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Highlights The recent tightening in U.S. monetary conditions increases the risk of a pause in the dollar bull market. The yen is in a strong cyclical bear market, but it is best placed to benefit from a dollar correction. The ECB just eased policy; monetary divergences between the euro area and the U.S. will only grow wider, hurting the cyclical prospects for EUR/USD. We are opening a short EUR/JPY tactical trade. The SNB's EUR/CHF floor is firmly in place. USD/CHF will continue to mirror EUR/USD until Switzerland's output gap is fully closed. Feature The dollar will make new cyclical highs against all currencies, but the short-term outlook for the greenback is poor. The 7% appreciation in the dollar and the 100 basis point move in 10-year Treasury yields have tightened U.S. monetary conditions considerably. This development would be manageable in the face of actual stimulus, but it is a much greater handicap when the economy has not yet received any shot in the arm. Tactically, the yen is well positioned to benefit from a dollar correction as the ECB just deepened its easing bias. The Dollar Faces Short-Term Headwinds The dollar is extremely overbought, as our Capitulation Index warns of an imminent correction (Chart I-1). The likelihood that the dollar weakens further around the Fed's meeting is growing. Our discounter suggests the market is already expecting rates to be 60 basis points higher a year from now. While we do think this hurdle will ultimately be beaten, the move has been too fast. The U.S. economy has surprised to the upside, a reality highlighted by the strong rebound in the U.S. surprise index. However, this development is backward looking. While the economy has yet to receive the benefit of the potential Trump stimulus, it still has to contend with large adjustments in financial variables. Take mortgage rates as an example. They have risen by 70 basis points since July to 4%; however federal income tax withholdings - a proxy for income growth - have plunged (Chart I-2). Falling income growth and rising financing costs create a major tightening of U.S. household financial conditions. Chart I-1Overbought Dollar Chart I-2Tightening The Screw On Households On the corporate front, while the ISMs paint a very upbeat picture, the shock from the dollar's surge is large. The 7% increase in the broad trade-weighted dollar since August could curtail profits growth by 15%. This could lead to additional weakness in capex and a slowdown in employment. Altogether, based on the Fed FRB model, the recent interest rate and dollar moves could shave 1% from GDP over the next 8 quarters. This is not a trivial amount when trend growth is around 1.5%. This reality is unsustainable. As such, we agree with our U.S. Bond Strategy service that a temporary pullback in yields is likely. As we argued three weeks ago, this would mean a correction in the overbought dollar.1 Ultimately, this correction should prove temporary. The U.S. economy was on a strong footing before liquidity conditions tightened. A reversal of the recent dollar and bond moves will only solidify this economic trend. And exactly as the economy's strength redoubles, Trump's fiscal stimulus will take shape. The timing of this development is uncertain. Our current bet is that this will happen in late Q1 2017. Once our Composite Capacity Utilization Gauge moves back into "no-slack" territory, the market's now-premature Fed pricing will be warranted (Chart I-3). This is when the USD can rise again. Chart I-3Conditions For Repricing The Fed: Almost There Bottom Line: The dollar is in the midst of a cyclical bull market. However, markets rarely move in a straight line. This time is not different. The recent surge in the dollar and bond yields hurt the very fundamentals that have supported these moves in the first place. With the pain being inflicted on the economy before the benefits of any Trump stimulus package are felt, the likelihood of a partial reversal of recent trends is growing. The Yen: A Vehicle To Play A Dollar Correction The yen should be the key beneficiary of a dollar counter-trend fall. Our yen Capitulation Index shows that USD/JPY has not been as overbought as it is now in 21 years (Chart I-4). Moreover, bond yields continue to correlate tightly with the yen (Chart I-5). This simply reflects the low beta of Japanese yields. When global rates move up, JGB yields rise less, implying widening rate differentials in favor of USD/JPY. The opposite is also true. Chart I-4Yen Is Massively Oversold Chart I-5Yen And Bonds: Brothers In Arms While we continue to hold our short USD/JPY tactical trade, we remain very worried over the long-term outlook for the yen. The old policy of the Bank of Japan, targeting the quantity of money, was a failure. The monetary base increased by 220% between December 2012 and today, but M2 only grew 15% or so. In effect, the BoJ changed the composition of Japanese money, skewing it toward bank reserves as the money multiplier collapsed by 65% (Chart I-6). However, the new policy of targeting the price of money - interest rates - should deliver a higher growth dividend. As the economy improves, inflation expectations perk up (Chart I-7). But with the BoJ keeping nominal rates capped near 0%, this depresses real rates, further stimulating the economy and boosting inflation expectations. This also hurts the yen. Chart I-6Targeting The Quantity Of ##br##Money Was A Failure Chart I-7Stronger Japan = Higher##br## Inflation Expectations\ Additionally, by capping JGB yields at 0%, the BoJ accentuates the upward pressure on yield differentials between the rest of the globe and Japan that naturally occurs when global yields move up. This means that an upward move in global rates is even more harmful to the yen than before. Finally, the Abe administration is ramping up its fiscal stimulus rhetoric as the job-opening-to-applicants-ratio hits its highest level since 1991. Stimulating the economy in the face of labor market tightness is inflationary. With the BoJ committing to an accommodative policy stance until inflation overshoots by a wide margin, this policy is tantamount to willingly crush real rates and the yen.2 Bottom Line: The yen cyclical bear market is intact. However, if the dollar corrects and Treasurys temporarily rally, the extremely oversold yen will be the prime beneficiary. The Euro: This Is Not Tapering Mario Draghi managed to please both the hawks and the doves on the ECB's governing council. But once the dust settles, this week's policy move represents an important easing. While the ECB's purchases will be curtailed to EUR60 billion from EUR80 billion in April 2017, the asset purchase program now has an unlimited time frame. Additionally, not only can the ECB buy securities with a maturity of 1-year, the -40 basis-point floor on eligible securities has been scrapped. The staff forecasts reinforced a dovish message. Inflation expectations have been revised down, from 1.6% to 1.3% in 2017, despite an acknowledgement that energy prices will positively contribute to inflation. Furthermore, when a journalist asked President Draghi if the 2019 HICP forecast of 1.7% was in line with the ECB's target of "close but under 2%", Draghi squarely responded that 1.7% was not within the target; and therefore, the ECB would persist in maintaining its monetary accommodation. Moreover, the market responded with all the signs that the ECB had eased policy. The yield curve steepened by 11 basis points - its sharpest daily move since mid-2015, the euro plunged 1.3%, and European stocks, led by financials, rallied. With regards to the economic outlook, recent survey data have improved, with eurozone manufacturing and service PMIs rising to 53.7 and 53.8, respectively. However, worrying signs highlight the persistence of the euro area output gap. Euro area core CPI has rolled over and wage growth is slowing, despite the falling unemployment rate (Chart I-8). Additionally, broad money supply growth has rolled over sharply, seconding the omen bank equities have flashed for future credit growth (Chart I-9). Therefore, the European credit impulse could wane in the coming quarters. Chart I-8European Labor Market Slack Is Evident ##br##Signs Of European Excessive Slack Chart I-9Money, It's ##br##A Crime Going forward, monetary divergence between the euro area and the U.S. will grow further, supporting our bearish EUR/USD stance and our bullish dollar view. We are closing our long EUR/AUD trade as the ECB is clearly bent on goosing the European economy. Tactically, the outlook is much trickier and the euro could rebound. The euro capitulation index is oversold and relative positioning between the EUR and the USD is skewed (Chart I-10). For now, we are expressing our negative view on the euro by shorting EUR/JPY. Being in place since late September, the dovish implications of the BoJ's policy are much better appreciated by the market than the recent ECB's move. Moreover, short-term technicals for EUR/JPY are stretched and are beginning to roll over (Chart I-11). A pull back in EUR/JPY toward 116.5 is likely. Chart I-10Euro: Oversold... Chart I-11...But Overbought Against The Yen Bottom Line: The ECB eased policy this week. With the European economy exhibiting fewer signs of an impending pickup in inflation than the U.S., monetary divergences between the Fed and the ECB will only grow wider in the future. This will weigh on EUR/USD. In the short-term, risks to the USD could help the euro. Thus, we elect to express our bearish view on the euro by shorting EUR/JPY for now. The Swiss Franc: A Floor Is A Floor The SNB unofficial floor below EUR/CHF 1.06 is firmly in place. The Swiss economy sports a negative output gap of around 2.5% of GDP according to the IMF and OECD. Even after recent improvements, headline and core CPI remain below 0%. Both nominal and real Swiss retail sales are contracting at a 2.5% annual pace. This fits with wage growing near 0%, with consumer confidence hovering near levels last registered when the euro crisis was raging, and with house price annual growth falling to 1%. Unsurprisingly, Swiss business confidence is below its post-crisis average and business investment is tepid. In line with this poor corporate and consumer backdrop, Swiss non-financial credit growth has fallen to near 0% - among the lowest readings in the past 20 years, and the money multiplier remains depressed (Chart I-12). This suggests that the output gap will continue to narrow only slowly. Interestingly, the outlook for Switzerland was on a definite upswing in 2014, but the botched CHF unpegging of January 2015 caused the economic relapse witnessed in 2015 and 2016. With Swiss stocks - financials and exporters particularly - underperforming global averages, financial markets are still flashing a red flag for the SNB. This means USD/CHF will continue to mirror EUR/USD. Moreover, positioning on the CHF is at oversold extremes, highlighting the risk of a correction in USD/CHF (Chart I-13). Chart I-12No Credit Growth In Zurich Chart I-13Swissie Is Oversold On a structural basis, the outlook for the CHF is much brighter. The Swiss economy will firm as the SNB keeps the EUR/CHF floor in place. Employment growth is strong, real exports are healthy, and financial as well as monetary conditions are very supportive. Money supply should ultimately pick up. The SNB is expanding its balance sheet through the reserve accumulation required to maintain the peg. In due time, inflationary pressures and wage growth will re-emerge in Switzerland. In terms of signal, once we see Swiss inflation and wage growth back above 1%, as well as non-financial private-credit growth moving back to its post-2010 average, the SNB should abandon its peg. Supported by a net international investment position of 120% of GDP and a current account surplus of 11% of GDP, the long-term equilibrium exchange rate for CHF will continue to rise, lifting the Swiss franc in the process (Chart I-14). Chart I-14The CHF Has A Long Term Positive Bias Additionally, the inflationary consequences of Trump's policies may take time to emerge, but U.S. inflation could rise markedly when the USD cyclical rally ends.3 Because Switzerland is structurally a low-inflation economy and a net creditor to the world, the long-term appeal of the Swiss franc will only increase. Bottom Line: The SNB unofficial floor under EUR/CHF is alive as the Swiss economy still exhibits deflationary tendencies. On a 12-18 months basis, USD/CHF will move higher as the CHF will be dragged down by EUR/USD. Structurally, the Swiss franc will become a buy only once the SNB abandons its current policy. We are monitoring inflation, wages, and credit growth to judge when this will become a reality. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "One Trade To Rule Them All", dated November 18, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 For a more detailed discussion of the BoJ's policy, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "How Do You Say "Whatever It Takes" In Japanese?", dated September 23, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Trump: No Nixon Redux", dated December 2, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The dollar rose substantially on Thursday after the ECB policy decision. Before this, DXY had already hit overbought levels, as shown by the RSI. Currently, the capitulation index is also in overbought territory, suggesting that a correction is to come. Moreover, it is likely that the market had overpriced Trump's fiscal proposals, as details have yet to be released. The U.S. economy remains strong for now. The ISM Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing hit 53.2 and 57.2, respectively. The labor market remains healthy despite the recent disappointing job reports. However, the tightening in U.S. financial conditions represents a short-term hurdle. Report Links: Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Reaganomics 2.0? - November 11, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro encountered significant volatility following the ECB's decision. Although the interest rates were left unchanged, the ECB put forth an extension of the asset purchase program (APP) at the current pace of EUR 80 billion, but plan to reduce purchases to EUR 60 billion by April 2017. The euro declined on the news, and on a possible increase of the purchases if "the outlook becomes less favorable". Recent data reflects a strong economy overall, as well as strong performances from its participants. This will limit the euro's downside. However, the euro may encounter some volatility in the long run as potential political risks begin to be priced in, and stimulating monetary policy continues. Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 The oversold U.S. bond market is finally stabilizing, a development that has also put a halt on the rapid yen sell-off of the past month, with USD/JPY encountering resistance at around 114.5. We are of the view that then yen downturn is overdone, as USD/JPY currently stands at highly overbought levels. That being said we continue to reiterate that past the short term, the outlook for the yen remains extremely bearish. The BoJ will continue to implement radical measures until it sees any signs of life in Japanese inflation. Recent data suggest this is not likely to happen any time soon: Japanese consumer confidence continues to be very depressed, standing at 40.9. Japanese GDP grew by a measly 1.3% YoY in Q3, underperforming expectations. Industrial production continues to contract, declining by 1.3%. Report Links: Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP/USD has rallied by about 4% from its end of October lows, being the best performer against the U.S. dollar among G10 currencies in this time period, in part because the U.K. economy has consistently beaten expectations. Nevertheless, recent data has been a mixed bag: while both construction PMI and Markit Services PMI outperformed expectations, Industrial and manufacturing production underperformed them, contracting by 1.1% and 0.4% respectively. We have often pointed to the cable as an attractive buy given that it is very cheap and fears of a significant slowdown in the British economy have been overblown. However it is important to point out that at levels near 1.30 the pound is no longer such a bargain, as the potentially damaging effects of Brexit still have to be taken into account. Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data paint a dull picture for the Australian economy, the most concerning of which is the quarterly contraction in GDP of -0.5%, and an annual growth of 1.8%, below expectations of 2.5%. Before GDP was published, the RBA left its cash rate unchanged at 1.5% on the basis of a weak labor market and poor investment prospects. With only part-time employment growing, and full-time employment contracting, it is unlikely that this growth will translate into improving consumer spending or inflation. RBA Governor Philip Lowe also highlighted that tightening monetary conditions and uncertainty have subdued business investment. We remain bearish on the AUD. The recent GDP figures may also cause the RBA to become slightly dovish in the future if data does not compensate for current weaknesses. Report Links: One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 We continue to be bearish on the kiwi on the short term, given that dollar strength will continue to weigh on this currency. That being said, some factors make this currency attractive against its crosses. While it is true that inflation is very low, this is mostly due the price of tradable goods falling by 2.1% YoY, which reflects the fall in commodity prices. Non-tradable inflation on the other hand stands at a healthy 2.4%. With base effects taking hold, inflation should pick up again, a development which could put upward pressure on rates and support the NZD on its crosses. Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Fed is Trapped Under Ice - September 9, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Canada's export sector has recently come into light as a factor hurting the economy. Although export figures for October increased by 0.5% on a monthly basis, this reflected a 1.2% increase in energy export prices offsetting a 0.7% decline in volume, and this was despite a stronger U.S. economy and a weaker CAD. Recent news highlights that Mexico has overtaken Canada as the second biggest exporter of goods to the U.S, reflecting rising Canadian unit labor costs and declining productivity, as well as the recent appreciation in CAD/MXN. Domestically, Canada continues to be mired by a bleak outlook. Wednesday's monetary policy statement highlights that uncertainty and tightening monetary conditions are hampering business confidence and investment. The BoC, therefore, kept rates unchanged at 0.5%. Rate divergences will lift USD/CAD. Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 USD/CHF will continue to mirror the Euro as the unofficial peg by the SNB is likely to stay enforced. The Swiss economy continues to be plagued by deflationary pressures. Additionally, Switzerland's real retail sales continue to contract by 2.5%YoY, while wage growth remains at 0% and consumer confidence is hovering near 2010/2011 lows. The SNB will try to avoid their 2015 blunder, where they unpegged the currency, and derailed the economic recovery that Switzerland was experiencing. On a longer time basis the outlook for the franc is very positive. This currency continues to be supported by a current account surplus of 11% of GDP and monetary conditions are as accommodative as they can be, which means that eventually SNB will have to break the floor under EUR/CHF, letting the Swiss Franc follow rising fair value. Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 We are bearish on the NOK versus the dollar, yet we are positive on this currency on its crosses, as oil should outperform other commodities. Moreover, Norway is the only country in the G10 where inflation is above target, which should put pressure on the Norges Bank to abandon its easing bias. The housing sector is also in dire need of higher rates. However, a big portion of household indebtedness in Norway is in adjustable rate mortgages. As house prices and household debt keeps rising, rising rates will become more dangerous as an ever larger pool of fragile debt would be at risks. Thus, it is imperative for the Norges Bank to not keep monetary policy too accommodative for too long in order to avoid further excess in household debt and in the housing market. This will eventually prove bullish for the NOK. Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Despite recent resilience in the consumer sector, a risk is looming. Rising house prices and increased mortgages have become a notable issue, as Riksbank research points out. Low rates have allowed households to finance their mortgages at a low cost and markets are worrying about household indebtedness, with around 35% of new borrowers burdened with debt above 650% of their disposable income, according to an IMF study. This may be a potential danger as consumers substitute consumption for debt-servicing, limiting the upside for Swedish interest rates. In the short run, the outlook remains more upbeat for the SEK as the dollar will swap overbought optimism for economic reality. But longer term, USD/SEK has more upside. Report Links: One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights ECB QE has pushed the euro area's Target2 banking imbalance to an all-time high. Thereby, QE has raised the cost of euro break-up. The ECB must dial down QE because the Target2 banking imbalance is directly related to the size of asset purchases. Core euro area sovereign bonds offer poor relative value in the government bond universe. Long Italian BTPs / short French OATs is now appropriate as a tactical position. Italian bank investors might have to suffer more pain before Brussels ultimately allows a public rescue. Feature "We've eliminated fragmentation in the euro area." Mario Draghi, speaking on October 20, 2016 Mario Draghi is wrong. QE was meant to reduce economic and financial fragmentation within the euro area. But in one important regard, it has done the exact opposite. In an un-fragmented monetary union, banking system liquidity would be spread evenly across the euro area. Unfortunately, the trillions of euros of QE liquidity created by the ECB has concentrated in four northern European countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Finland (but interestingly, not France). This extreme fragmentation is captured in the euro area's Target2 banking imbalance (Box I-1), which is now at an all-time high (Chart of the Week). Box 1: What Is Target2? Target2 stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. It is the settlement system for euro payment flows between banks in the euro area. These payment flows result from trade or financial transactions such as deposit transfers, sales of financial assets or debt repayments. If the banking system in one member country has more payment inflows than outflows, its national central bank (NCB) accrues a Target2 asset vis-à-vis the ECB. Conversely, if the banking system has more outflows than inflows, the respective NCB accrues a Target2 liability. Target2 balances therefore show the cumulative net payment flows within the euro area. Chart of the WeekQE Has Pushed The Euro Area's Target2 Imbalance To An All-Time High To be absolutely clear, this geographical polarization of bank liquidity is not deposit flight in the strictest sense (Chart I-2). Investors are simply using the ECB's €80bn of monthly bond purchases to offload their Italian, Spanish and Portuguese bonds to the central bank, and hold the received cash in banks in perceived haven countries. Nevertheless, ECB QE has unwittingly facilitated a geographical polarization of bank liquidity more extreme than in the darkest days of 2012 (Chart I-3). Chart I-2No Funding Stresses At The Moment Chart I-3Target2 Imbalances Are The Result Of QE QE Has Exposed Euro Area Banking Fragmentation To understand how this polarization has arisen, it is necessary to grasp how Eurosystem accounting works. The following section is necessarily technical, but stick with it because it is important. The ECB delegates its QE sovereign bond purchases to the respective national central bank (NCB): the Bundesbank buys German bunds, the Bank of France buys OATs, the Bank of Italy buys BTPs, and so on. When the Bank of Italy buys a BTP from, say, an Italian investor, the investor gives up the bond, but simultaneously receives a corresponding asset - cash. If the investor then deposits this cash at an Italian bank, say Unicredit, then Unicredit would have a new liability - the investor deposit. But in line with Eurosystem accounting, Unicredit would simultaneously receive a corresponding credit at its NCB, the Bank of Italy.1 Completing the accounting circle, the Bank of Italy would now have a new liability - the Unicredit claim, but it would also have a corresponding asset - the BTP that it has just bought. Therefore, all three accounts would be in perfect balance (see Figure I-1). Figure I-1Italian Investor Sells A BTP To The Bank Of Italy And Deposits The Cash At Unicredit Now consider what happens if the Italian investor deposits the cash not at Unicredit, but at a German bank, say Commerzbank. In this case, it would be the Bundesbank that had a new liability - the Commerzbank claim. However, the Bundesbank would not have a corresponding asset. Conversely, the Bank of Italy would have a new asset - the BTP, but without a corresponding liability. In order to balance these Eurosystem accounts, the Bundesbank would accrue a Target2 asset vis-à-vis the ECB, while the Bank of Italy would accrue an equal and opposite Target2 liability (see Figure I-2). Figure I-2Italian Investor Sells A BTP To The Bank Of Italy And Deposits The Cash At Commerzbank Essentially, the Target2 imbalance captures the mismatch between a Bundesbank liability denominated in 'German' euros and a corresponding Bank of Italy asset denominated in 'Italian' euros. Aggregated over the whole euro area, these imbalances now amount to more than €1 trillion. Does any of this Eurosystem accounting gymnastics really matter? No, as long as the monetary union holds together and the 'German' euro equals the 'Italian' euro. But if Germany and Italy started using different currencies, then suddenly the Target2 imbalances would matter enormously. This is because the Bundesbank liability to Commerzbank would be redenominated into Deutschemarks, while the Bank of Italy asset would be redenominated into lira. Hence, the ECB might end up with much larger liabilities than assets. In which case, any shortfall would have to be borne by the ECB's shareholders - essentially, euro area member states pro-rata to GDP. The ECB Must Dial Down QE Unlike in the depths of the euro debt crisis, the current Target2 imbalances do not reflect deposit flight. Rather, they are the direct result of ECB QE. Nonetheless, the indisputable fact is that QE has increased the cost of euro break-up. And another six or more months of QE will just add to this cost. Some people might argue that by increasing the cost of a divorce, an actual split becomes less likely. But this reasoning is weak. As we have seen in this year's polling victories for Brexit and President-elect Trump, the biggest risk comes from a populist backlash against the status quo. And populist backlashes do not stop to do detailed cost benefit analysis. Although the ECB is unlikely to broadcast the unintended side-effects of its policy, it must be acutely aware that the costs of QE are rising while its benefits are diminishing. Given that the Target2 imbalances are directly related to the size of asset purchases, the ECB needs to indicate its intention to dial down QE purchases. And if it does need to loosen policy again in the future, it might be better off emulating the Bank of Japan - in targeting a yield rather than an asset purchase amount. The 6-9 month investment implication is that core euro area sovereign bonds offer poor relative value in the government bond universe. And within the core euro area, perhaps French OATs offer the least relative value. OATs are priced as haven sovereign bonds, yet interestingly Target2 imbalances suggest that banking liquidity flows do not regard France as a haven in the same way as Germany (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4French OATs Are Priced ##br##As Haven Bonds... Chart I-5...But Banking Liquidity Flows Do Not ##br##Regard France As A Haven Another implication is that the euro should be stable or stronger against a basket of other developed economy currencies. Indeed, expect euro/pound to lurch up in the first half of next year when the U.K. government triggers Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to formally begin Brexit negotiations. Only then will the EU27 reveal its own negotiating strategy, and it is highly unlikely to be a sweet deal for the U.K. Italian Referendum Result: A Postscript The financial markets have shrugged off the Italian public's resounding "no" to constitutional reform, and rightly so. The current constitution, created in the aftermath of the Second World was designed to prevent a repeat of a populist like Benito Mussolini gaining power. Irrespective of whether the next General Election is in 2017 or 2018, the no vote actually reduces political tail-risk. A tactical position that is long Italian BTPs and short French OATs is now appropriate. As we discussed last week in Italy: Asking The Wrong Question the bigger issue is how Italy will unburden its banks of its non-performing loans (NPLs). Monte de Paschi's efforts at raising equity are baby steps in the right direction. But Monte de Paschi's €23 billion of sour loans2 are just the tip of Italy' NPL iceberg, which sizes up at €320 billion in gross terms and €170 billion net of provisions. These numbers, expressed as a share of GDP, show striking parallels with peak NPLs in Spain's banking system (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Spain ultimately unburdened its banks with a government bailout. Italy may have to do the same. But this will require Brussels to let Italy bend the EU's new bail-in rules for troubled and failing banks. Chart I-6Spain Unburdened Its Banks ##br##With A Government Bailout... Chart I-7...Italy May Ultimately##br## Do The Same The danger for investors is that Italian bank equity and bond holders might have to suffer more pain before Brussels relents. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Unicredit and all other commercial banks use their accounts at their NCLs to make interbank payments. 2 MPS NPLs amount to €45bn in gross terms and €23bn net of provisions. Fractal Trading Model* Bucking the synchronized sell-off in global bonds, Greek sovereign bonds have actually rallied strongly in the last three months. But this rally could be near exhaustion, warranting a countertrend position. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-8 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Global Duration: Global bond yields, pushed higher since July on the back of improving global growth and rising inflation, have now overshot to the upside on excessive expectations of U.S. fiscal stimulus. Take profits on bearish bond positions and increase portfolio duration exposure to at-benchmark on a tactical basis until the oversold conditions unwind. 2017 Global Yield Curve Expectations: The recent steepening of government bond yield curves across the developed markets should soon begin to fade, leading to a more diverse evolution of curves during the course of 2017: steeper in the U.S., core Europe and in Japan (at the long end), flatter in the U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. U.K. Inflation Protection: Take profits on our recommended U.K. inflation trades (overweight inflation-linked bonds and CPI swaps), in response to the recent stability of the Pound and signs that the Bank of England is shifting in a more hawkish direction. Feature Time To Tactically Take Profits On Short Duration Positions Investors have been reminded over the past few months that boring old bonds, just like equities, can generate painful losses when prices disconnect from fundamentals. Back on July 19, we moved to a below-benchmark stance on overall portfolio duration, as we noted that government bonds across the developed markets had reached an overbought extreme despite improving trends in global growth and inflation (Chart of the Week).1 Bonds have sold off smartly since, with benchmark 10-year government yields in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan rising +88bps, +60bps, +36bps, +27bps respectively. The popular market narrative is that the latest leg of the bond selloff is a direct result of Donald Trump winning the White House. This raised investor awareness to the bond-bearish implications of a protectionist U.S. president looking to provide a fiscal kick to an economy already at full employment. The reality, however, is that global bond yields troughed a full four months before the U.S. elections on the back of a better global growth picture. It is quite possible that the latest bump in yields would have happened even if Trump did not win the election. Rising industrial commodity prices, happening in the face of a strengthening U.S. dollar that typically dampens prices, also suggest that bond yields have been responding more to faster realized growth and inflation and less to future expected fiscal stimulus (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekGlobal Bonds##br## Are Oversold Chart 2Stronger Growth Has ##br## Pushed Yields Higher Looking ahead, if the global economy evolves as we expect, with growth continuing to look relatively robust and inflation continuing to grind higher, then yields have even more upside in 2017. However, bonds now appear deeply oversold amid highly bearish sentiment. U.S. Treasury yields, in particular, have overshot the fair value estimates from our models (Chart 3). Also, this week's ECB meeting is unlikely to provide any bearish surprises for bond investors, as the ECB will likely extend the current QE program (at the current pace of buying) until at least next September. This should act to cap the recent widening of global bond term premia (Chart 4) and prevent a "Fifth Tantrum" from unfolding in global bond markets, as we discussed last week.2 Therefore, we are taking profits today on our bearish bond call and moving back to a tactical at-benchmark portfolio duration stance. However, we still expect yields to rise over the next year to levels beyond current forward rates.3 Thus, we would look to reinstate a below-benchmark duration posture if the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield were to fall to the 2-2.2% range. We will also look for signs of oversold momentum fading and a reduction in short positioning in U.S. Treasuries before re-establishing a below-benchmark duration tilt (Chart 5). The next leg of pressure on global bond yields should come from the U.S., given our optimistic view on U.S. growth and inflation for next year (see below). Chart 3UST Yields Are##br## A Bit Too High Chart 4A Big Adjustment In##br## Term Premia & Expectations Chart 5Taking Profits On##br## Our Bearish Bond Call Bottom Line: Global bond yields, pushed higher since July on the back of improving global growth and rising inflation, have now overshot to the upside on excessive expectations of U.S. fiscal stimulus. Take profits on bearish bond positions and increase portfolio duration exposure to at-benchmark on a tactical basis until the oversold conditions unwind. Some Initial Thoughts On Developed Market Yield Curves In 2017 With only a handful of trading days remaining in 2016, it is time to peer ahead to how markets could perform in the New Year. We will be publishing our full 2017 Outlook report on December 20th, but this week we are presenting some preliminary ideas on how government bond yield curves could evolve over the course of next year. United States - Eventual Bear Steepening In Excess Of The Forwards We see U.S. growth accelerating to a 2.8% pace next year, an above-potential pace that is stronger than current consensus forecasts.4 Combined with a steady grind higher in realized inflation (both headline and core), this will generate a nominal growth outcome over 5% in 2017. This will help push the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield to the 2.8-3.0% area by the end of 2017 as the Fed will likely continue to raise rates but not as fast as nominal growth will accelerate (i.e. will remain accommodative). This move will be led by rising inflation expectations, which we see rising to a level consistent with the Fed's inflation target.5 This will put steepening pressure on the U.S. Treasury curve, at a pace that will easily exceed the flattening currently priced into the forwards (Chart 6, top panel). We see the potential for curve steepening pressure to come both from growth, which will push up longer-dated real yields and steepen the "real" yield curve, and from inflation, with a tight labor market putting upward pressure on wage and price inflation even with a stronger U.S. dollar (Chart 7). Chart 6A Steeper UST Curve,##br## Led By Rising Real Yields Chart 7Will UST Yields Pause##br## After A Rate Hike Next Week? For now, however, we are keeping a "neutral" stance on U.S. yield curve exposure until we see signs that oversold conditions in the Treasury market have corrected. One final point: the Treasury market likely moved too quickly in recent weeks to discount a fiscal ease under the new Trump administration. However, any impetus to growth from the government sector, coming at a time when the U.S. economy is running near full employment, will be another structural factor putting steepening pressure on the yield curve in the next year through more Treasury issuance and stronger inflation pressures. Core Euro Area - Very Modest Steepening In Line With The Forwards As we discussed in a recent Weekly Report, the ECB will most likely continue with its current bond-buying program, with no tapering of the size of the purchases, until at least September 2017.6 European inflation remains too low relative to the ECB's target (Chart 8) and the central bank will be wary about reducing monetary stimulus anytime soon. The overriding presence of ECB buying will act to limit the upside in longer-dated European bond yields, even in an environment where U.S. Treasury yields rise over the course of 2017. The core European government bond yield curves (Germany, France) will likely still see some modest steepening pressure, led by upward pressure on real yields, as global growth continues to improve. Combined with the lagged impact of the weakening Euro and the rise in commodity prices, there should be some mild additional steepening pressure coming from inflation expectations, as well. The forward curves are currently pricing in a very modest steepening over the next year, and we do not see a case for the curve to steepen much beyond the forwards (Chart 9). We continue to favor core Europe as a recommended overweight in our global Developed Market bond allocation. Favoring the longer-end of the curve (10 years and longer) in Germany and France - the higher yielding parts of these low-yielding bond markets - makes the most sense against the backdrop of subdued Euro Area inflation. Chart 8No Threat To Global Bonds##br## From The ECB This Week Chart 9ECB QE Will Limit##br## Any Curve Moves In Europe Japan - Expect Long-End Steepening, Even With Bank Of Japan Curve Targeting The Japanese yield curve is now fairly straightforward to predict, with the Bank of Japan (BoJ) now explicitly targeting the level of JGB yields. The BoJ has committed to keep the 10yr JGB yield at 0% until Japanese inflation expectations overshoot the 2% BoJ target. With inflation expectations currently sitting just above 0%, that goal is now far from being realized. We see very little movement in the 2-10 year part of the JGB curve next year, but we expect the curve beyond 10 years to be more influenced by trends in global bond yields, with the BoJ providing no guidance on the desired level of longer-dated JGB yields. Given our views on a potential bear-steepening of the U.S. Treasury curve in 2017, we expect that the 10/30 JGB curve will also steepen (Chart 10). Focusing Japanese bond exposure on the 10-year point makes the most sense in this environment, although at a yield of 0% the return prospects are hardly inviting. U.K. - Steepening Will Turn To Flattening The Bank of England (BoE) took out a very large insurance policy on the U.K. economy by cutting interest rates and re-starting quantitative easing (QE) after the shocking Brexit vote. This has appeared to work, as U.K. economic growth has been surprisingly strong in the months since the June referendum. But the ramifications of the BoE's aggressive easing was a massive depreciation of the Pound and a subsequent rise in U.K. inflation (Chart 11). Chart 10BoJ Is Not Worrying About##br## The Long End For JGBs Chart 11The Post-Brexit ##br## Adjustment Is Nearly Complete This has set up a situation where the Gilt market is behaving much like the U.S. Treasury market did after the Fed introduced its own QE programs between 2008 & 2012. The result was as rise in nominal bond yields led by rising inflation expectations and stronger economic growth, both of which were a function of a weaker currency. In the case of the U.K. now, the rise in inflation has been strong enough to force the BoE to back off its promise to deliver an additional rate cut before the end of 2016. The BoE will likely not extend the latest QE program beyond the March 2017 expiry, as well. There is even a chance that the BoE could be forced to hike rates sometime in the first half of 2017. Against this backdrop where the BoE has to play a bit of monetary catchup to rising nominal growth, the Gilt curve is likely to see some flattening pressure after the recent steepening. With the forwards pricing in no change in the slope of the curve next year (Chart 12), curve flattening positions that limit exposure to the front-end of the Gilt curve could offer opportunities in 2017 after global bond yields consolidate the recent rise in yields. While we believe it is too early to reposition our Gilt curve allocation this week, we are taking profits on our recommended U.K. inflation protection trades given the recent stability of the Pound and growing evidence that the Bank of England is turning more hawkish (Chart 13). Specifically, we are closing our Overlay Trade favoring index-linked Gilts versus nominals at a profit of +59bps. We also advise closing our "Brexit hedge" trade suggested in June before the referendum, which was a long position in U.K. CPI swaps versus U.S. equivalents. Chart 12Nearing The End Of ##br## Gilt Curve Steepening? Chart 13Take Profit On U.K.##br## Inflation Protection Trades Canada - The Steepening Is Over A modest steepening of the Canadian government bond yield curve in 2017 is currently priced into the forwards. We think even this small move is unlikely to be realized. The short-end of the yield curve should stay well-anchored around current levels. Probabilities extracted from the Canadian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve currently show a 4% market-implied chance of a rate cut, and 40% odds of a rate hike, by December 6th 2017. Of the two, the probability of a rate hike looks too high. The Bank of Canada (BoC) has rarely increased policy rates when our BCA Canadian Central Bank Monitor was in "easy money required" territory (Chart 14). More likely, the Bank of Canada will stay on hold throughout 2017 due to a lack of inflationary pressures. The Canadian unemployment rate remains far higher than the full employment level, while a wide gap has developed between the growth rates of core CPI and weekly earnings; low wage inflation usually drags core CPI inflation lower. Already, the Canadian CPI less the most volatile components - one of the core inflation measures monitored by the BoC - has rolled over. In the longer part of the curve, the weakening economic cycle will keep yields well contained. While the rebound in energy prices seen this year is a positive for the beaten-up Alberta economy, even higher prices will be needed for Canadian energy producers to rekindle investments in that sector given the high cost of oil extraction in Western Canada. Without a meaningful recovery in Alberta, the Canadian economy will be unable to expand at an above-trend pace; growth will be slower than the general consensus forecast of 2.0% in 2017.7 To profit from that view, we are opening a new butterfly spread trade on the Canadian curve: going long the 2-year/10-year barbell versus a short position in the 5-year bullet. This trade should generate positive excess returns if the 2-year/10-year slope of the Canadian curve flattens, as we expect (Chart 15). Chart 14Canadian Short Rates##br## To Remain Well-Anchored Chart 15Go Long A Canadian 2/10 ##br## Barbell Vs. The 5yr Bullet Australia - Flattening Phase Ahead A small flattening of the Australian yield curve over the next 12 months is currently priced into the forwards. This expectation seems reasonable to us, but the bulk of the flattening should come from the short end where yields will drift higher over the course of the year. Australian inflation prospects are improving, with the Melbourne Institute Inflation Gauge having stabilized of late. As the negative impact of imported goods price deflation recedes going forward, domestic inflation should rise. In addition, our model is calling for core CPI inflation to grind higher in 2017 (Chart 16). Chart 16Australian Inflation Is Bottoming... Chart 17...Even As Australian Growth Is Starting To Cool Because of this, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) will progressively become less dovish and greater odds of a rate hike will be priced into the yield curve. This is already starting to happen, on the margin; since October, the probability of a rate cut by December 5th, 2017 has decreased substantially, from 65% to 5%. As we have been pointing out over the past several months, the Australian economy has been humming along. China's policy reflation seen earlier in 2016 had a direct positive impact on Australian export demand, while a rising terms of trade fueled by higher base metals prices has provided a boost to domestic income. However, the upward pressure on yields from accelerating domestic growth has become milder of late. Employment growth, motor vehicle sales and aggregate private sector credit growth are now all trending to the downside (Chart 17). This might be an indication that the boom from the first half of this year is starting to dissipate. This tames, to some extent, our optimism over the Australian economy. If economic activity continues to slow modestly, corporate bond supply, i.e. demand for credit and liquidity, should ease. In turn, this should also alleviate the recent upside pressure on the longer part of the Australian government bond yield curve. Chart 18The NZ Curve Will Follow##br## The Forwards In 2017 In sum, on a 3-6 month horizon, the short end of the Aussie curve could edge higher as the market prices in a less dovish RBA that will need to begin worrying about rising inflation once again. While at the same time, longer-term bond yields might have seen their highs given some cooling of economic growth. We already have a recommended position on the Australian curve to benefit from these trends, as we are short the 4-year government bond bullet versus a long position in the 2-year/6-year barbell. This trade was initiated earlier this year, has generated +13bps of profits so far, and remains valid.8 As an exit strategy, we will re-evaluate this trade if high-frequency cyclical Australian data disappoint further or the current expansion of Australia's terms of trade starts to reverse. New Zealand - Following The Forwards The New Zealand forward yield curve is currently pricing a 12bps flattening over the next 12 months, with the 2-year/10-year slope expected to move from 107bps to 95bps (Chart 18). This move seems reasonable to us. As we discussed in a recent report, inflation will re-surface in New Zealand in 2017.9 The upside surprise will be due to those factors: Narrowing global output gaps that will bring about a more inflationary global backdrop. A boost from China, most notably through higher producer prices. A weakening of the Kiwi dollar in response to a more hawkish Fed. A stronger dairy sector, which should help New Zealand's exports and reflate domestic wages. A potential reversal of migration inflows, which should shrink the supply of workers and tighten the labor market, boosting wage growth and pressuring price inflation higher. If this view materializes, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) will become more hawkish. This should push short term yields higher and flatten the New Zealand government bond yield curve. Like everywhere else, the New Zealand yield curve has steepened over the last month as global bond markets have priced in faster growth and the potential impact of Trump-ian fiscal stimulus in the U.S. As this external impact dissipates in the next few months, the main factor driving the shape of the New Zealand curve will swing back to expectations of future RBNZ policy. Bottom Line: The recent consistent steepening of government bond yield curves across the developed markets should soon begin to fade, leading to a more diverse evolution of curves during the course of 2017: steeper in the U.S., core Europe and in the long end in Japan; flatter in the U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Jean-Laurent Gagnon, Editor/Strategist jeang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy/U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Six Reasons To Tactically Reduce Duration Exposure Now", dated July 19, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com & usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy/U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fourth Tantrum", dated November 29, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com & usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 The current 1-year forward rate for the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury is 2.67% 4 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen", dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 The Fed targets headline PCE inflation, while inflation compensation in U.S. TIPS is priced off headline CPI inflation. The historical gap between the two measures is about 40bps, thus a level of breakeven inflation in TIPS that is consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target is 2.4% (2% PCE inflation + 0.4%). 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The ECB's Next Move: Extend & Pretend", dated October 25, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 7 Both the Bank of Canada and the median economist surveyed by Bloomberg forecast 2.0% real GDP growth in 2017. For further details, please http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/10/mpr-2016-10-19/ 8 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Yield Curve Trades For The Rest Of The Year", dated May 24, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "A Post-Trump Update Of Our Overlay Trades", dated November 22, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of November 30, 2016. The model further augmented the overweight to the U.S. despite the fact that the U.S. had already been the largest overweight, at the expenses of the Euro Area. Japan's underweight is reduced again, albeit slightly. The model continues to dislike Canada and Australia even though the two countries have outperformed year to date. U.K. remains the largest underweight (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the large overweight of the U.S. versus the non-U.S. (Level 1 model) worked well in November with 49 bps of outperformance versus the MSCI World benchmark, the level 2 (allocation within the 11 non-U.S. countries), however, underperformed significantly, resulting the overall model to underperform by 16 bps. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of November 30, 2016. Table 3AllocationsTable 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance The momentum component has shifted Consumer Discretionary from underweight to overweight. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Senior Analyst patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
Highlights An Italian referendum 'no' is not really revolting. Some people are voting no for no change to the current constitution's vital checks and balances. Lean against any knee-jerk widening of the Italian sovereign yield spread versus France that followed a no vote. Lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote. A 50bps spike in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months is normally a bad omen for risk-asset performance. Retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Feature After shock victories for Brexit and Donald Trump at the polls, a 'no' vote in Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform would be the next worrying sign of a growing grassroots revolt against the establishment. Or would it? An Italian 'No' Is Not Really Revolting The votes for Brexit or Donald Trump were clearly votes for change. At first glance, an Italian no would also look like a revolt, with the potential to trigger political uncertainty and instability in the euro area's third largest economy. Chart of the WeekItalian Banks Are Tracking Japanese 'Zombie' Banks The truth is more nuanced. Clearly, some Italians are voting no to reject Prime Minister Renzi. But others - including former Prime Minister Mario Monti - are voting no for no change. These voters want to leave in place the current constitution's vital checks and balances. If Italians vote yes to constitutional reform, the upper house of parliament - the Senate - would be relegated to an advisory chamber. Meanwhile, an already approved new electoral law for the lower house of parliament - the Chamber of Deputies - hands an automatic 55 percent majority of seats to the largest party. Some people fear that this combination would amount to excessive executive power. So they are voting no to mitigate the danger. Granted, a no vote might also force Renzi to resign, but this would not necessarily trigger new elections. President Sergio Mattarella would likely explore options for a new government - perhaps a technocratic government - which the parties in the current governing coalition have a strong incentive to support until the next elections are due in 2018. Even if there were early elections, it is improbable that they would result in a government led by the populist 5 Star Movement. If 5 Star was the largest party, it would hold a 55 percent majority of seats in the lower house, but only 30 percent in the upper house, in proportion to its popular vote share (Chart I-2). Therefore, it could not form a government. Under the current constitution, the government needs the support of both houses. The irony is that a yes vote - by giving the executive excessive powers - would make it more likely for a populist party like 5 Star to form a government in 2018 or beyond. Still, even this might prove a tall order. Italy's constitutional court is reviewing the electoral law change that gives 55 percent of lower house seats to the largest party. The court will likely demand more proportionality, making it hard for any one party to win an outright majority. This means more coalition governments, which 5 Star rejects. Hence, an Italian no will not be the equivalent of the Brexit vote or U.S. election of Donald Trump. Fears that it will unleash a dangerous phase of populism and political instability in Italy are overblown. Yet in the last three months, the Italian sovereign yield spread has widened sharply versus France (Chart I-3). Note also that the 65-day fractal dimension of the Italy versus France sovereign bond performance is close to its technical limit, indicating excessive pessimistic groupthink. Chart I-2The 5 Star Movement Could Not Form A ##br##Government Under The Current Constitution Chart I-3Italy's Political Risk Premium Has ##br##Increased, But Is It Justified? If December 4 brings a no vote in the Italian referendum combined with the election of a far-right President of Austria - whose role is largely ceremonial - the knee-jerk market response might still be fright. In which case, a further widening in the Italy/France yield spread would be a tactical entry opportunity, given that political risk is overstated. Fixing Italian Banks Needs A 'Deep-V' Or A 'Long-L' The real question in Italy is not about an imminent populist backlash. The real question is what does the cure for Italy's banking malaise look like? The answer is either a 'deep-V', meaning a banking crisis forces a quick workout; or a 'long-L', meaning no banking crisis but a very long struggle back to normal health. As an investor, neither seems particularly appealing. Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the housing-related credit booms in Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown financial crises - requiring urgent government-led and central bank-led bailouts. Today, Italian banks' non-performing loans (NPLs) account for 18% of gross lending, and NPLs net of provisions equal 85% of equity capital. A few years ago, Irish banks looked even worse. Irish NPLs peaked at 25% of gross lending in 2013 and net NPLs peaked at 100% of equity capital. Following government bailouts Irish banks have recovered well (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Likewise, the Spanish government created a 'bad bank' in 2012 to offload bank NPLs. Subsequently, Spanish banks' NPLs as a share of gross lending has almost halved. Chart I-4Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy##br## For NPLs As A Share Of Loans Chart I-5Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy ##br##For NPLs As A Share Of Capital Compared to Ireland and Spain, Italy's avoidance of outright crisis (thus far) appears a blessing. Unfortunately, it is now a curse. In waiting so long, Italy cannot follow Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. in their escapes from their banking woes. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into full force on January 1 2016, has blocked the bailout escape route. The BRRD does allow state intervention in a banking crisis. But the overarching aim is to protect banks' critical functions and stakeholders, specifically: payment systems, taxpayers and depositors. Therefore, in a banking crisis "other parts may be allowed to fail in the normal way... after shares in full... then evenly on holders of subordinated bonds and then evenly on senior bondholders." For bank investors, this would constitute the 'deep-V' cure: likely intense pain up-front albeit with much better long-term prospects thereafter. Alternatively, without a crisis, the process to recognise and expunge NPLs would be largely up to the private sector and markets. But a long chain of events from the repossession of assets under bankruptcy law, to valuation, to full divestment from the banks' balance sheets could take years. Indeed, the Chart of the Week shows a striking parallel between Italian bank profits and Japan's 'zombie' bank profits, if we lag the Japanese experience by 17 years. Japan perfectly illustrates this alternative 'long-L' cure: no outright crisis, just a long and seemingly never-ending struggle back to normal health. Either way, absent any further information, we would lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote on December 4. What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? Turning to the broader financial markets, a bigger concern is the impact that sharply higher bond yields will have on growth and/or on risk-asset valuations. Higher long-term borrowing costs depress credit growth as captured in the credit impulse (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). A depressed credit impulse then almost always drags down subsequent GDP growth. The recent spike in U.S. 15-year and 30-year mortgage rates has already caused mortgage refinancing applications to plunge by 40% since July (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Higher Bond Yields Depress##br## Credit Growth In Europe... Chart I-7...And In ##br##The U.S. Chart I-8Mortgage Applications##br## Have Plunged Prior to the current incidence, a 50bps rise in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months has occurred only eight times this century (Chart I-9). Table I-1 lists those eight occasions and the subsequent 3-month performance of the equity market. On three out of the eight occasions, the equity market rose modestly, but on the other five it fell. Chart I-9The Bond Yield Has Spiked Table I-1What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? But perhaps the most interesting finding is that on all eight occasions, the equity market's subsequent 3-month performance consistently deteriorated, on average by -7%, compared to the preceding 3-month performance. For reference, today's preceding 3-month performance is just 0.7%. Given this evidence, it is prudent to retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The Italy versus France sovereign bond underperformance indicates excessive pessimistic groupthink. However, in this instance we would wait until after Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform before initiating the countertrend trade. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report My colleague Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President of BCA’s European Investment Strategy, has penned an excellent update on the upcoming Italian constitutional referendum. Dhaval argues that the market is mispricing risks emanating from the referendum. Not all voters who reject the plebiscite are Euroskeptic. In fact, many will vote against the referendum precisely because it removes checks and balances and increases the odds of an anti-establishment party forming a government. Geopolitical Strategy group agrees with Dhaval and has made a similar point in our November Monthly Report. Our September Special Report also posited that Italy cannot easily disentangle itself from European institutions due to its own incomplete unification. This is not to say that Italy is not a risk to the stability of the euro area. There are plenty of reasons to worry, starting with the banking system, which Dhaval addresses in his missive. However, the market’s obsession with the referendum is overdone and thus presents an investment opportunity. I hope you enjoy the European Investment Strategy report and I encourage you to take a look at Dhaval’s research closely, if you are not already a subscriber. Kindest regards, Marko Papic Highlights An Italian referendum 'no' is not really revolting. Some people are voting no for no change to the current constitution's vital checks and balances. Lean against any knee-jerk widening of the Italian sovereign yield spread versus France that followed a no vote. Lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote. A 50bps spike in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months is normally a bad omen for risk-asset performance. Retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Feature After shock victories for Brexit and Donald Trump at the polls, a 'no' vote in Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform would be the next worrying sign of a growing grassroots revolt against the establishment. Or would it? An Italian 'No' Is Not Really Revolting The votes for Brexit or Donald Trump were clearly votes for change. At first glance, an Italian no would also look like a revolt, with the potential to trigger political uncertainty and instability in the euro area's third largest economy. Chart of the WeekItalian Banks Are Tracking Japanese 'Zombie' Banks The truth is more nuanced. Clearly, some Italians are voting no to reject Prime Minister Renzi. But others - including former Prime Minister Mario Monti - are voting no for no change. These voters want to leave in place the current constitution's vital checks and balances. If Italians vote yes to constitutional reform, the upper house of parliament - the Senate - would be relegated to an advisory chamber. Meanwhile, an already approved new electoral law for the lower house of parliament - the Chamber of Deputies - hands an automatic 55 percent majority of seats to the largest party. Some people fear that this combination would amount to excessive executive power. So they are voting no to mitigate the danger. Granted, a no vote might also force Renzi to resign, but this would not necessarily trigger new elections. President Sergio Mattarella would likely explore options for a new government - perhaps a technocratic government - which the parties in the current governing coalition have a strong incentive to support until the next elections are due in 2018. Even if there were early elections, it is improbable that they would result in a government led by the populist 5 Star Movement. If 5 Star was the largest party, it would hold a 55 percent majority of seats in the lower house, but only 30 percent in the upper house, in proportion to its popular vote share (Chart I-2). Therefore, it could not form a government. Under the current constitution, the government needs the support of both houses. The irony is that a yes vote - by giving the executive excessive powers - would make it more likely for a populist party like 5 Star to form a government in 2018 or beyond. Still, even this might prove a tall order. Italy's constitutional court is reviewing the electoral law change that gives 55 percent of lower house seats to the largest party. The court will likely demand more proportionality, making it hard for any one party to win an outright majority. This means more coalition governments, which 5 Star rejects. Hence, an Italian no will not be the equivalent of the Brexit vote or U.S. election of Donald Trump. Fears that it will unleash a dangerous phase of populism and political instability in Italy are overblown. Yet in the last three months, the Italian sovereign yield spread has widened sharply versus France (Chart I-3). Note also that the 65-day fractal dimension of the Italy versus France sovereign bond performance is close to its technical limit, indicating excessive pessimistic groupthink. Chart I-2The 5 Star Movement Could Not Form A ##br##Government Under The Current Constitution Chart I-3Italy's Political Risk Premium Has ##br##Increased, But Is It Justified? If December 4 brings a no vote in the Italian referendum combined with the election of a far-right President of Austria - whose role is largely ceremonial - the knee-jerk market response might still be fright. In which case, a further widening in the Italy/France yield spread would be a tactical entry opportunity, given that political risk is overstated. Fixing Italian Banks Needs A 'Deep-V' Or A 'Long-L' The real question in Italy is not about an imminent populist backlash. The real question is what does the cure for Italy's banking malaise look like? The answer is either a 'deep-V', meaning a banking crisis forces a quick workout; or a 'long-L', meaning no banking crisis but a very long struggle back to normal health. As an investor, neither seems particularly appealing. Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the housing-related credit booms in Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown financial crises - requiring urgent government-led and central bank-led bailouts. Today, Italian banks' non-performing loans (NPLs) account for 18% of gross lending, and NPLs net of provisions equal 85% of equity capital. A few years ago, Irish banks looked even worse. Irish NPLs peaked at 25% of gross lending in 2013 and net NPLs peaked at 100% of equity capital. Following government bailouts Irish banks have recovered well (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Likewise, the Spanish government created a 'bad bank' in 2012 to offload bank NPLs. Subsequently, Spanish banks' NPLs as a share of gross lending has almost halved. Chart I-4Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy##br## For NPLs As A Share Of Loans Chart I-5Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy ##br##For NPLs As A Share Of Capital Compared to Ireland and Spain, Italy's avoidance of outright crisis (thus far) appears a blessing. Unfortunately, it is now a curse. In waiting so long, Italy cannot follow Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. in their escapes from their banking woes. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into full force on January 1 2016, has blocked the bailout escape route. The BRRD does allow state intervention in a banking crisis. But the overarching aim is to protect banks' critical functions and stakeholders, specifically: payment systems, taxpayers and depositors. Therefore, in a banking crisis "other parts may be allowed to fail in the normal way... after shares in full... then evenly on holders of subordinated bonds and then evenly on senior bondholders." For bank investors, this would constitute the 'deep-V' cure: likely intense pain up-front albeit with much better long-term prospects thereafter. Alternatively, without a crisis, the process to recognise and expunge NPLs would be largely up to the private sector and markets. But a long chain of events from the repossession of assets under bankruptcy law, to valuation, to full divestment from the banks' balance sheets could take years. Indeed, the Chart of the Week shows a striking parallel between Italian bank profits and Japan's 'zombie' bank profits, if we lag the Japanese experience by 17 years. Japan perfectly illustrates this alternative 'long-L' cure: no outright crisis, just a long and seemingly never-ending struggle back to normal health. Either way, absent any further information, we would lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote on December 4. What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? Turning to the broader financial markets, a bigger concern is the impact that sharply higher bond yields will have on growth and/or on risk-asset valuations. Higher long-term borrowing costs depress credit growth as captured in the credit impulse (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). A depressed credit impulse then almost always drags down subsequent GDP growth. The recent spike in U.S. 15-year and 30-year mortgage rates has already caused mortgage refinancing applications to plunge by 40% since July (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Higher Bond Yields Depress##br## Credit Growth In Europe... Chart I-7...And In ##br##The U.S. Chart I-8Mortgage Applications##br## Have Plunged Prior to the current incidence, a 50bps rise in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months has occurred only eight times this century (Chart I-9). Table I-1 lists those eight occasions and the subsequent 3-month performance of the equity market. On three out of the eight occasions, the equity market rose modestly, but on the other five it fell. Chart I-9The Bond Yield Has Spiked Table I-1What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? But perhaps the most interesting finding is that on all eight occasions, the equity market's subsequent 3-month performance consistently deteriorated, on average by -7%, compared to the preceding 3-month performance. For reference, today's preceding 3-month performance is just 0.7%. Given this evidence, it is prudent to retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The Italy versus France sovereign bond underperformance indicates excessive pessimistic groupthink. However, in this instance we would wait until after Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform before initiating the countertrend trade. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Fractal Trading Model
Recommended Allocation The Meaning Of Trump Sudden large shocks in markets are rare. But the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President is one such. After a shock of this magnitude, markets tend initially to overreact, then correct, before settling on a new course. Market action since November 9th has caused many asset prices to overshoot short term. It is likely that U.S. bond yields, inflation expectations, the performance of bank and materials stocks, and the U.S. dollar (Chart 1) will correct over the next month or so, perhaps triggered by the Fed's likely rate hike on December 14th or simply by shifting expectations for Trump's economic policies. But what is the likely long-term course, which should set our asset allocation for the next 6 to 12 months? We think investors should take Trump at least partly at his word when he says he will enact tax cuts and increase infrastructure investment. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service sees few constraints on Trump from Congress in the short term.1 The OECD in its latest Economic Outlook has given its imprimatur, arguing that "a stronger fiscal policy response is needed," and estimating that U.S. fiscal stimulus could add 0.1 percentage point to global growth next year and 0.3 points in 2018.2 If such a policy boosted growth and inflation, it would be negative for bonds. The only question, with 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yields having already risen by almost 100 bps since July, is how much of this is priced in. In the long run, government bond yields are broadly correlated with nominal GDP growth (Chart 2). In H1 2016, U.S. nominal GDP growth was 2.7%, and for 2016 as a whole probably about 3.2%. If it picks up to 4-5% in 2017 (2.5-3% real, plus inflation of 1.5-2%), an additional rise of 50-100 bps in the 10-year yield would not be surprising (though ECB and BoJ asset purchases might somewhat limit the rise in yields). Moreover, growth was already accelerating before Trump's victory. The effects of 2015's commodity shock and industrial and profits recessions have passed, with U.S. Q3 GDP growth revised up to 3.2% and the Fed's NowCasting models suggesting 2.5%-3.6% for Q4. The Citi Economic Surprise Index has surprised on the upside in recent weeks both in the U.S. and Europe - though not in emerging markets (Chart 3). And the Q3 earnings season in the U.S. was well above expectations, with EPS coming in at +3.3% YoY (compared to a consensus forecast pre-results of -2.2%). Analysts' forecasts for 2017 EPS growth are a comparatively modest 11%. Chart 1Some Short-Term Overshoots Chart 2Bond Yields Relate To Nominal Growth Chart 3Growth Was Already Surprising On The Upside But whether this new world will be positive for equities is harder to answer. Trump's unpredictability raises policy uncertainty: how much emphasis, for example, will he put on trade protectionism or confrontational foreign policy? This should raise the risk premium. The Fed's response will also be key. Futures have now priced in the rate hike in December and (almost) the two further rate hikes in the Fed's dots for 2017 (Chart 4). But the market still sees the long-term equilibrium rate (as expressed in five-year five-year forwards) as only just over 2%, compared to the Fed's 2.9%. And, although Janet Yellen has suggested that the Fed will act only after Trump's policies take effect ("We will be watching the decisions that Congress makes and updating our economic outlook as the policy landscape becomes clearer," she said), if core PCE inflation continues to pick up in 2017 beyond the current 1.7% and a strong stimulus package is implemented, the Fed might accelerate its rate hikes. More worryingly, Trump's fundamental views on monetary policy are unknown: does he, as a businessman, like low rates, or will he listen to his "hard money" advisers who believe the Fed has been too lax? Since he can appoint six FOMC governors in his first year in office, he will be able to influence monetary policy. Too fast a rise in Fed rates would be negative for equities. On balance, in this environment we see equities outperforming bonds over the next 12 months. It is unusual for the stock-to-bond ratio to decline outside of a global recession (Chart 5) - and, with the extra boost from fiscal policy (with Trump possibly joined by Japan, the U.K., China and others), a recession is unlikely over our forecast horizon. Chart 4Market Has Priced In 2017 Fed Hikes - ##br##But Not The Long-Term Chart 5Stocks Don't Often ##br##Underperform Outside Recession Accordingly, we are raising our recommendation for global equities to overweight, and lowering bonds to underweight. The problem is timing: we recognize that there may be a better entry point over the next couple of months. Some investors may, therefore, want to implement the change gradually. In addition, some recent market moves are not fundamentally justified: for example, we cannot see how the materials sector would be a significant beneficiary from a Trump fiscal stimulus. We plan to make further detailed adjustments to our equity country and sector recommendations and bond-class recommendations in the next Quarterly Portfolio Update, to be published on December 15th. Currencies: Stronger U.S. growth and tighter monetary policy suggest that the USD will continue to appreciate. The dollar looks somewhat expensive but is still well below the peak of overvaluation at the end of previous bouts of strength in 1985 and 2002. The Bank of Japan's policy of capping the 10-year JGB yield at 0% has worked well (pushing the yen down by 12% against the dollar in the past two months) and, as rates elsewhere rise, this implies further long-run yen weakness. The euro is likely to weaken less, with eurozone growth recently surprising on the upside and the ECB therefore likely to reconsider the amount of asset purchases at some point next year, though probably not at its meeting on December 8th. Emerging market currencies continue to look particularly vulnerable. Equities: In common currency terms, U.S. equities are more attractive than European ones. In local currency terms, however, the call is closer since the strong dollar will depress U.S. earnings relative to those in Europe, and an acceleration of global economic growth should help the more cyclical eurozone stock market. On the other hand, Europe faces structural issues, such as the chronically poor profitability of its banking system, and political risk from a series of upcoming elections (starting with the Italian referendum on December 4th). We continue to like Japan (on a currency hedged basis) and expect that the BoJ's policy will be bolstered by government fiscal and employment policies. We remain underweight on emerging markets. They have always been vulnerable during periods of dollar strength, and political side-effects from their bout of economic weakness in 2011-5 are starting to spread, recently to Turkey, Malaysia, India, Brazil, Korea and South Africa. Fixed Income: The risk of tighter Fed policy and higher yields suggest investors should remain underweight duration. We have liked U.S. TIPS over nominal bonds all year and, with 10-year breakeven inflation still only at 1.8%, they remain attractive in the current environment. We reduced high-yield bonds to neutral on September 30th, on the grounds that investors were no longer being sufficiently compensated for default risk: they have subsequently given -3% return, while equities rallied. We recommend investment grade credits for those investors who need to pick up yield (Chart 6). Commodities: After the OPEC agreement on production cuts, we expect the oil price to move towards $55 in the first few months of 2017 as inventories are drawn down. Over the longer run the risk is to the upside as a dearth of new projects, following cancellations last year, will tighten the supply/demand balance. Metals prices have strengthened since Trump's victory, with the CRB Raw Industrials Index up sharply (Chart 7). This makes little sense. Trump's stimulus will be centered on tax, not infrastructure. China remains a far more important factor: the U.S. represented only 7% of global steel consumption in 2015, for example, compared to 43% for China. And China's recent stimulus is running out of steam. Chart 6Yield On Investment Grade Credits ##br##Still Attractive Chart 7Trump Shouldn't Have ##br##This Much Effect On Metals Prices Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report,"U.S. Election: Outcomes and Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see OECD Global Economic Outlook, November 2016, available at http://www.oecd.org/economy/outlook/economicoutlook.htm. Recommended Asset Allocation
Highlights Duration: The odds of further bond bearish catalysts emerging during the next 6-12 months are still quite elevated. Maintain below benchmark duration. Global Bond Strategy: The most likely candidates for another bond bearish catalyst would be an announcement of substantial fiscal stimulus from Japan and/or a hawkish policy shift from the Fed. Investors should remain overweight core Europe, underweight U.S. Treasuries and neutral on JGBs. U.S. High-Yield: Given current spread levels and our default loss expectations, valuation in the U.S. high-yield market sends neither a strong buy nor sell signal. Feature In a U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report1 published in August we observed that, since the financial crisis, material increases in global bond yields have all been associated with a policy catalyst (Chart 1). We identified three such catalysts: the Fed's 2010 announcement of QE2, the Fed signaling its willingness to slow the pace of asset purchases in 2013, and the European Central Bank's (ECB) announcement of its own QE program in 2015. Now we can add the election of Donald Trump as a fourth catalyst that has spurred a tantrum in global bond markets. Chart 1The Four Post-Crisis Bond Tantrums The common factor that links all of these catalysts is that each causes the market to quickly re-assess its expectations about the future pace of monetary tightening. Interestingly, this re-assessment can be caused by either the announcement of a program that is perceived to be extremely stimulative or the announcement that monetary stimulus will be scaled back. Examples of the former include both the Fed's and ECB's QE announcements as well as the recent U.S. election. An example of the latter would be the 2013 taper tantrum. As in August, the goal of this report is to perform a quick survey of the major global economies in order to assess the likelihood that another bond-bearish catalyst emerges during the next 6-12 months. While we find it difficult to see a catalyst of the same scale as those shown in Chart 1, we assign high odds to the possibility that the announcement of fiscal easing in Japan will add to the bearish pressure on global bonds. We also assign high odds to the possibility that upside inflation surprises in the U.S. cause the Fed to adopt a more hawkish forward guidance, further increasing the bearish pressure on global bonds. We assign low odds to the possibility that ECB policy will contribute to the global bond selloff. U.S. Chart 2Fed Wants Breakevens To Head Higher The recent "Trump Tantrum" has sent yields sharply higher, and expectations priced into the U.S. bond market are now not far from the Fed's median rate hike expectations, especially at the short-end of the curve (Chart 2). In the U.S., the next most likely catalyst for sharply higher global bond yields would be the Fed signaling that it will adopt a quicker pace of rate hikes. Specifically, the Fed would need to cease revising its funds rate forecasts lower - which has been the pattern for the last few years - and start revising them higher. While the market was quick to price-in the likelihood of greater fiscal stimulus and rising deficits under the incoming government, the Fed will take a more cautious approach. In fact, with inflation still below target (Chart 2, bottom panel) and market-based measures of inflation compensation still depressed, the Fed will be in no rush to signal a more hawkish policy stance. We expect the Fed will follow through with an expected rate increase in December, but that the median expectation will continue to call for only two more hikes in 2017. The Fed is only likely to shift toward a more hawkish policy stance once inflation expectations are more firmly anchored around levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target. This corresponds to a range of 2.4% to 2.5% on the 5-year, 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate (Chart 2, second panel). Assuming that U.S. economic growth continues to accelerate into next year, as we expect, then the 5y5y TIPS breakeven rate could reach this target sometime in the middle of 2017. At that point, a more hawkish Fed policy becomes more likely. In the meantime, while the "Trump Tantrum" is likely to take a pause in the near-term (next 1-2 months), it may not have run its course just yet. If U.S. growth is strong in 2017 and the Trump administration appears to be making progress implementing its more stimulative policies, then the Treasury curve will likely resume its bear-steepening trend in the first half of next year.2 Euro Area Chart 3Strong Growth, But Plenty Of Slack According to the OECD and others, including the European Commission and ECB, trend GDP growth in the Eurozone is below 1%. In fact, most estimates center around 0.7%. This means that as long as GDP growth is maintained above these levels we should expect the labor market to continue to tighten. At least for now, the data suggest that growth is likely to remain well above trend. Led by gains in both the services and manufacturing indexes, the euro area's composite PMI jumped from 53.3 to 54.1 in November. The composite PMI has a good track record of leading European GDP growth (Chart 3), and the current reading is consistent with GDP growth of 2%. Despite strong growth, the ECB's policy stance is likely to remain accommodative for quite some time and is unlikely to spur a global bond tantrum within our 6-12 month investment horizon. The fact that core inflation remains below 1% (Chart 3, panel 3) tells us that the output gap in the euro area is still very wide. It will take a prolonged period of strong growth for the output gap to close and for inflationary pressures to mount. In prior cycles inflation has not begun to accelerate until the unemployment rate was below 9% (shaded regions in Chart 3). An announcement from the ECB that it will cease its asset purchase program because the economy has made adequate progress toward its economic and inflation goals would likely spur a large rise in global bond yields. However, this is unlikely to occur until the unemployment rate is below 9% and inflation is in an uptrend. As we argued in a recent Global Fixed Income Strategy report,3 the ECB will be able to alter the rules regarding the quantity of bonds available for purchase as is necessary to keep the program in place. Japan The Bank of Japan (BoJ) recently switched to a policy framework that involves targeting a level of yields as opposed to a quantity of purchases. In our view, this sends a pretty strong signal that monetary policy is close to being exhausted and that fiscal policy must take up the baton of Abenomics. While the timing and amount of any additional fiscal spending is not clear, it is probably necessary if policymakers are serious about reaching their 2% inflation goal. Chart 4Policy Action Required In Japan At present, the Japanese Diet is currently deliberating the third revision to the second supplementary budget and government officials have signaled that there will be more coordination between monetary and fiscal policy in the future. The government is also debating ways to boost household income, including raising government wages, lifting the minimum wage and providing tax incentives for the private sector to be more generous on the wage front. While any fiscal measures would not spur an increase in nominal JGB yields (because the BoJ will retain the cap), they would spur an increase in inflation expectations and a decline in real yields (Chart 4). We also think that the reflationary impulse would be felt by bond markets in the rest of the world, and that large enough fiscal stimulus from Japan would pressure global bond yields higher even though JGBs remain capped. Admittedly, the cap on nominal JGB yields would limit the contagion from Japanese fiscal stimulus to the rest of the global bond market. As would the impact of a depreciating yen relative to the euro and U.S. dollar. However, we also suspect that the shift toward greater fiscal stimulus in both the U.S. and Japan would cause investors to revise their global growth expectations higher, and that this impact would dominate in terms of the impact on global bond yields. Investment Conclusions The odds of further bond bearish catalysts emerging during the next 6-12 months remain quite elevated. The most likely candidates would be an announcement of substantial fiscal stimulus in Japan and/or a hawkish policy shift from the Fed. The ECB is unlikely to contribute to the bearish pressure on global bonds during the next 6-12 months. As such, we continue to recommend a below benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. In global bond portfolios, investors should remain overweight core Europe, underweight U.S. Treasuries and neutral JGBs. Valuation & Expected Returns In U.S. High-Yield A commonly used tool for assessing value in the high-yield bond market is a default-adjusted spread. That is, we formulate an expectation for default losses during our investment horizon and compare it to the spread that is currently on offer. If the current spread is elevated compared to our expectation for default losses then the default-adjusted spread is high and we would see good value in high-yield bonds relative to equivalent-duration Treasuries. This week we examine two different formulations of a default-adjusted spread for the U.S. high-yield market and test how well each corresponds to excess junk returns. The first measure we look at is a true ex-ante measure. It relies only on data that are available in real time, and can therefore be used as part of a trading strategy. Specifically, our ex-ante default-adjusted spread is calculated as the average option-adjusted spread from the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. High-Yield index less an expectation of default losses for the subsequent 12 month period. Expected default losses are calculated by taking the Moody's baseline forecast for the U.S. speculative grade default rate during the next 12 months and multiplying it by 1 minus our forecast of the recovery rate for this same period. We forecast the recovery rate based on its historical relationship with the default rate. The second measure we examine is an ex-post default-adjusted spread. In this case we look at the average spread of the index less actual default losses that are realized during the subsequent 12 months. As such, this measure can only be calculated after the fact. Comparing the ex-ante and ex-post measures, we see that both tend to reside within a range of 200 to 300 basis points. However, the ex-post measure periodically shows a negative value while the ex-ante measure is more often above 300 bps (Chart 5). This tells us that when forecasting default losses it is more common to underestimate default losses, rather than overestimate them. Chart 5Distribution of Default-Adjusted Spreads Over Time The next thing we look at is how closely each measure aligns with high-yield excess returns (Charts 6 & 7). Our ex-ante measure explains 34% of the variation in high-yield excess returns since 2002 (when our sample begins). Predictably, the ex-post measure, which removes the error surrounding the default loss forecast, explains a greater proportion of the variation in excess junk returns (53%). Our sample period is also longer for the ex-post measure, beginning in 1995. Chart 612-Month Excess High-Yield Returns Vs.##br## Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread (2002 - Present) Chart 712-Month Excess High-Yield Returns Vs. ##br##Ex-Post Default-Adjusted Spread (1995 - Present) The current average option-adjusted spread for the High-Yield index is 459 bps. If we incorporate the Moody's baseline forecast for the default rate during the next 12 months (4.1%) and our forecast for the recovery rate (39%), then we calculate an ex-ante default-adjusted spread of 210 bps. Using the relationship in Chart 6, this translates into an expected 12-month excess return of -26 bps. If we assume there is no error in our forecast then we can use the relationship in Chart 7. In that case, our expected 12-month excess return would be +55 bps. Of course, that exercise imposes a linear relationship between excess returns and the default-adjusted spread and doesn't consider that there is considerable variation in actual excess returns around this trendline. For that reason, in Charts 8 & 9 we split both our default-adjusted spread measures into intervals of 50 basis points. For each interval we display the average 12-month excess return along with a 90% confidence interval for where those returns are likely to fall. Chart 812-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & 90% Confidence Intervals: ##br##Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Chart 912-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & 90% Confidence Intervals:##br## Ex-Post Default-Adjusted Spread Specifically, the blue dots in Charts 8 & 9 show the 12-month excess return that is earned on average when the default-adjusted spread falls into a particular interval. The top and bottom edges of the vertical lines correspond to the upper and lower limits of the 90% confidence interval. More statistics related to the 12-month excess returns that have been observed when the default-adjusted spread falls into a specific interval can be found in the Appendix to this report. The main message from these charts is that a default-adjusted spread below 100 bps is a powerful sell signal, while a default-adjusted spread above 350 bps is a powerful buy signal. Between those two thresholds the signal is less clear. Bottom Line: Given current spread levels and our default loss expectations, valuation in the U.S. high-yield market sends neither a strong buy nor sell signal, but is consistent with small positive excess returns. Our inclination is to remain cautious on U.S. high-yield for the time being, but to look for opportunities to upgrade from more attractive valuations. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Tantrum Theory Of Global Bond Yields", dated August 16, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Toward A Cyclical Sweet Spot?", dated November 22, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The ECB's Next Move: Extend & Pretend", dated October 25, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com Appendix Table 112-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Table 212-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
The Tactical Asset Allocation model can provide investment recommendations which diverge from those outlined in our regular weekly publications. The model has a much shorter investment horizon - namely, one month - and thus attempts to capture very tactical opportunities. Meanwhile, our regular recommendations have a longer expected life, anywhere from 3-months to a year (or longer). This difference explains why the recommendations between the two publications can deviate from each other from time to time. Highlights In November, the model underperformed global equities and the S&P in USD and in local-currency terms. For December, the model reduced its allocation to cash and stocks and boosted its weighting in bonds (Chart 1). Within the equity portfolio, most of the decrease in allocation came at the expense of EM, Sweden, Netherlands, U.S., and New Zealand. The model increased its weighting in Swedish, French, U.K., and Canadian bonds. The risk index for stocks deteriorated in November, while the bond risk index improved significantly. Chart 1Model Weights Feature Performance In November, the recommended balanced portfolio lost 1.5% in local-currency terms and was down 3.4% in U.S. dollar terms (Chart 2). This compares with a gain of 1.3% for the global equity benchmark, and a 3.7% gain for the S&P 500 index. Given that the underlying model is structured in local-currency terms, we generally recommend that investors hedge their positions, though we do provide recommendations from time to time. The sharp bond selloff and weakness in EM equity markets both took a toll on the model's performance in November. Weights The model cut its allocation to stocks from 66% to 53%, and increased its bond weighting from 26% to 47%. The allocation to cash was brought down to zero from 8%, while commodities remain excluded from the portfolio (Table 1). The model trimmed its allocation to Latin American equities by 4 points, Sweden by 3 points, and the Netherlands by 3 points. Also, weightings were reduced in U.S., New Zealand, Spanish, and Emerging Asian stocks. In the fixed-income space, the allocation to Swedish paper was boosted by 12 points, France by 7 points, Canada by 5 points, the U.K. by 3 points, and Italy by 1 point. Allocation to New Zealand bonds was decreased by 6 points and U.S. Treasurys by 1 point. Chart 2Portfolio Total Returns Table 1Model Weights (As Of November 24, 2016) Currency Allocation Local currency-based indicators drive the construction of our model. As such, the performance of the model's portfolio should be compared with the local-currency global equity benchmark. The decision to hedge currency exposure should be made at the client's discretion, though from time to time, we do provide our recommendations. The dollar appreciated significantly in November following the U.S. presidential election. Our Dollar Capitulation Index spiked and is currently at levels that suggest the rally in the broad trade-weighted dollar could pause (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* And Capitulation Capital Market Indicators The momentum indicator for commodities has moved further into overbought territory, pushing up the overall risk index. This asset class remains excluded from the portfolio (Chart 4). The deterioration in the liquidity and momentum indicators has lifted the risk index for global equities to the highest level in over 2 years. Our model cut its weighting in equities for the fourth month in a row (Chart 5). Chart 4Commodity Index And Risk Chart 5Global Stock Market And Risk The risk index for U.S. stocks increased sharply in November. With stocks reaching new highs, the model trimmed its allocation to this bourse. The markets took note of the growth-positive aspects of Trump's policies, but seem complacent about the stronger dollar, higher interest rates, and the potential for trade protectionist policies (Chart 6). The risk index for euro area equities has ticked up slightly in November. However, unlike its U.S. peers, it remains in the low-risk zone. Above-trend growth could provide support for euro area equities. (Chart 7). Chart 6U.S. Stock Market And Risk Chart 7Euro Area Stock Market And Risk The risk index for Dutch equities ticked up slightly and the model has downgraded this asset. That said, the weighting in Dutch equities remains the highest among its euro area counterparts (Chart 8). Improvements in the value and momentum measures for Latin American stocks have been largely offset by a deteriorating liquidity reading. As a result, the risk index did not decline much after the selloff. The model decreased its allocation to this asset (Chart 9). Chart 8Dutch Stock Market And Risk Chart 9Latin American Stock Market And Risk Over the course of only a few months, the risk index for bonds has swung from an extremely high risk level to the low-risk zone. Momentum has been the primary driving force behind this move and currently suggests that yields could pull back in the near term (Chart 10). The risk index for U.S. Treasurys declined significantly in November. While the model used the latest selloff to boost its allocation to bonds, it preferred to add allocation to bond markets outside of Treasurys. (Chart 11). Chart 10Global Bond Yields And Risk Chart 11U.S. Bond Yields And Risk After the rise in yields, Canadian bonds are massively oversold based on our momentum measure. The extremely low-risk reading has prompted the model to allocate to this asset (Chart 12). German bonds are oversold, but the reading on the cyclical measure has become considerably more bund-unfriendly. The model opted not to include bunds in the overall boost to its bond allocation. (Chart 13). Chart 12Canadian Bond Yields And Risk Chart 13German Bond Yields And Risk The risk reading in French bonds is more favorable than for bunds. Apart from oversold momentum, the value reading has also improved. The model increased its allocation to French bonds (Chart 14). The cyclical component of the risk index for Swedish bonds keeps moving in a bond-bearish direction. But that is completely overshadowed by extremely oversold conditions. In fact, the overall risk index for Swedish bonds is the lowest within our bond universe. Much of the increase in overall bond allocation ended up in Swedish paper (Chart 15). Chart 14French Bond Yields And Risk Chart 15Swedish Bond Yields And Risk Following sharp gains, the 13-week momentum measure for the U.S. dollar has reached levels at which some consolidation may take place. But the recovery in the 40-week rate of change measure indicates that it would probably be a pause in the dollar bull market rather than a trend change. With the December rate hike baked in, the Fed's communication about the policy next year holds the key to the path of the dollar - in addition to the fiscal policy of the next administration (Chart 16). The Japanese yen has been a major victim of the dollar rally. The 13-week momentum measure is approaching levels that halted the yen weakening trend in 2013 and 2015. However, this time around, it is not coupled with the same signal from the 40-week rate of change measure. The BoJ is sticking to its easy monetary policy, and some additional support on the fiscal front could drag the yen lower, notwithstanding a possible hiatus in the short term. Short term the yen could benefit from an EM pullback (Chart 17). After the latest bout of depreciation, the euro seems poised for another attempt to break below 1.05. The 13-week and 40-week momentum measures do not preclude this from happening. However, it would probably take the ECB to reaffirm its dovish message to push EUR/USD technical indicators into more oversold territory (Chart 18). Chart 16U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* Chart 17Yen Chart 18Euro Miroslav Aradski, Senior Analyst miroslava@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the FTSE100 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the pound? Stay neutral in the Eurostoxx600 versus the FTSE100. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the Nikkei225 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the yen? Overweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the Nikkei 225. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the S&P500 reduces to: will European Banks outperform U.S. Technology? Underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Feature 2016 is the year of the political shock. But for investors, some things have stayed faithfully the same. Chart of the WeekEurostoxx Vs. Nikkei Reduces To: Will Euro/Yen Weaken? Last week's report From Berlin Wall To Mexican Wall explained how the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in a great era of globalization - an era in which goods, services, capital and people have moved around the world more and more freely. Chart I-2The Globalization Of Stock Markets For investors, one major upshot is that the world's biggest companies have also become more and more globalized. The leading European stock market indexes - Eurostoxx600, FTSE100, DAX30, CAC40 and many other national indexes - are now just a collection of multinational companies with a global footprint. The same applies to major indexes outside Europe, such as the Nikkei225 and S&P500. Before the era of globalization, many companies had little exposure to economies outside their country or region of domicile. Unsurprisingly, in the 1980s, a German bank share price was more correlated with the rest of the German stock market than it was with a U.S. bank share price. But today, a large proportion of sales and profits are sourced globally. The German bank share price is now more correlated with the U.S. bank share price than it is with the rest of the German stock market! (Chart I-2) This begs the question: if Brexit and President-elect Trump are ushering in a great era of anti-globalization, will the major indexes become parochial once again? The answer is perhaps, but it will be a slow process - even assuming that the anti-globalization rhetoric does fully materialize. Sometimes, Stock Market Allocation Reduces To A Currency View For the time being, one obvious distinction between the major indexes will remain instrumental in driving performance differences. The Eurostoxx600 is denominated in euros, the FTSE100 in pounds, the Nikkei225 in yen, and the S&P500 in dollars. However, the constituent companies' sales and profits are denominated in a mixture of major global currencies, or in dollars. So all else being equal, if the local currency weakens - in other words, if other global currencies strengthen versus the local currency - then index profits will rise in local currency terms. Meaning the index value must go up. And if the local currency strengthens, the index value must go down. Simplistic as it sounds, some important asset allocation decisions just reduce to a bi-lateral currency view. Chart I-3 clearly shows that Eurostoxx600 versus FTSE100 relative performance reduces to a simple question: will the euro weaken against the pound? If so, the Eurostoxx600 will outperform the FTSE100. And vice-versa. Clearly, the outlook for euro/pound has been an important question this year, and will be an equally important question next year. Chart I-3Eurostoxx Vs. FTSE Reduces To: Will Euro/Pound Weaken? Likewise, the Chart of the Week clearly shows that Eurostoxx600 versus Nikkei225 relative performance reduces to a similar simple question: will the euro weaken against the yen? If so, the Eurostoxx600 will outperform the Nikkei225. And vice-versa. Sometimes, Stock Market Allocation Reduces To A Sector View But in the case of the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500, relative performance does not reduce to the direction of euro/dollar. Since mid-2014, the euro has weakened substantially versus the dollar, yet the Eurostoxx600 has underperformed the S&P500. This is because another factor drives this relative performance pair (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Does Not ##br##Depend On Euro/Dollar... Chart I-5...Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Does Depend ##br##On Banks Vs. Technology Although major indexes are a collection of multinational companies, it doesn't follow that the sector exposures of these indexes will be the same. Comparing the Eurostoxx600 with the S&P500, the Eurostoxx600 has a marked overexposure to Banks and an especially marked underexposure to Technology (Table I-1). Table I-1Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 = Overweight##br## Banks, Underweight Technology Banks comprise 13% of the Eurostoxx600 market capitalization but only 6% of the S&P500. On the flipside, Technology comprises just 4% of the Eurostoxx600 market capitalization but a very substantial 21% of the S&P500. To repeat, multinational company share prices today are more correlated with their global sector than with their domestic stock market of listing. Recently, this has been true even for U.S. Banks - which amazingly have shown a higher correlation with European Banks than with the rest of the U.S. stock market. It follows that when two indexes are distinguished by large sector skews, these sector skews will drive relative performance. Our Special Reports Picking Countries The Right Way 1 Parts 1, 2 and 3 showed that this is the case for most head to head stock market comparisons within Europe. It is also the case for the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Put simply, for the Eurostoxx600 to outperform the S&P500 on a sustained basis, Banks must outperform Technology on a sustained basis. Or to be more precise, European Banks must outperform U.S. Technology (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Reduces To: Will European Banks Outperform U.S. Technology? Applying Reductionism To The Eurostoxx600 We can now apply investment reductionism to position the Eurostoxx600 against three other major indexes: the FTSE100, the Nikkei225 and the S&P500. 1. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the FTSE100 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the pound? For the foreseeable future, the euro/pound exchange rate hinges on the perceived severity of Brexit. In this regard, there is unlikely to be meaningful new information until the U.K. Supreme Court delivers its verdict on the legal process that the U.K. government must follow. The verdict is due in January. So for the time being, it is appropriate to stay neutral in the Eurostoxx600 versus the FTSE100. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the Nikkei225 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the yen? 2. The euro/yen exchange rate hinges on ECB/BoJ relative monetary policy. Given that the BoJ made its bold policy move a few months ago, the focus now is on whether the ECB will continue with QE beyond March 2017. Chart I-7European Banks Do Not Offer An Especially##br## Large Discount To U.S. Technology The minutes of the ECB's most recent policy meeting provide some clues. On the one hand, the central bank cautioned on the unintended consequences of extended QE: "The possible side effects of the low interest rate environment and the range of non-standard measures in place on the longer-term intermediation capacity of banks and other financial institutions had to be further examined" On the other hand, the ECB emphasised: "(QE) was set to run... in any case until the ECB saw a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim... underlying inflation, however, continued to lack clear signs of a convincing upward trend." On this basis, it seems that the ECB will extend its QE program beyond March 2017, as well as give a strong commitment to keep policy rates anchored. But the recent underperformance of the Eurostoxx600 versus Nikkei225 has discounted a sizable strengthening of euro/yen. It is appropriate to lean against this and overweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the Nikkei225. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the S&P500 reduces to: will European Banks outperform U.S. Technology? Again, the minutes of the ECB's most recent policy meeting perfectly summarized the environment for European banks: "Ongoing structural challenges to banks' balance sheets, notably arising from still high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) in parts of the euro area banking sector, in conjunction with regulatory challenges (BRRD), and the weakness in profitability were seen to pose a risk to the transmission of monetary policy and a further recovery in credit dynamics" Or as we recently put it,2 European bank investors are fighting three long-term headwinds: BRRD, NPLs and NIRP. Yet on a price to forward earnings multiple, European Banks do not offer an especially large discount to U.S. Technology (Chart I-7). Therefore, investment reductionism says it is appropriate to underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the three European Investment Strategy Special Reports 'Picking 5 European Countries The Right Way' November 13, 2014, 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 2' March 26, 2015 and 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 3' November 12, 2015, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "All Roads Lead To Banks", dated October 6, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The recent sharp moves in markets offer another opportunity for a long plantinum / short palladium pair-trade. A similar opportunity on October 6 successfully signaled a 13% countertrend move. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-8 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations