the JPY when asset markets are at risk. Bottom Line: The global economy remains awash in excessive supply. In the 1980s and 1990s, much of the supply expansion reflected an increase in the global labor force; since the turn of the millennium, the global supply expansion has been a function of high investment rates in developing economies. Without credit growth, the global economy will be hostage to deflationary pressures, at least for the rest of this cycle. Despite this picture, among major economies, the U.S. needs the smallest amount of monetary accommodation, supporting a bullish dollar stance. Policy Mistake In The Making? In this context of global overcapacity, low growth and underlying deflationary pressures, deflationary policy mistakes are easy to come by, and the world economy may be facing two such shocks. In and of itself, the U.S. economy may be able to handle higher rates. Even if inflation is likely to remain low by historical standards, a rebound toward 2% could happen later this year. At the very least, our diffusion index of industrial sector activity suggests that the recent inflation deceleration in the U.S. may be over (Chart I-9). However, it remains to be seen if EM economies, which is where the true excess capacity still lies, can actually handle higher global real rates. The rollover in our global leading indicator diffusion index is perplexing and points to a deceleration in global growth, a potential warning sign about the frailty of the global economy (Chart I-10). Additionally, it is true that 1% CPI inflation in China does not necessitate much of a strong policy response by the PBoC. But the vast swathe of cumulative capital investment in China implies that this country could suffer from the greatest amount of excess capacity (Chart I-11). China required a massive amount of stimulus in 2015 and early 2016 to generate a small rebound in growth. Thus, the current tightening in Chinese monetary conditions, as small as it may be, could be enough to prompt another wave of weakness in that country. The recent softness in PMIs - with the Caixin gauge falling below 50 - could be a symptom of this problem. Chart I-9U.S. CPI Deceleration Is Ending... Chart I-10...But Global Growth Is Deteriorating Chart I-11China Is Oversupplied Making the situation even more precarious is that China stands at the apex of the overcapacity problem, which makes it prone to develop virtuous and vicious cycles. Chinese corporate debt stands at 180% of GDP, heavily concentrated in state-owned enterprises and heavy industries. This means that swings in producer prices can have a deep impact on real rates. Based on a 10 percentage points swing in PPI, Chinese real rates were able to collapse from 10% to -1% in the matter of 12 months last year. The problem is that for this PPI rebound to happen, Chinese monetary conditions had to ease greatly (Chart I-12). Now that Chinese monetary conditions are tightening and now that commodity prices are weakening anew, PPI could once again fall toward 0%, lifting real rates to 4.4% in the process (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Chinese MCI: From Friend To Foe Chart I-13Real Rates Are Likely To Go Up This means that the already emerging contraction in manufacturing and the recent deceleration in new capex projects could gather further momentum (Chart I-14). As credit flows dry up because of the increasing price of credit in a weakening and over-supplied economy, so will Chinese imports, which are so sensitive to the investment cycle and credit impulse (Chart I-15). This is a problem because the recent bright patch in the global economy was based on this rebound in Chinese demand. In the wake of the Chinese growth acceleration last year, global exports and export prices rebounded sharply (Chart I-16). However, now that China is facing a renewed slowdown, this improvement is likely to dissipate. Chart I-14Problems With Chinese Growth Chart I-15Slowing Chinese Credit Will Hurt Chinese Imports... Chart I-16...Which Will Weigh On Global Trade This is obviously negative for the commodity currency complex. Not only does this mean that the negative terms of trade shock that is affecting many commodity producers could deepen - for example iron ore futures continue to fall and are now down 39% since mid-march - but also, monetary policy could be eased relative to the U.S. Actually, our monetary stance gauge, based on real short rates and the slope of the yield curve, already highlights potential weaknesses for AUD/USD (Chart I-17). This development is also a problem for Europe. As we have highlighted before, European growth is three times more levered to EM dynamics than the U.S. economy is. Also, employment in the manufacturing sector in the euro area is still five percentage points above that of the U.S., underscoring the euro area's greater exposure to global manufacturing and global trade. This means that if Chinese troubles deepen, the closing of the European unemployment gap might slow, at least relative to the U.S. where the unemployment rate is already below equilibrium. Therefore, the high-time to bet on a tightening of European policy relative to the U.S. could be passing. Already, before the European economy has even been hit by a negative shock from EM, the euro looks vulnerable. Investors are very long the euro, but also EUR/USD has dissociated enough from interest rate fundamentals that it is now expensive on a short-term basis. The relative monetary stance gauge between the euro area and the U.S. is pointing toward trouble ahead (Chart I-18). This trend may be magnified if, as we expect, global goods prices weaken anew. Another problem for the euro is that now that the world has embraced president Macron with a firm handshake, political risk may be once again rearing its ugly head in Europe. The Italicum electoral reform in Italy is progressing and there may be a new prime minister sitting in the Palazzo Chigi in Rome this fall. The problem is that the Italian public remains much more euroskeptic than France and the euro is supported by barely more than 50% of the population (Chart I-19, top panel). With euroskeptic and pro-euro parties standing neck-and-neck in the polls, the risk of a referendum on the euro in the area's third largest economy is becoming increasingly real (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Chart I-17Relative Monetary Conditions ##br##Point To A Lower AUD Chart I-18Euro At ##br##Risk Chart I-19Italy Is Not ##br##France The yen could benefit if the combined impact of higher U.S. rates and tighter Chinese policy proves to be a mistake. Our composite indicator of global asset market volatility - based on implied volatility in bonds, global stocks, global commodities, and various exchange rates - is near record lows (Chart I-20). Hence, global risk assets - commodity and EM plays in particular - could suffer some damage in the face of a deeper than anticipated global growth slowdown led by China. The recent improvement in Japanese industrial production, which mirrors the improvement in EM trade, may be short-lived. This would depress Japanese inflation expectations and boost Japanese real rates, helping the yen in the process (Chart I-21). Shorting GBP/JPY may be one of the best ways to take advantages of these dynamics (Chart I-22). Chart I-20Global Cross-Asset ##br##Volatility Is Too Low Chart I-21If China And EM Slow, Japanese ##br##CPI Expectations Will Plunge Chart I-22New Downleg In ##br##GBP/JPY? Bottom Line: An oversupplied global economy could find it difficult to withstand the combined tightening emanating from China and the U.S. The improvement in global trade and global good prices is likely to dissipate in the coming month. The euro and commodity currencies could suffer from this development and the yen could benefit. Concluding Thoughts Global policy makers will ultimately not stand pat in the face of this problem. This may in fact deepen their well-entrenched dovish biases. As a result, while the scenario above sounds dire, it is likely to be transitory. The Chinese authorities will not let growth crater; European and Japanese policymakers will fight deflation; and even the Fed may be forced to leave policy easier than it would like. We will explore this topic in more detail in future publications. A Few Words On The RMB Chart I-23China Has Regained Control ##br##Of Its Capital Account This week, the RMB has been well bid as the PBoC announced that the currency will increasingly be used as a countercyclical tool. The market has interpreted this move as an attack on speculators betting on a falling RMB. The conditions had become very propitious for this kind of announcement to lift the CNY. On the back of a weaker dollar the trade-weighted RMB had in fact weakened for most of 2017 (Chart I-23, top panel), implying that the RMB has continued to help the Chinese economy. Additionally, capital flight out of China has slowed in response to the enforcement of capital controls, something made clear by the collapse in import over-invoicing (Chart I-23, bottom panel). Going forward, it is not clear whether this announcement is necessarily bullish or bearish. It all depends on the Chinese economy and its deflationary pressures. If we are correct that Chinese deflationary pressures are set to increase in the coming quarters, this could imply that Chinese authorities put downward pressure on the CNY later this year. That being said, we remain reluctant to short the yuan to play Chinese deflationary forces. The capital account is well controlled and the PBoC will continue to aggressively manage the exchange rate. This implies that currencies like the AUD or BRL, which exhibit strong correlations with Chinese imports, could remain the main vehicles to play a Chinese slowdown in the forex space. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The greenback displayed further weakness as FOMC member Brainard shared her opinions questioning the future path of U.S. policy. We consider these remarks as temporary hurdles for the dollar, as fundamentals are still in favor of a stronger dollar, which is something the Fed recognizes. This week, some minor deflationary worries resurfaced as the ISM Prices Paid declined to 60.5 from the previous 68.5. While this is true, the labor market continues to tighten as the ADP survey come in very strong. Additionally, ISM Manufacturing PMI also paints a brighter picture for manufacturing, coming in at 54.9. We believe the Fed will hike this month, and will continue to highlight its tightening path going forward, which will provide a fillip for the dollar. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Europe delivered a more negative outlook this week with softer data: Services sentiment, economic sentiment indicator, industrial confidence and business climate all came in less than expected; German CPI disappointed with CPI increasing at a 1.5% rate, less than the expected 2% rate, and the harmonized index also underperformed at 1.4%; European CPI also disappointed at 1.4%, while core CPI also slowed; However, Italian unemployment improved to 11.1% from 11.5%. President Draghi also reiterated his dovish stance in a speech on Monday. While the euro is up this week, elevated short-term valuations warrant a lower euro in coming months. Furthermore, following Draghi's reiteration, rate differentials may continue to move in favor of the dollar. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Upbeat data from Japan has lifted the yen this week: Job/applicants ratio is at 1.48, a level last seen in 1974; Retail trade increased at a 3.2% annual pace, much more than the expected 2.3% rate; Industrial production increased at a 5.7% pace; Housing starts increased at 1 .9%. While data surprises to the upside in Japan, low inflation still remains entrenched in the economy. We believe the BoJ will remain dovish until inflation emerges, which will keep JPY's upside limited. That being said, risk-averse behavior can provide a temporary tailwind for the yen in the upcoming months. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 The U.K.'s consumer sector remains mixed, showing a ray of sunshine after batches of poor numbers: Gfk Consumer Confidence came in at -5, better than the expected -8; Consumer credit came in at GBP 1.525 bn,; M4 Money Supply also increased at 8.2% yoy. Mortgage approvals, however, clicked in below estimates, while net lending to individuals was GBP 4.3 billion, less than expected and previously reported. Nevertheless, cable has been relatively strong this week, lifted by the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 There was some negative data out of Australia this week: Building permits are still contracting, now at a 17.2% pace, less than the 19.9% pace last month; Private sector credit is expanding at a slower pace of 4.9%; AiG Performance of Manufacturing Index decreased to 54.8 from 59.2; AUD has been considerably softened recently, as commodity prices weakened. While the Chinese NBS manufacturing PMI marginally beat expectations, the Caixin Manufacturing PMI actually weakened from 50.3 to 49.6, and is now in contraction territory. As China continues to face structural issues, which are now front and center thanks to their most recent debt rating downgrade, AUD could suffer even more. In the G10 space, it is likely it will be one of the worst performing currencies this year. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The NZD has seen a broad-based appreciation across the G10 space in the past 2 weeks due to stronger than expected trade balance and visitor arrivals. Dairy prices annual growth rate also remain robust at 56% this week. Further buoying the NZD was the release of the RNBZ Financial Stability Report, which was upbeat and states that financial risks have subsided in the past 6 months. The RBNZ also highlighted the slowdown in house price growth due to macroprudential measures. Most recently, NZD has been weak against European currencies, as upbeat data and a higher euro drove up these currencies. EUR/NZD is likely to trend downwards as growth differentials could further bifurcate central bank policies, and weigh on this cross. NZD/USD, itself, is unlikely to see much upside if the dollar bull market resumes and EM cracks deepen. However, AUD/NZD should weaken some more. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The CAD has seen downside recently as oil's gains receded after markets seemed disappointed by the OPEC deal. Data further corroborated this negative view, as both industrial and raw material prices increased by less than expected at 0.6% and 1.6% respectively. Additionally, the first quarter current account also faltered into a further deficit of CAD 14.05 bn. However, GDP growth was strong and could improve further. Investors are currently highly bearish on the CAD, with net speculative positions at the lowest level in 10 years, suggesting the bad news is well priced in. Going forward, the BoC continues to argue that the output gap is closing quicker than expected which will warrant higher rates, and help the CAD. While the CAD may not appreciate much against the USD, it will be one nonetheless one of the best performing currencies in the G10 space. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF continues to drift lower as lofty short-term valuations are hurting the euro. As the ECB is likely to remain accommodative, as per Draghi's recent remarks, the recent weakness may only be the beginning of a new trend. Recent data shows that there might be a slight deceleration in the Swiss economy as the KOF leading indicator has slowed down to 101.6. However, with Italian political risks growing faster than anticipated, the CHF could find additional support. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 As oil prices falter after the OPEC deal, the NOK displayed substantial downside against the USD, the EUR, and the CAD. Despite our Commodity and Energy team seeing additional upside for oil prices, the NOK will continue to be pulled down by low rates as the Norges Bank battles against deflationary prices, falling wages, and a weak labor market. Real rate differentials will prompt upside in USD/NOK, as well as CAD/NOK, as both the U.S. and Canada have adopted a hawkish and neutral bias, respectively. Regarding data, retail sales picked up from a meager 0.1% growth rate to a still unimpressive rate of 0.2%. At 5.1%, Norway's credit Indicator also grew less than expected and continues to slowdown. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data this week showed that last quarter, the economy did not perform as well as anticipated, with GDP increasing by 2.2%, lower than the expected 2.9%. However, more recent data shows a pickup in activity, with retail sales increasing at a 4.5% rate. USD/SEK has been weak recently due to the dollar's weakness, which we think is at its tail end. EUR/SEK's recent appreciation is likely to alleviate the Riksbank's deflationary worries. However, downside is possible as the euro may retract some of its gains. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Feature Table 1 Growth And Its Implications We still see little on the horizon to undermine a continued rally in risk assets over the next 12 months. U.S. economic growth will be propelled by an acceleration in both consumption and capex - leading indicators for both point to further upside (Chart 1). The weak U.S. GDP growth in Q1, just 1.2% annualized, was dragged down by two, less meaningful elements: inventories (which fell, deducting 1 ppt from growth) and imports (which rose, deducting 0.6 ppt). Regional Fed GDP "nowcasts" are pointing to 2.2-3.8% growth in Q2. Corporate earnings had their best quarter in five years in Q1, with S&P500 sales up 8% and EPS up 14% - but, despite this, analysts have barely revised up their calendar year EPS growth forecast, which stands at 10%. In Europe, loan growth has picked up to 2.5% YoY, with the credit impulse indicating that GDP growth is likely to remain above trend at around the 2% it achieved in Q1 (Chart 2). But the stronger growth has implications. It suggests the market is too complacent about the probability of Fed tightening. Futures are pricing a hike on June 14 as a near certainty but, after that, imply little more than one further 25bp rise by end-2019 (Chart 3). We expect two hikes before the end of 2017. Not least, the Fed will be cognizant of how financial conditions have recently eased, not tightened, despite its raising rates in December and March (Chart 4) and will want to put in place insurance against inflation rising sharply in 12 months' time, especially given that it may wish to hold back from hikes early next year as it begins to reduce its balance-sheet. Chart 1Consumption And Capex On Track to Rebound Chart 2Euro Credit Growth Looks Good For GDP Chart 3 Will The Fed Really Be This Slow? As a result, 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yields are likely to move back up. The 40bp fall from the peak of 2.6% in March was caused partly by softer growth and inflation data, but also reflected a correction after the excessive pace at which rates had run up - the fastest in 30 years (Chart 5). The combination of stronger growth, a 50bp higher Fed Funds Rate, and a moderate acceleration of inflation as wages begin to pick up again, should push the 10-year yield to above 3% by year-end. Chart 4Fed Must Worry About Easing Conditions Chart 5Rates Couldn't Keep Rising This Fast Momentum for risk assets over the coming months is likely to slow a little. Global PMIs have probably peaked for now (Chart 6) and investors should not expect to repeat the 19% total return from global equities they have enjoyed over the past 12 months. And there are potential pitfalls: China could continue to slow, and European politics could come into focus again (with early Austrian and Italian parliamentary elections looking increasingly possible for the fall). Investors may also worry about the chaotic state of the Trump White House. However, we never believed the U.S. presidential election had much impact on markets (the S&P500 has risen by 2% a month since then, whereas it had risen by 4% a month over the previous nine months). If anything, there could still be a positive catalyst if Congress is able to pass a tax cut before year-end - which we see as likely - since this is no longer priced in (Chart 7). Chart 6Momentum For Equities Will Slow A Little Chart 7No One Expects A Corporate Tax Cut On balance, then, we continue to see equities outperforming bonds comfortably over the next 12 months, and so keep an overweight on equities within our asset class recommendations. We also maintain the generally pro-cyclical, pro-risk and higher-beta tilts within our multi-asset global portfolio. Equities: The combination of cyclical economic growth, accelerating earnings, and easy monetary conditions represents a positive environment for global equities. Valuations are not particularly stretched: forward PE for the MSCI All Country World Index is 15.9x, almost in line with the 30-year average of 15.7x (Chart 8). The Vix (30-day implied volatility on S&P500 options) may look low - famously it dipped below 10 last month, raising fears of complacency - but the Vix term structure is fairly steep, implying that investors are hedging exposure three and six months out (Chart 9). Within equities, our preference remains for DM over EM. The latter will be hurt by the slowdown in China (Chart 10), a rising dollar, the ongoing slowdown in credit growth in most EM economies, and continual political disappointments (most recent example: Brazil). We like euro zone equities, on the grounds of their high beta and greater cyclicality of earnings. We are overweight Japan (with a currency hedge), since rising global rates will weaken the yen and boost earnings. Chart 8Global Equity Valuations Are Not So High Chart 10China's Slowdown Should Hurt EM Fixed Income: As described above, we expect the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield to reach 3% by year-end. This should mean a negative return from global sovereign bonds for the year as a whole, for the first time since 1994. Accordingly, we remain underweight duration and prefer inflation-linked over nominal bonds in most markets. In this positive cyclical environment, we continue to overweight credit, with a preference for U.S investment grade (which trades at a 100 bp spread over Treasuries) over high-yield bonds (where valuations are not as attractive) and euro area credit (which will be hurt when the ECB starts to taper its bond purchases). Currencies: The temporary softness in the dollar has probably run its course. Interest rate differentials between the U.S. and other G7 countries point to further dollar appreciation (Chart 11). At the same time as we expect the Fed to tighten more quickly than the market is pricing in, we see the ECB setting monetary policy for the euro periphery (especially Italy) which, given weak fundamentals (Chart 12), cannot bear much tightening. The Bank of Japan, too, will stick to its yield curve control policy which, as global rates rise, ought to significantly weaken the yen. Chart 11Interest Differentials Point To Stronger USD Chart 12Italy Can Not Bear A Rate Hike Chart 13OPEC Cut Agreement Showing Through Commodities: The recently agreed extension of the OPEC agreement should push crude oil prices up to around $60 a barrel in the second half. OPEC production has already fallen noticeably since the start of the year, but the response from non-OPEC producers - including North American shale - to boost output has so far been subdued (Chart 13). Metals prices have fallen sharply over the past two months (iron ore, for example, by 36% since March) as Chinese growth slowed as a result of moderate fiscal and monetary tightening. They could have further to fall. But China, with its key five-year Party Congress scheduled for the fall, is likely to take measures to boost activity if economic growth slows much further, which would help commodities prices stabilize. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation

Highlights In the near term, the PBoC is likely to set a stronger fixing rate against the dollar and dampen market expectations for further RMB declines. The PBoC hinted that the exchange rate can be used as a "countercyclical" policy tool, which could signal a major shift, as previously the central bank had mostly stressed maintaining exchange rate stability as its main policy target. Chinese growth remains reasonably buoyant. Listed firms' Q1 earnings improved significantly, confirming the profit cycle upturn. This bodes well for private sector capex, and supports our positive cyclical stance on H shares. Feature The People's Bank of China (PBoC) last week changed how it sets the RMB's official fixing rate against the dollar, making an already opaque mechanism even less transparent. With the latest tweak, it appears the PBoC intends to assert greater discretion over the RMB exchange rate, a notable departure from its recent moves toward a more market-driven system. Odds are high that the central bank will try to stabilize the trade-weighted RMB around current levels in the near term, unless the dollar takes a sudden sharp turn in either direction. Technical details aside, fundamental factors are no longer unanimously bearish for the RMB, as we discussed in a recent report.1 Meanwhile, most of Chinese-listed firms have reported first quarter earnings, which show strong improvement compared to a year ago. This buttresses our positive stance on Chinese H shares. It also bodes well for capital spending in the private sector as well as overall business activity. Why? And Does It Matter? Technically, the PBoC appears to be trying to correct a problem inherently built into its old exchange rate-setting formula. Up until the recent changes, the RMB official fixing rate was determined by the closing exchange rate of the previous trading day as well as the RMB's performance against a currency basket. As such, a lower onshore spot CNY against the dollar automatically led to a lower official fixing on the following day, which in turn anchored expectations for further RMB depreciation in the spot market - setting in motion a series of self-feeding mini-vicious circles. This became increasingly obvious in recent months (Chart 1). The dollar has depreciated broadly against other currencies since the beginning of the year, which should have led to a higher CNY/USD. In reality, the RMB official fixing rate has been essentially flat, and the onshore CNY spot rate has constantly traded below the official fixing rate, reflecting market expectations of further declines in the RMB. In the new formula, by adding in an unspecified "countercyclical" factor, the PBoC intends to reset market expectations and arrest the automatic extrapolation of the recent RMB trend into the future. More fundamentally, the PBoC hinted that the exchange rate can be used as a "countercyclical" policy tool. If true, this would signal a major shift, as previously the PBoC had mostly stressed maintaining exchange rate stability as its main policy target. In a press release accompanying the latest change, the PBoC argued that China's recent growth improvement suggests that a weaker RMB is no longer warranted, which fits the PBoC's broader policy stance. By the same token, it also suggests the PBoC will actively guide the RMB exchange rate lower at times of weakening growth to reflate the economy. Historically, the PBoC had mostly sat idle with the exchange rate at times of heightened volatility in the global currency market, which exposed the Chinese economy to sharp swings in the trade-weighted RMB (Chart 2). For example, the PBoC effectively pegged the RMB to the dollar during the global financial crisis between mid-2008 and early 2010 - despite the rollercoaster ride other Asian currencies experienced. Similarly, the central bank held the RMB largely steady against the dollar between 2013 and mid-2015 amid sharp declines in other currencies against the dollar, leading to sharp RMB appreciation in trade-weighted terms and creating relentless deflationary pressure for the Chinese economy. The slide of the RMB against the greenback since August 2015 has been a catch-up to its Asian neighbors to the downside. Chart 1The PBoC Wants A Stronger RMB Fixing? Chart 2The RMB: Moving Towards Dirty Float How the PBoC manages the exchange rate under the new mechanism remains to be seen, and it is too soon to draw definite conclusions just yet. In the near term, the PBoC is likely to set a stronger fixing rate against the dollar and dampen market expectations for further RMB declines. Longer term, if the central bank indeed intends to use the exchange rate as a countercyclical macro policy tool, it will have to more actively manage the trade-weighted RMB according to the cyclical profile of the Chinese economy. This will move the RMB closer to a true "dirty float" currency, which also means much greater volatility for the RMB cross rate with the dollar than in the past. The Earnings Scorecard The latest macro numbers confirm that the Chinese economy is losing some steam, but overall growth momentum remains largely stable . Both manufacturing and service PMI numbers released early this week remained in expansionary territory. and some key components such as export orders, orders backlog and employment showed a pick-up compared with the previous month. We expect the economy to remain fairly buoyant in the next two to three quarters, even if year-over-year growth numbers continue to moderate. As far as investors are concerned, the important development is that China's profit cycle upturn remains in place. Total profits of industrial firms increased by 24% in the first four months of 2017 compared with a year ago. In addition, most of domestic-listed firms have released first-quarter earnings, which show similar profit growth (Chart 3). A few observations can be made: Chart 3Profit Acceleration Table 1A-Share Companies' Earnings Scorecard All domestic-listed A-share firms reported a 23% increase in Q1 earnings compared with last year, or 34% if financials and energy companies are excluded. Profit acceleration was more pronounced in the materials and energy sectors, but was also fairly broad-based (Table 1). Top line revenue growth accelerated, a key factor behind rising profits (Chart 4, top panel). Excluding financials and energy, A share-listed firms' total revenue increased by almost 20% from 2016 according to our calculation, a marked acceleration compared with previous years. Profit margins also increased modestly, which helped boost profits (Chart 4, bottom panel). Net margins still pale in comparison to pre-crisis levels, though are now close to their long-term trend line. In short, China's profit cycle upturn reflects a pickup in both price increase and volume expansion in the overall economy, and defies the assertion by some that China's growth improvement since last year has been purely driven by credit. Looking forward, our model suggests that profit growth will likely begin to roll over (Chart 5), but there is no evidence that profits will contract anytime soon. Chart 4Improvement In Both Revenue And Margin Chart 5Profit Growth Is Rolling Over, But No Contraction What does this mean? First, profit growth in the industrial sector is good news for the banking system. Materials producers and energy companies, the major trouble spots in banks' asset quality in recent years, experienced the biggest increase in profit growth among the major sectors. This should reduce non-performing loans (NPL) from these industries. The pace of banks' NPL increase will likely continue to decelerate, and asset quality stress in the banking sector should ease. Second, profit recovery in the industrial sector bodes well for capital spending, which in turn will support overall business activity. Private enterprise investment is mostly profit-driven. Therefore, rising profits should lead to stronger incentive to expand capex. We maintain the view that the multi-year downshift in China's capital spending cycle will likely bottom up going forward (Chart 6). Finally, strong profit growth should also be good news for Chinese equities. Chinese H shares are trading at 32% and 24% discounts compared with the global benchmark, based on trailing and forward price-to-earnings ratios respectively (Chart 7). Without a major profit contraction in Chinese-listed companies, the large valuation gap between Chinese shares and global equities is unreasonable and unsustainable - and will eventually narrow. In short, we remain cyclically positive on H shares, and overweight China against global/EM benchmarks. Chart 6Profit Improvement Bodes Well For Capex Chart 7Mind The Gap Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Markets have gone too far in pricing out the Republican's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections. A bill that at least cuts taxes should be forming by year end. The risk is that continued political turbulence, now including the possibility of impeachment, distracts Congress and delays or completely derails tax reform plans. Fortunately for the major global equity markets, corporate profits are providing solid support. We expect U.S. EPS growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at just under 20%. The projected profit acceleration is even more impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. Corporations are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end that will favor the latter two bourses in local currency terms. EPS growth will fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017, but what is more important for equity indexes is the direction of 12-month forward EPS expectations, which remain in an uptrend. The positive earnings backdrop means that stocks will outperform bonds for the remainder of the year even if Congress fails to pass any market-friendly legislation. The FOMC is "looking through" the recent soft economic data and slower inflation, and remains on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year. The impact of the Fed's balance sheet runoff on the Treasury market will be limited by several factors, but a shrinking balance sheet and Fed rate hikes will force bond yields to rise faster than is currently discounted. Policy divergence will push the dollar higher. The traditional relationship between the euro/USD and short-term yield differentials should re-establish following the French election. The euro could reach parity before the next move is done. "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Chinese growth has slowed but the authorities are easing policy, which will stabilize growth and support base metals. That said, we remain more upbeat on oil prices than base metals. Feature Investors have soured on the prospects for U.S. tax reform in recent weeks, but the latest travails in Washington inflicted only fleeting damage on U.S. and global bourses. The S&P 500 appears to have broken above the 2400 technical barrier as we go to press. Market expectations for a more tepid Fed rate hike cycle, lower Treasury yields and related dollar softness undoubtedly provided some support. But, more importantly, corporate profits are positively surprising in the major economies and this is not just an energy story. The good news on company earnings should continue to drive stock prices higher this year in absolute terms and relative to bond prices. It is a tougher call on the dollar and the direction of bond yields. We remain short duration and long the dollar, but much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and fiscal policy. A Death Knell For U.S. Tax Reform? Chart I-1 highlights that the market now sees almost a zero chance that the Republicans will ever be able to deliver any meaningful tax cuts or infrastructure spending. Many believe that mushrooming political scandals encumbering President Trump will distract the GOP and delay or derail tax reform. Indeed, impeachment proceedings would be a major distraction, although this outcome would not necessarily lead to an equity bear market. The historical record shows that the economy is much more important than politics for financial markets. BCA's geopolitical strategists looked at three presidential impeachments, covering the Teapot Dome Scandal (April 1922 to October 1927), Watergate (February 1973 to August 1974) and the President Clinton's Lewinsky Affair (January 1998 to February 1999).1 Watergate was the only episode that coincided with a bear market, but it is difficult to pin the market downturn on Nixon's impeachment since the U.S. economy entered one of the worst post-war recessions in 1973 that was driven by tight Fed policy and an oil shock. Impeachment would require that Trump loses support among the Republican base, which so far has not happened. The President still commands the support of 84% of Republican voters (Chart I-2). Investors should monitor this support level as an indicator of the President's political capital and the risk of impeachment. Chart I-1Fading Hopes For Tax Reform We believe that markets have gone too far in pricing out Trump's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections, and tax reform and deregulation are two key areas where the President and congressional Republicans see eye to eye. The odds are good that an agreement to cut taxes will be formed by year end. Congressional leaders want tax reform to be revenue neutral, but finding sufficient areas to cut spending will be extremely difficult. They may simply require that tax cuts are paid for in a 10-year window. This makes it possible to lower taxes upfront and promise non-specific spending cuts and revenue raising measures down the road. Or, Congress may pass tax reform that is not revenue neutral through the reconciliation process, which would require that tax cuts sunset at some point in the future. Tax cuts would give stocks a temporary boost either way but, as we discuss below, it may be better for corporate profits in the medium term if Congress fails to deliver any fiscal stimulus. Profits, Beats And Misses While economists fret over the soft U.S. economic data so far this year, profit growth is quietly accelerating in the background (Chart I-3). On a 4-quarter moving total basis, S&P 500 earnings-per-share were up by more than 13% in the first quarter (84% reporting). We expect growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at about 18%, before moderating in 2018. Profit growth is accelerating outside of the energy sector. The projected acceleration in EPS growth is equally impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. The favorable profit picture in the major economies reflects two key factors. First, profits are rebounding from a poor showing in 2015/16, when EPS was dragged down by the collapse in oil prices and a global manufacturing recession. Oil prices have since rebounded and global industrial production is recovering as expected (Chart I-4). Our short-term forecasting models for real GDP, based on a mixture of hard data and surveys, continue to flag a pickup in economic growth in the major economies (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Top-Down Profit Projection Chart I-4EPS Highly Correlated With Industrial Production Chart I-5GDP Growth Poised To Accelerate The U.S. model's forecast paints an overly rosy picture, but it does support our view that Q1 softness in the hard data reflected temporary factors that will give way to a robust rebound in the second and third quarters. The Eurozone economy is really humming at the moment, as highlighted by our model and recent readings from the IFO and purchasing managers' surveys. Indeed, these indicators are consistent with real GDP growth of nearly 3%! Our GDP models are also constructive for Japan and the U.K., although not nearly as robust as in the U.S. and Eurozone. Chart I-6Profit Margins On The Rise Second, the corporate sectors in the major economies are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. This is the case even in the U.S., where labor market slack has largely been absorbed. Indeed, margins rose in Q1 2017 for the third quarter in a row (Chart I-6). Our indicators suggest that the corporate sector has gained some pricing power at a time when wage gains are taking a breather.2 The hiatus of wage pressure may not last long, and we expect the "mean reversion" in profit margins to resume next year. But for now, our short-term EPS growth model remains upbeat for the next 3-6 months (not shown). Profit margins are also on the rise in Japan and the Eurozone. Margins in the latter appear to have the most upside potential of the three major markets, given the fact that current levels are still depressed by historical standards, and that there remains plenty of slack in the European labor market. We are not incorporating any margin expansion in Japan because they are already very high. Nonetheless, we do not expect any "mean reversion" in margins over the next year either, because the business sector is going to great lengths to avoid any increase in the wage bill despite an extremely tight labor market. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end: The U.S. is further ahead in the global profit mini recovery and year-ago EPS comparisons will become more difficult by the end of the year. The drag on corporate profits in 2017 from previous dollar strength will be larger than the currency drag in the Eurozone according to our models, assuming no change in trade-weighted exchange rates in the forecast period (Chart I-7). The pass-through of past yen movements will be a net boost to EPS growth for Japanese companies this year.3 Currency shifts would favor the Japanese and the Eurozone markets versus the U.S. even more if the dollar experiences another upleg. We expect the dollar to appreciate by 10% in trade-weighted terms. A 10% broad-based dollar appreciation would trim EPS growth by 2½ percentage points, although most of this would occur in 2018 due to lags (Chart I-8). Eurozone and Japanese EPS growth would receive a lift of 2 and ½ percentage points, respectively, as their currencies depreciate versus the dollar. Chart I-7Currency Impact On EPS Growth Chart I-8A 10% Dollar Rise Would Trim Profits Finally, the fact that profits in Japan and the Eurozone are more leveraged to overall economic growth than in the U.S. gives the former two markets the edge as global industrial production continues to recover this year and into 2018. Japanese and Eurozone equity market indexes also have a higher beta with respect to the global equity index. The implication is that we remain overweight these two markets relative to the U.S. on a currency hedged basis. Lofty Expectations Even though the message from our EPS models is upbeat, our forecasts still fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017. Is this a risk for the equity market, especially in the U.S. where valuations are stretched? Investors are well aware that bottom-up estimates are perennially optimistic. Table I-1 compares the beginning-of-year EPS growth estimate with the actual end-of-year outcome for 2007-2016. Not surprisingly, bottom-up analysts massively missed the mark in the recession. But even outside of 2008, analysts significantly over-estimated earnings in seven out of nine years. Despite this, the S&P 500 rose sharply in most cases. One exception was 2015, when the S&P 500 fell by 0.7%. Plunging oil and material prices contributed to an EPS growth "miss" of seven percentage points. Chart I-9 highlights that the level of the 12-month forward EPS estimate fell that year, unlike in the other years since the Great Recession. Valuations are more demanding today than in the past, but the message is that attaining bottom-up EPS year-end estimates is less important for the broad market than the trend in 12-month forward estimates (which remains up at the moment). Chart I-9S&P 500 Follows ##br##12-month Forward EPS The bottom line is that the backdrop is constructive for equities even if the Republicans are unable to push through any fiscal stimulus. In fact, it may be better for the stock market in the medium term if the GOP fails to pass any meaningful legislation. The U.S. economy does not need any demand stimulus at the moment (although measures to boost the supply side of the economy would help lift profits over the long term). The current long-in-the-tooth U.S. expansion is likely to stretch further in the absence of stimulus, extending the moderate growth/low inflation/low interest rate backdrop that has been positive for risk assets in recent years. The Fed's Balance Sheet: It's Diet Time The minutes from the May FOMC meeting reiterated that policymakers plan to begin scaling back on reinvesting the proceeds of its maturing securities of Treasurys and MBS by the end of the year. The Fed is leaning toward a gradual tapering of reinvestment in order to avoid shocking the bond market. Still, investors are rightly concerned about the potential impact of the balance sheet runoff, especially given that memories of the 2013 "taper tantrum" are still fresh. Chart I-10 presents a forecast for the flow of Treasurys available to the private sector, taking into consideration the supply that is absorbed by foreign official institutions and by the Fed. The bottom panel shows a similar calculation for the aggregate supply of government bonds from the U.S., Japan, the Eurozone and the U.K. While the supply of Treasurys has been positive since 2012, the net flow has been negative for these four economies as a whole because of aggressive quantitative easing programs. This year will see the largest contraction in the supply of government bonds available to the private sector, at US$800 billion. The flow will become less negative in 2018 even if the Fed were to keep its balance sheet unchanged (mostly due to assumed ECB tapering). If the Fed goes ahead with its balance sheet reduction plan, the net supply of government bonds from the major economies will move slightly into positive territory for the first time since 2014. There is disagreement among academics about whether quantitative easing (QE) directly depressed bond yields by restricting the supply of high-quality fixed income assets, or whether the impact on yields was solely via the "signaling effect" for the path of future short rates. Either way, balance sheet runoff will likely have some impact on bond yields. A good starting point is to employ an empirical estimate of the impact of QE. The IMF has modeled long-term Treasury yields based on a number of economic and financial variables and the stock of assets held by the Fed as a share of GDP. Just for exposition purposes, let us take an extreme example and assume that the Fed simply terminates all re-investment as of January 2018 (i.e. the runoff is not tapered). In this case, the amount of bank reserves held at the Fed would likely evaporate by 2021. This represents a contraction of roughly 10 percentage points of GDP (Chart I-11). Applying the IMF interest rate model's coefficient of -0.09, it implies that long-term Treasury yields and mortgage rates would rise by 90 basis points from the "portfolio balance" effect alone. Chart I-11Fed Balance Sheet Runoff Scenario However, it is more complicated than that. The impact on yields is likely to be tempered by two factors: The balance sheet may never fully revert to historic norms relative to GDP. Some academic experts are recommending that the Fed maintain a fairly large balance sheet by historical standards because of the need in financial markets for short-term, risk-free assets that would diminish if there are fewer excess bank reserves available. Banks, for example, are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions to tighten too quickly. Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimated that a $675 billion reduction in the size of the Fed's balance sheet is equivalent to a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate (although the authors admit that the confidence band around this estimate is extremely wide).4 We expect that the impact of runoff alone will be much less than the 90 basis point estimate discussed above. Still, the combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Fed Outlook: Mostly About Inflation The May FOMC minutes confirmed that the FOMC is "looking through" the soft economic data in the first quarter, chalking it up to temporary factors such as shifts in inventories. They are also inclined to believe that the moderation in core CPI inflation in recent months is temporary. The message is that policymakers remain on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year, in line with the 'dot plot' forecast. The market is pricing almost a 100% chance of a June rate hike. However, less than two full rate hikes are expected over the next year, which is far too benign in our view. Investors have been quick to conclude that recent economic data have convinced Fed officials to shift from a "gradual" pace of rate hikes to a "glacial" pace. Treasurys rallied on this shift in Fed expectations and a decline in long-term inflation expectations. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has dropped to about 1.8%, the lowest level since before the U.S. election. This appears to us that the bond market over-reacted to the drop in core CPI inflation from 2.2% in February to 1.9% in April. The evolution of actual inflation will be critical to the outlook for the Fed and Treasury yields in the coming months. Our U.S. fixed-income strategists have simulated a traditional Phillips Curve model of inflation (Chart I-12).5 The model projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2.1% by December, even assuming no change in the unemployment rate or the trade-weighted dollar. Inflation ends the year not far below the 2% target even in an alternative scenario in which we assume that the dollar appreciates and that the full-employment level of unemployment is lower than the Fed currently assumes. Chart I-12U.S. Inflation Should End Year At 2% Thus, the trend in inflation should reinforce the FOMC's bias to keep tightening policy, forcing the bond market to reassess the pace of rate hikes discounted in the curve. That said, if we are wrong and inflation does not trend higher in the next 3-4 months, then it is the FOMC that will be forced to reassess and our short duration recommendation will probably not pan out on a six month horizon. Longer-term, last month's Special Report highlighted that we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 20, builds on that theme with a look at the impact of technological progress on equilibrium bond yields. With respect to credit spreads, the state of nonfinancial corporate sector balance sheets and the overall stance of monetary policy will continue to be the main drivers of the credit cycle. If unwinding the balance sheet leads to a premature tightening of financial conditions, then the Fed will proceed more slowly on rate hikes. The crucial indicator to watch is core PCE inflation. Credit spreads will remain fairly well contained until core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target. At that point, the pace of monetary normalization will ramp up, putting spreads at risk of widening. Stay overweight corporate bonds within fixed income portfolios for now. While the Fed's balance sheet reduction by itself may not have a big impact on the dollar, we still believe the currency has more upside because of the divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) on the other. The BoJ will hold the 10-year JGB near to zero for quite some time. The ECB will also not be in a position to tighten policy for an extended period, outside of removing negative short rates and tapering QE purchases a bit further in 2018. The euro has appreciated versus the dollar even as two-year real interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the dollar since the end of March. This divergence probably reflects euro short-covering following the market-friendly French election outcome. Next up are the two rounds of French legislative elections in June. Polls support the view that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Republicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature. Such an election outcome would make possible the passage of genuine structural reforms that would suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive. Investors may be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus. In the meantime, we do not see any risk factors emanating from the Eurozone that could upset the global equity applecart in the near term. Moreover, the traditional relationship between the euro/USD exchange rate and 2-year real yield differentials should now re-establish. The implication is that the euro could reach parity before the next move is done. Dr. Copper? The recent setback in the commodity pits has added to investor angst regarding global growth momentum. The LMEX base metals index is up almost 25% on a year-ago basis, but has fallen by 5% since February (Chart I-13). From their respective peaks earlier this year, zinc and copper are down about 7-10%, nickel has dropped by 18% and iron ore has lost almost half of its value. Is the venerable "Dr. Copper" sending an important warning about world growth? Chart I-13What Are Commodities Telling Us? Some of our global leading economic indicators have edged lower this year, as we have discussed in previous reports. Nonetheless, the decline in base metals prices likely has more to do with other factors, such as an unwinding of the surge in speculative demand that immediately followed the U.S. election last autumn. Speculators may be disappointed by the lack of progress on Republican promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. The main story for base metals demand and prices, however, is the Chinese real estate sector. China accounts for roughly 50% of world consumption for each of the major metals. The Chinese authorities are trying to cool the property market and transition to a more consumer spending-oriented economy, thereby reducing the dependence on exports, capital spending and real estate as growth drivers. Fiscal policy tightened last year and new regulations were introduced to limit housing speculation. The effect of policy tightening can be seen in our Credit and Fiscal Spending Impulse indicator, which has been softening since mid-2016 (Chart I-14). The economy held up well last year, but the policy adjustment resulted in a peaking of the PMI at year-end. Growth in housing starts also appears to be rolling over. Both the PMI and housing starts are correlated with commodity prices. The good news is that BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not expect a major downshift in Chinese real GDP growth this year, which means that commodity import demand should rebound: The authorities wish to slow credit growth, but there is no incentive for the authorities to crunch the economy given that consumer price inflation is still low and the surge in producer price inflation appears to have peaked. Monetary conditions have tightened a little in recent months, but overall conditions are not restrictive. Both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment have picked up noticeably this year (Chart I-15). Finally, the PBoC re-started its Medium-Term Lending Facility and recently made the largest one-day cash injection into the financial system in nearly four months. Chart I-14China Is The Main Story ##br##For Base Metals Demand Chart I-15Direct Fiscal Spending And ##br##Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently Export growth will continue to accelerate based on our model (not shown). The upturn in the profit cycle and firming output prices should boost capital spending. Robust demand will ensure that housing construction will continue to grow at a healthy pace. Households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high last quarter. Tighter housing policies in major cities will prevent a massive boom, but this will not short-circuit the recovery in housing construction. Fading fears about a China meltdown may give commodities a lift later this year. Our commodity strategists are particularly positive on crude oil, as extended production cuts from OPEC and Russia outweigh the impact of surging shale production, allowing bloated inventories to moderate. In contrast, the backdrop is fairly benign for base metals. Our commodity strategists do not see the conditions for a major bull or bear phase on a 6-12 month horizon. Within commodity portfolios, they recommend a benchmark allocation to base metals, an underweight in agricultural products and an overweight in oil. From a broader perspective, our key message is that "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Investment Conclusions: Accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a healthy tailwind and suggests that stocks could perform well under a couple of different scenarios in the second half of 2017. If the rebound in U.S. economic growth from the poor first quarter is unimpressive and it appears that Congress will be sidetracked by political turmoil in the White House, then the S&P 500 should benefit from the 'goldilocks' combination of healthy profit growth, low bond yields, an accommodative Fed and a soft dollar. If, instead, U.S. growth rebounds strongly and Congress makes progress on the broad outline of a tax reform bill over the summer months, then stocks should benefit from the prospect of stronger growth in 2018. Rising bond yields and a firmer dollar would provide some offset for stocks, but would not derail the equity bull market as long as inflation remains below the Fed's target. Our model suggests that U.S. inflation will remain below-target for the next several months, but could be near 2% by year end. This scenario would set the stage for a more aggressive Fed in 2018, a surge in the dollar and possibly a bear market in risk assets next year. We are therefore comfortable in predicting that the stock-to-bond total return ratio will continue to rise for at least the remainder of this year. The tough part relates to bond yields and the dollar, since the above two scenarios have very different implications for these two asset classes. Our base case is closer to the second scenario, such that we remain below benchmark in duration and long the dollar. That said, much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and U.S. politics. Both are particularly difficult to forecast. A failure for core PCE inflation to pick up in the next 3-4 months and/or continuing political scandals in Washington would force us to reconsider our asset allocation. Of course, there are other risks to consider, including growing mercantilism in the U.S., Sino-American tensions and North Korea. At the top of the list are China and Italy. (1) China China remains our geopolitical strategists' top pick as the catalyst most likely to scuttle our upbeat view on global risk assets in 2017.6 Our base case assumption is that policymakers will not enact wide-scale financial sector reform, which would entail a surge in realized non-performing loans and bankruptcies and defaults, ahead of the Fall Party Congress. The regulatory crackdown so far seems merely to keep the financial sector in check for a while. The government has already stepped back somewhat in the face of the liquidity squeeze, and fiscal policy has been loosened (as mentioned above). All of the key Communist Party statements have emphasized that stability remains a priority. Nonetheless, it may be difficult for the authorities to manage the deleveraging process given nose-bleed levels of private-sector leverage. Politicians could misjudge the fragility of the financial system and investors might front-run the reform process, sending asset prices down well in advance of policy implementation. (2) Italy We have flagged the next Italian election as a key risk for markets because of polls showing that voters have become disillusioned with the euro. It appeared that an election would not take place until 2018, and we have downplayed European elections as a risk factor for 2017. However, the 5-Star Movement has now backed a proportional electoral system, which raises the chances of an autumn election in Italy. This would obviously spark turbulence in financial markets in the months leading up to the event. Turning to emerging markets, the pickup in global growth and a modest bounce in commodity prices would support this asset class. However, our view that the dollar is headed higher on the back of Fed rate hikes keeps us from getting too excited about EM stocks, bonds or currencies. Our other recommendations include the following: Within global government bond portfolios, overweight JGBs and underweight Treasurys. Gilts and core Eurozone bonds are at benchmark. Underweight the periphery of Europe. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. Overweight the dollar versus the other major currencies. Overweight small caps stocks versus large in the U.S. market. Stay exposed to oil-related assets, and favor oil to base metals within commodity portfolios. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 31, 2017 Next Report: June 29, 2017 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Overview," April 017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Currency shifts affect earnings with a lag, which in captured by our models. 4 Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy Under Balance Sheet Adjustments. The Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith. May 10, 2017. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers," dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets ," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com II. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? This month's Special Report was written by Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist for BCA's Global Investment Strategy Service. The report is a companion piece to last month's Special Report, which argued that some of the structural factors that have depressed global interest rates are at an inflection point. These factors include demographic trends and the integration of China's massive labor supply into the global economy. Peter's report focuses on technology's impact on bond yields. He presents the non-consensus view that slow productivity growth likely depresses interest rates at the outset, but will lead to higher rates later on. Not only could sluggish productivity growth lead to higher inflation, it could also deplete national savings. Both factors would be bond bearish, reinforcing the other factors discussed in last month's Special Report. I trust that you will find the report as insightful and educational as I did. Mark McClellan Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software ##br##Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The ##br##1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated The ##br##Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of the Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce ##br##Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed ##br##Thanks To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The breakout in the S&P 500 above 2400 in May has further stretched valuation metrics. Measures such as the Shiller P/E and price/book are elevated relative to past equity cycles. The price/sales ratio is in a steep rise too. However, our U.S. Composite valuation metric, which takes into consideration 11 different measures of value, is still a little below the one sigma level that marks significant overvaluation. This is because our composite indicator includes valuation measures that take into account the low level of interest rates. Of course, these measures will not look as favorable when rates finally rise. Technically, the U.S. equity market has upward momentum. Our Equity Monetary Indicator has remained around the zero line, meaning that it is not particularly bullish or bearish at the moment. Our Speculation Index is high, pointing to froth in the market. The high level of our Composite Sentiment Index and low level of the VIX speaks to the level of investor complacency. The U.S. net revisions ratio jumped higher this month, and it is bullish that the earnings surprise index advanced again. Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator continues to send a positive message for the S&P 500, although it is now so elevated that it suggests that there could be little "dry powder" left to buy the market. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The widening gap between the U.S. WTP and that of Japan and Europe highlights that recent flows have favored the U.S. market relative to the other two. Looking forward, this means that there is more "dry powder" available to buy the Japanese and European markets. A rise in the WTPs for these two markets in the coming months would signal that a rotation into Europe and Japan is taking place. It is disconcerting that our Europe WTP suffered a pull-back over the past month. Nonetheless, we believe that accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a strong tailwind and suggests that stocks remain in a window in which they will outperform bonds. U.S. bond valuation is hovering close to fair value. However, we believe that fair value itself is moving higher as we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. We also believe that the combination of Fed balance sheet shrinkage and rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Technically, our composite indicator has touched the zero line, clearing the way for the next leg of the bond bear market. The dollar is very expensive on a PPP basis, although it is less so by other measures. Technically, the dollar has shifted down this year, crossing the 200-day moving average. That said, according to our dollar technical indicator, overbought conditions have been totally worked off, suggesting that the currency is clear to move higher if Fed rate expectations shift up as we expect. Moreover, we believe that policy divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and BoJ on the other will push the dollar higher. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights Geopolitical risks remain overstated in 2017, but China and Italy could scuttle the party; June elections in France and the U.K. are not market-movers; But early Italian election is a risk that could prompt the ECB to stay easy, close long EUR/USD for a gain; U.S. budget reconciliation process may be arcane, but is vital to understand upcoming tax reform process; Investors should expect details of tax reform by Q4 2017, but legislation may only pass in Q1 2018. Feature We turned the traditional adage of "sell in May and go away" on its head last month in a report titled "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!"1 So far so good (Chart 1). The fundamental reasons behind the breakout is the narrowing of the global equity risk premium on the back of easy monetary policy and a recovering global economy (Chart 2) two trends that our colleagues at the Global Alpha Sector Strategy highlighted last September.2 Since then, geopolitical risks cited as likely to end the party have been largely overstated.3 We continue to worry about Chinese financial sector reforms, U.S. politics, Sino-American tensions, signs of growing U.S. mercantilism, prospects of early Italian elections, and especially the developments in North Korea. But these remain risks for 2018, rather than 2017.4 Chart 1Blow-Off Phase Has Resumed Chart 2Global ERP Has Room To Fall There are still some "loose ends" to tie up from the first quarter, including the upcoming French legislative and U.K. general elections. On the former, there is nothing to say other than that investors should indeed prepare for a "French Revolution," by which we mean a supply-side revolution.5 Current seat projections based on the latest polling have pro-market, centrist, Europhile parties controlling between 85-92% of the National Assembly following the two-round elections in mid-June (Diagram 1).6 Diagram 1French National Assembly Seat Projection Yes. In France. Skeptical commentary will surely rain on the centrist parade by pointing out that anti-establishment presidential candidates won nearly 50% of the vote in the first round of the presidential election (true), that Marine Le Pen will be back even stronger in 2020 (false), or that the electoral system is designed to suppress the populist vote (yes, so what?). We are not as perceptive nor profound as the witty op-ed writers. Our far simpler conclusion is that the French National Assembly will elucidate the revealed preference of the French electorate, given the electoral rules that are quite familiar to all French voters. And that preference appears to be for pro-market, and quite possibly painful, structural reforms. We remain long French industrials relative to German ones, but our clients may find alternative ways to play the upcoming free-market revolution in France. On the British front, Tory PM Theresa May is facing her first genuine crisis. The impact of the Manchester terrorist attack on the election is difficult to forecast. However, May's "dementia tax" gaffe has clearly given Labour new life in the polls (Chart 3). What most commentators saw as a clear shoo-in for the Conservative Party has now become a competitive, if not exactly tight, race. Chart 3Labour Gains... Chart 4...But Tories Keep Devouring UKIP We would note that despite Labour's rise in the polls, May's strategy of suppressing the UKIP vote by campaigning from the nationalist right is paying off. As Chart 4 illustrates, UKIP voters appear to be switching to the Tories en masse: UKIP has gone from support of 20% in April 2016 to under 5% today. Given Britain's first-past-the-post electoral system, May's strategy of swallowing the UKIP whole is a savvy move. It will eliminate the probability that UKIP siphons votes away from the Tories in competitive constituencies. Our own, highly conservative, estimate gives the Tories a minimum of 11 gained seats (Table 1). This is based on constituencies that voted for Brexit but where Labour and the Liberal Democrats won by less than 5% in the last election. Table 1Minimal Scenario Gives Tories 11 New Seats For Their Majority We do not think that the election will have much impact on the Brexit process. Political risks peaked in January when May announced that she planned to take the U.K. out of the EU Common Market. We pointed out at the time that this decision made it highly unlikely that the U.K. and EU negotiations would take an acrimonious turn.7 The market agreed with us, with the pound bottoming in mid-January. We continue to believe that the Brexit process will have no investment relevance for global assets. As for U.K. equities and the pound, a larger-than-expected seat grab by the Tories (375+) at the upcoming election would likely strengthen the pound further, which in turn could weigh on the FTSE 100 (with the FTSE 250 being less affected). A disappointing result, one where the Conservative Party fails to reach 350 seats, could create temporary headwinds for the pound. The one risk that remains on our horizon is faster-than-expected deleveraging in China. As we mentioned in our report last week, China's financial crackdown raises near-term risks (Chart 5).8 We do not think that policymakers are looking to enact wide scale financial sector reform, which would entail a surge in realized non-performing loans, bankruptcies, and defaults ahead of the Fall Party Congress. However, Chinese investors and businesses may already be looking ahead to 2018. Chart 5Policymakers Are Inducing Financial Risk... Chart 6...At A Time When Vulnerability Is Growing China's reserves-to-M2 ratio - an IMF-proposed measure that captures Chinese reserves of liquid assets against those that its residents could potentially liquefy as part of wide scale capital flight - has continued to decline (Chart 6). Measures of quarterly net portfolio flows and capital flight show that the Q4 2016 outflows accelerated sharply after a slowdown in outflows in the previous two quarters (Chart 7), although we have no information for Q1 2017. More recently, there has been a stunning surge in Bitcoin prices. The crypto-currency is up 65% since the start of May, which cannot be attributed to Euro Area fears given the victory of Europhile Emmanuel Macron in the French election. Could it be related to policy uncertainty in China? We think yes (Chart 8). China remains our pick for the risk that is most likely to scuttle our sanguine view on global risk assets in 2017. Chart 7Chinese Outflows Restarted In Q4 2016 Chart 8Chinese Uncertainty Is Bitcoin's Gain The final risk to investors that we have been tracking this year is inaction by U.S. Congress on the tax reform front. We have received many client questions regarding when investors should expect to see tax reform legislation and when (and how) it is expected to pass. We turn to this question in the rest of this report. Market Relevance Of The Budget Reconciliation Process The U.S. legislative process is complicated, arcane, and highly mutable. We have tried to spare our clients as much of the headache of U.S. congressional procedure as possible.9 However, the budget reconciliation process underpins current efforts to reform both the 2010 Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) and enact tax reform. To understand how, when, and whether the GOP-controlled Congress will pass these pieces of legislation, it is necessary for investors to learn the basics of the reconciliation process in particular, and the budget process more broadly. Budget reconciliation - or simply, reconciliation - simplifies the process of passing a budget and was introduced by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.10 To understand why reconciliation matters, we first have to explain how the U.S. Congress sets the budget. The U.S. Budget Process The U.S. budget process (Diagram 2) begins with the U.S. president submitting the White House budget request to Congress. This is a largely ceremonial act as Congress has the power over the appropriations process. Diagram 2U.S. Budget Process: A Tentative Timeline Congress takes into account the president's request as it formulates a budget resolution, which both houses of Congress pass but which is not presented to the president and does not actually constitute law. The resolution sets out the guidelines for the budget process, which is supposed to ultimately produce an appropriations bill. It is this bill, also referred to as a budget bill, which appropriates funding for the various federal government departments, agencies, and programs. Under a revised timetable in effect since 1987, the annual budget resolution is supposed to be adopted by both chambers of Congress by April 15, giving legislators sufficient time to then pass a budget bill by the start of the fiscal year on October 1. However, there is no obligation to do so. In fact, Congress failed to pass a budget resolution for most of President Obama's two terms in office due to a high degree of polarization between the Democrats and Republicans. As such, the government was funded via "continuing resolutions," which merely extended pre-existing appropriations at the same levels as the previous fiscal year. Reconciliation Process Where does the reconciliation process fit? It was originally introduced to simplify the process of changing the law on the books in order to bring revenue and spending levels into line with the budget resolution. The crucial feature of the process, and the reason we are focusing so much on it, is that it limits the debate in the Senate to 20 hours, thus automatically preventing any Senator from filibustering the ultimate legislation that emerges from the reconciliation process. No filibuster, no need to reach 60 Senate votes to invoke cloture, an act that ends the debate in the chamber. In the current context, where the Republican Party controls 52 seats, this means that the Republicans can use the reconciliation process to pass legislation that would otherwise be "filibustered" in the Senate. The reconciliation procedure is a very powerful legislative tool by which Congress can pass controversial legislation, as long as such legislation has an impact on government revenues or spending levels. Tax legislation, obviously, would impact government revenues. George W. Bush used the reconciliation procedure to lower taxes in 2001 and 2003. His father, George H. W. Bush used reconciliation to raise taxes in 1990 (and thus roll back some of the Ronald Reagan 1986 tax reform). The 1996 welfare reform - the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 - was also passed via the reconciliation process. Obamacare was not passed via the reconciliation procedure. The main portion of the bill - including almost all of its key provisions - was passed at the beginning of the 111th Congress in 2009 when the Democrats held 58 seats in the Senate following the momentous 2008 election.11 It was the subsequent amendments to the original bill that required the reconciliation process due to the death of Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy, particularly several crucial funding provisions. The one unifying feature of all reconciliation bills is that they must have an impact on the budget, essentially by changing the revenue or spending levels of the federal government. If the bill introduces extraneous provisions that deviate from the budgetary requirement, then these can be struck out by invoking the so-called "Byrd rule." Waiving the Byrd rule requires an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Senate, which is 60 votes. As such, it essentially requires the 60-seat majority needed to also invoke cloture, making the entire reconciliation process redundant. Bottom Line: The budget reconciliation process allows U.S. Congress to pass legislation without the a 60-seat Senate majority. However, procedural rules require the provisions of a reconciliation bill to deal exclusively with legislation that impact government revenue or spending levels. Timing Since the introduction of the procedure in 1974, there have been 24 reconciliation bills, three of which were vetoed by the president. The reconciliation process begins with the passing of the budget resolution, which sets out the "reconciliation instructions." However, since the procedure was introduced, it has rarely progressed along the intended timeline. The very first reconciliation act in 1980 was introduced in a budget resolution that passed well after the April 15 deadline, in mid-June. And the ultimate appropriations bill, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, was only signed into law in early December 1980, so essentially two months after the start of FY1981 on October 1. Investors should therefore understand that the U.S. budget process has no real firm deadlines. The schedule is highly malleable. A reconciliation bill also does not have to be passed with the actual budget. Despite being initiated by the budget resolution, reconciliation runs parallel to the budget process. For example, Congress has already set appropriations for FY2017, but the reconciliation bill on Obamacare - set by the FY2017 budget resolution - is still in negotiations. Diagram 3 illustrates that half of all reconciliation bills were passed after the start of the fiscal year for which they were introduced in a budget resolution. And five reconciliation bills were passed in the calendar year of the fiscal year for which they were supposed to reconcile the budget, basically mid way through the fiscal year. Diagram 3Timing Of Reconciliation Procedures This is important in the current context because investors are waiting for tax reform legislation which is supposed to be passed via the budget reconciliation process for FY2018. However, the GOP-controlled Congress has not even finished the budget process for FY2017. In fact, the budget resolution for FY2017 only passed the House on January 13, 2017. As we learned above, U.S. budget process guidelines call for the budget resolution to have been passed by April 15, 2016. As such, the Obamacare repeal and replace bill, if it were to ultimately pass the Senate, would certainly be the most delayed reconciliation bill ever. In fact, we could see the current Congress passing the FY2017 reconciliation bill in the waning days of FY2017! Congressional rules only allow one budget resolution to be active at any one time. In fact, as soon as a new budget resolution is passed, the old reconciliation instructions are made void. As such, investors have to wait for the Republicans to decide what they plan to do with the Obamacare reconciliation bill before they begin contemplating tax reform. Bottom Line: Republicans in Congress decided to issue reconciliation instructions as part of the FY2017 budget resolution, which passed in January. As such, investors have to wait until that process ends - with either Obamacare repeal or failure of the bill - before Congress can produce a FY2018 budget resolution with reconciliation instructions for tax reform. We suspect that the FY2018 budget resolution will be passed sometime between the end of the August Congressional recess, on September 5, and December. But that is just a guess (Diagram 4). It could happen earlier, in July, if Obamacare is dealt with over the next month. Diagram 4Tentative U.S. Political Timeline Reconciliation Rules And Tax Reform Changing America's complex tax laws is precisely the sort of legislative action that reconciliation was designed to facilitate. That said, investors are still not sure whether the Trump administration and Congress will be able to agree on comprehensive tax reform that includes lowering top rates for corporations, or whether they will merely agree to cut household taxes on households. Some clarity will emerge once the Republican-controlled Congress passes the FY2018 budget resolution, which will contain reconciliation instructions for either comprehensive tax reform (most likely) or merely household tax reform (unlikely). At that point, the length of the reconciliation process will depend on how much agreement there is surrounding tax reform. Diagram 3 shows that tax cuts - such as those in 2001 and 2003 - take relatively little time to pass. Tax reform, on the other hand, could take a while longer given multiple competing interests. If comprehensive, we would expect tax reform to be passed by the end of Q1 2018. Would that mean that tax cuts would only be effective from January 1, 2018? Or, even less bullish, from the start of FY2019? No. The GOP would have the option of making tax cuts retroactive and thus can avoid a huge market disappointment if tax cuts come later in the next year. It is even legally possible for tax laws passed in 2018 to take effect on January 1, 2017 - though it is admittedly more of a stretch than doing it this year.12 Can reconciliation be used to pass budget-busting tax reform, as we have argued investors should expect? You bet! From 1980 to the 1990s the reconciliation procedure was primarily used - and in fact designed - to reduce the deficit through reductions in mandatory spending, revenue increases, or both. It has since become a tool to expand deficits. This was most famously done by the Bush era reconciliation bills in 2001 and 2003, which introduced large tax cuts. The aforementioned Byrd rule forces any provision of a bill that increases the deficit beyond the years covered by the reconciliation bill to "sunset." In the case of the 2001 and 2003 bills, this meant that Bush-era tax cuts expired in 2011 (estate tax) and 2013 (which investors will remember as the "fiscal cliff"). The sunset period does not have to be ten years, it could conceivably be a lot longer, in effect making tax reform permanent, as far as most investors' time horizons are concerned. Following the Democratic Party sweep in the 2006 midterm elections, the Democrat-controlled Senate changed reconciliation rules to prohibit any deficit-increasing measures, regardless of the sunset clause loophole. However, the Republicans changed the rules back in 2015, after they re-took the Senate in the 2014 midterm election. This is crucial for two reasons: first, it means that the current procedural rules on the books allow deficits to be blown out via the reconciliation procedure and second, it establishes that the current cohort of Republicans in Congress is fiscally profligate, despite media punditry to the contrary. Bottom Line: The reconciliation process was designed to facilitate precisely the type of legislation that Republicans will try to pass via tax reform. According to the current procedural rules, such legislation can increase the budget deficit, as long as it sunsets at the conclusion of the budgetary period set out by the legislation (normally 10-years, but it could be longer). We suspect that tax reform will take until Q1 2018 to pass, but Republicans will be able to make its effects retroactive to January 1, 2017. The Big Picture - What Does It All Mean For Fiscal Policy? We expect the Republican-held Congress to attempt to pass comprehensive tax reform over the next four quarters. If the GOP fail to agree on "revenue offsets" for corporate tax cuts, we could see the Republican Congress electing to pass simple tax cuts for households, as the Bush-era tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 did. To facilitate such legislation politically, the Republicans will rely on "dynamic scoring," the macroeconomic modeling tool based on the work of economist Arthur Laffer (of the "Laffer curve" fame). The idea is that the headline government revenue lost through tax cuts fails to take into account the growth-generating consequences ("macroeconomic feedback") of the cuts, factors that actually add to revenues. In other words, "tax cuts pay for themselves." It is true that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) will balk at dynamic scoring. But we doubt that "egghead, socialist economists" will stand in the way of tax reforms. As we discussed above, the CBO's score will ultimately only force the Republicans to "sunset" tax reform legislation, not scuttle it. The market disagrees with us. After a wave of euphoria following the presidential election, the market has largely priced out meaningful fiscal stimulus. This can be seen in the flagging relative performance of infrastructure stocks and highly-taxed companies, as well as in the sharp decline in inflation expectations (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Has Voted: No Fiscal Stimulus We think the market is making a serious mistake by taking the Republican mantra of "revenue neutral" - meaning that any tax cuts would need to be offset by other revenue-raising measures - tax reform seriously. This is easier said than done. The three main ways that House Republicans have offered to pay for corporate and personal tax cuts - introducing a border adjustment tax, eliminating the deductibility of business interest payments, and jettisoning the deduction for state and local income taxes for individuals - will all face resistance from vested interests. We suspect that the GOP will produce some revenue offsets, but not enough to have a revenue-neutral tax reform. The path of least resistance, therefore, will be to bust the budget and then force the measures to expire over the life of the budget-setting window. White House budget director Mick Mulvaney has already floated the idea of extending the 10-year budget scoring window to 20 years. This would allow tax reform measures, even if they are characterized by the CBO as profligate, to expire in two decades. That's practically a lifetime away, as far as any investor is concerned. What is the investment significance of a stimulative tax reform package? Our colleague Peter Berezin has recently pointed out that it is ironic that fiscal stimulus is coming to America only when the economy has reached full employment. This means that much of the increase in aggregate demand arising from a more expansionary fiscal stance will be reflected in higher inflation rather than faster growth. This does not represent a major threat to risk assets now, but could later next year, as the Fed responds to greater fiscal thrust with tighter monetary policy.13 We encourage our clients to read BCA Special Report "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," penned by Martin Barnes in March, which details the likely path that assets and the economy will take over the next two years.14 In the short term, the market will continue to fret that tax reform is doomed and that Republicans are committed to austerity. However, budget-busting tax reform could begin to be priced in by the market well before the reconciliation bill is ultimately passed. We suspect that the outlines of tax reform will emerge this summer. The market may realize that stimulus is coming as soon as the FY2018 budget resolution, containing tax reform instructions, is passed in Q3 or Q4 2017. Such a realization later this year could augur a violent snap-back in the USD. Currently, the two-year real interest rate differentials between the euro area and the U.S. have widened by 58 basis points in favor of the latter since the end of March, even though EUR/USD has actually rallied over this period (Chart 10). We have been long EUR/USD since March 22,15 in expectations that investors would be busy covering their euro hedges that they put on in the lead up to the French elections, the outcome of which we have had a high conviction on since November.16 However, now that net long speculative positions in the euro have risen to a three-year high - having been deeply short just a few weeks ago - the speculative demand for euros will ultimately subside (Chart 11). Chart 10Widening Real Rate ##br##Differentials Support The Dollar Chart 11Speculators Are Long The Euro##br## For The First Time In Three Years We are therefore closing our USD short versus both the euro and the pound, for gains of 3.48% and 3.34% respectively. As we expected, the ECB is going to look to guide investors towards a "dovish" tapering of its QE program. Speaking before the European Parliament's committee on economic affairs, ECB President Mario Draghi confirmed that "very accommodative financing conditions" reliant on "a fairly substantial amount of monetary accommodation" would continue. The ECB will have to make a decision whether to extend its sovereign bond purchase program into the next year or start winding it down as planned. Given news flow out of Italy that an election may be planned as early as September, the ECB may be forced to stand pat until after the end of the year. Given our view that tax reform in the U.S. would ultimately happen, and that it would eventually be marginally stimulative, any resurfacing of political risks in Europe - which we are expecting - should be negative for the EUR/USD. What should investors do about European equities? We are cautious. As we have been pointing out to our clients since September of last year, Italy is the political risk in Europe.17 However, we think that most investors are willing to bet that European equities can survive Italian political turbulence. This could be a mistake in the short term, as we think that Euroskeptic (albeit evolving) Five Star Movement could win a plurality in the next election. In the long term, Italy will become ECB's proverbial boulder, that Draghi must push up a hill like Sisyphus, only to see it roll down to the bottom with each bout of Italian political instability. As such, Italy's instability will force ECB to set its monetary policy for the weakest link in the Euro Area (Italy), rather than the aggregate. This should be positive for Euro Area risk assets, but negative for the euro, all other things being equal. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Strike While The Iron Is Hot," dated September 2, 2016, available at gss.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 The dates for the two rounds of the legislative elections are June 11 and 18. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 We draw on several overviews of the budget reconciliation process in this report. Please see David Reich and Richard Kogan, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Introduction To Budget 'Reconciliation'," dated November 9, 2016, available at cbpp.org; Megan S. Lynch, Congressional Research Service, "The Budget Reconciliation Process: Timing Of Legislative Action," dated February 23, 2016, available at fas.org; and Megan S. Lynch, Congressional Research Service, "Budget Reconciliation Measures Enacted Into Law: 1980-2010," dated January 4, 2017, available at fas.org. 11 To reach the required 60 seat filibuster-proof majority the Democrats relied on some luck and cunning. Democrat Al Franken unseated Republican Incumbent Norm Coleman in a recount in Minnesota and Arlen Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, switched his party affiliation to Democrat. 12 Congress, after the sweeping 1986 tax reforms, corrected certain oversights in that law by passing subsequent measures in 1987. These were made to be retroactive back to the previous calendar year, i.e. January 1, 1986, and the courts upheld the legislation. Hence, there is precedent for Republicans to pass tax reform in 2018 that takes effect January 1, 2017, though admittedly the circumstances would matter. Courts have even upheld retroactive tax legislation back to two calendar tax years. Please see Erika K. Lunder, Robert Meltz, and Kenneth R. Thomas, "Constitutionality of Retroactive Tax Legislation," Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2012, available at fas.org. 13 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Fiscal Policy In The Spotlight," dated May 26, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," dated March 7, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Questions On Europe," dated March 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar