Government
Executive Summary Investors face a dilemma. The faster that inflation comes down, the better it will be for valuations via a stronger rally in the bond price. But if a collapse in inflation requires a sharp deceleration in growth, the worse it will be for profits. Bond yields are likely in a peaking process, but the sharpest declines may come a few months down the road, after an unambiguous roll-over in food and energy inflation. The stock market’s valuation-driven sell-off is likely over, but the danger is that it morphs into a profits-driven sell-off. As such, the stock market will remain under pressure through 2022, though it is likely to be higher 12 months from now in June 2023. High conviction recommendation: Overweight healthcare versus basic resources. In other words, tilt towards sectors that benefit the most from rising bond prices and that suffer the least from contracting profits. New high conviction recommendation: Go long the Japanese yen. As bond yield differentials re-tighten, the yen will rally. Additionally, the yen will benefit from its haven status in a period of recessionary risk. Fractal trading watchlist: JPY/USD, GBP/USD, and Australian basic resources. If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Stock Market Bottom Line: The risk is that the valuation-driven sell-off morphs into a profits-driven sell-off. Feature In May, many stock markets reached the drawdown of 20 percent that defines a technical bear market. Yet what has caught many people off guard is that the bear market in stocks has happened during a bull market in profits. Since the start of 2022, US profits are up by 5 percent.1 The bear market in stocks has happened during a bull market in profits… so far. This shatters the shibboleth that bear markets only happen when there is a profits recession. The 2022 bear market has been a valuation-driven bear market. US profits rose 5 percent, but the multiple paid for those profits collapsed by 25 percent, taking the market into bear territory. None of this should come as any surprise to our regular readers. As we have pointed out many times, a stock market can be likened to a bond with a variable rather than a fixed income. So, just as with a bond, every stock market has a ‘duration’ which establishes which bond it most behaves like. It turns out that that long-duration US stock market has the same duration as a 30-year bond. This means that: The US stock market = (The 30-year T-bond price) multiplied by (US profits) It follows that if the 30-year bond price falls by more than profits rise, then the stock market will sell off. And if the 30-year bond price falls by much more than profits rise, then the stock market will enter a valuation-driven bear market. Therein lies the story of 2022 so far (Chart I-1). Chart I-1The Bear Market Is Valuation-Driven. Profits Are Up... For Now Just As In 1981-82, Will The Sell-Off Morph From Valuation-Driven To Profits-Driven? In Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession, we argued that a good template for what happens to the economy and the markets in 2022-23 is the experience of 1981-82. Does 2022-23 = 1981-82? Then, just as now, the world’s central banks were obsessed with ‘breaking the back’ of inflation, and piloting the economy to a ‘soft landing’. Then, just as now, the central banks were desperate to repair their badly damaged credibility in managing the economy. And then, just as now, an invasion-led war between two major commodity producers – Iran and Iraq – was disrupting commodity supplies and adding to inflationary pressures. In 1981, just as now, the equity market sell-off started as a valuation sell-off, driven by a declining 30-year T-bond price. Profits held up through most of 1981, just as they have so far in 2022. In September 1981, US core inflation finally peaked, with bond yields following soon after. In the current experience, March 2022 appears to have marked the equivalent peak in US core inflation (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Does September 1981... Chart I-3...Equal March 2022? In late 1981, when the 30-year T-bond price rebounded, the good news was that beaten-down equity valuations also reached their low point. The bad news was that just as the valuation-driven sell-off ended, profits keeled over, and the valuation-driven sell-off morphed into a profits-driven sell-off (Chart I-4). In 2022-23, could history repeat? Chart I-4In September 1981, The Sell-Off Morphed From Valuation-Driven To Profits-Driven Recession Or No Recession? That Is Not The Question History rhymes, it rarely repeats exactly. What if the 2022-23 experience can avoid the outright economic recession of the 1981-82 experience? This brings us to another shibboleth that needs to be shattered. You don’t need the economy to go into recession for profits to go into recession. To understand why, we need to visit the concept of operational leverage. Profits is a small number that comes from the difference of two large numbers: sales and the costs of generating those sales. As any company will tell you, sales can be volatile, but costs – which are dominated by wages – are sticky and much slower to change. The upshot is that if sales growth exceeds costs growth, there is a massively leveraged impact on profits growth. This is the magic of operational leverage. But if sales growth falls below sticky cost growth, the magic turns into a curse. The operational leverage goes into reverse, and profits collapse. Using US stock market profits as an example, the magic turns into a curse at real GDP growth of 1.25 percent, above which profits grow at six times the difference, and below which profits shrink at six times the difference (Chart I-5). Chart I-5A Model For US Profits Growth: (Real GDP Growth - 1.25) Times 6 Strictly speaking, we should compare US profits growth with world GDP growth because multinationals generate their sales globally rather than domestically. But to the extent that the US has both the world’s largest stock market and the world’s largest economy, it is a reasonable comparison. We should also compare both profits and sales in either nominal or real terms, rather than a mixture. But even with these tweaks, we would still find that the dominant driver of profit growth is operational leverage. ‘Recession or no recession?’ is a somewhat moot question, because even non-recessionary low growth is enough to tip profits into contraction. Therefore, the conclusion still stands – ‘recession or no recession?’ is a somewhat moot question, because even non-recessionary low growth is enough to tip profits into contraction. Such a period of low growth is now likely. If 2022-23 = 1981-82, What Happens Next? To repeat: The US stock market = (The 30-year T-bond price) multiplied by (US profits) This means that investors face a dilemma. The faster that inflation comes down, the better it will be for valuations via a stronger rally in the bond price. But if a collapse in inflation requires a sharp deceleration in growth, the worse it will be for profits. This was the precise set-up in December 1981, the equivalent of June 2022 in our historical template. In which case, what can we expect next? 1. Bond yields are likely in a peaking process, but the sharpest declines may come a few months down the road, after an unambiguous roll-over in food and energy inflation (Chart I-6). Chart I-6If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Bond Yield 2. The stock market’s valuation-driven sell-off is likely over, but the danger is that it morphs into a profits-driven sell-off. As such, the stock market will remain under pressure through 2022, though it is likely to be higher 12 months from now in June 2023 (Chart I-7). Chart I-7If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Stock Market 3. Long-duration defensive sectors will outperform short-duration cyclical sectors. In other words, tilt towards sectors that benefit the most from rising bond prices and suffer the least from contracting profits. As such, a high conviction recommendation is to overweight healthcare versus basic resources (Chart I-8). Chart I-8If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To Healthcare Versus Resources 4. In foreign exchange, the setup is very bullish for the Japanese yen through the next 12 months. The yen’s recent sell-off is explained by bond yields rising outside Japan. As these bond yield differentials re-tighten, the yen will rally. Additionally, the yen will benefit from its haven status in a period of recessionary risk. A new high conviction recommendation is to go long the Japanese yen (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Yen's Sell-Off Is Due To Bond Yields Rising Outside Japan Fractal Trading Watchlist Supporting our bullish fundamental case for the Japanese yen, the sell-off in JPY/USD has reached the point of fragility on its 260-day fractal structure that marked previous major turning points in 2013 and 2015 (Chart 10). Hence, a first new trade is long JPY/USD, setting the trade length at 6 months, and the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent. Chart I-10The Sell-Off In JPY/USD Has Reached A Potential Turning Point Supporting our bearish fundamental case for resources stocks, the outperformance of Australian basic resources has reached the point of fragility on its 130-day fractal structure that marked previous turning points in 2013, 2015, and 2021 (Chart I-11). Hence, a second new trade is short Australian basic resources versus the world market, setting the trade length at 6 months, and the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 10 percent. Chart I-11The Australian Basic Resources Sector Is Vulnerable To Reversal Finally, we are adding GBP/USD to our watchlist, given that its 260-day fractal structure is close to the point of fragility that marked major turns in 2014, 2015, and 2016. Our full watchlist of 29 investments that are at, or approaching turning points, is available on our website: cpt.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions GBP/USD At A Turning Point Chart 1AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 2Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Chart 3Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 4US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal Chart 5BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Chart 6Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Chart 7CNY/USD Has Reversed Chart 8CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 9Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 10The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 11The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 12FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Reversing Chart 13Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Been Exhausted Chart 14The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 15The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 16Food And Beverage Outperformance Has Been Exhausted Chart 17The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 18The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 19A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 20Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 21Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 22Cotton Versus Platinum Is Reversing Chart 23Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Chart 24The Rally In USD/EUR Has Ended Chart 25The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 26A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 27Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart 28US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 29GBP/USD At A Turning Point Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Defined as 12-month forward earnings per share. Fractal Trading System 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Executive Summary EU Embargoes Russian Oil The EU imposed an embargo on 90% of Russian oil imports, which will provoke retaliation. Russia will squeeze Europe’s economy ahead of critical negotiations over the coming 6-12 months. Russian gains on the battlefield in Ukraine point to a ceasefire later, but not yet – and Russia will need to retaliate against NATO enlargement. The Middle East and North Africa face instability and oil disruptions due to US-Iran tensions and Russian interference. China’s autocratic shift is occurring amid an economic slowdown and pandemic. Social unrest and internal tensions will flare. China will export uncertainty and stagflation. Inflation is causing disparate effects in South Asia – instability in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and fiscal populism in India. Asset Initiation Date Return Long Brazilian Financials / Indian Equities (Closed) Feb 10/22 22.5% Bottom Line: Markets still face three geopolitical hurdles: Russian retaliation; Middle Eastern instability; Chinese uncertainty. Feature Global equities bounced back 6.1% from their trough on May 12 as investors cheered hints of weakening inflation and questioned the bearish consensus. BCA’s Global Investment Strategy correctly called the equity bounce. However, as BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy service, we see several sources of additional bad news. Throughout the Ukraine conflict we have highlighted two fundamental factors to ascertain regarding the ongoing macroeconomic impact: Will the war cut off the Russia-EU energy trade? Will the war broaden beyond Ukraine? Chart 1Russian-Exposed Assets Will Suffer More In this report we update our views on these two critical questions. The takeaway is that the geopolitical outlook is still flashing red. The US dollar will remain strong and currencies exposed to Russia and geopolitical risk will remain weak (Chart 1). In addition, China’s politics will continue to produce uncertainty and negative surprises this year. Taken together, investors should remain defensive for now but be ready to turn positive when the market clears the hurdles we identify. The fate of the business cycle hangs in the balance. Energy Ties Eroding … Russia Will Retaliate Over Oil Embargo Chart 2AEU Embargoes Russian Oil Europe is diversifying from Russian oil and natural gas. The European Union adopted a partial oil embargo on Russia that will cut oil imports by 90% by the end of 2022. It also removed Sberbank from the SWIFT banking communications network and slapped sanctions on companies that insure shipments of Russian crude. The sanctions will cut off all of Europe’s seaborne oil imports from Russia as well as major pipeline imports, except the Southern Druzhba pipeline. The EU made an exception for landlocked eastern European countries heavily dependent on Russian pipeline imports – namely Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria (Chart 2A). Focus on the big picture. Germany changed its national policy to reduce Russian energy dependency for the sake of national security. From Chancellors Willy Brandt to Angela Merkel, Germany pursued energy cooperation and economic engagement as a means of lowering the risk of war with Russia. Ostpolitik worked in the Cold War, so when Russia seized Crimea in 2014, Merkel built the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. But Merkel’s policy failed to persuade Russia that economic cooperation is better than military confrontation – rather it emboldened President Putin, who viewed Europe as divided and corruptible. Chart 2BRussia Squeezes EU’s Natural Gas Russia’s regime is insecure and feels threatened by the US and NATO. Russia believed that if it invaded Ukraine, the Europeans would maintain energy relations for the sake of preserving overall strategic stability. Instead Germany and other European states began to view Russia as irrational and aggressive and hence a threat to their long-term security. They imposed a coal ban, now an oil ban the end of this year, and a natural gas ban by the end of 2027, all formalized under the recently announced RePowerEU program. Russia retaliated by declaring it would reduce natural gas exports to the Netherlands and probably Denmark, after having already cut off Finland, Poland, and Bulgaria (Chart 2B). As a pretext Russia points to its arbitrary March demand that states pay for gas in rubles rather than in currencies written in contracts. This ruble payment scheme is being enforced on a country-by-country basis against those Russia deems “unfriendly,” i.e. those that join NATO, adopt new sanctions, provide massive assistance to Ukraine, or are otherwise adverse. Chart 3Russia Actively Cutting Gas Flows Russia and Ukraine are already reducing natural gas exports through the Ukraine and Turkstream pipelines while the Yamal pipeline has been empty since May – and it is only a matter of time before flows begin to fall in the Nord Stream 1 pipeline to Germany (Chart 3). German government and industry are preparing to ration natural gas (to prioritize household needs) and revive 15 coal plants if necessary. Europe is attempting to rebuild stockpiles for the coming winter, when Russian willingness and capability to squeeze natural gas flows will reach a peak. The big picture is demonstrated by game theory in Diagram 1. The optimal situation for both Russia and the EU is to maintain energy exports for as long as possible, so that Russia has revenues to wage its war and Europe avoids a recession while transitioning away from Russian supplies (bottom right quadrant, each side receives four points). The problem is that this solution is not an equilibrium because either side can suffer a sudden shock if the other side betrays the tacit agreement and stops buying or selling (bottom left and top right quadrants). Diagram 1EU-Russia Standoff: What Does Game Theory Say? The equilibrium – the decision sets in which both Russia and the EU are guaranteed to lose the least – is a situation in which both states reduce energy trade immediately. Europe needs to cut off the revenues that fuel the Russian war machine while Russia needs to punish and deter Europe now while it still has massive energy leverage (top left quadrant, circled). Once Europe diversifies away, Russia loses its leverage. If Europe does not diversify immediately, Russia can punish it severely by cutting off energy before it is prepared. Russian energy weaponization is especially useful ahead of any ceasefire talks in Ukraine. Russia aims for Ukrainian military neutrality and a permanently weakened Ukrainian state. To that end it is seizing territory for the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, seizing the southern coastline and strategic buffer around Crimea, and controlling the mouth of the Dnieper river so that Ukraine is forever hobbled (Map 1). Once it achieves these aims it will want to settle a ceasefire that legitimizes its conquests. But Ukraine will wish to continue the fight. Map 1Russian Invasion Of Ukraine, 2022 Russia will need leverage over Europe to convince the EU to lean on Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire. Something similar occurred in 2014-15 when Russia collaborated with Germany and France to foist the Minsk Protocols onto Ukraine. If Russia keeps energy flowing to EU, the EU not only gets a smooth energy transition away from Russia but also gets to keep assisting Ukraine’s military effort. Whereas if Russia imposes pain on the EU ahead of ceasefire talks, the EU has greater interest in settling a ceasefire. Finally, given Russia’s difficulties on the battlefield, its loss of European patronage, and potential NATO enlargement on its borders, Moscow is highly likely to open a “new front” in its conflict with the West. Josef Stalin, for example, encouraged Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea in 1950. Today Russia’s options lie in the Middle East and North Africa – the regions where Europe turns for energy alternatives. Not only Libya and Algeria – which are both inherently fertile ground for Russia to sow instability – but also Iran and the broader Middle East, where a tenuous geopolitical balance is already eroding due to a lack of strategic understanding between the US and Iran. Russia’s capabilities are limited but it likely retains enough influence to ignite existing powder kegs in these areas. Bottom Line: Investors still face a few hurdles from the Ukraine war. First, the EU’s expanding energy embargo and Russian retaliation. Second, instability in the Middle East and North Africa. Hence energy price pressures will remain elevated in the short term and kill more demand, thus pushing the EU and the rest of the world toward stagflation or even recession. War Contained To Ukraine So Far … But Russia To Retaliate Over NATO Enlargement At present Russia is waging a full-scale assault on eastern and southern Ukraine, where about half of Donetsk awaits a decision (Map 2). If Russia emerges victorious over Donetsk in the summer or fall then it can declare victory and start negotiating a ceasefire. This timeline assumes that its economic circumstances are sufficiently straitened to prevent a campaign to the Moldovan border.1 Map 2Russia May Declare Victory If It Conquers The Rest Of Donetsk There are still ways for the Ukraine war to spill over into neighboring areas. For example, the Black Sea is effectively a Russian lake at the moment, which prevents Ukrainian grain from reaching global markets where food prices are soaring. Eventually the western maritime powers will need to attempt to restore freedom of navigation. However, Russia is imposing a blockade on Ukraine, has more at stake there than other powers, and can take greater risks. The US and its allies will continue to provide Ukraine with targeting information against Russian ships but this assistance could eventually provoke a larger naval conflict. Separately, the US has agreed to provide Ukraine with the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which could lead to attacks on Russian territory that would prompt a ferocious Russian reaction. Even assuming that the Ukraine war remains contained, Russia’s strategic conflict with the US and the West will remain unresolved and Moscow will be eager to save face. Russian retaliation will occur not only on account of European energy diversification but also on account of NATO enlargement. Finland and Sweden are attempting to join NATO and as such the West is directly repudiating the Putin regime’s chief strategic demand for 22 years. Finland shares an 830 mile border with Russia, adding insult to injury. The result will be another round of larger military tensions that go beyond Ukraine and prolong this year’s geopolitical risk and uncertainty. Russia’s initial response to Finland’s and Sweden’s joint application to NATO was to dismiss the threat they pose while drawing a new red line. Rather than forbidding NATO enlargement, Russia now demands that no NATO forces be deployed to these two states. This demand, which Putin and other officials expressed, may or may not amount to a genuine Russian policy change. Russia’s initial responses should be taken with a grain of salt because Turkey is temporarily blocking Finland’s and Sweden’s applications, so Russia has no need to respond to NATO enlargement yet. But the true test will come when and if the West satisfies Turkey’s grievances and Turkey moves to admit the new members. If enlargement becomes inevitable, Russia will respond. Russia will feel that its national security is fundamentally jeopardized by Sweden overturning two centuries of neutrality and Finland reversing the policy of “Finlandization” that went so far in preventing conflict during the Cold War. Chart 4Military Balances Stacking Up Against Russia Russia’s military options are limited. Russia has little ability to expand the war and fight on multiple fronts judging by the army’s recent performance in Ukraine and the Red Army’s performance in the Winter War of 1939. This point can be illustrated by taking the military balance of Russia and its most immediate adversaries, which add up to about half of Russian military strength even apart from NATO (Chart 4). Russian armed forces already demonstrated some pragmatism in April by withdrawing from Kyiv and focusing on more achievable war aims. Unless President Putin turns utterly reckless and the Russian state fails to restrain him, Russia will opt for defensive measures and strategic deterrence rather than a military offensive in the Baltics. Hence Russia’s military response will come in the form of threats rather than outright belligerence. However, these threats will probably include military and nuclear actions that will raise alarm bells across Europe and the United States. President Dmitri Medvedev has already warned of the permanent deployment of nuclear missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave.2 This statement points to only the most symbolic option of a range of options that will increase deterrence and elevate the fear of war. Otherwise Russia’s retaliation will consist of squeezing global energy supply, as discussed above, including by opening a new front in the Middle East and North Africa. Instability should be expected as a way of constraining Europe and distracting America. Higher energy prices may or may not convince the EU to negotiate better terms with Russia but they will sow divisions within and among the allies. Ultimately Russia is highly unlikely to sacrifice its credibility by failing to retaliate for the combination of energy embargo and NATO enlargement on its borders. Since its military options are becoming constrained (at least its rational ones), its economic and asymmetrical options will grow in importance. The result will be additional energy supply constraints. Bottom Line: Even assuming that the war does not spread beyond Ukraine – likely but not certain – global financial markets face at least one more period of military escalation with Russia. This will likely include significant energy cutoffs and saber-rattling – even nuclear threats – over NATO enlargement. China’s Political Situation Has Not Normalized China continues to suffer from a historic confluence of internal and external political risk that will cause negative surprises for investors. Temporary improvements in government policy or investor sentiment – centered on a relaxation of “Zero Covid” lockdowns in major cities and a more dovish regulatory tone against the tech giants – will likely be frustrated, at least until after a more dovish government stance can be confirmed in the wake of the twentieth national party congress in October or November this year. At that event, Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to clinch another ten years in power and complete the transformation of China’s governance from single-party rule to single-person rule. This reversion to autocracy will generate additional market-negative developments this year. It has already embedded a permanently higher risk premium in Chinese financial assets because it increases the odds of policy mistakes, international aggression, and ultimately succession crisis. The most successful Asian states chose to democratize and expand free markets and capitalism when they reached a similar point of economic development and faced the associated sociopolitical challenges. But China is choosing the opposite path for the sake of national security. Investors have seen the decay of Russia’s economy under Putin’s autocracy and would be remiss not to upgrade the odds of similarly negative outcomes in China over the long run as a result of Xi’s autocracy, despite the many differences between the two countries. China’s situation is more difficult than that of the democratic Asian states because of its reviving strategic rivalry with the United States. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently unveiled President Biden’s comprehensive China policy. He affirmed that the administration views China as the US’s top strategic competitor over the long run, despite the heightened confrontation with Russia.3 The Biden administration has not eased the Trump administration’s tariffs or punitive measures on China. It is unlikely to do so during a midterm election year when protectionist dynamics prevail – especially given that the Xi administration will be in the process of reestablishing autocracy, and possibly repressing social unrest, at the very moment Americans go to the polls. Re-engagement with China is also prohibited because China is strengthening its strategic bonds with Russia. President Biden has repeatedly implied that the US would defend Taiwan in any conflict with China. These statements are presented as gaffes or mistakes but they are in fact in keeping with historical US military actions threatening counter-attack during the three historic Taiwan Strait crises. The White House quickly walks back these comments to reassure China that the US does not support Taiwanese independence or intend to trigger a war with China. The result is that the US is using Biden’s gaffe-prone personality to reemphasize the hard edge (rather than the soft edge) of the US’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan. US policy is still ambiguous but ambiguity includes the possibility that a president might order military action to defend Taiwan. US attempts to increase deterrence and avoid a Ukraine scenario are threatening for China, which will view the US as altering the status quo and penalizing China for Russia’s actions. Beijing resumed overflights of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in the wake of Biden’s remarks as well as the decision of the US to send Senator Tammy Duckworth to Taiwan to discuss deeper economic and defense ties. Consider the positioning of US aircraft carrier strike groups as an indicator of the high level of strategic tensions. On January 18, 2022, as Russia amassed military forces on the Ukrainian border – and the US and NATO rejected its strategic demands – the US had only one publicly acknowledged aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean (the USS Harry Truman) whereas it had at least five US carriers in East Asia. On February 24, the day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US had at least four of these carriers in Asia. Even today the US has at least four carriers in the Pacific compared to at least two in Europe – one of which, notably, is in the Baltics to deter Russia from attacking Finland and Sweden (Map 3). The US is warning China not to take advantage of the Ukraine war by staging a surprise attack on Taiwan. Map 3Amid Ukraine War, US Deters China From Attacking Taiwan Of course, strategic tensions are perennial, whereas what investors are most concerned about is whether China can secure its economic recovery. The latest data are still disappointing. Credit growth continues to falter as the private sector struggles with a deteriorating demographic and macroeconomic outlook (Chart 5). The credit impulse has entered positive territory, when local government bonds are included, reflecting government stimulus efforts. But it is still negative when excluding local governments. And even the positive measure is unimpressive, having ticked back down in April (Chart 6). Chart 5Credit Growth Falters Amid Economic Transition Chart 6Silver Lining: Credit Impulse Less Negative Bottom Line: Further monetary and fiscal easing will come in China, a source of good news for global investors next year if coupled with a broader policy shift in favor of business, but the effects will be mixed this year due to Covid policy and domestic politics. Taken together with a European energy crunch and Middle Eastern oil supply disruptions, China’s stimulus is not a catalyst for a sustainable global equity market rally this year. South Asia: Inflation Hammers Sri Lanka And Pakistan Since 2020 we have argued that the global pandemic would result in a new wave of supply pressures and global social unrest. High inflation is blazing a trail of destruction in emerging markets, notably in South Asia, where per capita incomes are low and political institutions often fragile. Chart 7South Asia: Surging Inflation Sri Lanka has been worst affected (Chart 7). Inflation surged to an eye-watering 34% in April and is expected to rise further. Surging inflation has affected Sri Lanka disproportionately because its macroeconomic and political fundamentals were weak to begin with. The tourism-dependent Sri Lankan economy suffered a body blow from terrorist attacks in 2019 and the pandemic in 2020-21. Then 2022 saw a power struggle between Sri Lanka’s President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and members of the national assembly including Prime Minister (PM) Mahinda Rajapaksa. The crisis hit a crescendo when the country defaulted on external debt obligations last month. These events weigh on Sri Lanka’s ability to transition from a long civil war (1983-2009) to a path of sustained economic development. While the political crisis has seemingly stabilized following the appointment of new Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, we remain bearish on a strategic time horizon. This is mainly because the new PM is unlikely to bring about structural solutions for Sri Lanka’s broken economy. Moreover, Sri Lanka holds more than $50 billion of foreign debt, or 62% of GDP. Another country that has been dealing with political instability alongside high inflation in South Asia is Pakistan, where inflation hit a three-year high in April (see Chart 7 above). The latest twist in Pakistan’s never-ending cycle of political uncertainty comes from the ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan. The former PM, who commands an unusual popular support group due to his fame as a cricketer prior to entering politics, is demanding fresh elections and otherwise threatening to hold mass protests. Pakistan’s new coalition government and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who came to power amid parliamentary intrigues, are refusing elections and ultimatums. From a structural perspective Pakistan is characterized by a weak economy and an unusually influential military. Now it faces high inflation and rising food prices – indeed it is one of the countries that is most dangerously exposed to the Russia-Ukraine war as it depends on these two for over 70% of its grain imports. Bottom Line: MSCI Sri Lanka has underperformed the MSCI EM index by 58.3% this year to date. Pakistan has underperformed the same index by 41.6% over the same period. Against this backdrop, we remain strategic sellers of both bourses. Instability in these countries is also one of the factors behind our strategic assessment of India as a country with a growing domestic policy consensus. South Asia: India’s Fiscal Populism And Geopolitics Inflation is less rampant in India, although still troublesome. Consumer prices nearly jumped to an 8-year high in April (see Chart 7). With a loaded state election calendar due over the next 12-18 months, the jump in inflation naturally triggered a series of mitigating policy responses. Ban On Wheat Exports: India produces 14% of the world’s wheat and 11% of grains, and exports 5% and 7%, respectively. India’s exports could make a large profit in the context of global shortages. But Prime Minister Narendra Modi is entering into the political end of the business cycle, with key state elections due that will have an impact on the ruling party’s political standing two years before the next federal election. He fears political vulnerability if exports continue amid price pressures at home. The emphasis on food security is typical but also bespeaks a lack of commitment to economic reform. Chart 8India's Real Interest Rates Fall Surprise Rate Hikes: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) increased the policy repo rate by 40 basis points at an unscheduled meeting on May 4, thereby implementing its first rate hike since August 2018. With real rates in India lower than those in China or Brazil (Chart 8), the RBI will be forced to expedite its planned rate hikes through 2022. Tax Cuts On Fuel: India’s central government also announced steep cuts in excise duty on fuel. This is another populist measure that reduces political pressures but fails to encourage the private sector to adjust. These measures will help rein in inflation but the rate hikes will weigh on economic growth while the tax cuts will add to India’s fiscal deficit. Indeed, India is resorting to fiscal populism with key state elections looming. Geopolitical risk is less of a concern for India – indeed the Ukraine war has strengthened its bargaining position. In the short run, India benefits from the ability to buy arms and especially cheap oil from Russia while the EU imposes an embargo. But over the long run its economy and security can be strengthened by greater interest from the US and its allies, recently highlighted by the fourth meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the launch of the US’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). These initiatives are modest but they highlight the US’s need to replace China with India and ASEAN over time, a trend that no US administration can reverse now because of the emerging Russo-Chinese strategic alliance. At the same time, the Quad underscores India’s maritime interests and hence the security benefits India can gain from aligning its economy and navy with the other democracies. Bottom Line: Fiscal populism in the context of high commodity prices is negative for Indian equities. However, our views on Russia, the Middle East, and China all point to a sharper short-term spike in commodity prices that ultimately drives the world economy deeper into stagflation or recession. Therefore we are booking a 22.5% profit on our tactical decision to go long Brazilian financials relative to Indian equities. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Chart 9Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 10Other Measures Of Russian Geopolitical Risk Chart 11China: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 12United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 13Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 14France: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 15Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 16Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 17Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 18Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 19Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 20Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 21Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 22South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 23Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Footnotes 1 Recent diplomatic flaps between core European leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reflect Ukraine’s fear that Europe will negotiate a “separate peace” with Russia, i.e. accept Russian territorial conquests in exchange for economic relief. 2 Dmitri Medvedev explicitly states ‘there can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic - the balance must be restored’ in warning Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Medvedev is suggesting that nuclear weapons will be placed in this area where Russia has its Kaliningrad exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. Guy Faulconbridge, ‘Russia warns of nuclear, hypersonic deployment if Sweden and Finland join NATO’, April 14, 2022, Reuters. 3 See Antony J Blinken, Secretary of State, ‘The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China’, The George Washington University, Washington D.C., May 26, 2022, state.gov. Additionally, see President Joe Biden’s remarks on China and getting involved military to defend Taiwan in a joint press conference with Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. ‘Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference’, Akasaka Palace, Tokyo, Japan, May 23, 2022, whitehouse.gov. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
Listen to a short summary of this report. Executive Summary US Financial Conditions Have Tightened Significantly This Year US financial conditions have tightened by enough that the Fed no longer needs to talk up interest rate expectations. If inflation decelerates faster than anticipated over the coming months, as we expect will be the case, the Fed’s messaging will soften further. Bond yields in the US and abroad are likely to fall over the next 6-to-12 months, even if they do rise over a longer-term horizon. Stay overweight stocks, favoring non-US equities over their US peers. We are closing our short 10-year Gilts trade, initiated at a yield of 0.85%, for a gain of 7.5%. We are also opening a new trade going long Canadian short-term interest rate futures versus their US counterparts. Investors expect Canadian rates to exceed US rates in 2024, which seems unlikely to us given that the Canadian housing market is much more sensitive to higher rates than the US market. Bottom Line: After having tightened significantly over the past seven months, financial conditions should loosen modestly during the remainder of the year. This should benefit risk assets. Fed Focused on Financial Conditions Chart 1Tighter Financial Conditions Will Hurt Growth Like many central banks, the Fed sees financial conditions as a key driver of the real economy. While there are many financial conditions indices (FCIs), most include bond yields, credit spreads, equity prices, and the exchange rate as inputs. Higher bond yields, wider credit spreads, lower equity prices, and a strong currency all lead to tighter financial conditions and a weaker economy, and vice versa. Goldman’s US FCI is especially popular among market participants. It is calibrated so that 100 bps in tightening corresponds, all things equal, to a 100 basis-point decline in US real GDP growth over the subsequent four quarters. The Goldman FCI has tightened by 212 bps since the start of the year and by 225 points from its loosest level in November 2021. If the historic relationship between the FCI and the economy holds, the tightening in financial conditions would be enough to push US growth to a below-trend pace by the second quarter of 2023. In fact, the tightening in the Goldman FCI over the past 12 months already suggests that the manufacturing ISM will fall below 50 (Chart 1). Along the same lines, the Chicago Fed’s Adjusted National FCI, which measures financial conditions relative to current economic conditions, has moved slightly into restrictive territory. Aside from a brief period at the outset of the pandemic, the index has been consistently in expansionary territory since early 2013 (Chart 2). Chart 2The Chicago Fed Financial Conditions Index Has Moved Into Slightly Restrictive Territory Other data are consistent with the message from the FCIs. Most notably, growth estimates for the US and for other major economies have come down over the past few months (Chart 3). Economic surprise indices have also fallen, especially in the US. Chart 3AGrowth Forecasts Have Softened As Economic Data Have Surprised To The Downside (I) Chart 3BGrowth Forecasts Have Softened As Economic Data Have Surprised To The Downside (II) Mission Accomplished? Chart 4The Fed Expects To Lift Rates Above Its Estimate Of Neutral Given the recent tightening in financial conditions and weaker growth expectations, the Fed is likely to soften its tone. Already this week, Atlanta Fed President Raphael Bostic suggested that the Fed could pause raising rates in September in order to assess the impact of the Fed’s tightening campaign. The Fed minutes also conveyed a sense of flexibility and data-dependence about the timing and magnitude of future hikes once rates reach 2%. It’s worth stressing that the Fed expects rates to rise in 2023 to about 40 bps above its estimate of the terminal rate (Chart 4). Jawboning rate expectations higher would potentially undermine the Fed’s goal of achieving a soft landing for the economy. Inflation Will Dictate How Much Easing Lies Ahead There is a big difference between not wanting financial conditions to tighten further and wanting them to loosen. The Fed would only want to see an easing in financial conditions if inflation were to fall faster than expected. Chart 5 shows how the year-over-year change in the core PCE deflator would evolve over the remainder of the year depending on different assumptions about the month-over-month change in the deflator. The Fed would be able to reach its expectation of year-over-year core PCE inflation of 4.1% for end-2022 if the month-over-month change averages 0.33%. Monthly core PCE inflation averaged 0.3% in February and March and is expected to clock in at around the same level for April once the data is released tomorrow. Chart 5AUS Inflation Will Fall By More Than The Fed Expects If The Monthly Change In Core PCE Is Less Than 0.3% (I) Chart 5BUS Inflation Will Fall By More Than The Fed Expects If The Monthly Change In Core PCE Is Less Than 0.3% (II) Regardless of tomorrow’s data print, as we discussed last week, we expect the monthly inflation rate to average less than 0.3 in the back half of the year. If that happens, inflation will surprise to the downside relative to the Fed’s expectations. Consistent with the observation above, market-based inflation expectations have already declined. The 5-year TIPS inflation breakeven has fallen from 3.64% in March to 2.98% at present. The widely watched 5-year/5-year forward breakeven rate is back down to 2.29%, at the bottom of the Fed’s comfort zone of 2.3%-to-2.5% (Chart 6).1 The Citi US Inflation Surprise Index has also rolled over (Chart 7). Chart 6Market-Based Inflation Expectations Have Come Down Of Late Chart 7The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over Financial Conditions Abroad Financial conditions indices in the other major developed economies have tightened somewhat less than in the US because equities represent a smaller share of household net worth abroad and also because most currencies have weakened against the US dollar (Chart 8). Nevertheless, with growth momentum having already deteriorated sharply, central banks are signaling a more balanced approach towards policy normalization. Chart 8Financial Conditions Have Tightened More In The US Than Elsewhere This Year ECB: Wait and See? In a blog post published on Monday, Christine Lagarde observed that inflation expectations have risen from pre-pandemic levels, implying that real policy rates are currently lower than they were two years ago. In her mind, this warrants ending net purchases under the Asset Purchase Programme early in the third quarter. It also warrants raising the deposit rate by 25 bps at both the July and September meetings, bringing it back to zero from -0.5% at present. Beyond then, Lagarde was circumspect about what should be done, stressing the need for “gradualism, optionality and flexibility.” She noted that “The euro area is clearly not facing a typical situation of excess aggregate demand or economic overheating … Both consumption and investment remain below their pre-crisis levels, and even further below their pre-crisis trends.” She then added: “The outlook is now being clouded by the negative supply shocks hitting the economy … households’ expectations of their future financial situation dropped to their second-lowest level on record in March and remained close to that level in April.” The market expects the ECB to raise rates by 170 bps over the next 12 months, bringing the deposit rate to 1.2% by mid-2023 (Chart 9). BCA’s Global Fixed Income team, led by Rob Robis, foresees only 50 bps of tightening over the next 12 months. Chart 9Markets Expect Rates To Rise The Most In The Anglo-Saxon World The UK, Canada, and Australia: Frothy Housing Markets Will Limit Rate Hikes The Bank of England (BoE) hiked rates by 90 bps over the past 12 months. The UK OIS curve is priced for another 140 bps of rate hikes over the next year. According to the BoE’s forecasting models, this would raise the unemployment rate by two percentage points while lowering inflation to below 2% within the next two-to-three years. In our opinion, that is more tightening than the BoE would like to see. BCA’s strategists expect the BoE to deliver only another 75 bps of hikes over the next year. Chart 10Buildup In Leverage And Frothy Housing Markets Pose A Challenge To Monetary Policy In Some Developed Market Countries The Canadian economy has been quite strong, with the unemployment rate falling to 5.2% in April, the lowest since 1974. The Canadian OIS curve is discounting 195 bps of interest rate hikes over the next 12 months, substantially more than the 150 bps of tightening our fixed income team foresees. By mid-2024, investors expect Canadian policy rates to be about 25 bps above US rates. This seems unreasonable to us, and as of this week, we are expressing this view by going long the June 2024 3-month Canadian Bankers’ Acceptance (BAX) futures contract (BAM4) versus the corresponding 3-month US SOFR futures contract (SFRM4). A more liquid option is to simply go long the 10-year Canadian government bond versus the 10-year US Treasury note. At present, Canadian 10-year government bonds are yielding 5 bps more than their US counterparts. Unlike in the US, where household debt has fallen over the past 14 years, debt in Canada has risen, fueled by a massive housing boom (Chart 10). High indebtedness and the prevalence of variable rate/short-term fixed-rate mortgages will limit the ability of the BoC to raise rates. The Australian OIS curve is currently discounting 262 bps of rate hikes over the next year which, if realized, would take the cash rate to 3.3% – a level last seen in 2013 when the neutral rate in Australia was much higher by the RBA’s own reckoning. BCA’s fixed income strategists expect only 150 bps of tightening over the next 12 months. Japan: Yield Curve Control Will Continue Chart 11Japan: Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Far Lower Than In The Rest Of The World The Bank of Japan expects inflation excluding fresh food prices to remain at about 2% in the second half of 2022, but then to slow to 1.1% in the fiscal year starting April 2023. The Japan OIS curve is discounting almost no tightening over the next 12 months. Long-term inflation expectations are far lower in Japan than in any other major economy, which makes ultra-low rates a necessity for the foreseeable future (Chart 11). China: Outright Easing Chart 12Covid Restrictions Have Eased Only Modestly In China China faces a trifecta of problems: A weakening housing market; slowing external demand for manufactured goods; and the ongoing threat of Covid-related lockdowns. Despite a steep drop in the number of new Covid cases over the past month, China’s lockdown index has only eased modestly, as the authorities continue to fret about the next outbreak (Chart 12). The leadership in Beijing has responded with policy easing. The PBoC lowered the 5-year loan prime rate by 15 bps last week, the largest such cut since 2019. This followed a cut in the floor rate for first-home mortgages that was announced on May 15. BCA’s China strategists believe these measures will arrest the deep contraction in the property market but will not spark a full-blown recovery due to the ongoing commitment of the government to the “three red lines” policy.2 In normal times, a Chinese real estate slump would be a cause of grave concern for global investors. These are not normal times, however. Public enemy number one these days is inflation. A weaker Chinese property market would curb commodity demand, thus helping to cool inflation. That would be a welcome development for global investors. Investment Conclusions Global financial conditions have tightened to the point that betting on ever-higher rates, at least for the next 12 months, no longer makes sense. If global inflation decelerates faster than anticipated during the remainder of the year, as we expect will be the case, central banks will dial back the hawkish rhetoric. We took partial profits on our short 10-year Treasury trade earlier this month (initiated at a yield of 1.45%). As of this week, consistent with the earlier decision of BCA’s fixed income strategists to upgrade UK Gilts, we are closing our short 10-year Gilt position (initiated at a yield of 0.85%) for a gain of 7.5%. The coming Goldilocks environment of falling inflation and supply-side led growth will buttress equities. We expect global stocks to rise 15%-to-20% over the next 12 months, with non-US markets outperforming the US. Looking further out, the fate of Goldilocks will rest on where the neutral rate of interest resides. If the neutral rate in the US turns out to be substantially lower than 2.5%, then any growth recovery will falter as the lagged effects of restrictive monetary policy work their way through the economy. Conversely, if the neutral rate turns out to be substantially higher than 2.5%, then inflation will reaccelerate as the economy overheats. Given the choice, we would wager on the latter outcome. Thus, while we expect global bond yields to decline over a 12-month horizon, we foresee them rising over a 2-to-5-year time frame. Similarly, while stocks will strengthen over the next 12 months, they are likely to encounter another bout of turbulence starting late next year or in 2024 as central banks initiate a second round of rate hikes. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn Twitter Footnotes 1 The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index. The TIPS breakeven is based on the CPI index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of 2.3%-to-2.5%. 2 The People’s Bank of China and the housing ministry issued a deleveraging framework for property developers in August 2020, consisting of a 70% ceiling on liabilities-to-assets, a net debt-to-equity ratio capped at 100%, and a limit on short-term borrowing that cannot exceed cash reserves. Developers breaching these “red lines” run the risk of being cut off from access to new loans from banks, while those who respect them can only increase their interest-bearing borrowing by 15% at most. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Next Thursday May 26, we will hold the BCA Debate – High Inflation: Here To Stay,Or Soon In The Rear-View Mirror? – a Webcast in which I will debate my colleague, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist, Bob Ryan on the outlook for inflation, and take the side that inflationary fears will soon recede. I do hope you can join us. As such, the debate will replace the weekly report, though we will renew the fractal trading watchlist on our website. Dhaval Joshi Executive Summary The second quarter’s synchronised sell-off in stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals and gold is an extremely rare star alignment. The last time that the ‘everything sell-off’ star alignment happened was in early 1981 when the Paul Volcker Fed ‘broke the back’ of inflation and turned stagflation into an outright recession. In 2022, the Jay Powell Fed risks doing the same. If history repeats itself, then the template of 1981-82 could provide a useful guide for 2022-23. In which case, bond prices are now entering a bottoming process. Stocks would bottom next. While the near term outlook is cloudy, we expect stock prices to be higher on a 12-month horizon, especially long-duration stocks that are most sensitive to bond yields. But just as in 1981-82, the biggest casualty will be industrial metals, which are likely to suffer at least double-digit losses over the coming year. Fractal trading watchlist: FTSE 100 versus Stoxx Europe 600, Czech Republic versus Poland, Food and Beverages, US REITS versus Utilities, CNY/USD. 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 Bottom Line: The 1981-82 template for 2022-23 suggests that bonds will bottom first, followed by stocks. But steer clear of gold and industrial metals. Feature Investors have had a torrid time in the second quarter, with no place to hide.1 Stocks are down -10 percent. Bonds are down -6 percent. Inflation protected bonds are down -6 percent. Industrial metals are down -13 percent. Gold is down -6 percent. To add insult to injury, even cash is down in real terms, because the interest rate is well below the inflation rate! (Chart I-1) Chart I-1The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 2022 Last Happened In 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Such a star alignment of asset returns, in which stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals, and gold all sell off together, is unprecedented. In the eighty calendar quarters since the inflation protected bond market data became available in the early 2000s there has never been a quarter with an ‘everything sell-off’. Everything Has Sold Off, But Does That Make Sense? The rarity of an ‘everything sell-off’ is because there are virtually no economic or financial scenarios in which all five asset-classes should fall together (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare Chart I-3An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare A scenario dominated by rising inflation is bad for bonds, but good for inflation protected bonds, especially relative to conventional bonds. Yet inflation protected bonds have not outperformed either in absolute or relative terms. A scenario of rising inflation should also support the value of stocks, industrial metals and certainly gold, given that all three are, to varying degrees, ‘inflation hedges.’ Yet the prices of stocks, industrial metals, and gold have all plummeted. The rarity of an ‘everything sell-off’ is because there are virtually no economic or financial scenarios in which all asset classes should fall together. Conversely, a scenario dominated by slowing growth is bad for industrial metal prices, but good for conventional bond prices – as bond yields decline on diminished expectations for rate hikes. Yet conventional bonds have sold off. What about a scenario dominated by both rising inflation and slowing growth – which is to say, stagflation? In this case, we would expect inflation protected bonds to perform especially well. Meanwhile, with the economy still growing, the prices of industrial metals should not be collapsing, as they have been recently. In a final scenario of an imminent recession we would expect stocks, industrial metals and even gold to sell off, but conventional bonds to perform especially well. The upshot is there are virtually no economic scenarios in which stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals, and gold plummet together, as they have recently. So, what’s going on? To answer, we need to take a trip back to the 1980s. 1981 Was The Last Time We Had An ‘Everything Sell-Off’ Inflation protected bonds did not exist before the late 1990s. But considering the other four asset-classes – stocks, bonds, industrial metals, and gold – to find the last time that they all fell together we must travel back to 1981, the time of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and the Paul Volcker Fed. And suddenly, we discover spooky similarities with the current Zeitgeist. Just like today, the world’s central banks were obsessed with ‘breaking the back’ of inflation, which, like a monster in a horror movie, kept appearing to die before coming back with second and third winds (Chart I-4). Chart I-4In 1981, Just As In 2022, Central Banks Would 'Do Whatever It Takes' To Kill Inflation Just like today, the central banks were desperate to repair their badly damaged credibility in managing the economy. As the biography “Volcker: The Triumph of Persistence” puts it: “He restored credibility to the Federal Reserve at a time it had been greatly diminished.” And just like today, central bankers hoped that they could pilot the economy to a ‘soft landing’, though whether they genuinely believed that is another story. Asked at a press conference if higher interest rates would cause a recession, Volcker replied coyly “Well, you get varying opinions about that.” 2022 has spooky similarities with 1981. In fact, in its single-minded aim ‘to do whatever it takes’ to kill inflation, the Volcker Fed hiked the interest rate to near 20 percent, thereby triggering what was then the deepest economic recession since the Depression of the 1930s (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). With hindsight, it was a price worth paying because the economy then began a quarter century of low inflation, steady growth, and mild recessions – a halcyon period for which the Volcker Fed’s aggressive tightening in the early 1980s have been lauded. Chart I-5In 1981, The Fed Hiked Rates To Near 20 Percent... Chart I-6...And Thereby Morphed Stagflation Into Recession Granted, the problems of 2022 are a much scaled down version of those in 1981, yet there are spooky similarities – a point which will not have gone unnoticed by the current crop of central bankers. It is no secret that Jay Powell is a big fan of Paul Volcker. The Echoes Of 1981-82 In 2022-23 The answer to why everything sold off in early 1981 is that central banks took their economies from stagflation to outright recession, and the risk is that the same happens again in 2022-23 (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Echoes Of 1981-82: Aggressive Rate Hikes In 2022-23 Will Morph Stagflation Into Recession In the transition from stagflation fears to recession fears, everything sells off because first the stagflation casualties get hammered, and then the recession plays get hammered. This leaves investors with no place to hide, as no mainstream asset is left unscathed. Just as in 1981, a transition from stagflation fears to recession fears likely explains the recent ‘everything sell-off’ because the sell-off in April was most painful for the stagflation casualties – bonds. Whereas, the sell-off in May has been most painful for the recession casualties – industrial metals and stocks. In a stagflation that morphs to recession, everything sells off. What happens next? The template of 1981-82 could provide a useful guide. Bond prices bottomed first, in the late summer of 1981, as it became clear that the economy was entering a downturn which would exorcise inflation. Of the three other asset classes – all recession casualties – stocks continued to remain under pressure for the next few months but were higher 12 months later. Gold fell another 30 percent, though rebounded sharply in 1982. But the greatest pain was in the industrial metals, which fell another 30 percent and did not recover their highs for several years (Chart I-8). Chart I-82022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 could be an echo of 1981-82, with bond prices now entering a bottoming process. Stocks would bottom next, with one difference being a quicker recovery than in 1981-82 because of their higher sensitivity to bond yields. While the near term outlook is cloudy, we expect stock prices to be higher on a 12 month horizon, especially long-duration stocks that are most sensitive to bond yields. But just as in 1981-82, the biggest casualty of a stagflation that morphs into a recession will be the overvalued industrial metals, which are likely to suffer at least double-digit losses over the coming year. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week’s new additions are Czech Republic versus Poland, and Food and Beverages versus the market, which appear overbought. And US REITS versus Utilities, and CNY/USD, which appear oversold. Finally, our new trade recommendation is to underweight the FTSE 100 versus the Stoxx Europe 600. The resource heavy FTSE 100 is especially vulnerable to our anticipated sell-off in commodities, and its recent outperformance is at a point of fragility that has marked previous turning points (Chart I-9). Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent. Chart I-9FTSE 100 Outperformance Is Near Exhaustion Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions Chart I-10Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart I-11Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Chart I-12US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 Chart I-13CNY/USD At A Support Level Chart 1The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 2The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 3AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 4Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Chart 5Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 6US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal Chart 7A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 8Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 9CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 10Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 11Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 12Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Chart 13BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Chart 14The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 15The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 16Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 17Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Chart 18Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Chart 19The Rally In USD/EUR Could End Chart 20The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 21A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 22FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 23Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Chart 24The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 25The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 26Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart 27Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Chart 28US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 Chart 29CNY/USD At A Support Level Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The returns are based on the S&P 500, the 10-year T-bond, the 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS), the LMEX index, and gold. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Listen to a short summary of this report. Executive Summary Small Caps Are Looking Attractive Relative To Their Large Cap Peers Adverse supply shocks have pushed down global growth this year, while pushing up inflation. With the war raging in Ukraine and China trying to contain a major Covid outbreak, these supply shocks are likely to persist for the next few months. Things should improve in the second half of the year. Inflation will come down rapidly, probably even more than what markets are discounting. Global growth will reaccelerate as pandemic headwinds abate. The return of Goldilocks will allow the Fed and other central banks to temper their hawkish rhetoric, helping to support equity prices while restraining bond yields. Unfortunately, this benign environment will sow the seeds of its own demise. Falling inflation during the remainder of the year will lift real incomes, leading to increased consumer spending. Inflation will pick up towards the end of 2023, forcing central banks to turn hawkish again. Trade Inception Level Initiation Date Stop Loss Long iShares Core S&P Small Cap ETF (IJR) / SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY) 100 Apr 21/2022 -5% Trade Recommendation: Go long US small caps vs. large caps via the iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF (IJR) and the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY). Bottom Line: Global equities are heading towards a “last hurrah” starting in the second half of this year. Stay overweight stocks on a 12-month horizon. Push or Pull? Economists like to distinguish between “demand-pull” and “cost-push” inflation. The former occurs in response to positive demand shocks while the latter reflects negative supply shocks. In order to tell one from the other, it is useful to look at real wages. When real wages are rising briskly, households tend to spend more, leading to demand-pull inflation. In contrast, when wages fail to keep up with rising prices, it is a good bet that we have cost-push inflation on our hands. Chart 1 shows that real wages have been falling across the major economies over the past year. The decline in real wages has coincided with a steep drop in consumer confidence (Chart 2). This points to cost-push forces as the main culprits behind today’s high inflation rates. Chart 1Real Wages Are Declining Chart 2Consumer Confidence Has Soured A close look at the breakdown of recent inflation figures supports this conclusion. The US headline CPI rose by 8.5% year-over-year in March. The bulk of the inflation occurred in supply-constrained categories such as food, energy, and vehicles (Chart 3). Chart 3The Acceleration In Inflation Has Been Driven By Pandemic And War-Impacted Categories The Toilet Paper Economy When the pandemic began, shoppers rushed out to buy essential household supplies including, most famously, toilet paper. Chart 4In A Break From The Past, Goods Prices Soared During The Pandemic The toilet paper used in offices is somewhat different than the sort used at home. So, to some extent, work-from-home (and do other stuff-at-home) arrangements did boost the demand for consumer-grade toilet paper. However, a much more important factor was household psychology. People scrambled to buy toilet paper because others were doing the same. As often occurs in prisoner-dilemma games, society moved from one Nash equilibrium – where everyone was content with the amount of toilet paper they had – to another equilibrium where they wanted to hold much more paper than they previously did. What has gone largely unnoticed is that the toilet paper fiasco was replicated across much of the global supply chain. Worried that they would not have enough intermediate goods on hand to maintain operations, firms began to hoard inputs. Retailers, anxious at the prospect of barren shelves, put in bigger purchase orders than they normally would have. All this happened at a time when demand was shifting from services to goods, and the pandemic was disrupting normal goods production. No wonder the prices of goods – especially durable goods — jumped (Chart 4). Peak Inflation? The war in Ukraine could continue to generate supply disruptions over the coming months. The Covid outbreak in China could also play havoc with the global supply chain. While the number of Chinese Covid cases has dipped in recent days, Chart 5 highlights that 27 out of 31 mainland Chinese provinces are still reporting new cases, up from 14 provinces in the beginning of February. The number of ships stuck outside of Shanghai has soared (Chart 6). Chart 527 Out Of 31 Chinese Provinces Are Reporting New Cases, Up From 14 Provinces In The Beginning Of February Chart 6The Clogged-Up Port Of Shanghai Chart 7Inflation Will Decelerate This Year Thanks To Base Effects Nevertheless, the peak in inflation has probably been reached in the US. For one thing, base effects will push down year-over-year inflation (Chart 7). Monthly core CPI growth rates were 0.86% in April, 0.75% in May, and 0.80% in June of 2021. These exceptionally high prints will fall out of the 12-month average during the next few months. More importantly, goods inflation will abate as spending shifts back toward services. Chart 8 shows that spending on goods remains well above the pre-pandemic trend in the US, while spending on services remains well below. Excluding autos, US retail inventories are about 5% above their pre-pandemic trend (Chart 9). Core goods prices fell in March for the first time since February 2021. Fewer pandemic-related disruptions, and hopefully a stabilization in the situation in Ukraine, could set the stage for sharply lower inflation and a revival in global growth in the second half of this year. How long will this Goldilocks environment last? Our guess is that it will endure until the second half of next year, but probably not much beyond then. As inflation comes down over the coming months, real income growth will rise. What began as cost-push inflation will morph into demand-pull inflation by the end of 2023. The Fed will need to resume hiking at that point, potentially bringing rates to over 4% in 2024. Chart 8Spending On Services Remains Well Below The Pre-Pandemic Trend, While Spending On Goods Is Above It Chart 9Shelves Are Well Stocked In The US Investment Implications Wayne Gretzky famously said that he always tries to skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it has been. Macro investors should follow the same strategy: Ask what the global economy will look like in six months and invest accordingly. The past few months have been tough for the global economy and financial markets. Last week, bullish sentiment fell to the lowest level in 30 years in the American Association of Individual Investors poll (Chart 10). Global growth optimism dropped in April to a record low in the BofA Merrill Lynch Fund Manager Survey. Chart 10AAII Survey: Equity Bulls Are In Short Supply Chart 11The Equity Risk Premium Remains Elevated Yet, a Goldilocks environment of falling inflation and supply-side led growth awaits in the second half of the year. Even if this environment does not last beyond the end of 2023, it could provide a “last hurrah” for global equities. Despite the spike in bond yields, the earnings yield on stocks still exceeds the real bond yield by 5.4 percentage points in the US, and by 7.8 points outside the US (Chart 11). TINA’s siren song may have faded but it is far from silent. Global equities have about 10%-to-15% upside from current levels over a 12-month horizon. We recommend that investors increase allocations to non-US stock markets, value stocks, and small caps over the coming months (see trade recommendation below). Consistent with our view that the neutral rate of interest is higher than widely believed in the US and elsewhere, we expect the 10-year Treasury yield to eventually rise to around 4% in 2024. However, with US inflation likely to trend lower in the second half of this year, we do not expect much upside for yields over a 12-month horizon. If anything, the fact that bond sentiment in the latest BofA Merrill Lynch survey was the most bearish in 20 years suggests that the near-term risk to yields is to the downside. Trade Idea: Go Long US Small Caps Versus Large Caps Small caps have struggled of late. Over the past 12 months, the S&P 600 small cap index has declined 3%, even as the S&P has managed to claw out a 5% gain. At this point, small caps are starting to look relatively cheap (Chart 12). The S&P 600 is trading at 14-times forward earnings compared to 19-times for the S&P 500. Notably, analysts expect small cap earnings to rise more over the next 12 months, as well as over the long term, than for large caps. Chart 12Small Caps Are Looking Attractive Relative To Their Large Cap Peers Chart 13Small Caps Tend To Outperform When Growth Is Picking Up And The Dollar Is Depreciating Small caps tend to perform best in settings where growth is accelerating and the US dollar is weakening (Chart 13). Economic growth should benefit from a supply-side boost later this year as pandemic headwinds fade and more low-skilled workers rejoin the labor market. With inflation set to decline, the need for the Fed to generate hawkish surprises will temporarily subside, putting downward pressure on the dollar. Investors should consider going long the S&P 600 via the iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF (IJR) versus the S&P 500 via the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY). Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn Twitter Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores