Equities
Highlights The U.S. dollar will likely overshoot. This is negative for EM. China by and large has a choice between two potential roadmaps: (1) short-term pain / long-term gain and (2) growth stagnation with mini-cycles around it. Regardless of which scenario transpires - so far the second scenario has been in effect - the medium-term outlook is downbeat. Given we are already advanced in this mini-cycle, the risk-reward for China plays in financial markets is negative. Feature Chart I-1Equity Investors Are ##br##Bullish With Minimum Hedges The U.S. dollar is overbought, but the primary trend remains up. A confluence of cyclical and structural economic forces, along with geopolitical and political risks, argue for further upside in the greenback. As the dollar grinds higher, emerging markets (EM) will suffer. EM stocks, currencies, and credit markets will not only underperform their developed market (DM) peers, but also relapse in absolute terms in the months ahead. Additional U.S. dollar strength and ongoing complacency in the U.S. equity market (Chart I-1) means that the 6-12 month outlook for global equity markets is poor. While momentum can carry DM markets higher in the very near term, EM share prices have already topped out, and the path of the least resistance is down. Dollar appreciation will be brought on by both global/EM and U.S. dynamics. Global Factors Supporting The U.S. Dollar The following global factors support the greenback's strength: Global demand for U.S. dollars is rising faster than the supply of U.S. dollars. We computed two measures of U.S. dollar liquidity. Measure 1 is the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held in custody for foreign official and international accounts. Measure 2 is the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreign residents (Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B). Chart I-2AU.S. Dollar Liquidity (Measure 2) Chart I-2BU.S. Dollar Liquidity (Measure 1) Notably, the U.S. monetary base and the amount of U.S. Treasury securities held by foreign official and international accounts are contracting, while the amount of U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreigners has stalled (Chart I-3). The monetary base shrinkage manifests the rise in reverse repos by the Fed, i.e., the Fed is siphoning in the banks' excess reserves (Chart I-3, bottom panel). The weakness in foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities is largely due to the selling of U.S. securities by EM central banks to provide U.S. dollars in order to meet strong dollar demand locally. China is the largest contributor to the surge in U.S. dollar demand as the depletion of its international reserves has been enormous. In short, the drop in U.S. dollar liquidity does not mean that U.S. dollar supply is shrinking. Instead, it implies that the demand for U.S. dollars is accelerating relative to its supply. When the pace of demand growth outpaces that of supply, the price of that commodity, good/service, or asset, rises. This will be the case for the greenback - it will appreciate further. Importantly, the RMB will remain under downward pressure, which will drag down other Asian currencies. China's unaccounted net capital outflows - measured by the balance of payment's net errors and omissions - have swelled to a record level of US$ 205 billion, or 2% of GDP (Chart I-4). Furthermore, the PBoC has been conducting full-out "reverse" sterilization of its U.S. dollar sales. By selling U.S. dollars to defend the RMB, the PBoC initially shrunk local currency liquidity. To preclude onshore interbank interest rates from spiking, the mainland monetary authorities have simultaneously re-injected RMB into the system via outright lending to banks and open-market operations (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Chart I-4China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows Chart I-5The PBoC: By doing so, they have kept interest rates low, but the supply of high-powered money has been restored. It is reasonable to expect such RMB liquidity injections to continue. This, in turn, will allow commercial banks to continue creating money/credit/deposits out of thin air. As such, the mushrooming supply of yuan will weigh on the currency's value. We discussed these issues in detail in our November 23, 2016 Special Report, titled China: Money Creation Redux and RMB.1 U.S. dollar borrowing costs are rising: Not only have U.S. bond yields spiked but the LIBOR rate has also continued its unrelenting uptrend, especially when compared to the EURIBOR (Chart I-6). Higher borrowing costs and expectations for further U.S. dollar strength will make non-American debtors with U.S. dollar liabilities reluctant to keep their short dollar exposure. They will try to either repay U.S. dollar debt or hedge it. This will ultimately increase the demand for U.S. dollars in the months ahead. Importantly, EM countries (outside of China) have US$ 5 trillion of foreign currency debt outstanding. Thus, higher U.S. borrowing costs will raise the demand for U.S. dollars as debtors rush to repay or hedge their U.S. dollar liabilities. We published an extensive review of EM foreign currency debt on January 4 in our Weekly Report titled EM: Overview of External Debt.2 This report provides information about various categories of borrowers (government, nonfinancial companies and financials), types of debt (loans versus bonds) and debt maturity (short- versus long-term) for each individual developing economy. The report also ranks countries according to their foreign debt burdens and short-term funding pressures. This report can be accessed by clicking on the link on page 19. The yield differential between EM local bonds and U.S. Treasurys has narrowed (Chart I-7), as U.S. bond yields have risen more than duration-adjusted EM domestic bond yields. Such a compression in the spread has reduced the attractiveness of EM local bonds. As U.S. bond yields resume their ascent, odds are that inflows into EM local bonds will diminish, and EM bonds will sell off. Chart I-8 illustrates that the J.P. Morgan EMLI EM currency total return index (including carry) has failed to break above an important technical resistance. When such a technical profile transpires, it is often followed by a major breakdown. Chart I-6Rising LIBOR Will Hurt Debtors ##br##With U.S. Dollar Liabilities Chart I-7The EM-U.S. Bond Yield ##br##Gap Has Narrowed Chart I-8EM Currency Return With ##br##Carry: More Downside Trade protectionism is bound to rise. The proposed U.S. Border-Adjusted Corporate Tax and any potential U.S. import tariffs will lead many exporter countries to devalue their currencies substantially to offset the loss in exporter revenues in local- currency terms. For example, Chart I-9 shows that U.S. import prices from China have been deflating in U.S. dollar terms but have risen a lot in RMB terms. The latter is what matters to producers. Hence, China and many other exporters to the U.S. will seek to devalue their currencies further to offset import tariffs and the resulting drop in US. dollar revenues from their sales in America. Finally, the outlook for foreign capital inflows (both FDI and equity flows) into EM remains very poor. EM growth is weak and will remain so. The growth acceleration in advanced economies will not help EM economies much for reasons we discussed at length in our December 14, 2016 Weekly Report.3 Remarkably, the worsening trend in relative manufacturing PMIs between EM and DM suggests EM growth and share prices will continue to underperform DM (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Deflation In U.S. Dollars, Rising In RMB Terms Chart I-10EM Will Continue Underperforming DM Bottom Line: The current confluence of global economic forces and rising trade protectionism in the U.S. will propel the U.S. dollar higher. Domestic Underpinnings Of The U.S. Dollar Rising U.S. interest rate expectations will extend the U.S. dollar rally: The U.S. labor market is tight, and wage growth is accelerating (Chart I-11). This is what the Federal Reserve has been waiting for years, and the central bank will now gradually but steadily ramp up its hawkishness. This will push up U.S. interest rate expectations and prop up the dollar. The exchange rate appreciation will cool off the manufacturing sector at a time when the rest of the economy will be robust. In brief, a strong dollar will be needed to avoid overheating in the U.S. economy. While an overshoot in the dollar will certainly have a deflationary impact on the U.S. economy, especially its manufacturing sector, the negative impact will be somewhat offset because of potential trade protectionist measures introduced by the U.S. authorities. Remarkably, U.S. interest rates are still too low. In particular, 10-year TIPS yields are a mere 0.5%, and long-term bond yields are low relative to wage growth (Chart I-12). Chart I-11U.S. Labor Market Is Tight Chart I-12U.S. Bond Yields Are Low U.S. credit growth is strong and the real estate market is vibrant. There is no reason for U.S. interest rates to stay at emergency low levels that have prevailed since the Lehman crisis. Notably, potential fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration warrants higher interest rates to avoid boom-bust cycles. The Fed will tighten policy sooner rather than later, as policymakers know that policy works with time lags and they will not wait for the economic impact of fiscal spending to works its way through the economy. We believe the 50 basis points hikes over the next 12 months currently priced into the U.S. fixed income market are too low, and interest rate expectations will climb by about 50 basis points in the months ahead. Finally, the U.S. dollar has not yet overshot. It is only modestly above its fair value, according to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. Typically, bull and bear markets do not end at fair value; financial markets tend to over- and under-shoot. We believe the U.S. dollar is primed to overshoot before this current bull run peters out. Bottom Line: Robust U.S. growth and tight labor market conditions put the U.S. in a unique global position to tolerate a stronger currency, for a while. We continue recommending short positions in a basket of the following EM currencies: KRW, IDR, MYR, TRY, ZAR, BRL, CLP and COP. We are also short the RMB via 12-month NDFs. China: Growth Revival And Hard Choices Ahead China's growth has revived, spurred by another round of credit and fiscal stimulus. However, BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team maintains that the latest improvement in growth will prove unsustainable and vulnerabilities abound. In particular: Despite improving economic data, the Chinese equity indexes have fared extremely poorly. China's MSCI Investable index was essentially flat during 2016, and domestic A-shares were down 20% in the U.S. dollar terms. This compares with 9.5%, 5.7% and 8.5% gains in the S&P 500, global, and EM share prices in U.S. dollar terms, respectively, over the course of 2016. The relative performance of the Chinese MSCI Investable index to the global stock index has rolled over after failing to break above its technical resistance (Chart I-13, top panel). The same is true for share prices in absolute terms (Chart I-13, bottom panel). These chart profiles hint that Chinese stocks have failed to enter a bull market, and downside is material. How do we explain the divergence between weak Chinese share prices and the rally in commodities prices and commodities stocks globally? Chart I-14 demonstrates that apart from the 2014-'15 bubble run in Chinese equities, the latter's relative performance versus global stocks has been a good forward-looking indicator for industrial metals prices. Chart I-13Chinese Stocks Have ##br##Failed To Break Out Chart I-14Underperformance Of Chinese ##br##Stocks Bodes Ill For Commodities Based on this chart and our qualitative analysis, our bias is to argue that the poor performance of Chinese share prices signals lingering downside risks in Chinese growth, and an associated drop in commodities prices and commodities related equities. Besides, the rally in both oil and metals can largely be explained by investor buying rather than by the real economy demand exceeding supply. Chart I-15 shows that net long positions of non-commercial traders (investors) in oil and copper are overextended. In addition, OECD oil product inventories continue their unrelenting uptrend, suggesting that supply is still exceeding consumption (Chart I-16). Following property market restrictions, China's home purchases have dived (Chart I-17). This will depress construction activity, which will weigh on demand for industrial goods/equipment and commodities over course of 2017. Chart I-15Traders Are Very Long Oil And Copper Chart I-16Global Oil Inventories Continue Rising Chart I-17China: Home Sales Have Plummeted Onshore bond yields, including corporate bond yields, have spiked, and the PBoC has allowed the repo rate for non-bank financial organizations to rise. This will, at a minimum, dampen non-bank (shadow) credit growth. Given that non-bank credit (entrusted loan, trusted loan, bank acceptance bill and net corporate bond issuance) accounts for 30% of total outstanding claims on companies and households, a deceleration in non-bank (shadow) credit will have a non-trivial impact on growth. Finally, there are considerable geopolitical and political risks in and around China. Many investors have become sanguine about China-related political risks, assuming the authorities will guarantee growth remains robust going into the fall 2017 Party Congress, which will decide on the leadership transition. However, a drop in perceived China-linked risks could be a sign of the calm before the storm. First off, the Chinese government might strive for economic stability ahead of this fall's Party Congress, but political volatility ahead of that time cannot be ruled out. It is an open secret that President Xi Jinping's aggressive consolidation of power and "non-collegial" decision-making has created opposition within the Communist party. The opposition cannot wait past the Party Congress when President Xi further strengthens his grip on power. The opposition, if it is able, will likely attempt to strike preemptively in order to prevent a further consolidation of power by President Xi. While it is impossible to know details or forecast the dynamics of the Communist Party's internal discourse, investors should not be complacent. Second, China will retaliate in some form against U.S. trade protectionist measures. It is difficult to know how this trade standoff between the U.S. and China will unfold, but our sense is that risks are underpriced in global financial markets. U.S.-China trade disputes could evolve into broader geopolitical tensions in Asia. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has written about geopolitical risks in Asia at great length.4 In short, political and geopolitical risks abound in and around China. Remarkably, in recent years financial markets have been more preoccupied by political rather than economic developments. Examples include Brazil, Turkey, Malaysia, Russia, the Philippines, Mexico, and South Africa. In these countries, financial markets have been much more sensitive to political changes than economic fundamentals. This may be the case in China too. Growth could stay firm for a while, but the markets will sell off based on heightened political and geopolitical volatility and tensions. Apart from the above-mentioned downside risks, China's growth model is facing two major ways forward from a big-picture perspective: 1. Short-Term Pain / Long-Term Gain: If the authorities were to allow market forces to prevail, the state should withdraw meaningfully from the credit allocation process. In that case, credit markets will bring discipline to both debtors and creditors - in effect, an emerging perception of potential losses rather government-led bailouts will make creditors less willing to lend, and debtors less willing to borrow and expand. The result will be a considerable dampening in credit origination. In this scenario, it is very likely that credit growth slows from 12% currently to the level of potential nominal GDP growth of 7-8% or lower (Chart I-18), leading to a classic credit-driven economic downtrend (Chart I-19). In that case, cyclical growth will undershoot. Chart I-18China: Credit Is Outpacing GDP ##br##Growth By Wide Margin Capitalist-Style Credit-Driven Downtrend However, potential GDP growth (the red line in Chart I-19) - which has been falling in recent years - will stabilize and probably improve. The reason being that by allowing market forces to prevail in credit allocation and corporate restructuring/reorganization, China will ultimately improve its capital allocation and productivity. In brief, potential GDP growth - which equals productivity growth plus labor force growth - will stop falling and, in fact, could improve as productivity growth ameliorates. 2. No Short-Term Pain But Long-Term Stagnation: It is essential to differentiate cyclical growth drivers from structural ones. If the government does not allow credit growth to slow, cyclical growth will hold up. However, in this scenario, structural growth will tumble and China will embark on a path of economic stagnation. As we have argued in past reports,5 banks in any country can originate unlimited amounts of credit/money/deposits if and when the central bank accommodates them, and shareholders and regulators do not object. China has been following this model over the past several years. Yet, this model does not bring about lasting prosperity. On the contrary, it leads to economic stagnation. China would be no different in this scenario, though the growth deceleration would be gradual, as depicted in Chart I-20. Toward Socialism = Secular Stagnation A rising role of state and government officials in capital allocation and business decision-making guarantees suboptimal capital allocation, resulting in poor efficiency and declining productivity growth. Since China's labor force growth is projected to be flat-to-negative (Chart I-21), the sole source of potential GDP growth going forward will be productivity growth. If the authorities do not allow market forces to play a larger role in resource allocation, including credit, the former will contract. The bullish camp on China argues that the authorities have a firm grip and control over the economy, and that they will never allow it to slow by injecting an unlimited amount of credit and fiscal stimulus. While this may be true, policymakers can do that, it is not a reason to be bullish. Quite the opposite: it is a reason to be structurally bearish on Chinese growth. Unrelenting credit and fiscal stimulus, and a resurging role of government in resource allocation, corporate restructuring, and increasingly in business decision-making, means the economy is moving back toward its socialist bend. In socialist economies, productivity growth is weak or sometimes negative. China's success over the past 30 years was based on a move towards private enterprise, entrepreneurism, and transition toward a more market-based model, and not on government credit injections. As China refuses to give greater say to market forces, and state officials and bureaucrats gets even more involved in credit and resource allocation to prevent genuine deleveraging and bankruptcies, economic efficiency and productivity will suffer. If we assume China's productivity is now about 6% (which is already a very high number) (Chart I-22), and if the country embarks down this path, odds are that productivity growth might drop by 100 basis points in each of the following years. In five years or so, productivity growth would be only around 1%. Given that labor force growth will be zero, if not contracting, in five years' time, potential GDP will drop to 1% or so, as shown in Chart I-20 on page 14. Hence, this path is the ultimate recipe for economic stagnation in China. Chart I-21China: Labor Force Is Projected To Contract Chart I-22Socialist Put Will Depress Productivity Growth The only thing the authorities can do in this scenario is to boost growth from time to time via credit and fiscal stimulus. This will produce mini-recovery cycles around a falling primary growth trend. The latest acceleration in China's growth is probably the first mini-cycle. How can investors invest in this scenario? The mini-cycles depicted in Chart I-20 on page 14 look nice, because we drew them ourselves. In reality, they will not be symmetric or smooth. Besides, financial market swings for China-related plays will differ from the economy's growth mini-cycles because markets can be driven by factors other than growth like politics, geopolitics, credit events, and other global variables such as the U.S. dollar and bond yields. In short, this analysis explains why we have been and remain bearish on China-related financial markets despite the stimulus that has been injected about a year ago. Investing around economic mini-cycles is difficult because it assumes near-perfect timing. Without that, investors cannot make money. Bottom Line: China by and large has two potential roadmaps going forward: (1) Short-term pain / long-term gain and (2) growth stagnation with mini-cycles around it. Regardless of which scenario transpires - so far, the second scenario has been in effect - the medium-term outlook is negative. Given that we are already advanced in the mini-cycle, the risk-reward for China plays in financial markets is negative. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, link available on page 19. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "EM: Overview Of External Debt," dated January 4, 2017, link available on page 19. 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Key EM Issues Going Into 2017," dated December 14, 2016, link available on page 19. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, links available on page 19. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Overweight One of the most glaring divergences between our macro indicators and relative share price performance exists in the consumer staples sector. Since the U.S. election, this sector has been used as a source of capital to fund more speculative investments in areas levered to global economic growth, such as industrials. An exploitable undershoot has developed in a sector with one of the best 12 and 24-month track records during Fed tightening cycles. The sector is undervalued, and is resting at an oversold extreme, based on our Technical Indicator. Our Cyclical Macro Indicator for the sector is grinding higher, supported by consumers' persistent preference for saving vs. spending, a plus for retail sales at non-discretionary stores. Tack on a budding recovery in consumer staples exports (bottom panel), and the nascent acceleration in sector sales growth should strengthen further, supporting earnings outperformance. For our complete list of high-conviction calls, please refer to yesterday's Weekly Report.
Yesterday, we introduced our top ten high conviction calls for 2017. The turn of the calendar does not require a change in strategy. Navigating a Fed tightening cycle, a divergence between economic and profit performance and significant patience with respect to the rollout of fiscal stimulus will all be critical to driving sub-surface equity performance this year. Moreover, we expect the U.S. dollar to remain firm, based on the relentless widening in interest rate differentials and policy divergences with the rest of the world. As such, our key themes of favoring domestic vs. globally-exposed equities, and consumer-geared vs. corporate spending-dependent industries remain intact. Perhaps our biggest out of consensus call is to overweight the much maligned consumer staples sector, please see the next Insight.
Highlights The economy is near full employment, but betting on significant inflation is premature. Market-based inflation expectations have risen substantially in recent weeks but these moves are not corroborated by survey measures of inflation expectations. Consumer inflation expectations are very well anchored due to ongoing deflation in many frequently purchased goods and services. We are on high alert for a near-term equity pullback, with Chinese liquidity tightening as a potential catalyst. Feature Chart 1Market-Based Inflation ##br##Expectations Breaking Out After years of focusing on deflation, the possibility of inflation has made a comeback on investors' radars. The shift makes sense, given that the labor market is now operating near full employment. The December payroll report showed that payrolls increased by 156,000, slightly lower than the 3-month average of 165,000. But, average hourly earnings increased by 0.4%, suggesting that slightly weaker employment growth is not due to sluggish demand, and reflects a smaller available pool of workers. However, as we explain below, the potential for a major inflation surge is low in 2017 and is premature as an investment theme. We are on high alert for a near-term pullback to the equity bull market, given that valuation and sentiment are stretched. But as we outline, the threat to the equity market is less likely to be domestic inflation than an external event, such as the fallout from tightening liquidity in China (similar to what occurred in mid-2015 and early 2016). In the past few weeks, one-year inflation expectations have moved to their highest level since mid-2014, when oil prices were above $110/bbl. Long-run inflation expectations have also spiked since the U.S. election (Chart 1). The extent to which this trend is judged sustainable, and provides an accurate forecast for general inflation, has important investment implications. Our view is that, although TIPS could move a bit higher, the market move should not be interpreted as a harbinger for a broad-based inflation acceleration. Policymakers consider a range of inflation expectations measures, but in recent years, market-based measures have garnered a lot of attention. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate in particular is often viewed as the market's assessment of whether the Fed can successfully achieve its inflation target. According to the Minutes of the December FOMC meeting, the recent rise in market-based inflation expectations was discussed at length. On this basis, the rise in TIPS is important as it could have a significant role in setting monetary policy. Beyond that, we have argued for some time that a major challenge for firms this cycle will be to raise selling prices, i.e. a lack of pricing power will restrain profit margins and, ultimately, earnings growth. If the recent pick-up in market-based inflation expectations heralds a more robust rise in actual inflation, then profits could positively surprise this year. The Rise In TIPS Is Partially Energy-Driven... Since 2010, there has been a strong correlation between oil prices and TIPS (Chart 2). The correlation has somewhat confounded policymakers.1 In theory, any oil price shock, even if it is considered to be permanent, should not exert any lasting impact on long-dated forward measures of inflation expectations. The reason is that as long as the Fed is committed to its 2% inflation target, then the market should expect that monetary policy will prevent a one-time shock to oil prices from having any permanent effect on the overall inflation rate. This is why, in theory, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate is a good indicator for policymakers. Chart 2Oil Prices And Breakevens As our fixed income team explained in a report last year,2 the main reason for the tight correlation between TIPS and oil prices stems from the market perception that monetary policy has been constrained. Prior to the financial crisis, oil prices rose from below $40 in 2003 to $140 in 2008. During that time, long-dated breakevens remained stable. One possible explanation for this lack of correlation is that the Fed tightened policy during this period, offsetting the inflationary impact from higher oil prices. But in 2015-2016, when oil prices fell from above $100 to below $40, breakevens plunged alongside. If the market perceives monetary policy to be constrained by the zero lower bound, then it could be the case that the cost of inflation compensation is highly sensitive to falling oil prices because the market perceives that the Fed has no ability to offset the deflationary shock. In other words, the 5-year/5-year TIPS breakeven rate has fallen because the zero lower bound is challenging the credibility of the Fed's inflation target. Our U.S. fixed income team forecasted that breakevens will head higher once oil prices move up and that the correlation between oil prices and breakevens will eventually weaken as the fed funds rate moves further away from the zero lower bound. The bottom line is that TIPS are most likely being unduly affected by energy price movements. ..And Only Thinly Corroborated By Alternative Inflation Indicators Despite our bias that the recent moves in market-based inflation expectations are exaggerated, TIPS are not the only gauge sending a more inflationary signal. This week's ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys both reported an uptick in prices paid (Chart 3). According to the manufacturing survey, 18 out of 21 recorded inputs were up in price over the past month. However, the bulk of these are commodities that have gone up in price alongside other financial market prices, and it is not clear the extent that the price rise is physical demand-driven, or financial demand-driven. In the non-manufacturing survey, the price rise was not quite as broad-based, but is nonetheless suggestive of upward price pressure. The NFIB small business survey also hinted at higher prices, although much more modestly than the ISM surveys (Chart 3). The Atlanta Fed's Business Inflation Expectations Survey has not broken out of the range that has held since 2011. There was no change in inflation expectations from the most recent survey of professional forecasters. Meanwhile, as we noted last week, consumers are not at all worried about inflation. In fact, according to the Conference Board survey, consumer inflation expectations are at a new cyclical low! At least part of the reason that consumers do not expect more inflation is likely due to their experience with frequently-purchased items. Table 1 shows inflation rates for selected high-frequency spending items, which account for about 30% of the total CPI basket. The table makes it easy to understand why perceptions about inflation are low: almost half of the items in the table are in deflation and only two are above the Fed's target of 2%. It may not matter that a good or service accounts for a small share of spending: if its price is going up/down at a steady pace, then there will be an impact on perceptions about inflation. Currently, very low or negative rates of inflation among frequently purchased items are likely pulling down consumers' perceptions of broad-based inflation. In this sense, one could argue that inflation expectations are very well-anchored. Chart 3Survey-Based Inflation ##br##Expectations More Mixed Table 1Inflation Rates For Selected ##br## High-Frequency Spending Items Actual Inflation Will Stay Subdued In 2017... Chart 4Only Mild Uptrend Likely In 2017 For many years, we have deconstructed core CPI and core PCE into their three major components to better understand and forecast the trend in consumer price inflation (Chart 4). Performing this exercise today continues to give a fairly benign forecast for inflation. Shelter, the largest component of core CPI, is mostly determined by rental vacancies which appear to be stabilizing just as market rents are rolling over. Our model suggests that shelter will not drive inflation higher in 2017. Core goods inflation (25% of core CPI) will also remain very low and possibly stay in deflationary territory. This component of inflation is most tightly correlated with the trade-weighted dollar (Chart 4, panel 3), and so will stay depressed as long as the bull market in the dollar remains intact. Wage growth is most tightly correlated with service sector inflation excluding shelter and medical care (Chart 4, bottom panel). This component, which accounts for 25% of core CPI, is the most likely source of inflation pressure now that wages are beginning to rise. But as we wrote in a Special Report on November 28, 2016, any wage inflation and pass-through is likely to be very gradual based on several structural headwinds at play this cycle. All in all, core PCE may converge on the Fed's target of 2% in the second half of 2017, but an inflation overshoot should not be a major driver of investment decision-making over the next six - twelve months. ...And Don't Blame Government Spending For Higher Inflation When It Does Come One missing ingredient from the above analysis is the likelihood that the political environment will become inflationary. This subject has been thoroughly covered by the financial press. Our own view has been that upcoming policies may not turn out to be particularly inflationary, at least not this year. For example, Trump's fiscal package may not boost aggregate demand by as much as the more optimistic estimates suggest. There simply are not enough marquee "shovel-ready" projects around that can make use of the public-private partnership structure that Trump's plan envisions in 2017. As for proposed personal tax cuts, the impact is likely to be modest, given that the benefits are tilted towards higher income groups that tend to save much of their earnings. Likewise, corporate tax cuts will have only an incremental effect on business capex, given that many companies are already flush with cash and effective tax rates are well below statutory levels. Our benign view about the impact of government spending on inflation is shared by researchers at the St Louis Federal Reserve. In a recent paper,3 researchers looked at periods when the central bank was not working to offset the potentially inflationary effects of fiscal policy, e.g. between 1959 and 1979, when the Fed followed a policy in which it accommodated increases in inflation. They found almost no effect of government spending on inflation. For example, a 10 percent increase in government spending during that period led to an 8 basis point decline in inflation. Note that this period covers years of when the economy was operating at full employment and below. As the researchers point out, this does not imply that countercyclical government spending is ineffective at boosting output, but it simply demonstrates that empirical evidence of inflation related to government spending is thin. The bottom line is that we view the likelihood of significant inflation pressure as low in 2017. The implication is that under this scenario, the Fed can afford to adjust their "dots" gradually, diminishing the risk for stocks and bonds of an aggressive adjustment to the policy backdrop. Equity Correction: Will China Be A Contributing Factor? Chart 5Is China Liquidity Tightening##br## A Repeat Threat To U.S. Equities? Over the past few weeks, we have argued that the odds of a meaningful equity correction are running high, given the aggressive rise in bond yields and exaggerated move in sentiment relative to only minor upside surprises in economic and earnings growth. We are still on high alert for this outcome and believe that one possible trigger is tighter liquidity conditions in China, which are aimed at supporting the renminbi. Indeed, just like the start of 2016, the Chinese renminbi is kicking off 2017 on a weak note. Chinese policymakers are again tightening rules to limit capital outflows: earlier this week, they adjusted the FX basket used to set the CNY's official daily fix. The new FX basket will include 24 currencies (up from 13). Consequently, the weight of the U.S. dollar drops from 26.4% to 22.4%. This will make it easier for the authorities to target a relatively stable renminbi versus the basket even as USD/CNY pushes higher. These attempts to support the renminbi is leading to tighter liquidity conditions and higher interbank interest rates. In Hong Kong, 3-month CNH Hibor has spiked to 10%. In the past, a combination of a weaker renminbi and rising interbank rates has spelled trouble for U.S. and global equities (Chart 5). There is no guarantee that history will repeat itself and one big difference with the sharp market sell-offs in mid-2015 and early 2016 is that the Chinese economy is not as weak as it was then. The PMIs released this week were generally firm. Overall, we are positive on equities and negative on bonds on a 12-month horizon but still see the risk of a correction to the Trump trade as elevated. Thus, investors should continue to stick close to benchmark tactically, looking to implement positions after a pullback in stock prices. Like in 2015 and early 2016, China could provide the trigger to that pullback if the authorities give up on capital controls and allow a sharp depreciation of the RMB. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/Bullard/remarks/Bullard-N… 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "A Tale Of Two Rallies", dated March 29, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2016/may/how-does-government-…
Highlights Portfolio Strategy A battle between tighter monetary conditions and the anticipation of fiscal largesse will be a dominant market theme this year. Our high-conviction equity allocation calls do not require making a major directional global economic bet, or second guessing the Fed's desire to continue tightening. The bulk of our calls could currently be considered contrarian, based on recent market momentum and sub-surface relative valuation swings. Recent Changes S&P Insurance Index - Downgrade to high-conviction underweight. Nasdaq Biotech Index - Downgrade to high-conviction underweight. Feature Stocks have already paid for a significant acceleration in earnings and economic growth this year and beyond. Fourth quarter earnings season will be the first real test of investor expectations since the post-election market surge. While recent data have been encouraging, forward corporate profit guidance is unlikely to be robust in the face of the U.S. dollar juggernaut. Currently, the hope is that fiscal stimulus will offset tighter monetary settings, ultimately delivering a higher plane of economic activity. The major risks are that the economy loses momentum before fiscal spending cranks up, and/or that profits diverge from a more resilient economic performance than liquidity conditions forecast. Indeed, fiscal stimulus isn't slated to accelerate until next year (Chart 1), while the impact of anti-growth market moves is far more imminent. Our Reflation Gauge has plunged, heralding economic disappointment (Chart 1). With the economy near full employment, Fed hawkishness could persist even in the face of any initial evidence of economic cooling. Under these conditions, the gap between nominal GDP and 10-year Treasury yields could turn negative in the first half of the year (Chart 2), which would be a major warning sign for stocks. Chart 1Fiscal Stimulus Is Still A Long Way Off Chart 2Warning Signal As a result, while the market has recently been focused almost solely on return, our emphasis at this juncture is on minimizing risk. That is consistent with the historic market performance during Fed tightening cycles. Going back to the early-1970s and using the last seven Fed interest rate hiking periods, it is evident that non-cyclical sector relative performance benefits immensely on both a 12 and 24 month horizon from the onset of Fed tightening (Charts 3 and 4). Cyclical sectors typically lag the broad market, while financials generally market perform1. Chart 312-Month Performance After Fed Hikes Chart 424-Month Performance After Fed Hikes Some of the other major macro forces that are likely to influence the broad market and sectoral trends are: Ongoing strength in the U.S. dollar and its drag on top-line growth: loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy is a classic recipe for currency strength. Tack on high and rising interest rate differentials due to policy divergences with the rest of the world (Chart 5), and exchange rate strength is likely to persist in the absence of a major domestic economic downturn. A tough-talking Fed. Wage growth is accelerating and broadening out, and will sharpen the Fed's focus on inflation expectations. With dollar strength constraining revenue growth potential, strong wage gains are profit margin sapping (Chart 2). A divergence between economic growth and profit performance, i.e. stronger growth is unlikely to feed into equal growth in corporate sector earnings given the squeeze on profit margins from a recovery in labor's ability to garner a larger share of aggregate income. Disappointment and/or uncertainty as to the timing and rollout of the much anticipated fiscal spending programs and unfunded tax cuts. Favoring domestic vs. global exposure will remain a key theme. Emerging markets (EM) have not validated the sharp jump in the global vs. domestic stocks, nor cyclical vs. defensives (Chart 6). Chart 5Greenback Is A Drag##br## On S&P 500 Top Line Growth Chart 6Mind##br## The Gap EM stocks are pro-cyclical, and outperform when economic growth prospects are perceived to be improving. The surging U.S. dollar is a growth impediment for many developing countries with large foreign liabilities to service. The U.S. PMI is gaining vs. the Chinese and euro area PMI (Chart 7, second panel), heralding a rebound in cyclical share price momentum. World export growth remains anemic and will remain so based on EM currency trends (Chart 7). When compared with the reacceleration in U.S. retail sales, the outlook for domestically-sourced profits is even brighter. The other key sectoral theme is to favor areas geared to the consumer rather than the corporate sector. Consumer income statements and balance sheets are far healthier than those of the corporate sector (Chart 8). As a result, they are in a more propitious position to spend and expand. Chart 7Domestics Will Rise To The Occasion Chart 8Consumers Trump The Corporate Sector We expect all of these forces to truncate rally attempts in 2017. The market is already stretching far enough technically to flag risk of a potentially sizeable correction in the first quarter, i.e. greater than 10%, particularly given the significant tightening in monetary conditions and overheating bullish sentiment that have developed. In other words, it is not an environment to chase the post-election winners, nor turn bearish on the losers that have been eschewed. Against this backdrop, we are introducing our top ten high-conviction calls for 2017. As always, these calls are fundamentally-based and we expect them to have longevity and/or meaningful relative return potential, rather than just reflect recent momentum trends. We recognize the difficulty of trading in and out of positions on a short-term basis. Energy Services - Overweight Chart 9Playable Rally The energy sector scores well in relative performance terms when the Fed is hiking interest rates2, supporting a high-conviction overweight in the energy services group. OPEC's agreement to curtail production should hasten supply/demand rebalancing that was already slated to occur via non-OPEC production declines through 2017. U.S. shale producers slashed capital expenditures by 65% from 2014 to 2016, and the International Oil Companies reduced capital expenditures by 40% over the same period. OPEC's decision to trim output should mitigate downside commodity price risks, providing debt and equity markets with confidence to restore capital availability to the sector. With easier access to capital, producers, especially shale, will be able to accelerate drilling programs in a stable commodity price environment. The three factors traditionally required to sustain a playable rally are now in place. The rig count has troughed. The growth in OECD oil inventories has crested. The latter is consistent with a gradual rise in the number of active drilling rigs. Finally, global oil production growth is falling steadily. Pricing power is likely to be slow to recover this cycle given the scope of previous capacity excesses, but even a move to neutral would remove a major drag and reduce the associated share price risk premium (Chart 9). Consumer Staples - Overweight 2016 delivered a number of company specific body blows to the consumer staples sector, most notably concerns about the pharmacy benefit manger pricing model, which undermined the retail drug store group. Thereafter, the sector was shunned on a macro level following the election, as it was used as a source of capital to fund aggressive purchases in more cyclical sectors. This has set the stage for a contrarian buying opportunity in a high quality, defensive sector with one of the best track records during Fed tightening cycles3. The sector is now closing in on an undervalued extreme, in relative terms, having already reached such a reading in technical terms (Chart 10). Our Cyclical Macro Indicator is climbing, supported by the persistent rise in consumers' preference for saving. The latter heralds an increase in outlays at non-cyclical retailers relative to sales at more discretionary stores. Importantly, consumer staples exports have reaccelerated, despite the strong U.S. dollar, pointing to a further acceleration in sector sales growth, and by extension, free cash flow. The strong U.S. dollar is a major boon, from an historical perspective, given that it typically creates increased global economic and market volatility. The latter is starting to pick up (Chart 10). A strong currency, particularly bilaterally against China, also implies a reduction in the cost of imported goods sold, and heralds a relative performance rebound (Chart 11). Chart 10Contrarian Buy Chart 11China To The Rescue? Home Improvement Retail - Overweight Enticing long-term housing prospects argue for looking through the recent rise in mortgage rates. Household formation is reaccelerating, as full employment is boosting consumer confidence, and clocking at a higher speed than housing starts. The implication is that pent-up housing demand will be unleashed. In fact, consumers have only recently started re-levering, with banks more than willing to facilitate renewed appetite for mortgage debt. Remodeling activity is booming and anecdotes of house flipping activity picking up steam are corroborating that the housing market is vibrant. Now that house prices have recently overtaken the 2006 all-time highs, the incentive to upgrade and remodel should accelerate. While the recent backup in bond yields has been a setback for housing affordability, the U.S. consumer is not priced out of the housing market. Yields are rising in tandem with job security and wages. Mortgage payments remain below the long-term average as a share of income and effective mortgage rates remain near generationally low levels. Building supply store construction growth has plumbed to the lowest level since the history of the data. Historically, capacity restraint has represented a boost to home improvement retail (HIR) profit margins and has been inversely correlated with industry sales growth. Stable housing data and improving operating industry metrics entice us to put the compellingly valued S&P HIR on our high-conviction buy list for 2017 (Chart 12). Chart 12Benefiting From Enticing##br## Long-Term Housing Prospects Chart 13Healthy Consumer Is A Boon##br## To Consumer Finance Stocks Consumer Finance - Overweight We are focusing our early-cyclical exposure on overweighting the still bruised S&P consumer finance index. This group is levered to the rising interest rate environment and debt-financed consumer spending. The selloff in the 10-year Treasury bond has been closely correlated with relative performance gains and the current message is to expect additional firming in the latter (Chart 13, top panel). Importantly, higher interest rates have boosted credit card interest rate spreads (the industry's equivalent net interest margin metric), underscoring that the next leg up in relative share prices will be earnings led (Chart 13, bottom panel). On the consumer front, consumer finances are healthy, the job market is vibrant and consumer income expectations are on the rise. In addition, house prices have vaulted to fresh all-time highs and are still expanding on a y/y basis. The positive wealth effect provides motivation for consumers to run down savings rates (Chart 13, second & third panels). Health Care Equipment - Overweight Health care equipment (HCE) stocks have been de-rated alongside the broad health care index, trading at a mere market multiple and below the historical mean, representing a buy opportunity. Revenue growth has been climbing at a double digit clip (Chart 14, third panel) and the surging industry shipments-to-inventories ratio is signaling that still depressed relative sales growth expectations will surprise to the upside (Chart 14, top panel). Synchronized global growth is also encouraging for U.S. medical equipment exports, despite the U.S. dollar's recent appreciation. The ageing population in the developed markets along with pent up demand for health care services in the emerging markets where a number of countries are developing public safety nets, bode well for HCE long-term demand prospects. The bottom panel of Chart 14 shows that the global PMI has been an excellent leading indicator of HCE exports and the current message is positive. The recent contraction in valuation multiples suggests that sales are expected to disappoint in the coming year, an outlook that appears overly cautious, especially within the context of the nascent improvement in industry return on equity (Chart 14, second panel). Chart 14HCE Stocks Are Cheap Given##br## Improving Final Demand Outlook Chart 15More Than##br## Meets The Eye REITs - Overweight REITs have traded as if the back up in global bond yields will persist indefinitely, and that the level of interest rates is the only factor that drives relative performance. Improving cash flows and cheap valuations suggest that REITs can decouple from bond yields. Our REIT Demand Indicator (RDI) has climbed into positive territory, signaling higher rental inflation. The latter is already outpacing overall CPI by a wide margin. The RDI is also positively correlated with commercial property prices, implying more new highs ahead. That will support higher net asset values. While increased supply is a potential sore spot, particularly in the residential space, multifamily housing starts have rolled over relative to the total, suggesting that new apartment builds are diminishing. As discussed in previous research reports, contrary to popular perception, relative performance is also depressed from a structural perspective. REIT relative performance is trading well below its long-term trend, a starting point which has historically overwhelmed any negative pressure from a Fed tightening cycle (Chart 15). Tech Hardware Storage & Peripherals - Underweight The S&P technology hardware storage & peripherals (THSP) sector is a disinflationary play (10-year treasury yield change shown inverted, second panel, Chart 16) and benefits when prices are deflating, not when there are whiffs of inflation4. The tech sector has the highest foreign sales/EPS exposure among the top 11 sectors, and the persistent rise in the greenback is weighing on export prospects for the THSP sub-index (Chart 16, third panel), and by extension top and bottom line growth. Computer and electronic products new order growth has fallen sharply recently, warning that THSP sales growth will remain downbeat. Industry investment is also probing multi-year lows (not shown). Asian inventory destocking is ongoing, which will pressure selling prices, but the end of this liquidation phase would be a signal that the worst will soon be over. Technical conditions are bearish. A pennant formation signals that a breakdown looms. Chart 16Tech Stocks Hate Reflation Chart 17Shy Away, Don't Be Brave Biotech - Underweight The Nasdaq biotech index is following the BCA Mania Index, which includes previous burst bubbles in a broad array of asset classes. The top panel of Chart 17 shows that if history at least rhymes, biotech bubble deflation is slated to continue. Only 45 stocks in the NASDAQ biotech index have positive 12-month forward earnings estimates, comprising 27% of the 164 companies in the index according to Bloomberg. There is still a lot of air to be taken out of the biotech bubble. Historically, interest rates and relative performance have been inversely correlated. The back up in bond yields and Fed tightening represent a draining in liquidity conditions which bodes ill for higher beta and more speculative investments. The biotech derating has been earnings driven and a sustained multiple compression period looms, especially given the sector's poor sales prospects (Chart 17, bottom panel) Worrisomely, not only have biotech stocks fallen despite Trump's win, but recent speculative zeal (buoyant equity sentiment and resurging margin debt, not shown) has also failed to reinvigorate biotech equities. The NASDAQ biotech index is a sell (ETF ticker: IBB:US). Industrials - Underweight The industrials sector was added to our high-conviction underweight list late last year so the turn in calendar does not require a change in outlook. The sector has discounted massive domestic fiscal stimulus and disregarded the competitive drag on earnings from the U.S. dollar, trading as if a profit boom is imminent. Recent traction in surveys of industrial activity is a plus, but is more a reflection of an improvement in corporate sentiment and is unlikely to translate into imminent industrials sector profit improvement. The U.S. dollar surge is a direct threat to any benefit from an increase in domestic infrastructure or private sector investment spending. Commodity prices and EM drag when the dollar is strong. Chronic surplus EM industrial capacity remains a source of deflationary pressure for their currencies, economies and U.S. industrial companies. U.S. dollar strength warns of renewed pricing power pressure (Chart 18). Non-tech industrial capacity is growing faster than output, and capital goods imports prices are contracting (Chart 18). Tack on the relentless surge in the U.S. dollar, and a new deflationary wave appears inevitable. Relative forward earnings momentum is already negative, and is likely to remain so given the barriers to a top-line recovery, and a soaring domestic wage bill. The sector is not priced for lackluster earnings. Chart 18Fade The Bounce Chart 19Advance Is Precarious Insurance - Underweight Insurance stocks have benefited from the upward shift in the yield curve and the re-pricing of the overall financials sector, but the advance is precarious. Previously robust insurance pricing power has cracked. The CPI for household insurance is barely growing. The latter is typically correlated with auto premiums, underscoring that they may also slip (Chart 19). While higher interest rates are positive for investment portfolio income, they also imply mark-to-market losses on bond portfolios and incent insurers to underwrite at a faster pace with more lenient standards, which is often a precursor to increased competition and less pricing power. Insurance companies have added massively to cost structures in recent years (Chart 19), while the rest of the financials sector was shedding labor costs. Relative valuations have enjoyed a step-function upshift, but the path of least resistance will be lower for as long as relative consumer spending on insurance products retreats on the back of pricing pressure (Chart 19). 2016 Review... Last year's high-conviction calls were hot out of the gate, and generally had very strong gains until the late-summer/early-fall, but were hijacked by the post-election surge in a few sectors. As a result of the end of year fireworks, our high conviction calls trailed the market by just under 2% for the year ending 2016. Had we had the foresight to predict a Trump win and a massive market rally, we could have closed our positions in early November for comfortably positive gains. In total, our average booked gains in the year were 3% in excess of the broad market since the positions were initiated. We are also closing our pair trades, and will re-introduce a number of new trades in the near future. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President Global Alpha Sector Strategy & U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report titled: "Sector Performance And Fed Tightening Cycles: An Historical Roadmap", available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Ibid 3 Ibid 4 Please see the U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report titled: "Equity Sector Winners And Losers When Inflation Climbs", available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps. Favor growth over value (downgrade alert).
Highlights Overall Strategy: The global economy is entering a reflationary sweet spot that will last for the next two years. Investors should overweight equities, maintain slightly below benchmark exposure to government bonds, and underweight cash over a 12-month horizon. Fixed Income: Global bond yields will rise only modestly over the next two years, reflecting an abundance of spare capacity in many parts of the world. A major bond bear market will begin towards the end of the decade, as stagflationary forces gather steam. Equities: Investors should underweight the U.S. for the time being, while overweighting Europe and Japan in currency-hedged terms. Emerging markets will benefit from the reflationary tailwind, but deep structural problems will drag down returns. Currencies: The broad trade-weighted dollar will appreciate another 6% from current levels. The yen still has considerable downside against the dollar. The euro will grind lower, as will the Chinese yuan. The pound is approaching a bottom. Commodities: Favor energy over metals. Gold will move higher once the dollar peaks later this year. Feature I. Key Theme: A Reflationary Window The global economy is entering a reflationary sweet spot where deflationary forces are in retreat but fears of excess inflation have yet to surface. Activity data are surprising to the upside and leading economic indicators have turned higher (Chart 1). Falling unemployment in most major economies is boosting confidence, fueling a virtuous cycle of rising spending and even further declines in joblessness. Manufacturing activity is bouncing back after a protracted inventory destocking cycle (Chart 2). In addition, the stabilization in commodity prices has given some relief to emerging markets, while fueling a modest rebound in resource sector capital spending. Meanwhile, easier fiscal policy is providing a welcome tailwind to growth. The aggregate fiscal thrust for advanced economies turned positive in 2016 - the first time this has happened in six years. We expect this trend to persist for the foreseeable future. Reflecting these developments, market-based measures of inflation expectations have risen, offsetting the increase in nominal interest rates. In fact, real rates in the euro area and Japan have actually declined across most of the yield curve since the U.S. presidential election (Chart 3). This should translate into higher household and business spending in the months ahead. Chart 1Global Growth Is Accelerating Chart 2Inventory Destocking Was A Drag On Growth Chart 3Falling Real Rates In The Euro Area And Japan Supply Matters Yet, there has been a dark side to this reflationary trend, and one that could sow the seeds for stagflation as the decade wears on. Simply put, much of the reduction in spare capacity over the past eight years has occurred not because of much faster demand growth, but because of continued slow supply growth. Chart 4 shows that output gaps in the main developed economies would still be enormous today if potential GDP had grown at the rate the IMF forecasted back in 2008. Chart 4AWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Chart 4BWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Unfortunately, we do not expect this state of affairs to change much over the coming years. The decline in birth rates that began in the 1960s has caused working-age populations to grow more slowly in almost all developed and emerging economies (Chart 5). In some countries such as the U.S., the downward pressure on labor force growth has been exacerbated by a structural decline in participation rates, especially among the less educated (Chart 6). Chart 5Slowing Workforce Growth Chart 6U.S.: The Less Educated Are Shunning The Labor Force Productivity growth has also fallen (Chart 7). Part of this phenomenon is cyclical in nature, reflecting the impact of several years of weak corporate investment in new plant and equipment. However, much of it is structural. As Fed economist John Fernald has shown, the slowdown in productivity growth since 2004 has been concentrated in sectors that benefited the most from the adoption of new information technologies in the late 1990s (Chart 8).1 Recent technological innovations have focused more on consumers than on businesses. This has resulted in slower productivity growth. Chart 7Slowing Productivity Growth Around The World Chart 8The Productivity Slowdown Has Been ##br##Greatest In Sectors That Benefited The Most From The I.T. Revolution To make matters worse, human capital accumulation has decelerated both in the U.S. and elsewhere, dragging productivity growth down with it. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the rate it did in the 1990s (Chart 9). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores, has also peaked, and is now falling in many countries (Chart 10). Chart 9The Contribution To Growth ##br##From Rising Human Capital Is Falling Chart 10Math Skills Around The World From Deflation To Inflation To reiterate what we have discussed at length in the past, the slowdown in potential GDP growth tends to be deflationary at the outset, but becomes inflationary later on.2 Initially, lower productivity growth reduces investment, pushing down aggregate demand. Lower productivity growth also curtails consumption, as households react to the prospect of smaller real wage gains. Eventually, however, economies that suffer from chronically weak productivity growth tend to find themselves rubbing up against supply-side constraints. This leads to higher inflation (Chart 11). One only needs to look at the history of low-productivity economies in Africa and Latin America to see this point - or, for that matter, the U.S. in the 1970s, a period during which productivity growth slowed and inflation accelerated. Likewise, a slowdown in labor force growth tends to morph from being deflationary to inflationary over time. When labor force growth slows, two things happen. First, investment demand drops. Why build new factories, office towers, and shopping malls if the number of workers and potential consumers is set to grow more slowly? Second, savings rise, as spending on children declines and a rising share of the workforce moves into its peak saving years (ages 35-to-50). The result is a large excess of savings over investment, which generates downward pressure on inflation and interest rates. As time goes by, the deflationary impact of slower labor force growth tends to recede (Chart 12). Workers who once brought home paychecks start to retire en masse and begin drawing down their accumulated wealth. Since there are few young workers available to take their place, labor shortages emerge. At the same time, health care spending and pension expenditures rise as a larger fraction of the population enters its golden years. The result is less aggregate savings and higher interest rates. Chart 11A Decline In Productivity Growth Is Deflationary In The Short Run, But Inflationary In The Long Run Chart 12An Aging Population Eventually Pushes Up Interest Rates Is Debt Deflationary Or Inflationary? The answer is both. Excessively high debt levels are deflationary at the outset because they limit the ability of overstretched borrowers to spend. However, high debt levels also reduce investment in new capacity - homes, office buildings, machinery, etc. This undermines the supply-side of the economy. Moreover, once the output gap is closed, high debt levels can become inflationary by increasing the incentive for central banks to keep rates low in order to suppress interest-servicing costs and reduce real debt burdens. Acting on that incentive also becomes easier as the output gap evaporates. Consider the case of forward guidance. If an economy has a large output gap, a central bank's promise to maintain interest rates at ultra-low levels, even after full employment has been reached, may hold little sway. After all, many things can happen between now and then: A change of central bank leadership, an adverse economic shock, etc. In contrast, if the output gap is already close to zero, a promise to let the economy run hot is more likely to be taken seriously. The U.S. Economy: Still In A Reflationary Sweet Spot The stagflationary demons described above will eventually come back to haunt the U.S., but for now and probably for the next two years, the economy will remain in a reflationary sweet spot. After a weak start to 2016, growth has bounced back. Real GDP grew by 3.5% in Q3. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model points to still-healthy growth of 2.9% in Q4. We expect growth to stay robust in 2017, as improving confidence and a stabilization in energy-sector investment lift overall business capex, homebuilding picks up after contracting in both Q2 and Q3 of 2016, and rising wages push up real incomes and personal consumption. Above-trend growth will continue to erode spare capacity. The headline unemployment rate has fallen to 4.6%, close to most estimates of NAIRU. Broader measures of unemployment, which incorporate marginally-attached and involuntary part-time workers, are also approaching pre-recession levels (Chart 13). Consistent with this observation, the job openings rate in the JOLT survey, the share of households reporting that jobs are "plentiful" versus "hard to get" in the Conference Board's Consumer Confidence survey, and the share of small businesses reporting difficulty in finding suitably qualified workers in the NFIB survey are all at or above 2007 levels (Chart 14). In contrast to most measures of labor market slack, industrial utilization still remains quite low by historic standards (Chart 15). In fact, the Congressional Budget Office's "capacity utilization-based" estimate of the output gap stands at around 3% of GDP, whereas its "unemployment-based" estimate is close to zero. Chart 13U.S. Labor Market: Not Much Slack Left Chart 14Most U.S. Labor Market Measures ##br## Are Back To Pre-Recession Levels Chart 15U.S.: Industrial Capacity Utilization Remains Low A strong dollar, as well as the ongoing decline of the U.S. manufacturing base, partly explain the low level of industrial utilization. However, another important reason bears noting: Years of depressed real wage growth has made labor scarce compared with capital. The free market solution to this problem is higher wages for workers. Good news for Main Street; but perhaps not so good news for Wall Street. Stagflation Is Coming, Just Not Yet While inflation will creep higher in 2017, a major spike is unlikely over the next two years. There are two main reasons for this. First, if the economy does run into severe capacity constraints, the Fed will have to step up the pace of rate hikes. Higher interest rates will push up the value of the dollar, curbing growth and inflation. Second, the historic evidence suggests that it takes a while for an overheated economy to generate meaningfully higher inflation. Consider how inflation evolved during the 1960s. U.S. inflation did not reach 4% until mid-1968. By that time, the output gap had been positive for five years, hitting a whopping 6% of GDP in 1966 due to rising military expenditures on the Vietnam War and social spending on Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs (Chart 16). The relationship between economic slack and inflation is depicted by the so-called Phillips curve. As one would intuitively expect, inflation tends to rise when slack diminishes. However, this correlation has weakened over the past few decades (Chart 17). For example, U.S. core inflation declined only modestly during the Great Recession, and has been slow to bounce back, even as the output gap has shrunk. Chart 16It Can Take A While For Inflation To Rise In Response To An Overheated Economy Chart 17The Phillips Curve Has Flattened The adoption of inflation targeting, coupled with more transparent Fed communication, has helped anchor inflation expectations. This has flattened the Phillips curve. A flatter Phillips curve implies a lower "sacrifice ratio." This means that the Fed could let the economy overheat without putting undue upward pressure on inflation. Going forward, the temptation to exploit the flatness of the Phillips curve may be too great to resist. While the Fed would have reservations about pursuing such a strategy, Janet Yellen's musings about running a "high-pressure economy" suggest that she is at least willing to entertain the idea. Interest rates are still fairly low and a few more hikes are unlikely to cause much distress among corporate and household borrowers. As rates continue to climb, however, this may change, making it difficult for the Fed to further tighten monetary policy. This is especially the case if potential real GDP growth remains lackluster, as this would make it harder for borrowers to generate enough income to service their debts. Trump's budget-busting fiscal deficits may also put some pressure on the Fed to eschew raising rates too much in an effort to hold down interest costs. Even if such political pressures do not materialize, the challenges posed by the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates could still justify efforts to raise the Fed's 2% inflation target. After all, if inflation were higher, this would give the Federal Reserve the ability to push down real rates further into negative territory in the event of an economic downturn. Admittedly, such a step is unlikely to be taken anytime soon. Nevertheless, given that a number of well-regarded economists - including prominent policymakers such as Olivier Blanchard, the former chief economist at the IMF; San Francisco Fed President John Williams; and former Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota - have floated the idea of raising the inflation target, long-term investors should be open-minded about the possibility. The bottom line is that inflation is likely to move up slowly over the next two years, but could begin to accelerate more sharply towards the end of the decade. Japan: The End Of Deflation? Like the U.S., Japan has also entered a reflationary window. Retail sales surprised on the upside in November, rising 1.7%, against market expectations of 0.8%. Industrial production and exports continue to rebound, a trend that should persist thanks to the yen's recent depreciation (Chart 18). Stronger economic growth is causing the labor market to heat up. The Bank of Japan estimates that the "labor input gap" is now positive, meaning that the economy has run out of surplus workers (Chart 19). Reflecting this, the ratio of job openings-to-applicants has reached a 25-year high (Chart 20). Chart 18Japan: Some Positive Economic News Chart 19Japan: Labor Market Slack Has Evaporated, But Industrial Capacity Utilization Has Fallen Chart 20Japan: Sign Of Tightening Labor Market Wage growth so far has been tepid, but that should change over the next two years. The labor force expanded by 0.9% year-over-year in November - the latest month for which data are available - largely due to the continued influx of women into the labor force. Chart 21 shows that the employment-to-population ratio for Japanese prime-age women now exceeds that of the U.S. by three percentage points. As Japanese female labor participation stabilizes, overall labor force growth will turn negative, pushing up wages in the process. Chart 21Japan: Female Labor Force ##br##Participation Now Exceeds The U.S. In contrast to the Fed, the BoJ is unlikely to tighten monetary policy in response to higher inflation. As a consequence, real yields will continue to fall as inflation expectations rise further. This will lead to higher net exports via a weaker yen, as well as increased spending on interest-rate sensitive goods such as consumer durables and business equipment. Indeed, a virtuous circle could develop where an overheated labor market pushes down real rates, causing aggregate demand and inflation to rise, leading to even lower real rates. If this occurs, growth could accelerate sharply, avoiding the need for more radical measures such as "helicopter money." In short, Japan may be on the verge of escaping its deflationary trap. This is something that could have happened shortly after Prime Minister Abe assumed office, but was short-circuited by the government's lamentable decision to tighten fiscal policy by 3% of GDP between 2013 and 2015. It won't make the same mistake again. Europe: Fine... For Now The European economy grew at an above-trend pace in 2016. Real GDP in the EU is estimated to have expanded by 1.9%, compared to 1.6% in the U.S. The euro area is estimated to have grown by 1.7% - the first time that growth in the common currency bloc exceeded the U.S. since the Great Recession. Euro area growth should remain reasonably strong in 2017, as telegraphed by a number of leading economic indicators (Chart 22). Fiscal austerity has been shelved in favor of modest stimulus. The European Commission is now even advising member countries to loosen fiscal policy more than they themselves are targeting (Chart 23). Chart 22Euro Area Growth Will Remain On Solid Footing In 2017 Chart 23The European Commission Recommends Greater Fiscal Expansion Ongoing efforts to strengthen the euro area's banking system will also help. As we noted in the "Italian Bank Job," the costs of cleaning up the Italian banking system are modest compared with the size of the Italian economy.3 The failure to have done it earlier represents a massive "own goal" by the Italian and EU authorities. As banking stresses recede, the gap in economic performance between northern and southern Europe should narrow. The overall stance of monetary policy will facilitate this trend. If the ECB keeps interest rates near zero for the foreseeable future, as it almost certainly will, Germany's economy will overheat. Chart 24 shows that the German unemployment rate has fallen to a 25-year low, while wage growth is now running at twice the rate as elsewhere in the euro area. Chart 24German Labor Market Going Strong An overheated German economy will help the periphery in two important ways: First, higher wage inflation in Germany will give a competitive advantage to Club Med producers seeking to sell their goods in the euro area's biggest economy. Second, faster wage growth and stronger domestic demand in Germany will erode the country's gargantuan current account surplus of nearly 9% of GDP. This will put downward pressure on the euro, giving the periphery a further competitive boost. Of course, all this rests on the assumption that Germany accepts an overheated economy. One could objectively argue that it is in Germany's political best interest to do so, as this may be the only means by which to hold the euro area together. One could also argue that rebalancing German growth towards domestic demand, and away from its historic reliance on exports, would be in the country's long-term best interest. One might also contend that German banks would accept a few more years of low rates if this helped lower nonperforming loans across the euro area, while also paving the way for the eventual abandonment of ZIRP and NIRP. Chart 25Italy Lags Peers On Euro Support Whatever the merits of these arguments, they clash with Germany's historical antipathy towards inflation. This means that political risk could escalate over the coming years. Against the backdrop of growing anti-establishment sentiment - fueled in no small measure by the EU's deer-in-the-headlights response to the migration crisis - Europe's populist parties will continue to make gains at the polls. Timing is important, however. With unemployment trending lower, our hunch is that any truly disruptive populist shock may have to wait until the next recession, which is likely still a few years away. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team holds a strong conviction view that Marine Le Pen, the leader of the eurosceptic National Front, will be defeated in the second round of the presidential election in May. They also think that Angela Merkel will cling to power, partly because Germany still lacks an effective anti-establishment opposition party. Italy is more of a concern, given that support for the common currency among Italians has been falling and is now lower than virtually anywhere else in the euro area (Chart 25). Nevertheless, our geopolitical strategists assign very low odds to Italy following Britain's example and voting to leave the EU. Indeed, it is still not even clear that the U.K. will actually follow through and exit the EU. Brussels is likely to play hardball with the U.K. during the negotiations slated to begin in March. EU officials are keen to send a clear warning to other EU members who may be tempted to leave the club. It is still quite possible that another referendum will be held in one or two years concerning the terms of the negotiated agreement that would govern Britain's future relationship with the EU. Given how close the first referendum was, there is a reasonable chance that U.K. voters will choose EU membership over a bad deal. In that case, Brussels will back off from its threat that triggering Article 50 would irrevocably lead to the U.K.'s expulsion from the EU. China: Still In Need Of A Spender-Of-Last Resort Investor angst about China rose to a fever pitch early last year, but has since faded into the background. The main reason for this is that the deflationary forces which once threatened to precipitate a hard landing for the economy have abated. Growth has picked up and producer price inflation has risen from -5.3% in early 2016 to 3.3% in November (Chart 26). As our China strategists have argued, the end of PPI deflation is a major positive development for the Chinese corporate sector, as it improves its pricing power while reducing its real cost of funding (Chart 27). Real bank lending rates deflated by the PPI rose to near-record highs early last year, but have since tumbled by a whopping 10 percentage points - largely due to easing deflation. This has bestowed dramatic relief on some highly-levered, asset-heavy industries. These industries were the biggest casualties of the growth slowdown and posed material risks to the banking sector due to their high debt levels. In this vein, rising PPI and easing financial stress among these firms also bode well for banks. Chart 26China: Improving Growth Momentum Chart 27China: Real Interest Rates Dropping ##br## Thanks To Easing Deflation Unfortunately, the reflationary forces in China are masking deep underlying problems. Structural reform has been patchy at best; credit continues to expand much faster than GDP; and speculation in the real estate sector is rampant (Chart 28). Meanwhile, capital continues to flow out of the country, taking the PBOC's foreign exchange reserves down from a high of $4 trillion in June 2014 to $3.1 trillion at present. There are no easy solutions to these problems. Tightening monetary policy could help fend off capital flight, but this would hurt growth and potentially plunge the economy back into deflation. This week's spike in interbank rates is evidence of just how sensitive the economy has become to any withdrawal of monetary accommodation (Chart 29). Chart 28China: Credit Continues Expanding And The##br## Real Estate Sector Is Getting Frothy Chart 29China: Yet Another Spike In Interbank Rates As we controversially argued in "China Needs More Debt," China's underlying problem is a chronic excess of savings.4 This has kept aggregate demand below the level commensurate with the economy's productive capacity. In the past, China was able to export some of those excess savings abroad via a large current account surplus, which peaked at 10% of GDP in 2007 (Chart 30). However, China is now too large to export its way out of its problems. It was one thing for China to run a current account surplus of 10% of GDP when its economy represented 6% of global GDP. It is quite another to do so when the economy represents 15% of global GDP, as it does now. This is especially the case when other economies are also keen to have cheap currencies. Faced with this reality, the government has been trying to buttress aggregate demand by funneling a huge amount of credit towards state-owned companies, which have then used these funds to finance all sorts of investment projects. The problem is that China no longer needs as much new capacity as it once did. As trend GDP growth has slowed, the level of investment necessary to maintain a constant capital-to-output ratio has fallen by about 10% of GDP over the past decade.5 China's aging population will eventually lead to a drop in savings. Government plans to strengthen the social safety net should also help this transition along by reducing household precautionary savings. However, these are long-term developments. Over the next couple of years, China will have little choice but to let credit grow at a rapid pace. The good news is that China has ample domestic savings to continue financing credit expansion. The ratio of bank loans-to-deposits remains near all-time lows (Chart 31). The government also has plenty of fiscal resources to safeguard the banks from losses on nonperforming loans extended to local governments and state-owned enterprises. Chart 30China Used To Rely On Large ##br##Current Account Surplus To Export Excess Savings Chart 31China: Banks Have Ample Deposit Coverage All that may not be enough, however. Given the risks to financial stability from excessive investment by state-owned enterprises, the government may have little choice but to cajole households into spending more by suppressing bank deposit rates while purposely engineering higher inflation. The resulting decline in real rates will reduce the incentive to save while helping to inflate away the mountain of debt that has already been accumulated. II. Financial Markets Equities Chart 32Investors Are Optimistic Deflation is bad for equities, as is stagflation. But between deflation and stagflation there is reflation - and that is good for stocks. This reflationary window should remain open for the next two years. As such, we expect global equities to be higher in 12 months than they are today. However, the risks for stocks are tilted to the downside over both a shorter-term horizon of less than two months and a longer-term horizon exceeding two years. The near-term outlook is complicated by the fact that global equities are overbought, and hence vulnerable to a selloff. Chart 32 shows that bullish sentiment is stretched to the upside. Expectations of long-term U.S. earnings growth have also jumped to over 12%, something that strikes us as rather fanciful. Renewed rumblings in China could also spook the markets for a while. We expect global equities to correct 5%-to-10% from current levels, setting the stage for a more durable recovery. Once that recovery begins, higher-beta developed markets such as Japan and Europe should outperform the U.S. As my colleague, Mark McClellan, has shown, Europe and Japan are considerably cheaper than the U.S., even after adjusting for sector skews and structural valuation differences.6 The relative stance of monetary policy also favors Europe and Japan. Neither the ECB nor the BoJ is likely to hike rates anytime soon. This means that rising inflation expectations in these two economies will push down real rates, weakening their currencies in the process. Emerging markets are a tougher call. The combination of a strengthening dollar, growing protectionist sentiment in the developed world, and high debt levels are all bad news for emerging markets. EM equity valuations are also not especially cheap by historic standards (Chart 33). Nevertheless, a reflationary environment has typically been positive for EM equities. The tight correlation between EM and global cyclical stocks has broken down over the past three months (Chart 34). We suspect the relationship will reassert itself again over the course of 2017, giving EM stocks a bit of a boost. Chart 33EM Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap Chart 34EM Stocks Are Lagging On balance, EM equities are likely in a bottoming phase where returns over the next 12 months will be positive but not spectacular. BCA's favored markets are Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Thailand, and Russia. We would avoid Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, and Peru. Turning to global equity sectors, a bias towards cyclical names is appropriate in an environment of rising global growth. Longer term, our equity sector specialists like health care and technology names. The outlook for financial stocks remains a key area of debate within BCA. Most of my colleagues would still avoid banks. I am more partial to the sector. As I argued in September in "Three Controversial Calls: Global Banks Finally Outperform," steeper yield curves will boost net interest margins over the next few years while rising demand for credit will support top-line growth (Chart 35). On a price-to-earnings basis, global banks are quite cheap, despite being much better capitalized than they were in the past (Chart 36). Chart 35AHigher Yields Will Benefit Banks Chart 35BHigher Yields Will Benefit Banks Lastly, in terms of size exposure, we prefer small caps over large caps. Small capitalization stocks tend to do better in reflationary environments (Chart 37). The ongoing retreat from globalization will also benefit smaller domestically-focused firms at the expense of those with large global footprints. In the U.S. specifically, small caps face a potential additional benefit. If the new Trump administration follows through with promised corporate tax cuts, then small caps will benefit disproportionately given that the effective tax rate of multinationals is already low. Chart 36Global Banks Are Cheap ##br##And Better Capitalized Since The Crisis Chart 37Reflationary Backdrop ##br##Favors Small Caps Outperformance Fixed Income And Credit Back in March 2015, we predicted that the 10-year Treasury yield would fall to 1.5% even if the U.S. economy avoided a recession.7 The call was notably out of consensus at the time, but proved to be correct: The 10-year yield reached a record closing low of 1.37% on July 5th. As luck would have it, on that very same day, we sent out a note entitled "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," advising clients to position for higher bond yields. Global bonds have sold off sharply since then, with the selloff intensifying after the U.S. presidential election. As discussed above, inflation in the U.S. and elsewhere will be slow to rise over the next two years. Hence, global bond yields are unlikely to move significantly higher from current levels. Indeed, the near-term path for yields is to the downside if our expectation of a global equity correction proves true. However, once the stagflationary forces described in this report begin to gather steam towards the end of the decade, bond yields could spike higher, imposing significant pain on fixed-income and equity investors alike. Regionally, we favor Japanese and euro area bonds relative to their U.S. counterparts over a 12-month horizon. Inflation in both Japan and the euro area remains well below target, suggesting that neither the BoJ nor the ECB will tighten monetary policy anytime soon. In contrast, the Fed is likely to raise rates three times in 2017, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. In addition, we would underweight U.K. gilts. While U.K. growth will decelerate next year as uncertainty over the Brexit negotiations takes its toll, a weaker pound and some fiscal loosening will keep the economy from flying off the rails. In this light, the market's expectations that U.K. rates will rise to only 0.66% at end-2019 seems too pessimistic. Elsewhere in the developed world, our global fixed-income strategists are neutral on Canada and New Zealand bonds, but are underweight Australia. A modest underweight to EM government bonds is also warranted. Turning to credit, a reflationary backdrop is positive for spread product insofar as it will keep defaults in check, while also propping up the appetite for riskier assets. That said, U.S. high-yield credit is now quite expensive based on our fundamental models (Chart 38). Private-sector leverage remains at elevated levels and our Corporate Health Monitor is still in deteriorating territory (Chart 39). Rising government yields could also prompt yield-hungry investors to move some of their money back into sovereign debt. On balance, U.S. corporate spreads are likely to narrow slightly this year, but corporate credit will still underperform equities. Regionally, we see more upside in European credit, given the ECB's continued bond-buying program and greater scope for corporate profit margins to rise across the region. Chart 38U.S. High-Yield Valuations Chart 39U.S. Corporate Health Keeps Deteriorating Currencies And Commodities BCA's Global Investment Strategy service has been bullish on the dollar since October 2014, a view that has generated a gain of nearly 17% for our long DXY trade recommendation. We reiterated this position last October in a note entitled "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen,"8 where we predicted that the dollar would rally a further 10%. Since that report was published, the real trade-weighted dollar has gained 4%, implying another 6% of upside from current levels. Chart 40Real Rate Differentials Are Driving Up The Dollar Both economic and political forces have conspired to keep the dollar well bid. The resurgent U.S. economy has pushed up real rate expectations in the U.S. relative to its trading partners. Chart 40 shows the amazingly strong correlation between the trade-weighted dollar and real interest rate differentials. Rate differentials should widen further over the coming months as investors price in more Fed rate hikes, and rising inflation expectations abroad push down real rates in economies such as Japan and the euro area. As we predicted in "A Trump Victory Would Be Bullish For The Dollar" and "Three Controversial Calls: Trump Wins And The Dollar Rallies," Donald Trump's triumph on November 8th has given the greenback an additional boost. Progress in implementing any of Trump's three signature policy proposals - fiscal stimulus, trade protectionism, and immigration restrictions - will cause the U.S. output gap to narrow more quickly than it otherwise would, forcing the Fed to pick up the pace of rate hikes. Chart 41The Pound Is A Bargain The adoption of a "destination-based tax system" would further strengthen the dollar. Under the existing corporate tax structure, taxes are assessed on corporate profits regardless of where they are derived. In contrast, under a destination-based system, taxes would be assessed only on the difference between domestic sales and domestic costs. In practice, this means that imports would be subject to taxes, while exports would receive a tax rebate. In the simplest economic models, the imposition of a destination-based tax has no effect on domestic economic activity, inflation, or the distribution of corporate profits across the various sectors of the economy. This is because the dollar is assumed to appreciate by precisely enough to keep net exports unchanged. For that to happen, however, the requisite change in the currency needs to be quite large. For example, if the Trump administration succeeds in bringing down effective corporate tax rates to 20%, the required appreciation would be 1/(1-tax rate)=25%. Under current law, the required appreciation would be over 30%! In reality, the dollar probably would not adjust that quickly, implying that the transition period to a destination-based tax system would disproportionately benefit exporters at the expense of importers. Partly for this reason, the proposal will probably be heavily watered down if it is ever passed. Nevertheless, overall U.S. policy will continue to be biased towards a stronger dollar. Looking at the various dollar crosses, we still see more downside for the yen. The BoJ's policy of pegging the 10-year nominal yield will result in ever-lower real yields as Japanese inflation expectations rise. The euro should also continue to drift lower, most likely reaching parity against the dollar later this year. The pound could dip further if an impasse is reached during Brexit negotiations, as is likely at some point this year. That said, sterling is now very cheap, which limits the downside for the currency (Chart 41). Chart 42The Dollar Has Weighed On Gold The Chinese yuan will continue to grind lower, in line with most other EM currencies. As we discussed in March 2015 in a report entitled "A Weaker RMB Ahead," China's excess savings problem necessitates a weaker currency. The real trade-weighted RMB has fallen by 7% since that report was written, but a bottom for the currency remains elusive.9 As noted above, the Chinese government may have no choice but to boost household spending by suppressing deposit rates while working to engineer higher inflation. Negative real borrowing rates will keep capital flowing out of the country, putting downward pressure on the yuan. The overall direction of the Canadian and Aussie dollars will be dictated by the path of commodity prices. A reflationary environment tends to be bullish for commodities. Nevertheless, an uncertain macro outlook in China muddies the waters. We prefer oil over metals, given that the former is more geared towards growth in developed economies while the latter is heavily dependent on Chinese demand. This also makes the Canadian dollar a more attractive currency than the Aussie dollar. Lastly, a few words on gold: The combination of political uncertainty, rising inflation expectations, and continued easy money policies should provide support to bullion prices over the next year. The main negative is the potential for a further rise in the dollar. The strengthening of the dollar clearly was a factor undermining gold prices in the second half of 2016 (Chart 42). On balance, we would maintain a modest position in gold for the time being, but would look to increase exposure later this year as the dollar peaks. Peter Berezin Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 John G. Fernald, "Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2014-15, (June 2014), and John G. Fernald, "The Pre-Great Recession Slowdown in U.S. Productivity Growth," (November 16, 2015). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2016: Supply Constraints Resurface," dated October 7, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Italian Bank Job," dated July 29, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Needs More Debt," dated May 20, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Back in 2007, trend growth was around 10%. Consistent with the empirical literature, let us assume that an appropriate capital-to-GDP ratio is 250% and that the capital stock depreciates at 5% a year. With a trend growth of 10%, China needs 2.5*10%=25% of GDP in new investment before depreciation to keep its capital-to-GDP ratio constant, and an additional 2.5*5%=12.5% of GDP in investment to cover depreciation, for a grand total of 37.5% of GDP in required investment. With a trend GDP growth rate of 6%, however, the required investment-to-GDP ratio would only be 2.5*6%+2.5*5%=27.5%. 6 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Reports Section 2, "Are Eurozone Stocks Really That Cheap?" dated June 30, 2016, and "Japanese Equities: Good Value Or Value Trap?" dated November 24, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Seven Structural Reasons For A Lower Neutral Rate In The U.S.," dated March 13, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Weaker RMB Ahead," dated March 06, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of December 30, 2016. The model has boosted its overweight in the Euro Area, especially in Italy, Spain and Netherland, financed mainly by a slight reduction in the large overweight in the U.S. Japan's underweight is back to the largest again, followed by the U.K. (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the non-U.S. model (Level 2) outperformed its benchmark by 206 bps in December, thanks to the overweight in Euro Area. The large overweight in the U.S. caused the Level 1 model to underperform by 27 bps. Overall, the GAA model outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 15 bps in December. Since Inception, the GAA model outperformed its benchmark by 26 bps. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model". http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of December 30, 2016. Table 3AllocationsTable 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance The momentum component has shifted Info Tech from overweight to underweight. The valuation component indicated that Consumer Staples is no longer expensive. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Senior Analyst patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com