Financial Markets

Special Report

Executive Summary The Excess Return Of Corporate Bonds Is Driven By Corporate Profits Given that a sustainable business cycle acceleration in China is unlikely in the short term, onshore government bond yields will likely drop further. In the long run, odds are that Chinese government bond yields will drop below US Treasury yields. For domestic asset allocators, we continue to recommend overweighting government bonds over stocks for now. The excess return of corporate bonds is driven by the corporate profit cycle. On a volatility-adjusted basis, the total return on equities exceeds the excess return on corporate bonds during periods when economic growth is accelerating and underperforms during deceleration phases. Bottom Line: Given our view that a meaningful growth recovery in China will only be a theme for the second half of this year, onshore asset allocators should continue favoring corporate credit over stocks and government bonds over corporate bonds. The bear market in Chinese offshore corporate credit might be in its late stages but it is not yet over. Feature In this report we (1) elaborate on our outlook for Chinese government and corporate bonds and (2) offer a framework for understanding how asset allocation for fixed-income (government and corporate bonds) and multi-asset portfolios (comprised of fixed-income plus equities) should be implemented. Domestic Government Bonds Chart 1Chinese Bond Yields Have Bucked The Global Trend The risk-reward profile of Chinese domestic government bonds remains attractive. Chinese government bond yields have been declining,  bucking the global trend of surging government bond yields (Chart 1, top panel). Odds are that Chinese bond yields will drop further, both cyclically and structurally: In contrast with the Americas and Europe, China’s consumer price inflation has remained subdued. Its core, trimmed mean and headline inflation rates have remained low (Chart 2). The ongoing growth slump will cap core inflation in China at around 1%, allowing monetary authorities to lower interest rates further. Real bond yields in China remain well above those in the majority of DM (Chart 1, bottom panel). Hence, risk-free bonds in China offer value. As to the Chinese stimulus and business cycle, the recent pickup in Chinese credit numbers has been entirely due to local government bond issuance. After excluding local government bonds, credit growth and its impulse have not improved (Chart 3). While infrastructure spending will pick up in the coming months (given large special bond issuance), sentiment among consumers and private companies remains downbeat and local government budgets are severely impaired by the collapse in revenues from land sales. Hence, it will take some time before a boost in infrastructure activity lifts broader business and consumer sentiment such that a sustainable economic recovery can take hold. Chart 2Chinese Consumer Price Inflation Is Subdued Chart 3Recent Credit Improvement Is Entirely Due to Local Government Bond Issuance The special bond quota for Q1 stands at RMB 1.46 trillion and is equivalent to 28% of local government aggregate quarterly revenue. Even though the special bond issuance in Q1 is massive, it will be largely offset by the drop in local governments’ land sales revenue. The latter is shrinking and makes up more than 40% of local government aggregate revenues. In brief, strong headwinds from the property market in the form of shrinking land sales might counteract the increase from front-loaded special bond issuance in Q1 2022. As to real estate construction, funding for property developers is down dramatically from a year ago (Chart 4). In the absence of financing, real estate developers will shrink construction volumes in the months ahead. Chart 5Debt Service Burden For Chinese Enterprises And Households Is High Chart 4Property Completions Will Roll Over   Structurally, high enterprise and household debt levels in China amid slumping incomes mean that borrowing costs should drop to facilitate debt servicing. BIS estimates that debt service costs for the private sector (enterprises and households) in China are 21% of disposable income, much higher than in many other economies (Chart 5). Finally, China’s large and persistent current account surpluses mean that the nation is a major international creditor rather than a debtor. Thus, China does not need to offer high yields to attract foreign capital. Structurally speaking, foreign fixed-income inflows into Chinese domestic bonds will likely continue. Chart 6Credit Cycle And Government Bond Yields Bottom Line: Bond yields will likely drop further as a sustainable business cycle acceleration in China is unlikely in the short term. Chart 6 illustrates that the total social financing impulse leads bond yields by nine months and a cyclical bottom in yields will probably occur a few months from now. In the long run, Chinese government bonds yields will likely drop below US Treasury yields. Onshore Corporate Bonds The proper measure of corporate bond performance is excess return over similar government bonds (herein excess return). The basis for using excess return instead of total return for corporate bonds is because investors can attain government bond return by purchasing them outright. Essentially, investors prefer corporate bonds over government bonds because of credit spreads. Hence, a corporate bond performance assessment – whether in absolute terms or relative to other asset classes – should be based on excess return. In China, the excess return on onshore corporate bonds1 usually moves in tandem with the business cycle and government bond yields. In particular: The excess return of corporate bonds is positive during periods of growth acceleration and negative during slowdowns (Chart 7, top panel). The middle panel of Chart 7 illustrates that the excess return of corporate bonds correlates with analysts’ net EPS revisions for onshore listed companies. This confirms the above point that corporate bonds correlate with the profit/business cycle. Significantly, even though industrial profit growth is not yet negative (Chart 8, top panel), earnings in commodity-user industries have crashed (Chart 8, bottom panel).  This explains the negative excess return for onshore corporate bonds in the past 12 months. Chart 7The Excess Return Of Corporate Bonds Is Driven By Corporate Profits Chart 8Corporate Profit Cycle: Mind The Divergence Furthermore, the excess return of corporate bonds declines and rises with interest rate expectations (Chart 7, bottom panel). As the outlook for corporate profits remains sour, fixed-income investors should continue to favor government bonds over corporate bonds. Now, how do corporate bonds perform versus stocks? What drives their relative performance? To compare stock performance to corporate bond excess return, one should adjust for volatility. In other words, share prices are much more volatile than the excess return on corporate bonds. Hence, during risk-on periods equities always outperform corporate bonds and vice versa. Chart 9The Performance of Stocks over Corporate Bonds is Very Pro-Cyclical Chart 9 demonstrates that even on a volatility-adjusted basis, the total return on equities exceeds the excess return on corporate bonds during periods when economic growth is accelerating and underperforms during deceleration phases. In short, the performance of stocks over corporate bonds is very pro-cyclical. Bottom Line: The excess return of corporate bonds is driven by corporate revenue and profits rather than by interest rate expectations. Getting China’s business cycle right is critical to the allocation between government and corporate bonds in fixed-income portfolios and to the allocation between corporate bonds and equities in multi-asset portfolios. Given our view that a meaningful growth recovery in China will only be a theme in the second half of this year, onshore asset allocators should continue favoring corporate bonds over stocks and government bonds over corporate credit. Offshore Corporate Bonds What drives the excess return of Chinese USD corporate bonds in absolute terms as well as versus Chinese non-TMT investable stocks2 and onshore corporate bonds? Given that the offshore corporate bond universe is dominated by property developers, their excess return correlates with perceived risks to the mainland property market in general and the financial health of property developers in particular (Chart 10, top panel). Property developers are very overleveraged, their sales are shrinking and their financing has dried up. Yet, authorities are compelling them to complete construction of their pre-sold housing. Property developers will therefore continue to experience financial distress. Odds are that bond prices of corporate developers – both investment grade and high yield - will continue falling (Chart 10, middle and bottom panels). Chart 11Investable Stocks Vs. Offshore Corporate Credit: Volatility-Adjusted Performance Chart 10A Massive Bear Market In Offshore Corporate Bonds On a volatility-adjusted basis, non-TMT investable stocks outpace the excess return of offshore corporate bonds during periods of growth improvement and underperform during growth slowdowns (Chart 11, top panel). The same pattern holds true when it comes to the performance of offshore corporate bond versus the aggregate MSCI Investable equity index (including TMT stocks) (Chart 11, bottom panel). The credit cycle leads the business cycle and, thereby, it leads these financial market trends. Bottom Line: The bear market in Chinese offshore corporate credit might be in its late stages but it is not yet over. Chinese offshore corporate bonds will continue underperforming EM corporate bonds as well as Chinese onshore corporate bonds. Investment Recommendations Investors often read market signals across asset classes to gauge which market moves will persist and which ones will be short-lived.  In this regard, we have two observations for Chinese onshore markets: Chart 12Moving In Tandem The sustainability of an equity rally is higher when it is confirmed by rising excess returns of corporate bonds and rising government bond yields (Chart 12). Presently, there is no strong signal to switch from government bonds to either corporate bonds or stocks. Unfortunately, the yield curve in China does not correlate with its business cycle and, hence, cannot be used as a tool in macro analysis.  Our key investment conclusions are: For fixed-income investors, we continue to recommend receiving 10-year swap rates in China and for dedicated EM local currency bond managers to remain overweight China. The renminbi has been firm versus the US dollar despite a considerable narrowing in the interest rate differential between China and the US. In the long run, the real interest rate differential between China and the US will drive the exchange rate, and it will favor the RMB. While US real bond yields might rise relative to Chinese bond yields in the coming months, triggering a period of yuan softness, it will prove to be transitory. The basis is that the Federal Reserve is very sensitive to asset prices. As US share prices decline and corporate spreads widen, the central bank will eventually turn dovish and will lag behind the inflation curve. When a central bank falls behind the inflation curve, real rates stay low and its currency depreciates. Chart 13China’s Stock-to-Bond Ratio For domestic asset allocators, we continue to recommend favoring government bonds over stocks (Chart 13). Within fixed-income portfolios, investors should overweight government bonds over corporate bonds. Finally, corporate bonds will fare better than equities in the near term. In a few months there will be an opportunity to shift these positions.  More aggressive stimulus from authorities and aggressive property market relaxation measures will create conditions for an improvement in domestic demand. Finally, the risk-reward profile for offshore USD corporate bonds remains unattractive. Chinese offshore corporate credit will continue underperforming EM USD corporate credit as well as Chinese onshore corporate bonds.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    Due to the lack of excess return data from the index provider (Bloomberg Barclays onshore bond indexes), we calculated the excess return on onshore corporate bonds as the ratio of the total return on the corporate bond index divided by the total return on the government bond index. This measure is not ideal as it does not account for duration mismatches between the corporate and government bond indexes. However, the key conclusions of this report will hold true for the duration-adjusted excess return not least because this framework is valid for financial markets in the US and Europe. 2    The reason to compare it to non-TMT (technology, media and telecommunication, i.e., Chinese tech and internet stocks) is that offshore corporate bond issuers are largely old economy industries.

Special Report

Executive Summary US Policy Uncertainty Rises With ERP The US is witnessing a rolling political crisis that will escalate again in the 2022-24 election cycle and presents a tail-risk of constitutional fracture. However, fundamental economic, constitutional, and geopolitical factors are structurally positive. US domestic political risk is not greater than foreign geopolitical risk affecting other major markets like Europe. The US faces challenges to maintain its competitive and technological edge. But the combination of a vibrant private sector and increasingly proactive fiscal policy give reason for optimism. The 2022-24 macroeconomic and political cycles will likely cause an increase in policy uncertainty and hence the equity risk premium – but foreign markets face even greater risks. Recommendation (Tactical) Inception Level Initiation Date Stop Loss Long DXY   Feb 23/2022   Bottom Line: Go tactically long US dollar (DXY) on the anticipation that US and especially global policy uncertainty and political risk premiums will rise. Feature With President Joe Biden’s approval rating falling to a new net low of -13%, investors are starting to ask about the future of American politics once again. It is highly likely that Democrats will lose control of Congress this fall, setting up a tumultuous 2024 election cycle. With political polarization at historic highs, it is worth asking whether US policy uncertainty will inject a risk premium into US equities. Our answer is yes, uncertainty and the risk premium will rise. But the US also contains fundamental strengths, especially relative to other major markets. With geopolitical risk rising for Europe as Russia engages in new military adventures, the US market will remain attractive over the long run. Natural Advantages Any fundamental assessment of US capability should begin with its people. The US working-age population continues to grow, while that of Europe and China has started to plateau or decline (Chart 1). China’s working population is four times bigger than that of the US, so if China can manage its transition to a higher-wage economy (i.e. if it can maintain productivity growth) then it can compete for global investment capital. But the US’s continued labor force growth, despite social change and political instability, suggests that the US will not follow Japan and Europe into sluggish trend growth, unless sharp curbs on immigration are put into place. The maxim that “the people are the riches of a nation” is only true if economic opportunity and job creation are sufficient. People need access to capital to become more productive. Europe has the largest capital stock in the world, at $100,000 per capita, compared to the US’s $71,000 and China’s $33,000. But Europe’s capital stock has been flat-to-down since the Great Recession. China’s capital stock is rising rapidly and has a lot further to go given its low level. But the country also faces a difficult transition to a new economic model and a debt-deleveraging process that may slow down the pace of capital deepening in the coming years, forcing the government to step in and promote capital projects (Chart 2). Meanwhile the US’s capital stock continues to grow steadily.  Chart 1The People Are The Riches Of A Nation... Chart 2...As Long As The People Are Not Starved Of Capital Since the shale boom the US has become nearly energy self-sufficient and now produces 20% of global oil and fuel. This development is a blessing from an economic and national security perspective. But it also poses the risk of a kind of resource curse, in which the US could lack the motivation to pioneer renewable energy technology. Currently the US only produces 4% of the world’s renewable energy, a share that has been declining. Europe and China are both energy import-dependent, which is a national security vulnerability, and they will continue to invest in renewable solutions to improve their energy security (Chart 3). Russian aggression will motivate Europe to go down this path, whereas China will go down this path for fear of American strategic containment. For now, however, the US is energy self-sufficient while technologically capable of advancing in renewable energy. The US has a range of structural problems: rising income inequality, extreme political polarization, and a policy turn away from globalization over the past 20 years. However, these problems have not weighed on GDP per capita growth. Of course, the greatest strides in GDP per capita are occurring in the developing world: China and India show the most promise. But the US’s GDP per capita is still growing at an annual average rate of 3%, putting it alongside Germany and ahead of the much less developed Brazil (Chart 4). Germany did not see anywhere near as big of increases in inequality and polarization and is still generally committed to globalization, yet its GDP per capita growth is about the same as the US’s, despite faster US population growth. Chart 3North America's Natural Resource Blessing Chart 4Does Political Instability Harm Productivity? Partisanship Means Big Government None of the above benefits have been reversed by the US’s historic increase in political polarization and partisanship over the past three decades. Make no mistake, the latter trends are harmful and could weigh on US stability and productivity in coming years, primarily through deteriorating fiscal management. But so far their bad effects have been contained. The two US political parties have won control of the White House, the Senate, and the House of Representatives a roughly equal number of times. While Republicans have a larger regional presence, across the 50 states, and tend to perform better in the Electoral College and the Senate, this advantage is very slight judging by the number of electoral victories. Meanwhile Democrats have a larger popular presence and perform better in the House of Representatives but this advantage is also slight (Chart 5). The two parties are evenly balanced, which is one explanation for why they compete so viciously for marginal victories. But it also prevents either party from achieving absolute power and distorting or corrupting American bureaucracy and corporate structures to perpetuate single-party rule. Chart 5An Even Balance Of Power Between The Parties The size of the federal government fluctuates within a fairly low and narrow range. Federal government receipts hovered around 16% of GDP in the 1950s-60s, peaked at 20.4% in 2000, and today stand right in the middle of this post-war range at 18.5%. Major increases in revenue follow the business cycle and it is rare that Democrats manage to raise taxes enough to have a substantial impact. This point is clear from looking at periods when Democrats controlled both the House of Representatives and the White House (shaded areas in Chart 6): the large increases in tax take mostly coincide with economic growth spurts. It is conceivable that the Biden administration will raise a minimum corporate tax this year via the budget reconciliation process, but the odds of that have been falling and it will not change the pattern in this chart, which shows rising revenue relative to GDP as the economy recovers but is not likely to match what was seen in the late 1990s. From the perspective of federal government spending, the growth in the size of government is clearer, rising from the post-war 15% of GDP to today’s 25% of GDP, with a pronounced structural uptrend. Republicans rarely control both the White House and the House of Representatives and only in the 1950s did they reduce spending outright. The past two Republican administrations presided over large increases in spending, while also capping revenue via tax cuts (Chart 7). Chart 6US Federal Revenue Does Not Change Much Over Time Chart 7US Federal Spending Does Not Change Much Over Time Thus in America’s highly polarized and populist political scene, Republicans fail to cut spending while Democrats fail to increase taxes. The takeaway is that budget deficits will remain structurally large. The political outlook reinforces this point as it promises a return to congressional gridlock. Historically speaking, Biden’s net negative approval rating implies that Democrats will lose 40 seats in the House of Representatives and 4 seats in the Senate this fall. It is unlikely that Democratic fortunes will improve much between now and this November given that midterm elections almost always punish the ruling party and midterm voters tend to make up their minds early in the year. Moreover the ruling party’s ailments are not easily reversed: headline inflation is running at 7.5%, crime and immigration are growing at historic rates, while foreign policy challenges will likely feed the narrative that the Biden administration is weak on the global stage. The likelihood of congressional gridlock from 2022-24 (and maybe beyond) entails that future increases in fiscal spending will be automatic, through lack of entitlement reform, rather than through grandiose new spending programs, which will not pass into law. As such, “Big Government” is back but it is still “limited government” in the US tradition – i.e. limited big government. Neither party has a blank check or dominates for long. And if anything a period of fiscal normalization (or pseudo-normalization) is on the horizon. Constitutional And Geopolitical Advantages The balance of the parties is not accidental but essential to the American constitutional system. This system is based on the tradition of “mixed” or “balanced” constitutionalism, which developed in ancient Greece and Rome and came to the Americas via the United Kingdom. The system can be discussed in philosophical or ideological terms but it is rooted in real, physical, institutional power. The tradition begins with great philosophers like Plato and Aristotle but is perhaps best illustrated by the Greek historian Polybius. Polybius observed a violent historical cycle that ceaselessly shifted from despotism to oligarchy to the tyranny of the masses to anarchy and finally back to despotism. He argued that the Roman constitution, by mingling the different social classes (the leaders, the elite, and the masses), could produce a durable constitutional order that would prolong the time period until the state decayed and collapsed. We call this the “Polybius Solution” (Diagram 1). Diagram 1The Polybius Solution The US constitution is successful because, like several of the oldest European constitutions, it mixes the different social classes and sources of power so that the leaders, elites, and masses each have a share in the political system and no single group can predominate and overwhelm the others. It is an extra benefit that the US constitution is one of the longest continually operating constitutions in the world, since the long fortification of the system in practice helps provide sociopolitical and economic stability, whereas the ideas themselves are not well taught or understood (Table 1). The fact that the constitution is written in a single document is useful but not decisive, as the British constitution similarly provides stability over long periods of change and upheaval both at home and abroad. Table 1The Balanced Constitution Investors should not mistake this constitutional system merely for a set of preferential ideas. Opinions change very easily. But it is physically difficult for ruling classes to take away rights and privileges that the masses of people have been given. Thus the mixture of constitutional powers is based in political realism, not idealism. The US constitution operates not because Americans are more well-meaning, educated, civic-minded, altruistic, or enlightened than others. It operates because the oligarchy is not powerful enough to disenfranchise the democracy, while the democracy is not powerful enough to purge the oligarchy. The government leaders themselves (the president, the lawmakers, the career bureaucrats, etc) are not powerful enough to suspend term limits and stay in power forever. Nor have they been able to ally with either the oligarchy or the democracy closely enough to permanently exclude the other one from its share of power within the system. There is a clear and present danger that the constitutional system could come under too much strain and fracture amid recent power struggles among the American social classes. The struggles between the classes have intensified since the fall of the Soviet Union (which deprived America of a common enemy) and especially the Great Recession (which provoked populist democratic movements). Some fear that a president could turn into an autocrat and refuse to yield power, others fear that the oligarchic faction could steal elections or manipulate the legal system, others fear that the democratic faction could steal elections or ride roughshod over legal procedures. Of these risks, the risk of autocracy is the lowest, while the risk of institutional corruption or electoral manipulation or majoritarian rule-breaking are the highest. Certainly political risk and policy uncertainty will rise from current levels over the 2022-24 election cycle, which promises to be extremely disruptive. However, there are three reasons to hold the baseline view that the US political structure will remain stable enough to sustain economic productivity over the coming years, despite enormous upheaval on the cyclical level of politics. The US remains secure from invasion, while provoked to meet rising geopolitical challenges. Neither Canada nor Mexico poses a fundamental threat to US national security – the US is capable of militarizing the borders, however undesirable – and the US is inaccessible to more distant enemies due to the tyranny of distance across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Yet the resurgence of Russia and the rise of China are likely to present common external rivals around which America’s elites will attempt to galvanize public opinion to maintain national security and keep themselves in office. Because elections still tend to swing on historically critical regions, such as the Midwestern heartland, politicians will need to pursue some degree of economic nationalism to stay in power (Map 1). Map 1USA: Splendid Isolation? The US continues to benefit from a “brain drain” of talented foreign immigrants and will keep that door open if and when it curbs immigration more broadly. Immigration flows into the US are typically robust according to various indicators, including the numbers of newly naturalized citizens, which is itself an indicator of the US’s abiding advantages (Chart 8). The global pandemic caused a decline that is quickly rebounding. Immigration is one of the major outstanding sources of power struggle between the US political factions. It will become a centerpiece of the 2022-24 election cycle. The outcome is unclear. But general American attitudes toward immigration are not hostile, while elite attitudes favor immigration. Therefore whatever government policy finally emerges, it will likely preserve the US’s national interest of continuing to import global talent . Chart 8People Voting With Their Feet The US’s chronic trade imbalance generated a new policy consensus in favor of strengthening American competitiveness. The US pursued a policy of globalization and de-industrialization for decades but it became untenable in the wake of the Great Recession, which spawned a populist backlash. The Biden administration has largely coopted the Trump administration’s hawkish approach to trade. While US trade and current account deficits will remain very large for the foreseeable future, reflecting a fundamental imbalance of savings relative to investment (Chart 9), nevertheless the US will undertake targeted policies to improve supply chain resilience and domestic high-tech competitive edge. The Congress’s likely passage of the American Competes Act of 2022 exemplifies the new bipartisan consensus around the need to invest in American industrial and technological capabilities so as to better compete with great powers overseas (Table 2). Chart 9US Competitiveness Waning? Table 2US Bipartisan Consensus On Restoring Competitiveness By contrast, other regions face greater geopolitical threats to their homelands and greater difficulties coping with hypo-globalization. Europe’s strategic vulnerability to Russia will dampen investment sentiment and risk appetite. Russia’s economic trajectory has suffered since 2014 and its ongoing conflict with the West will result in isolation and lower productivity. China will see rising tensions with its neighbors due to its economic transition, emerging protectionism, and its need to become more assertive for the sake of supply security. By contrast the US is relatively insulated. Investment Takeaways The US’s economic, constitutional, and geopolitical advantages are structural positives. Rising domestic policy uncertainty over the 2022-24 election cycle might overshadow these positives temporarily, but they are likely to persist over the long run. Increasing geopolitical risks abroad suggest that domestic American policy uncertainty is likely to be overrated. Great power competition – stemming from geopolitical risks – will fuel capital spending among the major nations as well as research and development investments. In this respect the United States faces challenges to maintain its competitive edge. But it is still the leader and the combination of a vibrant private sector and an increasingly proactive public sector are positive (Chart 10). Are the US’s structural advantages already priced? To a great extent, yes. The US equity risk premium today stands at 300 basis points, compared to 660 in Europe and 570 in China. And yet global geopolitical risk, highlighted by Russia’s escalating conflict with the West, suggest that this divergence can get worse before it gets better. We expect the 2022-24 election cycle to cause an increase in policy uncertainty and the political risk premium. But as things stand the increase in uncertainty and risk premiums abroad will be even greater (Chart 11). Chart 10US Investing In The Future? Chart 11US Stocks Priced The Good News?       Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)   Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Footnotes  

Executive Summary US Treasury yields have surged in response to high US inflation and Fed tightening expectations. However, the move looks overdone in the near-term. Too many Fed hikes are now discounted for 2022, US realized inflation should soon peak, inflation expectations have stabilized, financial conditions have started to tighten, and positioning in the Treasury market is now quite short. These factors will act to stabilize Treasury yields over the next few months, even with the cyclical backdrop remaining bond bearish. Markets Think The Fed Will Hike More Sooner And Less Later – The Opposite Is More Likely Recommendation Inception Level Inception Date Long Dec 2022/Short Dec 2024 3-Month SOFR Future 0.25 Feb 22/22 New Trade: Go long the December 2022 US SOFR interest rate futures contract versus shorting the December 2024 SOFR contract. The former discounts too many Fed hikes for this year and the latter discounts too few hikes over the next three years. Bottom Line: US Treasury yields now discount the maximum likely hawkish scenario for Fed rate hikes in 2022, with risks all pointing in the direction of the Fed delivering less than expected. Upgrade US duration exposure to neutral from below-benchmark on a tactical basis. Feature Chart 1A Near-Term Overshoot For UST Yields During the BCA Research US Bond Strategy quarterly webcast last week, we announced a shift in our recommended US duration stance, moving from below-benchmark to neutral. This move was more tactical (i.e. shorter-term) in nature, as we still strongly believe that bond markets are underestimating the eventual peak for US bond yields over the next couple of years. In the near term, however, we see several good reasons to expect the recent big run-up in US bond yields to pause, warranting a more neutral tactical duration exposure (Chart 1). We discuss those reasons – and the implications for both US duration strategy - in this report published jointly by BCA Research’s US Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy services. Reason #1: Too Many Fed Rate Hikes Are Now Discounted For 2022 The US overnight index swap (OIS) curve currently discounts 146bps of Fed rate hikes by the end of 2022. This is a big change from the start of the year when only 77bps of hikes were priced (Chart 2). The OIS curve repricing now puts the path of the funds rate for this year well above the last set of FOMC interest rate projections published at the December 2021 Fed meeting. In other words, the market has already moved to discount a big upward shift in the FOMC “dots” for 2022, and even for 2023, at next month’s FOMC meeting. Chart 2Markets Think The Fed Will Hike More Sooner And Less Later - The Opposite Is More Likely We think a more likely outcome for 2022 is that the Fed lifts rates four or five times, not six or even seven times as some Wall Street investment banks are forecasting. We set out the reasons why we think the Fed will go less than expected in the rest of this report. At a minimum, there is virtually no chance that the Fed will provide guidance to markets that is more hawkish than current market pricing, which would push bond yields even higher in the near term. Reason #2: US Inflation Will Soon Peak The relentless string of upside surprises on US inflation has been the main reason the bond market has moved so rapidly on pricing in more Fed rate hikes. The story is about to change, however, as US inflation should peak sometime in the next few months and begin to rapidly decelerate toward levels much closer to, but still well above, the Fed’s 2% inflation target. Already, the intense global inflation pressures from commodities and traded goods prices over the past year has started to lose potency. The annual growth rate of the CRB Raw Industrials index has eased from a peak of 45% in June to 18%, in line with slowing growth momentum of global manufacturing activity (Chart 3, top panel). The softening of input price pressures is evident in business survey measures like the ISM Manufacturing Prices Paid index, which typically leads US headline CPI inflation by six months and has fallen by 16 points since the peak in June (middle panel). Chart 3Global Inflation Pressures Easing The global supply chain disruptions that have caused inventory shortages in products ranging from new cars to semiconductors also appear to be easing. Supplier delivery times are shortening according to the ISM Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing surveys (bottom panel). Combined with other indications of the loosening of supply chain logjams, like lower shipping costs, the influence of supply disruptions on inflation should diminish, on the margin. Energy prices should also soon contribute to disinflationary momentum (Chart 4). BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service is forecasting the Brent oil price to reach $76/bbl at the end of 2022 and $80/bbl at the end of the 2023. That represents a significant decline from the current $95/bbl price that reflects a large risk premium for the potential oil market supply disruptions in response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine. A war-driven spike in oil prices does risk extending the current period of high US (and global) inflation. However, it should be noted that the annual growth in oil prices has been decelerating even as oil prices have been rising recently, showing the power of base effect comparisons that should lead to a lower contribution to overall inflation from energy prices over the next 6-12 months. ​​​​​​Chart 4Oil Prices Will Soon Turn Disinflationary Chart 5A Changing Mix Of US Consumer Spending Will Lower Overall Inflation   Looking beyond the commodity space, a shifting mix of US consumer spending should also help push overall US inflation lower. US core CPI inflation hit a 34-year high of 6.0% in January, fueled by 11.7% growth in core goods inflation (Chart 5). We anticipate that overall core inflation will slow to levels more consistent with the trends seen in more domestically focused sectors like core services and shelter, where inflation is running around 4%. US consumers have started to shift their spending patterns away from goods, which was running well above its pre-pandemic trend, back toward services, which was running below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 6). This will help narrow the gap between goods and services inflation, particularly as easing supply chain disruptions help dampen goods inflation. Chart 6Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak​​​​​ Chart 7There Are Still Pockets Of Available US Labor Market Supply​​​​​​ Chart 8US Wage Growth Should Soon Begin To Moderate There is also the potential for some of the pressures stemming from the tight US labor market to become a bit less inflationary in the coming months. While the overall US unemployment rate of 4% is well within the range of full employment NAIRU estimates produced by the FOMC, there are notable differences across employment categories suggesting that there are still sizeable pockets of labor supply. For example, the unemployment rate for managerial and professional workers is a tiny 2.3%, while the unemployment rate for services workers was a more elevated 6.7% (Chart 7, top panel). There are also noteworthy differences in US labor market trends when sorted by wage growth. Employment in industries with lower wages – predominantly in services – has not returned to the pre-pandemic peak, unlike employment in higher wage cohorts (middle panel).1 As the US economy puts the Omicron variant in the rearview mirror, service industries most impacted by pandemic restrictions should see an increase in labor supply as workers return to the labor force. This will help close the one percentage point gap between the labor force participation rate for prime-aged workers (aged 25-54) and its pre-pandemic peak (bottom panel). This will also help to mitigate the current upturn in service sector wage growth, which reached 5.2% at the end of 2021 according to the US Employment Cost Index (Chart 8). When US inflation finally peaks in the next few months – most notably for goods prices and service sector wages – the Fed will be under less pressure to hike rates as aggressively as discounted in current bond market pricing. Reason #3: US Inflation Expectations Have Stabilized Chart 9TIPS Breakevens Are Not Telling The Fed To Be More Aggressive The Fed always pays a lot of attention to inflation expectations, particularly market-based measures like TIPS breakevens, to assess if its monetary policy stance is appropriate. The current message from breakevens is that the Fed does not have to turn even more hawkish than expected to bring inflation back down to levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% target. The 10-year TIPS breakeven is currently 2.4%, down from a peak of 2.8% and within the 2.3-2.5% range that we deem consistent with the Fed’s inflation target. Inflation expectations are even more subdued on a forward basis, with the 5-year TIPS breakeven, 5-years forward now down to 1.95% (Chart 9). Shorter term TIPS breakevens remain elevated, with the 2-year breakeven at 3.7%. We continue to favor positioning for a narrower 2-year TIPS breakeven spread – realized inflation will soon peak and the New York Fed’s Consumer Expectations survey shows that household inflation expectations for the next three years have already fallen significantly (bottom panel). Lower inflation expectations, both market-based and survey-based, suggest that the Fed can be cautious on the pace of rate hikes after liftoff next month. Reason #4: US Financial Conditions Are Tightening Alongside Cooling US Growth Momentum We have long described the link between financial markets and the Fed’s policy stance as “The Fed Policy Loop.” In this framework, the markets act as a regulator on Fed hawkishness (Chart 10). If the Fed comes across as overly hawkish, risk assets will sell off (lower equity prices, wider corporate credit spreads), the US dollar will appreciate, the US Treasury curve will flatten and market volatility measures like the VIX index will increase. All of those trends act to tighten US financial conditions, threatening a growth slowdown that will force the Fed to back off from its previous hawkish bias. Chart 10The Fed Policy Loop Financial conditions have indeed tightened as markets have priced in more Fed rate hikes in 2022 (Chart 11). Since the start of the year, the S&P 500 is down 9% year-to-date, US investment grade corporate spreads have widened 26bps, the 2-year/10-year US Treasury curve has flattened by 34bps and the VIX index has increased 11 pts. In absolute terms, US financial conditions remain highly stimulative and the risk asset selloff so far poses little threat to US economic growth. However, if the Fed were to deliver all of the rate hikes in 2022 that are currently discounted in the US OIS curve, the market selloff would deepen as investors began to worry about a Fed-engineered economic slowdown. This would lead to a more significant tightening of financial conditions, representing an even bigger risk to US growth. The Fed cannot risk appearing too hawkish too soon, with US growth momentum already showing signs of slowing (Chart 12). The Conference Board US leading economic indicator has stopped accelerating and may be peaking, US business confidence is softening and consumer confidence is very depressed according to the University of Michigan survey. Importantly, high inflation is cited as the main reason for weak consumer confidence, as wage increases have not matched price increases. If realized inflation falls, as we expect, this could actually provide a boost to consumer confidence as households would feel an improvement in real incomes and spending power – a development that could eventually lead to more Fed rate hikes in 2023 if consumer spending improves, especially if inflation stays above the Fed’s 2% target. Chart 11Fed Hawkishness Has Already Tightened Financial Conditions​​​​​​ Chart 12Not The Best Time For The Fed To Be More Aggressive​​​​​ For now, however, the risk of a preemptive tightening of financial conditions will ensure that the Fed delivers fewer rate hikes than the market expects this year. Reason #5: Treasury Market Positioning Is Now Very Short Chart 13Reliable Bond Indicators Calling For A Pause In The UST Selloff The final reason to increase US duration exposure now is that Treasury market positioning has become quite short and has become a headwind to higher bond yields and lower bond prices. The JP Morgan fixed income client duration survey shows that bond investors are running duration exposures well below benchmark (Chart 13). Speculators are also running significant short positions in longer-maturity US Treasury futures. This suggests limited selling power in the event of more bond bearish news and increased scope for short-covering in the event of risk-off event – like a shooting war in Ukraine – or surprisingly negative US economic data. On that front, the Citigroup US data surprise index, which is typically highly correlated to the momentum of US Treasury yields, has dipped a bit recently but remains at neutral levels (top panel). A similar measure of neutrality is sent by some of our preferred cyclical bond indicators like the ratio of the CRB raw industrials index to the price of gold – the 10-year yield is now in line with that ratio, which appears to be peaking (middle panel). Investment Conclusions Given the five reasons outlined in this report – too many Fed hikes are now discounted for 2022, US realized inflation should soon peak, inflation expectations have stabilized, financial conditions have started to tighten, and positioning in the Treasury market is now quite short – we decided last week to upgrade our recommended US portfolio duration to neutral from below-benchmark. However, this move is only for a tactical investment horizon. We still see the cyclical backdrop as bond bearish, as Treasury yields do not yet reflect how high US interest rates will rise in the upcoming tightening cycle. The 5-year Treasury yield, 5-years forward is currently at 2.0%. This lies at the low end of the range of estimates of the longer-run neutral fed funds rate (Chart 14) from the New York Fed’s survey of bond market participants (2%) and the median FOMC longer-run interest rate projection from the Fed dots (2.5%). We see the Fed having to lift rates faster than markets expect in 2023 and 2024. US inflation this year is expected to settle at a level above the Fed’s 2% target before picking up again next year alongside renewed tightening of labor market conditions once the remaining supply of excess labor is fully absorbed. Chart 14The Cyclical UST Bear Market Is Not Over Yet Chart 15Go Long The Dec/22 SOFR Contract Vs. The Dec/24 Contract As a way to position for the Fed doing fewer rate hikes than expected in 2022, but more hikes than expected in 2023/24, we are entering a new trade this week – going long the December 2022 3-month SOFR US interest rate futures contract versus a short position in the December 2024 3-month SOFR contract.  The implied interest rate spread on those two contracts has tightened to 25bps (Chart 15). We expect that trend to reverse, however, with the spread increasing as markets eventually move to price out rate hikes in 2022 and price in much more Fed tightening in 2023 and 2024. We will discuss the implications of the shift in our US duration stance for our views on non-US bond markets in next week’s Global Fixed Income Strategy report. Our initial conclusion is that our country allocation recommendations for government bonds will remain unchanged – underweighting the US, UK, and Canada; overweighting core Europe, peripheral Europe, Japan and Australia – but we will also increase duration exposure within most (if not all) countries. As in the US, we also see markets pricing in too many rate hikes in the UK and Canada for 2022 but too few rate hikes over the next two years. On the other hand, markets are pricing in too many rate cumulative hikes over the next 2-3 years in Europe, Australia and Japan (Table 1). Table 1Markets Have Pulled Forward Rate Hikes Everywhere   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The definitions for the wage cohorts can be found in the footnote of Chart 7. Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Tactical Overlay Trades

Executive Summary The ultimate inflation anchor is unit labor costs. If relative price shocks cause employees to demand higher wages from their employers, and if they are granted wage increases above and beyond their productivity advances, inflation will become broad-based and persistent. US unit labor costs have been rising rapidly, which indicates that US inflation is becoming pervasive and entrenched (Chart of the week). The Fed is facing an acute dilemma that it has not encountered in the last 35 years or so: It either needs to slow growth materially to contain inflation or allow inflation to proliferate. The Fed will make a dovish pivot only after financial conditions tighten substantially, i.e., if the S&P 500 falls by 20% or more (from its peak) and credit spreads widen much more from the current levels. Rapid Rises In Unit Labor Costs Entail High Inflation Bottom Line: The Fed and equity markets are on a collision course: The Fed will not make a dovish pivot until markets sell off and markets cannot rally unless the Fed backs off. Feature In a report we published a year ago titled Riding A Tiger, we stated that “the enormous size of US stimulus and overflow of liquidity is creating a thrill akin to riding a tiger… Riding a tiger is fun. The hitch is that no one can safely get off a tiger. Similarly, US authorities are currently enjoying the exuberance from stimulus, but they will not be able to safely and smoothly dismount.” We also contended that “in any system where an explosive money/credit boom persists, the outcome will be one or a combination of the following: inflation, asset bubbles or capital misallocation… Odds are that the US will experience asset bubbles and inflation in the real economy.” Riding a tiger was indeed fun but now it is time for US policymakers to dismount. Yet, exiting the era of super easy monetary and fiscal policies will not be without costs and considerable financial market turbulence. Are the Fed and financial markets heading into a collision in the fog of inflation? Transitory Versus Persistent Inflation Chart 1US Inflation Is Broad Based, As Evidenced By Median And Trimmed-Mean CPIs US inflation has become broad-based.1 Not only is core CPI surging but also trimmed-mean, median and sticky core consumer price inflation have risen substantially (Chart 1).  Median and trimmed-mean price indexes would not be rocketing if inflation was limited to select goods or services. Particularly, the aforementioned measures exclude components with extreme price changes. What might have started as a narrow-based relative price shock has evolved into broad-based genuine inflation. The key to the transition from one-off inflation spikes to persistent genuine inflation is wages, more specifically unit labor costs. Unit labor cost are calculated as nominal wages divided by productivity (the latter is output per hour per employee). As long as unit labor costs are not rising considerably, sharp price increases in several types of goods do not entail genuine inflation and central banks should not tighten aggressively. However, when unit labor costs are escalating, odds are that higher inflation could become entrenched and persistent. The importance of wages stems from the fact that labor compensation makes up the largest share of costs for the majority of industries. Consequently, rising unit labor costs squeeze profit margins. When this transpires, businesses try to pass on rising costs to customers. Provided that robust wage growth propels consumer demand, companies often succeed in raising their prices. Chart 2US Wages Are Rising Rapidly In turn, inflation erodes the purchasing power of wages, and employees demand substantial pay raises. When revenues are strong, employers typically accommodate employees’ claims for higher compensation, and a wage-price spiral emerges. These dynamics are presently unfolding in the US. US wage growth has reached multi-decade highs of 4.5-5.5% (Chart 2). Plus, the high and climbing quit rate points to further wage acceleration (Chart 3). As US productivity cannot rise as fast as the current wage growth of 4.5-5.5% (Chart 4), the ratio of wages to productivity (unit labor costs) is escalating. Unit labor costs are rising faster than they have in the past 38-40 years. Historically, an acceleration in unit labor costs has often heralded higher inflation (Chart 5). Chart 3US Wages Will Continue Accelerating Chart 4Wage Growth Is Outpacing Productivity Gains   Chart 5Rapid Rises In Unit Labor Costs Entail High Inflation The only period when US core inflation fell despite rising unit labor costs was during the second half of the 1990s (Chart 5). During this period, EM currency devaluations from China to Mexico and then to Asia unleashed the deflation tsunami in goods prices. US imports prices from Asia collapsed allowing US inflation to drift lower despite rising unit labor costs. The current backdrop is different: US import prices from Asia, including China, are rising (Chart 6). Importantly, US wage growth is presently below headline and core CPI, i.e., real wages are contracting (Chart 7). Provided US employees have experienced a decline in their purchasing power in the past 12 months, they are keen to secure substantial pay raises in the coming months. Chart 6Unlike The Late 1990s, US Import Prices From Asia Are Rising Chart 7US Real Wages Are Shrinking   Employers facing strong demand cannot afford an employee exodus. Businesses will raise salaries and hike selling prices to preserve their profit margins, thereby giving rise to a wage-price spiral. Bottom Line: The ultimate inflation anchor is unit labor costs. This is why wages, more specifically unit labor costs, are the most important variable to monitor. If relative price shocks lead employees to demand higher wages from their employers, and if they are granted wage increases above and beyond their productivity advances, inflation will become broad-based and persistent. The Fed’s Dilemma When inflation becomes pervasive and entrenched, as it is now in the US, the only way to bring it down is to slow the economy. Unless demand decelerates meaningfully, US inflation will not go away because it has already spilled over into consumer and business expectations. Even though US headline and core CPI will likely drop in the coming months, core inflation will remain well above the Fed’s target of 2% (Chart 1 above). To maintain its credibility, the Fed should hike rates continually despite the potential rollover in headline and core CPI measures. Chart 8High Probability Of US Core Inflation Exceeding 4% In The Next 12 Months My colleague, Jonathan Laberge, Managing Editor of the Bank Credit Analyst, has quantitatively estimated that there is a almost 100% probability that in next 12 months core PCE inflation will be above 3%, and a 70% probability that it will be above 4% (Chart 8). All this means that if the Federal Reserve is serious about bringing core inflation closer to 2%, it will have to slow down the economy meaningfully. In short, the Fed cannot both achieve decent growth and bring inflation down to its 2% target in the next 1-2 years. The Fed seemed omnipotent over the past 35 years because inflation was falling or was very low. That allowed US monetary authorities during financial crises/deflationary shocks to cut rates aggressively and flood the system with liquidity. That playbook worked well in a disinflation context and the US central bank has prevented protracted debt deflation. When inflation – rather than deflation – is the problem, authorities can do little without slowing growth. In short, an inflation redux has made US policymakers’ jobs much more difficult. If the Fed tightens too much, the economy will slump. If policymakers drag their feet and do not raise interest rates rapidly and significantly, inflation will hover well above its target and inflation expectations will escalate with negative ramifications for the economy (more on this below). Bottom Line: The Fed is facing an acute dilemma. The Fed will not publicly acknowledge it, but financial markets are gradually waking up to the new reality that the era of an omnipotent Fed might be over, at least for a period of time. Why Not Allow Inflation To Proliferate? Why should authorities tighten policy and slow growth to reduce inflation? Why can’t the US operate with inflation in a range of 3.5-5%? First, there is no guarantee that core inflation will stabilize at 3.5-5% and not rise further. When higher consumer and business inflation expectations set in, they are not easily dislodged. Second, persistent inflation can damage growth itself. High price volatility increases business uncertainty as producers cannot properly plan their costs and selling prices. Higher uncertainty leads companies to abandon expansion projects and new investments. Consequently, economic growth, employment and ultimately productivity suffer. Lower productivity growth creates fertile ground for inflation to thrive. This can lead to stagflation whereby growth slows but inflation remains high. Finally, from a political perspective, inflation can be more damaging to a government’s popularity than modestly high unemployment. For example, if the unemployment rate is at 6-7%, there would be some unhappy voters, but the majority of the population would be employed and their real purchasing power would be rising. Hence, the majority of voters might be content about the incumbent government’s policies.  In an inflation scenario, however, everyone would be unhappy because inflation erodes the purchasing power of household income and wealth. The point is that moderately high unemployment affects a few families who do not have jobs while inflation affects everyone. US politicians and policymakers have forgotten the perils of inflation because rapidly rising prices have not been a problem for decades. Therefore, they have erred on the side of helicopter money assuming that deflationary pressures and higher unemployment are worse than inflation. They have forgotten that inflation is not only worse for the wider population but that it could cause growth to slump resulting in stagflation: a combination of high inflation and high unemployment. Inflation has already become a political problem in the US. With income growth lagging behind inflation, household purchasing power has declined, which has fueled dissatisfaction with the current government. Biden’s popularity has tanked in the past nine months along with the rise of inflation. If inflation is not quelled by this fall, chances are that the Democrats will lose Congress to the Republicans in the midterm elections. Further, if high inflation persists in the next two years, odds of a Republican candidate winning the 2024 presidential elections will be considerable. Recognizing this, the Biden administration will not oppose the Fed’s hawkish policy for now. While we are sympathetic to the view that the Fed will ultimately not raise rates too aggressively, they have no reason not to hike and cannot afford to appear dovish at the current juncture. Even as headline and core inflation measures start falling (which is very likely in the months ahead), the Fed has no excuse to turn dovish. The rationale is that the US core inflation rate, while dropping from 5.5-6%, will still be well above the central bank’s target of 2%. In our opinion, the Fed will make a dovish pivot only after financial conditions tighten substantially, i.e., if the S&P 500 falls by 20% or more (from its peak) and credit spreads widen much more from current levels. Bottom Line: Until panic selling occurs in the equity and credit markets or the economy is materially weaker, the Fed will hike interest rates at every meeting and will start quantitative tightening soon. Thus, US bond yields and the US dollar have more upside for the time being. Overall, the Fed and equity markets are on a collision course: the Fed will not make a dovish pivot until markets sell off and markets cannot rally unless the Fed backs off. Implications For Financial Markets Chart 9Second Half Of The 1960s: The S&P 500 And US Bond Yields Became Negatively Correlated As long as the Fed maintains its hawkish bias (which is very likely in the coming months), US bond yields will rise and/or the yield curve will flatten, the greenback will be firm, and stocks will struggle. The current environment will be more reminiscent of what occurred in the late 1960s than any other period of the past 40 years. In the second half of the 1960s, when US core CPI spiked, US share prices became negatively correlated with US bond yields (Chart 9). We discussed this topic at great length in a report from a year ago. Hawkish monetary policy amid the inflation overshoot means that the Fed appears to be credible, and this stance is positive for the US dollar. As soon as the Fed makes a dovish pivot however, the US dollar will tank. The basis is that by turning dovish earlier than warranted, odds are that inflation would remain well above its target, i.e., the Fed would fall behind the inflation curve. When a central bank is behind the inflation curve, the currency depreciates. Our US Equity Capitulation Indicator has fallen quite a bit but has not yet reached its 2018, 2016, 2011 and 2010 lows (Chart 10). We believe the macro backdrop is poor enough to justify a pullback on par with those selloffs (17-20% from the peak). In such an environment, EM stocks will outperform DM only if the US dollar weakens (Chart 11). Chart 10More Downside In The S&P 500? Chart 11EM Relative Equity Performance Moves With The US Dollar​​ Chart 12Will The Current Episode Play Out Like Q4 2018? Alternatively, we might be witnessing a replay of Q4 2018 when the S&P 500 sold off hard led by tech stocks, but having underperformed earlier that year EM outperformed (Chart 12). While such a scenario is quite possible, we need to downgrade our view on the US dollar in order to upgrade EM stocks from underweight. We are not ready to do so because we believe the Fed’s hawkish bias will for now support the greenback. On the whole, we continue to recommend underweight allocations to EM equities and credit markets within their respective global portfolios. Absolute-return investors should stay cautious on EM risk assets. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please note this is the view of Emerging Markets Strategy team and does not reflect the view of other BCA services.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Executive Summary Foreign And Domestic Politics Won't Stop The Fed Investors woke up to the Ukraine risk this week. It is not yet resolved. Stay defensive. Market reactions to Ukraine suggest investors will favor defensive sectors and growth stocks in the short term, with the notable exception of the energy sector. External risks will not dissuade the Fed from hiking rates in the face of 6% core inflation. Later the Fed might adjust to foreign crises but the stock market faces more downside in the interim. Polarization is reviving ahead of the midterm elections, which will usher in gridlock. Gridlock is disinflationary, reinforcing a tactically defensive market positioning despite our cyclical House View. Bottom Line: Biden’s external risks are not yet subsiding. The Fed will hike rates even in the face of external supply shocks. Stay tactically defensive. Feature Our three key views for the year are: gridlock, executive power, and foreign policy. First, Congress will become gridlocked even prior to the midterm elections. Second, President Biden will have to shift to executive power to achieve policy objectives. Third, Biden’s focus will be forced to engage in foreign policy more than he would prefer due to rising external risks. The Ukraine crisis – covered extensively in our Geopolitical Strategy – is the most pressing external risk but it is not the only one that we think will trouble markets this year. We expect politically induced volatility to persist all year. The cyclical investment view should be driven by the underlying macroeconomic reality. But that macro reality will change if external risks materialize and cause greater supply disruptions or if they alter the US midterm election outlook. We maintain our tactically defensive positioning for now. Mr. Market Wakes Up To Ukraine Risk The reason for the crisis is the historic Russian military buildup on all sides of Ukraine, in the face of US defense cooperation with Ukraine, not the “hysterical” American propaganda over the risk of war. When and if Russian forces withdraw, the crisis will melt away. But for now, Russia’s reported withdrawal of some troops is contradicted by movements of other troops as well as the fact that the Russian navy has effectively blocked off the Black Sea. Investors must judge by capabilities, not intentions, and Russia still has the capability to stage a limited attack at present so investors should maintain a defensive or cautious approach. In this context investors are rightly bidding up the US dollar and bidding down US equities in absolute terms (albeit not relative to European equities). Bond yields have not responded much to the external risk due to the high rate of inflation, which is pushing yields up (Chart 1). If Russia re-invades, stocks and bond yields will fall at least temporarily and the dollar will rise higher. When Russia initially invaded Ukraine eight years ago, in February 2014, the US stock-to-bond ratio moved sideways for several months but cyclicals outperformed defensives. Energy stocks rallied, until the oil crash in summer 2014. Small caps underperformed large caps, yet value outperformed growth stocks (Chart 2). Small caps likely suffered from risk-off sentiment and expectations of a drag on global growth, while value benefited from gently rising interest rates at that time. Chart 1Ukraine Crisis Escalates Chart 2Market Response To Crimea Invasion, 2014 Comparing the situation today, the difference is that cyclicals are trailing defensives and small caps are trailing large caps even more than they were in 2014. Yet value stocks have performed far better against growth now than then, in accordance with higher inflation and bond yields (Chart 3). Further escalation of the Ukraine crisis should drive investors to favor defensives, large caps, and growth stocks on a tactical time frame, even though this decision runs against our BCA House View on a cyclical time frame. The past week’s market moves reinforce the 2014 experience in general, with the stock-to-bond ratio faltering and cyclicals falling back (Chart 4). Small caps and value have benefited but these charts suggest that a negative hit to global growth will hurt small caps, while value is overextended relative to growth in the short term. The market only really began to discount the risk of a new war in Europe this past week, specifically on Friday, February 11 and Monday, February 14. Chart 3Market Response 2022 Versus 2014 Chart 4US Equities Just Woke Up To Ukraine There is not yet a solid diplomatic solution as we go to press on Tuesday, February 15, but some positive signs are fueling a rebound in risk assets. Fade these improvements in risk appetite until Russia makes its decision on whether to use military force and, if so, until Europe makes its decision on whether to impose crippling sanctions.  Bottom Line: Tactically stay long growth stocks versus value, but prepare to switch back to overweighting value if the Ukraine crisis abates. The Energy Sector Response To Ukraine So Far Commodity prices and the energy sector are naturally benefitting from rising supply risks. But there is a risk that they will suffer later if a war breaks out and generates a supply shock and energy price shock that weigh on European and global growth. Russia will likely maintain energy production to help pay for its military adventures. The Saudis could increase production to prevent demand destruction. It is also possible that a US-Iran nuclear deal could release Iranian oil to the market. The global economy can handle gradually rising energy prices but maybe not a sharp supply shock. Oil prices are rising on signs of escalating tensions and energy sector equities are generally outperforming the broad market and other cyclical sectors. Domestically oriented small cap energy stocks are rising relative to large caps, suggesting that the market does not believe that global growth will suffer greatly from any conflict. Apparently investors do believe that US energy companies will benefit from shipping more fossil fuels abroad (Chart 5). Bottom Line: Cyclically stay long small cap energy stocks versus their large cap brethren. Chart 5US Energy Sector Just Woke Up To Ukraine Peak-To-Trough Drawdowns Amid Geopolitical Crises The peak-to-trough equity drawdown amid major geopolitical crises ranges from 11%-15%, depending on the magnitude and nature of the crisis (Chart 6). In this case, the US will not be directly involved in any war in Ukraine, but US NATO allies will be right next door and providing aid to Ukraine. For “limited incursion” scenarios we looked at over a dozen crises, from the Berlin Blockade of 1949 to the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. The peak-to-trough drawdown averages 10%. For an unlimited or “full-scale” invasion, we looked at the S&P500 reaction to major invasions at the dawn of World War II as well as significant wars in the twentieth century, down to the US invasion of Iraq and NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. The peak-to-trough equity drawdown averaged 13%. Chart 6Range Of US Equity Peak-To-Trough Drawdowns Amid Geopolitical Crisis Given that the S&P500 has fallen by 8% since its peak on January 3, 2022, investors should be prepared for more downside. Health care stocks and consumer staples are outperforming the broad market this year so far, though they are underperforming energy where the supply squeeze is happening (Chart 7). The magnitude of war and sanctions will determine whether energy ultimately falls in expectation of demand destruction. Bottom Line: It is too soon to buy the dip in the S&P 500. Stay long health stocks relative to the broad market. Chart 7Health Care And Consumer Staples Will The Fed Respond To External Risks? No. Over the past year, we have argued with investors who tried to differentiate the current bout of inflation from the inflation of the 1970s by arguing that there is no energy supply shock. We argued that an energy shock could transpire by pointing to external risks such as Russia and Iran. While the Biden administration will likely prove risk-averse, for fear that higher prices at the pump will weigh on the Democratic Party in the midterm elections, what about the Federal Reserve? During the Arab oil embargo of late 1973, and the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Federal Reserve continued to hike interest rates, responding to domestic inflation and rising bond yields. Foreign supply shocks threatened to push up inflation, so the Fed was not deterred from hiking rates (Chart 8). When the US itself engages in war, the Fed might react differently (Chart 9). Chart 8The Fed Responds to Oil Shocks by Hiking Rates But... Chart 9... US At War Could Trigger Looser Monetary Policy In 1990, the Fed cut the policy rate once after the US entered the Iraq war, then kept rates flat for a few months before cutting more at the end of the year. Bond yields were falling due to recession. In 2001, the Fed was already cutting rates due to the business cycle and the September 11 terrorist attacks reinforced that process. In 2003, the Fed cut rates after the beginning of the Iraq war and did not start hiking rates until mid-2004 when the initial phase of the war ended. The implication is that Fed Chair Alan Greenspan accommodated both the war and the 2004 presidential election. Most external risks will not prevent the Fed from hiking rates, especially during an inflation bout when the nature of the external risk may be an energy supply disruption that pushes up prices. However, while we do not doubt that the Fed could hike by 50bps in March, we doubt that the consensus of 175bps in hikes in 2022 will pan out. The combination of initial hikes, fiscal drag, and foreign growth shocks would temper the Fed’s enthusiasm. Bottom Line: Stocks face more downside risk in this environment.   Bipartisanship And The Return Of Gridlock Polarization and partisanship are recovering. The Philadelphia Fed “Partisan Conflict Index” is now only 0.6% below its 2020 peaks as the midterm election approaches (Chart 10). Interestingly, one of our key views from last year – bipartisan reform – is still taking place beneath the surface. Our 2022 view of gridlock has not yet fully set in. Congress is stealthily cooperating on fiscal spending, the US Postal Service, women’s issues, public servants’ stock trading, and an attempt to revise the Electoral Count Act. Congress is also passing a bipartisan bill to make the US more economically competitive with China and impose sanctions against Russia. Chart 10Foreign And Domestic Politics Won't Stop The Fed The only area where bipartisanship is not happening is Biden’s “Build Back Better” reconciliation bill, which even lacks sufficient support from moderate Democratic senators due to high inflation. Passage is still possible in a partisan, watered-down, and deficit-neutral form. These developments show that Republican lawmakers are demonstrating some pragmatic governing ability and will use their voting records to make a case in the midterms, while pinning the blame for inflation, crime, immigration, and any foreign crises on Democrats. As such they reinforce the market consensus that Republicans are likely to take back Congress this fall. Thus while last year’s bipartisanship is spilling into the current legislative session, gridlock is rapidly approaching. When investors look to the second half of the year and beyond, they should expect to see legislative cooperation dry up, especially if Republicans only take the House and not the Senate. Bottom Line: Gridlock will freeze fiscal policy, which is non-inflationary or disinflationary for 2022-24. As such the midterm election is not fully priced. Midterm dynamics will support an overweight or at least neutral stance toward defensives and growth stocks. Investment Takeaways Tactically stay long defensives, notably health care, and growth stocks. Cyclically remain invested in the bull market – and stay long energy small caps. The chief risks to these views would be a speedy diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine and Iran conflicts or a dramatic revival of the Democratic Party’s popular support ahead of the midterm election. Diplomacy would remove risks to global growth, whereas a Democratic comeback would boost inflation expectations.   Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Footnotes  

Executive Summary China Needs To Create RMB35 Trillion In Credit In 2022 The pace of credit creation in January increased sharply over December. However, the jump was less than meets the eye compared with previous easing cycles and adjusted for seasonality. Our calculation suggests that a minimum of approximately RMB35 trillion of new credit, or a credit impulse that accounts for 29% of this year's nominal GDP, will be needed to stabilize the economy. January’s credit expansion falls short of the RMB35 trillion mark on a six-month annualized rate of change basis. Our model will provide a framework for investors to gauge whether the month-over-month credit expansion data is on track to meet our estimate of the required stimulus. Despite an improvement in January's credit growth from December, it is premature to update Chinese stocks (on- and off-shore) to overweight relative to global equities. Bottom Line: Approximately RMB35 trillion in newly increased credit this year will probably be needed to revive China’s domestic demand.  Any stimulus short of this goal would mean that investors should not increase their cyclical asset allocation of Chinese stocks in a global portfolio. Feature January’s credit data for China exceeded the market consensus. The aggregate total social financing (TSF) more than doubled in the first month of 2022 from December last year. However, on a year-over-year basis, the increase in January’s TSF was smaller than in previous easing cycles, such as in 2013, 2016 and 2019. Furthermore, underlying data in the TSF reflects a prolonged weak demand for bank loans from both the corporate and household sectors. While January’s uptick in credit expansion makes us slightly more optimistic about China’s policy support, economic recovery and equity performance in the next 6 to 12 months, we are not yet ready to upgrade our view. An estimated RMB35 trillion in newly increased credit this year will likely be necessary to revive flagging domestic demand. In the absence of seasonally adjusted TSF data in China, our framework will help investors determine whether incoming stimulus is on course to meet this objective. Interpreting January’s Credit Numbers Chart 1A Sharp Increase In Credit Creation In January January’s credit creation beat the market consensus to reach RMB6.17 trillion, pushed up by a seasonal boost and a frontloading of government bond issuance (Chart 1). However, the composition of the TSF data reflects an extended weakness in business and consumer credit demand. On the plus side, net government bond financing, including local government special purpose bonds, rose to RMB603 billion last month, more than twice the amount from January 2021 (Chart 1, bottom panel). Corporate bond issuance also picked up, reflecting cheaper market rates and more accommodative liquidity conditions (Chart 2). Furthermore, shadow credit (including trust loans, entrust loans and bank acceptance bills) also ticked up in January compared with a year ago. The increase in informal lending sends a tentative signal that policymakers may be willing to ease the regulatory pressure on shadow bank activities (Chart 3). Chart 2Corporate Financing Through Bond Issuance Also Increased Chart 3Shadow Banking Activity Ticked Up For The First Time In A Year Meanwhile, several factors suggest that the surge in January’s credit expansion may be less than what it appears to be at first glance. First, credit growth is always abnormally strong in January. Banks typically increase lending at the beginning of a year, seeking to expand their assets rapidly before administrative credit quotas kick in. In recent years loans made during the first month of a year accounted for about 17% - 20% of total bank credit generated for an entire year. Secondly, the credit flow in January, although higher than in January 2021, was weaker than in the first month of previous easing cycles. Credit impulse – measured by the 12-month change in TSF as a percentage of nominal GDP – only inched up by 0.6 percentage points of GDP in January this year from December, much weaker than that during the first month in previous easing cycles (Chart 4). TSF increased by RMB980 billion from January 2021, lower than the RMB1.5 trillion year-on-year jump in 2019 and the RMB1.4 trillion boost in 2016 (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4The Magnitude Of Increase In January’s Credit Impulse Less Than Meets The Eye Chart 5Corporate Demand For Bank Credit Remains Soft Furthermore, China’s households and private businesses have significantly lagged in their responses to recent policy easing measures and their demand for credit remained soft in January (Chart 5). Bank credit in both short and longer terms to households were lower than a year earlier due to downbeat consumer sentiment (Chart 6A and 6B). Chart 6AConsumption Was Unseasonably Weak During Chinese New Year Chart 6BHouseholds' Propensity To Consume Continues Trending Down How Much Stimulus Is Necessary? Our calculation suggests that China will probably need to create approximately RMB35 trillion in new credit, or 29% of GDP in credit impulse, over the course of this year to avoid a contraction in corporate earnings. In our previous reports, we argued that the state of the economy today is in a slightly better shape than the deep deflationary period in 2014/15, but the magnitude of the property market contraction is comparable to that seven years ago. Chart 7 illustrates our approach, which uses a model of Chinese investable earnings growth. The model is designed to predict the likelihood of a serious contraction in investable earnings in the coming 12 months. It includes variables on credit, manufacturing new orders and forward earnings momentum. The chart shows that the flow of TSF as a share of GDP needs to reach a minimum of 28.5% in order that the probability of a major earnings contraction falls below 50%. The size of the credit impulse necessary is 2 percentage points higher than that achieved last year, but still lower than the scope of the stimulus rolled out in 2016. Assuming an 8% growth rate in nominal GDP in 2022, the credit flow that should to be originated this year would be about RMB35 trillion, as illustrated in Chart 8. The chart also shows that this amount would exceed a previous high in credit flow reached in late-2020. Chart 7China Needs At Least A 29% Credit Impulse In 2022 To Avoid An Earnings Recession Chart 8China Needs To Create RMB35 Trillion In Credit In 2022 Based on a 3-month annualized rate of change, January’s credit growth appears that it will achieve the RMB35 trillion mark. However, the jump in TSF largely reflects a one-month leap in frontloaded local government bond issuance and it is not certain if private credit will accelerate in the months ahead. For now, we contend the stimulus have been insufficiently provided during the past six months (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chance Of A Stimulus Overshoot? We will closely monitor whether the month-to-month pace of credit growth is consistent with the scope of the reflationary policy response required to revive China’s domestic demand. Despite a sharp improvement in January’s headline credit number, we view the policy signal from January’s credit data as neutral. China’s unique cyclical patterns and the lack of official seasonally adjusted data make monthly credit figures difficult to interpret. Charts 9 and 10 represent an approach that we previously introduced to help gauge whether the pace of credit creation is on track to meet the stimulus called for to stabilize the economy. Chart 9Jan Credit Growth Looked To Be Stronger Than A “Half-Strength” Credit Cycle… Chart 10…But It Is Too Early To Conclude It Is In Line With What Is Needed The charts show an average cumulative amount of TSF as the year advances, along with a ±0.5 standard deviation, based on data from 2010 to 2021. The thick black line in both charts shows the progress in new credit creation this year, assuming an 8% annual nominal GDP growth rate. Chart 9 shows the cumulative progress in credit, assuming a 27% new credit-to-GDP ratio for the year, whereas Chart 10 assumes 30%. The 27% ratio scenario shown in Chart 9, which is slightly higher than the magnitude of stimulus in 2019, would correspond to a very measured credit expansion. If the thick black line continues to trend within this range, it would suggest that policymakers are reluctant to allow credit growth to surge. Consequently, global investors should continue an underweight stance on Chinese stocks. In contrast, Chart 10 represents a 30% rate of TSF as a share of this year’s GDP; this would be the adequate stimulus needed for a recovery in domestic demand. A cumulative amount of TSF that trends within or above this range would provide more confidence that a credit overshoot similar to 2015/16 and 2020 would occur.   Investment Conclusions It is premature to upgrade Chinese stocks to an overweight cyclical stance (i.e. over 6-12 months) within a global portfolio. For now, we recommend investors stay only tactically overweight in Chinese investable equities versus the global benchmark, given their cheap relative valuations. Meanwhile, the increase in January’s TSF, while registering an improvement relative to previous months, does not signal that the pace of credit growth will be strong enough to overcome the negative ramifications of the ongoing deceleration in housing market activity. Therefore, in view of policymakers’ steadfast desire to avoid another major credit overshoot, our cyclical recommendation to underweight Chinese stocks remains unchanged.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations Tactical Recommendations

Executive Summary The Euro And Relative Growth The euro is likely to appreciate over the course of 2022. But the path will be volatile, with a retest of recent EUR/USD lows within the central band of possible outcomes. Our 2022 target for the euro is 1.20. This partly hinges on cheap valuations. Beyond 2022, a bold estimate could see the euro gravitate towards 1.40. The pricing of interest rate hikes by the ECB this year are too aggressive. But this is also the case for the Federal Reserve, especially if inflation proves transitory. Our bias is that appreciation in the euro will be more driven by improving relative economic fundamentals as the 2022 cycle unfolds. A bottom in Chinese growth could be the ultimate arbiter of which mega economy outperforms. Sentiment on the euro is only neutral. This suggests that an escalation in Russo-Ukrainian tensions, as well as a more dovish ECB, are key risks in the short term. A short EUR/JPY position is a good hedge for this risk. In our FX portfolio, we are long EUR/CHF and long EUR/GBP as equally playable themes. We would buy the EUR/USD at current levels but suspect a better entry point awaits us. Recommendations Inception Level Inception Date Return Long EUR/CHF 1.05 2021-11-19 0.62% Long EUR/GBP 0.846 2021-10-15 -.71%   Bottom Line: A positive surprise in Chinese growth, which will boost the euro area trade balance, will be a catalyst for eurozone growth. So will a decline in Russo-Ukrainian tensions and lower energy inflation. Feature The most persistent question we have received in recent weeks is the outlook for the euro. As the premier anti-dollar asset, most clients have been surprised by recent strength in the European currency, betting that a hawkish Fed and US exceptionalism will push the greenback to new highs. A domestic energy crisis interlinked with a brewing war in their backyard has created perfect conditions for selling the euro. With US inflation surprising to the upside, the case for maintaining a dollar-bullish stance remains in place. Yet, the dollar is well below its previous highs. Our suspicion is that the market faces a conundrum. Transitory inflation will nudge the Fed to underwhelm market expectations of aggressive rate hikes. Meanwhile, sticky inflation means that other central banks will eventually catch up to the Federal Reserve in tightening monetary policy. This tug of war has been a defining theme of our strategy for currencies in 2022.1 Specific to the euro area, there is a lot of bad economic news that is now well priced in, while good news is underappreciated by markets. This is becoming evident in the interest rate market, where real Bund yields are creeping noticeably higher. The spread of Omicron in the euro area is receding in lockstep with the deceleration in the US (Chart 1). As a result, the potential growth profile of the euro area is improving tremendously (Chart 2). Should this prove durable, it will put a solid floor under the euro. Chart 1The Pandemic Is Receding Chart 2The Euro And Relative Growth The Case For European Growth Growth is moderating around the world. That said, the German manufacturing PMI has been sharply outpacing that of the US. What is also true is that most measures of euro area growth that we monitor are rising fast relative to the US. The results are preliminary, but the possibility of a growth rotation from the US to other economies, including the eurozone, is very much underappreciated by markets. The economic surprise index in the euro area is strong relative to the US, pointing to a stronger euro (Chart 3). Bloomberg economic forecasts suggest that euro area growth will outpace growth in the US this year. According to the consensus, the euro area will grow by 4.2% in 2022, compared to the US at 3.9%. Remarkably, eurozone growth has typically lagged growth in the US by a significant margin. If past is prologue, it suggests the euro is not priced for this paradigm change (Chart 4). Chart 3Economic Surprises And ##br##The Euro Chart 4Bloomberg Forecasters Expect A Pickup In Eurozone Growth Other economic forecasts corroborate this view. The IMF expects eurozone growth to moderate from 5.2%, to 3.9% in 2022. This is an advantage over the US, where growth is expected to moderate from 5.6% in 2021, to 4% in 2022. The Atlanta Fed GDP growth tracker suggests US growth will slow to a crawl in Q1. The ZEW survey points to a meaningful rebound in the German (and euro area) PMI in the coming months (Chart 5). This will further widen the gap between European and US growth. The key denominator for all these forecasts is a bottoming in Chinese growth. The euro area needs the manufacturing and external sector to keep humming, with China as a critical import partner. Industrial production in the euro area, relative to the US, tends to track the Chinese credit impulse closely (Chart 6). Our bias is that the Chinese credit impulse has bottomed. This will be a catalyst for more Chinese demand for European goods. Chart 5The ZEW Survey Points To An Improving German PMI Chart 6Europe Is Partly Dependent On China The ECB And Interest Rates Chart 7The Gap Between Expected US-EUR Interest Rates Is Wide The markets have begun to reprice higher interest rates in the eurozone. Admittedly, this has been partly due to higher expected inflation. In our view, the repricing by markets is warranted due to the gaping wedge between US versus European interest rate expectations. According to December 2022 contracts, markets expect the Fed to hike interest rates by significantly more than the ECB (Chart 7). It is true that structurally, inflation in the eurozone has been lower than in the US. In fact, our European Investment Strategy colleagues highlight that by stripping out energy, and the impact of VAT tax increases, European inflation is even lower. When CPI baskets are adjusted item for item, eurozone inflation today is indeed lower compared to the US, but not by much (Chart 8). For example, energy and transportation are only 14% of the eurozone CPI basket versus 26% in the US (Table 1). Meanwhile, the ECB targets HICP inflation (not core) that sits at 5.1%, versus a target of 2%.  Chart 8Item-For-Item Inflation: US Versus Eurozone Table 1Differences In The US And Eurozone CPI Basket In the coming months, inflation is likely to subside in the eurozone, but probably by less than markets expect. The key driver of inflation expectations in the eurozone (and in the US) are long-dated commodity prices (Chart 9). This has become even more evident, given the surge in electricity prices across many European countries. Robert Ryan, our Chief Commodity Strategist, expects long-dated crude prices to be revised upward, as the oil curve remains persistently backwardated. This puts a floor on how low inflation expectations can relapse in the euro area and will keep the ECB on edge. Meanwhile, the employment picture in the eurozone is also improving. Adjusting for the higher rate of structural unemployment, euro area joblessness compares favorably with the US (Chart 10). It is true that wage growth remains anemic, but it is also the case that the behavior of wages can exhibit a structural shift at very low levels of employment.  Chart 9What Drives Eurozone Inflation Expectations? Chart 10US Versus Eurozone Labor Markets Finally, the euro zone has a lot of pent-up demand. This could help bolster growth in the coming quarters and even beyond. While not a subject of this report, we suspect that the cascading crises in the eurozone could have sown the seeds for a productivity boom in the coming years. For a 12-18-month outlook, high savings and easy fiscal policy will allow European growth to recover in the coming quarters. EUR/USD Valuation And Future Returns Making a structural case for the euro is easy when it comes to valuation. According to our in-house PPP models, an investor who buys the euro today can expect to make 4%-5% a year over the next decade, should the euro stay at current levels of undervaluation versus the US. This will occur if Eurozone inflation keeps lagging that in the US.  (Chart 11). That said, this is the Goldilocks case. A simple return to PPP fair value will suggest the euro will rise by a robust 20%. For 2022, our forecast for the euro is more in the 1.20-1.23 range, 8% above current levels. Our stance is measured because investors are only neutral the euro (Chart 12). Usually, this means that the macroeconomic environment becomes the dominant driver, rather than sentiment. With a Russo-Ukrainian crisis still in the backyard and the potential for more market volatility, an undershoot in the euro cannot be ruled out.  Chart 11The Goldilocks Case For The Euro Chart 12Sentiment On The Euro Is Only Neutral That said, interest rate differentials are now moving in favor of the euro. Italian BTPs now yield 1.9%, like US Treasurys. The US Treasury-Bund spread has also narrowed. This removes a lot of the incentive for Europeans to flood the US Treasury or TIPs market, should market volatility subside. Given this confluence of factors, we have chosen to play euro strength via two channels: Long EUR/CHF: This trade will benefit from positive interest rate differentials. Also, the Swiss franc has been bid up relative to the euro on safe-haven demand. This has outpaced the traditional demand for safety, using the DXY index as a proxy (Chart 13). Long EUR/GBP: This is a bet on improving economic fundamentals between the eurozone and the UK (Chart 14), as well as a bet on policy convergence between the two economies. Chart 13Stay Long EUR/CHF Chart 14Stay Long EUR/GBP   Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Report, “The Biggest Macro Question By FX Investors Could Potentially Be The Least Relevant”, dated January 14, 2022.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Special Report

Executive Summary Brazil: Are Political & Macro Risks Priced-In? Presidential elections are due in Brazil on October 2, 2022. While the left-of-center former President Lula da Silva will likely win, the road to his victory will not be as smooth as markets expect. Incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro will make every effort to cling to power, including fiscal populism and attacks on Brazil’s institutions. These moves may roil Brazil’s equity markets as they may provide a fillip to Bolsonaro’s popularity. Bolsonaro’s institutional attacks have triggered down moves in the market before and any fiscal expansion may worry investors as it could prove to be sticky. We urge investors to take-on only selective tactical exposure in Brazil. Equities appear cheap but political and macro risks abound. To play the rally yet stave-off political risk in Brazil, we suggest a tactical pair trade: Long Brazil Financials / Short India. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Long Brazil Financials / Short India 2022-02-10   Bottom Line: On a tactical timeframe we suggest only selective exposure to Brazil given the latent political and macro risks. On a strategic timeframe, we are neutral on Brazil given that its growth potential coexists with high debt and low proclivity to structural reform. Feature Chart 1Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil’s equity markets underperformed relative to emerging markets (EMs) for a second consecutive year in 2021 (Chart 1). But thanks to this correction, Brazilian equities now appear cheap (Chart 1). With Brazil looking cheap, China easing policy, and Lula’s return likely, is now a good time to buy into Brazil? We recommend taking on only selective exposure to Brazil on a tactical horizon for now. Brazil in our view may present a near-term value trap as markets are under-pricing political and economic risks. Lula Set For Phoenix-Like Return Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or popularly Lula) of the Worker’s Party (PT) appears all set to reclaim the country’s presidency in the fall of 2022. The main risk that Lula’s presidency may bring is a degree of fiscal expansion. Despite this markets may ultimately welcome his victory at the presidential elections as Lula is in alignment with the median voter, is expected to be better for Brazil’s institutions, will institute a superior pandemic-control strategy, and may also undertake badly needed structural reforms in the early part of his tenure. Despite these points we urge investors to limit exposure to Brazil for now and turn bullish only once the market corrects further. Whilst far-right President Jair Bolsonaro managed to join a political party (i.e., the center-right Liberal Party) late last year, he is yet to secure something more central to winning elections i.e., a high degree of popularity. To boost his low popularity ratings (Chart 2), we expect Bolsonaro to leverage two planks: populism and authoritarianism. These measures will bump up Bolsonaro’s popularity enough to shake up Brazil’s markets with renewed uncertainty, but not enough to win him the presidency. Chart 2Lula Is Ahead But His Lead Has Narrowed Lula is a clear favorite to win. After spending more than a year in jail on corruption charges, Lula is back in the fray and has maintained a lead on Bolsonaro for the first round of polling (Chart 2). Even if a second-round run-off election were to take place, Lula would prevail over Bolsonaro or other key candidates (Chart 3). By contrast, Bolsonaro’s lower popularity means that in a run-off situation he stands a chance only if pitted against center-right candidates like Sergio Moro (his former justice minister) or João Doria (i.e., the center-right Governor of São Paulo) (Chart 4). Chart 3Lula Leads Run-Off Vote Against All Potential Candidates​​​​​​ Chart 4In A Run-Off, Bolso Stands Best Chance Of Winning If Pitted Against Moro​​​​​​ What has driven the swing to the left in Brazil? After the pandemic and some stagflation, Brazil’s median voter’s priorities have changed. In specific: Brazil’s median voter’s top concerns in 2018 were centered around improving law and order (Chart 5). A right-of-center candidate with concrete law-and-order credentials like Bolsonaro was well placed to tap into this public demand. Chart 5In 2018-19, Law And Order Issues Dominated Voters’ Concerns Now, however, Brazil’s voters’ top concerns are focused around improving the economy and controlling the pandemic, where Bolsonaro’s record is dismal (Chart 6). Given this change of priorities, a left-of-center candidate with a solid economic record like Lula is best placed to address voters’ concerns. Lula had the fortune to preside over a global commodity bull market and Brazilian economic boom in the early 2000s (Chart 7). Regarding pandemic control, almost any challenger would be better positioned than Bolsonaro, who initially dismissed Covid-19 as “a little flu” and lacked the will or ability to set up a stable public health policy. Chart 6In 2022, Median Voter Cares Most About Economic Issues, Pandemic-Control​​​​​​ Chart 7Lula’s Presidency Overlapped With An Economic Boom ​​​​​​ A left-of-center candidate like Lula, or even Ciro Gomes (Chart 8), is more in step with the median voter today for two key reasons: Inflation Surge, Few Jobs: Inflation has surged, and the increase is higher than that seen under the previous President Michael Temer (Chart 7). Transportation, food, and housing costs have all taken a toll on voter’s pocketbooks (Chart 9). The cost of electricity has also shot up. For 46% of Brazilian families, expenditure on power and natural gas is eating into more than half of their monthly income, according to Ipec. Chart 8Left-Of-Center Candidates Stand A Better Chance In Brazil In 2022​​​​​​ Chart 9Under Bolso Inflation Has Surged Across Key Categories​​​​ Distinct from inflation, unemployment too has been high under Bolsonaro (Chart 10). Chart 10Unemployment Too Has Surged Under Bolsonaro​​​​​​ Chart 11Brazil’s Per Capita Income Growth Has Lagged That Of Peers​​​​​​ Chart 12Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Stagnant Incomes: Despite a strong post-pandemic fiscal stimulus, GDP growth in Brazil has been low (Chart 7). In a country that is structurally plagued with high inequalities, the slow growth in Brazil’s per capita income (Chart 11) under a right-wing administration is bound to trigger a leftward shift. It is against this backdrop of rising economic miseries (Chart 12) that Latin America’s largest economy is seeing its ideological pendulum swing leftwards. This phenomenon has played out before too - most notably when Lula first assumed power as the president of Brazil in 2002. Brazil’s GDP growth was low, inflation was high and per capita incomes had almost halved under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (or popularly FHC) over 1995-2002. This economic backdrop played a key role in Lula’s landslide win in 2002. Brazil’s political differences are rooted in regional as well as socioeconomic disparities. In the 2018 presidential elections, left-of-center candidates like Fernando Haddad generated greatest traction in the economically backward northeastern region of Brazil. On the other hand, Bolsonaro enjoyed higher traction in the relatively well-off regions in southern and northern Brazil (Maps 1 & 2). Now Bolsonaro has faltered under the pandemic and Lula can reunite the dissatisfied parts of the electorate with his northeastern base. Map 1Brazil’s South, Mid-West And North Supported Bolso In 2018 Map 2Left-Of-Center 2018 Presidential Candidate Haddad Had Greatest Traction In Regions With Low Incomes Bottom Line: The stage appears set for Lula’s return to Brazil’s presidency. But will the road be smooth? We think not. Investors should gird for downside risks that Brazilian markets must contend with as President Bolsonaro fights back. Brace For Bolso’s Fightback The road to Bolsonaro’s likely loss will be paved with market volatility and potentially a correction. Interest rates have surged in Brazil as its central bank combats inflation (Chart 13). Even as BCB’s actions will lend some stability to the Brazilian Real (Chart 13), political events over the course of 2022 will spook foreign investors. Bolsonaro will leverage two planks in a desperate attempt to retain control: Plank #1: Populism Brazil’s financial markets experienced a major correction in the second half of 2021. This was partially driven by the fact that Brazilian legislators approved a rule that allows the government to breach its federal spending cap. Given Bolsonaro’s low popularity ratings today and given that his fiscal stance has been restrained off late, Bolsonaro could well drive another bout of fiscal expansion in the run up to October 2022. Such a move will bump up his popularity but at the same time worry markets given Brazil’s elevated debt levels (Chart 14). Bolsonaro can technically pass these changes in the Brazilian national assembly given that in both houses the government along with the confidence and supply parties has more than 50% of seats. Chart 13Brazil’s Central Bank Has Hiked Rates Aggressively​​​​​​ Chart 14Brazil Is One Of The Most Indebted Emerging Markets Today​​​​​​ Plank #2: Institutional Attacks To rally his supporters, the former army captain could also sow seeds of doubt in Brazil’s judiciary and electoral process. Given the strong support that Bolsonaro enjoys amongst conservatives, he may even mobilize supporters to stage acts of political violence in the run up to the elections. Bolsonaro could make more dramatic attempts to stay in power than former US President Trump, whose rebellion on Capitol Hill did not go as far as it could have gone to attempt to seize power for the outgoing president. Last but not the least, there is a possibility that the Brazilian judiciary presents an unexpected roadblock to Lula’s candidacy. Given the unpredictable path of Brazil’s judicial decisions, investors should be prepared for at least some kind of official impediments to Lula’s rise. Even if Lula is ultimately allowed to run, any ruling that casts doubt on his candidacy or corruption-related track record will upset financial markets. Global financial markets rallied through the Trump rebellion on January 6 last year. But US institutions, however flawed, are more stable than Brazil’s. Brazil only emerged from military dictatorship in 1985. Bolsonaro has fired up elements of the populace that are nostalgic for that period, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: Brazil’s equities look cheap today, but political risks have not fully run their course. President Bolsonaro may launch his fightback soon, which could drive another down-leg in Brazil’s markets. His institutional attacks have triggered down moves before and any potential fiscal expansion that Bolsonaro pursues may worry investors, as this expansion could stick under the subsequent administration. In addition, there is a chance that civil-military relations undergo high strain in the run-up to or immediately after Brazil’s elections. Is A Self-Coup By Bolso Possible? “One uncomfortable fact of the dictatorship is that its most brutal period of repression overlapped with what Milton Friedman called an economic miracle.… Brazil’s economy, nineteenth largest in the world before the coup, grew into the eighth largest. Jobs abounded and the regime then was actually popular.” – Alex Cuadros, Brazillionaires: Wealth, Power, Decadence, and Hope in an American Country (Spiegel & Grau, 2016) It is extremely difficult for President Bolsonaro to win the support of a majority of the electorate. But given his open admiration for Brazil’s dictatorship, is a self-coup possible in 2022? The next nine months will be tumultuous. A coup attempt could occur. However, we allocate a low probability to a successful self-coup because: Bolsonaro’s Popularity Is Too Low: Even dictators need to have some popular appeal. Bolsonaro has lost too much support (Chart 15), he never had full control of any major institutions (including the military), and few institutional players will risk their credibility for his sake. If he somehow clung to power, his subsequent administration would face overwhelming popular resistance. Chart 15Bolsonaro’s Low Approval Ratings - A Liability Bolsonaro’s Economy Is Too Weak: The dictatorship in Brazil managed to hold power for more than two decades partially because this period of authoritarianism was accompanied by a degree of economic well-being. Currently the public is shifting to the left because low growth and high inflation have dented the median voter’s purchasing power. The weak economy would make an authoritarian government unsustainable from the start. Lack Of American Support: Some military personnel may be supportive of a coup and several retired military officers are occupying civilian positions in the Brazilian federal government, thanks to Bolsonaro. So why can’t Brazil slip right back into a military dictatorship led by Bolsonaro, say if the election results are narrow and hotly contested? The coup d'état in Brazil in 1964 was a success to a large extent because this regime-change was supported by America. Back then communism was a threat to the US and Washington was keen to displace left-leaning heads of states in Latin America, such as Brazilian President João Goulart. But America’s strategic concerns have now changed. America today is attempting to coalesce an axis of democracies and the Biden administration has no incentive whatsoever to muddy its credentials by supporting dictatorship in Latin America’s largest country. Even aside from ideology, any such action would encourage fearful governments in the region to seek support from America’s foreign rivals, thus inviting the kind of foreign intervention that the US most wants to prevent in Latin America. The Brazilian Military Has Not Been Suppressed Or Sidelined: History suggests that coups are often triggered by a drop in the military’s importance in a country. However, the military’s power in Brazil has remained meaningful through the twenty-first century. Brazil has maintained steady military spends at around 1.5% of GDP over the last two decades. Thus, top leaders of Brazil’s military have no reason to feel aggrieved or disempowered. Having said that, it is not impossible that an extreme faction of junior officers might try to pull off a fantastical plot, even if they have little hope of succeeding, which is why we highlight that markets can be rudely awakened by the road to Brazil’s election this year. In Turkey in July 2016, an unsuccessful coup attempt caused Turkish equities to decline by 9% over a four-day period. Bottom Line: Investors must gird for the very real possibility of civil-military relations undergoing high degrees of strain in Brazil, particularly if a contested election occurs. While Bolsonaro’s supporters and disaffected elements of the Brazilian military could resist a smooth transition of power away from Bolsonaro, the transition will eventually take place because two powerful constituencies – Brazil’s median voter and America – will not support a coup in Brazil. Will Lula Be Good For Brazil’s Markets? Looking over Bolsonaro’s presidency, from a market-perspective, some policy measures were good, some were bad, and some were downright ugly. In specific: The Good: Pension Reforms And Independent Monetary Policy In Bolsonaro’s first year in power, he delivered pension sector reforms. The law increased the minimum retirement age and also increased workers’ pension contributions thereby resulting in meaningful fiscal savings. Bolsonaro passed a law to formalise the BCB’s autonomy and the BCB has been able to pursue a relatively independent monetary policy. BCB has now lifted the benchmark Selic rate by 725bps over 2021 thereby making it one of the most hawkish central banks amongst EMs (Chart 13). This is in sharp contrast to the situation in EMs like Turkey where the central bank cut rates owing to the influence of a populist head of state. The Bad: Poor Free Market Credentials And Fiscal Expansion In early 2021, President Bolsonaro fired the head of Petrobras (the state-owned energy champion) reportedly for raising fuel prices. Bolsonaro then picked a former army general (with no relevant work experience) to head the company. Although Bolsonaro positioned himself as a supporter of privatization in the run up to his presidency, he failed to follow through. Another area where the far-right leader has disappointed markets is with respect to Brazil’s debt levels. Under his presidency, a constitutional amendment to raise a key government spending cap was passed. Shortly afterwards came the creation of the massive welfare program Auxílio Brasil. Bolsonaro embraced fiscal populism to try to save his presidency after the pandemic. Consequently Brazil’s public debt to GDP ratio ballooned from 86% in 2018 to a peak of 99% in 2020. The Ugly: Poor Pandemic Response And Institutional Attacks The darkest hour of Bolsonaro’s presidency came on September 7, 2021, i.e., Brazil’s Independence Day. During rallies with his supporters, Bolsonaro levelled attacks on the Brazilian judiciary and sowed seeds of doubt in Brazil’s electoral process. More concretely, the greatest failing of the Bolsonaro administration has been its lax response to the pandemic. Bolsonaro delayed preventive measures, and this has meant that Brazil was one of the worst hit major economies of the world. The pandemic has claimed more than 630,000 lives in Brazil i.e., the second highest in the world. In relative terms too, Brazil has experienced a high death rate of about 2,960 per million which is even higher than the US rate of 2,720 per million. President Bolsonaro’s poor handling of the pandemic will cost the President in terms of votes in 2022 as the highest Covid-19-related death rates were seen in Southern Brazil (Map 3) i.e., a region that had voted in large numbers for Bolsonaro in 2018 (see Map 1 above). Map 3The Pandemic Has Had A Devastating Impact In Brazil’s South, Mid-West And North Given this backdrop, a Lula presidency will be welcomed by global financial markets, potentially for three reasons: Superior Pandemic-Control: An administration headed by Lula will bring in a more scientific and cohesive pandemic-control strategy thereby saving lives and benefiting the economy. Alignment With Institutions: Lula will act in alignment with Brazil’s institutions. He stands to benefit from the existing electoral system, the civil bureaucracy, academia, and the media. He may have rougher relations with the judiciary and parts of the military, but he is a known quantity and not likely to attempt to be a Hugo Chavez. Possibility Of Some Structural Reform: Given Brazil’s unstable debt dynamics, and the “lost decade” of economic malaise in the 2010s, there is a chance that Lula could pursue some structural reforms. Lula is more popular than his Worker’s Party, which is still tainted by corruption, so his strength in Congress will not be known until after the election. But Brazilian parties tend to coalesce around the president and Lula has experience in managing the legislative process. The probability of Lula pushing through some bit of structural reform will be the greatest in 2021. Back in 2019, it is worth recounting that only 4% of the Brazilian public supported pension reforms. Despite this Bolsonaro managed the passage of painful pension reforms in 2019 because market pressure forced the parties to cooperate. Faced with inflation and low growth, Lula may be forced to push through some piecemeal structural financial sector and economic reforms. However, if commodity prices and financial markets are cheering his election, he may spend his initial political capital on policies closer to his base of support, which means that a market riot may be necessary to force action on structural reforms. This dynamic will have to be monitored in the aftermath of the election. Assuming Lula does pursue some structural reforms while he has the political capital, and therefore that his first year is positive for financial markets, there is a reason to be positive on Brazil selectively on a tactical basis. However, electoral compulsions could cause Lula to pursue left-wing populism, fiscal expansion, and to resist privatization over the remaining three years of his presidency. Given Brazil’s already elevated debt levels (Chart 14), such a policy tilt would be market negative. It is against this backdrop that we expect a pro-Lula market rally to falter after the initial excitement. Bottom Line: Once the power transition is complete, a relief rally may follow as markets factor in the prospects of institutional stability and possibly a dash of structural reform in the first year of Lula’s presidency. But given Brazil’s elevated inequalities, even a pro-Lula rally will eventually fade as the administration will be constrained to switch back to the old ways and pursue an expansionary fiscal policy when elections loom. Investment Conclusions Brazil Presents A Value Trap, Fraught with Politico-Economic Risks From a strategic perspective, we are neutral on Brazil. A decade of bad news has been priced in but there is not yet a clear and sustainable trajectory to improve the country’s productivity. History suggests that both left-wing and right-wing presidents are often forced to backtrack on structural reforms and resort to cash-handouts in the run up to elections. This tends to add to Brazil’s high debt levels, prevents the domestic growth engine from revving up, and adds to inflation. Low growth and high inflation then set the wheels rolling for another bout of fiscal expansion (Chart 16). Chart 16The Vicious Politico-Economic Cycle That Brazil Is Trapped In Exceptions to this politico-economic cycle occur when a commodity boom is underway or if China, which is Brazil’s key client state, is booming. China today buys a third of Brazil’s exports (Chart 17) and is Brazil’s largest export market. The other reason we remain circumspect about Brazil’s strategic prospects is because of the secular slowdown underway in China. China is not in a position today to recreate the commodity and trade boom that buoyed Lula during his first presidency. China’s policy easing is a tactical boon at best, which can coincide with a Lula relief rally, but afterwards investors will be left with Chinese deleveraging and Brazilian populism. Political Risks Are High, Selective Tactical Exposure Brazil Will Be Optimal We urge investors to buy into Brazilian assets only selectively, even as Brazilian equities appear cheap (Chart 18). Political risks and economic risks such as low growth in GDP and earnings (Chart 19) could contribute to another correction and/or volatility in Brazilian equities. Chart 17China Buys A Third Of Brazil’s Exports​​​​​ ​​​​​Chart 18Brazil: Are Political & Macro Risks Priced-In? Chart 19Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag China’s policy easing is an important macro factor playing to Brazil’s benefit. As we highlighted in our “China Geopolitical Outlook 2022,” Beijing is focused on ensuring stability over the next 12 months. But history suggests that Brazil’s corporate earnings respond to a pick-up in China’s total social financing with a lag of more than six months (Chart 19). Thus, even from a purely macro perspective it may make sense to turn bullish on Brazil after the election turmoil concludes. Given that politically sensitive sectors account for an unusually high proportion of Brazil’s market capitalization (Chart 18), and given the political risks in the offing for Brazil, we suggest taking-on selective exposure in Brazil. To play the rally yet mitigate political risks (that can be higher for capital-heavy sectors), we suggest a pair trade: Long Brazil Financials / Short India. We remain positive on India on a strategic horizon. However, in view of India approaching the business-end of its five-year election cycle, when policy risks tend to become elevated, we reiterate our tactical sell on India. India currently trades at a 81% premium to MSCI EM on a forward P-E ratio basis versus its two year average of 56%. A Quick Note On The Nascent EM Rally Investors should gradually look more favorably on emerging markets, but tactical caution is warranted. MSCI EM and MSCI World are down YTD 1.1% and 4.6% respectively. Despite the dip, we are not yet turning bullish on EM as a whole, owing to both geopolitical and macroeconomic factors. Global geopolitical risks in the new year are high. We recently upgraded the odds of Russia re-invading Ukraine from 50% to 75%. Besides EM Europe, we also see high and underrated geopolitical risks in the Middle East in the short run. Both the Russia and Iran conflicts raise a non-negligible risk of energy shocks that undermine global growth. Once these hurdles are cleared, we will turn more positive toward risky assets. Macroeconomically, the current EM rally can be sustained only if China delivers a substantial stimulus, and the US dollar continues to weaken. The former is likely, as we have argued, but the dollar looks to be resilient and it will take several months before China’s credit impulse rebounds. Hence conditions for a sustainable EM rally do not yet exist. Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Executive Summary Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Compression Equity sector and style rotations could prevent the broad equity indexes from plunging, but these rotations will not be sufficient to propel the overall stock indexes to new highs. Rising US bond yields remain the key risk to US growth stocks in both absolute and relative terms. As US growth stocks drift lower in absolute terms, the S&P 500 will stay in a trading range but is unlikely to make new highs. Equity leadership rotations typically occur during or after bear markets and/or major corrections in global share prices. Hence, a major selloff in global stocks is likely before EM, commodities, global cyclicals and value stocks move toward a period of secular outperformance (i.e., a multi-year bull market in absolute and relative terms). Recommendation   Inception Date Return Underweight EM Relative To DM Stocks (In Common Currency) 2021-03-25 15.8% Bottom Line: Continue underweighting EM in a global equity portfolio. Cyclically, continue favoring value versus growth stocks. Feature We expect US bond yields to continue to rise, and global growth stocks to continue to underperform global value stocks in the months ahead. This prompts the question: What does this scenario mean for overall global share prices, EM markets, and EM relative equity performance? Equity Rotation And Overall Market Performance Can the S&P 500 or global equity index advance in absolute terms when US and global growth stocks sell off in absolute terms? Our hunch is as follows: As US growth stocks drift lower, the S&P 500 will stay in a trading range, but is unlikely to make new highs. A review of past episodes of sector and style rotation is in order. We recall two episodes of major rotation: 1. The closest historical comparison is in the year 2000. The top panel of Chart 1 illustrates US value stocks were resilient even after the Nasdaq bubble started bursting in March 2000. Besides, the S&P 500 index held up well in the first half of that year even though Nasdaq stocks were plummeting (Chart 1, bottom panel). Nevertheless, despite the rotation, value/old economy stocks failed to break out of their previous highs (Chart 1, top panel). We would expect a similar pattern to emerge in the current cycle as the Nasdaq index wobbles. Despite the Nasdaq selloff, oil prices continued to rise until October 2000, and the US median stock had a bumpy ride but made a new high in early 2002 (Chart 2). Chart 1US Equity Rotation In 2000 Chart 2Rotation In 2000: The Nasdaq, Oil And The Median Stock   Overall, as rising US interest rates weigh on growth stocks, the rest of the market can stay in a trading range. Segments with very good fundamentals and cheap valuations could even make new marginal highs. Nevertheless, given the sheer weight of growth stocks in the broad US equity index, it will be hard for the S&P 500 to make new highs when growth stocks wobble. However, a key difference between now and the 2000-2002 market is that back then, US bond yields were falling. Thus, the bear market in the US equity market in general and Nasdaq stocks in particular, occurred alongside falling US bond yields (Chart 3). Currently, the Fed is in a tightening mode and US bond yields are climbing. A rising discount factor is negative for all stocks (Chart 4): It is more negative for high-multiples stocks and less negative for low multiples companies. Chart 3The Nasdaq Bubble Burst Despite Falling Interest Rates Chart 4Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Compression   Another interesting observation about the 2000-2002 bear market is that it occurred despite resilient US consumer spending, and a very robust housing market and credit growth (Chart 5, top two panels). Remarkably, corporate profits collapsed by about 60% even though real GDP barely contracted at all (Chart 5, bottom two panel). We do not predict a similar equity bust this time around. Instead, we are highlighting that US equity valuations and corporate profits can shrink even if US consumer spending does not contract. What happens to costs, profit margins, inflation and interest rates are as important as the consumer spending outlook. To sum up, when the Nasdaq’s bubble began bursting in March of 2000, investors rotated into old economy stocks and the S&P 500 held up well until July of that year. From July onward, the selloff broadened, and the overall US equity indexes entered a bear market. The latter lasted until March 2003. 2. Another episode of extended market rotation occurred in the lead up to and during the 2008 bear market. The US financial/credit crisis in 2007-08 commenced with the selloff in sub-prime securities in March 2007. Corporate spreads began widening, and bank share prices rolled over in June 2007. Next, the S&P 500 and EM stocks peaked in October 2007 (Chart 6). Despite these developments, commodity prices and EM currencies continued to rally until the summer of 2008 when they finally collapsed in the second half of that year (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5US Profits Recession In 2001 Occurred Despite No Economic Recession Chart 6Domino Effect In 2007-08 Clearly, what was initially a rotation out of US cyclicals and financials into commodities and EM eventually proved to be nothing more than part of a domino effect. Again, we are not making the case that the US economy and financial markets are headed into a financial crisis. Our point here is that rotations do occur and can last for a while. Yet, a sustainable bull market in aggregate equity indexes does not emerge until there is a broad-based selloff during which the majority of sectors and bourses drop in absolute terms. Bottom Line: Rotation episodes can last several months. Equity sector and style rotations could prevent the broad equity indexes from plunging but these rotations will not be sufficient to propel the overall stock indexes to new highs. Equity Leadership Changes Occur Around Major Selloffs Having examined these rotation episodes, we can now take a step back and see the big picture: equity leadership rotations typically occur during or after bear markets and/or major corrections in global share prices. Chart 7 illustrates EM relative stock prices versus DM along with the global equity index. Over the past 25 years, there have been several major leadership changes between EM and DM, and all of them coincided with, or were preceded by, either a bear market or a substantial drawdown in global share prices. Chart 7EM Versus DM: Equity Rotations Similarly, the relative performance of global growth versus value stocks often experiences trend reversals during or after selloffs (Chart 8). Chart 8Global Growth Versus Value: Leadership Rotations Finally, secular trend changes in the relative performance of the global tech sector, energy stocks and materials have also occurred during or after drawdowns in global share prices (Chart 9). Chart 9Global Technology, Energy And Materials: Leadership Rotations A word on commodity prices is warranted. We are surprised that industrial metal prices have so far held up well and oil prices have been surging despite China’s slowdown. The culprits behind the rally in resource prices are strong DM demand for commodities and investor purchases of commodities as an inflation hedge. Therefore, it might take investor concerns about US demand and/or a slowdown in global manufacturing to trigger a relapse in commodity prices. Rising US interest rates and a continued US dollar rally will eventually lead to a meaningful drawdown in commodity prices. Yet, the precise timing of this shift is uncertain. Critically, among financial markets, oil prices are often the last to fall and/or rally. Hence, investors should not use oil as a leading indicator for other markets. As to share prices of commodity producers, global materials have rolled over at their previous high (Chart 10, top panel), while energy stocks have surged through multiple technical resistances. However, they now face another technical hurdle (Chart 10, bottom panel). If oil share prices decisively break above this long-term moving average, it would likely signal that they have entered a multi-year bull market. Chart 10Global Energy Stocks And Materials: A Long-Term Profile Bottom Line: Major equity leadership rotations normally occur around bear markets or major corrections. Hence, a major selloff in global stocks is likely before EM, commodities, global cyclicals and value stocks move toward a period of secular outperformance (i.e., a multi-year bull market in absolute and relative terms). Investment Considerations Chart 11EM And US Stocks Relative To The Global Benchmark: No Change In Trend We will contemplate upgrading EM if a broad selloff transpires. In such an equity drawdown, there is a 50% chance that EM may outperform the S&P 500 if the selloff is led by growth stocks, as occurred during the carnage in global stocks in January this year or in the fourth quarter of 2018 (Chart 11, top panel). Yet, the EM overall equity index will underperform Europe and Japan in such a broad-based drawdown. A weaker dollar is essential for EM outperformance. For now, we remain positive on the dollar for the next several months and are hence underweight EM stocks and credit markets versus their DM peers. As to US stocks, the jury is still out on whether their secular outperformance is over. Notably, US share prices relative to the global equity index have rebounded from their 200-day moving average (Chart 11, bottom panel). When such a technical pattern occurs, odds are high that US stocks will make new highs in relative terms. US equities outperforming the rest of the world is not consistent with growth stocks underperforming value ones. Hence, a potential US outperformance represents a risk to our core view that growth stocks will continue underperforming value stocks. How do we reconcile these inconsistencies? It might be that US growth stocks’ recent rebound persists for the next several weeks and they outperform value stocks during this window. In such a case, our equity leadership rotation theme will be delayed. Yet, in this scenario EM stocks will continue underperforming DM ones. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Executive Summary A Floor In Biden’s Approval? Biden’s approval rating is forming a bottom. Democrats will pivot away from Covid-19 to boost the economy and consumer sentiment. While Democrats face a dismal midterm election, Republican infighting could conceivably cost the GOP control of the Senate. Policy uncertainty will rise as the election approaches. Republican infighting is unlikely to affect the outcome in the House of Representatives, although Republicans could lose three-to-nine seats that they might otherwise hold if the party establishment fails to coordinate effectively with former President Trump as we expect. Our tactical trades hinge on Biden’s near-term external risks: the risk of an energy shock that weighs on Treasury yields and pushes up the dollar. Defensives like health care should benefit. Our cyclical recommendations continue to favor cyclical equities such as small cap energy stocks.     Bottom Line: Investors should be tactically prepared for geopolitical risks to push up the dollar and push down Treasury yields in the short run, contrary to the cyclical BCA House View. Feature Has Biden’s Approval Hit The Floor? Probably. President Biden’s net approval rating is still under water at -9%, only slightly better than President Trump’s at this stage in the approach to the 2018 midterm elections. Biden’s handling of the economy receives a lower approval rating, which is dangerous for his party because the economy is likely to be the most important issue in the midterm election, given that the Covid-19 pandemic is waning. If Biden follows the path of his predecessors then his approval rating will trend upward as the midterm approaches. That will not prevent a Republican victory in the House but it could affect the Senate and the size of the Republican majority (Chart of the Week). The latest jobs report saw 467, 000 new jobs created. The labor participation rate grew from 81.9% to 82%, while women’s participation rose from 56.5% to 56.8%. The unemployment rate ticked up from 3.9% to 4%, with the broader U6 measure rising from 7.2% to 7.9%, but the reason was that more workers joined the workforce, which is a good thing for the economy (Chart 1). The Omicron variant of the Covid-19 virus is having little impact so the labor market is continuing to heal, a positive for the Biden administration, which is otherwise struggling. Chart 1A Solid Jobs Report American sentiment about the economy will hinge on inflation. If inflation abates along with the virus then the Democratic Party will be able to pare some losses in the midterms. At the moment the polarization of economic sentiment – divergence based on partisan affiliation – is declining, but for reasons that will give the administration a headache. Democratic sentiment is falling while Republican sentiment is improving (Chart 2). If inflation stays high, Republican sentiment will tick back down and  the public will be increasingly united in a negative view of the president’s economic management. If inflation peaks and rolls over, Democratic sentiment will recover as the election approaches and Republican sentiment will at least not get much worse. Chart 2Economic Sentiment Polarization In Decline For this reason Biden and the Democrats are rapidly pivoting away from Covid-19 and social restrictions and trying to create the “return to normalcy” that failed last year. While they were in the opposition they had an interest in hyping the virus but now they are the incumbents and it is important to show that the pandemic is in the rear-view mirror. With 64% of Americans now vaccinated, and 40% having received booster shots, government social restrictions are likely to become less stringent (Chart 3). The latest data from the service sector will motivate this policy pivot away from the virus. The manufacturing sector improved again last month but the non-manufacturing sector was less upbeat in January. Services activity declined by a whopping 12% in January. It is still above its November 2020 level, when Biden got elected, but only by around 2.2%. The non-manufacturing employment index declined by 4.3% and only stands 0.8% above its November 2020 level. The ratio of new orders to inventories declined by 0.6% in January (Chart 4). Chart 3Democrats To Pivot Away From Covid-19These statistics suggest that the non-manufacturing sector slowed down sharply in January, probably due to omicron and post-Christmas belt tightening. But employers did not let go of a lot of workers, as seen by the discrepancies between business activity and employment. The mostly positive jobs report reinforces this point. The weakness is seen as temporary and employers expect higher demand in coming months. Now that consumer durable spending is running out of steam (at least, excluding cars), consumers are likely to switch to consuming services, as long as services are open for them to consume. There is little reason to think restrictions will stay tight, given the political points cited above. Even in Europe the Covid “hawks” are loosening controls. Chart 4Democrats Want To Boost Service Sector All that being said, the Biden administration has limited ability to control inflation that emanates from foreign supply shocks (e.g. Asia, Russia, Iran). Also voter perceptions of inflation will lag, even if inflation starts to abate. Crime and immigration will also weigh on the administration this fall. And the political clockwork favoring the opposition in midterm elections is remorseless. Bottom Line: Biden and the Democrats are likely to shift policy focus away from emphasis on the pandemic, which weighs on the service sector and employment, and instead pursue other policy options in preparation for the midterm election. The outlook is not positive but if Biden’s approval rating bottoms then Democrats’ chances of performing better in the midterm elections will rise and policy uncertainty will also rise. Will GOP Infighting Affect The Midterms? Maybe In The Senate Former President Trump clashed with former Vice President Mike Pence and others in the Republican Party over whether Pence had the right “to change the Presidential Election results” in 2020 by refusing to validate electoral college votes from states in which electoral fraud was alleged. Pence called the idea “un-American” and reiterated his position that the vice president has no “unilateral authority” to discard a state’s electoral votes while certifying the electoral count.1 Trump lashed out because moderate Republicans are flirting with Democrats over how to pass a bipartisan revision to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, which left a number of ambiguities in the US electoral process, including about the vice president’s role in election certification. It is conceivable that the law will be revised in time for the 2024 election but odds are against a quick solution: the original law took 10 years to pass. Throughout the 2022-24 election cycle, Trump will continue to clash with his party, which raises the single greatest risk to Republicans: that they will be too divided to capitalize fully on the Democrats’ weaknesses. We do not expect Trump to coordinate effectively with Republicans. His interest in revolutionizing the political establishment and winning a second term in 2024 diverges from the interest of the traditional Republicans, who want to preserve the political establishment with themselves on top, and want a fresh face to contend for eight years in the White House in 2024. However, Trump controls a plurality of the party’s grassroots voters (about 54%2 according to opinion polls) so that the Republican Party cannot afford to spurn him. If Trump were willing to cooperate with party leaders, then he would have cooperated when it mattered most: ahead of the Georgia special elections on January 5, 2020. If he had recognized the constitutional supremacy of the electoral college vote, he might have saved Republican control of the Senate. He did not, so the burden of proof falls on those who say that Trump can coordinate effectively with the Republican Party at critical junctures. Most likely the party will continue to play both sides, keeping Trump in the party but seeking a post-Trump future. Trump will continue to pursue the Republican nomination in 2024 and the party will have to acquiesce to him as long as he retains the support of a majority of the party’s grassroots. Trump’s conflict with the party will flare up in the primary elections this spring because Trump will endorse his own favorite candidates regardless of whether the Republican establishment agrees and views them as the most likely to win. Any success of Trump-backed populists in the primaries may become a liability for Republicans in the general election if the seat is competitive and the Democrats put up a moderate candidate. This point is primarily relevant in the Senate: Five Senate Republicans are stepping down, leaving an open competition in Alabama, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (Table 1). The last three of these (NC, OH, PA) are competitive seats, especially if the Republican candidate is weak and Biden’s approval revives by the time of the vote. Trump has only made an endorsement in North Carolina, where his candidate is far from assured to win. Given that control of the Senate could hang on a single seat, it is at least possible that Trump’s split with the GOP could affect the Senate balance of power in 2023-24. Table 1Senate Incumbents Not Seeking Re-Election, 2022 Trump will also have an impact on the House of Representatives but he is less likely to affect the outcome of the midterm there, given that Republicans are likely to win 40 seats when they only need five to take control. There are a lot more Democrats retiring from the House than Republicans in this cycle, a positive indication for Republicans (Chart 5). In total there are 48 competitive seats (13 Republican-leaning, 22 Democrat-leaning, and 13 toss-up).3 Of these 48 competitive seats, 12 seats are “open” (no incumbent), divided evenly among Republicans and Democrats. In most of these competitive seats, but especially in Democrat-leaning seats and toss-up seats, a Trump-backed Republican will have a harder time winning than a traditional Republican.  All ten Republicans who voted to impeach President Trump after the January 6 rebellion are vulnerable to Trump challengers (Table 2). Three are already retiring. Given that Wyoming Representative Liz Cheney won her seat by a 44% margin, and yet is polling poorly relative to her Trump-backed challenger, it is fair to say that all seven of the remaining Republican impeachers are vulnerable to a Trumpist challenge. Of these, the general election could be competitive in five seats, i.e. those held by John Katko (R, NY-24), David Valadao (R, CA-21), Peter Meijer (R, MI-3), Fred Upton (R, MI-6), and Jaime Herrera Beutler (R, WA-3). However, given that the national tide does not favor the Democrats, five seats is the maximum that Democrats could poach from this group of lawmakers due to Republican infighting (three is a more likely number).   Chart 5House Members Not Seeking Re-Election, 2022 Table 2House Republicans Who Voted To Impeach President Trump More broadly there are 21 moderate Republicans in the House whose seats could be vulnerable to intra-party struggle (Table 3): So far President Trump has only endorsed candidates in seats which Republicans are highly likely to win anyway: namely Beth Van Duyne (R, TX-24), Mario Diaz-Balart (R, FL-25), and Carlos Gimenez (R, FL-26). But as the primary heats up, Trump’s endorsements could cause more tension with the Republican Party machinery.  The following six moderate Republicans’ seats could be at risk: Maria Elvira Salazar (R, FL-27), Rodney Davis (R, IL-13), Jeff Van Drew (R, NJ-2), Andrew Garbarino (R, NY-2), Mike Turner (R, OH-10), and Brian Fitzpatrick (R, PA-1). Of these, Fitzpatrick and Garbarino do not face any challengers yet, and only Davis faces a Trump-backed challenger. So six is the maximum Democrats could steal while one-to-three vulnerable seats is more likely. Table 3Republican Moderates Vulnerable To Populist Challengers Summing up, the Republican Party could fail to retain three-to-nine Republican seats that they might otherwise win in this cycle. Previously we put the number at five-to-nine seats.   These numbers do not include any Democratic-leaning seats that Republicans could fail to poach if they choose a populist candidate who is not competitive in a “purple” state or district. In conclusion, Republican infighting will not prevent Republicans from retaking the House of Representatives this fall. Cyclical factors in favor of Republicans will overwhelm their internal differences. But infighting could leave them with a smaller majority than consensus expects. In 2024 Republican internal divisions will become much more important than in 2022. A competitive Republican primary election for president will reduce Republican odds in the general election. If President Trump fails to win the nomination, he could defect and form his party. If he wins the nomination, Liz Cheney or another traditional Republican could defect and run as a third party, acting as a spoiler. Given the tight margins of victory in presidential elections, even a splinter group could steal enough votes to determine the outcome. The midterms will shed light on the depth of GOP divisions but in general these divisions reinforce our view that while Democrats will perform poorly in the midterms, they are still favored to retain the White House in 2024. Bottom Line: While the odds are stacked against Democrats in the midterms, Republican infighting could affect several Senate seats and will subtract anywhere from three-to-nine seats from expected seat gains in the House. While control of the House will not be affected, it is conceivable that control of the Senate could hang in the balance. Policy uncertainty will rise if Republican infighting makes Senate races more competitive later this year. Housekeeping To conclude we offer a few remarks on our outstanding investment recommendations: Cyclically Long Energy Small Caps: US energy production is rising in keeping with global oil and commodity prices. West Texas Intermediate crude sells for $89 per barrel on the spot market, inventories are drawing, OPEC 2.0 is intact, and there are plenty of supply risks on the horizon. American natural gas exports are picking up but not enough to meet demand if conflict in Ukraine causes a European shortage, while US oil exports are falling (Chart 6). Chart 6US Energy Production Picking Up Evidence from initial unemployment claims in O&G-dependent states like North Dakota and Wyoming suggests that shale producers need more time to ramp up production (Chart 7), as highlighted by our Commodity Strategist Bob Ryan.  Small cap energy stocks have not benefited much from the sharp spike in energy prices this year. We see this as an opportunity, given that US small caps are insulated from geopolitical troubles and will become key players if shortages occur (Chart 8). The risk comes if the supply response overwhelms the supply disruptions, as occurred in 2014 – but oil companies were in a much better position to surge production at that time. The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran also appeared more durable at that time than it will this year if it is rejoined, and there is no guarantee it will be rejoined. Cyclically Long Infrastructure Stocks: Infrastructure stocks peaked along with the equity market and in the wake of the Biden administration’s $550 billion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which is now being implemented. Indicators of infrastructure construction peaked in late 2020 and early 2021 and are slipping of late. But as long as the economy does not relapse into recession they should stabilize, especially as the virus wanes and global demand recovers (Chart 9). Cyclically Long Cyber-Security Stocks: Global threats, proxied by the Canadian dollar’s exchange rate with the Russian ruble, suggest that cyber security stocks will rebound after getting caught up in the current tech selloff (Chart 10). Tech stocks are also likely to bounce if inflation expectations peak as the Federal Reserve kicks into action.     Chart 7It Takes Time To Boost Shale Output Chart 8US Small Caps Yet To Benefit From Oil Price Chart 9Buy The Dip In Infrastructure Stocks Chart 10Cyber Stocks A 'Buy' In Tech Selloff Investment Takeaways Chart 11A Floor In Biden’s Approval? US financial markets do not care about the midterm elections in the near term but that will change as policy uncertainty will rise over the course of the year. A bottom in Biden’s approval rating (Chart 11) and Republican primary election infighting both suggest that the Democratic Party’s odds in the midterms will improve going forward, raising policy uncertainty, especially over the Senate. Midterm uncertainty typically works in favor of the US dollar, Treasuries, defensive equity sectors, and growth stocks. As such it poses a risk to current market trends. The recent selloff in Big Tech confirms what we have argued since we launched the US Political Strategy: the tech sector faces a slow boil from inflation and rising interest, which are more immediate threats than government regulation. Having said that, we favor growth versus value on a tactical basis as we expect the dollar to rise and Treasury yields to fall on the back of geopolitical risks in the near term (Chart 12).  Chart 12A Tactical Bounce For Tech Stocks?   Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     See Vice President Michael R. Pence’s letter, dated January 6, 2021, available at “Read Pence’s full letter saying he can’t claim ‘unilateral authority’ to reject electoral votes,” PBS, pbs.org. See also Mychael Schnell, “Trump says he wanted Pence to overturn election, eyes effort to reform law,” January 31, 2022, and Brett Samuels, “Pence breaks with Trump: ‘I had no right to overturn the election,’” February 4, 2022, thehill.com. 2     Please see “Over half of Americans believe the country's economy is headed in the wrong direction,” Ipsos, December 29, 2021, Ipsos.com 3    See Cook Political Report, “2022 House Race Ratings,” February 8, 2022, cookpolitical.com.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)   Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets