Developed Countries

Highlights Senate Republicans would be suicidal not to agree to a fiscal relief bill before the election. Democrats are still offering a $2.2 trillion package. Grassroots Republican voters will forgive Republicans for blowing out the budget deficit but they will never forgive them for throwing away control of the White House and Senate. Nevertheless financial markets face more downside until a deal is reached. We are booking gains on several of our tactical risk-off trades but will hold our strategic risk-on trades, as we are still constructive over a 12-month period. Turkey is stepping back from its foreign adventurism in the face of constraints. Our GeoRisk Indicator for Turkey has rolled over. Feature Financial markets continue to sell off in the face of a range of risks, including new threats of COVID-19 restrictions in Europe, an increase in daily new cases of the disease in the United States (Chart 1), and the US Congress’s problems passing a new round of fiscal relief. Chart 1Increase In COVID-19 Cases Among Factors Weighing On Markets Chart 2Congress Will Pass Stimulus ~$2-$2.5 Trillion Since May, when the Democrats passed the $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, we have maintained that “stimulus hiccups” would roil the market. However, we also argued that Congress would eventually pass a new package – probably in the range of $2-$2.5 trillion (Chart 2).1 The latter part of this view remains to be seen and has come under pressure from investors who fear that Congress could fail to produce a bill entirely. We are sticking with our guns. GOP senators will recognize that they face sweeping election losses; House Democrats will not be able to reverse course and deprive households of badly needed assistance. However, stock investors might sell more between now and the final deal, which must be done by around October 9 so that lawmakers can go back to their home states to campaign for the November 3 election. Moreover the fiscal deal might not come in time to save the Republicans’ re-election bid in the White House and Senate, which raises further downside risk due to the Democratic agenda of re-regulation and tax hikes. And the election’s aftershocks could also be market-negative. For example, President Trump could also escalate the conflict with China, whether as the “comeback kid” or as a lame duck. Therefore this week we are booking some gains. We will not recommend a tactical risk-on position until our fiscal view is confirmed and we can reassess. US Fiscal Stimulus Is Coming Chart 3Republicans Highly Unlikely To Win House Of Representatives Why would Democrats agree to a stimulus bill given that it could help President Trump and the Republicans get re-elected? Democrats are afraid to deprive households of relief amid a crisis merely to spite the president and score election points. Around 28-43 of Democrats in the House of Representatives face re-election in districts that are competitive or could become competitive. Republicans need a net gain of 20 seats to retake the House (Chart 3). If Democrats offer to cooperate yet Republican senators balk, then the latter will take the blame for any failed deal and ensuing financial turmoil. The experience of other fiscal cliffs bears this out. The debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2013 and the government shutdowns of 2013 and 2018-19 all suggest that net presidential and congressional approval ratings suffer when partisanship prevents compromise on major fiscal issues (Charts 4A and 4B). This is a risk for the ruling GOP. All Democrats have to do is remain open to compromise. Net presidential and congressional approval ratings suffer when partisanship prevents compromise on major fiscal issues – a risk for the ruling GOP. Chart 4AFiscal Failures Pose A Risk To Ruling GOP Chart 4BFiscal Failures Pose A Risk To Ruling GOP Confirming this reasoning, Democrats joined with Republicans this week to pass a continuing resolution to maintain government spending levels through December 11, thus avoiding a government shutdown. Clearly the two parties can still cooperate despite record levels of partisanship. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi ruled out using government shutdown as a weapon to hurt the Republicans, fearing it would backfire. And just last week vulnerable House members pressured Pelosi into stating that the House will remain in session in October until a fiscal relief bill is passed. Democrats remain committed to their current plan – solidifying their grip on the House and demonstrating that they can govern, and that government can do more for households, by passing bills. This is still the strategy even if the risk is that these bills give Trump a marginal benefit. The Democratic demand is for a very large fiscal package – House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is today offering $2.2 trillion, a compromise from the initial $3.4 trillion bill (Table 1). A smaller bill is harder to negotiate because it would cut the House Democrats’ spending priorities for their constituents, including around $1 trillion in state and local government aid, while still giving Trump a bounce in opinion polls for boosting pandemic relief. This is unacceptable – and this is how a policy mistake could happen. Table 1What A Fiscal Compromise Will Look Like Chart 5Senate Republicans Face A Hotly Contested Election Chart 6Republican Senators' Hung Up On Future Deficit Concerns Senate Republicans face a hotly contested election – with 23 of them up for re-election versus only 12 Democrats. However, 30 of them are not up for re-election this year (Chart 5). These senators fear the eventual return of deficit concerns among the Republican base so they are bargaining to limit emergency spending (Chart 6). Until they can be cajoled by their fellow senators and the White House, they pose a risk to the passage of new stimulus. But this risk is overrated. Ultimately Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and the Senate Republicans will capitulate. It is political suicide if they do not. The GOP will lose control of the Senate and the White House if premature fiscal tightening sparks a bloody September-October selloff just ahead of the election (Charts 7Aand 7B). Chart 7AStocks Sell, Bonds Rally … When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Chart 7BStocks Sell, Bonds Rally … When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Chart 8Trump Compares Poorly To Other Presidents Re-Elected Amid Recession Only three out of six presidents in modern times have been re-elected when a recession struck during the election year yet ended prior to the fall campaign. These were William McKinley in 1900, Teddy Roosevelt in 1904, and Calvin Coolidge in 1924.2 Trump faces the same scenario, but financial markets are signaling that Trump is not faring as well as these three predecessors (Chart 8). The Senate races are all on a knife’s edge (Chart 9). American politics are highly nationalized – partisan identification overrides regional concerns. President Trump has also personalized his political party, making the election a referendum on himself (Chart 10). These trends suggest the Senate will fall to the party that wins the White House. Chart 9The Senate Races Are All On A Knife’s Edge Consumer confidence is weak and bodes ill for the incumbent president and party (Chart 11). Chart 10Trump Has Personalized Partisan Politics Chart 11Consumer Confidence Bodes Ill For Trump And GOP A failure to provide stimulus will ensure that sentiment worsens for the rest of the campaign and overshadows some underlying material improvements that are the Republicans’ only saving grace. Wage growth is recovering in line with the V-shape recovery in blue and purple states, including purple states that voted for Trump (Chart 12). The manufacturing rebound – and a surge in loans – is creating the conditions for the “Blue Wall” of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin to re-elect President Trump (Chart 13). A fiscal failure will blot out this positive news. Chart 12Fiscal Failure Would Blot Out Economic Improvements Chart 13Blue Wall' Could Re-Elect Trump On Economic Improvement Republicans’ standing offer is for a $1.3 trillion bill. The bipartisan “Problem Solver’s Caucus” has separately proposed a $1.5 trillion package that could be converted. McConnell has shown he can muster his troops by producing 52 Republican votes on a skinny relief bill on September 10. The Senate will go on recess on Friday, October 9 and the House is committed to staying until a bill is done. Negotiations cannot drag on much longer than that, however, because lawmakers need to go back to their home states and districts to campaign for the election. The equity selloff suggests policymakers will need to respond sooner anyway. Is there a way for Trump to bypass Congress and provide stimulus unilaterally? Chart 14Gridlock In 2020-22 Is Possible Under Trump Or Biden Trump is only too happy to run against a “do-nothing Congress,” which is how Harry Truman pulled off his surprise victory in 1948. He could use executive orders to redirect federal funds that have already been appropriated. However, he has already provided stimulus by decree – delaying payroll tax collections and calling on states to provide unemployment insurance – and yet the market has sold off anyway. That is because these measures are half-baked – they lack the size and the force of an act of Congress. They require coordination with states and firms, which face uncertainty over the legality of the measures and have little incentive to make sacrifices for an administration that may not last more than a few months. In short, if Trump tries to stimulate by decree, it is an election gimmick that will not satisfy market participants who need to look beyond the next 39 days to the critical question of whether US fiscal authorities understand the needs of the economy and can coordinate effectively. Congressional failure will cast a pall over the outlook given that there is still a fair chance the election could produce gridlock for the 2020-22 period, under Trump or Biden (Chart 14). Bottom Line: Financial markets face more downside until Senate Republicans capitulate to Pelosi’s demand of a bill around $2-$2.5 trillion. We think they will, but that is not an argument for getting long now – Republicans could capitulate too late to save the market from a deeper selloff. Investors should book profits now and buy when the deal is clinched. What About The Supreme Court? The Supreme Court battle over the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg may increase the risk of miscalculation in the stimulus negotiations, but not by much. Subjectively we would upgrade that risk from 25% to 33%. Republicans will fill the vacant seat before the election. So far they have the votes – even if Senator Mitt Romney changes his mind, there is still a one-seat buffer. However, a win on the high court has a mixed impact on financial markets. It may increase the odds of a Democratic Party sweep, which is initially a net negative for equities. But House Democrats will become less inclined to compromise on the size of the fiscal bill that we expect. They will say “take it or leave it” on the $2.2 trillion offer. The lowest we can see Democrats passing is $1.9 trillion. If the GOP fails to budge, the equity selloff will be aggravated by the implication that Democrats will win a clean sweep and thus gain the power to raise corporate and capital gains taxes next year. We have put 55%-60% odds on a clean sweep, but the market stands at 49%, so there is room for the market to adjust (Chart 15). As for the Supreme Court itself, a Republican nomination is legitimate regardless of the election timing, though the decision to go forward this close to the election reveals extreme levels of polarization. The Republican pick could energize the Democrats in the election, as occurred with the nomination of Justice Brett Kavanaugh just ahead of the 2018 midterms. A Democratic overreaction could mobilize conservatives, but this will be moot if the stock market collapses. If the presidential election is contested or disputed, Trump’s court nominee pick could cast the decisive vote, although, once nominated, a justice may not rule in accordance with his or her nominator’s wishes. The Supreme Court battle raises the risk of stimulus miscalculation to 33%. In a period of “peak polarization,” one should expect the Supreme Court battle to escalate further from here (Chart 16). Democrats are likely to remove the filibuster if they win the Senate. This would theoretically enable them to create four new seats on the court, which they could then fill with liberal judges. Franklin Roosevelt attempted to pack the court in 1937 when it got in the way of the New Deal and his plan only narrowly failed due to the unexpected death of a key ally in the Senate. Chart 15A Democratic Sweep Would Aggravate The Equity Selloff Chart 16Supreme Court Battle Will Escalate Amid Extreme Polarization Not only might the court decide the election outcome, but future controversial legislation could live or die by the court’s vote, as occurred with Obamacare in 2012 (Chart 17). In the event that Democrats achieve a clean sweep, the conservative court will be their only obstacle and they will possess the means to remove it. Chart 17Supreme Court Battle Will Prove Market Relevant In Event Of Democratic Sweep Bottom Line: Earlier we saw a 25% chance that stimulus would fail – now we give it a 33% chance. However, the size of the stimulus is now even more likely to fall within the $2-$2.5 trillion range we have signaled in previous reports. The Supreme Court will become a major factor in domestic economic policy uncertainty if Democrats win a clean sweep of government. Turkey Hits Constraints In East Med – For Now … Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policy assertiveness has once again put Turkey in conflict with NATO allies. Tensions escalated last month after Greece signed a maritime boundary deal with Egypt that Athens said nullified last November’s Libya-Turkey agreement (Map 1). Map 1Turkey Testing Maritime Borders In the East Med In response, Turkey issued a navigational warning (which was renewed thrice) and dispatched its seismic research vessel, the Oruc Reis, to explore for hydrocarbons in disputed areas of the Eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Cyprus. In shows of force, Turkey and Greece both deployed their navies to the area last month, raising the risk of an armed confrontation.3 The motivation for Erdogan’s hard power tactics is multi-pronged. Chart 18Erdogan’s Foreign Adventurism Reflects Domestic Weakness On a domestic level, Erdogan’s East Med excursions are an attempt to rally domestic support, where he and his party have lost ground (Chart 18). Given that popular opinion in Turkey indicates that the majority see the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a “kin country” and that they do not expect Turkey to be accepted into the EU, Ankara’s East Med strategy is likely to find support. On an international level, Turkey is flexing its muscles against the West. Erdogan has inserted Turkish forces into conflicts in Syria and Libya, confronting NATO allies there, and authorized the provocative purchase of the Russian S400 missile defense system at the expense of membership in the US F-35 program. The East Med gambit is another challenge to the West by testing EU unity. Specifically Erdogan is demonstrating that Turkey is willing to use military force to reject any unilateral attempts by foreign powers to impose maritime borders on Turkey – for instance through the EU’s Seville map.4 By demonstrating maritime strength, Turkey hopes to twist the EU’s arm into agreeing to a more favorable maritime partition plan in the East Med. As such the conflict is part of Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” strategy to expand its sphere of influence and secure energy supplies.5 Turkey is extremely vulnerable as a geopolitical actor because it depends on imports for three-quarters of its energy needs.6 With energy accounting for 20% of its import bill, these imports are weighing on the current account balance (Chart 19). Turkey’s exclusion from regional gas agreements has thus been a blow to its self-sufficiency goals. Meanwhile Greece, Italy, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Jordan have recently formalized their cooperation through the Cairo-based East Mediterranean Gas Organization. Turkish agitation in the East Mediterranean is an attempt to prevent others from exploiting gas resources there so long as its demands remain unmet. Erdogan’s retreat demonstrates Turkey’s constraints in its challenge to the EU. While the EU has yet to impose sanctions or penalties, Erdogan has now backtracked. Oruc Reis returned to Antalya on September 13, despite official statements that it would continue its mission. Turkish and Greek military officials have been meeting at NATO headquarters. And following talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and EU President Charles Michel, Erdogan’s office announced on September 22 that Turkey and Greece were prepared to resume talks. The postponement of the European Council’s special meeting to discuss Turkish sanctions to October 1-2 plays to Turkey’s favor by giving more time for talks. Chart 19Turkey's Energy Dependence A Geopolitical Vulnerability Erdogan’s retreat demonstrates Turkey’s constraints in its challenge to the EU. The possibility of damaging sanctions was too much at a time of economic vulnerability. Given Turkey’s dependence on the EU for export earnings and FDI inflows, the impact of sanctions on Turkey’s economy cannot be overstated (Chart 20). Chart 20EU Sanctions Could Destroy Turkey's Economy Turkey is also facing constraints diplomatically as two of its regional rivals – the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel – have agreed to normalize relations and strengthen ties under the US-mediated Abraham Accords (Table 2). The UAE already dispatched F-16s to Crete to participate in joint training exercises in a show of support to Greece. Table 2The Abraham Accords Unify Turkey’s Regional Rivals Details about the potential sanctions have not been released. However, EU Minister of Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell has indicated that penalties could be levied not only on individuals, but also on assets, ships, and Turkish access to European ports and supplies. This could include banks financing energy exploration or even entire business sectors, such as the energy industry. Moreover, the EU could play other damaging cards such as halting EU accession talks, or limiting its customs union with Turkey, which Ankara hopes to modernize. Chart 21EU Needs Turkey’s Cooperation To Stem Flow Of Migrants It is also in Europe’s interest to de-escalate the conflict. Sanctions on Turkey could accelerate Ankara’s re-orientation towards Russia and possibly China, expediting its transition to a hostile regional actor. In addition, Turkey has not shied away from using the 2016 migration deal, whereby Turkey has become the gatekeeper of Middle Eastern migrants fleeing to Europe, as a bargaining chip (Chart 21). Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu outright stated that Turkey will respond to EU sanctions by reneging on the deal, which could result in an influx of refugees into the EU and new challenges for Europe’s political establishment. Erdogan’s retreat is also likely a response to pressure from Washington. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lent some support to Greece and Cyprus during his September 12 visit to Cyprus. While the US has distanced itself from recent developments in the East Med, leaving German Chancellor Angela Merkel to play the role of mediator, a deterioration in Ankara’s relations with NATO allies could accelerate Turkey’s de-coupling from the West. Some within Washington are already calling for a relocation of the US strategic Incirlik air base to Greek islands. Erdogan’s retreat from a hawkish stance is in line with similar behavior elsewhere. For instance, despite having taken delivery of all parts and completed all necessary tests, Turkey has yet to activate its Russian S-400 missile defense system. It is wary of US sanctions. Similarly, Ankara has paused its Libyan offensive toward the eastern oil crescent in face of the risk of an outright military confrontation with Egypt. In each case, Erdogan appears to be at least temporarily recognizing the limits to his foreign adventurism. Nevertheless, the recent de-escalation does not mark the end of the conflict. Rather it demonstrates that both sides have hit constraints and are pausing for a breather. Chart 22Erdogan's Tactical Retreat Will Pull Down Turkish Risk The tactical retreat will provide some relief for the lira, which hit all-time lows against the dollar and euro, and thus pull down our Turkey GeoRisk indicator (Chart 22). But it does not guarantee that the Turkish risk premium will stay low. Talks between Greece and Turkey are unlikely to result in substantial breakthroughs. Instead the conflict will resurface – perhaps when Turkey is in a stronger economic position at home and the EU is distracted elsewhere, whether with internal political issues or conflicts with Russia, the UK, or any second-term Trump administration. Bottom Line: The recent de-escalation of East Med tensions does not mark the end of a bull market in Turkey-EU tensions. These tensions arise from geopolitical multipolarity – Turkey’s ability to act independently in foreign policy without facing an overwhelming, unified US-EU response. However, Turkey’s vulnerability to European economic sanctions shows that it faces real constraints. A major attempt to flout these constraints is a sell signal for the lira, as European sanctions could then become a reality. We remain negative on the lira, but will book gains on our short trade. Investment Takeaways We are booking gains on some of our tactical risk-off trades, given that we ultimately expect the US Congress to approve a new fiscal package. We are closing our long VIX December 2020 / short VIX January 2021 trade, which captured concerns about a contested election in the United States, for a gain of 4%. Volatility will still rise and a contested election is still possible, but the fiscal risk has gone up, COVID-19 cases have gone up, and Trump’s polling comeback has softened. The 4% gain does not include leverage or contract size. We were paid to put on the trade and now will be paid to exit it, so we are booking gains (Chart 23). Chart 23Book Gains On Bet On Near Term Volatility We are closing our short “EM Strongman Basket” of Turkish, Brazilian, and Philippine currencies for a gain of 4.5%. The trade has performed well but Turkey is not only recognizing its constraints abroad but also recognizing constraints at home by raising interest rates to defend the lira. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s approval rating has surged and our GeoRisk indicator has topped out. The latest readings on our GeoRisk Indicators provide confirmation of our major themes, views, and trades. The charts of each country’s indicator can be found in the Appendix. Short China, Long China Plays: Geopolitical risk continues on the uptrend that began with Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and has not abated with the Phase One trade deal. Policymakers will remain entirely accommodative on fiscal and quasi-fiscal (credit) policy in the wake of this year’s recession. New financial regulations do not herald a return of the deleveraging campaign in any way comparable to 2017-18. The October Politburo meeting on the economy could conceivably sound a hawkish note, which could conveniently undermine sentiment ahead of the US election, but if this occurs then we would not expect follow-through. China plays and commodity plays should benefit, such as the Australian dollar, iron ore prices, and Brazilian and Swedish equities. Yet we remain short the renminbi, which has recently flagged after a fierce rally. Trump is negative for the RMB and Biden will ultimately be tough on China, contrary to the market consensus. Short Taiwan: US-China strategic relations have collapsed over the course of the year but financial markets have ignored it due to COVID-19 and stimulus. The only thing keeping US-China relations on an even keel is the Trump-Xi gentleman’s agreement, which expires on November 3 regardless of the election outcome. While outright military conflict over Taiwan cannot be ruled out, Beijing is much more likely to impose economic sanctions prior to any attempt to take the island by force. This has been our base case since 2016. Our GeoRisk indicator is just starting to price this risk so it remains highly underrated from the perspective of the Taiwanese dollar and equities. We are short and there is still time to put on shorts. Long South Korea: The rise in Korean geopolitical risk since the faltering of US-North Korean diplomacy in 2019 has peaked and fallen back, as expected. Pyongyang has not substantively tested President Trump during the election year and we still do not think he will – though a showdown would mark an October surprise that could boost Trump’s approval rating. South Korean political risk should continue falling and we are long Korean equities. Short Russia: Russian geopolitical risk has exploded upward, as we expected. We have been bearish on the Russian ruble and local currency bonds, though we should note that this differs from our Emerging Markets Strategy view based on macro fundamentals. Our reasoning predates the escalation of tensions with the EU over Belarus, but Belarus highlights the negative dynamic: Vladimir Putin in his fourth term is concerned about domestic social and political stability, and this concern is especially heightened after the global pandemic and recession. Therefore he has little ability to tolerate unrest in the former Soviet sphere. Moreover, he has a window of opportunity when the US administration is distracted, and not unfriendly, whereas that will change if the Democrats take over. If Democrats win, they will not try another diplomatic “reset” with Russia; they believe engagement has failed and want revenge for Putin’s undermining the Obama administration and 2016 election interference. The Nordstream 2 pipeline and Russian local currency bonds are at risk of new sanctions. The Democrats will also increase their efforts at cyber warfare and psychological warfare to counter Russia’s use of such measures. If Trump wins, the upside for Russia is limited as Trump’s personal preferences have repeatedly lost to the US political and military establishment when it comes to Russia. The US has remained vigilant against Russian threats and has increased support for countering Russia in eastern Europe and Ukraine. Chart 24Russia Is At Risk of US Sanctions In Belarus, President Lukashenko has been sworn in as president again, and he will not step down unless Russia and its allies orchestrate a replacement who is friendly toward Russian interests. Russia will not allow a pro-EU, pro-NATO government by any stretch of the imagination. The likeliest outcome is that Russia demonstrates its security and military superiority in a limited way, while the US and Europe respond with sanctions but not with military force. There is no appetite for the US or EU to engage in hot war with Russia over Belarus, which they have little hope of re-engineering in the Western image. We are short Russian currency and local bonds on the risk of sanctions stemming from either the US election cycle or the Belarus confrontation or both. We note that local currency bonds are not pricing in the risks that our geopolitical risk indicators are pricing (Chart 24). Long Europe: Our European geopolitical risk indicators show that the EU remains a haven of political stability in an unstable time. European integration is accelerating in the context of security threats from Russia, the potential for sustained economic conflict with the US (if Trump is re-elected), and economic competition with an increasingly authoritarian and mercantilist China. Europe’s latent strengths, when acting in unison, are brought out by the report on Turkey above. However, the 35% chance that the UK fails to reach a trade deal at the end of this year will still push our European risk indicators up in the near term.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com   We Read (And Liked) … Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework For Predicting The Future What better way to revive the hallowed tradition of BCA Geopolitical Strategy book reviews than to give clients a sneak preview of our founder Marko Papic’s literary debut, Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework for Predicting the Future?7 Long-time readers will know much of this book – it is the distillation of a decade of Marko’s work at BCA Research and, more recently, Clocktower Group. Here is the story of European integration – perhaps Marko’s greatest call, from back in 2011. Here is the story of multipolarity and investing. Here is the apex of globalization. Here is the decline of laissez-faire and the rise of dirigisme. Here is the end of Chimerica. Attendees of the BCA Research Academy will also recognize much in Marko’s formal exposition of his method. The categories of material constraints that bind policymakers. The practical application of the median voter theorem. The psychological lessons from Richards Heuer and Lee Ross. The occasional dash of game theory – and the workingman’s critique of it. The core teaching is the same: “Preferences are optional and subject to constraints, whereas constraints are neither optional nor subject to preferences.” There is also much that is new, notably Marko’s analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is bound to generate controversy for classifying the whole episode as an example of mass hysteria comparable to the Salem witch trials, but which is as well-researched and well-argued as any section in the book. I was fortunate to learn the geopolitical method with Marko under the guidance of George Friedman, Peter Zeihan, Roger Baker, Fred Burton, Scott Stewart, and other colleagues at Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.) in Austin, Texas from the era of the Iraq troop surge, the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the Lehman Brothers collapse. We both owe a lot to these teachers: the history of geopolitics, intelligence analysis, open source monitoring, net assessments, and, of course, forecasting. What Marko did was to take this armory of geopolitical analysis – which we both can testify is best taught in practice, not universities – and to put it to use in the financial context, where political analysis was long treated as optional and anecdotal despite the manifest and growing need for a rigorous framework. A hard-nosed analyst will never cease to be amazed by the gaps that emerge between the consensus view on Wall Street and a careful, disciplined net assessment of a nation or political movement. By the same token, the investor, trader, or economist will never cease to be amazed by the political analyst’s inability to grasp the concept of “already priced in” or “the second derivative.” What needed to be done was to master the art of macro investing and geopolitics. Marko took this upon himself. It was audacious and it provoked a lot of skepticism from the dismal scientists and the political scientists alike. But Geopolitical Alpha, the concept and the book, is the consequence – and we are now all the better for it. Marko is fundamentally a post-modern thinker. His methodological hero is Karl Marx for the development of materialist dialectic, the back-and-forth debate between economic forces that humans internalize in the form of competing ideologies. His foil is the humanist and republican, Niccolo Machiavelli – not for his amoral approach, but for prizing the virtue of the prince in the face of outrageous fortune. Human agency is Marko’s favorite punching bag – he excels at identifying the ways in which individuals will be frustrated despite their best efforts by the cold, insensitive walls of reality around them. If there is a critique of Marko’s book, then, it is that he gives short shrift to the classical liberal tradition – or as I like to think of it, the balance-of-power tradition. The idea that hegemony, or unipolarity, leads to a stable social and political environment conducive to peace and prosperity has a lot going for it. But it also partakes of an older tradition of thought that envisions a single, central political order as necessarily the most stable and predictable – a tradition that can be ascribed to Plato as well as Marx. You can see the positive implication for financial markets. But what if this tradition is only occasionally right – what if it too is subject to historical cycles? If that is the case, then the Beijing consensus is a mirage – and the US’s reversion to a blue-water strategy (not only under President Trump, but also under a future President Biden, according to his campaign agenda) does not necessarily herald the “end [of] American dominance on the world stage.” The classical tradition behind the Greco-Roman, British, and American constitutional systems, including their naval strategies, envisioned a multipolar order that was somewhat less stable but more durable, and this tradition has proven immensely beneficial for the creation of technology and wealth. Of course, Marko is very much alive to this tradition and, despite his critique of the ancients, shows himself to be highly sensitive to the interplay of virtue and fortune. Throughout the work, the analytical style can be characterized as restless energy in the service of cool, chess-playing logic. Marko is generous with his knowledge, merciless in drawing conclusions, and outrageously funny in delivery. He attacks the questions that matter most to investors and that experts too often leave shrouded in finely wrought uncertainty. He also shows himself to be a superb writer as well as strategist, interspersing his methodological training sessions with vivid anecdotes of a lifelong intellectual journey from a shattered Yugoslavia to the heights of finance. The bits of memoir are often the best, such as the intro to Chapter Six on geopolitics. To paraphrase a great author, Marko writes because he has a story to tell, not because he has to tell a story. The tale of the mysterious consulting firm Papic and Parsley will do a great public service by teaching readers precisely how skeptical of mainstream news journalism they should be. It isn’t enough to say that we read Geopolitical Alpha and liked it – the sole criterion for a review in this column. Rather, the book and its author are the reason this column exists. And Geopolitical Alpha is now the locus classicus of market-relevant geopolitical analysis.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We favored the upper side of the range, first $2.5 trillion, and subsequently something closer to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s demand of $2.2 trillion. We have speculated that Republicans may get her to settle at $1.9 trillion. 2 Two of these cases were unique in that a vice president took over from a president who died and then won re-election – unlike Trump’s scenario. 3 On August 12 a Greek Navy frigate collided with a Turkish vessel guiding the Oruc Reis. Athens called the incident an accident while Ankara referred to it as a provocation. 4 The so-called Seville Map was prepared at the request of the European Union by researchers at the University of Seville, attempts to clarify the exclusive economic zones of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. The US announced on September 21 that it does not consider the Seville map to have any legal significance. 5 The Blue Homeland or Mavi Vatan doctrine announced in 2006 intends to secure Turkish control of maritime areas surrounding its coast (Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea) in order to secure energy supplies and support Turkey’s economic growth. 6 Erdogan’s claim that gas from the recently discovered Sakarya gas field would reach consumers by 2023 is likely overly optimistic and unrealistic. The drilling costs and commercial viability of the field are yet to be determined. Thus, the find does not impact dynamics in the East Med. 7 New Jersey: Wiley, 2021. 286 pages. Section II: GeoRisk Indicators China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights While we are bearish on the US dollar in the long run, the greenback is primed for a rebound in the near term. Consistently, commodities prices will relapse and EM currencies will depreciate versus the US dollar. Global growth stocks will correct further because they are overbought/over-owned and expensive. The rest of the equity market will relapse because its fundamentals are poor, especially given the renewed rise in new infection cases across Europe and the US. Feature Global financial markets are in the process of a reset. Several segments have been through very sharp and considerable movements in recent months, and these movements are starting to partially unwind. The US dollar will rebound, commodities prices will correct and global equities will continue selling off. In brief, EM risk assets and currencies are entering a period of weakness, which will eventually lead to buying opportunities. Inter-Linkages Between Fixed-Income, Currencies And Commodities Chart I-1A Reset In US Inflation Expectations And Real Rates Is Overdue US inflation expectations have risen meaningfully, and US TIPS (real) yields have plummeted since April (Chart I-1). Consistent with plunging US real rates, the US dollar has sold off sharply (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Although our bias is that US inflation will rise in the coming years, for now, the rise in inflation expectations seems excessive. Given the tight correlation between oil prices and US breakeven inflation, as illustrated in the top panel of Chart I-1, lower crude prices will cause a drop in inflation expectations. Moreover, the absence of another large US fiscal stimulus will also lead to a downgrade in growth and inflation expectations. US nominal bond yields will likely remain largely range bound, and a drop in breakeven inflation will lead to higher real yields. The latter will help the US dollar to rebound from oversold levels, and EM currencies will depreciate against the dollar. In turn, a rebound in the greenback will be associated with lower commodities prices. Notably, investors’ net long positions in copper have become very elevated (Chart I-2). Investor sentiment on commodities in general is quite positive. Hence, from a contrarian perspective, commodities prices are primed for a pullback. In addition, Chinese imports of commodities will slow in the near term, reinforcing the correction in resources prices. China has evidently been stockpiling commodities, as its commodities imports have been considerably stronger than its underlying final demand. In particular, Chart I-3 demonstrates that mainland imports of copper, crude oil, steel and iron ore have been surging. Chinese imports of crude and industrial metals are likely to drop temporarily. Chart I-2Long Copper Is A Crowded Trade Chart I-3China Has Been Stockpiling Commodities   China’s booming intake of commodities in recent months was stipulated by the country’s previously depleted commodity inventories, low prices and the availability of cheap bank financing. Granted commodity inventories have been replenished and resource prices are no longer low, Chinese imports of crude and industrial metals are likely to drop temporarily.    That said, from a cyclical perspective, China’s economic recovery will continue, and final demand for resources will expand. Thus, we will see a material correction, not a crash, in commodities prices. EM credit spreads inversely correlate with commodities prices and currencies – EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads are shown as inverted on both panels of Chart I-4. As commodities prices retreat and the US dollar rebounds, EM credit markets will sell off. Chart I-4EM Credit Markets Will Weaken As EM Currencies And Commodities Sell Off EM local currency bond yields might slightly back up as EM currencies depreciate and US real yields rebound. However, economic conditions in many EM countries outside China remain extremely weak, and inflation is very subdued. Hence, any back up in EM domestic bond yields will be limited. Bottom Line: While we are bearish on the US dollar in the long run, the greenback is primed for a rebound in the near term. Consistently, commodities prices will relapse and EM currencies will sell off versus the US dollar. Notably, oil prices, as well as several EM and DM currencies, have rolled over at technical levels which typically herald a major reversal (Chart I-5A and I-5B). Chart I-5AFacing A Major Resistance Chart I-5BFacing A Major Resistance Finally, EM fixed-income markets will experience a correction that will provide a buying opportunity. The Equity Correction: More To Go The correction in global share prices has further to run. Market leaders – growth stocks – remain overbought, and it is reasonable to expect that they will at least retest their 200-day moving averages. Meanwhile, the parts of the global equity universe hardest-hit during March have failed to break above their 200-day moving average. This can be interpreted as an indication that they have not yet entered a bull market. These include: EM ex-TMT1 and global value stocks as well as the US Value Line Geometric Composite Index (Chart I-6). In short, growth stocks will correct further because they are overbought/over-owned and expensive; the rest of the equity market will relapse because its fundamentals are poor, especially given the renewed rise in new infection cases across Europe and the US. Chart I-6These Stocks Have Not Entered A Bull Market Yet Chart I-7Downside Risks To EM Equities In addition, the following indicators also point to further selloff in EM and DM share prices. Our Risk-On / Safe-Haven currency ratio2 has been falling since June and continues pointing to lower EM share prices (Chart I-7). The EM and DM advance-decline lines have relapsed below zero indicating a deteriorating equity market breadth (Chart I-8). This heralds lower stock prices. As EM corporate bond yields rise due to either weaker EM currencies or lower commodities prices, as we argued above, EM share prices will tumble (Chart I-9).      Chart I-8Deteriorating Breadth Points To Lower Share Prices Chart I-9Rising EM Corporate Bond Yields Will Reinforce EM Equity Selloff Bottom Line: Global and EM share prices are in a correction that has not run its course. Investment Strategy A meaningful setback in their EM currencies will lead us to recommend switching from receiving long-term rates to buying their cash local currency bonds (taking currency risks as well). EM Domestic Bonds: We continue recommending receiving 10-year swap rates in Mexico, Colombia, Russia, India, China, Korea and Malaysia. A meaningful setback in their EM currencies will lead us to recommend switching from receiving long-term rates to buying their cash local currency bonds (taking currency risks as well). EM Equities: Absolute-return investors should be cautious at the moment as EM share prices are set to deflate further. Within a global equity portfolio, we continue recommending a neutral allocation to EM. Better equity valuations in EM than in the US will be offset by a rebound in the US dollar, warranting a trading range in EM versus DM relative equity performance. Our country equity allocation within the EM universe is always presented at the end of our report (please refer to page 10).   EM Exchange Rates: Even though we expect a meaningful rebound in the nominal broad trade-weighted US dollar, we believe the safe-haven currencies – such as the JPY, CHF and the euro – will outperform EM currencies.  As such, we reiterate our strategy of shorting a basket of EM currencies versus an equally-weighted basket of JPY, CHF and the euro. Our short EM currency basket consists of BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, PHP, KRW and IDR. Finally, we recommend a neutral allocation to EM credit markets (US dollar bonds) versus US corporate credit. Absolute-return investors should accumulate this asset class on a weakness.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Technology, media and telecom stocks excluding information technology (IT) sector before December 2018 and excluding IT, media & entertainment and internet & direct marketing retail as of December 2018 2Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, IDR, MXN, RUB, CLP & ZAR total return indices relative to average of JPY & CHF; rebased to 100 at January 2000 Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

The market bounced off the 3233 support level this week and while volatility has retrenched, we continue to caution investors not to deploy fresh capital just yet as a better entry point will likely materialize in the coming months. Looking across three key asset classes – fixed income, commodities, and currencies – reveals that equities will have a hard time breaking out of their recent funk. First, and most importantly, the corporate bond market has been discontent with equities’ behavior since early-August, warning that investors have to allow ample time for this drawdown to fully play out (top panel). Second, in the commodity universe, silver had been diverging from equities as it topped out in early-August and led the broad equity market peak. Now “poor man’s gold” – that fell another 5% yesterday alone – is weighing heavily on the SPX (middle panel). Finally, the ultimate risk-on/off currency cross AUD/CHF peaked in early June alongside a slew of other hypersensitive sectors like banks/financials, representing yet another yellow flag for the near-term prospects of the overall equity market (bottom panel). Bottom Line: Stay patient and refrain from deploying fresh capital in the broad equity market. A better entry point will likely materialize between now and the end of the year. ​​​​​​​

Special Report

Highlights We present a thought experiment for the next eight years. 7000 constitutes a reasonable long-term target for the S&P 500. A doubling of the S&P 500 over the coming eight years is in line with the historical experience. Monetary policy is unlikely to tighten meaningfully, which will allow multiples to remain elevated Earnings per share can rise to $310 by 2028. Market technicals are also consistent with significant long-term gains for stocks. Feature Chart II-1Prolonged ZIRP Neither Eliminates Corrections... Our structural target is neither a joke nor a marketing ploy. And yes, it really does read SPX 7000! This is our S&P 500 target for the year 2028. A new business cycle has commenced and with it a fresh bull market. Our secular US equity market view is bullish. Our readers can fault us for our optimistic view on the world. But we live by the Buffett maxim that “there are no short sellers in the Forbes Billionaires list.” What gives us confidence in this prima facie hyperbolic market view? The Fed’s explicit acceptance that it is ready to incur inflation risk, cementing the fed funds rate near the zero-lower bound for as long as the eye see. In the last cycle, it took the Fed seven years to lift the fed funds rate from zero, a move that ended being judged as premature and forced the Yellen-led Fed to pause for another year (bottom panel, Chart II-1). Seven years. As such, there is a good chance the Fed will stay put until the year 2028, another election year. Even if it ultimately raises interest rates faster due to an overheated economy goosed up on the sweet nectar of fiscal largesse, it is highly likely to be behind the curve. Before we move on to justifying our target, some observations on ZIRP are in order. First, the Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy (QE and ZIRP) in the last cycle did not prevent stock market corrections, including a near 20% fall in 2011 (top panel, Chart II-1). In other words, we do not expect smooth sailing or a 45-degree angle line in the SPX heading to 2028. Rather, an era of volatility with a plethora of sizable corrections is upon us, but the path of least resistance will be higher. Make no mistake, we are in a “buy the dip” market now. Similar to 2008-2015, there will be a lot of fits and starts and a number of mini economic cycles will develop. Chart II-2 highlights that the ISM oscillated violently during the ZIRP years and so did equity momentum and the 10-year Treasury yield. Granted, the Fed managed to suppress economic volatility as real GDP averaged ~2%/annum in the aftermath of the GFC, but mini economic cycles and profit growth scares did not disappear (top panel, Chart II-3). Chart II-2...Nor Mini Economic Cycles Chart II-3"Lowflation"/Disinflation Has Been The Story Of The Past 30 Years   Importantly, while the 10-year Treasury yield moved with the ebbs and flows of the ISM manufacturing survey’s readings, it remained in a downtrend and every bond market selloff proved a buying opportunity in the era of ZIRP (third panel, Chart II-2). What the Fed failed to generate was inflation – of either the CPI or PCE deflator variety. In fact, the Fed has not seen core PCE price inflation overshoot 2.5% since the early 1990s (bottom panel, Chart II-3). Another feature of the ZIRP years in the last cycle was that early on easy monetary policy coincided with easy fiscal policy, as was warranted for the first few years post the GFC. Subsequently, fiscal thrust increased starting in 2016 counterbalancing the Fed’s interest rate hikes. Despite all that fiscal easing, real GDP growth peaked at 3% in 2018 before decelerating last year, raising a question mark about the long-term health of the US economy, a question to be answered in a future Special Report. Frequent readers of US Equity Strategy know our long-held view that the two primary equity market drivers have been easy fiscal and monetary policies since the March carnage. Looking ahead, the Fed has cemented the view that easy monetary policy will stay with us for quite some time. While the jury is still out on fiscal policy, it appears at the moment that profligacy has staying power as no party in Washington is campaigning on austerity or worrying about paying down the debt (save for the lone voice of the Kentucky Senator Rand Paul). The Buenos Aires Consensus is a paradigm shift, and the most important long-term consequence will be higher inflation. The US has abandoned the guardrails on populism established by the Washington Consensus – countercyclical fiscal policy, independent central banking, free trade, laissez-faire economic policy – and has adopted something… different. A new Consensus. These are extremely potent macro forces and given that there is a lag between the time both easy monetary and loose fiscal policies hit the economy, their effects will be long lasting. Especially given that they are now synchronized – unlike for large periods of the previous cycle – and undertaken at a much greater order of magnitude than after the GFC. Table II-1 With that macro backdrop in mind, let us circle back to our 7000 SPX target. A fresh bull market has commenced and we consider the breakout above the previous cycle’s highs as its starting point. In August, the SPX surpassed the February 19, 2020 highs, giving birth to the new bull market. Using empirical evidence since the late-1950s we conclude that, on average, the SPX doubles from its breakout point (Table II-1). This gives us the SPX 7000 reading before the new bull is slayed in the plaza de toros of economic cycles. While this qualitative analysis is enticing, ultimately earnings have to deliver in order to justify the equity market’s appreciation. Put differently, easy fiscal and monetary policies the world over will deliver EPS inflation. On the quantitative EPS front, we first turn to the reconstructed S&P 500 earnings back to the late-1920s. On average, EPS have grown by 7.5%/annum, effectively doubling every decade (Chart II-4). Chart II-4Average Annual EPS Growth Since 1920s = 7.5% More recently, using I/B/E/S data, there have been four distinct EPS growth periods over the past four decades with different durations. From trough-to-peak, EPS have enjoyed an average CAGR of over 10% (top panel, Chart II-5). Chart II-5EPS Can Double In Next Eight Years The current trough in forward EPS stands just shy of $140. Applying the average CAGR until 2028 results in a $310 EPS figure. This is our starting point of our EPS sensitivity analysis. Assigning the current forward multiple equates to an SPX terminal value of over 7000. Table II-2 showcases different EPS and forward P/E multiple permutations with the grey shaded area representing our tight range of peak cycle multiples and peak EPS estimates. Table II-2SPX EPS & Multiple Sensitivity With regard to what is currently priced in by sell side analysts, the 5-year forward EPS growth rate – the longest duration estimate available – is near a trough reading of 10%. The historical mean is 12% since 1985, with a range of 19% near the dotcom bubble peak and a trough of 9% at the depths of the 2016 manufacturing recession (bottom panel, Chart II-5). A few words on presidential cycles are relevant given our structural bullish equity market view. We first noticed Tables II-3 & II-4 in the WSJ in late-2016 and we have corrected some minor mistakes and updated them filling in the gaps. Drawdowns are frequent during term presidencies1 dating back to Hoover. Table II-3Every Presidency Experiences Drawdowns Table II-4S&P 500 Returns During Presidential Terms What is truly remarkable, however, is that since the late-1920s only three term presidencies ended up in the red. What the WSJ article did not mention was that in all three market declines GOP presidents were at the helm and had taken over at/or near all-time highs in the SPX! This represents a risk to our SPX 7000 view. If President Trump wins the upcoming election, given the recent modest recovery in the polling, he could meet the same fate as his Republican predecessors. Our sister Geopolitical Strategy service still assigns 35% probability for the incumbent to remain in office, a solid figure that suggests the race remains close. Importantly, while we believe a transition to a Democratic president will be tumultuous as we have been cautioning investors recently, a Biden presidency along with the possibility of a “Blue Wave” will bode well for the long-term prospects of the US equity market, if history at least rhymes. BCA’s Geopolitical strategist Matt Gertken assigns 65% odds to a Biden win and 55% to a Blue trifecta. Finally, on a technical note, the recent megaphone formation has stirred a lot of debate among technical analysts in the blogosphere and is eerily reminiscent of a similar formation that lasted from 1965 until 1975. Typically, these megaphone formations get resolved/completed by a diamond formation (Chart II-6). Chart II-6Of Megaphones And Diamonds Chart II-7Diamond Base Is Long Term Bullish While this points to a selloff in the broad equity market in the near-term, which is in accordance with our tactically cautious view (please see the last section of this Weekly Report), it is very bullish for the long-term, as equities catapult higher from such a diamond base formation (Chart II-7). In other words, odds are much higher that the SPX will hit 7000 first, before it ever revisits 2200. Adding it all up, we are introducing a structurally constructive US equity market view with an SPX 7000 target for year 2028 on the back of peak cycle EPS of $310 and peak cycle P/E multiple of 23. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist Footnotes 1 By term presidencies we are referring to the different duration of Presidents staying in office.

Highlights The global recovery has legs, but it will follow a stop-and-go pattern. Global fiscal policy will ultimately remain loose enough to create an appropriate counterweight to three major risks. Risk assets are still attractive on a 12-month investment horizon despite short-term dangers. The dollar cyclical downtrend will be tested, but it will prevail. 10-year Treasury yields will be range bound between 0.5% and 1%. Industrials, materials, gold and Japanese equities are attractive. Feature Chart I-1Ebbing Surprises The S&P 500 correction remains minimal in the face of Washington’s inability to reach a much-needed fiscal compromise. This resilience reflects that economies in the G-10 and China have pleasantly surprised investors despite rolling second waves of infections across the world, fiscal policy paralysis and generalized unease (Chart I-1). Strong growth has fueled higher earnings expectations. Meanwhile, global central banks are promising to keep accommodative monetary conditions in place indefinitely, which has allowed valuations to balloon. The cyclical outlook for stocks remains attractive. Nonetheless, global equities have entered a period of heightened volatility and downside risk until year-end. The S&P 500 had overshot its fundamentals, but now the momentum of the economic surprise index is deteriorating and central banks have deployed their full arsenal. Investors are concerned by a lack of fiscal support and rising policy uncertainty created by the approaching US election in November. This nervousness will spark powerful fluctuations in stock prices.  Avoid Binary Judgments The global economy is at a complex juncture, buffeted between forces that will either propel its recovery or sink it. The positives will predominate in this contest, which suggests that the business cycle remains in an upswing, albeit, a volatile one. The Good… Five main positive forces underpin the nascent economic bounce and thus, the profit outlook. Pent-up demand and the inventory cycle: The economy is making up for the collapse of both cyclical spending and production at the end of Q1 and into Q2. Inventories of finished products have sharply declined in the past six months. In the US, rapidly shrinking inventories are supercharging the uptick in the new-orders-to inventories ratio. Similar dynamics are occurring in China, Europe and Japan (Chart I-2). China’s stimulus-driven recovery will provide a crucial boost to the global business cycle. The Chinese engine is revving: An aggressive stimulus campaign followed Beijing’s swift actions to contain the domestic spread of COVID-19. China’s policies are generating economic dividends that will percolate through the global industrial and commodity sectors. Sales of floor space are already expanding by 40% annually, driven by a 60% jump in Tier-1 cities. In response, construction is forming a trough. Moreover, the large issuance of local government bonds is financing an increase in infrastructure spending. Thanks to an upturn in building activity, the equipment purchases, construction and installation components of China’s real estate investment are all bottoming (Chart I-3). Chart I-2The Inventory Adjustment Is Advanced Chart I-3China: A Policy-Driven Recovery   BCA Research’s Emerging Markets team recently showed that the expenditure rebound is not limited to the real estate sector.1 Vehicle sales are healthier and tech infrastructure outlays are reaccelerating (Chart I-4). Retail sales also moved back into positive territory in August. Thus, China’s cyclical spending has regained its footing. China’s stimulus-driven recovery will provide a crucial boost to the global business cycle. Beijing’s unconstrained credit easing is the source for the turnaround in China’s cyclical and capital expenditures outlook. Hence, the sharp increase in China’s credit and fiscal impulse foreshadows a powerful rebound in imports and in global industrial production because Chinese capex demands plentiful commodities, industrial goods and capital goods (Chart I-5).  Chart I-4More Chinese Recovery Chart I-5Chinese Stimulus Matters Globally   Chart I-6Robust American Households Consumer balance sheets are robust: Unlike the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), US households do not need to rebuild destroyed balance sheets. This time around, the low level of household debt and the limited hit to net worth has allowed consumers to withstand an even greater income shock than during the GFC (Chart I-6). As a result, expenditures are rebounding much quicker than most investors anticipated six months ago. An extremely vigorous policy response: Policymakers in the G-10 did not wait to deploy their economic arsenal when the economic crisis erupted. Governments have racked up their largest budget deficits since World War II (Chart I-7). Monetary authorities also moved quickly to ease financial conditions. Broad money supply growth among advanced economies has skyrocketed, global corporate bond issuance stands at a record $2.6 trillion, and excess liquidity points to continued industrial production strength. In the US, our Financial Liquidity Index is climbing higher alongside the ISM Manufacturing Index. Even the performance of EM carry trades (a financial variable that shows whether funds are flowing into EM economies) is consistent with a stabilization in global IP (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Exceptional Fiscal Stimulus Chart I-8Liquidity Helps Growth     Stronger industrial production models: Our industrial production models for the major advanced economies are all moving up after experiencing massive collapses this past spring. These models encapsulate many influences and their uniformly positive message is very encouraging. In all likelihood, a virtuous cycle has been unleashed. As IP recovers, then so will income, which will fuel the demand expansion and thus, more production. We expect the models to rise even more in the coming quarters. … And The Bad Three near-term concerns still hang over the global economy. Hence, while Q3 is set to deliver stunningly strong numbers boosted by advantageous base effects, growth will recede in Q4.2  While fiscal policy was on point in late Q1 and Q2, Washington’s performance in the past three months has been questionable. Fiscal stimulus hiccups in the US: While fiscal policy was on point in late Q1 and Q2, Washington’s performance in the past three months has been questionable. The CARES Act’s expanded $600 per week unemployment benefit lapsed at the end of July. This benefit, along with one-time $1200 stimulus checks, pushed disposable income higher by 7.5% during the past five months. Thankfully, households managed to save a large proportion of the government support. Consequently, consumption remained strong in August, despite limited help from the federal government. The short-term outlook for consumption is fragile because households cannot continue to tap into their savings. In August, US retail sales disappointed. Calculations by our US fixed-income strategist show that in the coming months, Washington must spend almost $800 billion just for consumer expenditures to match its growth rate of -3% recorded at the depth of the last recession.3 Moreover, a potential wave of eviction of renters looms. Thus, the economy could relapse violently as long as Democrats and Republicans remain apart on a compromise for a new stimulus bill. The upcoming Senate confirmation process to fill the Supreme Court seat left vacant by Ruth Bader-Ginsburg’s passing only complicates the passage of these needed spending measures. Chart I-9Permanent Joblessness Is A Threat Rising permanent job losses: The US unemployment rate has fallen from a high of 14.7% in April to 8.4% in August. This bright picture hides a negative development. The number of permanent job losses has quickly escalated, reaching 4.1 million last month (Chart I-9). Moreover, continuing unemployment insurance claims are barely declining. Mounting long-term unemployment is not associated with an economic recovery. Furthermore, permanent joblessness could easily push down consumer confidence, which would lift the household savings rate and hurt consumption. This problem is not unique to the US. In the UK, an unemployment cliff looms on October 31 when there will be an end to government schemes allowing firms to receive funds as long as they do not permanently severe their links with furloughed workers. The UK’s unemployment rate of only 4.1% is bound to surge when these support measures disappear. In continental Europe, similar stimulus programs could also be rescinded this fall. The weak health of small businesses accentuates risks to the labor market. In the US, 21% of very small firms will run out of money by the end of the year if the government does not dispense supplemental help. Closing these businesses will push up permanent joblessness even more and thus, further weaken consumption. Either weaker stock prices or a deterioration in the economy will be the catalyst for Washington to strike a deal. COVID-19 and the service sector: Many major countries are now fighting a second wave of infections, which may surpass the first wave. Many schools have re-opened and winter in the Northern Hemisphere is approaching (which will force people to congregate inside), bringing with it the regular flu season. Chart I-10The Service Sector Is The Weakest Link This epidemiological backdrop still represents an elevated hurdle to overcome for large swaths of the service sector, especially leisure, food, hospitality and travel. While these industries account for only 10% of GDP in the US, they contribute roughly 25% of employment. If governments toughen social distancing rules and implement localized lockdowns, then the service sector will act as a drag on GDP and employment (Chart I-10). Which Side Will Win? Ultimately, we anticipate that the tailwinds supporting the economy will overcome the headwinds. On the policy front, governments will pass more stimulus. Our Geopolitical strategists believe that the following constraints will force greater spending in the US by mid-October: The Democrats face an election and they want to deliver benefits to their voters.  The White House needs to prevent financial turmoil in the final month of the campaign. If the Republicans fail to agree on a second stimulus bill, there is a significant risk they will lose the White House and their majority in the Senate. Chart I-11No Constraints There The package should total nearly $2 trillion. The Democrats have reduced their demands to $2.3 trillion, while the GOP has moved up its offer to $1.3 trillion. Moreover, a bi-partisan “Problem Solvers Caucus” has emerged in Congress with a $1.5 trillion bill proposal that the White House is considering. Either weaker stock prices or a deterioration in the economy will be the catalyst for Washington to strike a deal. Fiscal stimulus will also remain generous outside the US. In Europe, France is providing an attractive template. On September 3, the Macron government announced an additional EUR100 billion stimulus package, whereby 40% of the funds would come from the common bond issuance recently announced by the EU. In Japan, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga will continue the policies of his predecessor. Finally, in emerging economies, the absence of inflation and well-behaved sovereign yields and spreads have provided room for local authorities to alleviate any economic pain created by COVID-19 (Chart I-11). Monetary policy will remain extremely stimulative. Central banks will not meaningfully ease policy further, but our monetary indicators are already at their most accommodative levels on record (see Section III). Plus, the US Federal Reserve’s switch to an average-inflation target last month raised the bar that inflation must reach before the FOMC tightens policy. The European Central Bank is contemplating a similar change. Furthermore, the continued woes of service-sector employment constitute another hurdle to clear before central banks can remove accommodation. Chart I-12US Housing Is The New Locomotive Finally, COVID-19 currently has a limited impact on the lion’s share of cyclical spending, which will continue to recover. Cyclical sectors include residential investment, business capex and spending on consumer durable goods. In the US, they account for only 20% GDP, but they generate 70% of the variance in its fluctuations. These sectors are heavily geared toward manufacturing, which is crucial for cyclical spending. Importantly, the robustness of household balance sheets and record low borrowing costs have allowed mortgage applications for purchases to rise sharply, home sales to recover and homebuilder confidence to surge to an all-time high (Chart I-12). Hence, residential activity will remain an important driver of domestic demand, especially because residential investment also often galvanizes other forms of cyclical spending. Bottom Line: The global economy remains buffeted between five positive forces that bolster the recovery and three negatives that hamper it. Ultimately, the authorities will have no choice but to add supplementary fiscal stimulus and monetary conditions will remain extremely accommodative. The recovery will then slow from its heady Q3 pace, but cyclical spending will still power ahead next year. In a nutshell, the economy will not be weaker nor much stronger than the base case presented by the IMF. Investment Implications Our somewhat upbeat position on the global economic outlook remains consistent with a favorable stance toward risk assets in the next 12 to 18 months, because adverse economic outcomes are unlikely to materialize, not because growth will be stronger than expected. Nonetheless, we are conscious that the market place remains fraught with many risks and that growth will stay volatile. As a result, episodic violent corrections will punctuate the upward path in risk asset. We are currently in the midst of such a correction. Chart I-13The Dollar Remains Expensive The Dollar We are still bearish on the dollar on a cyclical investment horizon. The USD remains expensive despite its recent weakness. Against major currencies, the dollar has climbed by 30% since 2008. On a broad, trade-weighted basis, it is up 36% in the same period. Therefore, the US currency trades 15% above its Purchasing Power Parity equilibrium, the most among the major currencies (Chart I-13).4  The US balance of payments picture is becoming increasingly problematic for the dollar. After a surge this spring, US private-sector savings are set to decline. Low interest rates and asset bubbles will increasingly incentivize consumption, while rising capex intentions point to a drop in the corporate sector’s savings. Given that we anticipate the fiscal balance to remain negative in the coming years, the national savings rate will sag, which will worsen the US current account (Chart I-14).5 In other words, the US twin deficits will balloon as the recovery progresses. Despite our bearish view on the dollar, our base case still anticipates a short-term bounce in the USD. The US capital account will not offset the impact on the dollar of a wider current account deficit. US real interest rate differentials have collapsed and foreigners have shunned the Treasury market (Chart I-15, top panel). The Fed conducts the loosest monetary policy among the major economies, which is pushing the US shadow rate lower versus the euro area. Such a trend is euro bullish (dollar bearish) because it draws capital outside of the US economy (Chart I-15, middle panel). Additionally, the USD’s counter cyclicality will be its final undoing during the global economic recovery and will create another hurdle for the US capital account. Chart I-14A Dollar-Bearish Savings Backdrop Chart I-15No Love For The Greenback Chart I-16The Dollar Is Ripe For A Rebound Despite our bearish view on the dollar, our base case still anticipates a short-term bounce in the USD. Our dollar capitulation index is overextended and if stocks experience heightened volatility (see equities on page 32), then a safe-haven asset such as the greenback will catch a temporary bid (Chart I-16). A correction in the euro to 1.15-1.14 is a reasonable target. Government Bonds Our reluctance to overweight bonds or duration is intact. The BCA US 10-Year Government Bond Valuation index is consistent with higher yields in the next 12 months (Chart I-17). Moreover, bond prices are losing momentum, which creates a technical vulnerability for this asset class. The economy is the potential catalyst to expose the underlying valuation and technical risks of government bonds. Inflation is still a distant danger, but our BCA Pipeline Inflation indicator highlights that deflationary pressures are receding (Chart I-18, top panel). Likewise, our Nominal Cyclical Spending proxy already warns that yields have upside; and an expanding recovery implies that bond-bearish pressures will progress (Chart I-18, bottom panel). Chart I-17The Traitorous Treasury Market Chart I-18Problems For Treasurys   The Fed’s switch to an average inflation target is also consistent with higher long bond yields. The Fed’s newfound tolerance for loftier inflation should lift long-term inflation expectations and medium-term inflation uncertainty, especially given current fiscal trends. Higher long-term inflation expectations and inflation uncertainty have the potential to generate a broader range of policy-rate outcomes, therefore they will also normalize the extraordinarily depressed term premium and lead to a steeper yield curve (Chart I-19). Thus, 10- and 30-year yields have room to increase even if current short rates remain anchored near their lower bounds for the next three years. Over the next 12 months, 10- and 30-year Treasury yields will be capped at 1% and 2%, respectively. The expected yield upside will be limited in the next year. While investors should anticipate some curve steepening, the most violent selloffs only take hold of the Treasury market when the Fed generates hawkish surprises, which is very unlikely in 2021 (Chart I-20). Moreover, the stock market creates its own constraints. As our European Investment strategist has reasoned, higher yields will hurt growth stocks that derive a disproportionate share of their intrinsic value from long-term cash flows.6 If bond prices fall too quickly, then these growth stocks would plunge and drag down the equity market. In essence, elevated bond yields can generate a deflationary shock that undoes the primary reason why yields would rise. Therefore, over the next 12 months, 10- and 30-year Treasury yields will be capped at 1% and 2%, respectively. Chart I-19Average-Inflation Targeting Hurts Long-Dated Bonds Chart I-20Limited Upside For Yields   Equities Several factors underpin our positive stance on global equities in the next 12 months. The lack of investment alternatives or TINA (There Is No Alternative) is a crucial support under stock prices. As BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy service recently discussed, the S&P 500’s dividend yield stands at around 100 basis points above 10-year Treasury yields.7 Conservatively assuming that dividends per share remain constant in the next 10 years and inflation averages 2%, the real value of the US equity benchmark must decline by 25% during that period before it underperforms Treasurys. Given that gaps between dividend yields and bond yields are even larger outside the US, many foreign bourses must experience deeper real depreciation before they underperform their respective bond markets (Chart I-21). Corporate pricing power is returning, which is positive for the earnings outlook. The ability of firms to boost prices will be enhanced by the combination of a weak dollar, declining deflationary forces, rebounding commodity prices and a surge in the sales-to-inventory ratio. The pickup in pricing power is broadly based; 59% of the S&P 500 groups analyzed by our US equity strategist are experiencing mounting prices.8 When higher pricing power meets mending sales volumes, operating leverage allows profit margins to expand, which lifts earnings per share and stock prices (Chart I-22). Chart I-21TINA Flatters Stocks Chart I-22Corporate Pricing Power Is Coming Back Chart I-23Liquidity Underpins This Rally The global monetary environment also supports stocks. The swell in our US Financial Liquidity index is consistent with additional equity gains because it forecasts stronger economic activity (Chart I-23). Expectations of an upswing in the business cycle let earnings forecasts climb and can also improve the anticipated growth rate of long-term earnings while encouraging risk-taking, which compresses the equity risk premium. Moreover, generous liquidity limits the upside to real yields, which further boosts equity multiples. Another consequence of ample liquidity is a marked increase in corporate actions. Firms engage in greater M&A activity, which can generate gains in accounting earnings while withdrawing equity from the market. Businesses around the world have tapped the corporate bond market at a record pace this year, creating both large war chests and the capacity to deploy funds for capex. Higher capex boosts demand and cyclical spending, which creates a positive environment for earnings. Our positive cyclical view on stocks does not preclude a period of heightened volatility and further downside risk in the coming three months. The US and G-10 economic surprise indices are elevated, but they are losing momentum. This deterioration in the second derivative of activity is problematic when there is a non-trivial chance of a policy error in Washington. Importantly, the upcoming US election will raise questions about the regulatory environment for the two market heavyweights: technology and healthcare stocks. As we wrote last month, a shift of leadership away from these sectors will translate into episodic corrections for stocks at large.9 Additionally, investors must price in the risk of gridlock in Washington. If Senate Republicans are reluctant to write a check while an unpopular President Trump faces an imminent election, then their willingness to expand spending if Biden clinches the White House will be nonexistent. A complete refusal to add fiscal stimulus would nearly guarantee a double-dip recession. Equities must embed a risk premium against this scenario ahead of the election. Therefore, the S&P 500 is likely to test 3000 in the coming weeks before rebounding. Our positive cyclical view on stocks does not preclude a period of heightened volatility and further downside risk in the coming three months. Sector Considerations We are positive on the medium-term outlook for value versus growth stocks. The cheapness of value versus growth makes the former attractive, but is not enough to allocate funds to it aggressively. Instead, our bias takes root in our economic view. The forward earnings of global value stocks are very depressed relative to growth stocks. However, the ratio of value EPS to growth EPS is extremely pro-cyclical. Thus, our positive stance on global growth is consistent with a rebound in relative profits that will help value equities (Chart I-24, top panel). Moreover, higher yields correlate with a re-rating of relative equity multiples in favor of value stocks, which are less sensitive to rising discount rates than their growth counterparts (Chart I-24, bottom panel). In this context, we continue to favor industrials and materials; consumer discretionary stocks are also appealing.10 Investors should underweight the US, especially in common currency terms. Gold mining equities remain attractive long-term investments. In the near term, as long as the dollar counter-trend bounce continues, gold will purge its excess froth (Chart I-25, top panel). Nonetheless, our trend indicator remains positive for gold (Chart I-25, bottom panel). Moreover, if real yields start to stagnate at their current low levels, then gold will lose a tailwind but it will not develop a new handicap. In this context, an increase in inflation expectations will elevate gold prices (Table I-1). Other bullish cyclical forces underpinning gold include the dollar’s long-term bear market, limited supply expansion and the diversification of EM central banks away from Treasurys into gold. This positive backdrop should allow the attractive relative valuation of global gold mining firms and their improving operating metric (courtesy of rigorous cash flow management and limited expansion plans) to blossom into more equity price outperformance over the next year or so. Chart I-24Long Growth vs Value: A Cyclical Trade Chart I-25A Shakeout For The Gold Bull Market Table I-1Gold's Response To Yields Finally, Japan has become our favorite equity market for the next 9 to 12 months. Japanese stocks possess the perfect equity exposure to play the themes we espouse because they greatly overweight industrials and traditional consumer discretionary stocks at the expense of tech and healthcare (Table I-2). Moreover, we like auto stocks, an industry well represented in the Japanese bourse, which will benefit from a weak trade-weighted yen.11 Lastly, Japanese stock prices incorporate a large margin of safety. Most sectors in Japan trade at a significant discount to their European and US counterparts (Chart I-26). Nevertheless, it is too early to make a structural bet on Japan because its productivity problems and persistent deflation generate a long-lasting drag on corporate profitability. Table I-2Japan Possesses An Attractive Sector Composition Chart I-26Japan Is A Cheap Recovery Bet Section II presents a thought experiment by our Chief US Equity Strategist, Anastasios Avgeriou, which details the feasibility of a doubling of the S&P 500 over the coming 8 years. I trust you will find this report based on historical evidences thought-provoking.   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst September 24, 2020 Next Report: October 29, 2020   II. SPX 7000 We present a thought experiment for the next eight years. 7000 constitutes a reasonable long-term target for the S&P 500. A doubling of the S&P 500 over the coming eight years is in line with the historical experience. Monetary policy is unlikely to tighten meaningfully, which will allow multiples to remain elevated Earnings per share can rise to $310 by 2028. Market technicals are also consistent with significant long-term gains for stocks. Chart II-1Prolonged ZIRP Neither Eliminates Corrections... Our structural target is neither a joke nor a marketing ploy. And yes, it really does read SPX 7000! This is our S&P 500 target for the year 2028. A new business cycle has commenced and with it a fresh bull market. Our secular US equity market view is bullish. Our readers can fault us for our optimistic view on the world. But we live by the Buffett maxim that “there are no short sellers in the Forbes Billionaires list.” What gives us confidence in this prima facie hyperbolic market view? The Fed’s explicit acceptance that it is ready to incur inflation risk, cementing the fed funds rate near the zero-lower bound for as long as the eye see. In the last cycle, it took the Fed seven years to lift the fed funds rate from zero, a move that ended being judged as premature and forced the Yellen-led Fed to pause for another year (bottom panel, Chart II-1). Seven years. As such, there is a good chance the Fed will stay put until the year 2028, another election year. Even if it ultimately raises interest rates faster due to an overheated economy goosed up on the sweet nectar of fiscal largesse, it is highly likely to be behind the curve. Before we move on to justifying our target, some observations on ZIRP are in order. First, the Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy (QE and ZIRP) in the last cycle did not prevent stock market corrections, including a near 20% fall in 2011 (top panel, Chart II-1). In other words, we do not expect smooth sailing or a 45-degree angle line in the SPX heading to 2028. Rather, an era of volatility with a plethora of sizable corrections is upon us, but the path of least resistance will be higher. Make no mistake, we are in a “buy the dip” market now. Similar to 2008-2015, there will be a lot of fits and starts and a number of mini economic cycles will develop. Chart II-2 highlights that the ISM oscillated violently during the ZIRP years and so did equity momentum and the 10-year Treasury yield. Granted, the Fed managed to suppress economic volatility as real GDP averaged ~2%/annum in the aftermath of the GFC, but mini economic cycles and profit growth scares did not disappear (top panel, Chart II-3). Chart II-2...Nor Mini Economic Cycles Chart II-3"Lowflation"/Disinflation Has Been The Story Of The Past 30 Years   Importantly, while the 10-year Treasury yield moved with the ebbs and flows of the ISM manufacturing survey’s readings, it remained in a downtrend and every bond market selloff proved a buying opportunity in the era of ZIRP (third panel, Chart II-2). What the Fed failed to generate was inflation – of either the CPI or PCE deflator variety. In fact, the Fed has not seen core PCE price inflation overshoot 2.5% since the early 1990s (bottom panel, Chart II-3). Another feature of the ZIRP years in the last cycle was that early on easy monetary policy coincided with easy fiscal policy, as was warranted for the first few years post the GFC. Subsequently, fiscal thrust increased starting in 2016 counterbalancing the Fed’s interest rate hikes. Despite all that fiscal easing, real GDP growth peaked at 3% in 2018 before decelerating last year, raising a question mark about the long-term health of the US economy, a question to be answered in a future Special Report. Frequent readers of US Equity Strategy know our long-held view that the two primary equity market drivers have been easy fiscal and monetary policies since the March carnage. Looking ahead, the Fed has cemented the view that easy monetary policy will stay with us for quite some time. While the jury is still out on fiscal policy, it appears at the moment that profligacy has staying power as no party in Washington is campaigning on austerity or worrying about paying down the debt (save for the lone voice of the Kentucky Senator Rand Paul). The Buenos Aires Consensus is a paradigm shift, and the most important long-term consequence will be higher inflation. The US has abandoned the guardrails on populism established by the Washington Consensus – countercyclical fiscal policy, independent central banking, free trade, laissez-faire economic policy – and has adopted something… different. A new Consensus. These are extremely potent macro forces and given that there is a lag between the time both easy monetary and loose fiscal policies hit the economy, their effects will be long lasting. Especially given that they are now synchronized – unlike for large periods of the previous cycle – and undertaken at a much greater order of magnitude than after the GFC. Table II-1 With that macro backdrop in mind, let us circle back to our 7000 SPX target. A fresh bull market has commenced and we consider the breakout above the previous cycle’s highs as its starting point. In August, the SPX surpassed the February 19, 2020 highs, giving birth to the new bull market. Using empirical evidence since the late-1950s we conclude that, on average, the SPX doubles from its breakout point (Table II-1). This gives us the SPX 7000 reading before the new bull is slayed in the plaza de toros of economic cycles. While this qualitative analysis is enticing, ultimately earnings have to deliver in order to justify the equity market’s appreciation. Put differently, easy fiscal and monetary policies the world over will deliver EPS inflation. On the quantitative EPS front, we first turn to the reconstructed S&P 500 earnings back to the late-1920s. On average, EPS have grown by 7.5%/annum, effectively doubling every decade (Chart II-4). Chart II-4Average Annual EPS Growth Since 1920s = 7.5% More recently, using I/B/E/S data, there have been four distinct EPS growth periods over the past four decades with different durations. From trough-to-peak, EPS have enjoyed an average CAGR of over 10% (top panel, Chart II-5). Chart II-5EPS Can Double In Next Eight Years The current trough in forward EPS stands just shy of $140. Applying the average CAGR until 2028 results in a $310 EPS figure. This is our starting point of our EPS sensitivity analysis. Assigning the current forward multiple equates to an SPX terminal value of over 7000. Table II-2 showcases different EPS and forward P/E multiple permutations with the grey shaded area representing our tight range of peak cycle multiples and peak EPS estimates. Table II-2SPX EPS & Multiple Sensitivity With regard to what is currently priced in by sell side analysts, the 5-year forward EPS growth rate – the longest duration estimate available – is near a trough reading of 10%. The historical mean is 12% since 1985, with a range of 19% near the dotcom bubble peak and a trough of 9% at the depths of the 2016 manufacturing recession (bottom panel, Chart II-5). A few words on presidential cycles are relevant given our structural bullish equity market view. We first noticed Tables II-3 & II-4 in the WSJ in late-2016 and we have corrected some minor mistakes and updated them filling in the gaps. Drawdowns are frequent during term presidencies12 dating back to Hoover. Table II-3Every Presidency Experiences Drawdowns Table II-4S&P 500 Returns During Presidential Terms What is truly remarkable, however, is that since the late-1920s only three term presidencies ended up in the red. What the WSJ article did not mention was that in all three market declines GOP presidents were at the helm and had taken over at/or near all-time highs in the SPX! This represents a risk to our SPX 7000 view. If President Trump wins the upcoming election, given the recent modest recovery in the polling, he could meet the same fate as his Republican predecessors. Our sister Geopolitical Strategy service still assigns 35% probability for the incumbent to remain in office, a solid figure that suggests the race remains close. Importantly, while we believe a transition to a Democratic president will be tumultuous as we have been cautioning investors recently, a Biden presidency along with the possibility of a “Blue Wave” will bode well for the long-term prospects of the US equity market, if history at least rhymes. BCA’s Geopolitical strategist Matt Gertken assigns 65% odds to a Biden win and 55% to a Blue trifecta. Finally, on a technical note, the recent megaphone formation has stirred a lot of debate among technical analysts in the blogosphere and is eerily reminiscent of a similar formation that lasted from 1965 until 1975. Typically, these megaphone formations get resolved/completed by a diamond formation (Chart II-6). Chart II-6Of Megaphones And Diamonds Chart II-7Diamond Base Is Long Term Bullish While this points to a selloff in the broad equity market in the near-term, which is in accordance with our tactically cautious view (please see the last section of this Weekly Report), it is very bullish for the long-term, as equities catapult higher from such a diamond base formation (Chart II-7). In other words, odds are much higher that the SPX will hit 7000 first, before it ever revisits 2200. Adding it all up, we are introducing a structurally constructive US equity market view with an SPX 7000 target for year 2028 on the back of peak cycle EPS of $310 and peak cycle P/E multiple of 23. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist III. Indicators And Reference Charts The stock market correction has begun in earnest. The S&P 500 is suffering as the economic surprise index deteriorates, the dollar rebounds and uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy takes center stage. The deteriorating performances of silver, investment grade bonds, small-cap stocks, EM currencies and the AUD/CHF cross confirm that the equity market will suffer more downside. Moreover, the number of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week moving average is in free-fall but remain well above levels consistent with a bottom. Despite these short-term headwinds, the main pillar supporting the rally remains intact: global monetary conditions are highly accommodative. The shift to an average-inflation target by the Fed, which the ECB is also considering, buttresses this dovish stance further as inflation will have to rise even more than normally before the major global central banks tighten policy. Moreover, outside of the US, fiscal policy remains accommodative. Even in the US, we expect more stimulus to come through before the November election. Our cyclical indicators confirm the positive backdrop for stocks. Our Monetary Indicator has softened but it remains at the top of its pre-COVID-19 distribution, which balances the expensiveness of the market flashed by our Valuation Indicator. Putting those forces together, our Intermediate-Term Indicator and our Revealed Preference Indicator strongly argues in favor or staying invested in equities. When weighing the short-term negative forces against the cyclical positives, we expect the S&P 500 to find a floor around 3000. At this level, the froth highlighted by our Speculation Indicator will have dissipated. Despite the equity correction, bonds remain extremely unappealing. Our Bond Valuation Index shows Treasurys as prohibitively expensive and our Composite Technical Indicator continues to lose momentum. Moreover, our Cyclical Bond Indicator has turned higher and is now flashing an outright sell signal. In effect, with rates near their lower bound, the market understands that yields have little room to decline and thus bonds seems to be losing their ability to hedge equity risk. Thus, bonds yields are unlikely to rise as stocks correct, but their lack of downside right now suggests that when equities regain their footing, 10-year Treasury yields could quickly move higher toward 1%. The dollar countertrend rally that we expected last month has begun. So far, the dollar has still not purged its oversold conditions and the deterioration in risk sentiment around the world will likely result in additional upside for the greenback. Ultimately, this rally will be temporary. The global economic recovery has just begun, the US balance of payments picture is deteriorating and the USD trades at a large premium to its purchasing power parity equilibrium. Commodities remain in a bull market, but their current correction has further to run. As investors absorb the deterioration in economic surprises and risk sentiment declines, the overbought commodity complex will remain under downward pressure. The strength in the US dollar is creating an additional powerful headwind against commodities. Gold’s decline has been particularly noteworthy. Gold remains above its short-term fair value, hence its vulnerability to the dollar and to the decline in our Monetary Indicator is particularly pronounced. A stabilization in gold and silver prices is required before the rest of the commodity complex and stocks can find a firmer footing. Stronger precious metals would indicate that the deterioration in liquidity visible at the margin is ending. It is likely to be contemporary with the passage of a new fiscal stimulus bill in the US. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see  Emerging Markets Strategy "Charts That Matter," dated September 10, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 The Atlanta Fed GDPNow model already points to an annualized growth rate of 32% in Q3 in the US, but the New York Fed’s model pencils in a much more modest 5.3% expansion rate for Q4. 3 Please see  US Bond Strategy "More Stimulus Needed," dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy "Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades," dated September 11, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "August 2020," dated July 30, 2020 and The Bank Credit Analyst "July 2020," dated June 25, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see European Investment Strategy "The Puppet Master Is The 30-Year Bond," dated August 6, 2020, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy "Stock Prices And Interest Rates: Can We Trust TINA?," dated September 11, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Equity Strategy "Pricing Power Update," dated September 14, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "September 2020," dated August 27, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 10 However, in the US, investors must be careful as the sector is dominated by one firm: Amazon, which trades as a tech stock, not as a traditional consumer discretionary. 11 Please see Daily Insights "More Cars Please!" dated July 20, 2020, available at di.bcaresearch.com 12 By term presidencies we are referring to the different duration of Presidents staying in office.

Highlights Bank credit 6-month impulses are plunging, and the pandemic is resurging. Maintain an overweight to growth defensives (technology and healthcare). In the short term, profits will be more resilient in a resurgent pandemic. In the long term, profits are well set to grow in an increasingly online, decentralised, remote-working, health-conscious world. The European stock market’s massive underweighting to growth defensives will weigh on its relative performance. Go underweight China economy plays. Fractal trade: Fractal analysis confirms that basic resources are vulnerable to a reversal. Within value cyclicals, tactically overweight financials versus basic resources. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Greatest Ever Monetary Stimulus Is Over... For Now Monetary stimulus, as measured by the increase in banks’ six-month credit flows, reached an all-time high during the summer months. But now, the greatest ever monetary stimulus is fading (Chart of the Week). In the US and China, the increase in banks’ six-month credit flows peaked at $700 billion and $800 billion respectively during May. In the euro area, the increase peaked at over $1 trillion during July. The combination constituted the greatest ever global monetary stimulus, trumping even the stimulus that followed the 2008 financial crisis (Charts I-2 - I-4). Chart I-2US Monetary Stimulus Is Fading Chart I-3China Monetary Stimulus Is Fading Chart I-4Euro Area Monetary Stimulus To Fade However, the increase in six-month credit flows has recently slumped to around $200 billion in both the US and China. The euro area has yet to update its data beyond July, but we expect it to fade too. The upshot is that the greatest ever monetary stimulus is over… for now. Bond Yields Are No Longer Stimulating Our preferred metric for assessing the transmission of monetary stimulus on an economy is the increase in the banks’ six-month credit flows. In turn, this depends on the six-month deceleration in the bond yield – meaning, the bond yield decline in the most recent six months must be greater than the decline in the previous six months. At first glance, this seems counterintuitive. Why focus on the bond yield’s deceleration rather than its plain vanilla decline? Box 1 explains how it follows from a fundamental accounting identity of GDP statistics.   Box 1 Why The Bond Yield’s Deceleration Matters GDP is a flow statistic. It measures the flow of goods and services produced in a period. Hence, the GDP flow receives a contribution from the bank credit flow in that period. In turn, the bank credit flow is established by the decline in the bond yield (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Decline In The Bond Yield Establishes The Bank Credit Flow It follows that GDP growth receives a contribution from bank credit flow growth. Which, in turn, receives a contribution from the bond yield deceleration. In other words, the bond yield decline in the most recent period must be greater than the decline in the previous period. Finally, our preferred period is six months because it empirically equals the time to fully spend a bank credit flow. A quarter is too short: a year is much too long.   Admittedly, during this year’s pandemic recession and rebound, the link between monetary stimulus and the real economy has weakened. Fiscal stimulus has played a more important role. Even when it comes to bank credit, much of the recent increase was not due to new loans. It was due to firms tapping pre-arranged credit lines, which they used to reinforce cash buffers, rather than to spend. Nevertheless, some impact of monetary stimulus will reach the real economy. This means that while this year’s earlier deceleration of bond yields was good news for the economy, the more recent acceleration of bond yields is bad news (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Recent Acceleration Of Bond Yields Is Bad News Tactically Underweight China Plays Through the summer months, 10-year bond yields flipped from sharp six-month decelerations to sharp accelerations. But the reversals were much more extreme in China and the US than in the euro area. Seen in this light, it is hardly surprising that the increase in six-month bank credit flows has already slumped in China and the US, and could soon turn negative. If so, they would be a contractionary force on the economy. One tactical investment conclusion is to underweight China economy plays. Specifically, with China’s bank credit six-month impulse in freefall, the 40 percent outperformance of basic resources versus financials is vulnerable to a sharp reversal (Chart I-7). This is also confirmed by fractal analysis (see later section). Chart I-7With China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse In Freefall, Basic Resources Are Vulnerable Stay underweight cyclicals. But within cyclicals, tactically overweight financials versus basic resources. A Resurgent Pandemic Will Force People Back Into Their Shells A resurgence of the pandemic will create a further headwind to the economy, irrespective of whether governments impose fresh lockdowns or not. This is because most of us have an instinct for self-preservation as well as protecting our loved ones. In response to a resurgent pandemic, we will go back into our shells. Shunning public transport, shopping, and other crowded places, some might even think twice about letting their children go to school. But if this cautious behaviour is voluntary, then why do governments need to impose lockdowns? The answer is that while the majority behaves responsibly, a minority behaves irresponsibly. In the pandemic, this is critical because less than 10 percent of infected people are responsible for creating 90 percent of all Covid-19 infections. If this tiny minority of so-called ‘super-spreaders’ is left unchecked, then the pandemic will let rip. At first glance, it appears that the lockdown is causing the recession. In fact, this is a classic confusion between correlation and causation. The true cause of the recession is the pandemic, which forces people into their shells. But to the extent that severity of the lockdown correlates with the severity of the pandemic, many people confuse the correlated lockdown with the underlying cause, the pandemic. The ultimate proof comes from Scandinavia. Sweden imposed no lockdown, while its neighbour Denmark imposed the most extreme lockdown in Europe. If it was the lockdown that caused the recession, then the economy of no-lockdown Sweden should have fared much better than that of lockdown Denmark. In fact, the two Scandinavian economies suffered identical 9 percent recessions (Chart I-8). Chart I-8No-Lockdown Sweden Suffered An Identical Recession To Lockdown-Denmark Focus On Sectors That Can Thrive In The New World Tactically we have recommended an underweight to stocks versus bonds since July 9, and this tactical position is broadly flat. Stick with it for now.1 A crucial question is: can bond yields go significantly lower? It is a crucial question because it was the collapse in bond yields earlier this year that saved the aggregate stock market. As long-duration bond yields plunged by 1 percent, the forward earnings yield of long-duration technology and healthcare stocks also plunged by 1 percent (Chart I-9). This surge in the valuation of the growth defensive sectors compensated for the collapsed profits of the value cyclical sectors – banks, basic resources, and oil and gas (Chart I-10). A resurgent pandemic combined with the end of the greatest ever monetary stimulus means that this playbook may get a rerun in the coming months. Chart I-9The Collapsed Bond Yield Explains The Collapsed Earnings Yield (Surging Valuation) Of Tech And Healthcare Chart I-10Tech And Healthcare Saved The Aggregate Stock Market The worry is that, from current levels, long-duration bond yields will struggle to plunge by another 1 percent and provide the same boost to valuations that they did in the first wave of the pandemic. In which case, the outlook for stocks and sectors will hinge more on their profits. On this basis, we still favour the growth defensives – which we define as technology and healthcare – both for the short term and the long term. In the short term, their profits will be more resilient in a resurgent pandemic. In the long term, their profits are well set to grow in an increasingly online, decentralised, remote-working, health-conscious world. One unfortunate consequence is that the European stock market’s massive underweighting to the growth defensives sectors will weigh on its relative performance, both in the short term and in the long term. Fractal Trading System* Supporting the fundamental analysis in the main body of this report, fractal analysis confirms that basic resources are vulnerable to a reversal versus financials. Hence, this week’s recommended trade is to go long financials versus basic resources. One way of implementing this is: long XLF, short XLB. Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 3.5 percent. In other trades, long ZAR/CLP reached the end of its holding period flat, and is now closed. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 58 percent.   When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Expressed as short DAX versus 10-year T-bond. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields     Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations   Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations    

Highlights Bond Yields & Growth: Developed market bond yields have ignored improving cyclical economic data over the past few months, remaining stuck in narrow trading ranges at low levels. That broken correlation will persist until central banks become less concerned about supporting pandemic-ravaged economies and begin worrying more about rising inflation, financial stability or the size of their balance sheets. That shift will not happen anytime soon. Inflation-Linked Trades: Our models suggest US TIPS breakevens are now at fair value. We are taking profits on our tactical long US 10-year inflation breakevens trade for a return of 2.88%. Stay long 10-year breakevens in Italy and Canada until we see further shrinkage in the gap between inflation breakevens and model-implied fair value and watch for a selling opportunity in UK 10-year breakevens. Feature Do bond investors even care about economic growth anymore? This is a valid question to ask, given how government bond yields in the developed markets have stayed in very narrow trading ranges over the past few months, even as economic data has rebounded from the global COVID-19 recession in the first half of 2020. Investors should get used to the current backdrop of rock-bottom interest rates and bond yields, which is unlikely to change anytime soon.  Chart of the WeekBond Yields Are Responding To Inflation, Not Growth For example, the benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield has stayed between 0.65% and 0.75% since June 11, even though the US ISM Manufacturing index rose from 43 in May to 56 in August. Yields are also ignoring the ups and downs of the equity market. The 10-year Treasury yield now sits at 0.66% - the same level as on September 2 even though the NASDAQ equity index has fallen 12% from the all-time peak seen on that day. Our own Global Duration Indicator, comprised of cyclical measures like the global ZEW index and our global leading economic indicator, has surged to the highest level since 2008 (Chart of the Week). Given the usual lead time between broad turns in the Duration Indicator and the level of global bond yields (around 6-9 months), this suggests that yields have bottomed and should soon begin rising. Yet the reality is that the usual factors that typically drive yields higher during a cyclical upturn – namely, rising inflation expectations and a clearly understood signal from central banks that such a move would lead to tighter monetary policy – are not currently in place. Investors should get used to the current backdrop of rock-bottom interest rates and bond yields, which is unlikely to change anytime soon. Four Potential Triggers For A Rise In Bond Yields Chart 2A Breakdown Of The PMI/Yield correlation The breakdown of the positive correlation between growth and bond yields is not just visible in the US. For example, yields on German Bunds and UK Gilts also remain stuck at low levels despite sharp improvements in the German and UK manufacturing PMIs (Chart 2). Yet in China – where there is no zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) or large-scale quantitative easing (QE) programs - bond yields have steadily risen since the China manufacturing PMI bottomed back in April (bottom panel). What could change this backdrop? We see four potential catalysts, ranked below in our own subjective order of importance: Inflation Sustainably Returning Back To Central Bank Targets It may seem obvious, but it still needs to be said – dovish central bank policies are the biggest reason why developed market bond yields have de-linked from economic growth. That includes not only ZIRP or QE, but also forward guidance on future changes in interest rates. Central banks are telling markets they will not raise rates for a period measured in years, and will continue to expand their balance sheets to purchase assets and support bank lending, all in an effort to push undershooting inflation back to policy targets. This is a different message than bond investors have grown accustomed to hearing from central banks, most notably in the US. The Fed is trying to do something that it has never intentionally done before – erode some of its hard-earned inflation fighting credibility. The Fed is trying to do something that it has never intentionally done before – erode some of its hard-earned inflation fighting credibility. The recent shift by the Fed to an Average Inflation Targeting framework – where above-target inflation would be tolerated if inflation was below target for an extended period – is intended to change the perception that the Fed will hike rates preemptively based on a forecast of inflation, as they have done in the past. Chart 3Latest FOMC Projections Justify Years Of 0% Rates The latest set of Fed economic projections is consistent with this new framework (Chart 3): the unemployment rate is forecasted to fall back to the FOMC median estimate of full employment (4.1%) by 2023; headline PCE inflation is also projected to climb back to 2% by 2023; the fed funds rate is projected to stay unchanged near 0% until at least 2023. In many ways, the Fed is trying to atone for the mistakes made while normalizing policy after the extraordinary easing measures taken after the 2008 crisis. From signaling a slowing of QE bond purchases in 2013, to the 250bps of rate hikes and tapering of its balance sheet during 2016-18, the Fed moved aggressively relative to what was actually happening with US inflation. Core PCE inflation only inched above 2% for a few months in 2018 – towards the end of the normalization process - as did market-based inflation measures like TIPS breakevens (Chart 4). The Fed ended up raising the real fed funds rate during that tightening cycle to above its own estimate of neutral (r-star), even with inflation still not close to its target. Unsurprisingly, real US bond yields also rose during that same period, which tightened monetary conditions even further by boosting the value of the US dollar. No wonder US inflation could not stay at the 2% target for very long. This time around, the Fed is sending a much different signal to markets – that it wants to see inflation rise before raising rates, thus keeping real policy rates in negative territory for an extended period. If the Fed is looking for a real world case study of such an approach, it can look across the Atlantic to the Bank of England (BoE). On the surface, the BoE has been acting like a typical inflation-targeting central bank over the past several years, turning more hawkish in its commentary when the UK economy was improving and becoming more dovish when the economy was languishing. Yet since the 2008 crisis, the BoE has kept the Bank Rate in a range of 0.1% to 0.75%, well below realized UK inflation. While it has been difficult for the BoE to attempt to raise rates given the Brexit uncertainty since 2016 – which has also weakened the British pound, helping boost UK inflation - real UK policy rates have now been negative for 12 years (Chart 5). The result: steadily declining UK real bond yields with inflation expectations rising to levels well above the BoE 2% inflation target. Chart 4The Fed Is Trying To Erode Its Hard-Earned Credibility Chart 5Lessons From The BoE On How To Not Be Credible The experience of the ECB provides a cautionary tale for central banks not appearing dovish enough, even when policy settings are already extraordinarily accommodative. The message from central banks on future rate increases – namely, that there will not be any without sustainably higher inflation – must change before bond yields can have any hope of climbing higher. Chart 6Does The ECB Have Any Credibility Left? Inflation expectations have stayed below the ECB’s “just below 2%” target since 2013 (Chart 6), which forced the central bank into cutting nominal rates into negative territory while aggressively expanding its balance sheet through QE and long-term bank liquidity provision (i.e. LTROs). Yet the ECB has always put an expiration date on each of these programs, which sent a message to the markets that the central bank was not fully committed to keeping policy easy until inflation was back to target – however long that would take. In sum, the message from central banks on future rate increases – namely, that there will not be any without sustainably higher inflation – must change before bond yields can have any hope of climbing higher. A Shift From Central Banks To Concerns About Asset Price Bubbles Chart 7When Will CBs Start Worrying About Financial Market Valuations? Policymakers are paying lip service to the notion of the “financial stability” risks inherent in their new promises to keep rates low for a lot longer while intervening in financial markets more aggressively through asset purchase programs. Given the signs of froth in many important asset classes like US equities or global corporate debt, policymakers should at least be somewhat concerned that easy money policies are fueling asset bubbles (Chart 7). A big enough decline could erode confidence and spill over into the real economy, defeating the original purpose of easy money policies. However, given the still fragile state of much of the global economy that remains dependent on fiscal support amid ongoing COVID-19 restrictions, concerns over asset values will take a backseat to maintaining adequate monetary stimulus. Asset bubbles would have to become much larger before a central bank would even consider turning more hawkish to prick them through higher policy rates that would push up bond yields. The Announcement Of A Trustworthy COVID-19 Vaccine That Is Ready For Widespread Distribution Markets have already begun to worry about the “second wave” of the coronavirus that health officials had warned would happen in the cooler autumn months. The development of an effective, and safe, vaccine would thus be a game-changer for financial markets, particularly after the recent surge in new COVID-19 cases in Europe and the still elevated level of new cases in the US (Chart 8). Chart 8A Second Wave Of COVID-19 BCA Research’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin (a big fan of interesting data sets!), noted in his most recent report that, according to The Good Judgement Project, around 60% of “superforecasters” now expect a vaccine ready for mass distribution to be available by Q1/2021 (Chart 9).1 A vaccine appearing that rapidly – much faster than the usual multi-year process leading to a vaccine declared safe for use – would help boost business and consumer confidence and raise the odds of a return to pre-virus levels of economic activity. Bond yields would likely get a lift, as well, as markets would price in a shorter period of super low policy rates and a faster return of inflation to central bank targets. Yet even if a vaccine is presented to the world by next spring, there is no guarantee that a large enough share of the population will deem the vaccine safe enough to take to ensure “herd immunity”. A recent Economist/YouGuv survey noted that only 36% of American adults would choose to get vaccinated when a COVID-19 vaccine becomes available, 32% would not get vaccinated, while 32% were unsure (Chart 10). Thus, a vaccine would be a bond-bearish development only if it is trusted to be safe to use – the mere announcement of a vaccine will not be enough to declare an “end” to the pandemic. Chart 9High Odds Of A Vaccine In 6-To-12 Months Chart 10Will Enough People Take The Vaccine? Central Banks Slowing QE Purchases Relative To Increased Fiscal Issuance Chart 11Still Room For The Fed, ECB and BoE To Expand QE Right now, it is easy for the major central banks to aggressively expand their balance sheets and provide additional monetary stimulus through asset purchases. Yet there may come a point where a capacity constraint is reached on buying government bonds if it impairs market functionality. That is currently the case in Japan, where the Bank of Japan now owns 49% of the Japanese government bond (JGB) market after years of aggressive QE purchases of JGBs. This has damaged the day-to-day liquidity of JGBs, where there have been instances of days where no single JGB has traded in the secondary market. A move by central banks to buy fewer bonds because they own too many of them could potentially push bond yields higher by worsening the demand/supply balance for government bonds - assuming private investors do not pick up the slack and buy more bonds, of course. Currently, the Fed only owns 22% of the US Treasury market with little evidence suggesting that its purchases are impairing the trading of Treasuries (Chart 11). The BoE and ECB own much larger shares of the UK and euro area government bond markets – 37% and 38%, respectively – suggesting that those central banks are closer to a BoJ-like capacity constraint. However, given the rising budget deficits and surging government bond issuance seen in Europe (and the US) so far in 2020, the odds of a capacity constraint soon being reached that could result in slower QE purchases are low. Bottom Line: Developed market bond yields have ignored improving cyclical economic data over the past few months, remaining stuck in narrow trading ranges at low levels. That broken correlation will persist until central banks become less concerned about supporting pandemic-ravaged economies and begin worrying more about rising inflation, financial stability or the size of their balance sheets. That shift will not happen anytime soon. Reviewing Our Tactical Inflation Breakeven Trades Back in June, we initiated a series of recommended inflation-focused trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio. Specifically, we went long 10-year inflation breakevens in the US, Italy, and Canada by buying on-the-run inflation-linked bonds and selling government bond futures.2 We chose those trades based on the output of our fundamental valuation models for 10-year inflation breakevens in eight inflation-linked bond (ILB) markets: the US, UK, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, Canada, and Australia. Our fair value models use two inputs for all regions: a) a long-run moving average of headline inflation, representing the medium-term trend that anchors inflation expectations; and b) the annual percentage change of the Brent oil price in local currency terms, which creates shorter-term deviations from the trend to account for moves in oil and currencies. There looks to be little remaining upside to our tactical long TIPS breakeven position. The past few months have seen a sharp rise in global inflation expectations, owing to the extraordinary monetary policy actions taken by the major developed market central banks and recovering growth prospects coming out of the COVID-19 recession. This has led to a convergence between 10-year inflation breakevens and their model-implied fair values in the aforementioned ILB markets (Chart 12). Most notably, breakevens in the US are now at fair value, while breakevens in the UK and Australia are trading above fair value. In the US, 10-year breakeven inflation rates are now back to the long-run average of realized headline inflation, while the -8% decline in the Brent oil price so far this month has lowered the model-implied fair value (Chart 13). Therefore, there looks to be little remaining upside to our tactical long TIPS breakeven position with most of the easy gains following the pandemic-induced collapse having already been realized. Chart 12Global Inflation Breakevens Have Moved Higher Our colleagues over at BCA Research US Bond Strategy have reached a similar conclusion, noting that the Fed’s Jackson Hole announcement of the move to Average Inflation Targeting supercharged the rising trend in TIPS breakevens.3 Chart 13US Breakevens Are At Fair Value Although they also note the likelihood of stronger US CPI prints over the next few months should keep US breakevens well supported heading into year-end. The time horizon for trades that enter our Tactical Overlay portfolio is limited to no longer than six months. Thus, with TIPS breakevens reverting back to fair value after just three months in the trade, we are choosing to take profits on our long 10-year US inflation breakeven trade for a total return of 2.88%. Chart 14UK Breakevens Are Above Fair Value In other ILB markets, UK breakevens are now an intriguing case, and not only for the monetary policy driven interplay between UK real yields and breakevens discussed earlier in this report. The overshoot of UK breakevens relative to our fair value model may be related to growing market speculation that the BoE will move to negative interest rates – an outcome we deem to be unlikely, as we discussed in a recent report.4 Alternatively, the higher breakevens may be a reflection of UK political uncertainty. The risk of a hard Brexit has resurfaced as UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Conservatives have now backed a bill that includes powers for the government to override its withdrawal agreement with the European Union; understandably, this has caused a sell-off in the pound. Within our fundamental fair value framework, the UK 10-year breakeven inflation rate has overshot both the 3-year moving average of headline inflation and the growth of GBP-denominated oil prices, leaving breakevens 0.72 standard deviations expensive (Chart 14). One possible explanation is that markets are pricing in a significant further depreciation in the pound given this resurfacing of Brexit risk. Within our model, GBP/USD impacts the fair value of breakeven inflation via Brent oil prices, which are denominated in local currency terms. Thus, we can back out an implied change in GBP/USD that would make the model-derived fair value breakeven rate equal to the actual 10-year UK inflation breakeven rate, holding all other variables in the model constant. This does produce some extreme results during periods of very rapid moves in UK breakevens, but we can standardize the data to use as an indicator of ILB market-implied views on the currency (Chart 15). With that in mind, pound bearishness in ILB markets is nearing levels where it has historically troughed. A favorable development in Brexit negotiations could cause a reversal in this pound-bearish trend and a sharp downward correction in UK inflation breakevens. We see a potential opportunity to play for narrower UK breakevens if our view on Brexit and negative rates in the UK prove to be correct. On that front, BCA Research’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Matt Gertken, sees a no-deal Brexit by year-end as the less likely outcome, with odds of only 35%, given the political calculus that PM Johnson faces with the decision.5 Polls show that the UK public does not support a no-deal Brexit (Chart 16), which would severely hurt a UK economy that remains fragile due to the coronavirus, and would raise the odds of a new independence referendum in Scotland in 2021. Chart 15UK Breakevens Already Discount A Big Fall In GBP Chart 16Only 25% In The UK Think A No-Deal Brexit Is A Good Outcome We will monitor the situation closely in the coming weeks, but we see a potential opportunity to play for narrower UK breakevens if our view on Brexit and negative rates in the UK prove to be correct. Finally, although the majority of the gains from our long inflation breakeven trades in Canada and Italy have likely been realized, there are still some chips left on the table. Canadian breakeven inflation rates have risen in lockstep with Brent prices but have yet to converge with the long-run moving average of inflation (Chart 17). In Italy, the increases in oil prices in euro terms has outstripped the rise in breakevens, pushing up the model-implied fair value and leaving breakevens remain more than one standard deviation under fair value (Chart 18). We will look for the gap between breakevens and fair values to shrink further in these two countries before closing these trades, even though we are substantially in the green on both (see the Tactical Overlay table on page 19). Chart 17Canadian Breakevens Are Just Below Fair Value Chart 18Italian Breakevens Are Well Below Fair Value Bottom Line: Our models suggest US TIPS breakevens are now at fair value. We are taking profit on our tactical long US 10-year inflation breakeven trade for a return of 2.88%. Stay long 10-year breakevens in Italy and Canada until we see further shrinkage in the gap between inflation breakevens and model-implied fair value and watch for a selling opportunity in UK 10-year breakevens.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Pivot To Value", dated September 18, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. You can also learn more about The Good Judgement Project here: https://goodjudgment.com/about/ 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations", dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish…But Not Yet", dated September 8, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rate Club", dated August 26, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The End-Game For Trump And Brexit", dated September 18, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns