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Dear Client, I will be on vacation next week. In lieu of our regular report, we will be sending you a Special Report written by my colleagues Chester Ntonifor, BCA Research’s Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist, and Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Their report discusses the threat to the dollar’s reserve status over the next decade. This week, Matt published a timely report entitled “Afghanistan? Watch Iran And China,” examining the global macro significance of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. I trust you will find both reports insightful.   Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Over the next 12 months, US inflation will decline fast enough to allow the Federal Reserve to maintain its accommodative monetary stance, but not as fast as investors are expecting. A number of structural forces were becoming inflationary even before the pandemic began. The pandemic will only buttress the tide. Even if the virus is eventually vanquished, the pandemic could prop up inflation by permanently reducing labor supply, hastening the retreat from globalization, and keeping fiscal policy looser than it otherwise would have been. Fixed-income investors should maintain a short duration stance. We expect the US 10-year Treasury yield to rebound to about 1.8% by early next year. Long-term bond yields in the other major economies will also rise, although not as much as in the US. In and of itself, higher inflation is not necessarily bad for equities. What makes higher inflation toxic for stocks is when it forces central banks to raise rates to punitive levels. Fortunately, such an outcome is still a few years away, justifying an overweight equity position for now. Upside Risks To Inflation In our July 23rd report, we argued that investors were asking the wrong question about inflation. Rather than asking whether higher inflation is transitory, they should be asking whether inflation will decline faster or slower than what the market is discounting. Chart 1Investors Expect Inflation To Fall Rapidly From Current Levels Chart 1 shows that investors expect inflation to fall rapidly from current levels and to remain subdued thereafter. The widely followed 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently stands at 2.12%, below the Fed’s comfort zone of 2.3%-to-2.5% (Chart 2).1 Chart 2Below-Target Inflation Expectations And A Low R* Have Restrained Bond Yields Downbeat long-term inflation expectations and the market’s perception that the neutral rate of interest is very low are the two main reasons why bond yields are so depressed. QE programs have also dampened yields, although not nearly as much as widely believed. Chart 3Outside Of A Few Pandemic-Related Sectors, The CPI Has Yet To Return To Trend In our report, we contended that US inflation would come down fast enough over the next few quarters to allow the Federal Reserve to maintain its accommodative monetary stance, but not as fast as investors are expecting. On the one hand, the evidence clearly shows that most of the recent increase in US inflation has been driven by just a few pandemic-related sectors (Chart 3). On the other hand, high levels of excess household savings, the need for firms to expand capacity and rebuild inventories, and continued policy support will boost output and prices. The Long-Term Inflationary Consequences Of The Pandemic We also argued that a variety of structural forces, including the exodus of baby boomers from the labor market, a retreat from globalization, and increasing social unrest, would drive up inflation over the long haul. A key question is how the pandemic will shape these structural forces going forward. As we discuss below, there are three main overlapping channels through which the pandemic could have a lasting impact on inflation: Labor market scarring: Even if the virus is eventually vanquished, the pandemic could still permanently reduce the labor supply. Widespread worker shortages would fuel inflation. Deglobalization: Globalization has historically been a deflationary force. The pandemic could accelerate the retreat from globalization by prompting firms to bring more production back home, while exacerbating geopolitical tensions. Fiscal policy: Big budget deficits could persist in the post-pandemic period. Debt-saddled governments may turn to inflation to erode their debt burdens. Let us assess these three channels in turn.   Channel #1: Labor Market Scarring Despite July’s blockbuster employment report, there are still nearly 4% fewer Americans employed than was the case in January 2020. Yet, US businesses are struggling to hire workers (Chart 4). Nationwide, the job openings rate stands at a record 6.5%, up from 4.5% on the eve of the pandemic (Chart 5). Chart 4US Companies Are Facing A Labor Shortage Chart 5There Are Plenty Of Jobs Available Generous unemployment benefits, less immigration, and the reluctance of many workers to expose themselves to the virus have all helped to reduce labor supply. A marked shift in the composition of spending has increased the demand for workers in some sectors while reducing demand in other sectors (Chart 6). Since labor is not perfectly fungible across sectors, this has caused overall unemployment to rise. Chart 6Which Sectors Have Gained And Which Have Lost Jobs Since The Pandemic? Looking out, labor supply should increase as emergency unemployment benefits expire, immigration picks up, and more people are vaccinated. The mismatch of workers across sectors should also diminish as goods and services spending rebalances. Nevertheless, there is considerable uncertainty over how quickly all this will happen. According to Indeed, an online job posting site, unemployed workers cited having a “financial cushion” as the most popular reason for not looking for a job in July (Chart 7). Given that American households are sitting on $2.4 trillion in excess savings, it may take some time for this cushion to deflate (Chart 8). Chart 7Americans Are Not Desperate To Find Work Chart 8A Lot Of Excess Savings Chart 9No Jab, No Job Wider vaccine mandates could also impact labor market participation. A host of major companies, ranging from Google to Citigroup, are requiring their employees to be inoculated before returning to the office (Chart 9). The Pentagon has laid out a plan endorsed by President Biden obliging members of the military to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Earlier this week, the Las Vegas Raiders became the first NFL team to require fans to produce proof of vaccination to gain entry to home games. On the one hand, vaccine mandates could encourage more people to get the jab, which should help curb the pandemic and boost employment in the service sector. While the numbers have improved in recent weeks, only 57% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 64 are fully vaccinated (Chart 10). On the other hand, some people might opt for unemployment over a vaccine. According to a recent YouGov poll, about half of all unvaccinated Americans believe that the government is using COVID-19 vaccines to microchip the population (Chart 11). The threat of losing one’s job is unlikely to sway many of them. Chart 10Many Workers Remain Unvaccinated Chart 11One In Five Americans Believes The US Government Is Using The Covid-19 Vaccine To Microchip The Population Pandemic-induced shifts in work-life preferences could also reduce labor supply. According to Ipsos, a polling firm, most employees would prefer to work remotely at least part of the time, with 25% indicating they do not want to return to their workplace at all (Chart 12). The same poll found that 30% of workers would consider looking for another job if their employer required them to work away from home full time (Chart 13). Chart 12Let’s Chat Around The Water Cooler On Tuesdays And Wednesdays Chart 13What Is The Opposite Of A “One Size Fits All” Work Environment? Chart 14Number Of Retired People Jumped During The Pandemic If remote working boosted productivity, as some have claimed, this would not be such a bad thing. However, it is far from clear that this is the case. A recent University of Chicago study of 10,000 skilled professionals from an Asian IT company revealed that work-from-home policies decreased productivity by 8%-to-19%. Early retirement has also reduced labor supply. The share of retirees in the US population rose by 1.3 percentage points between February 2020 and July 2021, with most of the increase occurring early in the pandemic (Chart 14). Based on pre-pandemic demographic trends, the retirement rate should have risen by only 0.5 percentage points over this period.  The good news, as discussed in a recent study by the Kansas City Fed, is that most of the increase in the retirement rate was driven by fewer people transitioning from retirement back into employment. The share of people transitioning from employment to retirement did not change much (Chart 15). This led the authors to conclude that “More retirees may rejoin the workforce as health risks fade, but the retirement share is unlikely to return to a normal level for some time.” Chart 15Increased Retirees: A Closer Look Bottom Line: Labor supply will recover as the pandemic recedes. Nevertheless, the available pool of workers will likely be lower in the post-pandemic period than it would have otherwise been. A shortage of workers will prop up wage growth, helping to fuel inflation.   Channel #2: Deglobalization Globalization was on the back foot even before the pandemic began. Having steadily increased between 1991 and 2008, the ratio of global trade-to-output was basically flat during the 2010s (Chart 16). Ironically, the pandemic has revived global trade by shifting the composition of spending away from non-tradable services towards tradable goods. This shift in spending is the key reason why shipping costs have soared in recent months (Chart 17). Chart 16Globalization Plateaued Over A Decade Ago Chart 17Shipping Costs Have Soared In Recent Months The rebound in trade will not endure. Already, we are seeing companies moving production back home to establish greater control over their supply chains. The pandemic has exacerbated geopolitical tensions between China and the US. Recriminations about how the pandemic began and what China could have done to stop it will not go away anytime soon. Trade bloomed during Pax Britannica, when Great Britain ruled the waves, and then again during Pax Americana, when the US controlled the commanding heights. As BCA’s geopolitical team has long stressed, the shift to a multi-polar world is likely to restrain globalization.2 Historically, globalization has been a deflationary force. Trade has allowed countries such as the US that consistently run current account deficits to satiate excess demand for goods with imports, thereby forestalling inflation. Trade has also raised productivity by allowing countries to specialize in those areas in which they have a comparative advantage, while providing a mechanism to diffuse technological know-how around the world. Standard trade theory predicts that less-skilled workers in developed economies will suffer a relative decline in wages in response to rising trade with developing countries. A number of studies have documented that this is precisely what happened after China entered the global trading system.3  Poor workers tend to spend more of their paychecks than either rich workers or the owners of capital. To the extent that deglobalization shifts the balance of economic power back towards blue-collar workers in advanced economies, this will raise overall aggregate demand. Against the backdrop of muted productivity growth, inflation could increase as a consequence. Bottom Line: Globalization is deflationary, while deglobalization is inflationary. The pandemic is likely to reinforce the trend towards deglobalization.    Channel #3: Fiscal Policy There was once a time when governments trembled in fear of the bond vigilantes. Those days are long gone. After briefly rising to 4% in June 2009, the US 10-year Treasury yield trended lower over the subsequent decade, even though unemployment fell and government debt rose. The pandemic sent the bond vigilantes scurrying for cover. Negative real yields allowed governments to run budget deficits of previously unimagined proportions during the pandemic. Budget deficits will decline over the next few years, but the aversion to deficit spending will not return. Not anytime soon at least. The IMF expects the cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit in advanced economies to average 2.6% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, up from 1% of GDP in the 2014-19 period (Chart 18). Even that is probably too conservative, since the IMF’s projections do not include pending legislation such as President Biden’s $550 billion infrastructure package and $3.5 trillion reconciliation budget bill. Chart 18Fiscal Policy: Tighter But Not Tight If the growth rate of the economy exceeds the interest rate on government debt, then governments with high debt-to-GDP ratios could run larger budget deficits than governments with low ratios, while still achieving a stable debt-to-GDP ratio over time.4  The problem is that these same governments would face an exponential increase in debt-servicing costs if interest rates were to rise above the growth rate of the economy. This is not a risk for any major developed economy at the moment but could become an issue as spare capacity recedes. At that point, central banks could face political pressure to keep rates low, even if their economies are overheating. The result could be higher inflation. Higher inflation, in turn, would boost nominal GDP growth, putting downward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios. Bottom Line: While budget deficits will come down over the next few years, governments in developed economies will still maintain looser fiscal policies than before the pandemic. High debt levels could incentivize policymakers to permit higher inflation. Investment Conclusions US inflation will decline over the next 12 months, but not as quickly as markets are discounting. A number of structural forces were becoming inflationary even before the pandemic began. The pandemic will only reinforce the inflationary tide. Fixed-income investors should maintain a short duration stance. We expect the US 10-year Treasury yield to rebound to about 1.8% by early next year as the Delta variant wave fades. Long-term bond yields in the other major economies will also rise, although not as much as in the US. In and of itself, higher inflation is not necessarily bad for equities. What makes higher inflation toxic for stocks is when it forces central banks to raise rates to punitive levels. Fortunately, such an outcome is still a few years away, justifying an overweight equity position for now. The second quarter earnings season was a strong one. Back on July 2nd, analysts expected S&P 500 companies to generate about $45 in EPS in Q2. In the end, they generated at least $52. Analysts expect earnings to decline in absolute terms in Q3 and remain below Q2 levels until the second quarter of next year, when they are projected to grow by a meagre 3.5% year-over-year (Table 1). Table 1US Earnings Estimates Have Upside Earnings estimates usually drift lower over time (Chart 19). BCA’s US equity strategists think there is scope for earnings estimates for the second half of this year to rise materially from current levels. This should support US stocks. Along the same lines, above-trend global growth and attractive valuations should buoy stock markets outside the US. Chart 19Analysts Have Been Revising Up Earnings Estimates This Year Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index. The TIPS breakeven is based on the CPI index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of about 2.3%-to-2.5%. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report “Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update),” dated July 30, 2021; and Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here,” dated November 12, 2014. 3 For example, economists Katharine Abraham and Melissa Kearney have estimated that increased competition from Chinese imports cost the US economy 2.65 million jobs between 1999 and 2016, almost double the 1.4 million jobs lost to automation. Similarly, David Autor and his colleagues found that increased trade with China has led to large job losses for blue-collar workers in the US manufacturing sector. 4 The steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio can be expressed as p/(r-g), where r is the interest rate, g is trend GDP growth, and p is the primary (i.e., non-interest) budget balance. Thus, for example, if the government wanted to achieve a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 50% and r-g is -2%, it would need to run a primary budget deficit of 0.5*0.02=1% of GDP. However, if the government targeted a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 200%, it could run a primary budget deficit of 2*0.02=4% of GDP. See Box 1 in our February 22, 2019 report for a derivation of this debt sustainability equation. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Highlights US crude oil output will continue its sharp recovery before leveling off by mid-2022, in our latest forecast (Chart of the Week). The recovery in US production is led by higher Permian shale-oil production, which is quietly pushing toward pre-COVID-19 highs while other basins languish. Permian output in July was ~ 143k b/d below the basin's peak in Mar20, and likely will surpass its all-time high output in 4Q21. Overall US shale-oil output remains ~ 1.1mm b/d below Nov19's peak of 9.04mm b/d, but we expect it to end the year at 7.90mm b/d and to average 8.10mm b/d for 2022. We do not expect US crude oil production to surpass its all-time high of 12.9mm b/d of Jan20 by the end of 2023. Instead, exploration & production (E&P) companies will continue to prioritize shareholders' interests. This means larger shares of free cashflow will go to shareholders, and not to drilling for the sake of increasing output. While our overall balances estimates remain largely unchanged from last month, we have taken down our expectation for demand growth this year by close to 360k b/d and moved it into 2022, due to continuing difficulties containing the COVID-19 Delta variant. Our Brent crude oil forecasts for 2H21, 2022 and 2023 remain largely unchanged at $70, $73 (down $1) and $80/bbl. WTI will trade $2-$3/bbl lower. Feature Chart 1US Crude Recovery Continues Global crude oil markets are at a transition point. The dominant producer – OPEC 2.0 – begins retuning 400k b/d every month to the market from the massive 5.8mm b/d of spare capacity accumulated during the COVID-19 pandemic. For modeling purposes, it is not unreasonable to assume this will be a monthly increment returned to the market until the accumulated reserves are fully restored. This would take the program into 2H22, per OPEC's 18 July 2021 communique issued following the meeting that produced this return of supply. Thereafter, the core group of the coalition able to increase and sustain higher production – Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, KSA and Russia – is expected to meet higher demand from their capacity.1 There is room for maneuver in the OPEC 2.0 agreement up and down. We continue to expect the coalition to make supply available as demand dictates – a data-dependent strategy, not unlike that of central banks navigating through the pandemic. This could stretch the return of that 5.8mm b/d of accumulated spare capacity further into 2H22 than we now expect. The pace largely depends on how quickly effective vaccines are distributed globally, particularly to EM economies over the course of this year and next. US Shale Recovery Led By Permian Output While OPEC 2.0 continues to manage member-state output – keeping the level of supply below that of demand to reduce global inventories – US crude oil output is quietly recovering. We expect this to continue into 1H22 (Chart 2). Chart 2Permian Output Recovers Strongly The higher American output in the Lower 48 states primarily is due to the continued growth of tight-oil shale production in the low-cost Permian Basin (Chart 3). This has been aided in no small part by the completion of drilled-but-uncompleted (DUC) wells in the Permian and elsewhere. Chart 3E&Ps Favor Permian Assets Since last year’s slump, the rig count has increased; however, compared to pre-pandemic levels, the number of rigs presently deployed are not sufficient to sustain current production. The finishing of DUC wells means that, despite the low rig count during the pandemic, shale oil supply has not dipped by a commensurate amount. This is a major feat, considering shale wells’ high decline rates. Chart 4US Producers Remain Focused On Shareholder Priorities DUCS have played a large role in sustaining overall US crude oil production. According to the EIA, since its peak in June 2020, DUCs in the shale basins have fallen by approximately 33%. As hedges well below the current market price for shale producers roll off, and DUC inventories are further depleted, we expect to see more drilling activity and the return of more rigs to oil fields. We do not expect US crude oil output to surpass its all-time high of 12.9mm b/ of Jan20 by the end of 2023. Instead, exploration & production (E&P) companies will continue to prioritize shareholders' interests. This means only profitable drilling supporting the free cashflow that allows E&Ps to return capital to shareholders will receive funding. US oil and gas companies have a long road back before they regain investors' trust (Chart 4).   Demand Growth To Slow We expect global demand to increase 5.04mm b/d y/y in 2021, down from last month's growth estimate of 5.4mm b/d. We have taken down our expectation for demand growth this year by ~ 360k b/d and moved it into 2022, because of reduced mobility and local lockdowns due to continuing difficulties in containing the COVID-19 Delta variant, particularly in Asia (Chart 5).2 We continue to expect the global rollout of vaccines to increase, which will allow mobility restrictions to ease, and will support demand. This has been the case in the US, EU and is expected to continue as Latin America and other EM economies receive more efficacious vaccines. Thus, as DM growth slows, EM oil demand should pick up (Chart 6). Chart 5COVID-19 Delta Variant's Spread Remains Public Health Challenge Chart 6EM Demand Growth Will Offset DM Slowdown Net, we continue to expect demand for crude oil and refined products to grind higher, and to be maintained into 2023, as mobility rises, and economic growth continues to be supported by accommodative monetary policy and fiscal support. If anything, the rapid spread of the Delta variant likely will predispose central banks to continue to slow-walk normalizing monetary policy and interest rates. Global Balances Mostly Unchanged Chart 7Oil Markets To Remain Balanced Although we have shifted part of the demand recovery into next year, at more than 5mm b/d of growth, our 2021 expectation is still strong. This is expected to continue next year and into 2023 although not at 2021-22 rates. Continued production restraint by OPEC 2.0 and the price-taking cohort outside the coalition will keep the market balanced (Chart 7). We expect OPEC 2.0's core group of producers – Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, KSA and Russia – will continue to abide by the reference production levels laid out in 18 July 2021 OPEC communique. Capital markets can be expected to continue constraining the price-taking cohort's misallocation of resources. These factors underpin our call for balanced markets (Table 1), and our view inventories will continue to draw (Chart 8). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23Our balances assessment leaves our price expectations unchanged from last month, with Brent's price trajectory to end-2023 intact (Chart 9). We expect Brent crude oil to average $70, $73 and $80/bbl in 2H21, 2022 and 2023, respectively. WTI is expected to trade $2-$3/bbl lower over this interval. Chart 8Inventories Will Continue To Draw Chart 9Brent Prices Trajectory Intact   Investment Implications Balanced oil markets and continued inventory draws support our view Brent and refined-product forward curves will continue to backwardate, even if the evolution of this process is volatile. As a result, we remain long the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF, which is optimized for backwardation. We continue to wait for a sell-off to get long the SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (XOP ETF).   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The US EIA expects natural gas inventories at the end of the storage-injection season in October to be 4% below the 2016-2020 five-year average, at 3.6 TCF. At end-July, inventories were 6% below the five-year average (Chart 10). Colder-than-normal weather this past winter – particularly through the US Midwest and Texas natural gas fields – affected production and drove consumption higher this past winter, which forced inventories lower. Continued strength in LNG exports also are keeping gas prices well bid, as Asian and European markets buy fuel for power generation and to accumulate inventories ahead of the coming winter. Base Metals: Bullish The main worker’s union at Chile's Escondida mine, the largest in the world, and BHP reached an agreement on Friday to avoid a strike. The mine is expected to constitute 5% of total mined global copper supply for 2021. China's refined copper imports have been falling for the last three months (Chart 11). Weak economic data – China reported slower than expected growth in retail sales and manufacturing output for July – contributed to lower import levels.  Precious Metals: Bullish Gold has been correcting following its recent decline, ending most days higher since the ‘flash crash’ last Monday, facilitated by a drop in real interest rates. The Jackson Hole Symposium next week will provide insights to market participants regarding the Fed’s future course of action and if it is in fact nearing an agreement to taper asset purchases. According to the Wall Street Journal, some officials believe the program could end by mid-2022 on the back of strong hiring reports. This was corroborated by minutes of the FOMC meeting which took place in July, which suggested a possibility to begin tapering the program by year-end. While the Fed stressed there was no mechanical relationship between the tapering and interest rate hikes, this could be bearish for gold, as real interest rates and the bullion move inversely. On the other hand, political uncertainty and a potential economic slowdown in China will support gold prices. Ags/Softs: Neutral Grain and bean crops are in slightly worse shape this year vs the same period in 2020, according to the USDA. The Department reported 62% of the US corn crop was in good to excellent condition for the week ended 15 August 2021, compared to 69% for the same period last year. 57% of the soybean crop was in good-to-excellent shape for the week ending on the 15th vs 72% a year ago. Chart 10 Chart 11 Footnotes 1 Please see our report of 22 July 2021, OPEC 2.0's Forward Guidance In New Baselines, which discusses the longer-term implications of this meeting and the subsequent communique containing the OPEC 2.0 core group's higher reference production levels. It is available at ces.bcareserch.com. 2 S&P Global Platts notes China's most recent mobility restrictions throughout the country will show up in oil demand figures in the near future. We expect similar reduced mobility as public health officials scramble to get more vaccines distributed. Please see Asia crude oil: Key market indicators for Aug 16-20 published 16 August 2021 by spglobal.com. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2021 Summary of Closed Trades
特別レポート Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (August 17 at 10:00 AM EDT, 15:00 PM BST, 16:00 PM CEST and August 18 at 9:00 HKT, 11:00 AEST). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Scheduling Note: There will be no US Bond Strategy report next week. The following week (August 31), clients will receive a report written by our Global Fixed Income Strategist Rob Robis. The regular US Bond Strategy publication schedule will resume on September 8 with the publication of September’s Portfolio Allocation Summary. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist
Highlights The chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan is symbolic – the US is conducting a strategic pivot to Asia Pacific to confront China. US-Iran negotiations are the linchpin of this pivot. If they fail, war risk will revive in the Middle East and the US will remain entangled in the region. At the moment, there is no deal, so investors should brace for a geopolitical risk premium in oil prices. That is, as long as global demand holds up despite COVID-19, and as long as the OPEC 2.0 cartel remains disciplined. We think they will in the short run. The US and Iran still have fundamental reasons to agree to a deal. If they do, the US will regain global room for maneuver while China’s and Russia’s window of opportunity will close. The implication is that markets face near-term oil supply risks – and long-term geopolitical risks due to Great Power rivalry in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Feature Events in Afghanistan have little macroeconomic significance but the geopolitical changes underway are profound and should be viewed through the lens of our second key view for 2021: the US strategic pivot to Asia. Chart 1The US Pivot To Asia Runs Through Iran Not Afghanistan As we go to press the Taliban is reconquering swathes of Afghanistan while US armed forces evacuate embassy staff and civilians. The chaotic scenes are reminiscent of the US’s humiliating flight from Saigon, Vietnam in 1975. As with Vietnam, the immediate image is one of American weakness but the reality over the long run is likely to be different. Over the past decade we have chronicled the US’s efforts to disentangle itself from wars of choice in the Middle East and South Asia. In accordance with US grand strategy, Washington is refocusing its attention on its rivalries with Russia and especially China, the only power capable of supplanting the US as a global leader (Chart 1). The US has struggled to conduct this “pivot to Asia” over the past decade but the underlying trajectory is clear: while trying to manage its strategic interests in the Middle East through naval power, the US will need to devote greater resources and attention to shoring up its economic and military ties in Asia Pacific (Map 1). The Middle East still plays a critical role – notably through China’s energy import needs – but primarily via the Persian Gulf. Map 1The US Seeks Balance In Middle East In Order To Pivot To Asia And Confront China Thus the critical geopolitical risks today stem from Iran and the Middle East on one hand, and China on the other. They do not stem from the US’s belated and messy exit from Afghanistan, which has limited market relevance outside of South Asia. First, however, we will address the political impact in the United States. US Political Implications Chart 2Americans Agree With Biden And Trump On Exit From Afghanistan American popular opinion has long turned against the “forever wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan, which cumulatively have cost $6.4 trillion and about 7,000 American troops dead1 (Chart 2). Three presidents, from two political parties, campaigned and won election on the basis of winding down these wars. The only presidential candidate since Republicans George W. Bush and John McCain who took a hawkish stance for persistent military engagement, Hillary Clinton, nearly lost the Democratic nomination and did lose the general election to a Republican, President Trump, who had reversed his party’s stance to advocate strategic withdrawal. War hawks have been sidelined in both parties. This is notable even if it were not the case that the current President Biden, whose son Beau fought in Afghanistan, had opposed the troop surge there under Obama. True, Biden will use drones, surgical strikes, and limited troop rotations to manage the aftermath in Afghanistan, both militarily and politically. Americans are still concerned about terrorism in general and any sign of a resurgent terrorist threat to the US homeland will be politically potent (Chart 3). But neither Biden nor the US can roll back the Taliban’s latest gains or achieve anything in Afghanistan that has not been achieved over the past twenty years.   Chart 3American Public Cares About Terrorism, Not Afghanistan Per Se True, Biden will suffer a political black eye from Afghanistan. His approval rating has already fallen to 49.6%, slipping beneath 50% for the first time, in the face of the Delta variant of COVID-19 and the Afghan debacle. In both cases his early optimistic statements have now become liabilities. Biden is also 79 years old, which will make the 2024 campaign questionable, and he faces mounting problems in other areas, from lax border security and immigration enforcement to rising domestic crime. Nevertheless, Biden still has sufficient political capital to push through one or both of his major domestic legislative proposals by the end of the year, despite thin majorities in both the House and Senate. Afghanistan will not affect that, for three reasons: 1. The US economy is likely to continue to recover despite hiccups due to the lingering pandemic, since the vaccines so far are effective. The labor market is recovering and business capex and government support are robust. Setbacks, such as volatile consumer confidence, will help Biden pass bills designed to shore up the economy. 2. The public fundamentally agrees with Biden (and Trump) on military withdrawal, as mentioned. Voters will only turn against him if a major attack reinforces an image of weakness on terrorism. A major attack based in Afghanistan is not nearly as likely to succeed as it was prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. But Biden also faces an imminent increase in tensions in the Middle East that could result in attacks on the US or its allies, or other events that reinforce any image of foreign policy failure. 3. Biden has broad popular support for his infrastructure deal, which also has bipartisan buy-in, with 19 Republican Senators already having voted for it. Further, the Democratic Party has a special fast-track mechanism for passing his social spending agenda, though conviction levels must be modest on this $3.5 trillion bill, which is controversial and will have to be winnowed to pass on a partisan vote in the Senate. If we are correct that Afghanistan will not derail Biden’s legislative efforts then it will not fundamentally affect US fiscal policy or the global macro outlook. Note, however, that a failure of Biden’s bills would be significant for both domestic and global economy and financial markets as it would suggest that US fiscal policy is dysfunctional even under single party rule and would thus help to usher back in a disinflationary context. Might Afghanistan affect the midterm elections and hence the US policy setup post-2022? Not decisively. Republicans are more likely than not to retake at least the House of Representatives regardless. This is a cyclical aspect of US politics driven by voter turnout and other factors. Democrats are partly shielded in public opinion due to the Trump administration’s attempts to pull out of foreign wars. But surely a black eye on terrorism or foreign policy would not help. Similarly, a major failure to manage the Middle East, South Asia, and the pivot to Asia Pacific would marginally hurt the Democrats in 2024, but that is a long way off. Geopolitical Implications The Taliban’s reconquest of Afghanistan has very little if any direct significance for global financial markets. Pakistan and India are the two major markets most likely to be directly affected – and their own geopolitical tensions will escalate as a result – yet both equity markets have been outperforming over the course of the Taliban’s military gains (Chart 4). Afghanistan’s impacts are indirect at best. However, the US withdrawal connects with major geopolitical currents, with both macro and market significance. Afghanistan often marks the tendency of empires to overreach. Russia’s failure in Afghanistan contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, though Russia’s command economy was unsustainable anyway. British failures in Afghanistan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not lead to the British empire’s decline – that was due to the world wars – but Afghanistan did accentuate its limitations. Since 9/11 and the US’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US public’s economic malaise, political polarization, and loss of faith in public institutions have gotten worse. In turn, political divisions have impeded the government’s ability to respond cogently to financial and economic crisis, the resurgence of Russia, the rise of China, nuclear proliferation, constitutional controversies, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Once again Afghanistan marked imperial overreach. It is natural for investors to be concerned about the stability of the United States. And yet the US’s global power has recently stabilized (Chart 5). The US survived the 2020 stress test and innovated new vaccines for the pandemic. It is passing laws to upgrade its domestic technological, manufacturing, and infrastructural base and confronting its global rivals. Chart 4If Indo-Pak Markets Shrug Off Taliban Wins, So Can You Chart 5US Geopolitical Power Is Stabilizing Chart 6US Not Shrinking From Global Role The US is not retreating from its global role, judging by defense spending or trade balances (Chart 6). While the desire to phase out wars could theoretically open the way to defense cuts, the reality is that the great power confrontation with China and Russia will demand continued large defense spending. The US also continues to run large trade deficits, due to its shortage of domestic savings, which gives it influence as a consumer and provider of dollar liquidity across the world. The critical geopolitical problem is Iran, where events have reached a critical juncture: To create a semblance of a balance of power in the Middle East, the US needs an understanding with Iran, which is locked in a struggle with Saudi Arabia over the vulnerable buffer state of Iraq. President Biden was not able to rejoin the 2015 détente with Iran prior to the inauguration of the new president, Ebrahim Raisi, who is a hawk and whose confrontational policies will lead to an escalation of Middle Eastern geopolitical risk in the short term – and, if no US-Iran deal is reached, over the long term. Iran recognizes the US’s war-weariness, as demonstrated by withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan. It was also exposed to economic sanctions after the US’s 2018-19 abrogation of the 2015 nuclear deal – it cannot trust the US to hold to a deal across administrations. Still, both the US and Iran face substantial strategic forces pressuring them to conclude a deal. The US needs to pivot to Asia while Iran needs to improve its economy and reduce social unrest prior to its looming leadership succession. But the time frame for negotiation is uncertain. Any failure to agree would revive the risk of a major war that would keep the US entangled in the region. Thus the pivot to Asia could be disrupted again, with major consequences for global politics, not because of Afghanistan but because of a failure to cut a deal with Iran. If the US succeeds in reducing its commitments to the Middle East and South Asia, the window of opportunity that China and Russia have enjoyed since 2001 will close. They will face a United States that has greater room for maneuver on a global scale. This is a threat to their own spheres of influence. But neither Beijing nor Moscow has an interest in a nuclear-armed Iran, so a US-Iran deal is still possible. Unless and until the US and Iran normalize relations, the Middle East is exposed to heightened geopolitical risk and hence oil supply risk. Global oil spare capacity is sufficient to swallow small disturbances but not major risks to stability, such as in Iraq or the Strait of Hormuz. Investment Takeaways Chart 7Near-Term US-Iran Risks Help Oil...Long-Term US-China Risks Help Dollar Back in 2001, the combination of American war spending, and conflict in the Middle East, combined with China’s massive economic opening after joining the WTO, led to a falling US dollar and an oil bull market. Today the US’s massive budget deficits and current account deficits present a structural headwind to the US dollar. Yet the greenback has remained resilient this year. While the pandemic will fade as long as vaccines continue to be effective, China’s potential growth is slowing even as it faces an unprecedented confrontation with the US and its allies. Until the US and Iran normalize relations, geopolitics will tend to threaten Middle Eastern oil supply and put upward pressure on oil prices. However, if the US manages the pivot to Asia, China will face more resolute opposition in its sphere of influence, which will tend to strengthen the dollar. The dollar and oil still tend to move in opposite directions. These geopolitical trends will be influential in determining which direction prevails (Chart 7). Thus geopolitics poses an upward risk to oil prices for now.     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see Crawford, Neta, "United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post 9/11 Wars Through FY 2020: $6.4 trillion", Watson Institute, Brown University.
Highlights Global growth is peaking, which makes it important to monitor the risks for signs that it is time to reduce equity exposure. We are especially focused on five risks: 1) The emergence of vaccine-resistant Covid variants; 2) a possible “goods recession”; 3) higher real bond yields; 4) higher US corporate tax rates; and 5) a weaker Chinese economy and regulatory crackdown. For now, we recommend a modest overweight to global equities. We will likely pare back exposure early next year. Stocks And The Business Cycle Our “golden rule” for asset allocation is to remain bullish on equities unless there is a good reason to think that a recession is around the corner. This rule has strong empirical support. Chart 1 shows that equity bear markets rarely occur outside of major business cycle downturns. Chart 1Recessions And Bear Markets Tend To Overlap Nevertheless, there are different shades of bullishness. Stocks generally perform best coming out of recessions; that is, when the economy is weak but improving. Stocks perform worst when the economy is falling into recession. We are currently in an intermediate phase, where global growth is weakening but still solidly above trend. Historically, stocks have posted positive but uninspiring returns during such phases (Table 1). Table 1The Economic Cycle And Financial Assets Monitoring The Risks In “post peak growth” environments, it is important to monitor the risks for signs that it is time to reduce equity exposure. We are especially focused on five risks:   Risk 1: New Covid Variants Chart 2A New Covid Wave The Delta strain continues to roll through the US and a number of other countries (Chart 2). While the new strain does not seem to be any more deadly than other variants, it is a lot more contagious. CDC internal estimates suggest the R0 for the Delta variant is between 5-to-8, similar to that of chickenpox, and 40% higher than the original strain.1 Countries such as Thailand and Vietnam, which were able to keep the pandemic at bay last year, have succumbed to Delta. In Australia, the 7-day average of new cases has climbed above 300, the highest since last August. China has detected the Delta variant in more than a dozen cities since July 20. Even if the country succeeds in quashing the new variant, it will come at an economic cost. Lockdowns in major Chinese cities could further clog a global supply chain that is still reeling from the dislocations caused by the pandemic. While still vulnerable to the Delta variant, the symptoms of vaccinated individuals tend to be mild and non-life threatening. The Lambda variant, which surfaced in Peru this past December, appears more vaccine-resistant than the Delta variant. Fortunately, it is not as contagious as Delta, and has struggled to propagate outside of South America. The risk is that a new variant emerges which is: 1) highly contagious; 2) vaccine resistant; and 3) as or more lethal than the original strain. Chart 3The Divergence Between Goods And Services Spending Our Assessment: The current suite of vaccines confers substantial protection. While a vaccine-resistant strain could emerge, it is likely that vaccine producers will be able to adjust their formula to keep the virus at bay. As such, we see Covid as only a modest risk to global stocks.   Risk #2: A Goods Recession Even if Covid fades from view, the dislocations caused by the pandemic will persist for a while longer. As we discussed last week, the pandemic induced a major reallocation of spending from services to goods: Overall consumer spending in the US is broadly back to its pre-pandemic trend. However, service spending remains below trend while goods spending is above trend (Chart 3). Retail sales, which are dominated by goods, are also firmly above trend (Chart 4). We do not expect spending on goods to drop off anytime soon. A variety of manufactured goods, ranging from automobiles to major appliances, remain in short supply. The need to fill backorders and replenish inventories will keep production elevated for the next four quarters. However, at some point in the second half of 2022, manufacturers and retailers could find themselves with a glut of goods on their hands. Chart 4AUS Retail Spending Is Well Above Trend (I) Chart 4BUS Retail Spending Is Well Above Trend (II) Manufacturing accounts for only 11% of US GDP. However, goods producers account for about a third of S&P 500 market capitalization. Thus, while a slowdown in spending on goods is unlikely to push the US into recession, it could cause S&P 500 earnings growth to slow sharply, similar to what occurred during the 2015-16 manufacturing recession (Chart 5). Our Assessment: A goods recession represents a threat to both US and overseas stocks, particularly manufacturers and retailers. Most likely, however, that threat will not become visible to investors until next year.   Risk #3: Higher Real Bond Yields Stocks represent a claim on future corporate cash flows. Higher real interest rates reduce the present value of those claims, leading to lower stock prices. Chart 6 shows that there is a strong correlation between the US 10-year TIPS yield and the forward P/E ratio for the stock market. Chart 5The 2015-16 Manufacturing Recession Weighed On Earnings Chart 6Higher Real Rates Would Be A Headwind For Equity Valuations US real yields jumped in the wake of July’s stellar employment report. However, they still remain negative and far below pre-pandemic levels. Looking out, real yields could rise for two diametrically different reasons. On the one hand, an adverse demand shock could drive up real yields by pushing down inflationary expectations. This is precisely what happened during the early days of the pandemic.     Such a deflationary shock could arise if a vaccine-resistant variant emerges or if spending on manufactured goods declines faster than we expect. The failure of the US Congress to pass the infrastructure bill and/or a budget reconciliation bill could also exacerbate fiscal tightening next year. Under current law, fiscal policy will subtract around two percentage points from growth next year (Chart 7). Chart 7After A Strong Boost, Fiscal Thrust Is Turning Negative On the other hand, real yields could rise if an overheated economy prompts the Fed to hike rates more aggressively than markets are discounting. The US 10-year yield tends to track expected policy rates three years out (Chart 8). Chart 810-Year Treasurys Track Expected Policy Rates Three Years Out Chart 9Both The Fed And Market Participants Have Revised Down Their Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Of Interest   An increase in the market’s estimate of the terminal rate could also push up real yields. According to the New York Fed’s survey of primary dealers and market participants, investors think that the fed funds rate will top out at around 2%. Not only is this extremely low by historic standards, but it is also lower than the Fed’s estimate of the terminal rate (Chart 9). In the past, we have made a distinction between the strong- and weak-form versions of secular stagnation. The strong-form version is one where an economy is unable to reach full employment even with zero interest rates. Japan is a good example. The weak-form version is one where the economy can achieve full employment but only in the presence of low positive interest rates (Chart 10). Chart 10Strong- Versus Weak-Form Secular Stagnation In many respects, weak-form secular stagnation is better for equities than the normal state of affairs where the economy is at full employment and interest rates are near their historic average. This is because weak-form secular stagnation allows equity investors to have their cake and eat it too – to enjoy full employment and high corporate profits, all with the persistent tailwind of very low rates. Our Assessment: Our baseline view on the US envisions a goldilocks scenario of sorts: An economy that is hot enough to keep deflationary forces at bay, but not so hot that the Fed has to intervene to raise rates. While there are risks on both sides of this view, they are fairly modest. US households are sitting on nearly $2.5 trillion in excess savings, which should support consumption over the next few years. BCA’s geopolitical team, led by Matt Gertken, thinks that there is an 80% chance that Congress will pass an infrastructure bill. Assuming an infrastructure bill passes, they also see a 65% chance that the Democrats will succeed in pushing through a watered-down $3.5 trillion budget reconciliation bill. Meanwhile, as the July CPI report illustrates, inflationary forces are already starting to die down, which should keep rate expectations from rising too rapidly.   Risk #4: Higher US Corporate Tax Rates Chart 11Bettors Expect US Corporate Tax Rates To Rise, But Not By Much Congress’ passage of a budget reconciliation bill would blunt some of the fiscal tightening slated for next year. However, to pay for the additional spending, Democrats will seek to levy more taxes on corporations and higher-income earners. The Biden Administration is aiming to raise the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%, bringing it halfway back to the 35% level that prevailed prior to the Trump tax cuts. Joe Manchin, a key swing voter in the Senate, has indicated a preference for 25%. PredictIt, a popular betting site, assigns 31% odds to no tax hike. Among bettors forecasting higher tax rates, the median estimate is around 25% (Chart 11). Analyst estimates do not appear to reflect the prospect of higher taxes. This is not surprising. Chart 12 shows that analysts did not adjust their earnings estimates until shortly after President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act into law on December 22, 2017. Chart 12Analysts Have Not Adjusted Their Earnings Estimates To Reflect The Likelihood Of Higher Taxes Chart 13Until Recently, Companies That Stand To Lose The Most From Higher Taxes Have Fared Well It is more difficult to know what markets are discounting. Chart 13 displays the performance of Goldman‘s “Formerly High Tax” and “Formerly Low Tax” equity baskets. The formerly high-taxed companies gained the most from Trump’s tax cuts and presumably would lose the most if the tax cuts were rolled back. While formerly high-taxed companies have underperformed the market since early May, they are still up relative to their low-taxed peers since the Georgia runoff election, which handed control of the Senate to the Democrats. Moreover, companies that are vulnerable to higher taxes on overseas profits – many of which are in the tech space – have continued to fare well. Our Assessment: BCA’s geopolitical team thinks that corporate taxes will rise more than current market expectations suggest. However, even under our baseline scenario, higher tax rates will only cut earnings-per-share for S&P 500 companies by about 5% in 2022. Given that earnings are expected to rise by 9% next year, this would still leave earnings growth in positive territory.   Risk #5: China The Chinese economy grew at an annualized rate of only 3.5% in the first half of 2021 (Chart 14). While stricter Covid restrictions will weigh on growth in Q3, activity should pick up again in the fourth quarter. Chart 14Chinese Growth Was Weak In The First Half of 2021 The degree to which China’s economy recovers later this year will depend on the overall policy stance. Both credit and money growth fell short of expectations in July. Aggregate social financing declined to CNY 1.06 trillion from CNY 3.7 trillion in June, missing expectations of a CNY 1.7 trillion increase. M2 money growth clocked in at 8.3% year-over-year, below consensus estimates of 8.7%. As of July, local governments had used only 37% of their annual bond issuance quota, compared with 61% over the same period last year and 78% in 2019. BCA Chief China strategist, Jing Sima, thinks that local governments were waiting for a clear signal from the Politburo meeting held on July 30th before issuing new debt. If so, the fiscal stance should turn more expansionary over the coming months. Nevertheless, Beijing continues to send conflicting messages – on the one hand, telling local governments that they need to support growth, while on the other hand admonishing them for wasteful spending. Chart 15Chinese Tech Stocks Have Underperformed Their Global Peers This Year Stepped-up regulation of China’s major internet companies has also unnerved investors. Chinese internet stocks have underperformed the global tech sector by more than 40% since February (Chart 15). Our Assessment: With credit growth back down to its 2018 lows, the authorities are likely to ease policy over the coming months. While the crackdown on internet companies will continue, it is unlikely to spill over to other sectors. Unlike Chinese companies in, say, the telecom or semiconductor sectors, Beijing does not see most online platforms as contributing much to the economy. What they do see are companies with the potential to undermine the authority of the Communist Party (and in the case of online education providers, reduce the birth rate by burdening parents with high educational expenses). Investment Conclusions Chart 16Equities Look More Attractive Than Bonds We will likely pare back equity exposure early next year. For now, however, we recommend that asset allocators maintain a modest overweight to global equities. Growth is slowing but will remain solidly above trend for the remainder of the year. The forward earnings yield on the MSCI All-Country World Index stands at 5.2%. While this is not particularly high in absolute terms, it is still very high in relation to bond yields (Chart 16). Stocks outside the US trade at a still-decent earnings yield of 6.4% (compared to 4.6% in the US). Granted, the earnings performance of many non-US companies leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, relative valuations largely discount this fact. Moreover, continued above-trend global growth, Chinese stimulus, and rising bond yields should benefit cyclical stocks and value names, which are overrepresented in overseas indices. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  The basic reproduction number, R0 (pronounced “R naught”), corresponds to the average number of people a carrier of the virus will infect in a population with no natural or vaccine-induced immunity.   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores
特別レポート Highlights A critical aspect of the diffusion of global geopolitical power – “multipolarity” – is the structural rise of India. India will gain influence in the coming five years as a growing importer of goods, services, oil, and capital. Trade with China is a positive factor in Sino-Indian relations but it will not be enough to offset the build-up of strategic tensions. Indo-Russian relations will also wane. India’s slow transition to green energy will give it greater sway in the Middle East but will not remove its vulnerability if the region destabilizes anew over Iran. Sino-Indian tensions have already affected capital flows, with the US building on its position as a major foreign investor. Feature Chart 1Sino-Pak Alliance’s Geopolitical Power Is Thrice That Of India India’s geopolitical power pales in comparison to that of the China-Pakistan alliance (Chart 1). India is traditionally an independent and “non-aligned” power that has managed conflicts with its neighbors by influencing either Russia or America to display a pro-India tilt. This strategy has held India in good stead as it helps create the illusion of a “balance of power” in the South Asian region. Structural changes are now afoot: Sino-Pakistani assertiveness toward India continues. But in a break from the past India’s Modi-led Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) has been constrained to adopt a far more assertive stance itself. Russo-Indian relations face new headwinds. Russia has been a close historical partner of India. But Russia under President Vladimir Putin has courted closer ties with China, while the US has tried to warm up with India since President Bush. Under Presidents Trump and Biden, the US is taking a more confrontational approach to Russia and China and will continue to court India. Against this backdrop the key question is this: In a multipolar world, how will India’s relations with the Great Powers evolve over the next five years? Will the alliances of the early 2000s stay the same or will they change? And if they change, what will it mean for global investors? In this special report we provide a helicopter view of India’s relations with key countries. We do so by examining India’s trade and capital flows with the world. A country’s power to a large extent is a function not only of its population and military strength but also of the business interests it represents. India today is the second largest arms importer globally (guns), fifth largest recipient of global FDI flows (capital) and third largest importer of energy (oil). Looking at the trajectory of these business relations, we quantify the magnitude and sources of India’s geopolitical power over the next five years and its investment implications. Trade: India’s Imports Not Enough To Offset China Tensions “The 11th Law of Power - Learn to Keep People Dependent on You. To maintain your independence, you must always be needed and wanted. The more you are relied on, the more freedom you have.” – Robert Greene, The 48 Laws of Power1 A small and closed economy in the 1980s, India today is large and open. Since India lacked industrial capabilities, and was energy-deficient to start with, its import needs grew manifold over this period. India’s current account deficit has increased by nine times from 1980 to 2019. The magnitude of India’s appetite for imports is such that its current account deficit is the fifth largest in the world today (Chart 2). Chart 2India Is The Fifth Largest Importer Of Goods And Services Given its lack of domestic energy and industrial capabilities, India’s role as a client of the world will only become more pronounced as it grows. In fact, India appears all set to become the third largest importer of goods and services globally over the next five years (Chart 3). Chart 3India Will Become The Third Largest Net Importer, After US And UK, By 2026 Global history suggests that the client is king. The rise and fall of empires have been driven by the strength of their economies and militaries. Great powers import lots of goods and resources – and tend to export arms. The UK’s geopolitical decline over the nineteenth century, and America’s rise over the twentieth, were linked to their respective status as importers within the global economy. India’s rise as a large global importer will prove to be a key source of diplomatic leverage over the next five years. For example, India’s high appetite for imports from China will give India much-needed leverage in bilateral relations. Also, India’s slow transition to green energy continued reliance on oil will strengthen its bargaining power vis-à-vis oil producers. But these trends also bring challenges. Structurally, Sino-Indian tensions are rising and trade will not be enough to prevent them. Meanwhile dependency on the volatile Middle East is a geopolitical vulnerability. China: India’s Growing Might As A Consumer Increases Leverage Vis-à-Vis China China’s rising assertiveness in South Asia and India’s own inclination to adopt an assertive foreign policy stance will lead to structurally higher geopolitical tensions in the region. So, is a full-blooded confrontation between the two nigh? No. First, Sino-Indian wars have always been constrained by geography: they are separated by the Himalayas, which help to keep their territorial disputes contained, driving them toward proxy battles rather than direct and total war. Second, India, Pakistan, and China are nuclear-armed powers which means that war is constrained by the principle of mutually assured destruction. This principle is not absolute – world history is filled with tragedy. There are huge structural tensions lurking in the combination of China’s Eurasian strategy and growing Sino-Indian naval competition that will keep Sino-Indian geopolitical risks elevated. Nevertheless, the bar to a large-scale war remains high. In the meantime, India’s growing might as a consumer could act as a much-needed deterrent to conflict. The last two decades saw America’s share in Chinese exports decline from a peak of 21% to 17% today. With US-China relations expected to remain fraught under Biden and with the US looking to revive its strategic anchor in the Pacific and shore up its domestic manufacturing strength, China’s trade relations with America will continue to deteriorate regardless of which party holds the White House. Against such a backdrop, China will try to build stronger trading ties with countries like India whose share in China’s exports has been growing (Chart 4). After excluding Hong Kong, India today is the eighth-largest exporting destination for China. While it only accounts for 3% of China’s exports, this ratio is comparable to that of larger exporting partners like Vietnam (4% share in China’s exports), South Korea (4%), Germany (3%), Netherlands (3%), and the UK (3%). In other words, China’s need for India is underrated and growing. There are two problems with Sino-Indian trade going forward. First, the strategic tensions mentioned above could prevent trade ties from improving. Over the past decade, Sino-Indian maritime and territorial disputes have escalated while Sino-Indian trade has merely grown in line with that of other emerging markets (Chart 5). China’s rising import dependency has led it to develop both a navy and an overland Eurasian strategy. The Eurasian strategy threatens India’s security in border areas of South Asia, while India’s own naval rise and alliances heighten China’s maritime supply insecurity. These trends may or may not prevent trade from living up to its potential, but they could result in strategic conflict regardless. Chart 4Amongst Top Chinese Export Clients, India’s Importance Has Increased Chart 5India’s Imports From China Have Broadly Grown In Line With Peers Second, the trade relationship itself is imbalanced. India imports heavily from China but sells little into China. China is responsible for more than a third of India’s trade deficit. At the same time, India increasingly shares the western world’s concern about network security in a world where cheap Chinese hardware could become integral to the digital economy. If Sino-Indian diplomacy cannot redress trade imbalances, then trade will generate new geopolitical tensions rather than resolve other ones. One should expect China to court India in the context of rising American and western strategic pressure. Yet China has failed to do so. Why? Because China’s economic transition – falling export orientation and declining potential GDP – is motivating a rise in nationalism and an assertive foreign policy. Meanwhile India’s own economic difficulties – the need to create jobs for a growing population – are generating an opposing wave of nationalism. Thus, while Sino-Indian trade will discourage conflict on the margin, it may not be enough to prevent it over the long run. Oil: As India Lags On Green Transition, Its Significance As An Oil Consumer Will Rise Whilst renewable energy’s share of India’s energy mix is expected to grow, the pace will be slow. Moreover, India’s increased reliance on green energy sources over the next decade will come at the expense of coal and not oil (Chart 6). Consequently, India’s reliance on oil for its energy needs is expected to stay meaningful. Chart 6India’s Reliance On Oil Will Persist For The Next Decade And Beyond Chart 7India’s Importance As An Oil Client Has Been Rising The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts that India’s net dependence on imported oil for its overall oil needs will increase from 75% today to above 90% by 2040. But India’s relative importance as an oil client will also grow as most large oil consumers will be able to transition to green energy faster than India. In fact, data pertaining to the last decade confirms that this trend is already underway. India’s share of the global oil trade has been rising (Chart 7). In particular, India has taken advantage of Iraq’s rise as a producer after the second Gulf War and has marginally increased imports from Saudi Arabia (Chart 8). Chart 8India’s Importance As A Client Has Been Rising For Top Oil Exporters Iran is the country most likely to gain from this dynamic in the coming years – if the US and Iran strike a deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the US lifting economic sanctions. India has maintained stable imports from the Middle East over the past decade despite nominally eliminating imports of oil from Iran (Chart 9). Chart 9India Has Maintained Stable Imports From The Middle East However, while India will have greater bargaining power between OPEC and non-OPEC suppliers, dependency on the unstable Middle East is always a geopolitical liability. If the US and Iran fail to arrive at a deal, a regional conflict is likely, in which case India’s slow green transition and vulnerability to supply disruptions will become a costly liability. Bottom Line: India’s growing importance to both Chinese manufacturers and global oil producers will give it leverage in trade negotiations. However, ultimately, national security will trump economics when it comes to China, while India will remain extremely vulnerable to instability in the Middle East. Guns: Indo-Russian Relations Weaken “When the war broke out [between India & Pakistan in 1971], the Soviet Union cast aside all pretentions of neutrality and non-partisanship… the Russians were in no hurry to terminate the fighting since their interest was better served by the continuation of hostilities leading to an India victory … The factors that decisively determined the outcome of the war were: first, Soviet military assistance to India; secondly the USSR’s role in the UN Security council; and thirdly, Russia strategy to prevent a direct Chinese intervention in the war.” – Zubeida Mustafa, "The USSR and the Indo-Pakistan War"2 The true origins of Russia’s pro-India tilt can be traced back to 1971. The former Soviet Union’s support for India played a critical role in helping India win the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Half a century later the Indo-Russia relationship persists, but its intensity has declined and will continue declining over the next few years. We see three reasons: America’s withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan will allow the US to focus more intently on its rivalry with China and Russia – a dynamic that is reinforcing China’s and Russia’s move closer together. Meanwhile India’s relationship with the US continues to improve. The China-Pakistan alliance continues to strengthen. Beyond cooperation on China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, Pakistan shares a deep relationship with China based on defense and trade (Chart 10). Hence India is distrustful of closer Russo-Chinese relations. In light of this strategic re-alignment, Russia may see value in developing a closer defense relationship with China. Trading relations between Russia and India are minimal even today. Hence unlike in the case of China, there exists no backstop on weakening of Russo-Indian relations. Less than 1.5% of India’s merchandise imports come from Russia and less than 1% of India’s exports go to Russia. Russia’s share of Indian oil imports has grown in recent years but only to 1.4% of total. Meanwhile the US share of India’s imports has catapulted to 5.7% since the US became an exporter. Any removal of Iran sanctions will come at the cost of other Middle Eastern exporters, not these two alternatives to the risky Persian Gulf, but Russia’s share is still small. Now the backbone of Indo-Russia relations has been their arms trade. However, India’s reliance on Russia for arms could decline over the next five years. India today is Russia’s largest arms client accounting for 23% of its arms sales (Chart 10). However, second in line is China which accounts for 18% of Russia’s arms sales. Given that Russia’s share in global arms exports has been declining (Chart 11), Russia will be keen to reverse or at least halt this trend. Russia can do so most easily by selling more arms to India or to China. Even as China appears to be increasingly focused on developing indigenous arms production capabilities, for reasons of strategy, China appears like a better client for Russia to bank on for the next decade. After all, in 1989, when western countries imposed an arms embargo against China in response to events at Tiananmen Square, Russia became the prime supplier of arms to China. Chart 10India Is A Key Client For Russia, As Is China By contrast, for reasons of strategy India appears like a less promising client to bank on for Russia. India’s import demand for arms has been declining while China’s demand is increasing (Chart 12). India under the Modi-led Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) has been reducing its reliance on imported arms. Last month, for example, the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) said that it has set aside 64% of the defense capital budget for acquisitions from domestic companies.3 This is an increase of 6% over last year, which was the first time such a distinction between domestic and foreign defense expenditure was made. Whilst it will take years for India to develop its domestic arms production capabilities, India’s inward tilt is worrying for traditional suppliers like Russia. Chart 11Among Top Arms Exporters, Russia Is Losing Market Share Chart 12India’s Appetite For Arms Imports Is Falling Moreover, Russia is aware that the situation is rife for US-India arms trade to strengthen given that India is starting to display a pro-US tilt. Groundwork for a sound defense relationship with India has already been laid out by the US as evinced by: Foundational agreements: India and the US signed the Communications, Compatibility, and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020. Sanction exemptions: The US had applied sanctions on Turkey under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system in 2020. The US has threatened India with CAATSA sanctions for buying S-400 missile defense systems from Russia but has not applied these sanctions to India (at least not yet). Not applying CAATSA sanctions to India allows the US to strengthen its strategic relations with India that can help further the American goal of creating a counter to China in Asia. Bottom Line: India-Russia relations will remain amicable, but this relationship is bound to fade over the next five years as the US counters China and Russia. Limited backstops exist for Indo-Russia ties. Economic ties between India and Russia are minimal, as India is cutting back on arms imports and only marginally increasing oil imports. Capital: China Investment Down, US Investment Up “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.” – Henry Kissinger, Former US Secretary of State India’s economic growth rates could be higher if it did not have to deal with the paradox of plentiful savings alongside capital scarcity. Even as Indian households are known to be thrifty, only a limited portion of their savings is available for being borrowed by small firms. Almost a quarter of bank deposits are blocked in government securities. More than a third of adjusted net bank credit must be made available for government-directed lending. With what is left, banks prefer lending the residual funds to large top-rated corporates. It is against this backdrop that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows provide much needed succor to Indian corporates, particularly capital-guzzling start-ups. FDI inflows into India have become a key source of funding for Indian corporates over the last decade with annual FDI flows often exceeding new bank credit. Correspondingly, for FDI investors, India provides the promise of high returns on investment in an emerging market that offers political stability. India emerged as the fifth largest FDI destination globally in 2020. Amongst suppliers of FDI into India (excluding tax havens like Cayman Islands), the US and China have been top contributors. Whilst China has been a leading investor into the Indian start-up space, geopolitical tensions have translated into regulatory barriers that prevent Chinese funds from investing in India. Separately, as Indo-US relations improve, the symbiotic relationship between capital-rich US funds and capital-hungry Indian start-ups should strengthen. In fact, in 2020 itself, Chinese private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) investments into India shrank whilst American investments into India doubled, according to Venture Intelligence (Chart 13). Distinct from Chinese funds’ restrained ability to invest in Indian firms, Indian tech start-ups could potentially benefit from reduced global investor appetite in Chinese tech stocks owing to China’s regulatory crackdown and breakup with the United States. China’s foreign policy assertiveness and domestic policy uncertainty may lead to a reallocation of FDI flows away from China and into India. China (including Hong Kong) has been a top host country for FDI, attracting 4x times more funds than India (Chart 14). However, India’s ability to absorb these reallocated funds over the next five years will be a function of sectoral competencies. For instance, India’s information and communications technology (ICT) sector appears best positioned to benefit from this trend. But the same may not be the case for sectors like manufacturing that traditionally attract large FDI flows in China yet are relatively underdeveloped in India. On the goods’ front, given that India’s comparative advantage lies in the production of capital-light, labor-light and medium-tech intensive products, pharmaceuticals and chemicals could be two other industries that attract FDI flows in India. Chart 13Chinese PE/VC Investments Into India In 2020 Slowed Significantly Chart 14China Has Been A Top Host Country For FDI, Attracting 4x More Flows Than India Bottom Line: Whilst trade between India and China has not been affected much by geopolitical tensions, capital flows have been. Given that the US historically has been a top FDI contributor in India, and given improving Indo-US relations, FDI investment into India from the US appears set to rise steadily over the next five years, particularly into the ICT sector. Investment Conclusions China-India geopolitical tensions are here to stay and will be a recurring feature of South Asia’s geopolitical landscape. However, a growing trade relationship could discourage conflict, especially if it becomes more balanced. It may not be enough to prevent conflict forever but it is an important constraint to acknowledge. India’s current account deficit will remain vulnerable to swings in oil prices, but it may be able to manage its energy bill better as its bargaining power relative to oil suppliers improves. The problem then will become energy insecurity, particularly if the US and Iran fail to normalize relations. As India and Russia explore new alignments with USA and China respectively, the historic Indo-Russia relationship will weaken. It will not collapse entirely because Russia provides a small but growing alternative to Mideast oil. US-India business interests may deepen as India considers joint ventures with American arms manufacturers and American funds court India’s capital-hungry information and communications technology sector. Against this backdrop we reiterate our constructive strategic view on India. However, for the next 12 months, we remain worried about near-term geopolitical and macro headwinds that India must confront.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 (Viking Press, 1998). 2 Mustafa, Zubeida. "The USSR and the Indo-Pakistan War, 1971" Pakistan Horizon 25, No. 1 (1972): 45-52. 3 Ajai Shukla, "Local procurement for defence to see 6% hike this year: Govt to Parliament" Business Standard, July 2021.
Highlights Going into the new crop year, we expect the course of the broad trade-weighted USD to dictate the path taken by grain and bean prices (Chart of the Week). Higher corn stocks in the coming crop year, flat wheat stocks and lower rice stocks will leave grain markets mostly balanced vs the current crop year.  Soybean stocks and carryover estimates from the USDA and International Grains Council (IGC) are essentially unchanged year-on-year (y/y). In the IGC's estimates, changes in production, trade, and consumption for the major grains and beans largely offset each other, leaving carryovers unchanged. Supply-demand fundamentals leave our outlook for grains and beans neutral.  This does not weaken our conviction that continued global weather volatility will tip the balance of price risk in grains and beans over the coming year to the upside. Our strategically bearish USD view also tips the balance of price risk in grains – and commodities generally – to the upside. We believe positioning for higher-volatility weather events and a lower US dollar is best done with index products like the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF, which tracks a version of the GSCI optimized for backwardation.  Feature Chart of the WeekUSD Will Drive Global Grain Markets Chart 2Opening, Closing Grain Stocks Will Be Largely Unchanged Going into the new crop year, opening and closing stocks are expected to remain flat overall vs the current crop years, with changes in production and consumption largely offsetting each other in grain and bean markets (Chart 2).1 This will leave overall prices a function of weather – which no one can predict – and the path taken by the USD over the coming year. The IGC's forecast calls for mostly unchanged production and consumption for grains and beans globally, with trade volumes mostly flat y/y. This leaves global end-of-crop-year carryover stocks essentially unchanged at 594mm tons. The USDA expects wheat ending stocks at the end of the '21/22 crop year up a slight 0.5%; rice down ~ 4.5%, and corn up ~ 4%. Below we go through each of the grain and bean fundamentals, and assess the impact of COVID-19 on global trade in these commodities. We then summarize our overall view for the grain and bean complex, and our positioning recommendations. Rice The IGC forecasts higher global rice production and consumption, and, since they expect both to change roughly by the same amount, ending stocks are projected to remain unchanged in the '21/22 crop year relative to the current year (Chart 3). The USDA, on the other hand, is expecting global production to increase by ~ 1mm MT in the new crop year, with consumption increasing by ~ 8mm MT. This leaves ending inventories for the new crop year just under 8mm MT below '20/21 ending stocks, or 4.5%. Chart 3Global Rice Balances Roughly Unchanged Corn The IGC forecasts global corn production will rise 6.5% to a record high in the '21/22 crop year, while global consumption is expected to increase 3.6%. Trade volumes are expected to fall ~ 4.2%, leaving global carryover stocks roughly unchanged (Chart 4). In the USDA's modelling, global production is expected to rise 6.6% in the '21/22 crop year to 1,195mm MT, while consumption is projected to rise ~ 2.4% to 1,172mm MT. The Department expects ending balances to increase ~ 11mm MT, ending next year at 291.2mm MT, or just over 4% higher. Chart 4Corn Balances Y/Y Remain Flat Wheat The IGC forecasts global wheat production in the current crop year will increase by ~ 16mm MT y/y, which will be a record if realized. Consumption is expected to rise 17mm MT, with trade roughly unchanged. This leaves expected carryover largely unchanged at ~ 280mm MT globally (Chart 5). The USDA's forecast largely agrees with the IGC's in its ending-stocks assessment for the new crop year. Global wheat production is expected to increase 16.6mm MT y/y in '21/22, and consumption will rise ~ 13mm MT, or 1.7% y/y. Ending stocks for the new crop year are expected to come in at just under 292mm MT, or 0.5% higher. Chart 5Ending Wheat Stocks Mostly Unchanged Soybeans Both the IGC and USDA expect increases in soybean ending stocks for the '21/22 crop year. However, the USDA’s estimates for ending stocks are nearly double the IGC projections.2 We use the IGC's estimates in Chart 6 to depicts balances. USDA - 2021/22 global soybean ending stocks are set to increase by ~3 mm MT to 94.5 mm MT, as higher stocks from Brazil and Argentina are partly offset by lower Chinese inventories. US production is expected to make up more than 30% of total production, rising 6% year-on-year. Chart 6Higher Bean Production Meets Higher Consumption Impact Of COVID-19 On Ags Trade Global agricultural trade was mostly stable throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. China was the main driver for this resilience, accounting for most of the increase in agricultural imports from 2019 to 2020. Ex-China, global agricultural trade growth was nearly zero. During this period, China was rebuilding its hog stocks after an outbreak of the African Swine Flu, which prompted the government to grant waivers on tariffs in key import sectors, which increased trade under the US-China Phase One agreement. As a result, apart from COVID-19, other factors were influencing trade. Arita et. al. (2021) attempted to isolate the impact of COVID on global agricultural trade.3 Their report found that COVID-19 – through infections and deaths – had a small impact on global agricultural trade. Government policy restrictions and reduced mobility in response to the pandemic were more detrimental to agricultural trade flows than the virus itself in terms of reducing aggregate demand. Policy restrictions and lower mobility reduced trade by ~ 10% and ~ 6% on average over the course of the year. Monthly USDA data shows that the pandemic was not as detrimental to agricultural trade as past events. Rates of decline in global merchandise trade were sharper during the Great Recession of 2007 – 2009 (Chart 7). Many agricultural commodities are necessities, which are income inelastic. Furthermore, shipping channels for these types of commodities did not require substantial human interactions, which reduced the chances of this trade being a transmission vector for the virus, when governments declared many industries using and producing agricultural commodities as necessities. This could explain why agricultural trade was spared by the pandemic. Amongst agricultural commodities, the impact of the pandemic was heterogenous. For necessities such as grains or oilseeds, there was a relatively small effect, and in few instances, trade actually grew. For example, trade in rice increased by ~4%. The value of trade in higher-end items, such as hides, Chart 7COVID-19 Spares Ag Trade Chart 8Grains Rallied During Pandemic tobacco, wine, and beer fell during the pandemic. This was further proof of the income inelasticity of many agricultural products which kept global trade in this sector resilient. Indeed, the UNCTAD estimates global trade for agriculture foods increased 18% in 1Q21 relative to 1Q19. Over this period, Bloomberg's spot grains index was up 47.08% (Chart 8). Investment Implications We remain neutral grains and beans based on our assessment of the new crop-year fundamentals. That said, we have a strong-conviction view global weather volatility will tip the balance of price risk in grains over the coming year to the upside. Our strategically bearish USD view also tips the balance of price risk in grains – and commodities generally – to the upside. Weather-induced grain and bean prices volatility is supportive for our recommendations in the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF, which tracks a version of the GSCI optimized for backwardation. These positions are up 5.8% and 7.9% since inception, and are strategic holdings for us.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish US natural gas prices remain well supported by increased power-generation demand due to heat waves rolling through East and West coasts, lower domestic production and rising exports. The US EIA estimates natgas demand for July rose 3.9 bcf/d vs June, taking demand for the month to 75.8 bcf/d. Exports – pipeline and LNG – rose 0.4 bcf/d to 18.2 bcf/d, while US domestic production fell to 92.7 bcf/d, down 0.2 bcf/d from June's levels. As US and European distribution companies and industrials continue to scramble for gas to fill inventories, we expect natgas to remain well bid as the storage-injection season winds down. We remain long 1Q22 call spreads, which are up ~214% since the position was recommended April 8, 2021 (Chart 9). Base Metals: Bullish Labor and management at BHP's Escondida copper mine – the largest in the world – have a tentative agreement to avoid a strike that would have crippled an already-tight market. The proposed contract likely will be voted on by workers over the next two days, according to reuters.com. Separately, the head of a trade group representing Chile's copper miners said prices likely will remain high over the next 2-3 years as demand from renewables and electric vehicles continues to grow. Diego Hernández, president of the National Society of Mining (SONAMI), urged caution against expecting a more extended period of higher prices, however, mining.com reported (Chart 10). We remain bullish base metals generally, copper in particular, which we expect to remain well-bid over the next five years. Precious Metals: Bullish US CPI for July rose 0.5% month-over-month, suggesting the inflation spike in June was transitory. While lower inflation may reduce demand for gold, it will allow the Fed to continue its expansionary monetary policy. The strong jobs report released on Friday prompted markets and some Fed officials to consider tapering asset purchases sooner than previously expected. The jobs report also boosted an increasing US dollar. A strong USD and an increase in employment were negative for gold prices on Monday. There also were media reports of a brief “flash crash” caused by an attempt to sell a large quantity of gold early in the Asian trading day, which swamped available liquidity at the time. This also was believed to trigger stops and algorithmic trading programs, which exacerbated the move. The potential economic impact of the COVID-19 Delta variant is the only unequivocally supportive development for gold prices. Not only will this increase safe-have demand for gold, but it will also prevent the Fed from being too hasty in tapering its asset purchases and subsequently raising interest rates. Chart 9 Chart 10 Footnotes 1     The wheat crop year in the US begins in June; the rice crop year begins this month; and the corn and bean crop years begin in September. 2     Historical data indicate this difference is persistent, suggesting different methods of calculating ending stocks.  The USDA estimates ending stocks for the '21/22 crop year will be 94.5mm tons, while the IGC is projecting a level of 53.8mm.  3    Please refer to ‘Has Global Agricultural Trade Been Resilient Under Coronavirus (COVID-19)? Findings from an Econometric Assessment. This is a working paper published by Shawn Arita, Jason Grant, Sharon Sydow, and Jayson Beckman in May 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades
Highlights Since 2008, the 10-year T-bond yield has struggled to exceed the earnings yield on technology stocks minus a constant of 2.5 percent. Based on the current technology earnings yield of 3.8 percent, and the 10-year T-bond yield at 1.3 percent, stock markets are on the edge of rationality. But at the limit, the elastic can briefly stretch by around 0.5 percent before it eventually snaps back. Hence, the 10-year T-bond yield could make a brief trip to 1.8 percent before reversing. The labour market participation rate for African Americans dropped sharply in July to 2.3 percent below its pre-pandemic benchmark level. The weakest performing demographic group could set the employment condition for the Fed’s lift-off, making it later than the market is pricing. The next shock will drive down the T-bond yield to its ultimate low, and the stock market’s valuation to its ultimate high. Fractal analysis: NOK/GBP, Hong Kong versus the world, and Netherlands versus New Zealand. Feature Chart of the WeekSince 2008, The 10-Year T-Bond Yield Has Struggled to Exceed the Earnings Yield On Tech (Minus A Constant Of 2.5 Percent) Since 2008, a remarkable financial relationship has held true. The 10-year T-bond yield has struggled to exceed the earnings yield on technology stocks minus a constant of 2.5 percent. The 10-year T-bond yield has struggled to exceed the earnings yield on technology stocks minus a constant of 2.5 percent. T-bond yield ≤ technology forward earnings yield – 2.5% (Chart I-1). The upshot is that whenever, as now, the yields on tech and other high-flying growth stocks have become depressed – which is to say highly valued – the upper limit to the bond yield has been established not by the economy, but by the financial markets. On the occasions that the bond yield has attempted to breach its stock market-set upper limit, it has unleashed a self-correcting sequence of events. It has pulled up the tech sector earnings yield, which is to say pulled down the tech sector’s valuation and price. Then, to contain and reverse this sharp sell-off, the bond yield has quickly unwound its short-lived spike. Stock Markets Are On The Edge Of Rationality Earlier this year in The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational we highlighted that the T-bond yield was at its stock market-set upper limit. And in the subsequent six months, the markets have behaved exactly as predicted. First, tech stocks declined sharply through February-March. Then, bond yields declined sharply through May-July, allowing tech stocks to claw back their declines and then reach new highs. Indeed, since mid-February, the T-bond yield and tech stocks have moved as a near-perfect mirror image (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The T-Bond Yield And Tech Stocks Have Moved As A Near-Perfect Mirror Image In the long run, a depressed earnings yield relative to the bond yield – which is to say a high valuation – can normalise as earnings go up. But in the short term, the adjustment must come from either the equity price declining or the bond yield declining. Or some combination of the two. With the tech earnings yield now at 3.8 percent – and assuming the post-GFC 2.5 percent minimum gap still holds true – it would set the upper limit of the 10-year T-bond yield at 1.3 percent, close to where it is trading today. Still, at the limit, the elastic can briefly stretch before it eventually snaps back. Over the last thirteen years, the maximum stretch has been around 0.5 percent. This means that, based on the current earnings yield of the tech sector, the 10-year T-bond yield could make a brief trip to 1.8 percent before reversing. For equity investors, a higher T-bond yield would support the value versus growth trade. But given that it would be a brief trip, the opportunity would not be cyclical (12-month) but merely tactical (3-month), as has been the case over the past ten years. Since 2012, cyclical opportunities to overweight value versus growth have been virtually non-existent, but there have been several good tactical opportunities (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3Cyclical Opportunities To Overweight Value Versus Growth Have Been Virtually Non-Existent... Chart I-4...But There Have Been Several Good Tactical Opportunities We await a fractal signal that T-bonds are overbought to initiate this tactical trade. Stay tuned. The Truth About The Jobs Recovery At first glance, last week’s US employment report appeared strong. The unemployment rate continued its plunge from 14.8 percent in April 2020 to 5.4 percent in July 2021, constituting the fastest jobs recovery of all time. But the first glance doesn’t tell the true story.   Unlike in previous recessions, the number of workers put on furlough or ‘temporary layoff’ surged and then plunged as the pandemic let rip and then was brought under control. Hence, to get the true story of the jobs recovery, we must strip out the furloughed workers and focus on the unemployment rate based on those ‘not on temporary layoff’ (Chart I-5). Chart I-5To Get The True Story Of The Jobs Recovery, Focus On Those 'Not On Temporary Layoff' Based on this truer measure of labour market slack, the pace of the current recovery in jobs looks remarkably like the recoveries that followed previous downturns in 1974/75, the early 1980s, the early 1990s, dot com bust, and the GFC. The true story is that the US is little more than a third of the way on the journey to full employment (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Pace Of The Current Jobs Recovery Looks Remarkably Like Previous Recoveries This is significant, because unlike in previous recoveries, the Federal Reserve is now explicitly targeting full employment before it lifts the policy interest rate. Furthermore, the employment recovery must be broad and inclusive of minority demographic groups, which adds further conditionality for the Fed. While the market is focussing on the aggregate employment market, it is the weakest performing demographic group that could set the condition for the Fed’s lift-off. On this note, the labour market participation rate for African Americans dropped sharply in July to 2.3 percent below its pre-pandemic benchmark level (Chart I-7). This raises an interesting point. While the market is focussing on the aggregate employment market, it is the weakest performing demographic group that could set the condition for lift-off, if the Fed stays true to its promise of inclusivity. Which would push back lift-off to later than the market is pricing. Chart I-7The Labour Market Participation Rate For African Americans Dropped Sharply In July Shocks Do Not Have A Cycle According to the recovery in jobs then, we are still ‘early cycle.’ Some people argue that early cycle implies that a recession is a distant prospect, that stocks only underperform in a recession, and therefore that the bull market in stocks has further to run. The investment conclusion is right, but the reasoning is wrong, on two counts. First, nobody can predict the precise timing of recessions or shocks. Second, recessions or shocks do not have a ‘cycle.’ Shocks can come in quickfire succession such as the back-to-back GFC in 2008 and the euro debt crisis which started in 2010, or the back-to-back votes for Brexit and Trump in 2016 (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Shocks Do Not Have A Cycle Yet, while we cannot predict the precise timing of shocks, The Shock Theory Of Bond Yields tells us that we can predict their statistical distribution very accurately. The upshot is that in any 5-year period, the probability of (at least) one shock is an extremely high 81 percent, and in any 10-year period, it is a near-certain 96 percent.  Given the tight feedback from bond yields to stocks and then back to bond yields, we can say with high conviction that the next shock will drive down the T-bond yield to its ultimate low. This will happen directly from a deflationary shock, or indirectly from an initially inflationary shock that drives up bond yields through the upper limit set by stock valuations. The resulting sharp correction in stocks will then cause bond yields to reverse to the ultimate low. The next shock will drive down the T-bond yield to its ultimate low, and the stock market’s valuation to its ultimate high. In turn, the ultimate low in the T-bond yield will mark the ultimate high in the stock market’s valuation, and the end of the structural bull market in stocks. Until then, long-term investors should own stocks. Fractal Analysis Update This week’s fractal analysis highlights three recent price moves that are at risk of reversal because of fragile fractal structures. First, the recent sell-off in NOK/GBP has become fragile on its 65-day fractal structure implying a likelihood of a countertrend move based on similar recent signals (Chart I-9). Chart I-9NOK/GBP Is Oversold Second, the sell-off following China’s aggressive crackdown on its technology and private education sectors has created fragility in Hong Kong’s relative performance on its composite 65-day/130-day fractal dimension. Assuming the worst of the policy crackdown is over, this would imply a countertrend reversal based on similar signals over the past decade. The recommended trade is long Hong Kong versus developed world (MSCI indexes), setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 4 percent (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Hong Kong Versus The World Is Oversold Finally, the massive outperformance of tech-heavy Netherlands versus healthcare and utility-heavy New Zealand has reached the limit of fragility on its 260-day fractal structure that signalled major turning points in 2011, 2015, 2016, and 2018 (Chart I-11). Hence the recommended trade is short Netherlands versus New Zealand, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 13 percent. Chart I-11Netherlands Versus New Zealand Is Overbought   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  
Highlights The greatest legislative battle of the Biden presidency will unfold between now and the end of the year.   Biden’s bipartisan infrastructure deal is likely to pass the Senate soon but will have to cross several hurdles before passage in the House of Representatives. We maintain our 80% subjective odds that it will pass one way or another. Assuming the infrastructure bill does not fall apart, we will upgrade the odds that Biden’s budget reconciliation bill will pass this fall from 50% to 65%. The latter comprises a nominal $3.5 trillion in social spending and tax hikes that will be watered down and revised heavily by the time it passes, which may take until Christmas. Uncertainty about passage will cause volatility to rise in financial markets. Democrats left the debt ceiling out of their fiscal 2022 budget resolution, which ostensibly means they cannot raise the debt limit via a simple majority but will need 10 Republican senators to join. A bruising standoff will ensue that will add to volatility. Ultimately Republicans will comply as they cannot afford to be held responsible for a default on the national debt. The party is currently unpopular and tarred with accusations of insurrection. If Biden succeeds in passing both bills, US fiscal policy will be frozen in place through at least 2025, though endogenous disinflationary fears will largely be dispelled. Feature The biggest domestic political battle of the Joe Biden presidency is likely to occur between now and Christmas. With a one-seat de facto majority in the Senate, and a four-seat majority in the House, Biden is barely capable of passing his two outstanding legislative proposals. The first of these is the $550 billion bipartisan infrastructure deal, which we have given an 80% subjective chance of passing and which passed the Senate on a 69-30 vote margin as we went to press. The second is the $3.5 trillion partisan reconciliation package, based on the remainder of Biden’s American Jobs and Families Plan, which we have given a 50% chance of passage. We will upgrade these odds to 65% if bipartisan infrastructure does not fall through in the House. Next year will be consumed by campaigning for the 2022 midterms so it will be hard to pass any major legislation with such thin majorities (though bipartisan anti-trust legislation could pass and poses a risk to the equity market). The midterms are likely – though not guaranteed – to result in Republicans taking at least the House. The result will be gridlock in which only the rare bipartisan bill can pass. In other words, after Christmas, Biden’s domestic legislative capability and hence US fiscal policy will likely be frozen in place through 2025. In this report we provide a road map for the budget battle that will define the Biden presidency. Buy The Dip … Unless New Variants Change The Game First, a brief word regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. The Delta variant is ramping up, particularly in states where vaccination rates have lagged and social restrictions are minimal (Chart 1). The new lambda variant is also causing concerns that vaccines may be inadequate. Equity markets could easily suffer more downside in the near term but US-dedicated investors should consider the following: Scientists have created one vaccine for COVID-19 and can create others. There has been a concrete reduction in uncertainty since November 2020. Vaccination rates will never be perfect – many people smoke cigarettes and refuse to wear seat belts! – but greater infection rates and hospitalizations are leading to improvements in vaccination coverage. While new lockdowns are not impossible, the public will only support them as a last resort. Not only is the White House still officially opposed to new lockdowns but also the authority to impose lockdowns rests with governors. If hospital systems are crashing then even Republican governors will endorse new social restrictions. Otherwise, restrictions will not be draconian unless a much more virulent variant emerges (one that is more deadly or that has a worse impact on children). Monetary and fiscal stimulus will ramp up if a new variant is more deadly or the economy otherwise starts to slide back. In the US, additional fiscal stimulus will come faster than in other countries because new short-term measures can easily be tacked onto major bills that are already coming down the pike. Chart 1Stay Constructive Amid Delta Jitters Might the White House leverage a renewed sense of crisis to get its main fiscal bills passed? We can see that. The last thing Biden needs is a sluggish recovery to translate into congressional gridlock in the 2022 midterms – the bane of the Obama administration. Rather, the goal is to harness the sense of crisis to pass stimulus. Biden’s approval rating is falling, as is the norm with modern presidents. However, it is still “above water” (net positive) and still sufficient to get his legislative initiatives across the line. Biden’s forthcoming bills will reinforce economic recovery and sentiment (Chart 2) Chart 2Biden’s Approval Comes Down To Earth What if a variant evades vaccination? Especially if it is more deadly and/or more harmful to children? That would be a game changer and would cause at least a market correction. Still, investors would want to buy the dip given what they know today relative to what they knew in early 2020 (and given that they bought the dip in March 2020 even not knowing what they know today). Bipartisan Structural Reform Our second key view for 2021 – “bipartisan structural reform” – is coming to fruition with the Senate’s 69-30 vote passage of the American Infrastructure and Jobs Act as we go to press. Major bipartisan deals are rare in highly polarized America but we have given an 80% subjective chance of passage to this bill. Passage in the Senate reinforces that view, though the odds of final passage remain the same as there will be hurdles in the House. We include infrastructure as a “structural reform” because of its ability to increase the productivity of an economy. The bill contains funding for traditional infrastructure, like roads, bridges, and ports, as well as non-traditional infrastructure such as subsidies for electric vehicles and high-speed internet (Table 1). Table 1What’s In The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal? Table 2 shows the 19 Republican senators who voted in favor of this bipartisan deal, along with their ideological ranking and state support rates. This tally provides a nine-seat buffer in case the House version of the bill requires another Senate vote. It also provides a measure of the support that might be brought to bear for bipartisan causes later, such as funding the government, suspending the debt ceiling, or passing bills on popular issues (such as regulating Big Tech) in 2022-24. All Democrats voted in unison for the bill. Table 2Republican Senators Who Voted For Biden’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill Our high confidence on infrastructure spending stems both from its popular support (Chart 3) and from the fact that even if bipartisanship fails, there remains a partisan option: budget reconciliation. This is still true today. The bipartisan infrastructure bill could still die in the House, given Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s determination to make its passage contingent on the success of the larger reconciliation bill, which is anathema to Republicans. But if it dies, Democrats would take up the key provisions in the reconciliation bill – and the odds of that bill passing would go up, not down, since Democrats would need to close ranks to clinch a legislative victory ahead of the midterms. Chart 3Popular Support For Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal Thus the real risk is not that infrastructure spending will fail but that its success will reduce the political capital needed to pass the more controversial reconciliation bill, which we discuss below. Over the short and medium term, this bipartisan infrastructure deal emblematizes the sea change in US fiscal policy – the shift against austerity – and thus serves to dispel fears of disinflation. At the same time, the deal epitomizes America’s long-term fiscal predicament. Democrats only want to increase spending while Republicans only want to decrease taxes. The former will not make budget cuts while the latter will not hike taxes. The result, inevitably, is higher budget deficits. This is precisely what occurred with the latest agreement: tax measures to pay for new infrastructure spending are mostly chimerical – the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that only $200 billion of the new spending will be offset with new revenue. The other $350 billion will add directly to deficits and debt. The difference is small but the political signal is notable. Chart 4 highlights the increase in the deficit likely to occur, with the CBO’s more realistic assessment delineated from the nominal bill. From a macro point of view, the takeaway is that the US economy faces a stark withdrawal of government support in 2022 but this bill slightly cushions the blow. Continued recovery will depend on consumers and businesses (which look to be in good shape). Beginning in 2025 deficits will start to rise again and hence the overall picture is one in which US government support for the economy has taken a step up for the decade. Chart 4Bipartisan Deal Not Paid For = Fiscal Stimulus Side note: Chart 4 is worrisome for President Biden if his reconciliation bill fails, as it points to fiscal drag through 2024, the election year. Bottom Line: We still see an 80% chance that Biden’s infrastructure proposals will pass, as the Democrats have a backup plan if the bipartisan deal somehow collapses in the House. Biden’s Greatest Legislative Battle Up till now we have assigned 50% odds of passage to the subsequent part of the Biden agenda, the American Families Plan, which covers social spending and tax hikes (corporate and individual). If bipartisan infrastructure passes promptly, we would upgrade the reconciliation bill’s odds of passing to 65%. The reason is twofold: first, reconciliation only requires a simple majority consisting of all 50 Senate Democrats plus the vice president; second, hesitant moderate senators ultimately will be forced to recognize that sinking the bill would render the Biden presidency defunct and fan the flames of populist rebellion on both sides of the political spectrum. And yet, since Biden cannot spare a single vote, conviction levels cannot be high. Therefore 65% seems appropriate. On August 9 Senate Democrats presented a $3.5 trillion budget resolution that will form the basis of the reconciliation bill this fall. The bill contains a wish list of spending priorities, as outlined in Table 3. Most of these are familiar from last month when the Senate Budget Committee first put forward its framework. The hang-up stems from House Speaker Pelosi. Knowing that infrastructure’s passage will suck away political capital from social spending, Pelosi is attempting to link the two bills. If the Senate fails to pass the reconciliation bill, the House will not pass the infrastructure bill. This gambit will create a big increase in uncertainty this fall as the legislative battle heats up. Republicans cannot support the infrastructure bill if it is directly tied to the Democrats’ “Nanny State” debt blowout, which will be the basis for their campaign against Democrats in future. They need plausible deniability. If Pelosi insists on linking the two bills, Republican support will evaporate. True, Democrats would then proceed to partisan reconciliation – but they would need to sacrifice other agenda items, such as subsidies for green tech, college, health care, and manufacturing (see Table 3 above). Table 3Senate Democratic FY22 Budget Resolution (July 2021) Biden and the Senate are now united on the infrastructure bill. Biden and Democrats in marginal seats need a legislative victory ahead of the midterms – and a bipartisan victory on a popular policy like infrastructure is critical. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Therefore, Pelosi will probably have to concede, after gaining assurances from moderate Senate Democrats that they will not sink reconciliation. Moderate Democrats, in turn, will need to see the reconciliation bill watered down, both on spending and taxes. Table 4 shows both bills together, as Biden’s “Build Back Better” agenda, with a baseline net deficit impact. Budget deficit scenarios are then updated in Chart 5. Once again what stands out is the large fiscal drag in 2022, the fiscal thrust for the remainder of the decade, and (in this case) minimal fiscal drag for 2024. Table 4Face Value Impact Of Biden’s Spending Proposals Before Congress (Baseline) Chart 5Deficit Scenarios For Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal And Reconciliation Bill This is true even if tax hikes fail to make it into the final reconciliation bill. We still maintain that the corporate tax rate will rise above Senator Joe Manchin’s ideal 25% rate (if not all the way to Biden’s 28%) while individual tax rates will return to pre-Trump levels. It is not clear if capital gains tax hikes will make the final cut. Most likely some tax hikes will occur but they will fall short of Biden’s plan, producing, at most, a one percentage point increase in the budget deficit relative to the Congressional Budget Office’s baseline estimate (Chart 6). Chart 6What Happens If Tax Hikes Fail To Pass Congress? In Table 5 we update our various legislative scenarios, each consisting of different mixes of spending and tax hikes. We assume that the size of the bipartisan infrastructure deal will not be reduced in the House; that the revenue offsets of that deal will be $200 billion maximum; that moderate Senate Democrats will have greater success in watering down tax hikes than spending programs; and that the government overestimates its ability to collect revenue through tougher tax enforcement. Finally we assume that Senate Democrats’ spending proposals will not be cut – an extremely generous assumption that will not hold up in practice. Table 5Legislative Scenarios For Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal And FY22 Reconciliation Bill Each legislative scenario’s impact on the deficit is shown in Table 6. The result is a wide range of deficit impacts, from the baseline of $588 billion to Scenario 6, with $2.59 trillion (zero tax offsets). The more realistic range is from $1 trillion to $2.3 trillion (i.e. all scenarios except the baseline and Scenario 5). Within this range the result depends on the moderate senators’ negotiation skills. Conservatively, the impact will range from $1-$1.5 trillion (Scenarios 1, 2, 4), with moderate senators preventing a $2 trillion price tag as politically impracticable (e.g. Scenario 3). Table 6Scoring Of Legislative Scenarios For Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal And FY22 Reconciliation Bill There are two other aspects of Biden’s massive legislative battle this fall: regular government budget appropriations and the debt ceiling. Government appropriations are supposed to be passed by the end of the fiscal year, September 30, but often run over and likely will this time. Republicans will not support regular spending increases given that Democrats will ram through a partisan spending blowout. Therefore Congress will have to settle for a continuing resolution (a stop-gap measure) that keeps spending levels the same. Otherwise a government shutdown will occur. A shutdown is possible but would weigh heavily on Republicans’ public image, which is already at a low point in recent memory following the scandals of the Trump presidency. That is not all – there is also the debt ceiling (limit on national debt). Democrats made a major gambit by not including a suspension or increase of the debt ceiling in their fiscal 2022 budget resolution. If they had included it, then they could have raised the debt ceiling on their own with a simple majority when they passed their reconciliation bill. Instead they are attempting to make Republicans share the blame. Republicans, however, will mount an aggressive resistance, as they do not want to be seen as authorizing the debt increase necessary to accommodate the Democrats’ “socialist” spending spree. The “X date,” when the Treasury Department runs out of the ability to use extraordinary measures to make payments due on US debt, is expected sometime in October or November, though Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warns it could come sooner and will try to pressure lawmakers. After this date the US would technically default on national debt obligations, triggering financial turmoil and potentially a global crisis. A debt ceiling showdown is virtually inevitable and volatility will rise – but ultimately a default will be averted, as we outlined in a recent report. First, Democrats still have the ability to revise the budget resolution so as to include a debt ceiling suspension in their final reconciliation bill. While Republicans could arguably block this attempt via a filibuster in the Budget Committee, they would have no interest in doing so (they could abstain and thus keep their hands clean of any debt ceiling increase). Second, Republicans can be forced to agree to a suspension of the debt ceiling when they fund the government, since it is necessary to do so anyway to fund their own infrastructure deal. Suspending the debt ceiling is not the same as raising it. New battles would be set up for later, in 2022 and beyond. But Republicans do not have the political ability to force a default on the public debt of the United States in the same year that Democrats accuse them of raising an insurrection against its Congress. Bottom Line: This fall will see the great legislative battle of the Biden presidency. Infrastructure spending has an 80% chance of passing. Pelosi will not be able to withstand Biden and the Senate in passing this deal separately from the more partisan reconciliation bill. If it passes, then Biden’s reconciliation bill will rise from 50% to 65% odds of passage. The latter will be watered down to a net deficit impact of $1-$1.5 trillion to secure the votes of moderate Senate Democrats, who ultimately will not betray their party to neuter Biden’s presidency. Thin margins in the House and Senate do not permit higher odds of passage or a high level of confidence. Investment Takeaways Political polarization has fallen sharply (Chart 7). This is connected to our view that the Republican Party is split, while Biden’s key initiative (infrastructure) has bipartisan support. However, Biden’s bipartisanship has resulted in a larger loss of Democratic support than a gain of Republican support (Chart 7, bottom panel). And the upcoming reconciliation bill will reignite Republican opposition. Moreover, polarization will remain at historically elevated levels, even to the point of generating domestic terrorist attacks, as we have argued. Biden’s approval rating has fallen but not enough to sink his legislative proposals. The overall economy is strong judging by both consumer confidence (Chart 8) and capital spending (Chart 9). Any soft patch in the economy in the near term will assist Biden in his legislative battles. Passage of either or both major bills will boost his approval rating, potentially ameliorating the Democrats’ challenging situation in the 2022 midterms. Chart 7Bipartisan Biden Lowers Polarization As Dems Waver Chart 8US Consumer Confidence Soars Chart 9US Capital Spending At Peak Levels Still, we expect investors to “buy the rumor and sell the news” of Biden’s upcoming stimulus bills. After the Senate passes the reconciliation measure, investors will have to look forward to the combined impact of tax hikes, the Fed’s tapering of asset purchases and eventual rate hikes, and the various troubles with global growth and geopolitical risk. Until that time, investors must weigh the risks of the COVID-19 variants against actions by both American and Chinese policymakers to dispel deflationary tail risks. Thus for now we are sticking with our key trades of the year: value stocks, materials, and infrastructure plays (Chart 10). After Biden wins his big legislative battles, we will reassess.     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Chart 10Buy Rumor, Sell News On Biden Plan   Appendix Table A1USPS Trade Table Table A2Political Risk Matrix Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A3Political Capital Index Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Footnotes    
Highlights US Treasuries: US Treasury yields are rising once again, in response to typical drivers – less dovish Fed commentary and upside growth surprises. The spread of the Delta variant in the US represents a potential near-term roadblock to additional yield increases, but the recent slowing of new cases in the UK and Europe is a positive sign that the US can see a similar result and avoid a major economic hit. Stay below-benchmark on US duration exposure. UK: The Bank of England is starting to prepare the markets for less accommodative monetary policy, with the UK economy holding up well as its Delta variant surge is losing momentum. UK Gilt yields are vulnerable to a hawkish repricing with only 48bps of rate hikes discounted by the end of 2024. Stay below-benchmark on UK duration exposure, and downgrade Gilts to underweight in global bond portfolios. A New Turning Point For Global Bond Yields? After seeing steady declines since the peak in late March that took the yield down to an intraday 2021 low of 1.13% last week, the 10-year US Treasury experienced a rebound back to 1.30% in a span of just three days. Yields in typically “high-beta” countries like Canada and Australia also saw significant increases. There were two main triggers for the pickup in US yields. Firstly, a speech from Fed Vice-Chair Richard Clarida was interpreted hawkishly, as he stated that he expects the conditions necessary for the Fed to begin lifting rates would be met by the end of 2022. Secondly, a better-than-expected July employment report confirmed the strength of the US labor market already evident in booming demand indicators like job openings. A third potential cause of the trough in yields can be found outside the US in the increasingly positive news on the spread of the Delta variant coming out of the UK. We would argue that the more relevant turning point for global bond yields in 2021 was not the late March peak in the US, but the mid-May peak in non-US developed market yields. The 10-year UK Gilt yield reached its 2021 apex on May 13, just as the spread of the Delta variant was starting to push UK COVID-19 case numbers sharply higher – despite the high vaccination rate in that country (Chart of the Week). This raised the fears that the “reopening boom” could stall, not only in the UK but other major economies, at a time when global growth momentum was already starting to cool off from the overheated pace in the first half of the year. Chart of the WeekThe "Delta Rally" In Bond Markets Is Fading The Delta variant wave continues to wash over the US, although primarily in regions with lower vaccination rates. There was little sign of any impact from the variant in the July US jobs data with just over one million new jobs added (including revisions to prior months) and the unemployment rate falling one-half of a percentage point to 5.4%, the lowest level since March 2020 (Chart 2). However, we will need to see more economic data from July and August to confirm that this latest wave is not having a material impact on the broad US economy beyond the regions with lower vaccination rates. New COVID-19 cases in the UK peaked in mid-July, and are rolling over in continental Europe, with relatively low hospitalization rates – a hopeful sign that the US Delta spread could also soon begin to lose momentum. We continue to believe that steady improvements in the US labor market will be the driver of higher US bond yields over at least the next 6-12 months, as falling unemployment will embolden the Fed to begin tapering asset purchases and, eventually, begin rate hikes towards the end of 2022. The technical backdrop for Treasuries has become less of a headwind to higher yields, with the 10-year yield falling back to its 200-day moving average and speculators closing a lot of short positioning in Treasury futures (Chart 3). If the US can follow the more positive news from across the Atlantic with regards to the spread of the Delta variant, this would remove another impediment to higher US bond yields. Chart 2Steady Progress Towards The Fed's Employment Goals Bottom Line: US Treasury yields are rising once again, in response to typical drivers – less dovish Fed commentary and upside growth surprises. Chart 3Technical Backdrop Less Of A Headwind To Higher US Yields The surge in Delta variant cases represents a potential near-term roadblock to additional yield increases, but the recent slowing of new cases in the UK and Europe may be a positive sign that the US will avoid a major economic hit. Stay below-benchmark on US duration exposure. A Gilt-Bearish Shift In Tone From The Bank Of England Chart 4Pressures Building On The BoE To Dial Back Stimulus BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy has had the UK on “downgrade watch” over the past few months. Improving growth momentum and recovering inflation have raised the risks of a more hawkish turn by the Bank of England (BoE), as evidenced by the elevated reading from our UK Central Bank Monitor (Chart 4). At the same time, the spread of the Delta variant injected a note of caution into an otherwise positive UK economic story. We now think it is time to move from “downgrade watch” to a full downgrade of our current neutral stance on UK Gilts. The BoE left its policy settings unchanged at last week’s policy meeting, but did provide strong indications that some removal of monetary accommodation would soon be necessary. The central bank noted that the UK economy was recovering from the pandemic shock at a faster-than-expected pace. In the August Monetary Policy Report (MPR) also released last week, the BoE maintained its 2021 real GDP growth forecast at 7.25% while slightly raising its 2022 growth estimate to 6%. UK GDP is now projected to fully recover to the pre-COVID level by the end of 2021. More importantly, the projections for the unemployment rate were lowered substantially. The central bank no longer expects much of an impact on unemployment when the UK government’s job-protecting furlough scheme expires in September. The BoE now expects unemployment to peak at 5.1% in Q3/2021 (Chart 5), a big change from the 6% projection in the May MPR, with the central bank noting that job vacancies are already back to pre-pandemic levels. The unemployment rate is projected to reach 4.25% in both 2022 and 2023. Chart 5Major Changes To The BoE's Forecasts The BoE baseline forecast now calls for UK headline CPI inflation to see a temporary surge to 4% in Q4/2021 – a significant change from the 2.5% peak in inflation projected in the May MPR - before returning back to close to 2% over the next two years. Yet the minutes of last week’s policy meeting noted that the medium-term risks surrounding inflation were “two-way”, a message that sounds a bit more concerning compared to the benign 2022/23 inflation projections. The BoE is now running the risk of underestimating how long the UK inflation uptrend can persist and force increases in interest rates – perhaps beginning as soon as mid-2022 – given the multiple factors that are pushing up inflation. A modest growth hit from the Delta variant The daily number of new cases has fallen by nearly one-half since the peak on July 20th, according to the Oxford University data (Chart 6). Hospitalizations are also rolling over at a peak that would be one-quarter the size of the January peak. If these trends continue, this latest wave of COVID will not have a lasting negative impact on the economy that would dampen inflation pressures. The modest dip in the UK manufacturing and services PMIs in June and July, when cases were rising, supports this conclusion. Accelerating wage growth UK job vacancies are now higher than the pre-pandemic peak, while the BoE’s Agents’ Survey of companies reports an increasing number of firms reporting recruitment difficulties across a broader range of industries (Chart 7). The job market frictions are similar to the dynamics currently at play in the US, where labor demand is booming but firms have struggled to fill openings because government pandemic support programs have dampened labor market participation. Chart 6The Biggest Threat To The Dovish BoE Stance Chart 7Good Help Is Hard To Find In The UK The BoE noted in the August MPR that its forecasts include the impact of labor market frictions that have temporarily raised the medium-term equilibrium rate of unemployment during the pandemic, resulting in a surge in wage growth. However, this effect is expected to fade as the economy normalizes and government support programs expire. For example, the BoE estimates that the UK government’s job retention “furlough” scheme, which pays a reduced wage to workers who cannot work because of COVID economic restrictions and which expires in September, has acted to dampen measured wage growth over the past year. At the same time, compositional effects, with pandemic job losses being skewed towards lower-paying roles, have had a far greater impact in lifting wage growth. The BoE estimates that the “underlying” pace of wage growth, excluding pandemic effects, is only 3.3% compared to the reported 7.2%, but is expected to rise towards 4.5% in Q3 as the labor market recovers. Yet if the employment frictions do not fade as rapidly as the BoE expects, perhaps due to persistent skills mismatches for existing job openings, then the inflationary pressures emanating from the UK jobs market may cause UK inflation to stay elevated for longer than the BoE is projecting. Continued recovery from the initial COVID shock Chart 8Recovering From The COVID Recession The BoE now expects UK real GDP to return to its pre-pandemic level in Q4 of this year (Chart 8). Much of the recovery in activity seen so far has been in services as pandemic restrictions have been lifted. Looking forward, consumer spending will be boosted by improving growth momentum in employment and incomes, further underpinned by a high levels of household savings accumulated during the pandemic. Business investment is also expected recover, given the robust reading from the BoE Agents’ Survey of investment intentions (bottom panel). The twin engines of consumption and investment will be enough to keep the UK economy growing at an above-trend pace in 2022, even with a modest expected drag from fiscal policy, which should help maintain some of the current cyclical inflationary pressures. Rising house prices UK house prices are experiencing another sharp uptick, with the Nationwide index up 10.3% year-over-year in Q2 (Chart 9). Demand for homes has been boosted by the UK government’s holiday on stamp duty, or housing transaction taxes, which began last year as a form of pandemic economic support. Housing transactions spiked in June as demand surged ahead of the expiry of the stamp duty holiday last month, and some payback is likely in the near-term. Yet UK housing demand has also been supported by the same factors boosting house prices in most developed economies - low interest rates, high household savings available for down payments and the increased need for space for those choosing to work from home. UK house price inflation thus could remain higher for longer than the BoE expects. Chart 9Is This House Price Surge 'Transitory' Or Policy Driven? Supply Chain Bottlenecks The BoE noted in the August MPR that overall UK import prices have risen faster than expected, especially with the British pound higher on a year-over-year basis. UK firms have faced rising input costs because of disruption to global supply chains from the pandemic. For example, the annual growth rate of import prices for manufactured components rose by 12.1% in May, a sharp contrast to the -5.4% deflation of consumer goods prices (Chart 10). The BoE projects UK overall import price inflation to turn negative in 2022 and 2023, a big part of its slowing inflation forecast. Some decrease is inevitable as price momentum in oil and other commodities cools from overheated levels seen in 2021. However, supply chain disruptions are a global phenomenon already persisting for longer than expected in other countries and could linger into 2022 if global growth stays above trend - potentially causing UK import price inflation to once again exceed the BoE’s expectations. Summing it all up, the pressure is clearly building on the BoE to dial back the massive monetary easing put in place last year in response to the pandemic. Not only is the economy now recovering far more rapidly than the BoE had been projecting, with inflation set to peak at a higher level, but there are other indications that monetary conditions may now be too loose like accelerating house prices. There are numerous upside risks to the BoE’s benign post-2021 inflation forecasts, especially with the central bank also projecting the UK to have a positive output gap in 2022 and 2023 (Chart 11). Chart 10BoE Betting On Waning Global Supply Bottlenecks Markets are not expecting much from the BoE in terms of interest rate increases. While the UK overnight index swap (OIS) curve is now discounting an initial 25bp rate hike in August 2022, only one other 25bp increase is expected by the end of 2024 (Table 1). Chart 11Domestic Price Pressures On The Rise The BoE has not been a very active central bank since the 2008 financial crisis, never raising the Bank Rate above 0.75% over that time, thus the markets now seem conditioned to think that the BoE will continue to do very little in the future. Table 1Markets Expect The BoE To Hike Before The Fed Chart 12Markets Expect Persistent Negative UK Real Rates That is evident when you look at longer-dated OIS rates compared to forward inflation rates from the UK CPI swap curve. The combined message from those markets is that the BoE is expected to maintain deeply negative real interest rates for at least the next decade, a major reason why the UK has persistently negative real bond yields (Chart 12). A lower equilibrium real interest rate (i.e. “r-star”) is consistent with the declining trend in the OECD’s estimate of UK potential real GDP growth over the past 20 years (Chart 13). Yet it is a stretch to think that the neutral UK real interest rate is now negative, especially given how rapidly UK growth and inflation have snapped back from the 2020 COVID recession. UK interest rate markets are highly vulnerable to any hawkish shift by the BoE – and outcome that the current growth and inflation dynamics suggest is increasingly likely over the next 6-12 months. The BoE has already started to process of dialing back monetary accommodation by slowing the pace of asset purchases in its quantitative easing (QE) program (Chart 14). While no decision on additional tapering was made last week, the BoE did dedicate three pages of the August MPR to a detailed discussion on how the future size of the BoE’s balance sheet would likely be reduced if the BoE were to begin raising interest rates. There has also been some political pressure on the UK to dial back QE, with the Chair of the Economic Affairs Committee in the UK House of Lords saying that the BoE was “addicted” to QE last month. BoE Governor Andrew Bailey has previously stated that he viewed QE as a regular part of a central banker’s toolkit, to be used opportunistically during periods of deep economic or financial market stress. That made sense in 2020 during the height of the pandemic, but is no longer the case now. Chart 13UK R-Star Is Still Positive We anticipate that the BoE will end the current QE program sometime in the next six months, with an initial 25bp rate hike occurring sometime in mid-2022. Chart 14UK QE: Expect More Tapering This would be a faster pace of tapering, with a quicker liftoff, than the Fed, although we expect the Fed to eventually raise rates by more than the BoE in the next interest rate cycle. Investment Conclusions Given our expectation that the BoE is starting to prepare the markets for an unwind of its pandemic policy settings, we come to the following fixed income and currency investment conclusions (Chart 15): Chart 15Summarizing Our UK Fixed Income Recommendations Chart 16A More Hawkish BoE Would Benefit The Pound Duration: Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance within dedicated UK bond portfolios, with too few rate hikes discounted Country Allocation: Downgrade UK Gilts to underweight in global bond portfolios Yield Curve: On a tactical (0-6 months) basis, the UK Gilt curve may re-steepen as UK and global growth stays resilient, but a more hawkish BoE will eventually result in a flatter Gilt curve Inflation-Linked: Inflation breakevens on UK index-linked Gilts are already quite elevated and are overvalued on our fair value models, while real yields are at deeply negative levels that are conditioned on a continually dovish BoE – a combination that suggests an underweight stance on UK linkers is appropriate. Corporate Credit: Stay neutral on a tactical basis, as solid UK growth will offset the impact of a shift to a less dovish BoE. Currency: Our currency strategists are positive on the British pound - which is undervalued on their models (Chart 16) - over the medium-term, with the BoE seemingly on a path to begin tightening monetary policy sooner than the ECB and perhaps even the Fed.     Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns