財政

Highlights A slower money and credit growth in China will eventually generate disinflationary pressures by weighing on demand for commodities. The PBoC has shifted its inflation anchor and policy framework to target core CPI and the PPI rather than headline CPI. Beijing is scaling back its fiscal supports and cooling the property sector to tackle local government and housing sector debt issues. In the next six to nine months we favor companies and sectors that will benefit from global economic recovery rather than China’s domestic demand. We are long CSI500 relative to China’s A shares. The CSI500 has a larger exposure to the global economy and lower valuation relative to China’s broad onshore market.  Feature As a follow up to last week’s report, we look at another topic raised in recent client meetings: whether rapidly rising producer prices in China will morph into a broad-based inflationary risk and how macroeconomic policies will evolve to counter such a risk. Clients who believe that the ongoing producer price inflation is transitory cited China’s low consumer price inflation, and slowing money and credit growth, as leading indicators of budding disinflationary pressures. Advocates of sustained inflation pointed to robust recoveries and demand among advanced economies, extremely accommodative monetary conditions worldwide, massive fiscal stimulus in the US, a weak US dollar, and supply constraints. It remains to be seen what the worldwide pandemic’s impact will be on the balance between global production capacity and aggregate demand. In this report we analyze the PBoC’s inflation target and policy framework, and conclude that while China’s monetary policy has not become more hawkish, policy tightening seems to be taking place on the fiscal front. Is Inflation In China A Risk? It is debatable whether the strong rebound in GDP growth in Q4 last year and in Q1 this year has closed China’s output gap and will lead to widespread inflation. Given data distortions due to low-base effects from the previous year and uncertainty about China’s productivity and labor force growth, any calculation of the output gap will be unreliable. In addition, China’s employment statistics lack cyclicality and cannot be used to gauge inflationary pressure stemming from wage growth and unit labor costs.     Chart 1A Rollover In Credit Growth Will Weigh On Chinese Demand For Commodities Our cyclical view of inflation is therefore based on the framework that the ongoing moderation in China's money and credit growth will eventually generate disinflationary pressures by weighing on the country’s demand for and price of commodities (Chart 1).  Furthermore, behind a resilient PPI, there are suggestions that the strength in China’s economy is still bifurcated. A narrow-based uptrend in the PPI lacks the ground for sustained inflation, and is unlikely to trigger a general tightening in monetary policy.  While mounting global prices for raw materials propelled strong upstream PPI, producer prices for consumer goods and core consumer price inflation remain very subdued (Chart 2).  The inconsistency in producer prices among various industries highlight the unevenness of the economic recovery and, importantly, persistently muted household consumption (Chart 3). Chart 2A Bifurcated Economic Recovery Chart 3A Muted Recovery In Household Consumption Chart 4Weak Price Transmission From Upstream To Downstream Industries The transmission from upstream industrial PPI to the middle and downstream sectors has also been weak (Chart 4). It is evidenced in the faster growth of manufacturing output volume compared with price increases (Chart 5). This contrasts with the previous inflationary cycles, as well as mining and ferrous metals where surging prices for raw materials have way surpassed recovery in output volume (Chart 6). Given that price changes are more important to corporate profits than volume changes, Chinese middle-to-downstream industries face downward pressure on their profit margins and will likely deliver disappointing profits, despite a strong rebound in production. Chart 5China's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices Chart 6China's Upstream Industries: Prices Surged Faster Than Production Furthermore, PMI input prices, which lead core CPI by about nine months, rolled over in April (Chart 7). While it is too soon to conclude that input prices have peaked, it is implied that upward pressure on core CPI from input prices may start to ease in 2H21. Bottom Line: So far there is no sign that elevated upstream producer prices will create sustainable inflationary pressure on consumer prices. Hence our view is that the PBoC will not respond to a rising PPI by further tightening monetary policy. Chart 7PMI Input Prices Have Rolled Over Chart 8Core CPI And PPI Have Been The PBoC's Inflation Targets Since 2015 The PBoC’s Inflation Target Since 2015, China’s monetary tightening cycles have closely correlated with a combination of the core CPI and PPI instead of headline CPI (Chart 8). The shift to targeting core CPI and PPI occurred despite the central bank’s frequent mention of headline CPI as its inflation target. The reasons for the shift are twofold. First, swings in food and fuel prices have become much larger since 2014, often dominating fluctuations in headline CPI (Chart 9).  Secondly, the price swings were often driven by supply-side factors and did not reflect changes in demand. Therefore, monetary policies could do little to mitigate inflationary or deflationary pressures. Furthermore, the PPI seems to play a greater role in the PBoC’s monetary policymaking than the headline and core CPI (Chart 10).  The tighter relationship between the de facto policy rate and the PPI is not surprising, given that China’s ex-factory price inflation reflects changes in corporate pricing, profit, and inventory cycles – all are driven by the country’s money supply and credit cycles.  Chart 9Large Swings In Food And Energy Prices Distorted Headline CPI In Recent Years Chart 10PPI Plays A Greater Role In The PBoC's Monetary Policymaking The relationship between the 7-day repo rate - the de jure policy rate - and the PPI has broken down since 2015 (Chart 11). Meanwhile, the 3-month repo rate has maintained a close relationship with the PPI (Chart 10, bottom panel). The change in the relationship is because the PBoC shifted its policy to target interest rates instead of the quantity of money supply since 2015 (Chart 12). Moreover, since 2016 the PBoC has generated monetary policy tightening measures through changes in its Macro Prudential Assessment Framework (MPA) rather than directly through interest rate hikes.  Chart 11Relationship Between The 7-Day Repo Rate And The PPI Has Broken Down Since 2015... Chart 12...Due To Monetary Policy Regime Shifted Bottom Line:  The PBoC has shifted its inflation anchor and policy framework since 2015. Core CPI and the PPI are now the main inflation targets. A Quiet Fiscal Tightening? Despite a jump in the PPI, the 3-month repo rate fell sharply in the past two months (Chart 10 on page 6, bottom panel).  It is possible that the PBoC considers escalating producer prices as transitory and, therefore, intends to keep its overall policy stance unchanged. However, the PBoC’s relaxed policy response towards inflation risk may be explained by Beijing’s quiet tightening on the fiscal front. Chart 13The Central Bank Has Made Little Interbank Liquidity Injections Lately The PBoC can hold its policy rates steady by supplying adequate liquidity to the interbank system through open market operations or by reducing the demand for liquidity. On a net basis, the PBoC has recently injected very little liquidity into the interbank system, implying that banks’ liquidity demand has likely softened (Chart 13).  This might be a sign of weakening credit origination. In a previous report we discussed how fiscal stimulus has become a more relevant driver of China’s credit origination since the onset of the 2014/15 economic downcycle. A rising 3-month SHIBOR can be the result of rapid fiscal and quasi-fiscal expansions, which occurred in Q3 last year. A flood of local government bond issuance drained liquidity from commercial banks, which boosted the banks’ needs to borrow money from the interbank system and pushed up interbank rates. Despite higher interest rates, credit growth soared in Q3 as fiscal multiplier provided an imminent and powerful reflationary force to the economy. In contrast, local government bond issuance was down sharply in the first four months of this year, compared with 2019 and 2020. Local governments sold 222.7 billion yuan of special-purpose bonds (SPBs) from January to April, a plunge from 730 billion yuan of debt sold in the same period in 2019 and 1.15 trillion yuan in 2020. The total local government bond issuance in Q1 this year has also been 36% and 44% lower than in Q1 2019 and 2020, respectively. A lack of local governments’ appetite to borrow coupled with a shortage in profitable infrastructure projects might have contributed to the sharp drop in bond issuance this year. Local government financing and spending have been under increased scrutiny this year. Following the State Council Executive Meeting in late March, in which Premier Li Keqiang pledged to reduce government leverage ratio and raise regulatory standards on infrastructure investment, Beijing suspended two high-speed rail projects that were initiated by provincial governments. Messages from Politburo’s meeting last week reinforced our view that policymakers may be scaling back fiscal support while further tightening regulations in the property sector. Both aspects have the potential to cool China’s demand for industrial metals and global industrial material prices (Chart 14 and Chart 15). Chart 14A Slowdown In Chinese Manufacturing Demand Will Have A Greater Impact On Global Industrial Material Prices Chart 15Lower Housing Demand In China Will Help To Cool Industrial Metal Prices We expect the intensity of policy tightening to reach its peak between mid-year to third-quarter 2021. It is unclear at this point whether policymakers are willing to allow local governments to significantly undershoot their SPB quota for this year. Local governments reportedly experienced a shortage in profitable investment projects towards the end of last year, and thus, parked more than 10% of proceeds from 2020 SPB issuance at the central bank. The central government may be taking a wait-and-see attitude this year, and saving more fiscal dry powder for later this year when the economic slowdown becomes more meaningful. Bottom Line: Beijing is pulling back its fiscal supports and cooling the property sector to tackle local government and housing sector debt issues. The deleveraging efforts will curb China’s demand for commodities, and may work to ease inflationary pressure on prices for raw materials. Investment Conclusions The outlook for China’s risk asset prices remains bearish, at least in the next six months. If the credit and fiscal impulse slow enough to depress corporate pricing power, inflation will not be a problem because disinflationary pressures will resurface. However, the growth of corporate profits will disappoint (Chart 16). Beijing may be saving more fiscal dry powder for later this year. Still, SPBs are only a small part of local governments’ financing source for infrastructure projects. Given the central government’s renewed focus on reducing public debt, policymakers are unlikely to unleash fiscal power to significantly boost infrastructure spending or economic growth. In the next six to nine months, we favor companies and sectors that will benefit from global economic recovery rather than China’s domestic demand. With this week's report, we initiate a long position on the CSI500 index, which has a larger exposure to the global market and lower valuation relative to China’s broad onshore market (Chart 17).  Chart 16Aggregate Corporate Profit Growth Will Slow Even Though Inflation Is No Longer An Issue Chart 17Long CSI500/Broad Market   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Sweden’s economic recovery is robust and will deepen. Policy is accommodative. Very few advanced economies will benefit as much from the global economic rebound. The labor market will tighten, capacity utilization will increase, and inflation will rise faster than the Riksbank forecasts. On a one- to two-year investment horizon, the SEK is a buy against both the USD and the EUR. Despite their pronounced outperformance, Swedish stocks possess significantly more upside against both Eurozone and US equities over the remainder of the cycle. Swedish industrials will beat their competitors in both these markets. Nonetheless, China’s policy tightening creates a meaningful tactical risk, which selling Norwegian stocks can hedge. Italy’s fiscal plan constitutes a new salvo in Europe’s efforts to avoid last decade’s mistakes. Feature Last week, the Swedish Riksbank did not follow in the footsteps of the Norges Bank. The Swedish central bank acknowledged that the economy is performing better than anticipated and that the housing market is gaining in strength; yet, it refrained from hinting at any forthcoming adjustment to its policy rate or the pace of its asset purchase program. The positive outlook for the Swedish economy will force the Riksbank to tighten policy significantly before the ECB. As a result, we expect the Swedish Krona to outperform the euro and the US dollar. Moreover, investors should continue to overweight Swedish equities due to their large exposure to industrials and financials, even if they have already significantly outperformed the Euro Area. Sweden’s Economic Outlook The Swedish economy will accelerate, which will put pressure on resource utilization and fan inflationary risk in the years ahead. The degree of stimulus supporting Sweden is consequential. Chart 1A Dual Labor Market On the fiscal front, the government support measures that have been announced since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis currently amount to SEK420bn, or SEK197bn for 2020 (4% of GDP), and SEK223bn for 2021 (4.5% of GDP). Moreover, generous labor market protection and part-time employment schemes meant that the number of employees in permanent employment contracts remained stable during the pandemic (Chart 1). Thus, the bulk of the rise in Swedish unemployment came from workers on fixed-term contracts. Monetary policy remains very accommodative as well. The Riksbank left its repo rate unchanged at 0% through the crisis, but cut its lending rate from 0.75% to 0.1%. More importantly, the Swedish central bank is aggressively injecting liquidity into the economy. It set up a SEK500bn funding-for-lending facility in order to incentivize bank lending to the nonfinancial private sector, and started a SEK700bn QE program, which as of Q1 2021 had purchased SEK380bn securities and which will purchase another SEK120bn in Q2, with covered bonds issued by banks accounting for 70% of it. As a result, the amount of securities held on the Riksbank balance sheet will nearly triple by year end (Chart 2). Chart 2The Riksbank Is Open For Business Beyond the monetary and fiscal stimulus, many factors point to greater economic strength for Sweden. Despite a slow start to the process, as of last week, nearly 30% of the Swedish population had received at least one vaccine dose, which is broadly in line with vaccination rates prevalent in France or Germany. Crucially, the pace of vaccination is accelerating at a rate of 13% per week. Even if this second derivative slows, more than 70% of the population will have received at least one dose by this summer. Thus, greater mobility is in the cards during the second quarter, which will boost household spending. Chart 3The Wealth Effect The housing market also favors a pick-up in consumption. The HOX housing price index is growing at a 15% annual rate, its fastest expansion in over 5 years. As a result of the wealth effect, this rapid appreciation is consistent with a swift improvement in the growth rate of household expenditures (Chart 3). Moreover, spending on durable goods now stands 1.3% above its pre-pandemic levels, while spending on non-durables is back to pre-pandemic levels. This context suggests that increased mobility translates into greater spending. The industrial sector remains a particularly bright spot in the Swedish economy. Sweden is extremely sensitive to the global industrial and trade cycle, because exports represent 45% of GDP. Moreover, the highly cyclical intermediate and capital goods comprise 56% of the country’s foreign shipments, which accentuates the beta of the Swedish economy. BCA Research remains optimistic about the global industrial cycle. Sweden will reap a significant dividend. Already the Swedish PMI points to stronger industrial production, and the index’s exports component is roaring ahead (Chart 4). The potential for a greater uptake in consumption, capex, and durable goods spending in the rest of the EU (Sweden’s largest trading partner) bodes well for the Swedish manufacturing sector. Additionally, if the collapse in the US inventory-to-sales ratio is any indication for the rest of the world, a global restocking cycle is forthcoming, which will further boost Swedish industrial activity (Chart 4, bottom panels). Finally, global public infrastructure plans are on the rise, which will also help Sweden. Chart 4Sweden Is well Placed Chart 5Brightening Labor Market Prospects In this context, the Swedish labor market should tighten significantly in the approaching quarters. Already, job vacancies are rebounding, and redundancy notices have normalized, which matches both the GDP growth surprise in Q1 and the continued rise in the NIER Sweden Economic Tendency Indicator. Furthermore, the employment component of the PMIs stands at 58.9 and is consistent with a sharp improvement in job growth over the coming year (Chart 5). The expected labor market growth will contribute to an increase in capacity utilization, which will place upward pressure on wages and inflation. When the 12-month moving average of US and Eurozone imports rises, so does the Riksbank Resource Utilization Indicator, because global trade has such a pronounced effect on the Swedish economy (Chart 6). Meanwhile, greater resource utilization leads to accelerated inflation, greater labor shortages, and rising unit labor costs (Chart 7).  Chart 6CAPU Will Rise Chart 7The Coming Pressure Buildup Bottom Line: As a result of generous stimulus and the global economic recovery, the Swedish economy is set to continue its rebound. Consequently, employment and capacity utilization will improve meaningfully, which will lead to a resurgence of inflation and wages in the coming 24 months. Investment Implications On a 12 to 24 months horizon, we remain positive on the Swedish krona and Swedish equities. Fixed Income And FX Chart 8Three Hikes By 2025 The backend of the Swedish OIS curve only discounts 75bps of hikes by 2025. This pricing is too modest (Chart 8). The Swedish economy will rebound further as the vaccination campaign advances, and rising house prices and household indebtedness will fan growing long-term risk to financial stability, both of which suggest that the Riksbank will have to change its tack in 2022. The great likelihood that the Fed will start tapering off its asset purchase toward the end this year, that the ECB will follow sometime in 2022, and that the Norges Bank will be increasing interest rates next year will give more leeway to the Swedish central bank. A wider Sweden/Germany 10-year government bond spread is not an appealing vehicle to play a more hawkish Riksbank down the road. This spread hit a 23-year high in March and now rests at 62bps or its 98th percentile since 2000. Moreover, the terminal rate proxy embedded in the German money market curve is currently so low that the spread between Sweden’s and the Eurozone’s terminal rate proxy stands near a record high. Hence, German yields already embed much more pessimism than Swedish ones. Nonetheless, BCA recommends a below benchmark duration exposure within the Swedish fixed-income space, as we do for other government bond markets around the world.1 A bullish bias toward the SEK is a bet on the Riksbank that offers a very appealing risk/reward ratio, according to BCA Research’s Foreign Exchange Strategy strategists.2 The krona is very cheap against both the euro and the US dollar, trading at 9% and 29% discounts to purchasing power parity, respectively. Moreover, the Swedish current account stands at 5.2% of GDP, compared to 2.3% and -3.1% for the Euro Area and the US, creating a natural underpinning under the SEK. Chart 9The SEK Loves Growth Over the coming 12 to 24 months, cyclical forces favor selling EUR/SEK and USD/SEK on any strength. The SEK is one of the most cyclical G-10 currencies and has one of the strongest sensitivities to the US dollar. Hence, our positive global economic outlook and our FX strategists negative view on the greenback are synonymous with a weak USD/SEK. These same factors also mean that the krona will appreciate more than the euro, as the negative correlation between EUR/SEK and our Boom/Bust Indicator and global earnings growth illustrate (Chart 9). Equities We also like Swedish equities, but the state of the Swedish economy and the evolution of the Riksbank policy surprise have a limited impact on Swedish equities. The Swedish bourse is mostly about the evolution of the global business cycle. The Swedish benchmark heightened sensitivity to the global business cycle reflects its massive overweight in deep cyclicals, with industrials, financials, consumer discretionary, and materials accounting for 38.4%, 26.1%, 9.7% and 3.7% of the MSCI index respectively, or 78% altogether (Table 1). As a result, BCA’s preference for global cyclicals at the expense of defensives and this publication’s fondness for the recovery laggards like the industrial and financial sectors automatically translate into a favorable bias toward Sweden’s stocks.3 Table 1Mamma Mia! That’s A Lot Of Cyclicals Valuations offer a more complex picture, but they do not diminish our predilection for Sweden. Swedish equities trade at a discount to US stocks but at a premium to Euro Area ones (Chart 10). However, Swedish stocks offer higher RoEs and profit margins than both the US and the Euro Area, while also sporting lower leverage (Chart 11). Thus, their valuation premium to Euro Area stocks is warranted and their discount to US ones is excessive, especially when rising yields hurt the relative performance of the growth stocks that dominate US indexes. Chart 10Swedish Discounts And Premia Chart 11Profitable Sweden The outlook for Swedish earnings is appealing, both in absolute and relative terms. The Swedish market’s extreme sensitivity to global economic activity means that Sweden’s EPS increase and beat US profits when the Riksbank Resource Utilization Indicator expands (Chart 12). These relationships are artefacts of the Swedish economy’s pro-cyclicality, which causes capacity utilization to interweave tightly with the global business cycle (Chart 6). Chart 12The Winner Takes It All Chart 13Better Capex Play Than You Global capex and infrastructure spending favor Swedish equities compared to Euro Area ones. Over the past thirty years, Sweden’s stocks have outperformed those of the Eurozone when capital goods orders in the advanced economies have expanded (Chart 13). This reflects the Swedish benchmark’s large overweight in industrials, a sector that is the prime beneficiary of global capex. Capital goods orders are recovering well, and their growth rate can climb higher, especially as western multinationals announce capex plans and as governments from the US to Italy intend to ramp up infrastructure spending. Moreover, the large pent-up demand for durable goods in the Eurozone further enhances the potential of industrial firms, and thus, of Swedish equities.4  Chart 14Another Sign Of Pro-Cyclicality BCA Research’s positive cyclical stance on commodities offers another reason to overweight Sweden’s market relative to that of the US and the Euro Area. Our Commodity and Energy Strategy sister service anticipates significant further upside for natural resources, especially base metals, over the remainder of the business cycle.5 Commodity prices still have room to rally, because demand will grow as the global economy continues to recover and because the supply of natural resources has been constrained by a decade of low investment. As a result, rising metal prices will symptomatize strong economic activity around the world and will incentivize capex in commodity extraction, both of which will boost the revenue of industrial firms. Furthermore, commodity price inflation often corresponds with rising yields, which boosts financials as well. These relationships explain the Swedish stocks’ outperformance of US and Eurozone stocks, when natural resource prices rally, despite the former’s low exposure to materials (Chart 14). At the sector level, the appeal of Swedish industrials relative to those of the Eurozone and the US completes the rationale to favor Swedish equities in a global portfolio. Swedish industrials are just as profitable as US ones and are more so than Euro Area ones, while having significantly lower leverage than either of them (Chart 15). Additionally, for the past two years, the EPS growth of Swedish industrials has bested that of US and Eurozone ones. Yet, their forward P/E ratio trades in line with the US and the Euro Area, while the sell-side’s long-term relative earnings growth estimate is too depressed (Chart 16). The same observations are valid when comparing Swedish industrials to French or German ones. Hence, in the context of a global business cycle upswing, buying Swedish industrials while selling their US and Euro Area competitors is an appealing pair trade, especially since it also involves short USD/SEK and short EUR/SEK bets. Chart 15Attractive Swedish Industrials... Chart 16...And Not Expensive Despite our optimism toward Swedish stocks on a 12 to 24 months basis, investors must hedge a near-term risk. Chinese authorities are aiming to contain financial excesses and trying to restrain credit growth. As we showed four weeks ago, China’s excess reserve ratio is contracting, which points toward a slowdown in the Chinese credit impulse.6 Historically, such a development can hurt global cyclicals, and thus, also Swedish equities. However, BCA Research’s China strategists believe that Beijing will not kill off the Chinese business cycle; thus, the recent disappointment in the Chinese PMI is transitory.7   Chart 17Industrials vs Materials: Europe vs China Materials more than industrials will suffer the brunt of a China slowdown, as the re-opening trade and capex cycle among advanced economies will create a buffer for the latter. Indeed, the performance of global industrials relative to materials stocks correlates with the evolution of the spread between the Euro Area and Chinese PMI (Chart 17). Thus, we recommend selling Norwegian equities to hedge the tactical risk inherent in an overweight on Sweden. As Table 1 above shows, Norway overweighs materials and energy (two sectors greatly exposed to China), hence, a temporary pullback in commodity prices should hurt Norwegian stocks more than Swedish ones. Bottom Line: The SEK is an inexpensive and attractive vehicle to bet on both the global business cycle strength and the Swedish economic recovery. Thus, investors should use any rebound in EUR/SEK and USD/SEK to sell these pairs. Moreover, Swedish stocks greatly overweight cyclical sectors, particularly industrials and materials. This sectoral profile renders Swedish equities as attractive bets on the global economy. Additionally, Swedish shares display alluring operating metrics. As a result, we recommend investors go long Swedish industrials relative to those of the US and Euro Area. They should also overweight Swedish equities against the US and the Eurozone. Consequent to some China-related tactical risks, an underweight stance on Norwegian stocks constitutes an attractive hedge to this Swedish exposure. A Few Words On Italy’s National Recovery And Resilience Plan Mario Draghi’s plan to revive the Italian economy, announced last week, is an important marker of Europe’s changing relationship with fiscal policy. Last decade, excessive austerity contributed to subpar growth, ultimately firing up concerns about debt sustainability in many peripheral economies, and fueled risk premia in Italy and Spain. Under the cover of the current crisis, and in the face of the changing political winds in Brussel and Berlin where fiscal rectitude is not the mantra it once was, national European governments are beginning to propose ambitious fiscal stimulus plans. The National Recovery and Resilience program illustrates these dynamics. The EUR248bn plan is a testament to the importance of the NGEU recovery program as well as the REACT EU recovery fund. Through these facilities, the EU will contribute EUR191.5bn to the fiscal plan via grants and loans. Italy will contribute the remainder of the funds. While the total amount disbursed over the next six years corresponds to 14% of Italy’s 2019 GDP, the Draghi government estimates that the program will add 3.2 percentage points to GDP between 2024 and 2026. Importantly, markets are not rebelling. Despite expectations that Italy would continue to run an accommodative fiscal policy, the BTP/Bund spreads remain stable. We can expect this trend of greater stimulus to be mimicked around the EU. Spain is another large recipient of the NGEU program, and it too is likely to increase stimulus beyond what the EU will fund. France will hold an election in May 2022, and President Macron has all the incentives to stimulate the economy between now and then. If, as we wrote last week, Germany shifts to the left in September, then this outcome will be guaranteed. Bottom Line: The Draghi plan is the first salvo of greater fiscal stimulus in the EU. This trend will help Eurozone growth improve relative to the US over the coming few years. Despite a loose fiscal policy, BTPs and other peripheral bonds will continue to outperform on the back of declining risk premia.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy “GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Grand Reopening,” dated April 6, 2021, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy “2021 Key Views: Tradeable Themes,” dated December 4, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3Please see European Investment Strategy “Summer Of ‘21,” dated March 22, 2021, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 4Please see European Investment Strategy “Winds Of Change: Germany Goes Green,” dated April 23, 2021, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 5Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy “Industrial Commodities Super-Cycle Or Bull Market?” dated March 4, 2021, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 6Please see European Investment Strategy “The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward,” dated March 29, 2021, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 7Please see China Investment Strategy “National People’s Congress Sets Tone For 2021 Growth,” dated March 17, 2021, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds Corporate Bonds Equity Performance Major Stock Indices Geographic Performance Sector Performance Closed Trades

Highlights Biden’s first 100 days are characterized by a liberal spend-and-tax agenda unseen since the 1960s. It is not a “bait and switch,” however. Voters do not care about deficits and debt. At least not for now. The apparent outcome of the populist surge in the US and UK in 2016 is blowout fiscal spending. Yet the US and UK also invented and distributed vaccines faster than others. US growth and equities have outperformed while the US dollar experienced a countertrend bounce. While growth will rotate to other regions, China’s stimulus is on the wane. Of Biden’s three initial geopolitical risks, two are showing signs of subsiding: Russia and Iran. US-China tensions persist, however, and Biden has been hawkish so far. Our new Australia Geopolitical Risk Indicator confirms our other indicators in signaling that China risk, writ large, remains elevated. Cyclically we are optimistic about the Aussie and Australian stocks. Mexico’s midterm elections are likely to curb the ruling party’s majority but only marginally. The macro and geopolitical backdrop is favorable for Mexico. Feature US President Joe Biden gave his first address to the US Congress on April 28. Biden’s first hundred days are significant for his extravagant spending proposals, which will rank alongside those of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, if not Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, in their impact on US history, for better and worse. Chart 1Biden's First 100 Days - The Market's Appraisal The global financial market appraisal is that Biden’s proposals will turn out for the better. The market has responded to the US’s stimulus overshoot, successful vaccine rollout, and growth outperformance – notably in the pandemic-struck service sector – by bidding up US equities and the dollar (Chart 1). From a macro perspective we share the BCA House View in leaning against both of these trends, preferring international equities and commodity currencies. However, our geopolitical method has made it difficult for us to bet directly against the dollar and US equities. Geopolitics is about not only wars and trade but also the interaction of different countries’ domestic politics. America’s populist spending blowout is occurring alongside a sharp drop in China’s combined credit-and-fiscal impulse, which will eventually weigh on the global economy. This is true even though the rest of the world is beginning to catch up in vaccinations and economic normalization. As for traditional geopolitical risk – wars and alliances – Biden has not yet leaped over the three initial foreign policy hurdles that we have highlighted: China, Russia, and Iran. In this report we will update the view on all three, as there is tentative improvement on the Russian and Iranian fronts. In addition, we will introduce our newest geopolitical risk indicator – for Australia – and update our view on Mexico ahead of its June 6 midterm elections. Biden’s Fiscal Blowout From a macro point of view, Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) was much larger than what Republicans would have passed if President Trump had won a second term. His proposed $2.3 trillion American Jobs Plan (AJP) is also larger, though both candidates were likely to pass an infrastructure package. The difference lies in the parts of these packages that relate to social spending and other programs, beyond COVID relief and roads and bridges. The Republican proposal for COVID relief was $618 billion while the Republicans’ current proposal on infrastructure is $568 billion – marking a $3 trillion difference from Biden. In reality Republicans would have proposed larger spending if Trump had remained president – but not enough to close this gap. And Biden is also proposing a $1.8 trillion American Families Plan (AFP). Biden’s praise for handling the vaccinations must be qualified by the Trump administration’s successful preparations, which have been unfairly denigrated. Similarly, Biden’s blame for the migrant surge at the southern border must be qualified by the fact that the surge began last year.1 A comparison with the UK will put Biden’s administration into perspective. The only country comparable to the US in terms of the size of fiscal stimulus over 2019-21 so far – excluding Biden’s AJP and AFP, which are not yet law – is the United Kingdom. Thus the consequence of the flare-up of populism in the Anglo-Saxon world since 2016 is a budget deficit blowout as these countries strive to suppress domestic socio-political conflict by means of government largesse, particularly in industrial and social programs. However, populist dysfunction was also overrated. Both the US and UK retain their advantages in terms of innovation and dynamism, as revealed by the vaccine and its rollout (Chart 2). Chart 2Dysfunctional Anglo-Saxon Populism? No sharp leftward turn occurred in the UK, where Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Conservatives had the benefit of a pre-COVID election in December 2019, which they won. By contrast, in the US, President Trump and the Republicans contended an election after the pandemic and recession had virtually doomed them to failure. There a sharp leftward turn is taking place. Going forward the US will reclaim the top rank in terms of fiscal stimulus, as Biden is likely to get his infrastructure plan (AJP) passed. Our updated US budget deficit projections appear in Chart 3. Our sister US Political Strategy gives the AJP an 80% chance of passing in some form and the AFP only a 50% chance of passing, depending on how quickly the AJP is passed. This means the blue dashed line is more likely to occur than the red dashed line. The difference is slight despite the mind-boggling headline numbers of the plans because the spending is spread out over eight-to-ten years and tax hikes over 15 years will partially offset the expenditures. Much will depend on whether Congress is willing to pay for the new spending. In Chart 3 we assume that Biden will get half of the proposed corporate tax hikes in the AJP scenario (and half of the individual tax hikes in the AFP scenario). If spending is watered down, and/or tax hikes surprise to the upside, both of which are possible, then the deficit scenarios will obviously tighten, assuming the economic recovery continues robustly as expected. But in the current political environment it is safest to plan for the most expansive budget deficit scenarios, as populism is the overriding force. Chart 3Biden’s Blowout Spending Biden’s campaign plan was even more visionary, so it is not true that Biden pulled a “bait and switch” on voters. Rather, the median voter is comfortable with greater deficits and a larger government role in American life. Bottom Line: The implication of Biden’s spending blowout is reflationary for the global economy, cyclically negative for the US dollar, and positive for global equities. But on a tactical time frame the rotation to other equities and currencies will also depend on China’s fiscal-and-credit deceleration and whether geopolitical risk continues to fall. Russia: Some Improvement But Coast Not Yet Clear US-Russia tensions appeared to fizzle over the past week but the coast is not yet clear. We remain short Russian currency and risk assets as well as European emerging market equities. Tensions fell after President Putin’s State of the Nation address on April 21 in which he warned the West against crossing Russia’s “red lines.” Biden’s sanctions on Russia were underwhelming – he did not insist on halting the final stages of the Nord Stream II pipeline to Germany. Russia declared it would withdraw its roughly 100,000 troops from the Ukrainian border by May 1. Russian dissident Alexei Navalny ended his hunger strike. Putin attended Biden’s Earth Day summit and the two are working on a bilateral summit in June. Chart 4Russia's Domestic Instability Will Continue De-escalation is not certain, however. First, some US officials have cast doubt on Russia’s withdrawal of troops and it is known that arms and equipment were left in place for a rapid mobilization and re-escalation if necessary. Second, Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists will be emboldened, which could increase fighting in Ukraine that could eventually provoke Russian intervention. Third, the US has until August or September to prevent Nord Stream from completion. Diplomacy between Russia and the US (and Russia and several eastern European states) has hit a low point on the withdrawal of ambassadors. Fourth, Russian domestic politics was always the chief reason to prepare for a worse geopolitical confrontation and it remains unsettled. Putin’s approval rating still lingers in the relatively low range of 65% and government approval at 49%. The economic recovery is weak and facing an increasingly negative fiscal thrust, along with Europe and China, Russia’s single-largest export destination (Chart 4). Putin’s handouts to households, in anticipation of the September Duma election, only amount to 0.2% of GDP. More measures will probably be announced but the lead-up to the election could still see an international adventure designed to distract the public from its socioeconomic woes. Russia’s geopolitical risk indicators ticked up as anticipated (Chart 5). They may subside if the military drawdown is confirmed and Biden and Putin lower the temperature. But we would not bet on it. Chart 5Russian Geopolitical Risk: Wait For 'All Clear' Signal Bottom Line: It is possible that Biden has passed his first foreign policy test with Russia but it is too soon to sound the “all clear.” We remain short Russian ruble and short EM Europe until de-escalation is confirmed. The Russian (and German) elections in September will mark a time for reassessing this view. Iran: Diplomacy On Track (Hence Jitters Will Rise) While Russia may or may not truly de-escalate tensions in Ukraine, the spring and summer are sure to see an increase in focus on US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Geopolitical risks will remain high prior to the conclusion of a deal and will materialize in kinetic attacks of various kinds. This thesis is confirmed by the alleged Israeli sabotage of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility this month. The US Navy also fired warning shots at Iranian vessels staging provocations. Sporadic attacks in other parts of the region also continue to flare, most recently with an Iranian tanker getting hit by a drone at a Syrian oil terminal.2 The US and Iran are making progress in the Vienna talks toward rejoining the 2015 nuclear deal from which the US withdrew in 2018. Iran pledged to enrich uranium up to 60% but also said this move was reversible – like all its tentative violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) so far (Table 1). Iran also offered a prisoner swap with the US. Saudi Arabia appears resigned to a resumption of the JCPA that it cannot prevent, with crown prince Mohammed bin Salman offering diplomatic overtures to both the US and Iran. Table 1Iran’s Nuclear Program And Compliance With JCPA 2015 Still, the closer the US and Iran get to a deal the more its opponents will need to either take action or make preparations for the aftermath. The allegation that former US Secretary of State John Kerry’s shared Israeli military plans with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif is an example of the kind of political brouhaha that will occur as different elements try to support and oppose the normalization of US-Iran ties. More importantly Israel will underscore its red line against nuclear weaponization. Previously Iran was set to reach “breakout” capability of uranium enrichment – a point at which it has enough fissile material to produce a nuclear device – as early as May. Due to sabotage at the Natanz facility the breakout period may have been pushed back to July.3 This compounds the significance of this summer as a deadline for negotiating a reduction in tensions. While the US may be prepared to fudge on Iran’s breakout capabilities, Israel will not, which means a market-relevant showdown should occur this summer before Israel backs down for fear of alienating the United States. Tit-for-tat attacks in May and June could cause negative surprises for oil supply. Then there will be a mad dash by the negotiators to agree to deal before the de facto August deadline, when Iran inaugurates a new president and it becomes much harder to resolve outstanding issues. Chart 6Iran Deal Priced Into Oil Markets? Hence our argument that geopolitics adds upside risk to oil prices in the first half of the year but downside risk in the second half. The market’s expectations seem already to account for this, based on the forward curve for Brent crude oil. The marginal impact of a reconstituted Iran nuclear deal on oil prices is slightly negative over the long run since a deal is more likely to be concluded than not and will open up Iran’s economy and oil exports to the world. However, our Commodity & Energy Strategy expects the Brent price to exceed expectations in the coming years, judging by supply and demand balances and global macro fundamentals (Chart 6). If an Iran deal becomes a fait accompli in July and August the Saudis could abandon their commitment to OPEC 2.0’s production discipline. The Russians and Saudis are not eager to return to a market share war after what happened in March 2020 but we cannot rule it out in the face of Iranian production. Thus we expect oil to be volatile. Oil producers also face the threat of green energy and US shale production which gives them more than one reason to keep up production and prevent prices from getting too lofty. Throughout the post-2015 geopolitical saga between the US and Iran, major incidents have caused an increase in the oil-to-gold ratio. The risk of oil supply disruption affected the price more than the flight to gold due to geopolitical or war risk. The trend generally corresponds with that of the copper-to-gold ratio, though copper-to-gold rose higher when growth boomed and oil outperformed when US-Iran tensions spiked in 2019. Today the copper-to-gold ratio is vastly outperforming the oil-to-gold on the back of the global recovery (Chart 7). This makes sense from the point of view of the likelihood of a US-Iran deal this year. But tensions prior to a deal will push up oil-to-gold in the near term. Chart 7Biden Passes Iran Test? Likely But Not A Done Deal Bottom Line: The US-Iran diplomacy is on track. This means geopolitical risk will escalate in May and June before a short-term or interim deal is agreed in July or August. Geopolitical risk stemming from US-Iran relations will subside thereafter, unless the deadline is missed. The forward curve has largely priced in the oil price downside except for the risk that OPEC 2.0 becomes dysfunctional again. We expect upside price surprises in the near term. Biden, China, And Our Australia GeoRisk Indicator Ostensibly the US and Russia are avoiding a war over Ukraine and the US and Iran are negotiating a return to the 2015 nuclear deal. Only US-China relations utterly lack clarity, with military maneuvering in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and tensions simmering over the gamut of other disputes. Chart 8Biden Still Faces China Test The latest data on global military spending show not only that the US and China continue to build up their militaries but also that all of the regional allies – including Japan! – are bulking up defense spending (Chart 8). This is a substantial confirmation of the secular growth of geopolitical risk, specifically in reaction to China’s rise and US-China competition. The first round of US-China talks under Biden went awry but since then a basis has been laid for cooperation on climate change, with President Xi Jinping attending Biden’s virtual climate change summit (albeit with no bilateral summit between the two). If John Kerry is removed as climate czar over his Iranian controversy it will not have an impact other than to undermine American negotiators’ reliability. The deeper point is that climate is a narrow basis for US-China cooperation and it cannot remotely salvage the relationship if a broader strategic de-escalation is not agreed. Carbon emissions are more likely to become a cudgel with which the US and West pressure China to reform its economy faster. The Department of Defense is not slated to finish its comprehensive review of China policy until June but most US government departments are undertaking their own reviews and some of the conclusions will trickle out in May, whether through Washington’s actions or leaks to the press. Beijing could also take actions that upend the Biden administration’s assessment, such as with the Microsoft hack exposed earlier this year. The Biden administration will soon reveal more about how it intends to handle export controls and sanctions on China. For example, by May 19 the administration is slated to release a licensing process for companies concerned about US export controls on tech trade with China due to the Commerce Department’s interim rule on info tech supply chains. The Biden administration looks to be generally hawkish on China, a view that is now consensus. Any loosening of punitive measures would be a positive surprise for Chinese stocks and financial markets in general. There are other indications that China’s relationship with the West is not about to improve substantially – namely Australia. Australia has become a bellwether of China’s relations with the world. While the US’s defense commitments might be questionable with regard to some of China’s neighbors – namely Taiwan (Province of China) but also possibly South Korea and the Philippines – there can be little doubt that Australia, like Japan, is the US’s red line in the Pacific. Australian politics have been roiled over the past several years by the revelation of Chinese influence operations, state- or military-linked investments in Australia, and propaganda campaigns. A trade war erupted last year when Australia called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 and China’s handling of it. Most recently, Victoria state severed ties with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Despite the rise in Sino-Australian tensions, the economic relationship remains intact. China’s stimulus overweighed the impact of its punitive trade measures against Australia, both by bidding up commodity prices and keeping the bulk of Australia’s exports flowing (Chart 9). As much as China might wish to decouple from Australia, it cannot do so as long as it needs to maintain minimum growth rates for the sake of social stability and these growth rates require resources that Australia provides. For example, global iron ore production excluding Australia only makes up 80% of China’s total iron ore imports, which necessitates an ongoing dependency here (Chart 10). Brazil cannot make up the difference. Chart 9China-Australia Trade Amid Tensions Chart 10China Cannot Replace Australia This resource dependency does not necessarily reduce geopolitical tension, however, because it increases China’s supply insecurity and vulnerability to the US alliance. The US under Biden explicitly aims to restore its alliances and confront autocratic regimes. This puts Australia at the front lines of an open-ended global conflict. Chart 11Introducing: Australia GeoRisk Indicator (Smoothed) Our newly devised Australia GeoRisk Indicator illustrates the point well, as it has continued surging since the trade war with China first broke out last year (Chart 11). This indicator is based on the Australian dollar and its deviation from underlying macro variables that should determine its course. These variables are described in Appendix 1. If the Aussie weakens relative to these variables, then an Australian-specific risk premium is apparent. We ascribe that premium to politics and geopolitics writ large. A close examination of the risk indicator’s performance shows that it tracks well with Australia’s recent political history (Chart 12). Previous peaks in risk occurred when President Trump rose to power and Australia, like Canada, found itself beset by negative pressures from both the US and China. In particular, Trump threatened tariffs and the Australian government banned China’s Huawei from its 5G network. Today the rise in geopolitical risk stems almost exclusively from China. There is potential for it to roll over if Biden negotiates a reduction in tensions but that is a risk to our view (an upside risk for Australian and global equities). Chart 12Australian GeoRisk Indicator (Unsmoothed) What does this indicator portend for tradable Australian assets? As one would expect, Australian geopolitical risk moves inversely to the country’s equities, currency, and relative equity performance (Chart 13). Australian equities have risen on the back of global growth and the commodity boom despite the rise in geopolitical risk. But any further spike in risk could jeopardize this uptrend. Chart 13Australia Geopolitical Risk And Tradable Assets An even clearer inverse relationship emerges with the AUD-JPY exchange rate, a standard measure of risk-on / risk-off sentiment in itself. If geopolitical risk rises any further it should cause a reversal in the currency pair. Finally, Australian equities have not outperformed other developed markets excluding the US, which may be due to this elevated risk premium. Bottom Line: China is the most important of Biden’s foreign policy hurdles and unlike Russia and Iran there is no sign of a reduction in tension yet. Our Australian GeoRisk Indicator supports the point that risk remains very elevated in the near term. Moreover China’s credit deceleration is also negative for Australia. Cyclically, however, assuming that China does not overtighten policy, we take a constructive view on the Aussie and Australian equities. Biden’s Border Troubles Distract From Bullish Mexico Story The biggest criticism of Biden’s first 100 days has been his reduction in a range of enforcement measures on the southern border which has encouraged an overflow of immigrants. Customs and Border Patrol have seen a spike in “encounters” from a low point of around 17,000 in 2020 to about 170,000 today. The trend started last year but accelerated sharply after the election and had surpassed the 2019 peak of 144,000. Vice President Kamala Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, both with Mexico and Central American states. She does not have much experience with foreign policy so this is her opportunity to learn on the job. She will not be able to accomplish much given that the Biden administration is unwilling to use punitive measures or deterrence and will not have large fiscal resources available for subsidizing the nations to the south. With the US economy hyper-charged, especially relative to its southern neighbors, the pace of immigration is unlikely to slacken. From a macro point of view the relevance is that the US is not substantially curtailing immigration – quite the opposite – which means that labor force growth will not deviate from its trend. What about Mexico itself? It is not likely that Harris will be able to engage on a broader range of issues with Mexico beyond immigration. As usual Mexico is beset with corruption, lawlessness, and instability. To these can be added the difficulties of the pandemic and vaccine rollout. Tourism and remittances are yet to recover. Cooperation with US federal agents against the drug cartels is deteriorating. Cartels control an estimated 40% of Mexican territory.4 Nevertheless, despite Mexico’s perennial problems, we hold a positive view on Mexican currency and risk assets. The argument rests on five points: Strong macro fundamentals: With China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse slowing sharply, and US stimulus accelerating, Mexico stands to benefit. Mexico has also run orthodox monetary and fiscal policies. It has a demographic tailwind, low wages, and low public debt. The stars are beginning to align for the country’s economy, according to our Emerging Markets Strategy. US and Canadian stimulus: The US and Canada have the second- and third-largest fiscal stimulus of all the major countries over the 2019-21 period, at 9% and 8% of GDP respectively. Mexico, with the new USMCA free trade deal in hand, will benefit. US protectionism fizzled: Even Republican senators blocked President Trump’s attempted tariffs on Mexico. Trump’s aggression resulted in the USMCA, a revised NAFTA, which both US political parties endorsed. Mexico is inured to US protectionism, at least for the short and medium term. Diversification from China: Mexico suffered the greatest opportunity cost from China’s rise as an offshore manufacturer and entrance to the World Trade Organization. Now that the US and other western countries are diversifying away from China, amid geopolitical tensions, Mexico stands to benefit. The US cannot eliminate its trade deficit due to its internal savings/investment imbalance but it can redistribute that trade deficit to countries that cannot compete with it for global hegemony. AMLO faces constraints: A risk factor stemmed from politics where a sweeping left-wing victory in 2018 threatened to introduce anti-market policies. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO) and his MORENA party gained a majority in both houses of the legislature. Their coalition has a two-thirds majority in the lower house (Chart 14). However, we pointed out that AMLO’s policies have not been radical and, more importantly, that the midterm election would likely constrain his power. Chart 14Mexico’s Midterm Election Looms These are all solid points but the last item faces a test in the upcoming midterm election. AMLO’s approval rating is strong, at 63%, putting him above all of his predecessors except one (Chart 15). AMLO’s approval has if anything benefited from the COVID-19 crisis despite Mexico’s inability to handle the medical challenge. He has promised to hold a referendum on his leadership in early 2022, more than halfway through his six-year term, and he is currently in good shape for that referendum. For now his popularity is helpful for his party, although he is not on the ballot in 2021 and MORENA’s support is well beneath his own. Chart 15AMLO’s Approval Fairly Strong MORENA’s support is holding at a 44% rate of popular support and its momentum has slightly improved since the pandemic began. However, MORENA’s lead over other parties is not nearly as strong as it was back in 2018 (Chart 16, top panel). The combined support of the two dominant center-right parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the National Action Party, is almost equal to that of MORENA. And the two center-left parties, the Democratic Revolution Party and Citizen’s Movement, are part of the opposition coalition (Chart 16, bottom panel). The pandemic and economic crisis will motivate the opposition. Chart 16MORENA’s Support Holding Up Despite COVID Traditionally the president’s party loses seats in the midterm election (Table 2). Circumstances are different from the US, which also exhibits this trend, because Mexico has more political parties. A loss of seats from MORENA does not necessarily favor the establishment parties. Nevertheless opinion polling shows that about 45% of voters say they would rather see MORENA’s power “checked” compared to 41% who wish to see the party go on unopposed.5 Table 2Mexican President’s Party Tends To Lose Seats In Midterm Election While the ruling coalition may lose its super-majority, it is not a foregone conclusion that MORENA will lose its majority. Voters have decades of experience of the two dominant parties, both were discredited prior to 2018, and neither has recovered its reputation so quickly. The polling does not suggest that voters regret their decision to give the left wing a try. If anything recent polls slightly push against this idea. If MORENA surprises to the upside then AMLO’s capabilities would increase substantially in the second half of his term – he would have political capital and an improving economy. While the senate is not up for grabs in the midterm, MORENA has a narrow majority and controls a substantial 60% of seats when its allies are taken into account. In this scenario AMLO could pursue his attempts to increase the state’s role in key industries, like energy and power generation, at the expense of private investors. Even then the Supreme Court would continue to act as a check on the government. The 11-seat court is currently made up of five conservatives, two independents, and three liberal or left-leaning judges. A new member, Margarita Ríos Farjat, is close to the government, leaving the conservatives with a one-seat edge over the liberals and putting the two independents in the position of swing voters. Even if AMLO maintains control of the lower house, he will not be able to override the constitutional court, as he has threatened on occasion to do, without a super-majority in the senate. Bottom Line: AMLO will likely lose some ground in the lower house and thus suffer a check on his power. This will only confirm that Mexican political risk is not likely to derail positive underlying macro fundamentals. Continue to overweight Mexican equities relative to Brazilian.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix 1 The market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd and as such our Geopolitical Risk Indicators were not designed to predict political risk but to answer the question of whether and to what extent markets have priced that risk. Our Australian GeoRisk Indicator (see Chart 11-12 above) uses the same simple methodology used in our other indicators, which avoid the pitfall of regression-based models. We begin with a financial asset that has a daily frequency in price, in this case the AUD, and compare its movement against several fundamental factors – in this case global energy and base metal prices, global metals and mining stock prices, and the Chilean peso. Australia is a commodity-exporting country. It is the largest producer of iron ore and is among the largest producers of coal and natural gas. It is also a major trading partner for China. Due to the nature of its economy the Australian dollar moves with global metal and energy prices and the global metals and mining equity prices. Chile, another major commodity producer also moves with global metal prices, hence our inclusion of the peso in this indicator. The AUD has a high correlation with all of these assets, and if the changes in the value of the AUD lag or lead the changes in the value of these assets, the implication is that geopolitical risk unique to Australia is not priced by the market. We included the peso as Chile is not as affected as Australia by any conflict in the South China Sea or Northeast Asia, which means that a deviation of the AUD from CLP represents a unique East Asia Pacific risk. Our indicator captures the involvement of Australia in a few regional and international conflicts. The indicator climbed as Australia got involved in the East Timor emergency and declined as it exited. It continued declining even as Australia joined the US in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, which showed that investors were unperturbed by faraway wars, while showing measurable concern in the smaller but closer Timorese conflict. Risks went up again as the nation erupted in labor protests as the Howard government made changes to the labor code. We see the market pricing higher risk again during the 2008 financial crisis, although it was modest and Australia escaped the crisis unscathed due to massive Chinese stimulus. Since then, investors have been climbing a wall of worry as they priced in Northeast Asia-related geopolitical risks. These started with the South Korean Cheonan sinking and continued with the Sino-Japanese clash over the Senkaku islands. They culminated with the Chinese ADIZ declaration in late 2013. In 2016, Australia was shocked again when Donald Trump was elected, and investor fears were evident when the details of Trump-Turnbull spat were made public. The risk indicator reached another peak during the trade wars between the US and the rest of the world. Investors were not worried about COVID-19 as Australia largely contained the pandemic, but the recent Australian-Chinese trade war pushed the risk indicator up, giving investors another wall of worry. If the Biden administration forces Australia into a democratic alliance in confrontation with autocratic China then this risk will persist for some time.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com We Read (And Liked) ... The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, And The Fate Of Liberty This book is a sweeping review of the conditions of liberty essential to steering the world away from the Hobbesian war of all against all. In this unofficial sequel to the 2012 hit, Why Nations Fail: The Origins Of Power, Prosperity, And Poverty, Daron Acemoglu (Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and James A. Robinson (Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago) further explore their thesis that the existence and effectiveness of democratic institutions account for a nation’s general success or failure. The Narrow Corridor6 examines how liberty works. It is not “natural,” not widespread, “is rare in history and is rare today.” Only in peculiar circumstances have states managed to produce free societies. States have to walk a thin line to achieve liberty, passing through what the authors describe as a “narrow corridor.” To encourage freedom, states must be strong enough to enforce laws and provide public services yet also restrained in their actions and checked by a well-organized civil society. For example, from classical history, the Athenian constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes “were helpful for strengthening the political power of Athenian citizens while also battling the cage of norms.” That cage of norms is the informal body of customs replaced by state institutions. Those norms in turn “constrained what the state could do and how far state building could go,” providing a set of checks. Though somewhat fluid in its definition, liberty, as Acemoglu and Robinson show, is expressed differently under various “leviathans,” or states. For starters, the “Shackled Leviathan” is a government dedicated to upholding the rule of law, protecting the weak against the strong, and creating the conditions for broad-based economic opportunity. Meanwhile, the “Paper Leviathan” is a bureaucratic machine favoring the privileged class, serving as both a political and economic brake on development and yielding “fear, violence, and dominance for most of its citizens.” Other examples include: The “American Leviathan” which fails to deal properly with inequality and racial oppression, two enemies of liberty; and a “Despotic Leviathan,” which commands the economy and coerces political conformity – an example from modern China. Although the book indulges in too much jargon, it is provocative and its argument is convincing. The authors say that in most places and at most times, the strong have dominated the weak and human freedom has been quashed by force or by customs and norms. Either states have been too weak to protect individuals from these threats or states have been too strong for people to protect themselves from despotism. Importantly, many states believe that once liberty is achieved, it will remain the status quo. But the authors argue that to uphold liberty, state institutions have to evolve continuously as the nature of conflicts and needs of society change. Thus society's ability to keep state and rulers accountable must intensify in tandem with the capabilities of the state. This struggle between state and society becomes self-reinforcing, inducing both to develop a richer array of capacities just to keep moving forward along the corridor. Yet this struggle also underscores the fragile nature of liberty. It is built on a precarious balance between state and society; between economic, political, and social elites and common citizens; between institutions and norms. If one side of the balance gets too strong, as has often happened in history, liberty begins to wane. The authors central thesis is that the long-run success of states depends on the balance of power between state and society. If states are too strong, you end up with a “Despotic Leviathan” that is good for short-term economic growth but brittle and unstable over the long term. If society is too strong, the “Leviathan” is absent, and societies suffer under a pre-modern war of all against all. The ideal place to be is in the narrow corridor, under a shackled Leviathan that will grow state capacity and individual liberty simultaneously, thus leading to long-term economic growth. In the asset allocation process, investors should always consider the liberty of a state and its people, if a state’s institutions grossly favor the elite or the outright population, whether these institutions are weak or overbearing on society, and whether they signify a balance between interests across the population. Whether you are investing over a short or long horizon, returns can be significantly impacted in the absence of liberty or the excesses of liberty. There should be a preference among investors toward countries that exhibit a balance of power between state and society, setting up a better long-term investment environment, than if a balance of power did not exist.   Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan – Province Of China Korea Turkey Brazil Australia Footnotes 1 "President Biden’s first 100 days as president fact-checked," BBC News, April 29, 2021, bbc.com. 2 "Oil tanker off Syrian coast hit in suspected drone attack," Al Jazeera, April 24, 2021, Aljazeera.com. 3 See Yaakov Lappin, "Natanz blast ‘likely took 5,000 centrifuges offline," Jewish News Syndicate, jns.org. 4 John Daniel Davidson, "Former US Ambassador To Mexico: Cartels Control Up To 40 Percent Of Mexican Territory," The Federalist, April 28, 2021, thefederalist.com. 5 See Alejandro Moreno, "Aprobación de AMLO se encuentra en 61% previo a campañas electorales," El Financiero, April 5, 2021, elfinanciero.com. 6 Penguin Press, New York, NY, 2019, 558 pages. Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Rising CO2 emissions on the back of stronger global energy growth this year will keep energy markets focused on expanding ESG risks in the buildout of renewable generation via metals mining (Chart of the Week).   EM energy demand is expected to grow 3.4% this year vs. 2019 levels and will account for ~ 70% of global energy demand growth.  Demand in DM economies will fall 3% this year vs 2019 levels.  Overall, global demand is expected to recover all the ground lost to the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the IEA.  Rising energy demand will be met by higher fossil-fuel use, with coal demand increasing by more than total renewables generation this year and accounting for more than half of global energy demand growth. Demand for renewable power will increase by 8,300 TWh (8%) this year, the largest y/y increase recorded by the IEA.  As renewables generation is built out, demand for bulks (iron ore and steel) and base metals will increase.1  Building that new energy supply will contribute to rising CO2, particularly in the renewables' supply chains. Feature Energy demand will recover much of the ground lost to the COVID-19 pandemic last year, according to the IEA.2 Most of this is down to successful rollouts of vaccination programs in systemically important economies – e.g., China, the US and the UK – and the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus deployed to carry the global economy through the pandemic. The risk of further lockdowns and uncontrolled spread of variants of the virus remains high, but, at present, progress continues to be made and wider vaccine distribution can be expected. The IEA expects a global recovery in energy demand of 4.6% this year, which will put total demand at ~ 0.5% above 2019 levels. The global rebound will be led by EM economies, where demand is expected to grow 3.4% this year vs. 2019 levels and will account for ~ 70% of global energy demand growth. Energy demand in DM economies will fall 3% this year vs 2019 levels. Overall, global demand is expected to recover all the ground lost to the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the IEA. Chart of the WeekGlobal CO2 Emissions Will Rebound Post-COVID-19 Coal demand will lead the rebound in fossil-fuel use, which is expected to account for more than total renewables demand globally this year, covering more than half of global energy demand growth. This will push CO2 emissions up by 5% this year. Asia coal demand – led by China's and India's world-leading coal-plant buildout over the past 20 years – will account for 80% of world demand (Chart 2). Chart 2China, India Lead Coal-Fired Generation Buildout Demand for renewable power will post its biggest year-on-year gain on record, increasing by 8,300 TWh (8%) this year. This increase comes at the back of roughly a decade of an increasing share of electricity from renewables globally (Chart 3). As renewables generation is built out, demand for bulks (iron ore and steel) and base metals will increase.3 Building that new energy supply will contribute to rising CO2, particularly in the renewables' supply chains. Chart 3Share of Electricity From Renewables Has Been Increasing ESG Risks Increase With Renewables Buildout Governments have pledged to invest vast sums of money into the green energy transition, to reduce fossil fuels consumption and deforestation, thus curbing temperature increases. In addition, banks have pledged trillions will be made available to support the buildout of renewable technologies over the coming years. The World Bank, under the most ambitious scenarios considered (IEA ETP B2DS and IRENA REmap), projects that renewables, will make up approximately 90% of the installed electricity generation capacity up to 2050. This analysis excludes oil, biomass and tidal energy. (Chart 4). Building these renewable energy sources will be extremely mineral intensive (Chart 5). Chart 4Renewables Potential Is Huge … While we have highlighted issues such as a lack of mining capex and decreasing ore grades in past research – both of which can be addressed by higher metals and minerals prices – the environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks posed by mining are equally important factors for investors, policymakers and mining companies to consider.4 The mining industry generally uses three principal sources of energy for its operations – diesel fuel (mostly in moving mined ore down the supply chain for processing), grid electricity and explosives. Of these three, diesel and electricity consumption contributes substantially to mining’s GHG emissions. In the mining stage, land clearing, drilling, blasting, crushing and hauling require a considerable amount of energy, and hence emit the highest amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Chart 5… As Are Its Mineral Requirements The Environmental Impact Of Mining Under the scenarios depicted in Chart 5, copper suppliers could be called on to produce approximately 21mm MT of the red metal annually between now and 2050, which is equivalent to a 7% annual increase of supplies vs. the 2017 reference year shown in the chart. Mining sufficient amounts of copper, a metal which is critical to the renewable energy buildout, both in terms of quantity and versatility, will test miners' and governments' ability to extract sufficient amounts of ore for further processing without massively damaging the environment or indigenous populations' habitats (Chart 6). Chart 6Copper Spans All Renewables Technologies A recent risk analysis of 308 undeveloped copper orebodies found that for 180 of the orebodies – roughly equivalent to 570mm MT of copper – ore-grade risk was characterized as moderate-to-high risk.5 High risk implies a lower concentration of metal in the ore deposits. Mining in ore bodies with lower copper grades will be more energy intensive, and thus will emit more greenhouse gases. Table 1 is a risk matrix of the 40 mines that have the most amount of copper tonnage in this analysis: 27 of these mines displayed in the matrix have a medium-to-high grade risk. Table 1Mining Risk Matrix Another analysis established a negative relationship between the ore-grade quality and energy consumption across mines for different metals and minerals.6 This paper found that, as ore grade depletes, the energy needed to extract it and send it along the supply chain for further processing is exponentially higher (Chart 7). Lastly, a recent examination found that in 2018, primary metals and mining accounted for approximately 10% of the total greenhouse gases. Using a case study of Chile, the world’s largest producer of the red metal, the researchers found that fuel consumption increased by 130% and electricity consumption per unit of mined copper increased by 32% from 2001 to 2017. This increase was primarily due to decreasing ore grades.7 As ore grades continue to fall, these exponential relationships likely will persist or become more significant. Chart 7Energy Use Rises As Ore Quality Falls Bottom Line: While technology can improve extraction, it cannot reduce the minimum energy required for the mining process. This increased energy use will contribute to the total amount of CO2 and other GHGs emitted in the process of extracting the ores required to realize a low-carbon future. Trade-Off Between CO2 Emissions And Economic Development A recent Reuters analysis highlights the gap between EM and DM from the perspective of their renewable energy transition priorities.8 Of the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), “Taking action to combat climate change” takes precedence over the rest for DM economies. This is largely because they have already dealt with other energy and income intensive SDGs such as improvements in healthcare and poverty reduction. The large scale of unmet energy demand in developing countries poses a huge challenge to controlling CO2 emissions. The populations of these countries are growing fast and are projected to continue increasing over the next three decades. Rising populations, make the issue of a "green-energy transition" extremely dynamic – i.e., not only do EM economies need to replace existing fossil fuels, but they also need to add enough extra zero-emission fuel sources to meet the growth in energy demand. Bottom Line: Coupled with the increased amount of energy required to mine the same amount of metal (due to lower ore grades), rising energy demand resulting from a burgeoning population in EM economies - which use fossil fuels to meet their primary needs - will require more metals to be mined for the renewable energy transition. This will further increase the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions from mine activity, and increase the risk to indigenous populations living close-by to the sources of this new metals supply. ESG risks will increase as a result, presenting greater challenges to attracting funding to these efforts.   Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 was expected to stick with its decision to return ~ 2mm b/d of supply to the market at its ministerial meeting Wednesday. Markets remain wary of demand slowing as COVID-19-induced lockdowns persist and case counts increase globally. The production being returned to market includes 1mm b/d of voluntary cuts by Saudi Arabia, which could, if needs be, keep barrels off the market if demand weakens. Base Metals: Bullish Front-month COMEX copper is holding above $4.50/lb, after breaching its 11-year high earlier this week. The proximate cause of the initial lift above that level was news of a strike by Chilean port workers on Monday protesting restrictions on early pension-fund drawdowns, according to mining.com. After a slight breather, prices returned to trading north of $4.50/lb by mid-week. Last week, we raised our Dec21 COMEX copper price forecast to $5.00/lb from $4.50/lb. Separately, high-grade iron ore (65% Fe) hit record highs, while the benchmark grade (62% Fe) traded above $190/MT earlier in the week on the back of lower-than-expected production by major suppliers and USD weakness. Steel futures on the Shanghai Futures Exchange hit another record as well, as strong demand and threats of mandated reductions in Chinese steel output to reduce pollution loom (Chart 8). Precious Metals: Bullish Rising COVID cases, especially in India, Brazil and Japan are increasing gold’s safe-haven appeal (Chart 9). The US CFTC, in its Commitment of Traders (COT) report for the week ending April 20, stated that speculators raised their COMEX gold bullish positions. At the end of the two-day FOMC meeting, the Fed decided against lifting interest rates and withdrawing support for the US economy. However, officials sounded more optimistic about the economy than they did in March. The decision did not give any sign interest rates would be lifted, or asset purchases would be tapered against the backdrop of a steadily improving economy.  Net, this could increase demand for gold, as inflationary pressures rise. As of Tuesday’s close, COMEX gold was trading at $1778/oz. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn and bean futures settled down by mid-week after a sharp rally earlier. After rising to a new eight-year high just below $7/bushel due to cold weather in the US, and fears a lower harvest in Brazil will reduce global grain supplies, corn settled down to ~ $6.85/bu at mid-week trading. Beans traded above $15.50/bu earlier in the week, their highest since June 2014, and settled down to ~ $15.36/bu by mid-week. Attention remains focused on global supplies. The uptrend in grains and beans remains intact. Chart 8 Chart 9   Footnotes 1     Please see Renewables, China's FYP Underpin Metals Demand, published 26 November 2020, for further discussion.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see Global Energy Review 2021, the IEA's Flagship report for April 2021. 3    Please see Renewables, China's FYP Underpin Metals Demand, published 26 November 2020, for further discussion.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    We discussed these capex issues in last week's research, Copper Headed Higher On Surge In Steel Prices, which is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    Please see Valenta et al.’s ‘Re-thinking complex orebodies: Consequences for the future world supply of copper’ published in 2019 for this analysis. 6    Please see Calvo et. al.’s ‘Decreasing Ore Grades in Global Metallic Mining: A Theoretical Issue or a Global Reality?’ published in 2016 for this analysis. 7     Please see Azadi et. al.’s ‘Transparency on greenhouse gas emissions from mining to enable climate change mitigation’ published in 2020 for this analysis. 8    Please see John Kemp's Column: CO2 emission limits and economic development published 19 April 2021 by reuters.com.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

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Highlights The US fiscal outlook has deteriorated substantially over the past two decades, as a consequence of the fiscal response to both the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. US government debt-to-GDP is now nearly as high as it was at the end of the Second World War, and is projected by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to explode higher over the coming 30 years. Some investors argue that extreme levels of government debt now virtually guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, and we test this claim alongside a scenario that limits the projected rise in the primary deficit. We find that US fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will likely be negative for health care stocks. We also note that even in a scenario where the US limits the size of its future primary budget deficit, net interest outlays will likely rise to elevated levels compared to history. A comparison with the Canadian experience in the 1990s suggests a structurally negative outlook for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point. Finally, we note that the US fiscal outlook does not necessarily prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in a scenario where investors raise their expectations for the neutral rate of interest, a possibility that we discussed in last month’s report. This scenario is not our base case view, but it is plausible and should actively be monitored by investors over the coming one to two years. For now, we do not expect that rising interest rates pose a risk to stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Investors should remain cyclically overweight equities within a multi-asset portfolio, and should maintain a below-benchmark level of duration on a risk-adjusted basis. In 2001, US government debt held by the public as a share of GDP stood at 31.5%, after having fallen roughly 16 percentage points from early 1993 levels. Today, as a result of both the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, the debt to GDP ratio has risen to a whopping 100%, and is projected to rise meaningfully higher over the coming decades. Feature In this report we review the long-term US fiscal outlook in the wake of the pandemic, with a focus on the implications for interest rates. Some investors argue that extreme levels of government debt now virtually guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, and we test this claim alongside a scenario that limits the projected rise in the primary deficit. We find that US fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will likely be negative for health care stocks, whose fundamental performance has outstripped that of the broad equity market since the mid-1990s (reflecting pricing power that stands to be curtailed through regulation). We also note that even in a scenario where the US limits the size of its future primary budget deficit, net interest outlays will likely rise to elevated levels compared to history. A comparison with the Canadian experience in the 1990s suggests a structurally negative outlook for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point. Finally, we note that the US fiscal outlook does not necessarily prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in the hypothetical scenario that we described in last month’s report,1 i.e., an environment where the narrative of secular stagnation is challenged and investor expectations for the neutral rate rise closer to trend rates of economic growth. This scenario is not our base case view, but it is plausible and should actively be monitored by investors over the coming one to two years. For now, investors should remain cyclically overweight equities within a multi-asset portfolio, and should maintain a below-benchmark level of duration on a risk-adjusted basis. Debt Sustainability, And The CBO’s Baseline Projection When analyzing the US fiscal outlook, the Congressional Budget Office’s Long-Term Budget Outlook report is typically the reference point for investors. The report provides annual projections for the budget deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio for the next three decades, as well as a breakdown of the projected deficit into its primary (i.e., non-interest) and net interest components. Charts II-1 and II-2 present the most recent baseline projections from the CBO, which clearly present a dire long-term outlook. The deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio are projected to be relatively stable over the next decade, but explode higher over the subsequent 20 years. In 2051, the CBO’s baseline projects that the budget deficit will be roughly 13% of GDP, with net interest costs accounting for approximately two-thirds of the deficit. Chart II-1The CBO’s Fiscal Outlook Is Extremely Negative Chart II-2In 2051, The CBO Projects A 13% Annual Budget Deficit In order to understand what is driving the CBO’s dire long-term budget and debt forecast, it is important to review the government debt sustainability equation shown below. The equation highlights that the change in a government’s debt-to-GDP ratio is approximately equal to 1) the primary deficit plus 2) net interest costs as a share of GDP, the latter being defined as the product of last year’s debt-to-GDP ratio and the difference between the average interest rate on the debt and the rate of GDP growth. Δ Debt-To-GDP Ratio ≈ Primary Deficit As A % Of GDP2 + (r-g)*(Prior Period Debt-To-GDP Ratio) Where: r = Average interest rate on government debt and g = Nominal GDP growth The equation highlights that expectations of a persistently rising debt-to-GDP ratio must occur either because of expectations of a persistent primary deficit, or expectations that interest rates will persistently exceed the rate of economic growth (or some combination of the two). This underscores why debt sustainability analysis often focuses on the primary budget balance, as a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio will be stable if no primary deficit exists and interest costs are at or below the prevailing rate of economic growth. Chart II-3 illustrates the source of the CBO’s projected rise in debt-to-GDP beyond 2031, by presenting the two components of the debt sustainability equation alongside the projected annual change in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The chart makes it clear that while the CBO is forecasting a sizeable primary deficit to continue, it is projected to grow at a slower pace than the debt-to-GDP ratio itself. The increasing rate at which the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to grow in the latter years of the CBO’s forecast period is clearly driven by the interest rate component, meaning that “r” is projected to be greater than “g”. Chart II-4 presents this point directly, by highlighting that the CBO is forecasting the average interest rate on government debt to exceed that of nominal GDP growth in 2038, and to continue to exceed growth (by an increasing amount) thereafter. Chart II-3Decomposing The CBO's Projected Change In The Debt-To-GDP Ratio Chart II-4The CBO's Projections Rest, In Part, On Rates Eventually Exceeding Growth   Three Adjustments To The CBO’s Baseline We make three adjustments to the CBO’s baseline in order to assess how the US fiscal outlook shifts under an interest rate path that is different than that projected by the CBO. First, we adjust the CBO’s projected budget deficit over the coming few years based on deficit forecasts from our US Political Strategy service following the passage of the American Recovery Plan act.3 Chart II-5We Test The Effect Of An Initially Higher, But More Sustainable, Rate Path Next, we adjust the interest component of the total budget deficit based on a new path for short- and long-term interest rates that models a scenario in which the neutral rate of interest rises to, but not above, GDP growth (Chart II-5). In last month’s report we outlined a scenario in which this could feasibly occur,1 and the hypothetical path for interest rates shown in Chart II-5 thus incorporates both the negative budgetary impact of an earlier rise in interest rates and the positive budgetary impact of “r” never rising above “g”. We explicitly exclude any crowding out effect on long-term interest rates, based on the view that term premia are likely to remain muted in a world of low potential economic growth, unless a fiscal crisis appears to be imminent (see Box II-1). Box II-1 Arguing Against The CBO’s Crowding Out Assumption The CBO’s projection that interest rates will ultimately rise above the rate of economic growth rests on the view that increased government spending will absorb savings that would otherwise finance private investment (a “crowding out” effect). We agree that crowding out can occur over the course of the business cycle, especially in a scenario where increased government spending pushes output above its potential (creating a cyclical acceleration in inflation and eventually an increase in interest rates). But the CBO is assuming that high government debt-to-GDP ratios will crowd out private investment on a structural basis, and on this basis we disagree. First, Chart Box II-1 highlights that there is essentially no empirical relationship across countries between a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio and its long-term government bond yield. Japan is a clear outlier in the chart, but including Japan implies that the relationship is negative, not positive. Chart Box II-1There Is No Empirical Relationship Between Debt-To-GDP And Interest Rates In addition, given that central banks directly control interest rates at the short-end of the curve, a structural crowding out effect can only manifest itself in the form of an elevated term premium embedded in longer-term government bond yields. Our bet is that term premia are likely to stay low in a world of low falling nominal growth, as evidenced by the experience of the past decade.4 Finally, we model the impact of two changes, beginning in 2031, that would work towards reducing the primary deficit: an increase in average government revenue to 20% of GDP (its peak level reached in 2000), and a slower pace of increase on major health care program spending. Despite the fact that population aging will increase mandatory spending on social security and health care over the coming three decades, the CBO has highlighted that the majority of the increase in spending towards these programs is projected to occur due to rising health care costs per person (Chart II-6). We thus model the impact of medical care cost control by limiting the rise in net mandatory outlays on health care programs between 2021 and 2051 to roughly half of what the CBO baseline projects. This adjustment does not prevent mandatory spending on health care programs from rising, given the strong political challenges involved in limiting spending increases that are caused by an aging population. Chart II-6The US Structural Primary Balance Is Heavily Impacted By Medical Costs Charts II-7 and II-8 illustrate how these three adjustments impact the long-term US fiscal outlook. Relative to the CBO’s baseline projections, the American Recovery Plan (ARP) budget deficit forecasts from our US Political Strategy service imply that the debt-to-GDP ratio will be approximately three to four percentage points higher over the very near term, and roughly ten points higher over the long term. Chart II-7Even With Higher Rates, The Fiscal Outlook Is Meaningfully Less Bad… Relative to this new baseline, an increase in interest rates to, but not above, the projected rate of nominal economic growth increases the debt-to-GDP ratio by an additional ten percentage points (20 points higher versus the CBO’s baseline) in the middle of the forecast period, but it lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio over the longer run by eliminating the effect of outsized interest rates magnifying a persistent primary deficit. Still, the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise to a whopping 207% of GDP by 2051 in this scenario, with a budget deficit in excess of 10% of GDP. The third adjustment shown in Charts II-7 and II-8 underscores the impact on the US fiscal outlook of actions aimed at reducing the primary deficit. Increases in government revenue and the prevention of rising health care costs per person results in the debt-to-GDP ratio that is 64 percentage points lower in 2051 than in our normalized interest rate scenario. The budget deficit in this scenario still increases to approximately 6% of GDP thirty years from today, but in this case most of the deficit is due to the net interest component rather than the primary deficit, meaning that the debt-to-GDP ratio would be increasing at a much slower rate if interest rates were no higher than the rate of economic growth. Chart II-8 highlights that net interest spending in this scenario would rise to 4.5% of GDP, which would be meaningfully higher than the prior high of roughly 3% in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Chart II-8...With Higher Taxes And Medical Cost Control Chart II-9A Meaningful, But Not Unprecedented, Rise In Net Interest Outlays But that is far from unprecedented or necessarily consistent with a fiscal crisis. Chart II-9 also shows that Canada’s public debt charges rose to 6.5% of GDP in the early 1990s without triggering a public debt crisis. It is true that Canada subsequently embarked on a painful fiscal consolidation program in order to reduce its public debt burden, but this, in part, occurred because of a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit of approximately 3% - twice as large as that projected for the US in 2051 in our adjusted scenario shown in Charts II-7 and II-8. Revenue And Health Care Cost Reform Our third adjustment to the CBO’s long-term budget outlook involved changes to revenue and health care cost control to reduce the US’ projected primary deficit. Are these adjustments achievable? In our view, the answer is yes: As noted above, our scenario modeled these changes taking place a decade from today, which allows for policymakers and stakeholders to have a substantial amount of time to act and adjust to these changes. On the revenue front, we noted above that US government revenue has reached 20% of GDP in the past, in the year 2000. Chart II-10 highlights that while raising taxes will likely reduce US competitiveness, the US maintains a sizeable tax advantage relative to other advanced economies, and that this was true prior to the tax cuts that took place under the Trump administration. On the health care cost front, Chart II-11 highlights that US healthcare expenditure is much larger as a share of GDP than other countries, which was not the case prior to the 1980s. Chart II-12 highlights that this cost difference is entirely due to inpatient (i.e., hospital) and outpatient (i.e., drug) costs. While it is not clear what form it will take, it seems likely that future reforms by policymakers to eliminate rising health care costs per person will occur and can be achieved. Chart II-10The US Government Can Afford To Raise Revenue Chart II-11The US Spends Much More On Health Care Than Other Countries   Chart II-12The US Significantly Outspends The World On Hospital And Drug Costs The key point for investors is not whether these changes should or should not occur, but whether there are any feasible scenarios in which spiraling government debt and interest payments are avoided without the Fed purposely maintaining monetary policy at levels persistently below the rate of economic growth – and thus risking major inflationary pressure. Our analysis above highlights that there are; the question is when policymakers will choose to act and in what form. A potential tipping point may be when US government spending on net interest as a % of GDP exceeds its prior high, which occurs in 2026 in the scenario modeled in Chart II-8. In a scenario where reforms fail to materialize or where financial markets force policymakers to act, a fiscal risk premium could certainly emerge in longer-term government bond yields, which could lead the Fed to maintain lower short-term interest rates than it otherwise would. But this scenario is only likely to emerge after interest rates converge towards rates of economic growth, as US government debt will remain highly serviceable for some time if "r" remains meaningfully lower than "g". Investment Conclusions There are three potential investment implications of our research. First, the fact that rising medical costs have such a significant impact on the CBO’s projections of the primary deficit implies that fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will be negative for US health care stocks. Chart II-13 highlights that US health care sector earnings have outperformed broad market earnings since the mid-1990s, and that the sector has consistently delivered an above-average return on equity. This historical performance likely reflects the sector’s pricing power, which stand to be curtailed through regulatory efforts in a world where rising health care costs per person collide with fiscal belt-tightening. Interestingly, Chart II-12 highlighted that US per capita spending on medical goods is not significantly higher than in other developed markets, suggesting that the health care equipment & supplies industry may fare better over a very long term time horizon than overall health care. Second, Charts II-7 and II-8 highlighted that even if the US does raise revenue as a share of GDP and limits excessive growth in medical costs, a primary deficit will still exist and net interest outlays will still rise to elevated levels compared to what has historically been the case. We noted that Canada experienced a higher public debt burden in the 1990s and did not suffer from a fiscal crisis, but Chart II-14 highlights that the fiscal situation did weigh on the Canadian dollar, which progressively traded 10-20% below its PPP-implied fair value level over the course of the 1990s. Thus, the implication is that eventual fiscal reform in the US may be structurally negative for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point (panels 3 and 4 of Chart II-14). Chart II-13Eventual Fiscal Reform Will Likely Be Negative For Health Care Stocks Chart II-14The US Fiscal Outlook, Even With Some Reforms, Is Dollar-Negative   Finally, our scenario analysis highlights that very elevated levels of government debt do not guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, especially over the next decade when the US primary deficit is projected to remain relatively stable. For investors focused on forecasting the direction of 10-year Treasury yields from the perspective of valuation, it should be noted that the next decade is the relevant projection period for the Fed funds rate, not what occurs to net interest outlays in the two decades that follow. Over the very long run, it is true that there may ultimately be very strong political pressure on the Fed to keep interest rates below the prevailing rate of economic growth, as policymakers in 2030 will be able to avoid a structural adjustment to the primary deficit of roughly 1.1-1.3% of GDP for every percentage point that average interest rates on government debt are below nominal GDP growth. However, we noted above that this pressure is unlikely to build before the second half of this decade even in a scenario where interest rates rise significantly over the coming few years, and it remains an open questions whether the Fed will acquiesce to this pressure given its strong potential to fuel excess private sector leveraging. Over the coming one to two years, the key conclusion is that the US fiscal outlook is not likely to prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in the hypothetical scenario that we described in last month’s report, i.e., an environment where the narrative of secular stagnation is challenged and investor expectations for the neutral rate rise closer to trend rates of economic growth. This remains a risk to our overweight stance towards risky assets and is not our base case view. But it does highlight the importance of monitoring long-dated rate expectations over the coming year, and argues, on a risk-adjusted basis, for a below-neutral duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks," dated March 31, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Presented in this fashion, a budget deficit (surplus) is recorded with a positive (negative) sign. 3 For more information, please see US Political Strategy report “Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda,” dated April 1, 2021, available at usp.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see “Term premia: models and some stylised facts”, by Cohen, Hördahl, and Xia, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2008.

Highlights Clients countered our opinion that China’s economy has reached its cyclical peak. However, we have already incorporated the supporting facts into our analysis so they will not alter our cyclical outlook for the economy. The favorable external backdrop is a potential downside risk to China’s domestic economy, because the country’s pain threshold for reform is often positively correlated with global growth. We agree that an acceleration in local governments’ special-purpose bond issuance could boost infrastructure investment in the next six months, but we are skeptical about the magnitude of such support. China’s onshore and offshore stock markets remain firmly in a risk-off mode. For now, we recommend investors stay on the sidelines until some of the early indicators turn more bullish. Feature We spent the past week hosting virtual meetings with BCA’s clients in Europe and Asia. We presented our view that China’s economic recovery has likely peaked and escalating risks of a policy overtightening warrant an underweight position on Chinese stocks for the next six months. Most clients shared our concern that policymakers may keep financial and industry regulations more restrictive than the market is currently pricing in, leading to more downside surprises to risk asset prices. Clients also brought up a few opposing views which challenged our analytical framework. In this and next week’s reports we will highlight some of the counterpoints we discussed in these meetings. Interestingly, most of our clients - even ones who are more sanguine about China’s economic outlook - prefer to wait on the sidelines before jumping back into China’s equity market. They foresee sustained volatility in the coming months as the market continues to struggle between digesting high valuations and adjusting expectations for future earnings growth. Has China’s Economic Recovery Reached An Apex? The primary discussion centered around whether the strength in China’s economy has reached a cyclical peak. Q1 GDP points to slower sequential economic momentum from Q4 last year (Chart 1). Some of the high-frequency economic data also indicate that economic activity peaked in Q4 last year (Chart 2).  Chart 1Q1 Sequential Growth Was The Slowest In A Decade Chart 2Has Economic Activity Peaked? Chart 3Our Framework Suggests A Slower Growth Momentum Ahead The view fits perfectly into our analytical framework, which has worked well in the past decade. Historically, China’s credit formation has consistently led economic activity by about six to nine months. A turning point in the credit impulse occurred last October, which suggests that economic activity should start to slow in Q2 this year (Chart 3). However, our clients countered with the following arguments, which support a notion that sequential economic growth rate can still trend higher in the next six months: Aggregate demand in Europe and the US continues to improve, while the COVID-19 resurgence in major emerging economies, such as India and Brazil, has forced their production recoveries to pause. Thus, China’s exports will remain robust and should continue to make substantial contributions to the economy (Chart 4). Infrastructure spending could get a meaningful boost when local governments speed up issuing special-purpose bonds (SPB) in Q2 and Q3. Infrastructure investment growth was relatively weak in Q1, probably the result of a slower pace in credit growth and government expenditures (Chart 5). However, a delay in local government SPB issuance in Q1 this year means more support for infrastructure investment in the rest of the year (Chart 6). Chart 4Counterpoint #1: Chinese Exports Will Stay Strong   Chart 5Slower Credit Growth Led To A Subdued Q1 Infrastructure Investment Growth     Travel restrictions imposed during the Chinese New Year weighed heavily on the service sector in Q1 (Chart 7). If China’s domestic COVID-19 cases remain well controlled, then the trend could reverse and the pent-up demand for service consumption may usher in a significant improvement in Q2 when three major public holidays occur. The service sector accounts for more than half of China’s GDP, therefore, an improvement in this sector should significantly bolster future GDP growth. Chart 6Counterpoint #2: More LG SPBs, More Spending On Infrastructure Chart 7Counterpoint #3: Service Sector Activities Will Pick Up Our Analytical Framework The viewpoints expressed by clients have not changed our cyclical view of China’s economy, since our broad analysis of Chinese business cycle already incorporates the main points that clients raised. Additionally, data such as GDP growth figures are coincident and lagging indicators, and do not explain the direction of forward-looking financial markets. The authorities will shift their policy trajectories only if the data significantly deviate from expectations. We view Q1 GDP and underlying data broadly in line with Chinese leadership’s short- and medium-term economic growth targets and, therefore, will not lead to any policy adjustment. Chart 8If Demand For Chinese Exports Stays Strong, Reform Efforts Will Intensify To our clients’ point that strong exports ahead will support China’s overall GDP growth, we regard a favorable external backdrop as a potential downside risk to the domestic economy. The willingness of Chinese authorities to pursue painful reforms is often positively correlated with global growth (Chart 8). BCA has written extensively about how China has taken advantage of a stronger export sector by increasing the pace of domestic reforms and in the past has embarked on a multi-year reform plan that weighed on growth. At the beginning of this year, Chinese policymakers were set out to “keep credit growth in line with nominal GDP growth in 2021.” Nonetheless, policymakers’ targets for credit and nominal GDP growth rates could change during the year, contingent on their perception of the broad growth outlook and unemployment. Chart 9Both Credit And Economic Growth Rates Are Moving Targets And Subject To Policy Finetuning Even if policymakers keep the country’s leverage ratio steady in 2021, which is our base case view and assuming China’s nominal GDP grows by 11%, then the credit impulse (measured by the 12-month difference in total social financing as a percentage of GDP) will likely fall to about 28% of GDP, down from 32% of GDP in 2020 (Chart 9).  The rate of credit formation increased by 13.6% in the first three months from Q1 last year, above government’s target. We expect a further pullback in credit growth in the rest of the year, to bring the annual pace at or below 12%. Construction capex, which is sensitive to both credit creation and tightening regulations in the housing sector, will likely experience a slowdown. At more than 90% of GDP, China’s economy is mainly driven by domestic demand and a weakening in the domestic economy can more than offset positive contributions from a robust export sector. Infrastructure And Services We expect infrastructure investment will grow by 4-5% this year, which is in line with its rate of expansion in 2020. However, the sequential growth in the sector in Q2 – Q4 this year will be slower than during the same period in 2020 (Chart 10). We agree that a more concentrated issuance of local government SPBs in Q2 and Q3 could help to buttress infrastructure investment. However, SPBs made up only about 15% of overall infrastructure spending in the past three years, so we are dubious that SPBs can provide the crucial support. The rest of the gap for local governments to finance their spending on infrastructure projects will need to be filled through public-private partnerships (PPP) financing, government-managed funds’ (GMFs) revenues, government budgets and bank loans. Note that only non-household medium- and long-term (MLT) bank lending showed a positive impulse so far (Chart 11). While not all of MLT loans are used for infrastructure, they have a positive correlation with investments in infrastructure projects which are generally long term in nature. Chart 10Sequential Growth In Infrastructure Investment Will Be Slower Than In Q2 – Q4 Last Year Chart 11MLT Bank Loans Have Been Supportive To Infrastructure Spending... On the other hand, the contribution of PPPs to total infrastructure spending has been plunging in recent years due to tighter regulations aimed at controlling increased risks related to local government debt (Chart 12). Depressed revenues from land sales and extended corporate tax cuts this year will also curb the ability of local governments to finance infrastructure projects (Chart 13). Chart 12...But Public-Private Partnerships Have Become Too Small To Fill The Financing Gap Chart 13Government-Managed Funds Also Face Headwinds From Falling Land Sales Finally, although the service sector accounts for 54% of China’s GDP (2019 statistic), transport, retail and accommodation, which were hardest hit by COVID-19, accounted for less than 30% of China’s tertiary GDP. This compares with a slightly larger share of tertiary GDP from finance- and housing-related sectors (financial intermediation, leasing & business services, and real estate) –the sectors that have been thriving since the second half of last year when both the equity and housing markets boomed (Chart 14). Nonetheless, it is unreasonable to expect these areas to strengthen even more in an environment where the policy has shifted to contain risks in the financial and housing arenas. The net result to tertiary GDP growth is that the deterioration in finance- and real estate-related segments will likely offset an improvement in transport, retail and accommodation. Chart 14More Than 70% Of China’s Services Sector Is Finance And Real Estate Related Investment Conclusions The ultimate question we got from almost every client meeting was: What would make us turn bullish on Chinese stocks in the next 6 to 12 months?  Chart 15Changes In Domestic Policy Dominate Chinese Stock Performance Since most monthly and quarterly economic data do not provide enough market-moving catalysts, we rely on our assessment of the changes in policy direction, such as interbank liquidity conditions and excess reserves, in addition to overall credit growth (Chart 15). We will also continue to watch for the following signs before upgrading our tactical and cyclical calls from underweight to overweight: Chart 16 shows that cyclical stocks remain depressed relative to defensives in both onshore and offshore markets, underscoring investors’ concerns about China’s economy. A breakout in cyclicals versus defensives would signify a major improvement in investor sentiment towards policy support and economic growth. A technical breakdown in the performance of healthcare and utility stocks relative to investable stocks would be another bullish indicator (Chart 17). These equities have historically led China’s economic activity, core inflation and stock prices by one to three months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would signify that market participants anticipate a meaningful economic upturn in China.   Chart 16Waiting For A Telltale Sign... Chart 17...Before Upgrading Chinese Stocks   Given that the above mentioned indicators remain firmly in a risk-off mode, we maintain our view that China’s economy has reached its peak, and policy has tightened meaningfully. Our cyclical underweight position on Chinese stocks, in both absolute terms and within a global portfolio, is warranted.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The backdrop for global high-yield corporates remains positive, and a rebound in global GDP and earnings will help ease leverage and interest coverage concerns. With improving global growth taking over the reins from central bank liquidity as the primary driver of high-yield returns, we have decided to reassess the sources of value using some of our key indicators for junk bonds in the US and Europe. The US and euro area appear fairly evenly matched on our valuation metrics but euro area high-yield still offers good value on an absolute basis. We are therefore increasing our recommended allocation to overweight, matching our similar stance for US high-yield. Within the euro area, stay up in quality, favoring Ba-rated credit. Retail and consumer products are attractive bounce-back sectors as Europe emerges from lockdowns later this year. Feature Chart of the WeekCentral Bank Liquidity Has Driven High Yield Outperformance The past year has been excellent for global high-yield corporate bonds. Unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus in response to the COVID-19 economic shock and market rout helped rapidly lower credit spreads in the final three quarters of 2020. As the vaccine rollout picked up pace and the reopening trade began to dominate earlier this year, high-yield corporates continued to perform well despite defaults hitting a post-2008 high (Chart of the Week). An improving outlook for the global economy is highly supportive for lower-rated corporate debt from a fundamental perspective, even if that same pickup in growth will put pressure on policymakers to dial back monetary accommodation. Already, growth in major central bank balance sheets – a reliable leading indicator of high yield outperformance – is slowing, with corporate spreads approaching historically tight levels. Thus, we feel it is timely to assess valuation metrics in the largest high-yield markets of the US and Europe – and the implications for regional high-yield allocations - as economic growth takes over the reins from central bank liquidity as the primary driver of spread product performance. A Cyclical Reduction In Corporate Credit Risk In its recently published Global Financial Stability Report,1 the IMF noted that the COVID-19 shock has pushed up global nonfinancial corporate leverage, measured as debt relative to GDP, to historical highs (Chart 2). Some of that rise is due to companies ramping up debt issuance over the past year in response to supportive monetary policy and favorable financial market conditions. Yet according to the IMF, about half of the rise in global corporate debt-to-GDP ratios from Q4/2019 to Q3/2020 was attributable to sharply lower output. Now, with economic growth set to stage a strong rebound this year – the IMF is forecasting global real GDP growth of 6.0% in 2021 and 4.4% in 2022 - a rising denominator should result in corporate debt-to-GDP ratios stabilizing or even falling over the next couple of years. This will help maintain a positive backdrop for corporate spread product, even if central banks like the Fed turn less dovish later this year, as we expect Corporate interest coverage, using the Refinitiv Datastream bottom-up aggregates of individual company data, paints a similar cyclical picture (Chart 3). The absolute level of coverage ratios fell sharply in 2020, accelerating pre-pandemic downtrends that had already been in place in both the US and Europe. Since Q4/2019, however, interest expense actually fell very slightly in the US, meaning that of the 1.5 point fall in the interest coverage ratio, 1.3 points can be attributed to declining corporate earnings over that period. The picture was also lopsided in the euro area, with 2.5 points of the 2.8 point decline in interest coverage over that same period attributable to falling profits. Chart 2Rising Leverage Is Not Just A Debt Story Chart 3Falling Earnings Are Responsible For The Decline In Interest Coverage Rapid improvements in economic growth momentum, fueled by reopening economies and increased fiscal stimulus (especially in the US), should lead to a cyclical rebound interest coverage ratios in both the US and Europe in 2021 and 2022. Bottom Line: The backdrop for global high yield corporates remains positive, and a rebound in global GDP and earnings will help ease leverage and interest coverage concerns. A Trans-Atlantic Comparison Of High-Yield Bond Valuations Chart 4Our Relative Overweight On US HY Has Been A Success Since March of last year, we have maintained a recommended overweight stance on US high-yield versus European equivalents (Chart 4). That was originally a relative central bank play with the Fed including US high-yield in its corporate bond buying program, in contrast to the ECB that was only buying investment grade debt. Our relative regional allocation on high-yield corporates has worked out well, with the US outperforming the euro area by 3.9 percentage points (in excess return terms versus duration-matched government debt) since the pandemic peak in credit spreads last March. Today, with high-yield spreads back near historical tight levels and the momentum of excess returns starting to peak, a forward-looking reevaluation of our US versus Europe high-yield recommendation along value grounds is in order. To conduct our reassessment of value, we look at five key areas: default-adjusted spreads; 12-month breakeven spreads; volatility-adjusted spreads; credit quality curves; and, lastly, the relative carry offered by high-yield corporates in currency-hedged and unhedged terms. Default-Adjusted Spreads As discussed earlier in the report, fiscal and monetary support have helped stave off the worst for high-yield corporates on both sides of the Atlantic, with default rates spiking far less than the amount implied by the collapse in year-over-year GDP growth (Chart 5). Forecasts for 2021 are sanguine—Moody’s expects the trailing 12-month high yield default rate to reach 4.2% in the US and 2.6% in the euro area in 2021, in line with the IMF’s sharp upward revision to growth forecasts for both regions. The outlook for default-adjusted spreads, which look at the index option-adjusted spread (OAS) net of realized default losses, is much more positive in the euro area however, given that they have a much more attractive “starting point”. The realized default-adjusted spread in the euro area was already inching into positive territory last year, as opposed to the deeply negative spread in the US (Chart 6). This alone makes it much more likely that euro area high-yield will deliver a positive return net of default losses. Chart 5The Default Picture Is Expected To Improve Chart 6Euro Area Spreads Are More Attractive On A Default-Adjusted Basis In addition, the potential range for default-adjusted spreads (combining default rates and recovery rates, see the shaded boxes in the chart) is much narrower in the euro area given the lower post-crisis volatility in default rates in that region, making outcomes in the euro area far less uncertain than in the US. Volatility-Adjusted Spreads Chart 7Falling US Spreads Have Overshot The Level Implied By Equity Volatility Another way to evaluate the attractiveness of the level of spreads, and how much further they could fall, is to compare them to standard macro volatility gauges like the US VIX and the European VSTOXX indices. Credit spreads and equity volatility are highly correlated, as both are measures of investor uncertainty that rise during risk-off episodes and vice versa. The ratio of corporate credit spreads to equity volatility, therefore, can signal if spreads appear stretched relative to the broader risk backdrop. The global rally in riskier credit has helped push down volatility-adjusted spreads for both regions, making them expensive relative to the historic mean (Chart 7). However, the divergence between volatility and high-yield spreads is much more pronounced in the US, where the volatility-adjusted spread, currently at all-time lows and 1.8 standard deviations below the mean, appears much less attractive. In contrast, while the euro area measure is still within one standard deviation of the mean and has room to fall further, as it did in 2007. 12-Month Breakeven Spreads To look at valuations in high yield corporates relative to history, we turn to our 12-month breakeven spread metrics. These measure how much spread widening is required over a one-year horizon to eliminate the yield advantage of owning corporate bonds versus a duration-matched position in government debt. We then show those breakeven spreads as a percentile ranking versus its own history, to allow comparisons over periods with differing underlying spread volatility. On this basis, there seems to be a bit more value in US high-yield spreads, with the 12-month breakeven at the 32nd percentile compared to the 18th percentile ranking for European high-yield. Both markets are not cheap on this metric, though, with the lion’s share of cyclical spread compression having already been realized (Chart 8). This additional value in the US is concentrated in the lower-quality tiers, with B-rated US HY looking most attractive (Chart 9). Chart 8US And Euro Area High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Chart 9All Credit Tier Breakeven Valuations Are In the Bottom Half Relative To History Credit Quality Curves To further inform our decision on value across credit tiers in the US and Europe, we look at credit quality curves, which measure the incremental spread pick-up earned from moving down to lower credit tiers. For example, we look at the spread differential between B-rated and Ba-rated high-yield bonds within the US or Europe. When making the comparisons, we adjust the spreads to account for duration differences between credit tier sub-indices and the overall regional high-yield index. This adjusts for slightly lower index durations as we move down in quality.2 Our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy have pointed out that the spread pickup earned from moving out of US Baa-rated bonds into Ba-rated bonds is elevated compared to typical historical levels.3 Credit quality curves in the euro area tell a similar story (Chart 10). The spread pickup from moving into Ba-rated credit is slightly higher in the euro area on a cross-country basis while there is a more attractive pickup in the US from moving further down in quality. Chart 10US & European HY Credit Quality Curves Chart 11Euro Area Caa-Rated Spreads Have Room To Fall To Pre-COVID Lows As quality curves have compressed across the board, we can also use the pre-COVID lows in these series as an anchor for how much more narrowing we could see (Chart 11). On that basis, there seems to be a bit more value left in the top two tiers of US high yield while there is more juice left in the euro area Caa-rated minus B-rated spread. The Caa-B spread differential is now quite expensive for the US, sitting -140bps below its pre-COVID low, a reflection of yield-chasing behavior by risk-seeking investors in an easy monetary policy environment. As the Fed begins to take its foot off the monetary accelerator within the next 6-12 months, as we expect, this credit tier is also most vulnerable to a repricing of default risk. Index Yield-To-Maturity Chart 12Junk Index Yields At All Time Lows The hunt for yield by fixed income investors has driven down the index yield on lower-quality credit to all-time lows in both the US and euro area (Chart 12). This dynamic has played out at a time when falling interest rate differentials between the two regions have cut down the cost of hedging US dollar (USD) exposures into euros (or, alternatively, reduced the gain from hedging euro exposures into USD). Importantly, this reduction in the gains/losses from currency hedging allows for a more honest assessment of the relative attractiveness of yields on lower-rated corporates in the US and Europe, reflecting compensation for taking credit risk rather than currency risk. With the backdrop for spread product looking positive, it is worth considering the simple carry over a twelve-month period for holding high-yield debt, in both USD-hedged and unhedged terms (Chart 13). For the overall index and the Ba-rated tier, the US dominates completely, with investors in the euro area better off holding US credit even after paying the currency hedging cost. This dynamic is flipped at the B- and Caa-rated tiers, with euro area credit appearing dominant. Chart 13US Ba-Rated Debt Is Dominant On A Carry Basis An Additional Point On High-Yield Sectors Sector composition will also be an important driver of high-yield returns going forward. In the April 2021 Global Financial Stability report, the IMF noted that global high-yield defaults in 2020 were concentrated in sectors most affected by the pandemic. On a relative basis, the US high-yield index appears more heavily weighted towards those sectors – a picture that becomes even more focused if Energy, which is the largest industry group in US high-yield, is considered as a pandemic-stricken industry (Chart 14). However, the euro area does have a slightly larger tilt towards the hard-hit Retail sector. Chart 14Oil And Gas Was Hardest-Hit In 2020 An important implication is that the sectors that suffered the most in 2020 are also the ones most poised for a snapback this year as economies reopen and growth recovers. One way to approach this from a relative valuation perspective is to look at the relative industry-level cross-country spreads between the US and Europe, compared to the change in global defaults by sector from 2019 to 2020 (Chart 15). Chart 15Sectors That Saw Rising Defaults In 2020 Are Poised For A Rebound Sectors that saw a moderate-to-high number of defaults last year, such as Retail and Consumer products, offer higher spreads in the euro area. These will also be the sectors to benefit the most from a consumption rebound as Europe exits lockdowns. On the other hand, US spreads are more attractive than European spreads for the Media and Transportation sectors that saw a big increase in defaults in 2020. Importantly, while the US Energy sector also looks more relatively attractive on that basis, much of a post-COVID recovery has already been priced in, with US high-yield energy spreads below pre-pandemic lows. Investment Conclusions Having looked at our suite of valuation metrics, euro area and US high-yield appear quite evenly matched. On a default and volatility-adjusted basis, spreads in the euro area appear to offer more value while US high-yield largely wins out on a breakeven spread and carry basis. Thus, the case for favoring US high-yield over European equivalents is no longer as compelling as it has been for much of the past twelve months. We are therefore taking profits on our long-held recommended overweight stance on US high-yield versus European high-yield. We are implementing this change by upgrading our strategic euro area high yield allocation to overweight (4 out of 5), which matches our similar overweight recommended tilt for US high-yield (see table on page 15). Within our model bond portfolio, we are “funding” that upgrade by reducing the size of our recommended overweight exposure to core European sovereign debt in Germany and France (see the model bond portfolio tables on pages 13-14). On the margin, this decision also positions us favorably with regards to the consumption driven H2/2021 recovery in euro area economies highlighted by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy.4 Within European credit, we recommend staying up in quality, favoring the Ba-rated tier as lower quality tranches do not offer adequate compensation for the increased credit risk. Bottom Line: Rebounding global growth will help maintain a favorable backdrop for global high yield credit. The US and euro area look evenly matched on our valuation metrics, but there is still good value on offer in the euro area on an absolute basis. Increase allocations to euro area high-yield, favoring the Ba-rated credit tier and Retail and Consumer Products industries, in particular. Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2021/04/06/global-financial-stability-report-april-2021 2 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Report, "Ba- Rated Bonds Look Best", dated February 9, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Note that this adjustment is made to facilitate more accurate comparisons within the credit tiers of the high-yield universe. No such adjustment is made to the Baa-rated credit spread, which is higher-quality investment grade and therefore not part of the high-yield universe. 4 Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Special Report, "A Temporary Decoupling", dated April 5, 2021, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

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Highlights President Biden’s proposal to raise the capital gains tax rate from 20% to 43.4% is part of the American Families Plan, which at best has a 50% chance of passing before the 2022 midterm election. Biden will soon present the full outline of this $1 trillion bill. The legislative priority is the American Jobs Plan with infrastructure spending and corporate tax hikes. This bill has an 80% chance of passing by Christmas. If it passes by end of July, then the odds of passing the American Families Plan prior to the midterm will shoot up. But we expect it to take to November, which could render the families plan (and capital gains tax) a campaign issue for 2022. Republicans are much more likely to vote for infrastructure spending than tax hikes. Traditional infrastructure can be separated into a bipartisan bill with Republicans and passed along with a renewed highway authorization by September. This creates an alternate avenue for infrastructure. Democrats would still pass the rest of Biden’s American Jobs Plan via reconciliation, including corporate tax hikes, which will only be watered down a bit. We reiterate our recommendations in favor of the BCA Infrastructure Basket and the Biden Fiscal Advantage Equity Basket. Given the eight-year span of the US infrastructure proposals, we recommend a cyclical and structural overweight for these baskets. Feature President Joe Biden’s $2.3 trillion American Jobs Plan is shifting from the initial phase – “coordinated policy rollout” and media cheerleading – to the drawn-out process of congressional negotiation and voting. None of our core views on the bill have changed: we expect the bill to pass before the end of the year and to be similar to what Biden has proposed on both corporate tax hikes and spending. Some spending proposals can be offloaded, some tax hikes can be watered down, but the gist of the bill is known to investors. Scares over Biden’s proposed capital gains tax hike are premature as this bill must pass before Congress can turn to Biden’s second plan and individual tax hikes. In this special report with BCA’s US Equity Strategy, we update the status of the bill and then take a closer look at our BCA Infrastructure Basket. We recommend investors stick to this trade over a structural time horizon of 12 months-plus. Biden’s Bill Will Pass – Bipartisanship Is Possible But Separate Biden’s infrastructure plan will pass on a party-line vote through budget reconciliation. Republicans will reject tax increases; Democrats will muster all 50 of their caucus votes plus Vice President Kamala Harris. Procedurally, reconciliation has been cleared. The fiscal 2021 budget resolution will be revised and this will enable Democratic leaders to cram the infrastructure package into a new reconciliation bill, ostensibly to raise the debt ceiling, which is due to expire on July 31. Technical public debt default will loom in early fall to help the Democrats motivate stragglers to vote for the bill.1 Spending Compromises: The reconciliation process will keep the price tag of the bill from rising higher than the proposed $2.3 trillion, since it will mostly exclude “earmarks.” States will have to apply in a competitive bidding for funding for projects beginning sometime in 2022 rather than receive guarantees of special projects in exchange for their senator’s vote for the overall package. The headline price tag could be whittled down by about $1 trillion if a bipartisan deal is done. Biden’s proposal consists of $784 billion in traditional infrastructure, $647 billion in social welfare, $370 billion in green energy initiatives, $280 billion in tech initiatives, and $219 billion in business support (Chart 1). The Republicans might be willing to agree to most of the traditional infrastructure as well as some of the tech initiatives and business support (Chart 2). This means these measures could be removed from the bill and passed separately. This would leave the Democrats to pass the rest on their own, including corporate tax hikes, which they could do at earliest by the end of July and at latest by the end of December (Diagram 1). Or Democrats could pass the whole package alone. Chart 1American Jobs Plan Has $784Bn In Traditional Infrastructure Chart 2Republicans Support Roads And Bridges Diagram 1Timeline For Congress To Pass American Jobs Plan By End Of 2021 Tax Compromises: Much has been made of West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin’s claim that the corporate tax rate should not exceed 25%, as opposed to Biden’s preferred 28%. Manchin is not alone, however. Table 1 highlights other Senate Democrats who oppose a 28% rate. These decisive swing voters may get a reduction in the rate but we tend to doubt it will be modified much from the proposal. Corporate tax hikes are popular – including when presented as a responsible way to pay for infrastructure (Chart 3). A minimum corporate tax will play very well politically while the headline corporate rate can be toggled one or two percentage points to ensure the bill gets enough votes (Chart 4). Chart 3Independents Support Corporate Taxes For Infrastructure Chart 4Voters Favor Corporate Tax Hike And Minimum Tax Table 1Centrist Senators: Democrats Who Oppose A 28% Corporate Rate, Republicans Who Voted To Convict Trump Of Insurrection, And Others Bipartisan infrastructure spending is possible but separate. Republicans are at risk of getting steamrolled by Democrats in the coming years. Democrats have stolen back the lead on infrastructure, manufacturing, trade, and China, yet they are free of the taint of mishandling the pandemic. Most importantly they have gotten hold of the magic money tree (Modern Monetary Theory), which enables them to expand the social safety net in a historic way that could boost the fortunes of their own party and its underlying principle of Big Government for a decade or more. Thus the pressure will be high on Republicans to show that they can govern and compromise – and infrastructure is the policy on which it is least painful for the GOP to join them. Republicans could hive off traditional “roads and bridges” – as well as tech competition with China – into a separate bill that could go forward on a bipartisan basis. There is a separate opportunity to pass infrastructure spending because the federal highway funding authorization, the 2015 FAST Act, expires on September 30 (Chart 5). The need to reauthorize this law will force lawmakers to act, thus presenting an opportunity to top up funding for traditional infrastructure projects.2 But this merely highlights that infrastructure spending has multiple avenues. If partisanship prevails as usual then Democrats will drive through their bill anyway. Chart 5US Infrastructure Spending In Recent Decades The regular budget process will be gridlocked. The regular appropriations process for FY2022 will not be an avenue for increased spending. Limits on discretionary spending expire at the end of FY2021 so there are no limits on budget appropriations. But 60 votes are needed for appropriations. Republicans will be loath to assist Democrats on the normal budget while the latter achieve all their other priorities via reconciliation. The economy will not need extra spending. A continuing resolution – a stopgap measure that keeps appropriations at the same level as the previous year – is the likeliest outcome. Or a government shutdown, which might be useful for Republicans to rally their base after a demoralizing year, though it would hurt their standing among the general public. Biden’s $1 trillion American Families Plan will be presented on April 28. This bill could pass in H1 2022, if the American Jobs Plan passes by July, but it is just as likely to become the Democrats’ campaign platform for the 2022 midterms. This bill will require the House and Senate to draft a FY2022 concurrent resolution, which cannot be finalized prior to passing the FY2021 reconciliation bill for both parliamentary and budgetary reasons. The economy will be red hot and fiscal fatigue will be setting in. We stick with our subjective 50/50 odds of passage for this bill. This means that the market’s concern over the capital gains rate hike is premature. First, Democrats have been back-loading tax hikes to prioritize economic recovery – and minimize negative impacts prior to the midterm election – so there is no reason to expect the capital gains tax hike to be retroactive whenever the American Families Plan passes Congress. If Congress passes it in mid-2022 then it will most likely go into effect on January 1, 2023. Second, the capital gains rate itself will likely be watered down from Biden’s proposed 43.4% to something around 32%. The good news for investors is that Biden is proposing to keep the distinction between individual income and capital gains (thus preserving the “carried interest loophole”). The bad news is that he is also keeping the Obamacare surtax of 3.8% on capital gains for those making over $250,000 or more. The American Families Plan is not urgent for investors because it is less likely to pass than the American Jobs Plan – and Republicans could win the House in 2022. But if the latter passes by July then the odds of the former passing before the midterm will shoot up. The family plan also shows that there is an upside risk to the budget deficit outlook and inflation expectations (Chart 6). Chart 6Revised US Budget Deficit Projection Post-ARPA Investment Implications Of Biden’s Sweeping Infrastructure Package While both the CBO and IMF currently project that the fiscal impulse will turn negative in 2022 (a mid-term election year) following a modest decrease this year, government largesse has staying power (Chart 7). Chart 7Fiscal Easing… The populist shift in US politics will push government expenditures as a share of output to nose-bleed levels. Given the lack of adequate tax offsets, it will buttress government debt-to-GDP to levels last seen during WWII (Chart 8). True, debt sustainability largely depends on nominal GDP growth, but spendthrift politicians are unconcerned about paying back debt as interest rates are held low courtesy of an extremely accommodative Federal Reserve and (temporarily) well-behaved bond vigilantes. This is all welcome news for equities exposed to fiscal spending in general and for infrastructure-reliant shares in particular. Two weeks ago we matched different segments of Biden’s infrastructure proposal (Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix) to eight ETFs and one stock that now comprise our Biden Fiscal Advantage equity basket (Chart 9).3 Today we reiterate our sanguine view on this basket – especially versus the NASDAQ 100, given the high concentration of tech stocks in these ETFs. Chart 8...And Debt Uptake Bode Well For Infrastructure Stocks Chart 9Stick With The Biden Fiscal Advantage Basket Importantly, Charts 7 & 8 highlight that a rising fiscal deficit and ballooning government debt are a boon for the BCA’s infrastructure stock basket both from a cyclical and structural perspective.4 Tack on the Fed’s 6.5% real GDP growth projections for calendar 2021 that are more or less in line with the Street’s economic expectations and even the shorter-term outlook brightens for these infrastructure-laden equities (real GDP forecast shown advanced, Chart 10). Chart 10Enticing Domestic Growth Already, the US ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment is soaring following up the path of the ISM manufacturing survey, corroborating that the US economy is firing on all cylinders (top panel, Chart 11). While the recent bond market selloff has gone on hiatus, it will likely prove short-lived. The US population is on track to reach herd immunity sometime this fall and by then inflation will be rearing its ugly head (bottom panel, Chart 11). As a result, the 10-year US Treasury yield should resume its ascent (middle panel, Chart 11). Chart 11Plenty Of Upside Left Historically, all these key macro indicators have been positively correlated with the relative share price ratio of BCA’s infrastructure equity basket and the current message is positive (Chart 11). Beyond the conducive domestic backdrop, likely in the back half of the year the rest of the world will also be on the cusp of getting back to normal – with China’s pace of deceleration being the sole question mark – heralding a synchronized global growth setting. Not only will the US twin deficits weigh on the greenback, but a looming commodity up-cycle is also a boon for hypersensitive commodity-exposed currencies. This dual boost coupled with the budding rebound in EMs is music to the ears of US infrastructure-reliant US conglomerates (Chart 12). Gelling everything together, our US and global capex indicators do an excellent job in encapsulating all of these moving parts. Chart 13 shows that both of our capital expenditure indicators are in V-shaped recoveries, with our global capex one probing multi-decade highs. Chart 12Alluring EM Growth Chart 13Heed The Bullish Message From Our Capex Indicators Bottom Line: The sweeping American Jobs Plan will bolster both the BCA infrastructure and BCA Biden Fiscal Advantage equity baskets. Given the multi-year span of this looming bill, we recommend a cyclical and structural overweight in both baskets.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1 Table A2 Footnotes 1       Paul M. Krawzak, “More questions than answers in parliamentarian’s budget opinion,” Roll Call, April 8, 2021, www.rollcall.com. 2       Jinjoo Lee, “Road Is Smoother Than Expected For Infrastructure, Biden Plan Or Not,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2021, wsj.com. 3      As a reminder, the ticker symbols we included in this Equity Basket are: PAVE, PHO, QCLN, TAN, WOOD, SOXX, HAIL, GRID and SU. We choose SU as there is no pure play Canadian oil sands ETF trading in USD. 4      We first created this basket in late-2018 comprising a range of industrials and materials indexes that should see a positive reaction to a spur in infrastructure demand; Table A2 in the Appendix at the end of this report updates all the constituents in our basket.  

特別レポート

ハイライト 緑の党が9月26日の連邦選挙でドイツ政府の支配権を握る可能性が高い。少なくとも新連立政権で非常に影響力を持つだろう。 ドイツはEU内で長期にわたる地政学的目標の多くを達成している。金融政策と財政政策はハト派で、環境政策はタカ派というコンセンサスがある。最大の変化は外部からもたらされるだろう。 米国とドイツの関係はより困難になっている。両国ともロシアと中国の侵略には反対するが、ドイツは米国の攻撃的行動には抵抗するだろう。 キリスト教民主同盟（CDU）が政府に留まる確率は65％であり、これにより緑の党の論争的で野心的な増税議題は制限されるだろう。左派連立の確率は35％であり、回復のために財政刺激を前倒しで実行するだろう。 経済は回復基調にあり、緑の党主導の財政緩和は回復を加速させるだろう。しかし、連立政治はドイツの人口動態の悪化、生産性の低下、大きな過剰貯蓄といった問題に対処することはおそらくできないだろう。 景気循環の観点では、ブントに対して周辺欧州債をオーバーウェイト；EUR/USD；およびドイツ株に対してイタリア株とスペイン株をオーバーウェイト。 特集 チャート 1ドイツ人は若い女性と緑の党に注目 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ドイツは緑の党が指導する主要国としては初めての国になる見込みだ。少なくとも9月26日のドイツ選挙では現政権が期待を下回り、緑の党が期待を上回る番狂わせが起きるだろう（チャート 1）。 オンラインベッティング市場は30％で、アナレーナ・ベアボックが2022年に緑の党出身として初の首相、かつ第三党から選出される初の首相になる確率を過小評価している（チャート 2）。 「ドイツ問題」――ドイツを統一しつつ隣国との平和を維持する方法の問題――は過去二世紀にわたりヨーロッパの中心にあったが、今日では実質的に解決されたように見える。平和で統一されたドイツが平和で概ね統一されたヨーロッパの中心に位置している。様々なリスクは差し迫っているが、このポジティブな背景は認識されるべきである。 チャート 2市場はベアボックの首相挑戦に気づき始めている 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ドイツ選挙で最もあり得るシナリオはいずれも、ユーロ圏の連帯を目指す政策を継続させることで現在の状況を強化するだろう。緑のシフトですら既にかなり進行しているが、緑の党主導の政府はそれをさらに加速するだろう。それでも今年の選挙は重要だ。なぜならドイツの左方へのシフトを告げ、少なくとも今後4年間の財政、エネルギー、産業、貿易政策を形作るからである。 左派の大勝は短期的には株式市場に興奮をもたらすだろう――パンデミック後の反発を加速させるポジティブな財政サプライズ――が、長期的には過去との決別を招き、政策の不確実性を高めるだろう（チャート 3）。緑の党は増税や規制の大幅な強化、および産業とエネルギー政策における大きな変更を支持している。左派の大勝がない場合、連立政治は混迷を招き、ドイツの既存政策が継続されるだろう。 チャート 3ドイツの政策不確実性の高まり ドイツの政策不確実性が高まっている ドイツの政策不確実性が高まっている ドイツ国内で何が起ころうとも、地政学的環境は一段と危険になっている。ドイツは米国のロシアや中国との大国間闘争に巻き込まれることを避けようとするが、選択の余地がないかもしれない。 ドイツの地政学 ドイツ統一の困難さは近代ヨーロッパ史の中心にある。ドイツ語を話す大きく生産的な人口を有していたため、1871年の統一は近隣諸国にとって安全保障上の脅威となり、それが世界大戦へとつながった。冷戦後の平和的なドイツ再統一は、EUが大陸の平和と繁栄を確立する可能性を生み出した。 この体制は最近の挑戦を乗り越えてきた。ドイツとEUの関係は金融危機、アラブの春と移民流入、ブレグジット、トランプ大統領の貿易関税によって脅かされた。しかし最終的にこれらの出来事は、外圧に直面してドイツとヨーロッパの結びつきが強まる現実を固めた。ドイツは軍事的役割を回避し、経済面でフランスと歩調を合わせ、ロシアとの衝突を避けることで大陸における優越性を達成した。 ドイツは長年求めてきた戦略目標の多くを達成しているため、過去10年間に米国や英国のようなナショナリストの反発に見舞われることはなかった。しかしドイツはポピュリズムや反既成勢力の感情に無縁ではない。二大政治勢力であるキリスト教民主同盟と社会民主党は最近の選挙で支持を失い、やむなく大連立を組むことになった。 ドイツの反既成感情は有権者を左に動かし、緑の党を支持する傾向を生んだ。緑の党は過去10年間で着実に支持を伸ばし、選挙のわずか5か月前に勢いをつかんだ（チャート 4）。しかしドイツの緑の党は基本的に既成政党でもある。16州のうち11州で州政府に参加しており、現在はドイツで三番目に人口が多く生産的な州であるバーデン＝ヴュルテンベルク州で首位の座にある。1998年から2005年にかけては政府に参加し、新自由主義的な構造改革や海外への軍事派遣にかかわったこともある。さらに緑の党は単独で政権をとることはできず、連立政権の中で統治する必要があり、それが彼らのより論争的な政策を調整するだろう。 チャート 4緑の党躍進、キリスト教民主同盟失速 緑の党が躍進、キリスト教民主党は失速 緑の党が躍進、キリスト教民主党は失速 今日のドイツは、三つの重要な条件を満たすことでフランスおよびEUと足並みを揃えている：完全な金融緩和（ドイツ連邦憲法裁判所による欧州中央銀行への挑戦は効果がない）、完全な財政的順応（アンゲラ・メルケル首相はCOVID-19危機下で共同債の発行と緩い赤字管理に同意し、かつ強力なグリーン・エネルギー政策を採用した）、そして完全な安全保障上の調整（ドイツの再軍備はNATOの文脈内で行われ、ヨーロッパの安全保障上の願望はフランスと足並みを揃えて実行されている）。これらの条件は、たとえ緑の党が左派連立の先頭に立って政権を掌握したとしても、2021年の選挙で変わることはないだろう。 結論：ドイツはヨーロッパを統一し統治するという大戦略的目標を事実上達成した。どのドイツ政府もこの状況に挑むことはなく、すべてのドイツ政府はこれを固めようと努めるだろう。この体制に対する最大のリスクは国内よりもむしろ国外から生じる。 ドイツ問題の再来か？ ドイツの地政学的立場はチャート 5 に要約される。これは各国や機関に対する国民の見方を示している。ドイツ人はEUや国連のようなグローバルな機関に対しては好意的であり、NATOに対してはやや低い好感度を示す。それ以外のものに対しては好意的ではない。ロシアに対しては否定的な見方をしているが、劇的ではなく、これはロシアとの衝突に関心がないことを示している――彼らは別の大規模な欧州戦争の戦場や城壁になりたくないのだ。彼らは米国と中国をさらに、かつ同等に嫌っている。2020年の選挙以降米国に対する態度が改善したとしても、純粋な不支持は示唆的である。 チャート 5ドイツは米国よりロシアを好んでいるのか？ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 世界金融危機以降、特に2014年のロシアによるウクライナ侵攻以降、ドイツは軍備を増強してきた。この増強は米国の促しの下で、旧ソ連圏における勢力圏回復を図るロシアの軍事行動に対応するNATO同盟国と歩調を合わせて行われている（チャート 6）。ただしドイツの軍事支出はNATOのGDP比2％の目標にはまだ達していない。フランスやヨーロッパと統合され、ロシア抑止を目的としている限り、それは近隣国にとって脅威とは見なされないだろう。 チャート 6ドイツとNATOが軍事支出を増加させる 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ チャート 7ロシア・ドイツ関係の亀裂がヨーロッパの基盤に与える影響を注視せよ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ロシアの攻撃性はドイツ人とヨーロッパ人を互いに引き寄せ続けるはずだ。もしプーチンが軍事的強制ではなく外交を追求すれば状況は変わり得る。そうなればドイツを東ヨーロッパから切り離す可能性がある。 ノルドストリーム2パイプラインを完成させるというロシアとドイツの現在の強硬な姿勢からもその可能性は明らかである。これは米国や東欧の反対にもかかわらず進められている。パイプラインは選挙に間に合うよう9月までに完成する予定であり、緑の党がこれに反対していることが影響している部分も少なくない。もし米国がパイプラインの停止を主張すれば、ロシアとの間で危機が発生し、メルケルとキリスト教民主同盟は屈辱を受けるだろう。しかし米国はロシアの軍事的脅威に直面してそれを控える可能性もある（確率は五分五分である）。 ロシアが今年ウクライナ国境に10万人以上の部隊を配置したこと――そして報道によれば5月1日までに部隊を基地に戻すよう命じたとされること――はロシア・ドイツ関係の試金石に相当する。プーチンはウクライナで容易にロシアの影響力を拡大することができ、緊張は少なくともロシアの議会選挙が行われる9月までは高止まりするだろう。ドイツ人は再度の侵攻に対して制裁で応じるだろうが、米国が提案するより厳しい制裁は和らげられる可能性が高い。真に情勢を変えるのはロシアがウクライナ全土を征服する場合だろう。それはありそうもない――正にそれがドイツ、ヨーロッパ、米国を結束させ、ロシアにとって経済的損失と戦略的劣勢をもたらすからである（チャート 7）。 中国の台頭もまたドイツをヨーロッパと結びつけ続ける要因となるはずだ。ドイツ人は中国の技術的・製造面での進展、特にデジタルインフラやネットワークへの中国の関与を恐れている。緑の党は二酸化炭素排出量が多い中国製品が低炭素のドイツ製品の価格を圧迫している点を批判している。ベアボックはカーボン調整手数料を支持しているが、これは関税の婉曲表現である。しかしドイツ人は中国とのビジネス関係を維持したがっており、中国の軍事力を大いに恐れているわけではない。したがって中国問題を巡って米独が分裂するリスクがある。 もしドイツが米国の反対にもかかわらず一貫してロシアや中国に肩入れするならば、米国のみならず同胞の欧州諸国からも敵対的な注目を浴びる危険がある。最終的にはEU外の大国と関係を結ぶことでドイツの力が過剰になるのではないかと恐れられるだろう。しかしこれは今日の主要なリスクではない。米国はドイツを取り込み、トランス大西洋同盟を再活性化しようとしている。一方でドイツはロシアの軍事的脅威や中国の貿易慣行に対抗するために米国の支援を必要としている。米独関係は、米国が独裁的勢力との全面的な対立へドイツを強いるようなことがない限り改善するだろう。 結論：米国とドイツの関係は過去よりも難しくなっているが、両国はロシアの侵略と中国の技術的・貿易上の野心を抑止するという共通の利益を共有している。バイデン大統領がこれらの大国に多国間で対処しようとする試みは、ドイツのリスク回避的姿勢によって制約されている。2021年選挙のシナリオ ドイツの選挙結果については現実的なシナリオがいくつか考えられます。私たちが緑の党が政権を形成すると予想するのは、複数の基本的要因に基づいています。世論調査は現在、明確に私たちの見方に有利に転じており、残り5か月で緑の党が勢いを増しています。政党をイデオロギーのブロックに分類すると、争いはほぼ拮抗しています。我々の見立ては、その勢いが野党である緑の党に傾くというもので、その理由を以下に説明します。 一方で自由民主党（FDP）は好成績を収め、キリスト教民主同盟から票を奪うはずです。右派のAlternative für Deutschland（AfD）は大きく得票するわけではないものの、キリスト教民主同盟からいくつかの票を奪うほどには根強く存在しています。これらは保守派にとって「失われた」票であり、連立に加わる政党がないため戻らないでしょう（Chart 8）。 Chart 8Germany's Median Voters Shifts To the Left ドイツの中央値の有権者が左傾化 ドイツの中央値の有権者が左傾化 キリスト教民主同盟は、新鮮味を失い脆弱な政府のすべての兆候を示しています。彼らは16年間政権を担っており、州および連邦選挙での成績は最近悪化しており、今年も含まれます（Table 1）。有権者は「変化の時だ」という強い考えに影響されやすい状況です。メルケル首相の支持率はまだ約60％ですが急落しており、彼女の成功した功績だけでは党を救えません。党内は動揺の兆候に満ちています：後継問題、優柔不断、内紛、汚職スキャンダル。緑の党は「増税・支出拡大」の左派とみなされるでしょうが、実際に何が立法化され得るかは連立構成次第です（Table 2）。1 Table 1AChristian Democrats Fall, Greens Rise, In Recent State Elections 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ Table 1BChristian Democrats Fall, Greens Rise, In Recent State Elections 変革の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ Table 2Policy Platforms Of The Green Party 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ キリスト教民主同盟とそのバイエルンの姉妹政党であるキリスト教社会同盟が首相候補の争いでこれほど苦戦したことは不吉な前兆です。さらに、党内のエリート層は、より人気のあったマルクス・ゼーダーではなくメルケルが指名した後継者アルミン・ラシェットという安全策を選びました（Chart 9）。この分裂は今年後半に党を悩ませる可能性が高いでしょう。 Chart 9Christian Democrats And Christian Social Union Divided Ahead Of Election 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ラシェットは指名で世論調査における反発上昇（バウンス）を受けましたが、それは一時的なものになるでしょう。それ以前の世論調査で彼が大きな存在感を示したことはありません。 Chart 10Dissatisfaction Points To Government Change 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 彼はパンデミック対応をめぐってメルケルや連立と公然と対立してきました。そもそも彼はメルケルの第一の後継者の選択肢ではありませんでした。第一の候補はアナグレート・クランプ＝カレンバウアーであり、わずかなAfDとの協力の示唆をめぐる論争で失脚しました。メルケルの後継を埋めるには明白な問題があります。 連立内の内紛以上に重要なのは、ドイツが世界の他の国々と同様に、経済と社会に対する歴史的ショックを受けたという事実です。パンデミックと景気後退は不適切なワクチン配布によってさらに悪化しました。国民の不満は高く、現職党にとっては別のネガティブサインです（Chart 10）。 もちろん選挙はまだ5か月先です。ワクチンはやがて行き渡り、経済は再開し、消費者の景況感は改善するでしょう――以下に示すように、ドイツが選挙までに期待すべき非常にポジティブなマクロの上振れがあるからです。有権者は概して厳格なパンデミック対策を支持しており、メルケルの影響力は長く続くでしょう。キリスト教民主同盟とキリスト教社会同盟は再統一以降のほとんどの期間にわたって現代ドイツを支配してきており、世論の支持率が33％を下回ったことはありません。緑の党は世論調査ではしばしば投票所での得票よりも多くの勢いを喚起してきました。こうした点を踏まえ、以下に主観的確率を付した選挙シナリオを提示します： 緑・赤・赤連立 – 緑の党がキリスト教民主同盟抜きで政権を率いる – 35％の確率. 緑・黒連立 – 緑の党がキリスト教民主同盟とともに政権を率いる – 30％の確率. 黒・緑連立 – キリスト教民主同盟が緑の党とともに政権を率いる – 25％の確率. 大連立（現状維持） – キリスト教民主同盟が緑の党抜きで政権を率いる – 10％の確率. 私たちの主観的確率は、上記の世論調査やオンライン賭けのデータに基づきますが、緑の党の勢い、キリスト教民主同盟の内部分裂、「変化の時」要因、そして歴史的な外生的経済・社会ショックの存在を考慮して調整したものです。 選挙前に地政学的なサプライズが起こる可能性はありますが、それらはたいてい緑の党を強化する方向に働くでしょう。緑の党はロシアと中国に対して強硬な姿勢を取っているからです。 要点： 緑の党が次期ドイツ政府を主導する可能性が高いですが、少なくとも強力な影響力は持つでしょう。 選挙シナリオの政策影響 どの連立が政権を構成するかが新たな政策の枠組みを決定します。財政政策は選挙の結果に基づいて変わり、支出と税の両方が影響を受けます。緑の党は「増税・支出拡大」の左派ですが、実際に何が立法化され得るかは連立次第です。2 緑の党の考え方は、環境政策を通じて再建プロセスを「舵取り」することです。しかし左派が強固な多数を欠く場合、緑の党のより論争的で懲罰的な施策は通りません。変革的な政策は低所得層に重くのしかかるでしょう（Chart 11）。 Chart 11Ambitious Climate Policy Will Face Resistance 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 各首相候補の政策姿勢は、ドイツにおける高い政策的一致度を示すのに役立ちます。Table 3は、ある政策分野において候補者が「鷹派」（積極的、攻撃的）か「鳩派」（受動的、防御的）かに基づいて候補者を見ています。際立っているのは、党の違いにもかかわらず候補者間の合意です。誰も財政や金融の鷹派ではありません。貿易に関して鷹派と分類できるのはベアボックだけです。3 移民問題で鷹派とされる者はいません。ほとんど全員が気候変動対策には強硬です。またロシアや中国に対する姿勢はより懐疑的になりつつありますが、完全な強硬派というわけではありません。 Table 3Policy Consensus Among German Chancellor Candidates 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化する 変化の風：ドイツがグリーン化する 緑の党が期待を下回ったとしても、ドイツはグリーン関連の取り組みを放棄しないでしょう。現在の大連立は、緑の党が野党にあったとしても、国民の圧力により気候対策パッケージを追求しました。ドイツ国民は他のヨーロッパ諸国よりも環境志向がかなり強いです（Chart 12）。グリーンへのシフトは世界的にも進行しています。米国も現在グリーン競争に参入しており、中国も独自の理由で取り組みを強化しています。4月22-23日のバイデンのアースデイ気候サミットに先立つ一連の発表を受けて更新された現在のグリーン目標と措置については、付録を参照してください。 Chart 12Germans Care Even More About Environment Than Other Europeans 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ いかなる連立でも、COVID後の経済回復に注力するため支出を税よりも多く引き上げるでしょう。ドイツの積極的な財政転換には長い前奏があり、それは持続力があり無視すべきではありません。キリスト教民主同盟を中核とする連立は他の場合より早く財政規律を回復させようとするでしょうが、上に示したシナリオによればそれが実行できる確率はわずか5％にすぎません。EUの財政上限が2022年に凍結されている間、欧州の他国は積極的な支出を行う動機を持つでしょう。特にドイツ政府がより鳩派に傾く場合はなおさらです。 米英以上に、ドイツはワシントン・コンセンサス的な新自由主義から距離を置きつつあります。しかしドイツでは米国型の激しい分極化やポピュリズムの急増は見られていません。少なくとも現時点ではそうです。これは長期的にはリスクになり得ます。キリスト教民主同盟、AfD、および様々な内外の展開の行方次第です。 要点： ドイツには金融、財政、貿易、移民に関しては鳩派的な国民的一致があり、環境政策については強硬（プロ・グリーン）の一致があります。ロシアや中国との地政学的対立に関しては以前より強硬になりつつあります。連立政権が現実的であることを踏まえると、この合意が今年の選挙後の実際の政策を決定する可能性が高いでしょう。 与党の構成にかかわらずいくつかの点は明確です。第一に、ドイツは成長の新たな源として内需を求め、経済の再均衡とEU統合の深化を図っていること。第二に、ドイツはグリーン・エネルギー推進を加速していること。第三に、ドイツはロシアとの新たな冷戦のただ中にいることを受け入れられないこと。第四に、対中国政策はあいまいであること。ドイツのマクロ見通し より広範な財政の状況を考慮する以前から、今後12〜24か月のドイツの経済活動見通しはすでにポジティブでした。9月の選挙に関する当社のベースケースは、緑の党を中心とした連立政権を想定しており、この楽観的な見方を裏付けるものです。ただし、ドイツは依然として重大な長期的課題に直面しており、これらの構造的逆風に適切に対処するための政治的合意はこれまでのところ形成されていません。緑の党は幾つかの解決策を提示していますが、すべての提案が建設的というわけではなく、多くは議会での勢力次第となるでしょう。 短期を覗くと… ドイツ経済は世界的な景気循環の回復の恩恵を受ける見込みであり、これはBCAリサーチの現在の見通しの核心にある見方です。4 ドイツは依然として貿易と製造の強国であり、そのため世界的な製造業の回復から大きな恩恵を受けます。製造業と貿易はドイツのGDPのそれぞれ20％と88％を占めており、主要経済の中で最も高い割合です。別の見方では、OECDによれば、ドイツ製品に対する海外需要は国内付加価値のおよそ30％を占めており、これは韓国のような小規模経済よりも高い比率です（Chart 13）。さらに、自動車、機械およびその他の輸送機器、ならびに化学製品および関連製品は、ドイツの輸出の53％を占めています。これらの製品はいずれも世界的な景気循環に特に敏感であり、したがって今後2年間でドイツ経済のパフォーマンスを高めるでしょう。 欧州域内との貿易は、今後のドイツ経済にとってもう一つの後押しとなります。ユーロ圏向けおよびEU域内向けの出荷はそれぞれドイツの輸出の34％と23％、合計で57％を占めます。現在、停滞気味の欧州経済はドイツにとってハンディキャップですが、欧州には米国よりも抑圧された需要が多く、耐久財の消費はワクチン接種がさらに進展すれば急増するでしょう（Chart 14）。これは、今後12〜18か月で欧州の消費が大幅に回復すると当社が予想するため、ドイツにとって大きな追い風となります。5 Chart 13ドイツはグローバル貿易に依存している 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ Chart 14欧州は米国よりも多くの潜在需要を抱えている 欧州は米国よりも先送りされた需要が大きい 欧州は米国よりも先送りされた需要が大きい Chart 15ワクチン接種の進捗 ワクチン接種の進捗 ワクチン接種の進捗 国内要因も対外要因だけでなくドイツ経済の強さを示しています。ワクチン接種のペースはドイツで急速に加速しています（Chart 15）。四半期向けに追加で5000万回分、そして今後2年間で最大18億回分のワクチン購入を行うというEUの最近の発表はさらなる改善を示唆しています。より幅広いワクチン接種の取り組みは、消費に対する基礎的な追い風を触発するでしょう。 ドイツの家計所得も大幅に改善する見込みです。クルツァルバイト制度は危機時に失業率を抑える上で重要な役割を果たし、失業率は2020年初めの5％からピークでも6.4％にとどまりました。しかし、この制度は総就業時間の7％という大幅な減少を阻止することはできませんでした。というのも定義上、600万人の従業員が所定労働時間の短縮を余儀なくされていたからです（Chart 16）。この制度の大きな利点の一つは、労働者と雇用主との連結が断絶するのを防ぐことであり、したがって活動が回復する際の摩擦的失業が少なく、家計所得に長期的な損傷が生じにくい点にあります。一方で、ドイツ政府は債務ブレーキの適用の遅延を受けて、家計と企業への支援を継続する可能性が高いでしょう。緑の党は債務ブレーキを2022年に復元するのではなく改定することを提案しており、保守派が約束する復元とは対照的です。 Chart 16クルツァルバイトが功を奏した Kurtzarbeitが窮地を救った Kurtzarbeitが窮地を救った 家計のバランスシートが強固であることは、増加する所得を消費に回す余力があることを意味します。住宅不動産価格は年率8％のペースで上昇しており、資産対可処分所得比率を過去最高水準に押し上げています。一方で、債務対資産比率と金利水準も非常に低く、既存債務の返済負担は最小限にとどまっています（Chart 17）。 このような状況では、耐久財支出が加速し、たとえドイツの家計が過去1年間で蓄積した1,200億ユーロの過剰貯蓄を多く使わなかったとしても、全体として景気循環的な支出は持ち上がります。Chart 18が示すように、米国の耐久財支出はすでにコロナ前の高水準を上回っていますが、ドイツは長期トレンド付近に留まっています。したがって、今夏に経済が再開し、所得と雇用が増加するにつれて、同時に高まる消費者信頼感が景気循環的支出の回復を可能にするでしょう。 Chart 17強固な家計のバランスシート 強固な家計のバランスシート 強固な家計のバランスシート Chart 18ドイツも米国より多くの潜在需要を抱えている ドイツも米国よりも抑えられた需要が大きい ドイツも米国よりも抑えられた需要が大きい Chart 19多くの指標からのポジティブなメッセージ 多くの指標が示すポジティブなメッセージ 多くの指標が示すポジティブなメッセージ さまざまな経済指標がすでに到来しつつあるドイツの経済ブームを示しています。製造受注は堅調で、ほとんどのセクターで経済センチメントが上昇しています。一方で、消費者の楽観主義は底を形成しつつあり、新車登録は急速に増加しています。最も好ましい点として、完成品在庫が崩壊しており、これは将来の需要を満たすために生産が増強されることを示唆しています（Chart 19）。 要点：ドイツ経済は今年後半から2022年にかけて加速する見込みです。いつものように、ドイツは力強い世界成長から健全な利益を享受しますが、ワクチン接種プログラムの拡大、雇用主と従業員の良好な関係、強固な家計のバランスシート、および耐久財に対する顕著な潜在需要も国内経済を後押しします。ベルリンでの政治的な左派へのシフトを受けて9月以降に財政政策が引き続き緩和的に推移するという当社のベースケースは、この不可避の回復をさらに加速させるだけでしょう。…そして長期的見通し 目先の見通しが明るいのに対し、ドイツ経済の長期的見通しは依然として芳しくない。新たな与党連合の政策がドイツの厳しい人口動態、悪化する生産性、大きな過剰貯蓄という問題に対処する可能性は低い。グローバルなグリーン・エネルギーとハイテクの競争の文脈で生産性の押し上げ余地はあるが、現時点では憶測の域を出ない。 ドイツが直面するもっとも明白な問題は高齢化であり、合計特殊出生率はわずか1.6にとどまる。今後30年間で、ドイツの扶養比率は80%まで急増する見込みで、高齢者扶養比率が20%増加することが主因である（チャート20）。生産年齢人口は2050年までに18%減少する見込みで、潜在GDPの成長を抑制するだろう。 ドイツの生産性成長の見通しも厳しい。ドイツの生産性成長は長期的に低下しており、1975年の5%から2019年には1%を下回った。一般に広まっている考えに反し、1999年から2007年の間、ドイツの労働生産性成長はフランスやスペインと同程度にしか過ぎなかった；2008年以降はこの二国に遅れをとっているが、イタリアは上回っている。 ドイツの生産性が振るわない重要な理由の一つは投資不足である。これは同国の緊縮的な財政運営を反映している面もある。例えば2019年、ドイツの公的投資はGDPの2.4%であり、OECD平均の3.8%や、米国の公的投資であるGDPの3.6%と比べても見劣りする。この数字はドイツの公的資本ストックの減価償却を考慮していない。ユーロ導入以降、ネット公的投資は平均でGDPの0.03%にとどまっている。最大の問題は自治体レベルにある。2012年から2019年にかけて、連邦および州レベルのネット投資は平均でGDPの0.2%だった一方で、自治体のネット投資は平均でGDPの0.2%をマイナスにした。新政権がこのドイツ経済の欠陥に対処できることが望まれる。緑の党が最も積極的ではあるが、障害に直面するだろう。 ドイツの生産性にとってより大きな問題は企業の設備投資である。企業の投資は同国で低迷してきた。ユーロ導入以降、ドイツにおける資本集約度の生産性への寄与はイタリアと同等であり、フランスやスペインよりも劣後している。その結果、ドイツの資本ストックの平均年齢は過去最高水準であり、米国やユーロ圏平均を大きく上回っている（チャート21）。 チャート20ドイツは人口動態が厳しい ドイツは人口動態が悪い ドイツは人口動態が悪い チャート21ドイツの資本ストックは老朽化している ドイツの資本ストックは老朽化している ドイツの資本ストックは老朽化している ドイツの設備投資の内訳は生産性のハンディキャップを悪化させている。ドイツ連邦銀行（ブンデスバンク）の研究によれば、情報通信技術（ICT）への資本支出が労働生産性に与えた寄与は、2008年から2012年の間で年平均0.05パーセントポイントだった。この指標において、ドイツはフランスや米国より遅れていたが、それでもイタリアは上回っていた。2013年から2017年にかけては、ICT投資の生産性への寄与は0.02パーセントポイントに落ち、依然としてフランスや米国より低いが、イタリアとは同水準であった。 ICTや知識基盤資本（KBC）への投資の絶対水準を見ると、ドイツの課題がさらに浮き彫りになる。2016年におけるICT機器、ソフトウェアとデータベース、研究開発および知的財産生産物、その他のKBC資産（組織資本や研修を含む）への総投資はGDPの8%未満を占めていた。フランス、米国、スウェーデンではそれぞれこれらの支出がGDPの11%、12%、13%を占めていた（チャート22、上段）。この投資不足はドイツのイノベーション能力を直接的に損ねる。チャート22の下段は、ICT特許の総数の80%を占める8つの主要カテゴリについて、ドイツが米国、日本、韓国、あるいは中国に著しく遅れを取っていることを示している。 チャート22ドイツはICT投資で遅れを取っている 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ICTおよびKBC投資におけるドイツのハンディキャップの主要因の一つは中小企業であり、これらは資本の投入に特に消極的であった。OECDの研究は、2010年から2019年の間に、ドイツの小企業と大企業の間のICTツールおよび活動の採用ギャップがOECD平均に比べて悪化したことを示している（チャート23）。ベンチャーキャピタル投資の不足もこれらの問題を悪化させている可能性が高い。2019年におけるドイツのベンチャーキャピタル投資はGDPの0.06%を占めるにすぎない。これはフランスや英国（それぞれ0.08%および0.1%）の水準を下回り、ましてや韓国、カナダ、イスラエル、米国（それぞれ0.16%、0.2%、0.4%、0.65%）の水準には遠く及ばない。緑の党は新たなベンチャーキャピタル・ファンドを創設すると主張しているが、この分野での実行力は疑わしい。 チャート23ドイツの中小企業におけるICT能力の遅れ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ ドイツの生産性成長はOECD諸国の他と比べて今後も平均を下回る可能性が高く、フランスや英国にも遅れを取る見込みであるため、ドイツが競争力を維持する唯一の方法はコストを抑制することである。つまり、ドイツは近年の競争力喪失をこれ以上放置することはできない（チャート24）。したがって、生産性の低成長はドイツの実質賃金を制約するだろう。 チャート24ドイツの競争力は低下している ドイツの競争力が低下している ドイツの競争力が低下している この賃金抑制は消費に悪影響を与えるだろう。今後12～24か月の一時的な押し上げを除けば、ドイツの消費は抑制されたままである可能性が高い。これは千年紀の変わり目以降の最初の15年に見られた状況と同様であり、ハルツIVの労働市場改革は実質賃金にも打撃を与えた。緑の党は福祉給付を拡充し、最低賃金を引き上げ、ハルツIVの運用を緩和することを目指している。 結論：ドイツの過剰貯蓄は構造的に幅広く残るだろう。設備投資が実質的に回復しなければ、ドイツの非金融企業は純貸し手のままである。加えて、実質賃金成長が低い世界で将来の家計の状況を不安視している家計は、所得のかなりの割合を引き続き貯蓄するだろう。その結果、千年紀の変わり目以降にドイツが蓄積した過剰貯蓄は定着する（チャート25）。言い換えれば、ドイツは大きな経常収支黒字を維持し、欧州および世界に対してデフレ的な影響を及ぼし続けるだろう。 9月の選挙に出馬する各党が提唱する政策が、設備投資低迷やICT投資低迷という問題を覆す新法につながるとは限らない。緑の党は経済の過剰規制をさらに悪化させるだろう。すべての目的を達成するような政策革命が実行されない限り（非常に高いハードルである）、ドイツにはこれまでと同様の状況、つまり緩やかに衰退する経済が続くと予想される。 チャート25貯蓄過多、投資不足 貯蓄過多、投資不足 貯蓄過多、投資不足 チャート26ドイツは再生可能エネルギーで好成績 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ とはいえ、明るい点もある。ドイツは再生可能エネルギー分野でリーダーになりつつあり、この流れの拡大を活かして輸出市場を拡大することができる（チャート26）。 投資への示唆 債券市場 ドイツとユーロ圏全体の経済見通しは、欧州のフィクスト・インカム・ポートフォリオ内でドイツ・ブントをアンダーウェイトすることと整合的です。 ブントは世界で最も割高な債券市場の一つに入っており、特に今年後半に欧州で経済の良いサプライズが生じた場合、非常に脆弱になります。とりわけ9月の選挙を受けてドイツの財政政策がさらに緩和されれば脆弱性は増します（チャート27）。さらに、ドイツの財政政策が緩和されれば欧州の周辺国債が支えられ、現在ECBが積極的に買っている割安なイタリアBTPは特に恩恵を受けるでしょう。したがって、我々はBTPのオーバーウェイトを継続し、ギリシャ債とポルトガル債をそのリストに加えます。 チャート27ドイツ・ブントは割高である 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ チャート28ドイツ利回りは既に欧州に関して多くの悲観を織り込んでいる ドイツ国債利回りは既に欧州に対する相当な悲観を織り込んでいる ドイツ国債利回りは既に欧州に対する相当な悲観を織り込んでいる 米国債と比較すると、ブントの見通しはより複雑です。一方で、ECBはこのサイクルの後半でFRBほど金融政策を引き締めないでしょう。さらに、欧州のインフレ率は今年および事業サイクルを通じて米国水準を下回る可能性が高いです。他方で、ブントは既に実質ターミナル・レートの代理指標とタームプレミアムの両方で国債（Treasury Notes）よりもかなり低い数値を織り込んでいます（チャート28）。 総合的に見れば、BCAリサーチのグローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジー・サービスは、ブントは今年米国債をアウトパフォームすべきだと見ています。なぜならブントはベータが低く、利回り上昇局面で価値のある特徴を持っているからです。6 我々はこの見方に関連するリスクを注意深くモニターします。なぜなら欧州の景気回復が世界的な利回り上昇の触媒になる可能性があり、その場合ドイツ・ブントは一時的にアンダーパフォームすることがあり得るからです。 構造的には、ベルリンがドイツの生産性問題に対処しない限り、ドイツ・ブントは世界の利回りにとっての錨（アンカー）であり続ける公算が大きいです。ドイツは過剰貯蓄に溢れ、これはデフレ的な錨として作用するとともに、欧州の実質金利の長期的な上昇を抑制します。過剰貯蓄は大きな経常収支黒字をもたらすため、ドイツは引き続き貯蓄を海外へ輸出し、世界の利回りを抑制する要因として作用し続けるでしょう。 ユーロ 中期的な見通しはユーロの大幅な上昇を示唆しています。 今後12カ月で欧州およびドイツの成長が良いサプライズとなるという我々の予想は、ユーロのアウトパフォーマンスと整合します。過去10年間、投資家がユーロ圏から資金を取り出し米国へ移してきたという事実は、この議論に説得力を与えます（チャート29）。 我々のドイツの財政政策に関する見解もユーロに有利に働きます。ドイツの財政赤字拡大は欧州の経済活動を助け、ユーロ圏全体のリスクプレミアムを縮小します。このプロセスはユーロにとって二重にポジティブです。第一に、周辺国のリスクプレミアム低下はユーロ圏への資金流入を呼び込みます。とりわけギリシャ、ポルトガル、イタリア、スペインの利回りは代替投資よりも価値を提供します。第二に、強い成長と低いリスクプレミアムは、ユーロ圏の唯一のリフレーターであるECBへの負担を軽減します。これにより、マージンではありますが、欧州の極めて低迷したターミナル・レート代理指標が押し上げられ、EUR/USDを支援するはずです。 欧州内部のポジティブな力に加え、堅調な世界経済活動はユーロの魅力を高めます。ドルはカウンターサイクル通貨であり、したがって世界の景気サイクルの上昇は一般にドル安と一致し、EUR/USDの魅力を増します。とはいえ、もし世界経済の押し上げが米国から生じれば、ドルは強くなる可能性があります。この現象は2021年の第1四半期に見られました。しかし、今後12カ月で世界の成長リーダーシップは米国から離れる見込みであり、これは世界成長とドルの逆相関という通常の関係が再びユーロに有利に働くことを意味します。 欧州の国際収支の動態はユーロの魅力をさらに強固にします。ドイツおよびユーロ圏の経常収支黒字は依然として大きく、特に米国で拡大する双子の赤字と比較すると際立っています。 今後12〜24カ月を超えた期間では、ドイツおよび欧州経済の構造的な活力欠如がユーロを円やスイスフランのようなセーフヘイブン通貨へと変える可能性が高いです。強い国際収支と低金利（いずれも過剰貯蓄の症状）はファンディング通貨の定義的特徴であり、改革が生産性低迷に対処しない限りユーロ圏の恒久的属性となるでしょう。ユーロ圏の対外純資産ポジションは既に上昇しており、低インフレはユーロの購買力平価見積りに構造的な上方バイアスを与えるでしょう（チャート30）。これらの展開は日本やスイスですでに見られており、時間が経てばユーロのプロサイカリティ（景気循環性）は消えていく可能性が高いです。 チャート29投資家は既に欧州資産をアンダーウェイトしている 投資家は既に欧州資産をアンダーウェイトしている 投資家は既に欧州資産をアンダーウェイトしている チャート30ユーロのフェアバリューにおける上方バイアス ユーロのフェアバリューには上方バイアスがある ユーロのフェアバリューには上方バイアスがある チャート31ドイツはユーロ圏の他国よりアウトパフォームしていない ドイツはユーロ圏の他国を上回っていない ドイツはユーロ圏の他国を上回っていない ドイツ株式 絶対的に見れば、DAXおよびドイツ株式は今後12〜24カ月で依然として大きな上振れ余地を持っています。BCAリサーチは株式に対してポジティブな姿勢を想定しており、ベータが高い市場であるドイツは恩恵を受ける可能性があります。7 さらに、ドイツ株式は世界経済活動への感応度が高いことがその魅力を際立たせます。我々は欧州株式を好み、ドイツ株も例外ではありません。8 より複雑な問題は、欧州株式ポートフォリオ内でドイツ株式をどのように位置付けるかです。2003年から2012年にかけて大幅にアウトパフォームした後、ドイツ株式はそれ以降ユーロ圏の他と同じ動きになっています（チャート31）。さらに、ドイツ株式は現在、主要なバリュエーション指標のすべてでユーロ圏の他地域に対してディスカウントで取引されています（チャート31、下段）。 ドイツ株式のユーロ圏他地域に対する見通しを左右するグローバル・マクロの力は現在、相反するメッセージを送っています。一方では、コモディティ価格が上昇したりユーロが上昇したりすると通常ドイツ株はアウトパフォームします（チャート32）。他方では、世界の利回りが上昇したり、中国の過剰準備が減少した期間の後にはドイツ株はアンダーパフォームすることもあります。今日見られるような環境がそれに該当します。 こうした世界的要因からの不明確さがあるため、ドイツの相対的パフォーマンスに関する答えは欧州の経済動態の中にあります。ドイツはユーロ圏の他地域に対して競争力を失いつつあり（チャート24 22ページ）、これはユーロが強くなった場合にドイツ株が過去10年のパフォーマンスほど恩恵を受けないことを示唆しています。さらに、ドイツ株はドイツの製造業PMIが広いユーロ圏のそれに対して上昇したときにアウトパフォームします。ドイツとユーロ圏の製造業PMIの差はほぼ史上高水準にあり、ユーロ圏の他地域が追いつくにつれてこの差は縮小する可能性が高いです。これはドイツ株のパフォーマンスに影響を与えるはずです（チャート33）。 チャート32ドイツの相対的パフォーマンスにとって混在するグローバルな背景 ドイツの相対パフォーマンスを取り巻く混在するグローバル環境 ドイツの相対パフォーマンスを取り巻く混在するグローバル環境 チャート33欧州の経済の追いつきはドイツ株にとって不利となる 欧州の経済の追い上げはドイツ・エクイティに打撃を与える 欧州の経済の追い上げはドイツ・エクイティに打撃を与える 最後に、セクター別の動態が最終的な決定要因となる可能性があります。表4はドイツとユーロ圏の他市場との間でセクター配分に限定的な差しかないことを示しており、これが過去9年間の相対的パフォーマンスの安定性を説明するのに役立ちます。 しかしながら、国別に見ればドイツと特定の欧州諸国との間で差異は大きくなります。この観点では、BCAの成長株に対するネガティブなスタンスはオランダに対してドイツをオーバーウェイトすることと相関します。さらに、我々の金融株と債券利回りに関するポジティブな見通しは、ドイツがイタリアおよびスペインの株式に対してアンダーパフォームすべきであることを示唆します。 表4欧州主要取引所におけるセクター別内訳 変革の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツがグリーン化へ   マット・ガートケン バイスプレジデント ジオポリティカル・ストラテジー mattg@bcaresearch.com   マチュー・サヴァリー, チーフ・ヨーロピアン・インベストメント・ストラテジスト Mathieu@bcaresearch.com 付録：世界の気候政策コミットメント 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変革の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 変化の風：ドイツ、グリーン化へ 脚注 1 Matthew Karnitschnig、"German Conservatives Mired In ‘The Swamp,’" Politico、2021年3月24日、politico.eu。 2 緑の党は炭素税、デジタルサービス税、金融取引税を含む様々な税に関心を持っています。彼らはまた、鉄鋼や自動車メーカーに一定割合の炭素中立鋼材や電気自動車を販売させる工業クオータにも関心があります。Baerbock氏への優れたインタビューはIleana GrabitzとKatharina Schuler、"I don’t have to convert the SUV driver in Prenzlauer Berg," Zeit Online、2020年1月2日、zeit.deを参照してください。 3 Zeit Onlineに対する彼女のコメントを参照してください。 4 BCAリサーチ グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー・ストラテジー・アウトルック "Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh?"、日付2021年3月26日、gis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。 5 BCAリサーチ ヨーロピアン・インベストメント・ストラテジー・スペシャル・レポート "A Temporary Decoupling"、日付2021年4月5日、eis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。 6 BCAリサーチ グローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジー・ストラテジー・レポート "Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger"、日付2021年3月16日、gfis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。 7 BCAリサーチ グローバル・インカム・ストラテジー・ストラテジー・アウトルック "Second Quarter 2021 Strategy Outlook: Inflation Cometh?"、日付2021年3月26日、gis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。 8 BCAリサーチ ヨーロピアン・インカム・ストラテジー・ストラテジー・レポート "Time And Attraction"、日付2021年4月12日、eis.bcareseach.comで入手可能。

Highlights Chart of the WeekThe Bond Bear Mantle Being Passed To Canada? US Treasuries: The steady climb of US bond yields has left longer-maturity Treasuries in an oversold position. However, underlying growth and inflation momentum remains bond bearish and the Fed is likely to begin preparing the market later this year for a tapering of asset purchases in 2022. Maintain a medium-term defensive posture towards US Treasuries (below-benchmark duration and an underweight country allocation). Canada: The Canadian economy is gaining significant positive momentum, with an increased pace of vaccinations boosting optimism despite a third wave of COVID-19. We now see a growing risk of the Bank of Canada shifting to a less dovish policy stance sometime in the next few months, led by a tapering of its bond buying – perhaps even before the Fed does the same (Chart of the Week). Downgrade Canadian government bonds to underweight in global fixed income portfolios. US Treasuries: The Pause That Refreshes Chart 2UST Yield Uptrend Has Paused After leading the global government bond market selloff over the past several months, US Treasury yields have calmed down of late. The 10-year Treasury yield is down 14bps from the most recent peak of 1.74% reached March 31, while the 30-year Treasury yield is down 16bps from the peak of 2.45% reached on March 18. These moves have been concentrated in the real yield component, with inflation breakevens stable, as the 10yr and 30yr TIPS yields are down -15bps and -20bps, respectively, since the dates of those peaks in nominal yields (Chart 2). The drift lower in US yields has occurred in the face of an explosive surge in US economic data. Retail sales rose +9.8% in March compared to February and a staggering +27.7% on a year-over-year basis. The Fed’s regional manufacturing surveys showed very robust results for April, with the New York Empire State index hitting the highest level since October 2017 and the Philadelphia Fed headline index surging to a level last seen in 1973. This follows the very strong payrolls and ISM data for March that came out in early April. Yet the US economic data is not unanimously positive. The latest readings from the University of Michigan consumer confidence and NFIB small business optimism surveys both remained well below pre-pandemic peaks (Chart 3). Annual core CPI inflation only inched up 0.2 percentage points in March to 1.6%, a tepid move compared to the base effect driven surge that took year-over-year headline CPI inflation from 1.7% in February to 2.6%. Chart 3Some Mixed Messages From Recent US Data Chart 4Fewer Positive US Data Surprises The overall flow of US economic data has been disappointing versus elevated expectations, as evidenced by the almost uninterrupted decline in the Citigroup US data surprise index since peaking in July of 2020 (Chart 4). This indicator reliably correlated to the momentum of US Treasury yields prior to the COVID-19 outbreak and now, given the bullish growth combination of vaccine optimism and fiscal stimulus, the bond market’s focus is returning to how US data evolves versus expectations - and what that means for the Fed’s future moves on monetary policy. The most senior leadership at the Fed continues to send a consistent message on policy, with no rate hikes expected before 2024 and no hints at when the tapering of quantitative easing (QE) could begin. Yet some Fed officials have started to be a bit more vocal about their comfort level with the current accommodative policy stance and the associated risks to financial stability and inflation. Last week, Dallas Fed President Robert Kaplan noted that he would like to see the Fed begin to withdraw its support for the economy “at the earliest opportunity”. St. Louis Fed President James Bullard was even more specific, noting that once the share of vaccinated Americans reaches “herd immunity” levels of 75-80%, it will be time for the Fed to debate tapering QE. At the moment, however, there is no need for the Fed to move preemptively. Our Fed Monitor - comprised of economic, inflation and financial market data that would signal pressure for the Fed to ease or tighten policy – is at a neutral level (Chart 5). Our 12-month Fed discounter, which measures the change in interest rates over the next year that is priced into the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve, is at 7bps, consistent with a stand-pat Fed. The latest read this month from the New York Fed’s Survey of Primary Dealers (and Survey of Market Participants) showed no change in the median longer-run expectation for the fed funds rate of 2.25% that has prevailed over the past year (middle panel) – despite a sharp recovery in US growth expectations. Chart 5UST Valuations A Bit Stretched The market pricing of the Fed’s next move is still relatively benign, with liftoff not expected until February 2023. This suggests that a pause in the trend of rising Treasury yields was essentially the market getting a bit ahead of itself in pricing in higher longer-term yields. This can be seen by looking at various valuation measures. For example, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield now sits at 2.4%, which is at the high end of the range of longer-run fed funds rate expectations from the Primary Dealer survey. Also, various measures of the term premium on 10-year Treasury yields have returned to the above-zero levels last seen during the Fed’s 2016-2018 rate hiking cycle – even with the Fed not signaling any need to tighten policy in response to rising inflation expectations. Despite these signs of stretched near-term UST valuation, there is still no sign of major global bond investors being comfortable with increasing exposure to Treasuries. For example, despite yields on 10-year Treasuries (hedged into euros and yen) looking historically attractive compared to the near-zero yields on JGBs and sub-zero yields on German Bunds, the US Treasury’s capital flow data shows that foreign investors remain net sellers of Treasuries (Chart 6). It is possible that those foreign buyers need more evidence of a sustained decrease in US bond volatility before moving money into US Treasuries, where duration losses from higher US yields could wipe out the yield pickup from moving into US bonds. While valuations are a bit stretched for Treasuries, technicals appear very oversold. Both the deviation of the 10-year Treasury yield from its 200-day moving average, and the 6-month rate of change of the Bloomberg Barclays US Treasury total return index, are at levels seen only four previous times since 2010 (Chart 7). The JP Morgan client duration positioning surveys and the Market Vane Treasury sentiment index are also approaching post-2010 bearish extremes. It should be noted that both of those measures reached even more bearish extremes during the latter half of the Fed’s 2026-2018 tightening cycle, so there is potential for Treasury sentiment to become even more bearish once the Fed starts to tighten monetary policy – a scenario looking increasingly likely over the next 6-12 months. Chart 6No Foreign Bid For USTs (Yet) Chart 7USTs Are Technically Oversold We continue to expect a robust US economy and rising inflation to force the Fed to begin preparing the market in the latter half of 2021 for QE tapering in 2022, with the first rate hike of the next tightening cycle coming in late 2022. As that outcome appears largely consistent with current market pricing, amid oversold technicals, it is likely that Treasury yields will continue to move sideways over at least the next few weeks. Yet there is little to suggest that yields have peaked and are about to enter a new downtrend, given the accelerating pace of US vaccinations that is boosting optimism on an eventual end to the US leg of the pandemic. Stay defensive on US Treasury exposure, as the cyclical rise in yields is not over yet. Bottom Line: The steady climb of US bond yields has left longer-maturity Treasuries in an oversold position. However, underlying growth and inflation momentum remain bond bearish and the Fed is likely to begin preparing the market later this year for tapering of asset purchases in 2022. Maintain a medium-term defensive posture towards US Treasuries (below-benchmark duration and an underweight country allocation). Canada: Downgrade To Underweight In a Special Report published back in February along with our colleagues at BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy, we outlined the case for placing Canadian government debt on “downgrade watch” in global fixed income portfolios.1 We expected Canadian bond yields to continue rising along with the rise in global bond yields and, hence, we maintained our below-benchmark recommended duration exposure within Canada. Chart 8Canada: A High Beta Bond Market Once Again However, we concluded that it was too soon to shift to a full-blown underweight stance on Canadian government bonds with COVID-19 cases still raging through the country, the vaccination program off to a very slow start, and the Bank of Canada (BoC)’s QE program preventing Canadian bonds from returning to their usual “high-beta” status within developed economy bond markets. It now appears that we were too cautious on that front. Canadian government bonds have been one of the worst performing markets year-to-date within the Bloomberg Barclays Global Government bond index, delivering a local currency return of –4.1% - worse than the -3.5% return earned on US Treasuries so far in 2021.2 It is clear that the Canadian government bonds are once again a market more sensitive to global interest rate moves (Chart 8). In that February Special Report, we laid out three factors that could prompt the BoC to move to a less dovish, and more bond bearish, monetary policy stance faster than we expected. Much of that list has already started to come to fruition. 1) Good News On The Vaccine Rollout Sadly, Canada is suffering a third wave of COVID-19 cases that has resulted in the nation’s most populous province, Ontario, implementing the harshest lockdown yet seen during the pandemic. Yet the pace of vaccinations has also been rising with the share of Canadians receiving at least one jab is now 21% (Chart 9) - higher than that of the overall European Union (EU). Canada is now administering more daily vaccinations than both the UK and EU. The quickening pace of vaccinations is already providing a major lift to Canadian economic confidence. The Bloomberg Nanos consumer confidence index is at an all-time high (Chart 10), while the BoC’s Business Outlook Survey for the spring of 2021 was incredibly solid. Two-thirds of firms in that survey expect sales to exceed pre-pandemic levels, even with the latest upturn in COVID-19 cases. Chart 9Canadian Vaccine Rollout Improving Chart 10Booming Optimism The BoC’s Q1/2021 Consumer Survey showed similar levels of optimism. 74% of Canadians surveyed aged 25-54 are planning to engage in levels of social and economic activities equal to, or greater than, those seen prior to the pandemic once the majority is vaccinated (Chart 11). A net majority (18%) of those surveyed plan to spend more on the types of “high-touch” service spending unavailable during the pandemic, like travel, movies and dining in restaurants, once a majority is vaccinated (Chart 12). Chart 11Canadians Are Ready To Have Fun Once Again All of the Canadian survey data is sending a clear message: a faster vaccine rollout will leader to much faster spending by consumers and businesses. 2) Signs Of Financial Stability Risks Highly-indebted Canadians' love affair with real estate has always concerned the BoC. While a combination of cutting policy interest rates to zero and ramping up QE helped stabilize Canadian financial markets during the 2020 pandemic shock, it has also set off a new surge of housing speculation. According to the Bloomberg Nanos consumer survey, 67% of Canadians now expect house prices to appreciate. The demand for homes has given a lift to the Canadian economy through a surge in new housing starts (residential investment is 8% of Canadian real GDP), while pushing national house price inflation back above 10% (Chart 13). Chart 12A Surge In "High-Touch" Spending Awaits Canadian Herd Immunity As already indebted Canadian households pile on more debt to partake in another national home-buying party, the BoC must now concern itself with the potential financial stability risks from a too-rapid rise in housing values. Chart 13Yet Another Canadian Housing Boom In a recent speech, BoC Deputy Governor Toni Gravelle noted that the BoC had to introduce QE in 2020 to help fight COVID-related dysfunction across a variety of Canadian financial markets, including government bonds where liquidity dried up.3 Gravelle also noted that the BoC would begin to dial back QE once it was clear that financial markets no longer needed the support from QE. With Canadian equities booming and Canadian corporate bond spreads near the lowest levels of the past decade (Chart 14), it seems clear that the BoC can begin dialing back its government bond purchase program if it is no longer necessary and likely fueling another housing bubble. 3) Additional Large Fiscal Stimulus The governing Canadian Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau delivered a massive amount of fiscal stimulus to the pandemic-stricken Canadian economy in 2020. In the 2021/22 federal budget announced yesterday, another huge burst of spending was introduced, equal to C$101bn or 4.2% of Canadian GDP over the next three years. The spending was described as another COVID relief package, but included many long-term programs like national child care, raising the minimum wage and boosting green investments. According to the projections from the latest IMF World Fiscal Monitor, the “fiscal thrust” for Canada – the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance as a share of GDP - was projected to turn from a stimulus of +9% in 2020 to a drag of -2% in 2021 (Chart 15). The spending announced in the latest budget will effectively eliminate that drag for the next three years. This will provide a major lift to an economy already likely to see booming post-pandemic growth. Chart 14BoC QE No Longer Necessary Chart 15No Fiscal Drag Now Expected In 2021 Chart 16Canadian Real Yields Are Too Low Given the combination of expanding vaccinations, surging confidence, a renewed housing boom and soaring financial markets, it will be difficult for the BoC to maintain its current policy settings for much longer. This is a central bank that engaged in QE reluctantly last year and numerous BoC officials have stated – even in the worst days of the global pandemic - that they would begin to remove accommodation once it was no longer needed. Interest rate markets have already moved to price in a full-blown BoC tightening cycle. The Canadian OIS curve now discounts “liftoff” (a full 25bp rate hike) in October 2022, with 163bps of rate hikes priced in to the end of 2024 (Chart 16). The projected path of rates is below the BoC’s inflation forecasts to 2023. Thus, the implied Canadian real policy rate is expected to remain negative over the next two years – even though the BoC estimates that the neutral policy rate range is 1.75% to 2.75%, or -0.25% to +0.75% in real terms after subtracting the midpoint of the BoC’s 1-3% inflation target band. In other words, Canadian interest rate markets are vulnerable to any BoC shift in a less dovish direction, as seems increasingly likely sometime in the next few months. Our BoC Monitor is rapidly moving out of the “easier policy required” zone (Chart 17), and the rapid improvement in the Canadian employment situation suggests the BoC will be under more pressure to begin signaling a path towards withdrawing policy accommodation. This will start with an announced tapering of QE purchases, perhaps even ahead of any signals from the Fed that it is doing the same (Chart 18). This justifies a more cautious stance on Canadian fixed income exposure. Chart 17Downgrade Canadian Government Bonds To Underweight Chart 18Could The BoC Start Tapering Before The Fed? While a BoC tapering announcement before the Fed would likely put upward pressure on the Canadian dollar versus the US dollar, that would be something the BoC could live with if the economy was rapidly gaining strength – especially as our currency strategists believe the “loonie” to be undervalued. Thus, we are formally downgrading our strategic recommended allocation to Canadian government bonds to underweight (2 out of 5, see table on page 16). We are also maintaining our recommended below-benchmark duration exposure within dedicated Canadian bond portfolios. We are also cutting the allocation to Canada to underweight in our model bond portfolio and placing the proceeds in both, the US and core Europe (see pages 14-15). Bottom Line: The Canadian economy is gaining significant positive momentum, with an increased pace of vaccinations boosting optimism despite a third wave of COVID-19. We now see a growing risk that the Bank of Canada shifts to a less dovish policy stance sometime in the next few months, led by a tapering of its bond buying. Downgrade Canadian government bonds to underweight in global fixed income portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy/Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle?", dated February 12, 2021, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 That Canadian return is virtually the same after hedging into US dollars, hence that local currency return can be compared to the US dollar denominated Treasury market return. 3https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2021/03/market-stress-relief-role-bank-canadas-balance-sheet Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns