Gov Sovereigns/Treasurys

Highlights Continue to underweight the most cyclical sectors - Banks, Basic Materials, and Energy. As predicted, global growth is losing steam. This implies that the Eurostoxx50 will struggle to outperform the S&P500. Continue with a currency pecking order of "yen first, euro second, pound third, dollar fourth." The sell-off in bonds is due a retracement, or at least a respite. Stock markets' rich valuations are contingent on low bond yields. Feature The views in this report do not necessarily align with the BCA House View Matrix. Chart I-2Cyclicals Were Underperforming##br## Long Before The Trade Skirmishes Stock markets have experienced turbulence this year, and it would be very simple to blame the first skirmishes of a global trade war. It would also be simplistic. The sharp underperformance of cyclical stocks started in January, well before any inkling of the Trump tariffs (Chart I-2). The trade skirmishes have merely accelerated a process that was already underway. In this week's report, we make sense of the market turbulence from three broad perspectives: the global economic mini-cycle; market technicals; and valuation. The Economic Mini-Cycle Has Likely Turned Down When bond yields rise, interest rate sensitive sectors in the economy feel a headwind, but this headwind is felt with a delay. Similarly, when bond yields decline, interest rate sensitive sectors feel a tailwind, but the tailwind is felt with a delay. This delay occurs because credit supply lags credit demand by several months. But if credit supply lags demand, an economic theory called the Cobweb Theorem1 points out that both the quantity of credit supplied and its price (the bond yield) must undergo 'mini-cycle' oscillations. The theory is supported by compelling empirical evidence (Chart I-3). Furthermore, as the quantity of credit supplied is a marginal driver of economic activity, economic activity will also experience the same mini-cycle oscillations (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Compelling Evidence For Mini-Cycles In##br## Credit Supply And The Bond Yield... Chart I-4...And ##br##Economic Activity These mini-cycles are remarkably regular with half-cycle lengths averaging around eight months. Their regularity creates predictability. And as most investors are unaware of these cycles, the next turn is not discounted in financial market prices - providing a compelling investment opportunity for those who do recognise the predictability. Mini half-cycles average eight months, and the latest mini-upswing started last April. Hence, on January 4 we predicted that "contrary to what the consensus is expecting, global growth will lose steam in the first half of 2018." The predicted deceleration is precisely what we are now witnessing, and we expect this to continue through the summer months. From an equity sector perspective, the relative performance of the most cyclical sectors - Banks, Basic Materials, and Energy - very closely tracks the regular mini-cycles in global growth. In a mini-downswing these cyclical sectors always underperform (Chart of the week). Accordingly, continue to underweight these sectors through the summer months. Chart of the weekCyclicals Always Underperform In An Economic Mini-Downswing For the time being, this implies that the Eurostoxx50 will struggle to outperform the S&P500 - because euro area bourses have an outsize exposure to the most cyclical sectors. From a currency perspective, the stark asymmetry of central bank 'degrees of freedom' favours the euro and the yen over the dollar. In essence, as the ECB and BoJ are at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy, long-term expectations for their policy rates possess an asymmetry: they cannot go significantly lower, but they can go significantly higher. In contrast, long-term expectations for the Fed policy rate possess full symmetry: they can go either way, lower or higher. Hence, on January 18 we advised a currency pecking order of "yen first, euro second, pound third, dollar fourth." This currency pecking order has also worked perfectly this year, and we expect it to continue working through the summer months. Cyclical Sectors Had Bullish Groupthink Groupthink in any investment is a warning sign that the investment's trend is approaching exhaustion, because the liquidity that has fuelled the trend is about to evaporate. Liquidity is plentiful when market participants disagree with each other. Consider a stock whose price is rising strongly: a momentum trader wants to buy it, while a value investor wants to sell it. Hence, the market participants trade with each other with plentiful liquidity. Liquidity starts to evaporate when too many market participants agree with each other. Instead of dispassionately investing on the basis of value, value investors get sucked into chasing a price trend, and their buy orders fuel the trend. But when all the value investors have become momentum traders, the trend reaches a tipping point. If a value investor suddenly reverts to type and puts in a sell order, he will find that there are no buyers left. Liquidity has evaporated and finding new liquidity might require a substantial reversal in the price to attract a buy order from an ultra-long-term deep value investor. As regular readers know, our proprietary fractal analysis measures whether groupthink in a specific investment has become excessive, signalling the end of its price trend. Furthermore, using a 130-day groupthink indicator (fractal dimension), the fractal framework provides a powerful and independent reinforcement of our mini-cycle framework. This is because 130 (business) days broadly aligns with the mini half-cycle length. Fractal analysis reinforces our decision to underweight cyclical sectors, because it shows excessive (bullish) 130-day groupthink in these economically sensitive sectors (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Excessive Bullish Groupthink In Cyclical Sectors It also shows excessive (bearish) 130-day groupthink in government bonds, suggesting that the sell-off in bonds is due a retracement, or at least a respite (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Excessive Bearish Groupthink In Government Bonds Rich Valuations Are Contingent On Low Bond Yields On price to sales, world equities are as richly valued as they were at the peak of the dot com boom in 2000. The observation is important because price to sales has proved to be a near-perfect predictor of future 10-year returns. It shows that in 2010, world equities were priced to generate 8% a year compared with 4% a year available from global bonds. Today, richer valuations mean that both world equities and global bonds are priced to generate a paltry 2% a year (Chart I-7). Chart I-7World Equities As Richly Valued As At The Peak Of The Dot Com Boom Nevertheless, this makes perfect sense, because when bond yields are at 2%, bonds and equities are equally risky as each other. It follows that they must offer the same return as each other. One of the biggest errors in finance is to define an investment's risk in terms of its (root mean squared) volatility. This is incorrect because nobody fears sharp gains, they only fear sharp losses. Consider an investment whose price goes up sharply one day and then sideways the next day ad infinitum. The investment has a very high volatility, but it has no risk. You can never lose money, you can only make money. This leads us to the correct definition of risk, as defined by Professor Daniel Kahneman. He proved that investors are not concerned about volatility per se, they are concerned about the ratio of potential short-term losses versus short-term gains, a measure known as 'negative skew'. The important point is that at low bond yields, bond returns start to exhibit negative skew. Intuitively, this is because the lower bound to yields forces an unattractive asymmetry on bond returns: prices can fall a lot, but they cannot rise a lot. Specifically, at a bond yield of 2%, theoretical and empirical evidence shows that bonds and equities possess the same negative skew (Chart I-8). And as the two asset classes are equally risky, they must offer the same return, 2% (Chart I-9). Chart I-8At A 2% Bond Yield, 10-Year Bonds##br## Have The Same Negative Skew As Equities... Chart I-9...So At A 2% Bond Yield, ##br##Equities Must Also Offer A 2% Return Therefore, equities find themselves in a precarious equilibrium. Rich valuations are justified if bond yields remain at low levels or fall, but rich valuations become increasingly hard to justify if bond yields march higher. Seen through this lens, the rise in bond yields at the start of the year is one important reason why equities have experienced a turbulent 2018 so far. What lies ahead? The combination of our economic mini-cycle, market technicals and valuation perspectives suggests that the equity sector and currency trends established since the start of the year should persist into the summer. As for equities in aggregate, the greatest structural threat would arise if bond yields gapped upwards. But for the time being, this is not our expectation. Happy Easter! Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' published on January 11 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model Given the Easter holidays, there are no new trades this week. But we are pleased to report that our long global utilities versus market trade achieved its 3.5% profit target and is now closed. Out of our four open trades, three are in profit with the short nickel / long lead trade already up sharply in its first week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights The 2018 outlook for both economic growth and corporate profits remains constructive for risk assets, although evidence is gathering that global growth is peaking. Some measures of global activity related to capital spending have softened in recent months. Nonetheless, the G3 aggregate for capital goods orders remains in an uptrend, suggesting that it is too soon to call an end in the mini capital spending boom. Our global leading indicators are not heralding any major economic slowdown. The dip in early 2018 in the Global ZEW index likely reflected uncertainty over protectionist trade action. Economic growth in the major countries outside of the U.S. may have peaked, but will remain robust at least through this year. The potential for a trade war is a key risk facing investors. Sino-American tensions are likely to intensify over the long term as the two nations spar over geopolitical and military supremacy. That said, there are hopeful signs that the latest trade skirmish will not degenerate into a full-blown trade war and thereby cause lasting damage to risk assets. Stay overweight equities and corporate bonds. President Trump will announce on May 19 whether he will terminate the nuclear agreement with Iran. Cancelation could be a game-changer for Iranian internal politics, and the return of hardliners would signal greater instability in the region. Stay long oil and related investments. The profit picture remains bright as global margins continue to make new cyclical highs and earnings revisions are elevated. EPS growth is peaking in Europe and Japan, but has a bit more upside in the U.S. later this year. Cross-country equity allocation is a tough call, but relative monetary policy, our positive view for the dollar, the potential for earnings surprises and better value bias us toward European stocks relative to the U.S. in local currency terms. Rising U.S. corporate leverage is not an issue now, but could intensify the next downturn as ratings are slashed, defaults rise and banks tighten lending standards. The bond bear market remains intact, although the consolidation phase has further to run. By Q1 2019, the Fed could find itself with inflation close to target, above-trend growth driven by a strong fiscal tailwind, and an unemployment rate that is a full percentage point below NAIRU. Policymakers will then try to nudge up the unemployment rate, but the odds of avoiding a recession are very low. Feature Investors are right to be concerned following the March 23 U.S. announcement of tariffs on about $50 billion of Chinese imports. The President is low in the polls and needs a victory of some sort heading into midterm elections. Getting tough on trade plays well with voters, and the President faces few constraints from Congress on this issue. Trump wants a raft of items from China, including opening up to foreign investment and a crackdown on intellectual theft. Sino-American tensions are likely to intensify over the long term as the two nations spar over geopolitical and military supremacy.1 That said, we do not expect the latest trade skirmish to degenerate into a full-blown trade war. First, China has already signaled it wants to avoid significant escalation. Beijing has offered several concessions, and its threat of retaliatory trade action has been measured so far. On the U.S. side, the fact that the Administration has decided to bring its case against China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) shows that the Americans are willing to proceed through the normal trade-dispute channels. The bottom line is that, while we cannot rule out escalating trade action that causes meaningful damage to the equity market, it is more likely that the current round of tensions will be limited to brief flare-ups. Investors should monitor the extent of European involvement. If Europe joins the U.S. effort to force China to change its trade practices via the WTO, then China will have little choice but to give in without a major fight. In terms of other geopolitical risks, North Korea should move to the back burner for a while now that the regime has agreed to negotiations. Of greater near-term significance is May 19, when Trump will announce whether he will terminate the nuclear agreement with Iran. Cancelation could be a game-changer for Iranian internal politics, and the return of hardliners would signal greater instability in the region. Oil prices would benefit if the May deadline for issuing waivers on Iran sanctions passes. Trade penalties against Iran would reduce its oil production and exports. The U.S. is also considering sanctions on Venezuela's oil industry. Moreover, Russia and Saudi Arabia are reportedly considering a deal to greatly extend their alliance to curb oil supply. While there are downside risks as well, our base case outlook sees the price of Brent reaching US$74 before year end. Global Growth: Some Mixed Signs Also facing investors this year is the risk that the recent softening in the economic data morphs into a serious growth scare. The 2018 outlook for both the economy and corporate profits remains constructive in our view, but evidence is gathering that global growth is peaking. Investors may begin to question recent upward revisions to the growth outlook for this year and next. Industrial production has softened and the manufacturing PMI has shifted lower in most of the advanced economies (Chart I-1). Bad weather in North America and Europe in early 2018 may be partly to blame, but Korean exports, a leading indicator for the global business cycle, have also softened. The Chinese economy is decelerating and we believe the growth risks are underappreciated. President Xi has cemented his power base and there has been a shift toward accelerated reform. Chinese leaders recognize that leverage in the system is a problem, and the regime is tightening policy on a multi-pronged basis. Structural reforms are positive for long-term growth, but are negative in the short term. The tightening in financial conditions is already evident in the Chinese PMI and the sharp deceleration in the Li Keqiang index (although the latest reading shows an uptick; not shown). A hard landing is not our base case, but the risks are to the downside because the authorities will err on the side of tight policy and low growth. It is also disconcerting that some of our measures of global activity related to capital spending have softened in recent months, including capital goods imports and industrial production of capital goods (Chart I-2). Nonetheless, the fact that the G3 aggregate for capital goods orders remains in an uptrend suggests that it is too soon to call an end in the mini capital spending boom. Consumer and business confidence continues to firm in the major economies. Chart I-1Some Signs Of A Peak In Global Growth Chart I-2A Soft Spot For Capital Spending Our global leading indicators are not heralding any major economic slowdown (Chart I-3). BCA's Global LEI remains in an uptrend and its diffusion index is above the 50 line. In contrast, the global measure of the ZEW investor sentiment index plunged in March. We attribute the decline to the announcement of steel and aluminum tariffs and the subsequent market swoon, suggesting that the ZEW pullback will prove to be temporary. Turning to the U.S., retail sales disappointed in January and February, especially considering that taxpayers just received a sizable tax cut. Nonetheless, this probably reflects lagged effects and weather distortions. Our U.S. consumer spending indicator continues to strengthen as all of the components remain constructive outside of auto sales. Household balance sheets are the best that they have been since 2007; net worth is soaring and the aggregate debt-to-income ratio is close to the lowest level since the turn of the century (Chart I-4). Given robust employment growth and the tightest labor market in decades, there is little to hold U.S. consumer spending back. We expect that the tax cut effect on retail sales will be revealed in the coming months, helping to sustain the healthy backdrop for corporate profits. Chart I-3Global Leading Indicators Mostly Positive Chart I-4U.S. Consumers In Good Shape Global Margins Still Rising The profit picture remains bright as global margins continue to make new cyclical highs and earnings revisions are elevated (Chart I-5). Earnings-per-share surged in the early months of the year in both the U.S. and Japan, although they languished in the Eurozone according to IBES data (local currencies; not shown). Relative equity returns in local currency tend to follow relative shifts in 12-month forward EPS expectations over long periods, and bottom-up analysts have lifted their U.S. earnings figures in light of the fiscal stimulus (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Global Margins Still Rising Chart I-6EPS And Relative Equity Returns The key question is: can the U.S. market outperform again in 2018 now that the tax cuts have largely been priced in? One can make a compelling case either way. Growth: Global growth will remain robust for at least the next year, and the Eurozone and Japanese markets are more geared to global growth than is the U.S. However, the impressive fiscal stimulus in the pipeline means that economic growth momentum is likely to swing back toward the U.S. this year. GDP growth in Europe and Japan will remain above-trend, but it has probably peaked for the cycle in both economies. Valuation: Our composite measure of valuation suggests that Europe and Japan are on the cheap side relative to the U.S. based on our aggregate valuation indicator, which takes into consideration a wide variety of yardsticks (Chart I-7). That said, one of the reasons why European stocks are on the cheap side at the moment is that export-oriented German exporters are quite exposed to rising international tariffs. Earnings: Previous currency shifts will add to EPS growth in the U.S. in the first half of the year, but will be a drag in Europe and Japan (Chart I-8). However, these effects will wane through the year unless the dollar keeps falling. Indeed, we expect the dollar to firm modestly over the next year, favoring the European equity market at the margin. In contrast, we expect the yen to strengthen in the near term, which will trim Japanese EPS growth. Chart I-7Valuation Ranking Of Nonfinancial ##br##Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. Chart I-8Impact Of Currency Shifts On EPS Growth Chart I-9 updates the forecast from our top-down earnings models. The incorporation of the fiscal stimulus lifted the U.S. EPS growth profile relative to our previous forecast. EPS growth is expected to peak at over 20% later this year (4-quarter moving total basis using S&P 500 data). Growth is expected to decelerate thereafter since we have factored in a modest margin squeeze as U.S. wage growth picks up. Narrowing margins are less of a risk in Europe. U.S. EPS growth should be above that of Europe in 2018, but will then fall to about the same pace in 2019. We expect Japanese profit growth to remain very strong this year and next, given Japan's highly pro-cyclical earnings sensitivity. However, this does not incorporate the risk of further yen strength. Earnings expectations will also matter. Twelve-month bottom-up expectations are higher than our U.S. forecast ('x' in Chart I-9 denotes 12-month forward EPS expectations). In contrast, expectations are roughly in line with our forecast for the European market. It will therefore be more difficult at the margin for U.S. earnings to surprise to the upside. Monetary Policy: The relative shift in monetary policies should favor the European and Japanese markets to the U.S. The FOMC will continue tightening, with risks still to the upside on rates in absolute terms and relative to the other two economies. Sector Performance: Sector skews should work in Europe's favor. Financials are the largest overweight in Euro area bourses, while technology is the largest overweight in the U.S. We are constructive on the financial sector in both markets, but out-performance of the sector will favor the Eurozone broad market. Meanwhile, tech companies are particularly sensitive to changes in discount rates, since they often trade on the assumption that most of their earnings will be realized far into the future. As such, higher long-term real bond yields will adversely affect U.S. tech names, especially in an environment where the dollar is strengthening. The Japanese market has a relatively high weighting in industrials and consumer discretionary. The market will benefit if the global mini capex boom continues, but this could be counteracted by softness in global auto sales and further yen strength. It is a tough call, but relative monetary policy, our positive view for the dollar, the potential for earnings surprises and better value bias us toward European stocks relative to the U.S. in local currency terms. We continue to avoid the Japanese market for the near term because of the potential for additional yen gains. As for the equity sector call, investors should remain oriented toward cyclicals versus defensives. Our key themes of a synchronized global capex mini boom, rising bond yields and firm oil prices favor the industrials, energy and financial sectors. Chart I-10 highlights four indicators that support the cyclicals over defensives theme, the dollar and the business sales-to-inventories ratio. Telecom, consumer discretionary and homebuilders are underweight. Chart I-9Profit Forecast Chart I-10These Indicators Favor Cyclical Stocks We will be watching the indicators in Chart I-10 to time the shift to a more defensive equity sector allocation. Leverage And The Next Recession As the economic expansion enters the late stages, investors are focused on where leverage pressure points may lurk. Last month's Special Report on U.S. corporate vulnerability to higher interest rates and a recession raised some eyebrows. For our sample of 770 companies, we estimated how much interest coverage for the average company would decline under two scenarios: (1) interest rates rise by 100 basis points across the curve; and (2) interest rates rise by 100 basis points and there is a recession in which corporate profits fall by 25% peak to trough. Given all the client inquiries, we decided to delve deeper into the results. We were concerned that our sample of high-yield companies distorted the overall results because it includes many small firms and outliers. We are more comfortable with the results using only the investment-grade firms, shown in Chart I-11. The 'x' marks the interest rate shock and the 'o' marks the combined shock. Nonetheless, the main qualitative message is unchanged. The starting point for interest coverage is low, considering that interest rates are near the lowest levels on record and profits are extremely high relative to GDP. This is the result of an extended period of corporate releveraging on the back of low borrowing rates. Chart I-12 shows that the interest coverage ratio has declined even as profit margins have remained elevated. Normally the two move together through the cycle. Chart I-11Corporate Leverage Will Take A Toll Chart I-12The Consequences Of Rising Leverage The implication is that the next recession will see interest coverage fare worse than in previous recessions. Of course, there are many other financial ratios and statistics that the rating agencies employ, but our results suggest that downgrades will proliferate when the agencies realize that the economy is turning south. Moreover, banks may tighten C&I lending standards earlier and more aggressively because they will also be finely attuned to the first hint of economic trouble given the leverage of the companies in their portfolio. Recovery rates may be particularly low in the next recession because the equity cushion has been squeezed via buybacks, which will intensify widening pressure in corporate spreads. Tighter lending standards would generate more corporate defaults, even wider spreads and a greater overall tightening in financial conditions. Corporate leverage could therefore intensify the pullback in business spending in the next recession. The good news is that we do not see any other major macro-economic imbalances, such as areas of overspending, that could turn a mild recession into a nasty one. As long as growth remains solid, the market and rating agencies will ignore the leverage issue. Indeed, ratings migration has improved markedly following the energy related downgrades in 2014 and 2015. An improving rating migration ratio is usually associated with corporate bond outperformance relative to Treasurys (Chart I-13). We remain overweight U.S. investment-grade and high-yield bonds within fixed-income portfolios for now. The European corporate sector is further behind in the leverage cycle (Chart I-14). Europe does not appear to be nearly as vulnerable to rising interest rates. Nonetheless, our European Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) has deteriorated over the past couple of years due to some erosion in profit margins, debt coverage and the return on capital. Meanwhile, the U.S. CHM has improved in recent quarters because the favorable earnings backdrop has temporarily overwhelmed rising leverage (top panel of Chart I-14). For the short-term, at least, corporate health is moving in favor of the U.S. at the margin. Chart I-13Ratings Migration Is Constructive For Now Chart I-14Corporate Health Trend Favors U.S. The implication is that, while we see trouble ahead for the U.S. corporate sector in the next economic downturn, in the short term we now favor the U.S. over Europe in the credit space. We are watching our Equity Scorecard, bank lending standards, the yield curve and our profit margin proxy in order to time our exit from both corporate bonds and equities (see last month's Overview section). We are also watching for a rise in the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate above 2.3% as a signal that the FOMC will get more aggressive in leaning against above-trend growth and a falling unemployment rate. Powell Doesn't Rock The Boat The Fed took a measured approach when reacting to the fiscal stimulus that is in the pipeline. The FOMC lifted rates in March and marginally raised the 'dot plot' for 2019 and 2020. Policymakers shaved the projection for unemployment to 3.6% by the end of 2019. This still appears too pessimistic, unless one assumes that the labor force participation rate will rise sharply. Table I-1 provides estimates for when the unemployment rate will reach 3½% based on different average monthly payrolls and participation rates. Our base case scenario, with 200k payrolls per month and a flat participation rate, sees the unemployment rate reaching 3½% by March 2019. Table I-1Dates When 3.5% Unemployment Rate Threshold Is Reached The soft-ish February reports for consumer prices and average hourly earnings took some of the heat off the FOMC. Core CPI, for example, rose 'only' 0.2% from the month before. Still, when viewed on a 3-month rate-of-change basis, underlying inflation remains perky; the core CPI inflation rate increased from 2.8% in January to 3% in February (Chart I-15). Inflation in core services excluding medical care and shelter, as well as in core goods, have also surged on a 3-month basis. We expect the latter to continue to pressure overall inflation higher, following the upward trend in import prices. The recent downtrend in shelter inflation should also stabilize due to the falling rental vacancy rate. Chart I-15U.S. Inflation Is Perky Moreover, the NFIB survey of U.S. small businesses shows that the gap between the difficulties of finding qualified labor versus demand problems is close to record highs. The ISM manufacturing survey shows that companies are paying more for their inputs and experiencing delays with suppliers. This describes a late-cycle environment marked with rising inflationary pressures. We expect that core inflation will grind up to the 2% target by early next year. By the first quarter of 2019, the Fed could find itself with inflation close to target, above-trend growth driven by a strong fiscal tailwind, and an unemployment rate that is a full percentage point below its estimate of the non-inflationary limit. Policymakers will then attempt a 'soft landing' in which they tighten policy enough to nudge up the unemployment rate. Unfortunately, the Fed has never been able to generate a soft landing. Once unemployment starts to rise, the next recession soon follows. Our base case is that the next recession begins in 2020. Bond Bear In Hibernation For Now The bond market showed that it can still intimidate in February, but things have since calmed down as the U.S. mini inflation scare ebbed, some economic data disappointed and trade friction created additional macro uncertainty. Bearish sentiment and oversold technical conditions suggest that the consolidation period has longer to run. Nonetheless, unless inflation begins to trend lower, the fact that even the doves on the FOMC believe that the headwinds to growth have moderated places a floor under bond yields. Fair value for the 10-year Treasury is 2.90% based on our short-term model, but we expect it to reach the 3.3-3.5% range before the cycle is over. Both real yields and long-term inflation expectations have room to move higher. Private investors will also have to absorb US$680 billion worth of bonds this year from governments in the U.S., Eurozone, Japan and U.K., the first positive net flow since 2014 (see last month's Overview). Yields may have to fatten a little in order for the private sector to make room in their portfolios for that extra government supply. In the Eurozone, the net supply of government bonds available to the private sector will still be negative this year, even if the ECB tapers to zero in September as we expect. Some investors are concerned about a replay in the European bond markets of the Fed's 'taper tantrum' of 2013, when then-Chair Bernanke surprised markets with a tapering announcement. The ECB has learned from that mistake and has given several speeches recently highlighting that policymakers will be making full use of forward guidance to avoid "...premature expectations of a first rate rise."2 We think they will be successful in avoiding a similar tantrum, but the flow effect of waning bond purchases will still place some upward pressure on the term premium in Eurozone bonds (Chart I-16).3 Chart I-16ECB: End Of QE Will Pressure Term Premium The bottom line is that monetary policy will undermine global bond prices in both the U.S. and Eurozone, but we expect U.S. yields to lead the way higher this year. Japanese bond prices will be constrained by the 10-year yield target. Investors with a horizon of 6-12 months should remain overweight JGBs, at benchmark in Eurozone government bonds and underweight Treasurys within hedged global bond portfolios. We recommend hedging the currency risk because we continue to expect the dollar to rebound this year. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 18, discusses the cyclical factors that will support the dollar: interest rate differentials, a rebound in U.S. productivity growth and a shift in international growth momentum back in favor of the U.S. In terms of the longer-term view, the Special Report makes the case that the U.S. dollar's multi-decade downtrend will persist. This does not mean, however, that long-term investors will make any money by underweighting the greenback. The 30-year U.S./bund yield spread of 190 basis points means that the €/USD would have to rise to more than 2.2 to offset the yield disadvantage of being overweight the euro versus the dollar over the next 30-years. Indeed, once it appears that the U.S. yield curve has discounted the full extent of the Fed tightening cycle (perhaps 12 months from now), it will make sense for long-term investors to go long U.S. Treasurys versus bunds on an unhedged basis. Conclusion Recent data releases suggest that global growth is peaking, especially in the manufacturing sector. Nonetheless, we do not believe that this heralds a slowdown in growth meaningful enough to negatively impact the profit outlook in the major countries. Indeed, the major fiscal tailwind in the U.S. will lift growth and extend the runway for earnings to expand at least through 2019. That said, fiscal stimulus at this stage of the U.S. business cycle will serve to accentuate a boom/bust cycle, where stronger growth in 2018/19 gives way to higher inflation a hard landing in 2020. The Fed is willing to sit back and watch the impact of fiscal stimulus unfold in the near term. But by early 2019, the Fed will find itself behind the curve with rising inflation and an overheating economy. The monetary policy risk for financial markets will then surge, setting up for a classic end to this expansion. The consequences of years of corporate releveraging will come home to roost. This year, trade skirmishes will be a headwind for risk assets and will no doubt generate further bouts of volatility. Nonetheless, recent signals from both the U.S. and China suggest that the situation will not degenerate into a trade war. The bottom line is that, while the economic expansion and equity bull market are both in late innings, investors should stay overweight risk assets and short duration for now. Stay overweight cyclical stocks versus defensives, overweight corporate bonds versus governments, overweight oil-related plays, and modestly long the U.S. dollar against most currencies except the yen. Our checklist of items to time the exit from risk is not yet flashing red. We would change our mind if our checklist goes south, our forward-looking indicators turn sharply lower or U.S. inflation suddenly picks up. We are also watching closely the situation in Iran, the U.S./China trade spat and NAFTA negotiations. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst March 29, 2018 Next Report: April 26, 2018 1 For more information on why we believe that Sino-American conflict will be a defining feature of the 21st century, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated March 28, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 ECB President Mario Draghi. Speech can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180314_1.en.html 3 For more information, please see BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report "Bond Markets Are Suffering Withdrawal Symptoms," dated March 20, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com II. U.S. Twin Deficits: Is The Dollar Doomed? In this Special Report, we review the theory behind exchange rate determination and examine the cyclical and structural forces that will drive the dollar. The long-term structural downtrend in the dollar is intact. This trend reflects both a slower underlying pace of U.S. productivity growth relative to the rest of the world and a persistent external deficit. The U.S. shortfall on its net international investment position, now at about 40% of GDP, is likely to continue growing in the coming decades. Fiscal stimulus means that the U.S. twin deficits are set to worsen, but the situation is not that dire that the U.S. dollar is about to fall off a cliff because of sudden concerns regarding sustainability. The U.S. is not close to the point where investors will begin to seriously question America's ability to service its debt. The U.S. will continue to enjoy a net surplus on its international investments except under a worst-case scenario for relative returns. From an economic perspective, we see little reason why the U.S. will not be able to easily continue financing its domestic saving shortfall in the coming years. There are some parallels today with the Nixon era, but we do not expect the same outcome for the dollar. The Fed is unlikely to make the same mistake as it made in the late 1960s/early 1970s. There are risks of course. Growing international political tensions and a trade war could threaten the U.S. dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency. We will explore the geopolitical angle in next month's Special Report. While the underlying trend in the dollar is down, cyclical factors are likely to see it appreciate on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Growth momentum, which moved in favor of the major non-U.S. currencies in 2017, should shift in the greenback's favor this year. U.S. fiscal stimulus is bullish the dollar, despite the fact that this will worsen the current account balance. Additional protectionist measures should also support the dollar as long as retaliation is muted. The U.S. dollar just can't seem to get any respect even in the face of a major fiscal expansion that is sure to support U.S. growth. Nonetheless, there are a lot of moving parts to consider besides fiscal stimulus: a tightening Fed, accumulating government debt, geopolitical tension and growing trade protectionism among others. The interplay of all these various forces can easily create confusion about the currency outlook. Textbook economic models show that the currency should appreciate in the face of stimulative fiscal policy and rising tariffs, at least in the short term, not least because U.S. interest rates should rise relative to other countries. However, one could also equate protectionism and a larger fiscally-driven external deficit with a weaker dollar. Which forces will dominate? In this Special Report, we sort out the moving parts. We review the theory behind exchange rate determination and examine the cyclical and structural forces that will drive the dollar in the short- and long-term. Tariffs And The Dollar Let's start with import tariffs. In theory, higher tariffs should be positive for the currency as long as there is no retaliation. The amount spent on imports will fall as consumer spending is re-directed toward domestically-produced goods and services. A lower import bill means the country does not need to export as much to finance its imports, leading to dollar appreciation (partially offsetting the competitive advantage that the tariff provides). Tariffs also boost inflation temporarily, which means that higher U.S. real interest rates should also lift the dollar to the extent that the Fed responds with tighter policy. That said, the tariffs recently announced by the Trump Administration are small potatoes in the grand scheme. The U.S. imported $39 billion of iron and steel in 2017, and $18 billion of aluminum. That's only 2% of total imports and less than 0.3% of GDP. If import prices went up by the full amount of the tariff, this would add less than five basis points to inflation. The positive impact on U.S. growth is also modest as the tariffs benefit only two industries, and higher domestic prices for steel and aluminum undermine U.S. consumers of these two metals. A unilateral tariff increase could be mildly growth-positive if there is no retaliation by trading partners. This was the result of a Bank of Canada study, which found that much of the growth benefits from a higher import tariff are offset by an appreciation of the currency.1 Even a short-term growth boost is not guaranteed. A detailed analysis of the 2002 Bush steel tariff increase found that the import tax killed many more jobs than it created.2 Shortages forced some U.S. steel-consuming firms to source the metal offshore, while others made their steel suppliers absorb the higher costs, leading to job losses. A recent IMF3 study employed a large macro-economic model to simulate the impact of a 10% across-the-board U.S. import tariff without any retaliation. It found that tariffs place upward pressure on domestic interest rates, especially if the economy is already at full employment (Chart II-1). This is because the central bank endeavors to counter the inflationary impact with higher interest rates. However, a stronger currency and higher interest rates eventually cool the economy and the Fed is later forced to ease policy. This puts the whole process into reverse as interest rate differentials fall and the dollar weakens. Chart II-1At Full Employment, Import Tariffs Raise Rates The economic outcome would be much worse if U.S. trading partners were to retaliate and the situation degenerates into a full-fledged trade war involving a growing number of industries. In theory, the dollar would not rise as much if there is retaliation because foreign tariffs on U.S. exports are offsetting in terms of relative prices. But all countries lose in this scenario. China is considering only a small retaliation for the steel and aluminum tariffs as we go to press, but the trade dispute has the potential to really heat up, as we discuss in the Overview section. The bottom line is that the Trump tariffs are more likely to lead to a stronger dollar than a weaker one, although far more would have to be done to see any meaningful impact. Fiscal Stimulus And The Dollar Traditional economic theory suggests that fiscal stimulus is also positive for the currency in the short term. The boost in aggregate demand worsens the current account balance, since some of the extra government spending is satisfied by foreign producers. The U.S. dollar appreciates as interest rates increase relative to the other major countries, attracting capital inflows. The currency appreciation thus facilitates the necessary adjustment (deterioration) in the current account balance. The impact on interest rates is similar to the tariff shock shown in Chart II-1. All of the above market and economic adjustments should be accentuated when the economy is already at full employment. Since the domestic economy is short of spare capacity, a vast majority of the extra spending related to fiscal stimulus must be imported. Moreover, the Fed would have to respond even more aggressively to the extent that inflationary pressures are greater when the economy is running hot. The result would be even more upward pressure on the U.S. dollar. Reality has not supported the theory so far. The U.S. dollar weakened after the tax cuts were passed, and it did not even get a lift following the Senate spending plan that was released in February. The broad trade-weighted dollar has traded roughly sideways since mid-2017. Judging by the market reaction to the fiscal news, it appears that investors are worried about a potential replay of the so-called Nixon shock, when fiscal stimulus exacerbated the 'twin deficits' problem, investors lost confidence in policymakers and the dollar fell. Twin deficits refers to a period when the federal budget deficit and the current account deficit are deteriorating at the same time. Chart II-2 highlights that the late 1960s/early 1970s was the last time that the federal government stimulated the economy at a time when the economy was already at full employment. Seeing the parallels today, some investors are concerned the dollar will decline as it did in the early 1970s. Chart II-2A Replay Of The Nixon Years? Current Account And Budget Balances Often Diverge... The two deficits don't always shift in the same direction. In fact, Chart II-3 highlights that they usually move in opposite directions through the business cycle. This is not surprising because the current account usually improves in a recession as imports contract more than exports, but the budget deficit rises as tax revenues wither. The process reverses when the economy recovers. Chart II-3Twin Deficits And The Dollar The current account balance equals the government financial balance (i.e. budget deficit) plus the private sector financial balance (savings less investment spending). Thus, swings in the latter mean that the current account can move independently of the budget deficit. Even when the two deficits move in the same direction, there has been no clear historical relationship between the sum of the fiscal and current account balances and the value of the trade-weighted dollar (shaded periods in Chart II-3). In the early 1980s, the twin deficits exploded on the back of the Reagan tax cuts and the military buildup, but the dollar strengthened. In contrast, the dollar weakened in the early 2000s, a period when the twin deficits rose in response to the Bush tax cuts, the Iraq War, and a booming housing market. ...But Generally Fiscal Expansion Undermines The Current Account Over long periods, a sustained rise in the fiscal deficit is generally associated with a sustained deterioration in the external balance. Numerous academic studies have found that every 1 percentage-point rise in the budget deficit worsens the current account balance by an average of 0.2-0.3 percentage points over the medium term. One study found that the current account deteriorates by an extra 0.2 percentage points if the fiscal stimulus arrives at a time when the economy is at full employment (i.e. an additional 0.2 percentage points over-and-above the 0.2-0.3 average response, for a total of 0.4 to 0.5).4 Given that the U.S. economy is at full employment today, these estimates imply that the expected two percentage point rise in the budget deficit relative to the baseline over 2018 and 2019 could add almost a full percentage point to the U.S. current account deficit (from around 3% of GDP currently to 4%). It could be even worse over the next couple of years because the private sector is likely to augment the government sector's drain on national savings. The mini capital spending boom currently underway will lift imports and thereby contribute to a further widening in the U.S. external deficit position. Nonetheless, theory supports the view that the dollar will rise in the face of fiscal stimulus, at least in the near term, even if this is accompanied by a rising external deficit. Theory gets fuzzier in terms of the long-term outlook for the currency. However, the traditional approach to the balance of payments suggests that the equilibrium value of the dollar will eventually fall. An ongoing current account deficit will accumulate into a rising stock of foreign-owned debt that must be serviced. The Net International Investment Position (NIIP) is the difference between the stock of foreign assets held by U.S. residents and the stock of U.S. assets held by foreign investors. The NIIP has fallen increasingly into the red over the past few decades, reaching 40% of GDP today (Chart II-4). The dollar will eventually have to depreciate in order to generate a trade surplus large enough to allow the U.S. to cover the extra interest payments on its growing stock of foreign debt. Chart II-4Structural Drivers Of the U.S. Dollar The structural depreciation of the U.S. dollar observed since the early 1980s supports the theory, because it has trended lower along with the NIIP/GDP ratio. However, the downtrend probably also reflects other structural factors. For example, U.S. output-per-employee has persistently fallen relative to its major trading partners for decades (Chart II-4, third panel). The bottom line is that, while the dollar is likely to remain in a structural downtrend, it should receive at least a short-term boost from the combination of fiscal stimulus and higher tariffs. What could cause the dollar to buck the theory and depreciate even in the near term? We see three main scenarios in which the dollar could fall on a 12-month investment horizon. (1) Strong Growth Outside The U.S. First, growth momentum favored Europe, Japan and some of the other major countries relative to the U.S. in 2017. This helps to explain dollar weakness last year because the currency tends to underperform when growth surprises favor other countries in relative terms. It is possible that momentum will remain a headwind for the dollar this year. Nonetheless, this is not our base case. European and Japanese growth appears to be peaking, while fiscal stimulus should give the U.S. economy a strong boost this year and next (see the Overview section). (2) A Lagging Fed The Fed will play a major role in the dollar's near-term trend. The Fed could fail to tighten in the face of accelerating growth and falling unemployment, allowing inflation and inflation expectations to ratchet higher. If investors come to believe that the Fed will remain behind-the-curve, rising long-term inflation expectations would depress real interest rates and thereby knock the dollar down. This was part of the story in the Nixon years. Under pressure from the Administration, then-Fed Chair Arthur Burns failed to respond to rising inflation, contributing to a major dollar depreciation from 1968 to 1974. We see this risk as a very low-probability event. Today's Fed acts much more independently of Congress beyond its dual commitment on inflation and unemployment. And, given that the economy is at full employment, there is nothing stopping the FOMC from acting to preserve its 2% inflation target if it appears threatened. Chair Powell is new and untested, but we doubt he and the rest of the Committee will be influenced by any political pressure to keep rates unduly low as inflation rises. Even Governor Brainard, a well-known dove, has shifted in a hawkish direction recently. President Trump would have to replace the entire FOMC in order to keep interest rates from rising. We doubt he will try. (3) Long-Run Sustainability Concerns It might be the case that the deteriorating outlook for the NIIP undermines the perceived long-run equilibrium value of the currency so much that it overwhelms the impact of rising U.S. interest rates and causes the dollar to weaken even in the near term. This scenario would likely require a complete breakdown in confidence in current and future Administrations to avoid a runaway government debt situation. Historically, countries with large and growing NIIP shortfalls tend to have weakening currencies. The sustainability of the U.S. twin deficits has been an area of intense debate among academics and market practitioners for many years. One could argue that the external deficit represents the U.S. "living beyond its means," because it consumes more than it produces. Another school of thought is that global savings are plentiful, and investors seek markets that are deep, liquid and offer a high expected rate of return. Indeed, China has willingly plowed a large chunk of its excess savings into U.S. assets since 2000. If the U.S. is an attractive place to invest, then we should not be surprised that the country runs a persistent trade deficit and capital account surplus. But even taking the more positive side of this debate, there are limits to how long the current situation can persist. The large stock of financial obligations implies flows of income payments and receipts - interest, dividends and the like - that must be paid out of the economy's current production. This might grow to be large enough to significantly curtail U.S. consumption and investment. At some point, foreign investors may begin to question the desirability of an oversized exposure to U.S. assets within their global portfolios. We are not suggesting that foreign investors will suddenly dump their U.S. stocks and bonds. Rather, they may demand a higher expected rate of return in order to accept a rising allocation to U.S. assets. This would imply that the dollar will fall sharply so that it has room to appreciate and thereby lift the expected rate of return for foreign investors from that point forward. Chart II-5 shows that a 2% current account deficit would be roughly consistent with stabilization in the NIIP/GDP ratio. Any deficit above this level would imply a rapidly deteriorating situation. A 4% deficit would cause the NIIP to deteriorate to almost 80% of GDP by 2040. The fact that the current account averaged 4.6% in the 2000s and 2½% since 2010 confirms that the NIIP is unlikely to stabilize unless major macroeconomic adjustments are made (see below). Chart II-5Scenarios For The U.S. Net International Investment Position Academic research is inconclusive on how large the U.S. NIIP could become before there are serious economic consequences and/or foreign investors begin to revolt. Exorbitant Privilege The U.S. has been able to get away with the twin deficits for so long in part because of the dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency. The critical role of the dollar in international transactions underpins global demand for the currency. This has allowed the U.S. to issue most of its debt obligations in U.S. dollars, forcing the currency risk onto foreign investors. The U.S. is also able to get away with offering foreign investors a lower return on their investment in the U.S. than U.S. investors receive on their foreign investment. Chart II-6 provides a proxy for these two returns. Relatively safe, but low yielding, fixed-income investments are a large component of foreign investments in the U.S., while U.S. investors favor equities and other assets that have a higher expected rate of return when investing abroad (Chart II-7). This gap increased after the Great Recession as U.S. interest rates fell by more than the return U.S. investors received on their foreign assets. Today's gap, at almost 1½ percentage points, is well above the 1 percentage point average for the two decades leading up to the Great Recession. Chart II-6U.S. Investors Harvest Higher Returns Chart II-7Composition Of Net International ##br##Investment Position A yield gap of 1.5 percentage points may not sound like much, but it has been enough that the U.S. enjoys a positive net inflow of private investment income of about 1.2% of GDP, despite the fact that foreign investors hold far more U.S. assets than the reverse (Chart II-6, top panel). In Chart II-8 we simulate the primary investment balance based on a persistent 3% of GDP current account deficit and under several scenarios for the investment yield gap. Perhaps counterintuitively, the primary investment surplus that the U.S. currently enjoys will actually rise slightly as a percent of GDP if the yield gap remains near 1½ percentage points. This is because, although the NIIP balance becomes more negative over time, U.S. liabilities are not growing fast enough relative to its assets to offset the yield differential. Chart II-8Primary Investment Balance Simulations However, some narrowing in the yield gap is likely as the Fed raises interest rates. Historically, the gap does not narrow one-for-one with Fed rate hikes because the yield on U.S. investments abroad also rises. Assuming that the yield gap returns to the pre-Lehman average of 1 percentage point over the next three years, the primary investment balance would decline, but would remain positive. Only under the assumption that the yield gap falls to 50 basis points or lower would the primary balance turn negative (Chart II-8, bottom panel). Crossing the line from positive to negative territory on investment income is not necessarily a huge red flag for the dollar, but it would signal that foreign debt will begin to impinge on the U.S. standard of living. That said, the yield gap will have to deteriorate significantly for this to happen anytime soon. What Drives The Major Swings In The Dollar? While the dollar has been in a structural bear market for many decades, there have been major fluctuations around the downtrend. Since 1980, there have been three major bull phases and two bear markets (bull phases are shaded in Chart II-9). These major swings can largely be explained by shifts in U.S./foreign differentials for short-term interest rates, real GDP growth and productivity growth. A model using these three variables explains most of the cyclical swings in the dollar, as the dotted line in the top panel of Chart II-9 reveals. Chart II-9U.S. Dollar Cyclical Swings Driven By Three Main Factors The peaks and troughs do not line up perfectly, but periods of dollar appreciation were associated with rising U.S. interest rates relative to other countries, faster relative U.S. real GDP growth, and improving U.S. relative productivity growth. Since the Great Recession, rate differentials have moved significantly in favor of the dollar, although U.S. relative growth improved a little as well. Productivity trends have not been a factor in recent years. Note that the current account has been less useful in identifying the cyclical swings in the dollar. Looking ahead, we expect short-term interest rate differentials to shift further in favor of the U.S. dollar. We assume that the Fed will hike rates three additional times in 2018 and another three next year. The Bank of Japan will stick with its current rate and 10-year target for the foreseeable future. The ECB may begin the next rate hike campaign by mid-2019, but will proceed slowly thereafter. We expect rate differentials to widen by more than is discounted in the market. As discussed above, we also expect growth momentum to swing back in favor of the U.S. economy in 2018. U.S. productivity growth will continue to underperform the rest-of-world average over the medium and long term. Nonetheless, we expect a cyclical upturn in relative productivity performance that should also support the greenback for the next year or two. Conclusion Reducing the U.S. structural external deficit to a sustainable level would require significant macro-economic adjustments that seem unlikely for the foreseeable future. We would need to see some combination of a higher level of the U.S. household saving rate, a balanced Federal budget balance or better, and/or much stronger growth among U.S. trading partners. In other words, the U.S. would have to become a net producer of goods and services, and either Europe or Asia would have to become a net consumer of goods and services. Current trends do not favor such a role reversal. Indeed, the U.S. twin deficits are sure to move in the wrong direction for at least the next two years. Longer-term, pressure on the federal budget deficit will only intensify with the aging of the population. The shortfall in terms of net foreign assets will continue to grow, which means that the long-term structural downtrend in the trade-weighted value of the dollar will persist. Other structural factors, such as international productivity trends, also point to a long-term dollar depreciation. It seems incongruous that the U.S. dollar is the largest reserve currency and that U.S. is the world's largest international debtor. The situation is perhaps perpetuated by the lack of an alternative, but this could change over time as concerns over the long-run viability of the Eurozone ebb and the Chinese renminbi gains in terms of international trade. The transition could take decades. The U.S. twin-deficits situation is not that dire that the U.S. dollar is about to fall off a cliff because of sudden concerns about the unsustainability of the current account deficit. Even though the NIIP/GDP ratio will continue to deteriorate in the coming years, it does not appear that the U.S. is anywhere close to the point where investors would begin to seriously question America's ability to service its debt. The U.S. will continue to enjoy a net surplus on its international investments except under a worst-case scenario for relative returns. From an economic perspective, we see no reason why the U.S. will not be able to easily continue financing its domestic saving shortfall in the coming years. There are other risks of course. Growing international political tensions and a trade war could threaten the U.S. dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency. We will explore the geopolitical angle in next month's Special Report. In 2018, we expect the dollar to partially unwind last year's weakness on the back of positive cyclical forces. Additional protectionist measures should support the dollar as long as retaliation is muted. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Mathieu Savary Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy 1 A Wave of Protectionism? An Analysis of Economic and Political Considerations. Bank of Canada Working Paper 2008-2. Philipp Maier. 2 The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Steel Import Tariffs: A Quantification of the Impact During 2002. Trade Partnership Worldwide, LLC. Joseph Francois and Laura Baughman. February 4, 2003. 3 See footnote to Chart II-1. 4 Fiscal Policy and the Current Account. Center for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 7859 September 16, 2010. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The earnings backdrop remains constructive for the equity market. In the U.S., bottom-up forward earnings estimates and the net earnings revisions ratio have spiked on the back of the tax cuts. Unfortunately, many of the other equity-related indicators in this section have moved in the wrong direction. The monetary indicator is shifting progressively into negative territory as the Fed gradually tightens the monetary screws. Valuation in the U.S. market improved a little over the past month, but our composite Valuation Indicator is still very close to one sigma overvalued. Technically, our Speculation Indicator is still in frothy territory, but our Composite Sentiment Indicator has pulled back significantly toward the neutral line. Our Technical Indicator broke below the 9-month moving average in March (i.e. a 'sell' signal). These are worrying signs. Nonetheless, at this point we believe they are a reflection of the more volatile late-cycle period that the market has entered. An equity correction could occur at any time, but a bear market would require a significant and sustained economic downturn that depresses earnings estimates. Our checklist does not warn of such a scenario over the next 12 months. It is also a good sign that our Willingness-to-Pay indicator is still rising, at least for the U.S. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. While this suggests that investor flows remain positive for the U.S. equity market, the WTP appears to have rolled over in both Europe and Japan. This goes against our overweight in European stocks versus the U.S. in currency hedged terms (see the Overview section). Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) remained on its bullish equity signal in March. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. So far, the indicator has not flashed 'red'. Treasurys are hovering on the 'inexpensive' side of fair value, but are not cheap based on our model. Extended technicals suggest that the period of consolidation will persist for a while longer. Value is not a headwind to a continuation in the cyclical bear phase. Little has changed on the U.S. dollar front. It is expensive by some measures, but is on the oversold side technically. We still expect a final upleg this year, before the long-term downtrend resumes. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Fixed Income Asset Allocation: Global growth indicators remain solid, while inflation pressures continue to build. Central banks will remain focused on those factors, and not news-driven market volatility spikes, until the trends change. The cyclical environment still favors a below-benchmark duration stance for bond investors, favoring credit over government debt, but with lower risk-adjusted return expectations. U.K. Gilts: Bank of England hawkishness is increasing, but policymakers will be hard pressed to tighten more than is currently priced. Stay overweight Gilts in hedged global government bond portfolios. Position for a steeper Gilt curve by going long the 5yr in a 2yr/5yr/10yr butterfly trade. Feature Chart of the WeekStill A Bond-Bearish Backdrop Higher financial market volatility remains the most important investment theme for 2018, as investors continue to be fed a steady diet of worrisome headlines. Threats of a U.S. - China trade war, widening LIBOR-OIS spreads in the U.S., the ascent of trade and foreign policy hawks in the White House, troubles at Facebook hitting the market-leading technology stocks - all are just the latest reasons for investors to become more cautious on taking risk. Yet the ability of markets to shrug off, or succumb to, growing uncertainty will be related to two things - the momentum of global economic growth and the future direction of global monetary policy. On the former, the latest data releases have shown some moderation in the strong coordinated global growth upturn witnessed over the past year. Our aggregate measures such as the global PMI and global ZEW indices have dipped lower in the first few months of 2018. These indicators remain at levels suggesting growth is still in decent shape, even with some worsening in expectations (Chart of the Week). On the latter, the BCA Central Bank Monitors are still showing a growing need to tighten monetary policy further in the major developed economies. This continues to put upward pressure on government bond yields through rising inflation expectations and a higher expected path of short-term interest rates. Until there is evidence of a more meaningful downturn in global growth, bond yields will keep on drifting higher. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance for fixed income investors, favoring spread product over government bonds, while running below-average portfolio risk (i.e. tracking error) given more elevated levels of market volatility. The "TINA Trade" Is Now The "TISNA Trade" - There Is STILL No Alternative Central bankers remain on a path to normalize the extraordinary monetary accommodation of the past several years, led by their steadfast belief in the Phillips Curve at a time of low unemployment in most countries. Against this backdrop, government bond yields cannot fall enough to limit the damage from rapid equity market selloffs without much softer growth or inflation data that would alter the expected trajectory of policy rates. This implies a higher structural level of market volatility now relative to previous years, as we discussed in a recent Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report.1 Yet despite the signs of greater nervousness among investors, there is still a strong level of positive sentiment towards equities and bearish sentiment towards bonds according to the Market Vane indices (Chart 2). The latest edition of the widely-followed Bank of America Merrill Lynch Investor Survey also revealed a disconnect between the opinions of investors (worries over protectionism, trade wars, higher inflation and softer global growth) and actual positions (large equity overweight's favoring cyclical growth stocks).2 Investors seem to be "nervously complacent", staying long risk assets (equities, credit) and underweight safe havens (government bonds) but with a growing list of concerns. For now, this appears to be the most appropriate allocation, for the following reasons: Global growth is still generally strong. Our global manufacturing PMI remains close to the cyclical highs, although there was some pullback seen in the "flash estimates" for March in the euro area, Japan and the U.K. (Chart 3). The breadth of the current cyclical global upturn remains strong, with all eighteen countries in the composite index having a PMI in the "growth zone" above 50 (top panel). Chart 2Pro-Risk Sentiment,##BR##Despite More Volatile Markets Chart 3Global Growth##BR##Still Looks Good The OECD global leading economic indicator continues to accelerate, while the Citigroup global inflation surprise index is also picking up (Chart 4). These are pointing to continued upward pressure on global bond yields through higher real yields and faster inflation expectations, respectively. The global cyclical backdrop is boosting inflation. 75% of OECD countries are operating beyond full employment while capacity utilization rates in the developed economies are approaching 80% - the highest level since mid-2008 (Chart 5, top panel). Global oil prices should continue to grind higher, with BCA's commodity strategists now expecting the benchmark Brent oil price hitting $80/bbl in one year's time (middle panel). Also, global export price inflation is showing no signs of slowing, suggesting that global headline inflation should continue moving higher (bottom panel). Chart 4Upward Pressure On##BR##Real Yields AND Inflation Chart 5A More Inflationary##BR##Global Backdrop Central bankers are still biased towards becoming less accommodative. This was seen last week with the U.S. Federal Reserve hiking the fed funds rate and raising its growth and interest rate projections (Chart 6), while the Bank of England (BoE) gave a strong indication that an interest rate increase was coming in May. This comes as the European Central Bank continues to signal a tapering of its asset purchase program later this year. The latter point is critical for markets, as tighter global monetary policy has diminished the ability for investors to ignore sources of potential uncertainty. Take the current concern over trade tensions between the U.S. and China, for example. A Google Trends search of the phrase "China Trade War" shows, unsurprisingly, a huge recent spike in interest in that topic (Chart 7, top panel). There was also a big increase in such online searches around the time of Donald Trump's election victory in November 2016 and his inauguration in January 2017. At that time, however, global monetary policy was still accommodative, with the real fed funds rate well below the neutral "r-star" estimate (middle panel) and central bank balance sheets in the major developed economies expanding at a 20% annual rate (bottom panel). Chart 6The Fed Will Keep On Hiking Chart 7Expect More Vol Spikes While CBs Tighten The easy monetary settings helped keep market volatility low despite the shock of Trump's election win and what it meant for the implementation of his more aggressive campaign promises, like raising tariffs on U.S. imports from China. Fast forward to today and the real fed funds rate is now at neutral and central banks are buying bonds at a much slower pace. This means that markets will have a tougher time ignoring greater uncertainty, as was witnessed in last week's equity market selloff following President Trump's announcement of $60 billion in Chinese import tariffs. Going forward, without the soothing balm of very low interest rates and plentiful central bank liquidity expansion, volatility spikes like the ones seen in early February and last week will become more frequent. The implication is that volatility-adjusted returns on risk assets will be lower, even if the global growth backdrop remains reasonably supportive. A pro-risk investment bias, but playing with fewer chips on the table, is still appropriate over at least the next six months. Bottom Line: Global growth indicators remain at elevated levels, while inflation pressures continue to build. Central banks will remain focused on those factors, and not news-driven market volatility spikes, until the trends change. The cyclical environment still favors a below-benchmark duration stance for bond investors, favoring credit over government debt, but with lower risk-adjusted return expectations. U.K. Update: Sticking With Our Overweight Call On Gilts Chart 8Mixed Messages On U.K. Growth The BoE kept interest rates unchanged at last week's policy meeting, but sent clear signals that a rate hike would be very likely in May. Two members of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), Michael Saunders and Ian McCafferty, actually voted a rate hike last week, which was a surprise. The BoE's increasing hawkishness continues a process that began in autumn of 2017, when policymakers began shifting their language in advance of a November rate hike - the first BoE rate increase since May 2007. The central bank had been worried more about the risks to the U.K. growth outlook since the July 2016 Brexit vote, while ignoring the currency-driven overshoot of its inflation target. Now, the BoE seems a bit more comfortable with the U.K. growth outlook, even amid the ongoing Brexit uncertainty, as was noted in the official policy statement from last week's MPC meeting: Developments regarding the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union - and in particular the reaction of households, businesses and asset prices to them - remain the most significant influence on, and source of uncertainty about, the economic outlook. In such exceptional circumstances, the MPC's remit specifies that the Committee must balance any significant trade-off between the speed at which it intends to return inflation sustainably to the target and the support that monetary policy provides to jobs and activity. The steady absorption of slack has reduced the degree to which it is appropriate for the MPC to accommodate an extended period of inflation above the target. We find it a bit of a surprise that the BoE would seek to switch to inflation-fighting mode now, for two reasons: U.K. growth momentum may be slowing. The flash estimate for the March manufacturing PMI fell to an 8-month low, while the leading economic indicators (LEIs) from both the OECD and Conference Board have clearly rolled over (Chart 8). The BoE did highlight the recent pickup in wage inflation, with year-over-year growth in average weekly earnings now up to 2.8% in nominal terms. This has pushed real wage growth back into positive territory (3rd panel), which appears to be feeding through into a slight pickup in consumer confidence (bottom panel). Although the modest increase in February retail sales suggests that a consumer spending revival may be slower to arrive than the BoE is hoping for. U.K. inflation momentum is slowing. The surge in U.K. inflation following the decline in the British Pound after the 2016 Brexit vote is in the process of unwinding. The trade-weighted currency is up 9% from the 2016 low, which has sliced imported goods price inflation from 10% to 2% over the same period (Chart 9). Headline CPI inflation, which rose from near 0% to 3.1% in November 2017, now sits at 2.7%. The upturn in core CPI inflation has also stabilized. While both CPI inflation measures remain above the 2% BoE target, the momentum has clearly peaked and pipeline price pressures continue to decelerate. Investors have listened to the signals sent by the BoE, pricing in 45bps of hikes over the next year and pushing the 2-year Gilt yield to 0.9% - the highest level since May 2011 (Chart 10). At the same time, market-based inflation expectations have dipped a bit and the U.K. data surprise index has fallen back to the zero line (bottom panel). Chart 9U.K. Inflation Has Peaked Chart 10A Rapid BoE Repricing At The Wrong Time? Conflicting signals can also be seen in the slope of the Gilt curve. The nominal 2-year/10-year Gilt curve now sits at 55bps, just above the 2016 post-Brexit lows. The real Gilt curve (the nominal curve minus the 2-year/10-year U.K. CPI swap curve) is sitting at the flattest levels last seen since 2015/16 (Chart 11, top panel) when the BoE base rate was above zero in real terms (2nd and 3rd panels). Now, the real base is deeply negative around -2%, suggesting that the Gilt curve may already be discounting higher real BoE policy rates. At the same time, the U.K. inflation expectations curve is steepening, with 2-year CPI swaps falling faster than 10-year CPI swaps, as was the case during that 2015/16 episode (bottom panel). U.K. money markets are now pricing in an increase in the base rate to 1% over the next year. Given the slowing trends in the U.K. LEIs, the manufacturing PMI and realized inflation rates, we remain doubtful that the BoE will be able to deliver more hikes than are currently discounted. We continue to view U.K. Gilts as a "defensive" overweight within dedicated global government bond portfolios, especially given our recommendation to also stay defensive on overall duration exposure. The primary trend in the performance of U.K. Gilts relative to the Barclays Global Treasury Index, on a currency-hedged basis, is broadly correlated (inversely) to the ratio of the U.K. OECD LEI to the overall OECD LEI (Chart 12, top panel). Thus, we feel comfortable sticking with our call to expect U.K. Gilt outperformance in the next 6-12 months as long as the U.K. LEI continues to underperform - especially with the yield betas of Gilts to U.S. Treasuries and euro area government bonds now well below 1 (middle panel). Chart 11The Gilt Curve##BR##Looks Too Flat Chart 12Stay O/W Gilts & Add Go Long##BR##The Belly On A 2/5/10 Butterfly Given the recent flattening of the Gilt curve, which appears a bit extreme, we are adding a new trade to our Tactical Overlay this week: going long the belly (5-year) of a 2-year/5-year/10-year (2/5/10) Gilt butterfly. The current level of that 2/5/10 butterfly is 9bps, and we are targeting a move down to the -10bp to -15bp range. This trade is mildly negative carry, with -0.75bps of flattening per month already discounted in the forwards over the next year (bottom panel), but we anticipate the 2/5/10 butterfly to compress at a faster rate than the forwards in the coming months. Bottom Line: BoE hawkishness is increasing, but policymakers will be hard pressed to tighten more than is currently priced. Stay overweight Gilts in hedged global government bond portfolios. Position for a steeper Gilt curve by going long the 5yr point in a 2yr/5yr/10yr butterfly trade. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Policymakers Are Now Selling Put Options On Volatility, Not Asset Prices", dated March 6th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-20/cracks-in-bull-case-emerge-yet-stubborn-investors-not-moving Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Economy: There is no imminent danger of a significant deterioration in global growth, but the rate of improvement is peaking. The result of the more moderate pace of economic growth and the mounting threat of protectionism is that there is more two way risk in both bond yields and spreads than there has been for some time. Fed: The message from last week's Fed meeting is that the committee recognizes that the outlook for U.S. growth and inflation has improved. Going forward, we anticipate a more hawkish Fed that is somewhat less responsive to tightening financial conditions. This will keep a floor under Treasury yields and impart volatility to credit spreads. Leveraged Loans: Leveraged loans have not yet started to outperform fixed rate junk bonds, but this will change as we approach the end of the credit cycle and loan coupons follow interest rates higher. Feature Yet another down week for risk assets, and all of a sudden 2018 is shaping up to be a pretty miserable year for spread product (Chart 1). High-Yield corporate bonds have underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 29 basis points year-to-date, and investment grade corporates have underperformed by 90 bps. Meanwhile, the sell-off in Treasuries has also paused and the 10-year yield is now 12 bps below its 2018 peak. Chart 1Annual Excess Returns To Credit What exactly is going on? We identify two catalysts for the recent market moves and consider each in turn. Questioning The Synchronized Global Recovery Market moves during the past few weeks have, to some extent, been driven by investors starting to question the sustainability of the so-called "synchronized global recovery". The strong pace of global growth has been a key driver of higher bond yields and risk asset outperformance, and most indicators suggest this trend remains intact. The Global Manufacturing PMI is high compared to recent years, and our PMI diffusion index shows that only 1 out of 36 countries has a PMI below the 50 boom/bust line (Chart 2). Our Global Leading Economic Indicator is similarly elevated, and has a diffusion index that has mostly been in positive territory since mid-2016 (Chart 2, panel 2). But last week we received some evidence that this rapid pace of growth may not persist. Flash PMIs predict that the Eurozone Manufacturing PMI will fall to 56.6 in March, down from a recent peak of 60.6 (Chart 2, panel 3). Similarly, the Japanese PMI is predicted to fall to 53.2 in March, down from a recent peak of 54.8 (Chart 2, bottom panel). There is no Flash PMI data for China, the country with the largest weighting in the Global PMI index, but leading indicators suggest that Chinese PMI will also moderate in the months ahead. This is a risk we have flagged in several recent reports.1 Granted, these are all strong PMI readings that are still well above the 50 boom/bust line, but the pace of improvement has clearly moderated and this sort of marginal change often causes investors to extrapolate weaker growth into the future. This appears to be exactly what is happening. The Global ZEW index, a survey of investors' economic sentiment, fell in March (Chart 3). The BCA Carry Canary Indicator, a composite measure of emerging market currency trades geared to global growth, has also weakened (Chart 3, panel 2). Meanwhile, cyclical equity sectors (excluding technology) have not managed to outperform defensives even as Treasury yields have risen, a break from the prior correlation (Chart 3, panel 3). Of the four market-based indicators that most closely track the 10-year Treasury yield, only our Boom/Bust Indicator is not currently pointing to lower yields in the near-term (Chart 3, bottom panel). As usual, we turn to our 2-Factor Treasury Model to assess the impact of moderating global growth on the 10-year Treasury yield. At present, the model - which is based on the Global Manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar - pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.96% (Chart 4). However, if we assume that Flash PMI readings for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan are accurate, and also that PMIs in the rest of the world and dollar sentiment stay flat at current levels, then the fair value reading from our model will drop to 2.85% when the final March PMI data are released next week. This is not far from the current yield level, and could even be an optimistic forecast if the Chinese PMI starts to roll over, as we expect. Chart 2Global Recovery Still Intact Chart 3Global Growth Warning Signs Chart 42-Factor Treasury Model Of course the global economy also has to contend with the possibility of an escalating trade war between the U.S. and China. Markets reacted last week as the U.S. government ramped up the pressure by announcing a 25% tariff on $50-$60 billion worth of trade with China. While the immediate economic impact of these measures is highly uncertain, our Geopolitical strategists view an escalating trade war as a real possibility during the next 1-2 years.2 Bottom Line: There is no imminent danger of a significant deterioration in global growth, but the rate of improvement is peaking. The result of the more moderate pace of economic growth and the mounting threat of protectionism is that there is more two way risk in both bond yields and spreads than there has been for some time. Stay tuned. A Less Supportive Fed Chart 5Fed Versus Market The second catalyst driving bond markets at the current juncture is that the Fed is providing markets with a less accommodative monetary back-drop. Faced with a firmer outlook for U.S. growth and inflation, the Fed is now somewhat less responsive to tighter financial conditions than it has been during the past few years. This hawkishness will put a floor under Treasury yields going forward, and is also the most immediate risk to credit spreads, as we have explained in several recent reports.3 Chart 6The Fed's Phillips Curve Model Case in point, the Fed went ahead with a rate hike at last week's FOMC meeting despite the recent turbulence in financial markets. Not only that, but FOMC participants generally revised up their projections for both economic growth and the fed funds rate. The same number of participants (6) now expect four rate hikes this year as expect three. Last December only four participants expected four or more rate hikes in 2018. Further, the committee's median projection for the fed funds rate at the end of 2019 rose from 2.7% to 2.9%, the median for the end of 2020 rose from 3.1% to 3.4%, and even the median federal funds rate expected to prevail in the longer run rose from 2.8% to 2.9%. The market has moved a long way towards the Fed's dots in recent months, but is still somewhat more pessimistic. The overnight index swap curve is priced for slightly more than three rate hikes in 2018 (including last week's), but is below the Fed's median projection for 2019, 2020 and the longer run (Chart 5). As mentioned above, the Fed also revised up its projections for economic growth and the pace of labor market tightening. The Fed is now looking for an unemployment rate of 3.6% by the end of next year, well below its estimated 4.5% natural rate. At the same time, however, the Fed left its projections for core inflation largely unchanged leaving some to question whether the Fed is re-assessing its commitment to the Phillips curve. In fact, the following question was asked to Chairman Powell at last week's post-meeting press conference:4 Question: Interesting changes in the forecast. A higher growth forecast [...]. Lower unemployment, [...]. And yet, very little change in inflation. What does that say about what you and the Committee believe about the inflation dynamic? Answer: [...] that suggests that the relationship between changes in slack and inflation is not so tight. [...] It has diminished, but it's still there. In other words, the Chairman refused to dismiss the Phillips curve framework altogether but acknowledged that the slope is very flat. The implication is that the labor market will have to run hot for the next couple of years for the Fed to achieve its inflation target. By our assessment, the Fed's projections for the unemployment rate and inflation seem fairly reasonable. Chart 6 shows an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model of core inflation that we re-created from a 2015 Janet Yellen speech.5 Using the Fed's median projections for the unemployment rate, and also holding relative import prices and inflation expectations flat, the model projects that core inflation will rise during the next two years, but will remain slightly below the Fed's target. In other words, the Fed's inflation forecasts seem to agree with the empirical data. In Search Of A More Robust Phillips Curve One of the reasons that the Phillips curve is so flat is that while core PCE inflation includes some prices that respond briskly to labor market slack, it also includes many prices that are less driven by labor slack and more by idiosyncratic factors. The price of imported goods being a prime example. Recent research from the San Francisco Fed splits out those prices that are more sensitive to labor slack - procyclical inflation - from those that are less sensitive to labor slack - acyclical inflation.6 Interestingly, it is the acyclical components that have caused core inflation to run below the Fed's target in recent years, while procyclical inflation has been well above 2% (Chart 7). This framework is helpful because it allows us to estimate a more robust Phillips curve on just the components of inflation that are most sensitive to tightness in the labor market. For example, when we estimate a Phillips curve relationship on just procyclical inflation (excluding housing), the model shows that this component of inflation will rise by 0.18% for every percentage point decline in the unemployment rate. When we estimate the Phillips curve model on overall core PCE we find that a 1 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate only raises core PCE inflation by 0.09%. The top panel of Chart 8 shows that if the unemployment rate follows the path predicted by the Fed, then procyclical inflation (ex. housing) will rise during the next two years, and should stay above the Fed's 2% target. Our own model of housing inflation also shows that its deceleration should reverse in the coming months (Chart 8, panel 2). Chart 7Acyclical Components A Drag On Inflation Chart 8TCore Inflation Will Move Higher As for the acyclical components of inflation, in a prior report we discussed why health care inflation should rise during the next two years, and this has so far been confirmed by strong producer price data (Chart 8, panel 3).7 For the remaining acyclical components, of which 41% are goods and 59% are services, we would expect that at least the goods component will rise in response to the recent acceleration in non-oil import prices (Chart 8, bottom panel). In conclusion, there is reason to expect some upside in each component of core inflation. We anticipate that core inflation will move higher in the coming months and that the Fed will respond with continued gradual rate hikes. Bottom Line: The message from last week's Fed meeting is that the committee recognizes that the outlook for U.S. growth and inflation has improved. Going forward, we anticipate a more hawkish Fed that is somewhat less responsive to tightening financial conditions. This will keep a floor under Treasury yields and impart volatility to credit spreads. Leveraged Loan Update Chart 9Loan Coupons Will Rise We continue to recommend that investors favor floating rate leveraged loans over fixed rate high-yield bonds in their credit portfolios. The two main reasons for this recommendation are that (i) loans will benefit from higher coupons as the Fed lifts rates and LIBOR resets higher and (ii) loans will benefit from higher recoveries than bonds when the next default cycle occurs. However, somewhat puzzlingly, as 3-month LIBOR has increased during the past few years the coupon return on the S&P Leveraged Loan index has not kept pace. In fact, leveraged loans only started to outperform fixed rate junk a couple of months ago (Chart 9). There are two reasons for this. First, many leveraged loans have LIBOR floors at around 1%, so initial increases in LIBOR in 2016 had no impact on leveraged loan coupons. But 3-month LIBOR is now well above 1%, and yet leveraged loan coupons are still not rising. This is because issuers have been aggressively refinancing loans at lower spreads as LIBOR has increased. This spread compression has kept coupon payments low, but history tells us that this dynamic cannot persist. Eventually, as credit spreads stop tightening near the end of the credit cycle, issuers will not be able to reduce their interest costs through refinancing and will be forced to accept higher coupon payments as interest rates rise. Notice that even though the average price on the S&P Leveraged Loan index was higher between 2004 and 2006 than it is today, that did not prevent loan coupons from rising alongside LIBOR, after some initial lag (Chart 9, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Leveraged loans have not yet started to outperform fixed rate junk bonds, but this will change as we approach the end of the credit cycle and loan coupons follow interest rates higher. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://gps.bcaresearch.com/blog/view_blog/460 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Brainard Gives The Green Light", dated March 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 A full transcript of the post-meeting press conference: https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20180321.pdf 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 6 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2017-35.pdf 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Fed preview: The Fed will hike rates again this week, and may signal a faster pace of future hikes given signs that U.S. inflation is starting to accelerate. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance and stay underweight U.S. Treasuries in global hedged bond portfolios. Oversold U.S. Treasuries: While most indicators of positioning and momentum for U.S. Treasuries show a deeply oversold market, an analysis of past such episodes shows that it can take 4-6 months before bond yields correct an oversold condition in the absence of slowing growth or inflation - with yields potentially hitting new highs in the interim. ECB Tapering: The ECB strongly believes that the "stock effect" of its asset purchases matters more for European bond yields than the "flow effect". This suggests that the odds of a European "Taper Tantrum" later this year are low, although bond yields there are still headed higher. Feature Chart of the WeekThis Time Is Different? Global bond markets have calmed down after the big surge that started the year. The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield has traded in a relatively narrow 2.80-2.95% range since the VIX spike in early February, despite a string of weaker-than-expected U.S. economic data prints that has triggered sharp downgrades to Q1/2018 U.S. GDP growth forecasts. At the same time, 10-year benchmark yields for other major government bond markets (Germany, France, U.K., Canada) have been drifting lower, but remain above levels that began the year. In the case of U.S. Treasuries, the overall level of yields is being held up by the steady climb at the short-end of the yield curve. Recent hawkish comments from new Fed Chairman Jay Powell and long-time Fed dove Lael Brainard have raised expectations for a rate hike at this week's FOMC meeting, which is now priced as a certainty. The 2-year Treasury yield has climbed to a 10-year high of 2.3%, which is helping keep a floor underneath longer-term Treasury yields despite positioning indicators showing that traders and bond managers already have significantly reduced duration exposure (Chart of the Week). The other factor that is likely holding up global bond yields is the incremental move by the European Central Bank (ECB) towards a tapering of its asset purchases. The market has already repriced both future interest rate expectations and the term premia embedded in European government bond yields, although recent comments from ECB officials suggest that they believe that there will not be a "Taper Tantrum 2.0" in Europe similar to the Treasury market sell-off in 2013. This week, we tackle those two critical issues for bond markets head-on: the implications of large short positions in the U.S. Treasury market versus the ECB taper impact on global bond yields. Our conclusion is that the impact of both is likely overestimated by investors. How To Think About A Technically Oversold Treasury Market The Fed will deliver another rate hike this week. That outcome has already been fully discounted by the market, which should not be considered surprising given the current U.S. economic backdrop: Inflation: Underlying inflation has clearly bottomed out and has begun to accelerate, with the 3-month annualized growth rate of core CPI inflation now up over 3% (Chart 2). That trend should continue in the next several months: our model for CPI Shelter inflation is calling for a pickup (2nd panel), core goods inflation is showing signs of responding to the weakening U.S. dollar (3rd panel), and the big plunge in U.S. wireless phone prices that severely dampened inflation in 2017 is about to wash out of the year-over-year CPI data and boost core services inflation (bottom panel). Growth: Despite some recent signs of softening momentum in the Q1 data, the underlying trend in U.S. growth remains upbeat. Labor demand is accelerating and our payrolls growth model suggests further gains are coming (Chart 3). Corporate profit growth remains solid and the impact of the Trump tax cuts will only boost earnings momentum and business confidence. Leading economic indicators are also accelerating and suggest that any loss of growth momentum in Q1 - which seems to be an annual occurrence despite the seasonal adjustment of data - will be short-lived (bottom panel). Chart 2U.S. Inflation Is Starting To Perk Up Chart 3No Reason For Any Dovish Fed Surprises Financial Conditions: U.S. equity prices have recovered much of the losses suffered during the February VIX-driven correction, while corporate credit spreads remain narrow from a historical perspective (Chart 4). Add in the weaker U.S. dollar - the impact of which is already boosting import prices and potentially following through into the shorter-term inflation expectations of households (bottom panel) - and overall financial conditions remain highly accommodative. Against this positive backdrop, the Fed can feel confident that its growth and inflation forecasts for 2018 will be achieved, and that inflation expectations can continue to climb back to levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target. There is even a chance that the Fed could accelerate its planned pace of rate hikes (Chart 5), particularly if there is an upgrade to the FOMC growth and inflation projections, which will be updated for this week's meeting. Chart 4U.S. Financial Conditions##BR##Remain Accommodative Chart 5All Eyes On##BR##The Dots This Week Yet for all the positive economic, bond-bearish news, one fact stands out - the U.S. Treasury market is deeply oversold from a technical perspective. This should, in theory, limit the ability for bond yields to continue rising and could set up a short-covering bond rally if there is a more meaningful and prolonged slowing of economic growth or inflation. The technical indicators that we regularly monitor for the U.S. Treasury market are all at or near the extremes of the ranges observed since 2000 (Chart 6). Chart 6U.S. Treasuries Are Very Oversold The 10-year Treasury yield is 43bps above its 200-day moving average The 26-week total return of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Treasury index is -4.3% The J.P. Morgan client survey of bond managers and traders showed the largest underweight duration positioning since the mid-2000s, although there has been some recent reduction of those positions The Market Vane index of sentiment for Treasuries is now at 49, near the bottom of the range since 2000 The CFTC data on positioning in 10-year Treasury futures shows a large net short of -8%, scaled by open interest Given this degree of investor negativity toward U.S. Treasuries, some pullback in yields seems inevitable. However, a look back at past episodes where Treasuries were this oversold shows that the timing of such a pullback is highly variable - anywhere from one month to seven months. The determining factor is the growth and inflation backdrop in the U.S. To show this, we did a simple study using two series from our list of Treasury technical indicators. Specifically, we looked at "oversold episodes" since 2000 where the Market Vane Treasury sentiment index dipped below 50 and where the 10-year Treasury yield was trading at least 30bps above its 200-day moving average. We then defined the end of the oversold episode as simply the point when the 10-year Treasury yield fell back below its 200-day moving average. We then looked at the duration (in days), and change in bond yields, for each oversold episode. There were eleven such episodes since the year 2000, not counting the current one which has not yet ended. In Table 1, we list them ranked by the number of days it took to complete each episode as we defined it. The longest correction of an oversold Treasury market since 2000 took place between July 2003 and February 2004, where 203 days passed before the 10-year yield dipped back below its 200-day moving average. The shortest correction was in May 2000, where only 28 days were needed. Table 1A Look At Prior Episodes Of An Oversold U.S. Treasury Market To determine what the U.S. economic backdrop was during each episode, we then simply asked if economic growth was rising or falling, or if inflation was stable/rising or falling, using the ISM Manufacturing index and core PCE inflation as the relevant data series. The answers to those questions are found in the final two columns of Table 1. All the positioning and economic indicators used in our historical study, shaded for the oversold episodes, are shown in Charts 7, 8 and 9. Chart 7U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2000-2005 Chart 8U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2006-2011 Chart 9U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2011 To Today The simplest conclusion that we reached from our study is that the shortest corrections of an oversold Treasury market occurred, unsurprisingly, during the two episodes where both growth and inflation were slowing, with an average length of each episode of 42 days. The four episodes where growth and inflation were both rising had a more variable performance, lasting anywhere from 98 days to 203 days, averaging 156 days per episode. The five episodes where growth was slowing but inflation was stable or rising were also of varying length, averaging 140 days. In other words, it has taken around five months, on average, to correct an oversold Treasury market when inflation was stable or rising, and about 1.5 months when inflation was falling. In the current environment, where the ISM Manufacturing index is in an uptrend and core PCE inflation is rising, we should expect a longer period of time before the Treasury market corrects its oversold condition. If we mark the start of the current episode on February 20th of this year, using the definition described above, then the 10-year Treasury yield may return to its 200-day moving average of 2.4% by August (five months from now). A word of warning for traders and investors looking to play for that move by flipping to a long duration position now, though - the primary trend of the market, defined by that 200-day moving average, is currently rising. It was also rising during the two longest oversold correction episodes 2003-04 and 2013-14. The 10-year Treasury yield only declined -14bps and -17bps, respectively, over those entire episodes. During the 2013-14 episode, also a period similar to today when growth and inflation were both rising, yields actually climbed to new cyclical highs before finally peaking. In other words, betting on a reversal of an oversold bond market without any deterioration in growth and inflation dynamics may generate only modest returns over a lengthy period, and with substantial mark-to-market volatility in the meantime. In the current cycle, with leading indicators for U.S. growth and inflation accelerating and the Fed becoming more hawkish, we recommend maintaining below-benchmark duration positions in the U.S. rather than positioning now for a short-covering rally. Bottom Line: The Fed will hike rates again this week, and may signal a faster pace of future hikes given signs that U.S. inflation is starting to accelerate. While most indicators of positioning and momentum for U.S. Treasuries show a deeply oversold market, an analysis of past such episodes shows that it can take 4-6 months before bond yields correct an oversold condition in the absence of a slowing of economic growth or inflation - with yields potentially hitting new highs in the interim. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance and stay underweight U.S. Treasuries in global hedged bond portfolios. The ECB Is Betting On A Tantrum-Free Taper Several key ECB officials have been giving speeches over the past week, spelling out a consistent message to the markets on the future of euro area monetary policy. Most notably, ECB President Mario Draghi and ECB Chief Economist Peter Praet gave speeches last week at a conference in Frankfurt. Both of them used nearly identical language to highlight how the ECB's main policy tool going forward will no longer be net asset purchases, but instead will be interest rates and forward guidance on changes to rates.1 This echoes the message sent after the ECB's policy meeting earlier this month, when the commitment to increase the pace of asset purchases was dropped from the ECB policy statement. Both Draghi and Praet repeated the ECB's official stance on the end of asset purchases, which requires a "sustained adjustment" in the path of inflation. This was described by Draghi as: Specifically, a sustained adjustment requires three conditions to be in place. [...] The first is convergence: headline inflation has to be on course to reach our aim over a meaningful definition of the medium term. The second is confidence: we need to be sure that this upward adjustment in inflation has a sufficiently high probability of being realized. The third condition is resilience: the adjustment in inflation has to be self-sustained even without additional net asset purchases. Draghi then went on to add these comments on the sequencing of rate hikes after the asset purchases are completed, with our emphasis added: [...] when progress towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation is judged to be sufficient, net purchases will come to an end. At that point, next to our forward guidance, appropriate financial conditions will be maintained by our reinvestment policy. [...] as regards the evolution of our policy rates beyond the end of our net purchases, we will maintain the sequencing that is currently set out in our forward guidance, namely our pledge to keep key interest rates at their current levels "well past" the end of net purchases. This time-based element of our guidance is already vital today, in particular to ensure that our policy stimulus is not weakened by premature expectations of a first rate rise, and so financial conditions remain consistent with inflation convergence. That last line can be roughly translated from policymaker-speak as "we want to avoid a Fed-style Taper Tantrum when we stop buying euro area government bonds." Chart 10An Orderly Repricing Of ECB Expectations Praet made similar comments in his speech, discussing how the first rate hike after the end of asset purchases must only take place once there is a "durable convergence" of euro area inflation with the ECB target of just below 2% on headline inflation. So far, the markets have been heeding the ECB's communication and policy guidance. The timing of the ECB's first full 25bp rate hike, taken from our "months-to-hike" indicator, shows that the market does not expect the ECB to adjust rates until November of 2019 (Chart 10). At the same time, the market is only slowly repricing the term premium on longer-dated euro area government bonds, which would be expected if the ECB were to take its time in fully tapering its asset purchases. With realized euro area inflation, and market-based inflation expectations, still well short of the ECB's target, the market appears to be "correctly" following the ECB's guidance on the timetable for future policy moves. This is keeping euro area bond yields at low levels and dampening interest rate volatility. There may be another factor at work holding down bond yields, however. In a speech given at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum in New York last month - an event attended by numerous academic and Wall Street economists, as well as several current FOMC members - ECB Executive Board Member Benoit Coeure discussed the importance of the "stock" effect of central bank asset purchases compared to the "flow" effect.2 Or as Coeure described it: [...] the "stock effect" - that is, the persistence of the effects of the stock of bonds held by the central bank on its balance sheet under a commitment of reinvestment. If the effects of purchases dissipate quickly, a shorter purchase horizon could lead to term premia rising even as interest rate expectations remain well anchored by forward guidance. Financial conditions would then tighten. But if the effectiveness of asset purchases rises with the stock of assets already acquired - if there is some "crossover point" where the stock effect becomes more important than the continued flow of purchases - then a reduced pace of purchases would not unduly decompress the term premium. This brings up an interesting point about the ECB's policy strategy as it prepares to taper its asset purchase program. If the ECB can effectively communicate that it will continue to reinvest the maturing bonds on its balance sheet after the new asset purchases have stopped, then the market will not price in a bigger term premium on longer-dated bonds since the ECB will continue to own a huge share of the stock of euro area government debt. The stock effect will dominate the diminishing flow effect. Coeure noted in his speech that the experience of the U.S. in 2013, when Ben Bernanke surprised markets with talk that the Fed was planning on cutting back its asset purchases, is different than Europe today. The biggest reason is that the ECB owns a far bigger share of the European bond market than the Fed did at that time. That is because the ECB asset purchases since its bond buying program began in 2015 have dwarfed the net issuance of euro area government debt (Chart 11). At no point during the Fed's quantitative easing (QE) era did the central bank ever buy more U.S. Treasuries than the U.S. government was issuing. According to the logic of Benoit Coeure, the smaller Fed "footprint" in the Treasury market relative to the ECB's ownership share of euro area government bonds (Chart 12) should mean that the Treasury term premium will be more volatile than that for German bunds (and other euro area debt). That is because a greater share of Treasury issuance must be sold to private investors who are more price-sensitive than central banks. In other words, the flow effect dominates the stock effect. Chart 11ECB & BoJ Have Been Absorbing##BR##All Net Government Bond Issuance Chart 12The 'Stock Effect' Of QE##BR##Should Be Bigger In Europe & Japan In Chart 13, we try and visually prove Coeure's thesis. The chart plots the gap between central bank asset purchases and net government bond issuance (the blue solid line proxying the "flow effect", using IMF data) for the U.S., euro area and Japan versus our estimates of the term premium (the black dotted line). The correlation appears to be very strong for the euro area and Japan during the era of asset purchases for those central banks, perhaps due to the "stock effect" dominating the "flow effect". This differs from the experience seen in the U.S. during the Fed QE era, when there was no stable relationship between the term premium and the amount of Treasuries the Fed was purchasing relative to net issuance. Looking ahead, there are important implications of this "stock vs. flow" argument for the future direction of euro area (and Japanese) bond yields, both in absolute terms and relative to U.S. Treasuries. In Chart 13, we also added BCA's forecasts for net government bond issuance over the next two years relative to our projections for the pace of asset purchases from the ECB and BoJ (both new purchases and reinvestments), and the Fed's own projections for the runoff of Treasuries from its balance sheet. Our estimates show that there will still be no new government bond issuance for the private sector to absorb in the euro area and Japan in 2018 and 2019, even with the ECB expected to fully taper new buying to zero by the end of this year and the BoJ dramatically cutting back its pace of buying. This contrasts to the U.S., where the private sector will be forced to absorb an extra US$1 trillion (!) of Treasuries this year and next, thanks to the huge Trump fiscal stimulus and the diminished buying by the Fed. U.S. private investors may require a higher yield (i.e. term premium) to absorb that additional debt, especially if inflation expectations are rising and the Fed is hiking interest rates at the same time. The implication is that the spread between Treasuries and euro area debt (and Japanese bonds, for that matter) could stay stubbornly wide - at least until there is more decisive evidence that the U.S. economy is in a cyclical slowdown that would put the Fed rate hiking cycle on hold (Chart 14). Chart 13The 'Flow Effect' Of##BR##QE Does Still Matter Chart 14The 'Stock Effect' Could Keep The##BR##UST-Bund Spread Wider For Longer From the point of view of euro area debt, however, the existence of a "stock effect" means that those investors expecting a Taper Tantrum 2.0 will likely be disappointed in the size of any upward move in euro area bond yields this year. Bottom Line: The ECB strongly believes that the "stock effect" of its asset purchases (how much they already own) matters more for European bond yields than the "flow effect" (how much they are buying). This suggests that the odds of a European "Taper Tantrum" later this year are low, although bond yields there are still headed higher. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 The Draghi speech can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180314_1.en.html, while the Praet speech can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180314_2.en.html 2 Coeure's speech can be found at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180223.en.html Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Highlights Data based on Bloomberg/Barclays global treasury/aggregate indexes from December 1990 to January 2018 supports the argument that foreign government bonds are not worthy of investing in when unhedged, due to extremely high volatility. On a hedged basis, however, foreign bonds are a good source of risk reduction for bond portfolios. Hedging not only reduces volatility of a foreign government bond portfolio, it reduces it so much that on a risk adjusted-return basis, foreign government bonds outperform both domestic government bonds and domestic credit for investors in Australia, New Zealand, the U.K., the U.S. and Canada. Aussie and kiwi fixed income investors stand out as the biggest beneficiaries of investing overseas, because hedged foreign government bonds not only provide lower volatility compared to domestic bonds, but also higher returns. This empirical evidence does not support the strong home bias of Aussie and kiwi investors. Investors in the euro area also benefit from the risk reduction of hedged foreign exposure. However, they also suffer significant return reduction - such that the improvement in risk-adjusted returns is not significant. Investors in Japan do enjoy higher returns from foreign government bonds, hedged and unhedged, yet at the cost of much higher volatility, with risk-adjusted returns also not justifying investing overseas. This empirical finding does not lend support to the "search for yield" strategy that has been very popular among Japanese investors. Feature Practitioners and academics do not often agree with one another on investment management issues, but when it comes to whether to hedge foreign government bonds, both accept that foreign government bonds should be fully hedged because currency volatility overwhelms bond volatility. Yet hedged total returns from foreign government bonds are very similar to those from domestic bonds for investors in the U.S., U.K. and Canada, while worse in the euro area. Only in Japan, Australia and New Zealand do investors enjoy higher hedged returns from investing in foreign bonds, as shown in Chart 1 based on Bloomberg/Barclays Global Treasury Indexes hedged to their respective home currencies. So why do investors in the U.S., U.K. and euro area, whose own government bond markets currently account for about 60% of the global treasury index universe (Chart 2), even bother to invest in foreign government bonds? Even for those who may achieve higher returns overseas, would they not be better off just buying domestic corporate bonds (for the potentially higher returns from taking domestic credit risk) rather than venturing into foreign countries and taking the trouble to hedge currency risk? Indeed, home bias among bond investors globally is a lot higher than among equity investors. Chart 1Domestic Vs. Foreign Bonds Chart 2Country Weights In Global Treasury Index In this report, we present empirical evidence based on Bloomberg/Barclays domestic treasury indexes and aggregate bond indexes, hedged and unhedged global treasury indexes in seven different currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GBP, CAD, AUD and NZD), in the context of strategic asset allocation. In a future report, we will attempt to identify the driving forces underpinning the decisions between investing in domestic bonds versus foreign bonds in the context of tactical asset allocation. Hedged Foreign Government Bonds Are a Good Source Of Diversification When a foreign bond is hedged back to the domestic currency, its total return correlation with domestic bonds is quite high. As shown in Chart 3, domestic bonds and their respective hedged foreign bonds have an average correlation of around 70% for all currencies, with the exception of the JPY. For Japanese investors, hedged foreign bonds have a much lower correlation with JGBs, averaging around 30%. Intuitively, there should not be a high incentive for USD, GBP, CAD, EUR, AUD and NZD based investors to invest in foreign bonds, while JPY based investors should benefit from the diversification of hedged foreign bonds. In reality, the very high home bias among fixed income investors in general and the popularity of search-for-yield carry trades among Japanese individual investors seems to support this. Is there empirical evidence that shows the same thing? Table 1 presents statistics from Bloomberg/Barclays domestic treasury indexes and their respective market cap-weighted foreign treasury indexes, hedged and unhedged, in USD, JPY, GBP, EUR, CAD, AUD and NZD. Please see Appendix 1 for the hedged return calculation. Chart 3High Correlations Table 1Domestic And Foreign Government Bond Profile (Dec 1999 - Jan 2018) On an unhedged basis, foreign bonds have much higher volatility compared to domestic bonds for all investors. In terms of return, only Japanese investors enjoy higher yields overseas. On a risk-adjusted return basis, all investors are worse off in investing in unhedged foreign bonds. This is in line with the "conventional wisdom" acknowledged by both academics and practitioners. Hedging not only reduces the corresponding foreign bond portfolio's volatility, it reduces it so much, for all currencies other than the JPY, that the foreign bond portfolio has lower volatility than domestic bonds. As such, in terms of risk-adjusted return, hedged foreign bonds outperform domestic government bonds in all countries except Japan. This implies that on a risk-adjusted return basis, Japanese investors should not invest in hedged foreign bonds at all, while other investors should. Even more shockingly, Table 1 shows that AUD and NZD investors would have achieved both higher returns and lower volatility by investing in hedged foreign bonds. These implications appear to fly in the face of common sense for AUD and NZD investors, because their domestic bonds have much higher returns than others, while in reality Japanese retail investors are keen on "carry trades" as a way to enhance yields. What has caused such significant discrepancies? Could it be simply due to the time period chosen? Chart 4 and Chart 5 present the results of the same analysis performed over different periods: the whole period from 1990, when the majority of the Bloomberg/Barclays indexes first became available; pre-euro (1990-2000); after the euro and before the global financial crisis (GFC); and after the GFC (the extremely low-yield period). Surprisingly, the relative performance of hedged foreign bonds versus domestic bonds for each currency has been quite consistent across all the time periods in terms of risk-adjusted returns, even though absolute performance varied in different periods. Chart 4Domestic Vs. Foreign Treasury Bonds: Consistent Performance Across Time (1) Chart 5Domestic Vs. Foreign Treasury Bonds: Consistent Performance Across Time (2) So when it comes to investing in hedged foreign government bonds, investors with different home currencies should bear the following observations in mind: For Japanese investors, the slightly higher yield enhancement from hedged foreign bonds comes with sharply higher volatility compared to JGBs. The risk-adjusted return does not justify investing in foreign bonds.1 This is mostly because Japanese bonds have below-average volatility, while hedged foreign bonds have above-average volatility. For euro area investors, the lower volatility from foreign bonds is at the expense of lower returns. The improvement in risk-adjusted returns is not significant enough to justify the extra work in hedging. U.K. gilts have the highest volatility. As such, U.K. investors have benefited the most in risk reduction from buying hedged foreign bonds, to the slight detriment of returns. Consequently, they are better off investing in hedged foreign government bonds if improving risk-adjusted return is the objective. The Aussie and kiwi government bond markets are very small in terms of market cap (Chart 2). Fortunately, hedged foreign bonds not only have lower volatility than domestic bonds, they also provide much higher returns. Indeed, Aussie and kiwi investors are the most suitable candidates for going global. For U.S. and Canadian investors, hedged foreign portfolios and domestic indexes share similar returns, but foreign portfolios have much lower volatility, hence better risk-adjusted returns. Hedging currencies is not an easy task. Would investors not be better off taking domestic credit risks than investing in hedged foreign government bonds? Domestic Credit Or Hedged Foreign Government Bonds? The Bloomberg/Barclays domestic aggregate bond indexes are comprised of treasuries, government-related, corporate, and securitized bonds. Chart 6 shows the total returns of the aggregate bond indexes and the corresponding treasury weights in each country index. It is clear that Japan's credit portion is very small, while the U.S. and Canadian credit markets dominate their corresponding treasury markets. In the euro area and Australia, credit accounts for about half of the aggregate index, while it is only about 30% in the U.K. Since some aggregate indexes have a short history (Chart 6), we use the corresponding treasury index to fill in the missing links. In the case of New Zealand, an aggregate index does not exist at all, local treasury bonds are used instead in our analysis below. Table 2 presents the risk/return profiles of the Bloomberg/Barclays domestic aggregate bond indexes, and the same market cap-weighted global treasury index hedged and unhedged in USD JPY, GBP, EUR, CAD, AUD and NZD. Chart 6Aggregate Bond Index Composition Table 2Domestic Aggregate Bond Index Vs. Hedged Global Treasury Index (Dec 1999 - Jan 2018) Domestic credits also improve the risk-adjusted returns for all the investors, and for investors in the U.S., Canada and Australia, credits also add returns while reducing volatility compared to their respective treasury indexes. However, the hedged global treasury index has much lower volatility than the domestic aggregate index such that on a risk-adjusted-return basis, the hedged global treasury index still outperforms the local aggregate index for all investors except those in Japan and the euro area. Similar to the findings in the previous section, this observation also holds true across all the time periods as shown in Charts 7 and 8. Aussie and kiwi investors stand out again as the best beneficiaries of going global because the hedged global treasury indexes not only have lower volatility than the domestic aggregate bond indexes, they also provide higher returns. Chart 7Domestic Aggregate Vs. Global Treasury: Consistent Performance Across Time (3) Chart 8Domestic Aggregate Vs. Global Treasury: Consistent Performance Across Time (4) This raises an interesting question for asset allocators: which bond index should one use to measure the performances of global bond managers? It is common for some pension funds and mutual funds to use a domestic aggregate bond index as a benchmark to measure their bond managers' performance. In such a case, what are you really paying for if your managers have the discretion to buy hedged foreign government bonds? Another interesting observation is that the hedged global treasury index has almost the same volatility around 2.85% in different currencies. This essentially levels out the playing-field for bond managers globally in terms of volatility, a very important criteria for bond investors. Is High Home Bias Justifiable? There are many well-known reasons that explain why home bias in bond portfolios is typically high. But are investors giving up too much for the comfort of "staying home"? Chart 9 shows the effects of adding hedged foreign government bonds into a portfolio of domestic aggregate bonds for each investor based on two timeframes - from 1990 and from 1999 to the present. The messages are clear: If investors are comfortable with the volatility in their domestic aggregate bond index, which is already a lot lower than equities, then investors in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and the euro area are better off staying home for higher returns without dealing with currency hedging operations. For Aussie, kiwi and Japanese investors, however, going abroad enhances returns. Chart 9Is High Home Bias Justifiable? If investors focus on lower volatility, then all investors should invest a large portion of their portfolios overseas, with the exception of Japanese investors. If investors focus on risk-adjusted returns, then investors in Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., the U.K., the euro area and Canada are better off investing a large portion overseas. In short, while there may be some justification for most fixed-income investors to maintain a home bias, empirical evidence does not lend strong support to Aussie and kiwi investors having a home bias at all. Chart 9 shows that Australian and New Zealand investors should consider investing 70-90% of their fixed income portfolio in hedged foreign government bonds for higher returns and lower volatility. Implications For Asset Allocators Chart 10What Drives The Dynamics Between ##br## Foreign And Domestic Bonds? The analysis presented in this report is by nature based on historical data. The findings may not apply to the future, especially because the periods for which we have data cover only the great bull market in government bonds. However, this exercise does provide some interesting aspects for consideration: Should hedged foreign government bonds have a presence in strategic asset allocation? If your fixed income managers have the discretion to invest in foreign government bonds, then is it appropriate for you to use a domestic aggregate bond index to measure their performance? In the context of strategic asset allocation, the answer to the first question is yes and to the second is no, as implied by the analysis in this report. In the context of tactical asset allocation, however, the answer may well be different. In a later report, we will attempt to identify the factors that drive the dynamics between domestic and hedged foreign bonds because the most obvious factor, interest rate differentials, cannot fully explain it as shown in Chart 10. Stay tuned. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com 1 Granted, Japanese retail investors do not pay attention to risk adjusted returns as much as institutional investors do. Therefore their buying unhedged foreign bonds is consistent with their yield enhancement objective, albeit at much higher volatility. Appendix 1: Bond Hedged Return Calculation We use the same methodology as Bloomberg/Barclays1 to calculate hedged return using one-month forward contracts and re-balancing on a monthly basis. This is unlike equity hedging, where the gain or loss of the underlying index during the month is not hedged.2 A bond index can be reasonably assumed to grow at the nominal yield (yield to worst is used). Only the gain/loss that is different from the stated yield during the month is not hedged, but converted back to the home currency at the month-end spot rate. Hedged return using forward contract: 1+Rd,t+1= (Pt+1 * St+1 ) / (Pt * St ) + Ht*(Ft - St+1)/ St..............................................(1) Where: Pt and Pt+1 are the foreign bond total return index levels at time t and t+1 in corresponding foreign currencies; St and St+1 are the foreign currency exchange rates versus the domestic currency at time t and t+1, quoted as one unit of foreign currency equal to how many units of domestic currency; Ht = (1 + Yt/2)(1/6) is the hedged notional; Yt is the yield to worst; Ft is the foreign currency's one-month forward rate at time t for delivery at time t+1; Rd,t+1 is the hedged total return in domestic currency of the foreign hedge index between time t and t+1. 1 https://www.bbhub.io/indices/sites/2/2017/03/Index-Methodology-2017-03-17-FINAL-FINAL.pdf 2 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors," dated September 29, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Risk assets find themselves in a precarious equilibrium. Record high valuations are fully justified if bond yields remain at current levels or fall, but valuations become increasingly hard to justify if bond yields march much higher. If the average of the German 10-year bund yield and U.S. 10-year T-bond yield breaks through 2%, we would downgrade equities and upgrade bonds. Stay long Italian BTPs versus French OATs. The Italian election result is not an investment game changer... ...but stay underweight the Italian equity market (MIB) on a 6-9 month horizon. Our sector stance to underweight banks necessarily implies underweighting the bank-heavy MIB. Feature "Even yet we may draw back, but once cross yon little bridge, and the whole issue is with the sword." - Julius Caesar, contemplating whether to cross the Rubicon River in 49 BC World GDP amounts to $80 trillion. But the combined value of equities and correlated risk assets such as high yield and EM debt is worth double that, around $160 trillion. Real estate is worth $220 trillion. Hence, global risk assets are worth around five times world GDP. With the value of risk assets dwarfing the world economy by a factor of five, it perplexes us that many commentators insist that causality must always run from the economy to financial markets. In fact, in major downturns, the causality usually runs the other way. Rather than economic downturns causing financial instabilities, it is more common for financial instabilities to cause economic downturns. Specifically, the last three economic downturns had their geneses in the financial markets. The bursting of the dot com bubble triggered the downturn of 2001; the large-scale mispricing of U.S. mortgages caused the Great Recession of 2008; and the explosive widening of euro area sovereign credit spreads resulted in the euro area recession of 2011. This raises a crucial question: is there a major vulnerability in financial markets right now? Risk Assets Are As Expensive As In 2000... For at least five decades, the ratio of global equity market capitalization to world GDP (effectively, the price to sales ratio) has proved to be an excellent predictor of subsequent 10-year global equity returns (Chart I-2). Chart of the WeekWorld Equities As Highly-Valued As In 2000 On Price To Sales Chart I-2Price To Sales Has Been An Excellent Predictor Of World Equity Returns Today's extreme ratio of global equity market capitalization to world GDP has been seen only once before in modern history - at the peak of the dot com boom in 2000. In the subsequent decade global equities went on to return a paltry 2% a year. Using the particularly tight predictive relationship in recent decades, we can infer that global equities are now priced to generate 2% a year in the coming decade too (Chart of the Week). Still, equities are not as extremely valued relative to government bonds as they were in 2000. Today, the global 10-year bond yield stands near 2%, implying a broadly equal prospective 10-year return from equities and bonds. In 2000, the global 10-year bond yield stood at 5%, implying that equities would return 3% less than bonds, which they duly did (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Relative To Government Bonds, Equities Were More Expensive In 2000 On the other hand, high yield credit is more extremely valued relative to government bonds than it was in 2000. Today, the global high yield credit spread stands at a very tight 4%: in 2000, it stood at 8% (Chart I-4). So taking the combination of equities and high yield credit, we can say that risk assets are as highly valued today as they were in 2000. Chart I-4Relative To Government Bonds, High Yield Credit Was Less Expensive In 2000 ...But Risk Assets Should Be Very Expensive When Bond Yields Are Ultra-Low The record high valuation of risk assets is fully justified when government bond yields are ultra-low. This is because bond returns take on the same unattractive asymmetry - known as 'negative skew' - that equity and high yield credit returns possess. For a detailed explanation, please revisit our report Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? 1 But in a nutshell, as bond risk becomes 'equity-like' it diminishes the requirement for a superior return on equities and other risk-assets, lifting their valuations exponentially. Consider what happens to valuations when bond yields decline from 4% to 2%. At a 4% bond yield, equities possess significantly more negative skew than 10-year bonds. So investors will demand a comparatively higher return from equities, let's say 8% a year. Whereas, at a 2% bond yield, equities and 10-year bonds possess the same negative skew. So investors will demand the same return from equities as they can get from bonds, 2% a year (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Below A 2% Yield, 10-Year Bonds Are Riskier Than Equities At the lower bond yield, the bond must deliver 2% a year less for ten years, meaning its price must rise by 22%.2 But equities must deliver 6% a year less for ten years, so the equity market must surge by 80%.3 All well and good, except if bond yields go back up to 4%. In which case, bond and equity prices must fall again - in proportion to their preceding rise. Hence, risk assets find themselves in a precarious equilibrium. Record high valuations are fully justified if bond yields remain at current levels or fall, but valuations become increasingly hard to justify if bond yields march much higher. However, a setback to $380 trillion of global risk assets means that yields can't march much higher without at least a temporary reversal. Unfortunately, the exact point at which the precarious equilibrium becomes threatened is hard to define. Still, we might define crossing the Rubicon as follows. If the average of the German 10-year bund yield and U.S. 10-year T-bond yield - now standing at 1.8% - breaks through 2%, we would downgrade equities and upgrade bonds. Italy: Banks More Important Than Politics On Sunday, Italy's electorate punished the establishment centre-left and centre-right parties - the Democratic Party and Forza Italia - whose combined vote share collapsed to just 33%. Italians gravitated to parties offering populist, anti-establishment and anti-migration bromides. Sound familiar? This is just a continuation of the pattern seen in recent elections in France, Germany and Austria - as well as the victories for Brexit and President Trump. Begging the question, does the Italian election result change anything for investors? Political change disrupts markets if it dislocates the long-term expectations embedded in economic agents and financial prices. The vote for Brexit changed expectations about the U.K.'s long-term trading relationships; the election of Trump changed expectations about fiscal stimulus, the tax structure, and protectionism; and the election of Macron exorcised the potential chaos of a Le Pen presidency. On this basis, the Italian election result is not an investment game changer. The one exception would be if M5S and Lega joined forces to govern, as it could throw EU integration into reverse. But the likelihood of this unholy alliance seems very low. Many people - including some of the more populist Italian politicians - claim that Italy's long-standing economic underperformance is because it is shackled to the euro. But membership of the single currency cannot be the main cause of Italy's underperformance. After all, through 1999-2007, Italian real GDP per head performed more or less in line with the U.S., Canada and France, even without a private sector credit boom. Italy's underperformance really started after the 2008 financial crisis (Chart I-6). And the most plausible explanation is that its dysfunctional banking system has been left broken for close to a decade (Chart I-7). Italy procrastinated because its government is more indebted than other sovereigns and its banking problems did not cause an outright crisis. Chart I-6Italy Has Underperformed##br## Since The Great Recession... Chart I-7...Because The Banks ##br##Were Left Unfixed But now the banking system is finally recuperating. In the past year, banks have raised almost €50 billion in much needed equity capital, the share of non-performing loans (NPLs) is down sharply having peaked at the same level as in Spain in 2013 (Chart I-8), and bank solvency is much healthier (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Italy's NPLs Are Finally Declining... Chart I-9...And Bank Solvency Is Getting Better In effect, Italy is where Spain was in 2014. So could Italy in 2018-21 repeat Spain's turnaround in 2014-17? Italy has more work to do, but on balance we remain cautiously optimistic, and express this optimism through a relative trade in bonds: long Italian BTPs versus French OATs. The connection with the Italian equity market (MIB) is more tenuous. The market's outsize exposure to banks means that sustained outperformance of the MIB requires sustained outperformance of banks. On a 6-9 month horizon, our sector stance is to underweight banks. Necessarily, this means our country stance must be to underweight Italy. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities?" published on January 25, 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2 1.02^10 3 1.06^10 Fractal Trading Model* The rally in the Chilean peso appears technically extended. Hence, this week's trade recommendation is to short the Chilean peso versus the U.S. dollar setting a profit target of 2.7% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Chart 1Inflation Perks Up The Fed has struck a decidedly more upbeat tone in 2018. We noted last week that the Fed staff made upward revisions to its growth forecasts, and then Chairman Jerome Powell testified to Congress that "some of the headwinds the U.S. economy faced in previous years have shifted to tailwinds." So far this more optimistic outlook is borne out in the data. Core PCE inflation rose sharply in January. The annualized 6-month rate of change is back above the Fed's target (Chart 1), and the 12-month rate of change should follow once base effects kick-in in March. For our investment strategy the message is to stay the course. The re-anchoring of inflation expectations will impart another 18 bps to 38 bps of upside to the 10-year Treasury yield. How much higher yields rise beyond that will depend on how well credit markets and equities digest the less accommodative monetary environment. Stay at below-benchmark duration and be prepared to scale back on credit risk once our target range of 2.3% to 2.5% is reached by both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +10 bps. Although last month's sell-off did return some value to the investment grade corporate space, the sector is still expensive compared to both its own history and other comparable sectors. The 12-month breakeven spread for a Baa-rated corporate bond has only been tighter 11% of the time since 1989 (Chart 2). Further, in last week's report we compared breakeven spreads across the investment grade bond universe, split by credit tier.1 Our results showed that municipal bonds offer greater breakeven spreads than investment grade corporates, after adjusting for the tax advantage. We also found that Foreign Agency debt is more attractive than investment grade corporate debt in both the Aa and Baa credit tiers. Local Authority debt is more attractive in the Baa credit tier. With a less than compelling valuation case for investment grade corporates, we will start to pare exposure once our TIPS breakeven inflation targets (mentioned on page 1) are met. This week we take a preliminary step toward de-risking by adjusting our recommended sector allocation (Table 3). The adjustments were made to both increase exposure to sectors that look cheap after adjusting for credit rating and duration, and also to lower the average duration-times-spread (DTS) of the portfolio. Specifically, we downgrade Cable/Satellite, Paper, Media/Entertainment, Brokerage/Asset Managers/Exchanges and Lodging. We upgrade Supermarkets, Tobacco, Life Insurance and P&C Insurance. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 52 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +97 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 17 bps on the month, and currently sits at 348 bps. The 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate edged down to 3.2% in January, and Moody's projects it will fall to 2% in one year's time. The projected decline is mostly driven by the continued waning of credit stress in the oil & gas sector. Using the Moody's projection as an input, we forecast High-Yield default losses of 1.3% for the next 12 months. This means that if junk spreads are unchanged from current levels we would expect High-Yield to return 251 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries (Chart 3). One hundred basis points of spread tightening would translate roughly to excess returns of 661 bps, and 100 bps of spread widening would translate to excess returns of -159 bps. Though High-Yield valuation is more attractive than for investment grade corporates - the 12-month breakeven spread for a B-rated security has been tighter than it is today 28% of the time since 1995, the same measure has been tighter only 13% of the time for a Baa-rated security - we still view the potential for spread tightening in high-yield as limited. First, 130 bps of spread tightening would lead to all-time expensive valuations in the High-Yield index - using the 12-month breakeven spread as our valuation measure. Second, the higher levels of implied equity volatility that are likely to prevail in an environment with a less-accommodative Fed will also limit how far spreads can fall (top panel). MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -25 bps. February's underperformance was concentrated in GNMA and Conventional 15-year issues, and also in 3.5% and 4% coupons. Excess returns for Conventional 30-year MBS were roughly flat, and securities with coupons above 5% delivered strong positive performance. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread narrowed 4 bps on the month, split between a 3 bps reduction in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp tightening in the option-adjusted spread. In last week's report we showed that the value proposition in Agency MBS is comparable to a Aaa-rated corporate bond, but is much less attractive than other Aaa-rated securitizations (consumer ABS and CMBS).2 However, MBS are also likely to offer investors more protection in a risk-off environment. Refinancing risk will remain muted as interest rates rise (Chart 4), and in past reports we showed that extension risk will likely be immaterial.3 Valuation in MBS versus investment grade corporates is less attractive than it was a month ago, owing to the recent widening in corporate spreads, but the relative spread is still elevated compared to recent years (panel 3). MBS will start to look more attractive on a relative basis as corporate spreads recoup some of their February losses. After that, we stand ready to shift some exposure from corporate bonds to MBS once our end-of-cycle inflation targets are met. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +22 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 108 bps on the month, Foreign Agencies underperformed by 20 bps and Supranationals underperformed by 2 bps. Local Authorities delivered excess returns of +11 bps, and Domestic Agencies performed in-line with the benchmark. The Sovereign index has returned only 9 bps in excess of Treasuries so far this year, compared to 40 bps from the Baa-rated corporate bond index (Chart 5).4 We expect this poor relative performance to continue in the months ahead as the composition of global growth shifts back to the U.S., putting upward pressure on the dollar. In last week's report we looked at 12-month breakeven spreads in each segment of the investment grade U.S. fixed income market.5 Our results showed that Sovereign debt looks expensive across every credit tier. In contrast, Foreign Agency debt and Local Authority debt offer elevated breakeven spreads. Foreign state-owned energy companies account for a large portion of the Foreign Agency index, and this sector's relative performance closely tracks the price of oil. With our commodity strategists now calling for average 2018 crude oil prices of $74/bbl and $70/bbl for Brent and WTI respectively, the Foreign Agency sector should stay well supported.6 Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 32 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +86 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal/Treasury yield ratio declined a modest 1% on the month, concentrated at the long-end of the curve. January's abrupt increase in flows into municipal bond mutual funds reversed course last month (Chart 6). Interestingly, the sudden surge and subsequent reversal in flows was mirrored by the behavior of municipal bond issuance for new capital (panel 2). This suggests that both trends were driven by changes to the federal tax code. While we remain underweight municipal bonds for now, we stand ready to shift exposure out of corporate bonds and into municipal bonds once our end-of-cycle inflation targets are met. But in the meantime, we note that municipal bonds are already quite attractive compared to corporates. In last week's report we showed that tax-adjusted municipal bond breakeven spreads are much higher than for comparable-quality corporate bonds.7 We also note that the yield differential between a tax-adjusted Aaa-rated municipal bond and an equivalent-duration A3/Baa1 corporate bond is only -19 bps (bottom panel). Historically, this yield differential turns positive near the end of the credit cycle and investors get an even better opportunity to shift out of corporates and into Munis. We expect to get that opportunity this year. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve rose sharply and steepened in February. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 4 basis points and the 5/30 slope steepened 5 bps. As a result, our recommendation to favor the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell returned +5 bps on the month, though it is still underwater 35 bps since the trade was initiated in December 2016. As we explained in a Special Report last year, bullet over barbell trades are designed to profit from curve steepening.8 But they also depend on what is initially priced into the yield curve. Our model of the 2/5/10 butterfly spread relative to the 2/10 Treasury slope shows that the 5-year note is currently 5 bps cheap on the curve (Chart 7). Or alternatively, it shows that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for roughly 26 bps of 2/10 curve flattening during the next six months (panel 4). In other words, if the 2/10 slope steepens during the next six months, or flattens by less than 26 bps, we would expect the 5-year bullet to outperform the 2/10 barbell. The window for curve steepening is clearly closing, given that the Fed has adopted a more aggressive tightening bias. However, with inflation on the rise and long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates still below levels consistent with the Fed's target, we think 2/10 flattening in excess of 26 bps during the next six months is unlikely. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 9 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +84 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 2.12%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 4 bps and currently sits at 2.21%. As we explained in a recent report, we view the first stage of the cyclical bond bear market as being driven by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations.9 We will consider inflation expectations well anchored when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are in a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, where they were the last time that inflation was well anchored around the Fed's target. If the recent trend in realized inflation continues, then this re-anchoring could occur relatively soon. January data show that the annualized 6-month rate of change in trimmed mean PCE jumped to 1.99% (Chart 8), and while the 12-month rate of change rose only slightly to 1.69%, it will start to move higher in March when the strong inflation prints from January and February 2017 are removed from the sample. Our Pipeline Inflation Indicator also suggests that inflation will move higher, as do leading indicators for both shelter and medical care inflation, as we showed in last week's report.10 ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -16 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 10 bps on the month and now sits at 45 bps, 12 bps above its pre-crisis low (Chart 9). The 12-month breakeven spread differential between Aaa-rated ABS and Aaa-rated corporate bonds currently sits at +13 bps, solidly above its post-2010 average (panel 3).11 Further, we noted in last week's report that consumer ABS exhibit relatively low excess return volatility.12 Although valuation is quite attractive, the evidence suggests that collateral credit quality is starting to weaken. Delinquency rates have bottomed for both auto loans and credit cards, and a rising household debt service ratio suggests they will continue to trend higher (panel 4). Banks have also noticed the deterioration in credit quality and have responded by tightening lending standards (bottom panel). Historically, tighter lending standards tend to coincide with periods of spread widening. Remain neutral ABS for now, based on still-attractive valuation relative to investment alternatives, but monitor credit trends for a signal on when to downgrade further. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +47 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 62 bps, close to one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean (Chart 10). In last week's report we observed that the 12-month breakeven spread of Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS is elevated compared to other Aaa-rated sectors (consumer ABS being the exception), but that it also exhibits high excess return volatility.13 While there is no doubt that relative value is attractive, we are concerned about the gap that has emerged between CMBS spreads and the rate of appreciation in commercial real estate (CRE) prices (panel 4). It is possible that tight spreads are simply foreshadowing an imminent re-acceleration in prices, and in fact bank lending standards have become less of a headwind, tightening less aggressively than in recent years (bottom panel). But for now, we think non-Agency CMBS are still not worth the risk. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +8 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 41 bps. In last week's report we noted that the 12-month breakeven spread for Agency CMBS is higher than for all other Aaa-rated sectors, except for non-Agency CMBS and consumer ABS. We also noted that the sector has historically exhibited low excess return volatility. Remain overweight. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.96% (Chart 11). The fair value was revised down by 5 bps compared to last month due to a combination of more bullish dollar sentiment (bottom panel) and a tick lower in the Global PMI (panel 3). Of the four major economic blocs, PMIs declined in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. Only the Chinese PMI managed a slight increase (panel 4). We see the risk of a significant relapse in the U.S. PMI as quite low, but recently highlighted that weakening leading indicators in China could soon bleed into lower Chinese PMI prints.14 This is a significant near-term risk to our below-benchmark duration recommendation. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.86%.   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On The MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 The Baa-rated corporate index is the Sovereign sector's closest comparable in terms of average credit rating. 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices", dated February 22, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies" dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 The breakeven spread measures the option-adjusted spread on offer per unit of duration. 12 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 14 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Highlights Easier fiscal policy will cause U.S. inflation to rise or force the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than the market is discounting. Either outcome is likely to lead to a real appreciation in the dollar. Policy developments are starting to work in the greenback's favor. The Fed's leadership is turning somewhat more hawkish. Trade protectionism is also on the rise. Contrary to yesterday's market reaction, this will end up being dollar-bullish. The only plausible scenario where the dollar weakens in the face of bountiful fiscal stimulus is one where U.S. rates rise a lot but foreign rate expectations rise even more. Such an outcome is not particularly likely, considering that the U.S. is going from laggard to leader in the global growth horserace and most central banks are tightening monetary policy much more gingerly than the Fed. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded, which is why investors should consider going long 30-year U.S. Treasurys versus German bunds in currency-unhedged terms. This position would pay off if EUR/USD weakens, while also providing downside protection in the case where the greenback comes under pressure due to a narrowing in the long-term interest rate spread between Germany and the U.S. Held to maturity, investors stand to gain 40% on this position. Feature Beware Of "Arguments By Accounting Identity" One of the biggest mistakes economic commentators make is that they engage in "arguments by accounting identity." These arguments almost always fall flat. This is because there are plenty of ways for accounting identities to hold true, only a small number of which are consistent with how people actually respond to economic incentives. Consider the often-cited identity which says that the difference between what a country saves and what it invests is equal to its current account balance or, in algebraic terms, S-I=CA. The U.S. is currently operating at close to full employment. It is sometimes asserted, using this formula, that a large dollop of fiscal stimulus will drain national savings, thereby increasing America's current account deficit. A bigger current account deficit is normally associated with a weaker currency. Ergo, fiscal stimulus must be dollar-bearish. It is a plausible sounding argument, but it makes no sense because it confuses cause and effect.1 It is analogous to saying that an increase in the number of apples coming to market means that the price of apples will fall even when it is apparent that farmers are planting more apple trees because the demand for apples is rising. If the government cuts taxes and boosts outlays, aggregate spending will increase. Should the value of the dollar simultaneously fall, the composition of that spending will shift towards domestically produced goods and services. Not only will people want to spend more, but they will also want to devote a larger share of their spending on U.S.-made goods. But how exactly is the economy supposed to generate all this additional output? It is already running at full capacity! The only story that makes sense is one where the value of the dollar rises. That would allow aggregate spending to go up, while ensuring that spending on American-made goods and services remains the same. Table 1 illustrates this point using a stylized example of a hypothetical economy. Table 1A Stronger Currency Can Be A Counterweight To Fiscal Stimulus U.S. imports account for about 15% of GDP (Chart 1). Assuming no change in the exchange rate, spending on domestically produced goods and services will rise by about 85 cents in response to every $1 increase in aggregate demand. If the economy cannot produce this additional output due to a lack of available workers, one of two things will happen: Either inflation will go up or the Fed will be forced to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. Chart 1U.S. Trade As A Share Of The Economy Both outcomes imply a "real appreciation" in the dollar exchange rate, which can be thought of as the value of foreign goods and services that can be acquired by selling a basket of U.S. goods and services.2 In the former case, the real dollar exchange rate will appreciate because the U.S. price level will rise relative to prices abroad. In the latter case, the real dollar exchange rate will appreciate because higher interest rates will put upward pressure on the nominal value of the currency. Two Paths To A Real Dollar Appreciation The catch is that it is impossible to know how much of the real appreciation will occur through higher inflation and how much of it will occur through a stronger nominal dollar. In theory, one could envision a scenario where the real value of the dollar rises even as the nominal value declines. This would happen if the Fed fell so far behind the curve that inflation rocketed higher. Alternatively, one could contemplate a scenario where the Fed raises rates too aggressively, driving the dollar up so much that the economy falters and inflation declines. Our baseline scenario lies somewhere between these two extremes. We expect U.S. fiscal stimulus to push up inflation, while also pushing up the nominal trade-weighted dollar. It rarely happens that real and nominal exchange rates move in opposite directions (Chart 2). Thus, if the real dollar exchange rate appreciates, the nominal exchange rate is bound to appreciate as well. Chart 2Nominal And Real Exchange Rates Tend To Move In The Same Direction Global Growth: Back To The USA So why, then, has the dollar been on the back foot over the past year? The answer is better economic prospects at home were more than matched by stronger growth abroad. Keep in mind that the discussion above does not need to be confined to fiscal stimulus. Anything that causes domestic demand to accelerate is apt to trigger a real appreciation of the currency. After a sluggish recovery following the sovereign debt crisis, euro area growth accelerated last year as credit markets thawed and pent-up demand was unleashed. Sensing better economic times ahead, investors bid up the euro. The global growth revival was assisted by a rebound in global manufacturing activity. The manufacturing sector tends to be highly procyclical; when global growth accelerates, manufacturing production usually accelerates even more. The U.S. manufacturing sector accounts for only 12% of GDP, compared to 18% in the euro area, 21% in Japan, and 30% in China (Chart 3). As such, an improving manufacturing outlook disproportionately helped the rest of the world. Meanwhile, a rebound in commodity prices aided emerging markets and other economies with large natural resource sectors. Looking out, the picture for global growth is murkier. Global manufacturing PMIs have likely peaked. Korean exports, a leading indicator for the global business cycle, have softened (Chart 4). China is decelerating, with this week's weaker-than-expected official PMI print being the latest example. This could weigh on metals prices (Chart 5). As we discussed last week, slower global growth tends to benefit the dollar.3 Meanwhile, the composition of global demand growth should shift back toward the U.S. thanks to the lagged effects from the relative easing in financial conditions that the U.S. enjoyed last year, as well as all the fiscal stimulus coming down the pike (Chart 6). Chart 3Global Manufacturing Revival ##br##Not Benefiting The U.S. Much Chart 4Global Growth Seems To Be Peaking Chart 5Chinese Slowdown Will Weigh On Metal Prices Chart 6Lagged Easing In Financial Conditions ##br##And Fiscal Stimulus Bode Well For Growth A More Dollar-Friendly Policy Backdrop Policy developments are starting to work in the dollar's favor. Jerome Powell tried not to rock the boat during his Humphrey-Hawkins testimony this week. However, he did stress that the economic outlook did improve since the Fed last met in December, seemingly opening the door to four rate hikes this year. That was enough to lift the DXY by 0.4%. Powell is not a doctrinaire hard-money type, but he is no Yellen clone either. Remember this was the guy who said back in 2012 that "We look like we are blowing a fixed-income duration bubble right across the credit spectrum that will result in big losses when rates come up down the road. You can almost say that is our strategy."4 Critically, there are still four vacancies on the Fed's Board of Governors. If the nomination of Martin Goodfriend - who is definitely no good friend of easy money - is part of a broader trend, the composition of the board will shift in a somewhat more hawkish direction. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has introduced tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. While we do not expect this decision to trigger an all-out trade war, it will almost certainly prompt retaliatory actions. There are three reasons why an escalation in trade protectionism would help the dollar. First, a decrease in global trade would likely reduce trade surpluses and deficits alike. This would shift demand back towards economies such as the U.S., which run trade deficits, at the expense of surplus economies such as Japan, China, and the euro area. Second, a slowdown in trade flows would curb global growth. As noted above, slower global growth tends to be dollar-bullish. Third, the specter of trade wars would exacerbate geopolitical risks. A more uncertain political landscape, even when instigated by the U.S., tends to prop up the dollar. It is true that foreign powers could retaliate against the U.S. by buying fewer Treasurys. But why would they? This would only drive down the dollar, giving U.S. exporters an even greater advantage. The smart strategic response would be to intervene in currency markets with the aim of bidding up the dollar. All this suggests that the dollar may be ripe for a rebound. Positioning has gotten fairly short the dollar (Chart 7). This raises the odds of a short-covering rally. Momentum measures have also improved over the past few weeks, an important consideration given that the dollar is one of the most momentum-driven currencies out there (Chart 8). Chart 7Speculative Positioning Has Gotten Increasingly Dollar-Bearish Chart 8Momentum Matters, And It May Be Starting To Move Back In The Dollar's Favor A Safer Way To Go Long The Dollar: Buy 30-Year Treasurys/Short 30-Year German Bunds, Currency-Unhedged The only scenario where the dollar weakens in the face of bountiful fiscal stimulus is one where U.S. rates rise a lot but foreign rate expectations rise even more. Sharply higher U.S. interest rates would offset the stimulative effects of a weaker dollar, thus preventing the economy from overheating. Such an outcome is not particularly likely, given that the U.S. is going from laggard to leader in the global growth horserace, and most central banks are tightening monetary policy much more gingerly than the Fed. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded. As such, investors should consider going long 30-year U.S. Treasurys versus German bunds in currency-unhedged terms. This position would pay off if EUR/USD weakens, while also providing downside protection in the case where the greenback comes under pressure due to a narrowing in the long-term interest rate spread between Germany and the U.S. The trade is effectively a bet that the interest rate differential between bunds and Treasurys - which has widened sharply this year, even as the dollar has weakened - will revert to its former self (Chart 9). Over the long haul, it is hard to see how one could lose money on this trade. As we go to press, 30-year Treasurys are yielding 3.11% while 30-year bunds yield only 1.29%. The euro would have to strengthen to 2.10 against the dollar over the next 30 years to cancel out the 182 bps in additional carry that U.S. bonds are offering. Even if one assumes that the fair value for the euro climbs by 0.4% annually due to lower inflation in the common-currency bloc, this would still leave the euro 40% overvalued.5 To maintain consistency with our other trade recommendations, we are closing our short 30-year Treasury trade for a gain of 3.8% and opening a new trade going long 30-year TIPS breakevens. Chart 10 shows that long-term inflation expectations as gauged by 30-year breakevens are still 27 basis points below where they were on average between 2010 and 2013. Chart 9EUR/USD And Long-Term Spreads Will Recouple Chart 10More Upside To Long-Term TIPS Breakevens Investment Conclusions We expect the dollar to strengthen over the coming months. EUR/USD should ultimately bottom at around 1.15. EM currencies will also struggle on the back of slower Chinese growth and higher financing costs for dollar-denominated loans. Among commodity producers, we favor "oily" currencies such as the Canadian dollar and Norwegian krone over metal exporters such as the Australian dollar. Our commodity strategists expect Brent and WTI to average $74 and $70/bbl this year, above current market expectations of $66 and $62, respectively. They note that Saudi Arabia has a strong incentive to boost oil prices by curtailing production in the lead up to Aramco's initial public offering. The yen is better positioned to hold its ground, considering that it is still very cheap and positioning remains heavily short (Chart 11). My colleague, Mathieu Savary, discussed the yen's prospects two weeks ago.6 A rebound in the dollar and creeping protectionism will pose headwinds for global equities. Nevertheless, with corporate earnings continuing to surprise on the upside, this is unlikely to derail the cyclical bull market in stocks. However, investors should prepare for a lot more volatility, as we flagged in several reports earlier this year.7 At the regional level, U.S. equities have underperformed their global peers in common-currency terms since the start of 2017, but outperformed in local-currency terms (Chart 12). We could see a reversal of that pattern over the coming months as the dollar begins to firm. Chart 11The Yen Is Cheap And ##br##Positioning Is Short Chart 12A Stronger Dollar Could Reverse ##br##U.S. Equity Relative Performance Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Paul Krugman made a similar point more than 20 years ago. 2 The real exchange rate between two currencies is the product of the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of prices between the countries. A real appreciation tends to make a country less competitive, either through a nominal increase in its currency or through an increase in prices in that country relative to those of its trading partners. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Next Recession: Later But Deeper," dated February 23, 2018. 4 Please see FOMC Meeting Transcript, "Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on October 23-24, 2012," Federal Reserve. 5 For this calculation, we assume that the fair value for EUR/USD is 1.32, which is close to the IMF's Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimate. The inflation differential of 0.4% is based on 30-year CPI swaps. This implies that the fair value for EUR/USD will rise to 1.49 after 30 years. If the euro needs to strengthen to 2.10 over 30 years to cover the cost of carry, this would leave it 41% (2.10/1.49) overvalued. Our assessment would not change much if we used Germany rather than the euro area as the basis for the analysis. We estimate that the fair value exchange rate for Germany is 1.45, which is higher than the fair value exchange rate for the euro area as a whole. However, the differential in 30-year CPI swaps between Germany and the U.S. is only 16 basis points. Thus, if the fair value German exchange rate evolves in line with inflation differentials, it would rise to only 1.52. This would still leave Germany 38% (2.10/1.52) overvalued against the U.S. after 30 years. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy, "The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues...For Now," dated February 16, 2018. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Return Of Vol," dated February 6, 2018; and Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Fiscal Stimulus To Prolong The Expansion The market swoon in early February should not induce investors to lower risk. The stock market correction (the first for almost two years) was triggered by a couple of inflation and wage readings that came in slightly above expectations, and was exacerbated by some technical factors such as automated trading by volatility-target funds. But, significantly, it was not accompanied by the usual signals of rising risk aversion: for example, credit spreads barely widened and the gold price was stable (Chart 1). Volatility is likely to remain high but, as our U.S. Investment Strategy service recently found, the VIX has not been a useful indicator of recessions and bear markets: many times over the past 30 years it has spiked higher without risk assets producing negative returns over the subsequent 12 months (Chart 2).1 Recommended Allocation Chart 1Sell-Off Didn't Trigger Risk Signals Chart 2Spike In Vix Is Not A Sell Signal Fiscal policy moves in the U.S. make us believe, rather, that the current economic expansion will last longer than we previously forecast. A combination of tax cuts plus recent spending proposals (including $165 billion on the military and $45 billion on disaster relief) will boost GDP by about 0.8% of GDP this year and 1.3% next, compared to the IMF's earlier forecast of a fiscal contraction this year (Chart 3).2 Add to that the boost from the 8% trade-weighted depreciation of the U.S. dollar over the past 12 months (which should add 0.3% to growth over two years), and it is difficult to imagine U.S. GDP growth turning down any time soon. Accordingly, BCA has shifted its recession call from the second half of 2019 to sometime in 2020. Of course, this is not all good news. The U.S. budget deficit is likely to increase to 5½% of GDP in 2019, which will put upward pressure on interest rates. The fiscal impulse will hit an economy already at full capacity, and so will be inflationary. The scenario we envisage is boom-and-bust, leading to a nastier recession than we had previously expected. Nonetheless, the boost to growth should be positive for risk assets over the next 12 months. Our model of earnings growth now suggests that U.S. EPS should continue to grow at close to a 20% rate for the rest of this year (Chart 4). Chart 3Fiscal Boost To U.S. Growth Chart 4Earnings Growth Gets A Boost Too How quickly will the Fed push back against the potentially inflationary implications of this higher growth? We have found a remarkable turnaround in investors' perceptions of inflation over the past few weeks. Whereas last year most argued that structural forces (online shopping, the gig economy etc.) meant that inflation would stay depressed, now many worry that it will quickly shoot above 2% and force the Fed to tighten policy aggressively. This has caused them to over-react, for example, to the (rather obvious) statement from the last FOMC minutes that "participants noted that a stronger outlook for economic growth raised the likelihood that further gradual policy firming would be appropriate." Our view remains that core PCE inflation - the Fed's favorite measure - is likely to move back gradually to 2% (from 1.5% currently), but not accelerate dramatically. Unit labor costs remain subdued (Chart 5), the continued rise in the participation rate means there is more slack in the labor market than implied by headline unemployment (Chart 6), and inflation expectations remain low. This should allow new Fed chair Jerome Powell to continue to withdraw accommodation at a measured pace. The market has already priced in that the Fed will tighten this year at least in line with its dots (Chart 7). We expect four, rather than the Fed's projected three, hikes this year, but this should not be too hard for the market to absorb. Chart 5Unit Labor Costs Don't Point To Jump In Inflation Chart 6 Still Some Slack In Labor Market Chart 7Market Has Caught Up To The Fed We have for some months now advised long-term, more risk-averse investors to consider dialing back risk, and the volatility in February was a good example of why. We would expect further such bouts of volatility. However, with a recession still probably two years away, and a combination of stronger-than-expected growth and a Fed reluctant to accelerate tightening, the next 12 months should remain positive for equities and other risk assets. Fixed Income: We now expect the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield to rise to 3.3-3.5%. This will come from a further 40 BP increase in inflation expectations (taking them back to a level compatible with the Fed achieving its inflation target) plus a rise in the real yield, as markets start to price in the end of secular stagnation (Chart 8). The rise in global yields will be exacerbated by increasing net supply, as fiscal deficits rise and central banks wind down QE (Chart 9). We are, accordingly, underweight duration, and prefer inflation-linked bonds to nominal ones. We will likely reduce our exposure to credit before we turn defensive on equities. But, for now, strong economic growth and higher oil prices mean spread product is likely to outperform government bonds. Chart 8Inflation Expectations And Real Yields To Rise Chart 9Net Government Bond Supply To Increase Currencies: Rising interest rate differentials have failed to cause the dollar to rally (Chart 10). FX markets are trading, rather, on valuations (the euro and yen are, indeed, undervalued), on current account positions (the euro zone and Japan have large surpluses), and on the narrative that U.S. twin deficits historically caused the dollar to weaken. Our FX strategists find this is true only when, as in 2001-3, U.S. real rates were falling; after the Reagan tax cuts in 1981, real rates rose, pushing up the dollar (Chart 11). The key, therefore, is how quickly the Fed reacts this time. The dollar currently has strong downward momentum (especially against the yen) and this could continue. But as global growth slows relative to the U.S., relative interest rates are likely to reassert themselves as a factor, causing the dollar to strengthen again. Chart 10Rising Rate Differentials Fails To Boost Dollar Chart 11Do Twin Deficits Matter For Dollar? Equities: Given the macro environment, we continue to recommend pro-cyclical equity tilts, with overweights in higher beta markets such as the euro zone and Japan, and cyclical sectors such as financials, energy, and industrials. Our underweight on EM equities is based on the risk of a slowdown in China (where tighter financial conditions point to a slowing of the industrial sector, Chart 12), the possibility of a U.S. dollar rebound, and the vulnerability of highly leveraged foreign-currency EM borrowers to a rise in U.S. interest rates. Commodities: Our energy team has further revised up their oil price forecast, on expectations that the OPEC agreement will be extended, which will cause a greater draw-down in oil inventories (Chart 13).3 They see Brent crude averaging $74 a barrel this year, with spikes above $80. However, the response of the U.S. shale industry will begin to kick in, pushing the price down to below $60 by end-2019. We are neutral on industrial commodities, which will benefit from stronger global growth but are at risk in the event of dollar appreciation and slowdown in China. Chart 12Tighter Monetary Conditions In China Chart 13Oil Inventories To Draw Down Further Please note that, due to the Easter holidays in some countries, the GAA Quarterly Portfolio will be published one day later than usual, on April 3. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Late Innings," dated 26 February 2018, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 For details, please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "March 2018," available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0: Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices," dated 22 February 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation