Emerging Markets
Highlights Trade talks have been the primary driver of the rally in Chinese stocks and China-related assets over the past five months. While trade is important to China’s economy, Chinese domestic demand is the primary driver of China-related asset fundamentals, meaning that the recent equity rally has occurred on the back of a largely false narrative. The January surge in credit has brought the first concrete sign that Chinese domestic demand will eventually bottom, but the current pace of money & credit growth suggests that investable earnings are facing a “catch up” period of potentially material weakness. The need for a stabilization in the outlook for earnings argues against an immediate shift to overweight, but we agree that investors should put Chinese investable stocks on upgrade watch for the coming few months. Feature Chart 1 reviews the recent performance of the Chinese investable equity market, and highlights two important facts: Chinese equity performance bottomed in both absolute and relative terms at the end of October, and The relative performance trend versus global stocks has now retraced roughly 40% of the decline that occurred in 2018 Chart 1A Sizeable Retracement, Based On A (Largely) False Narrative For investors looking for an appropriate allocation to Chinese stocks and China-related assets more generally over the coming 6-12 months, it is important to understand what has driven this post-October outperformance. In our view, it is only the January surge in credit growth that has brought the first concrete sign that Chinese domestic demand will eventually bottom, meaning that China plays have been rallying for the past five months on a largely false narrative. This significantly complicates the cyclical investment outlook, even under the assumption of an imminent trade deal with the U.S. As we will detail below, several factors argue against an immediate shift to overweight, but we agree that investors should put Chinese investable stocks on upgrade watch. We will be watching closely over the next few months for confirmation that above-average credit growth will be sustained, and that the outlook for Chinese earnings is stabilizing. Dissecting The Rally: Mostly Driven By Trade Optimism, Not Easing During the week of October 29th, the equity market was buoyed somewhat by a statement emerging from the late-October politburo meeting. The statement cited the need for the government to take “more timely steps” to counter increasing downward pressure on the economy, which catalyzed a 6% bounce in investable stocks (3% for the domestic market) by Thursday, November 1st. However, to most investors, news of a much more significant event came on Friday, November 2nd: President Trump was looking to make a deal with China at the late-November G20 meeting in Argentina, and had asked key officials to begin drafting potential terms.1 The investable market rallied over 3% on the day in response to the news, and continued to rise until Monday December 3rd, the day after the 3-month trade talk agreement was struck. Chart 1 shows that while investible stocks nearly hit a new 2018 low in December, this was due to a significant sell off in global stocks: relative performance was flat during this period, and resumed its uptrend once global stocks began to rise. Chart 2 provides confirmation that trade talks have been the primary driver behind the rally in China-related assets as well. The chart shows the BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator alongside a diffusion index of its 17 components, with the vertical line denoting the point where the prospect of a deal became public. The Fed’s shift to a more dovish posture following its December rate hike has certainly helped propel the global rally in risky assets, but Chart 2 makes it clear that a shift in the outlook for trade between the U.S. and China has been the more important factor driving the prices of China-related assets over the past few months. Chart 2Trump's Desire For A Deal Was The Turning Point For The Market In terms of its relative importance for the Chinese economy, the focus of investors on trade is mostly wrongheaded. Trade is important to China’s economy, but the domestic demand trend is a far more important driver for the fundamental performance of China-related assets. We have highlighted over the past year that investor attention has been focused on the wrong factor, underscoring the rally in Chinese stock prices over the past few months has been driven by a largely false narrative. From Trade, To Credit Chart 3 compares our leading indicator for the Chinese economy with a measure of coincident economic activity, and highlights that the sharp slowdown in growth that has occurred over the past few months represents a reversion to a level that would be more consistent with that of our leading indicator (which has been pointing to weaker economic activity for the better part of the past 18 months). In fact, Chart 3 implies that actual growth is still stronger than what monetary conditions, money, and credit growth would imply, meaning that a further slowdown should be expected over the coming several months. Chart 3Economic Activity Is Recoupling With Our Leading Indicator However, judging by January’s credit release, this further slowdown in growth may occur against the backdrop of a durable uptrend in our leading indicator. Our calculation of adjusted total social financing grew by nearly 5 trillion RMB in January, a very substantial rise that has seldom occurred over the past few years (Chart 4). Legitimate questions about the seasonal effects of the Lunar New Year remain, but Chart 5 shows that the January data was large enough to cause a visible tick higher in the YoY growth rate, caused a sharp rise in our ratio of new credit to GDP, and occurred alongside an easing in the contraction of shadow credit as a percent of total credit. These are clear signs that reluctant policymakers are responding to the need to stabilize a weak economy. Chart 4A Very Strong Surge In January Credit...Chart 5...Has Led To A Visible Uptick In Annual Growth The magnitude of the January surge suggests that there is now a legitimate basis to forecast an eventual bottom in Chinese domestic demand. Our December 5 Weekly Report outlined our key views for 2019,2 and in it we noted that “our base case view is that growth will modestly firm in the second half of 2019, which would provide a somewhat stronger demand backdrop for commodities and emerging economies that sell goods to China”. The odds of a firming in growth have certainly gone up as a result of January’s data, although it remains unclear how strong the upturn in credit growth will ultimately be over the course of 2019. This, along with the desynchronizing effect of trade front-running and a truce-driven rally in Chinese stocks, significantly muddles the 6-12 month investment strategy outlook. From Credit, To Investment Strategy We noted in our December key views report that a tactical overweight stance towards Chinese stocks was probably warranted over the coming three months, in recognition of the fact that investors could bid up the market in the lead-up to a possible trade deal with the U.S. We argued that the conditions for a cyclical overweight stance (6-12 months) were not yet present but could emerge sometime this year, particularly if money & credit growth begin to pick up. Is the January surge in adjusted total social financing a sign that investors should increase their allocation to Chinese equities today? We agree that investors should put Chinese investable stocks on upgrade watch for the next few months, but three factors continue to argue against an immediate shift: Investors appear to have bid up Chinese stocks assuming not only that the trade deal with the U.S. will occur, but that it will result in a durable resolution to the dispute (including, presumably, the rolling back of all tariffs that have been imposed). Even under the assumption that a deal does occur, it may be less comprehensive than investors are assuming and could still cause some lasting negative implications for global trade. While the odds of a credit overshoot have legitimately risen,3 January’s credit number is only one data point and the month-over-month change in credit is always abnormally strong in the first month of the year. At a minimum, investors should wait until the February credit data is released in mid-March to judge whether a higher pace of credit growth will be sustained over the course of the year. The recent quarrel between Premier Li Keqiang and the PBOC over whether the January credit spike represented “flood irrigation-style” stimulus suggests that policymakers are still somewhat reluctant to significantly boost credit,4 underscoring the need to monitor whether the recent pace of growth will be sustained. As first highlighted in Chart 3 above, the inflection point in credit growth implies that economic activity will improve at some point in the months ahead, but the current pace of money & credit growth suggests that both activity and, crucially, the level of earnings are facing a “catch up” period of potentially material weakness before they durably bottom. Chart 6 illustrates this potential weakness by comparing the current circumstance of our leading economic indicator, our measure of coincident economic activity, and the level of forward earnings to the 2015/2016 episode. The chart shows that by comparison to today, the 2015/2016 episode had clearer sequencing: our leading indicator fell, coincident activity followed, and stock prices bottomed only once forward earnings had contracted materially. Chart 6In 2015/2016, Our Leading Indicator Led Activity, Earnings, And Relative Stock Performance This time around, our leading indicator peaked in Q1 2017, but activity remained stronger than our indicator would have suggested even though it peaked relatively soon afterwards. Incoming data over the past three months suggest that economic activity is now catching up to the downside, and forward earnings remain elevated. Chart 7 shows that Chinese net earnings revisions remain firmly in negative territory, at levels that have been historically been associated with contracting forward earnings growth. Chart 7Earnings Weakness Looks Set To Continue Panel 4 of Chart 6 is emblematic of the fact that the recent rally in Chinese relative performance, driven largely by a false narrative, has significantly complicated the cyclical investment outlook. If the January improvement in credit had instead come in late October when Chinese relative performance was near its low, it would have been much easier for us to recommend that investors move to an overweight stance in response to a legitimate fundamental improvement and to take the risk of being somewhat too early. Now, a razor sharp focus on the earnings outlook is necessary, and we are unlikely to recommend an increased allocation to Chinese stocks unless that outlook stabilizes. Table 1 presents one of the tools that we will be using to judge the outlook for earnings, based on a model that we presented in two recent reports.5 The table shows a series of earnings recession probabilities that are based on a variety of credit and exchange rate scenarios and conditional on a material improvement in Chinese exporter sentiment. Light colored cells represent an earnings recession probability of less than 1/3rd, and the circled cell shows roughly where we would be today if the new export order component of the NBS manufacturing PMI were to rise sharply back to its June 2018 level. Table 1Credit Needs To Rise Further And RMB Appreciation Needs To Slow For The Earnings Outlook To Stabilize The table makes two key points. First, even given January’s surge, new credit will have to improve relative to GDP over the coming months in order to stabilize the earnings outlook. Second, the more that China’s currency appreciates in response to a trade deal with the U.S., the higher the hurdle rate for credit. Chart 8 shows that CNY-USD is already deviating quite significantly from the level implied by interest rate differentials, suggesting that significant further currency appreciation may not be in the cards. But the bottom line for investors is that a rising currency has the potential to negate some of the reflationary effects of stronger credit, and is a risk that must be monitored alongside the effort to gauge the sustainable rate of credit growth. Chart 8While Policymakers Or Rate Differentials Drive CNY-USD Over The Coming Year? Stay tuned! Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Trump Said To Ask Cabinet To Draft Possible Trade Deal With Xi”, dated November 2, 2018, available at Bloomberg News 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “2019 Key Views: Four Themes For China In The Coming Year”, dated December 5, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report “China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks”, dated February 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see “Chinese Premier In Rare Spat With Central Bank”, Financial Times. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “Six Questions About Chinese Stocks”, dated January 16, 2019, and Weekly Report “A Gap In The Bridge”, dated January 30, 2019 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
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Highlights It may seem self-evident that most governments are overly indebted, but both theory and evidence suggest otherwise. Higher debt today does not require higher taxes tomorrow if the growth rate of the economy exceeds the interest rate on government bonds. Not only is that currently the case, but it has been the norm for most of history. Unlike private firms or households, governments can choose the interest rate at which they borrow, provided that they issue debt in their own currencies. Ultimately, inflation is the only constraint to how large fiscal deficits can get. Today, most governments would welcome higher inflation. There are increasing signs China is abandoning its deleveraging campaign. Fiscal policy will remain highly accommodative in the U.S. and will turn somewhat more stimulative in Europe. Remain overweight global equities/underweight bonds. We do not have a strong regional equity preference at the moment, but expect to turn more bullish on EM versus DM by the middle of this year. Feature A Fiscal Non-Problem? Debt levels in advanced economies are higher today than they were on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis. Rising private debt accounts for some of this increase, but the lion’s share has occurred in government debt (Chart 1). Chart 1Global Debt Levels Have Risen, Especially In The Public Sector Not surprisingly, rising public debt levels have elicited plenty of consternation. While there has been a lively debate about how fast governments should tighten their belts, few have disputed the seemingly self-evident opinion that some degree of “fiscal consolidation” is warranted. Given this consensus view, one would think that the economic case for public debt levels being too high is airtight. It’s not. Far from it. Debt Sustainability, Quantified Start with the classic condition for debt sustainability, which specifies the primary fiscal balance (i.e., the overall balance excluding interest payments) necessary to maintain a constant debt-to-GDP ratio (See Box 1 for a derivation of this equation). An increase in the economy’s growth rate (g), or a decrease in real interest rates (r), would allow the government to loosen the primary fiscal balance without causing the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase (Chart 2).1 If the government were to ease fiscal policy beyond that point, debt would rise in relation to GDP. But by how much? It is tempting to assume that the debt-to-GDP ratio would then begin to increase exponentially. However, that is only true if the interest rate is higher than the growth rate of the economy. If the opposite were true, the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise initially but then flatten out at a higher level.2 A Fiscal Free Lunch The last point is worth emphasizing. As long as the interest rate is below the economic growth rate, then any primary fiscal balance – even a permanent deficit of 20%, or even 30% of GDP – would be consistent with a stable long-term debt-to-GDP ratio. In such a setting, the government could just indefinitely rollover the existing stock of debt, while issuing enough new debt to cover interest payments. No additional taxes would be necessary. In fact, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio becomes easier the higher it rises. Chart 3 shows this point analytically. Ah, one might say: If the government issues a lot of debt, then interest rates would rise, and before we know it, we are back in a world where the borrowing rate is above the economy’s growth rate, at which point the debt dynamics go haywire. Now, that sounds like a sensible statement, but it is actually quite misleading. As long as a government is able to issue its own currency, it can always create money to pay for whatever it purchases. If people want to turn around and use that money to buy bonds, they are welcome to do so, but the government is under no obligation to pay them the interest rate that they want. If they do not wish to hold cash, they can always use the cash to buy goods and services or exchange it for foreign currency. As long as a government is able to issue its own currency, it can always create money to pay for whatever it purchases. Wouldn’t that cause inflation and currency devaluation? Yes, it might, and that’s the real constraint: What limits the ability of governments with printing presses to run large deficits is not the inability to finance them. Rather, it is the risk that their citizens will treat their currencies as hot potatoes, rushing to exchange them for goods and services out of fear that rising prices will erode the purchasing power of their cash holdings. When Is Saving Desirable? The reason governments pay interest on bonds is because they want people to save more. However, more savings is not necessarily a good thing. This is obviously the case when an economy is depressed, but it may even be true when an economy is at full employment. Just like someone can work so much that they have no time left over for leisure, or buy a house so big that they spend all their time maintaining it, it is possible for an economy to save too much, leading to an excess of capital accumulation. Under such circumstances, steady-state consumption will be permanently depressed because so much of the economy’s resources are going towards replenishing the depreciation of the economy’s capital stock. Economists have a name for this condition: “dynamic inefficiency.” What determines whether an economy is dynamically inefficient? As it turns out, the answer is the same as the one that determines whether debt ratios are on an explosive path or not: The difference between the interest rate and the economy’s growth rate. Economies where interest rates are below the growth rate will tend to suffer from excess savings. In that case, government deficits, to the extent that they soak up national savings, may increase national welfare. r < g Has Been The Norm Today, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield stands at 2.69%, compared to the OECD’s projection of nominal GDP growth of 3.8% over the next decade. The gap between projected growth and bond yields is even greater in other major economies (Chart 4). Granted, equilibrium real rates are likely to rise over the next few years as spare capacity is absorbed. Structural factors might also push up real rates over time. Most notably, the retirement of baby boomers could significantly curb income growth, leading to a decline in national savings. Chart 5 shows that the ratio of workers-to-consumers globally is in the process of peaking after a three-decade long ascent. Economic growth could also fall if cognitive abilities continue to deteriorate, a worrying trend we discussed in a recent Special Report.3 Chart 5The Global Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked It may take a while before real rates rise above GDP growth. Still, it may take a while before real rates rise above GDP growth. As Olivier Blanchard, the former chief economist at the IMF, noted in his Presidential Address to the American Economics Association earlier this year, periods in U.S. history where GDP growth exceeds interest rates have been the rule rather than the exception (Chart 6).4 The same has been true for most other economies.5 Chart 6GDP Growth Above Interest Rates: Historically, The Rule, Not The Exception What’s Next For Fiscal Policy? Austerity fatigue has set in. In the U.S., fiscally conservative Republicans, if they ever really existed, are a dying breed. Trump’s big budget deficits and his “I love debt” mantra are the waves of the future. For their part, the Democrats are shifting to the left, with the “Green New Deal” proposal being the latest manifestation. The case for fiscal stimulus is stronger in the euro area than for the United States. The European Commission expects the euro area to see a positive fiscal thrust of 0.40% of GDP this year, up from a thrust of 0.05% of GDP last year (Chart 7). This should help support growth. Chart 7The Euro Area Will Benefit From A Modest Amount Of Fiscal Easing This Year Additional fiscal easing would be feasible. This is clearly true in Germany, but even in Italy, the cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus is larger than what is necessary to stabilize the debt ratio.6 Unfortunately, the situation in southern Europe is greatly complicated by the ECB’s inability to act as an unconditional lender of last resort to individual sovereign borrowers. When a government cannot print its own currency, its debt markets can be subject to multiple equilibria. Under such circumstances, a vicious spiral can develop where rising bond yields lead investors to assign a higher default risk, thus leading to even higher yields (Chart 8). Mario Draghi’s now-famous “whatever it takes” pledge has gone a long way towards reassuring bond investors. Nevertheless, given the political constraints the ECB faces, it is doubtful that Italy or other indebted economies in the euro area will be able to pursue large-scale stimulus. Instead, the ECB will keep interest rates at exceptionally low levels. A new round of TLTROs is also looking increasingly likely, which should protect against a rise in bank funding costs and a potential credit crunch. Our European team believes that a TLTRO extension would be particularly helpful to Italian banks. Even in Italy, the cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus is larger than what is necessary to stabilize the debt ratio. Despite having one of the highest sovereign debt ratios in the world, Japan faces no pressing need to tighten fiscal policy. Instead of raising the sales tax this October, the government should be cutting it. A loosening of fiscal policy would actually improve debt sustainability if, as is likely, a larger budget deficit leads to somewhat higher inflation (and thus, lower real borrowing rates) and, at least temporarily, faster GDP growth. We expect the Abe government to counteract at least part of the sales tax increase with new fiscal measures, and ultimately to abandon plans for further fiscal tightening over the next few years. In the EM space, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa are among a handful of economies with vulnerable fiscal positions. They all have borrowing rates that exceed the growth rate of the economy, cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficits, and above-average levels of sovereign debt (Chart 9). In contrast, China stands out as having the biggest positive gap between projected GDP growth and sovereign borrowing rates of any major economy. The problem is that the main borrowers have been state-owned companies and local governments, neither of which are backstopped by the state. Not officially, anyway. Unofficially, the government has been extremely reluctant to allow large-scale defaults anywhere in the economy. Despite all the rhetoric about market-based reforms, they are unlikely to start now. Historically, the Chinese government has allowed credit growth to reaccelerate whenever it has fallen towards nominal GDP growth. As we recently argued in a report entitled “China’s Savings Problem,” China needs more debt to sustain aggregate demand.7 Historically, the government has allowed credit growth to reaccelerate whenever it has fallen towards nominal GDP growth (Chart 10). The stronger-than-expected jump in credit origination in January suggests that we are approaching such an inflection point. Chart 10Historically, China Has Scaled Back On Deleveraging When Credit Growth Has Fallen Close To Nominal GDP Growth Investment Conclusions The consensus economic view is that deflation is a much harder problem to overcome than inflation. When dealing with inflation, all you have to do is raise interest rates and eventually the economy will cool down. With deflation, however, a central bank could very quickly find itself up against the zero lower bound constraint on interest rates, unable to ease policy any further via conventional means. While this standard argument is correct, it takes a very monetary policy-centric view of macroeconomic policy. When interest rates are low, fiscal policy becomes very potent. Indeed, the whole notion that deflation is a bigger problem than inflation is rather peculiar. Just as it is easier to consume resources than to produce them, it should be easier to get people to spend than to save. People like to spend. And even if they didn’t, governments could go out and buy goods and services directly. Looking out, our bet is that policymakers will increasingly lean towards the ever-more fiscal stimulus. If structural trends end up causing the so-called neutral rate of interest to rise – the rate of interest that is necessary to avoid overheating – policymakers will have no choice but to eventually raise rates and tighten fiscal policy (Box 2). However, they will only do so begrudgingly. The result, at least temporarily, will be higher inflation. Fixed-income investors should maintain below benchmark duration exposure over both a cyclical and structural horizon. Reflationary policies that increase nominal GDP growth will help support equities, at least over the next 12 months. Chart 11 shows that corporate earnings tend to accelerate whenever nominal GDP growth rises. We upgraded global equities to overweight following the December FOMC meeting selloff. While our enthusiasm for stocks has waned with the year-to-date rally, we are sticking with our bullish bias. Chart 11Earnings And Nominal GDP Growth Tend To Move In Lock-Step A reacceleration in Chinese credit growth will put a bottom under both Chinese and global growth by the middle of this year. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar will likely come under pressure in the second half of this year. Until then, we expect the greenback to be flat-to-modestly stronger. The combination of faster global growth and a weaker dollar later this year will be manna from heaven for emerging markets. We closed our put on the EEM ETF for a gain of 104% on Jan 3rd, and are now outright long EM equities. I do not have a strong view on the relative performance of EM versus DM at the moment, but expect to shift EM equities to overweight by this summer.8 Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1 The Arithmetic Of Debt Sustainability Box 2 Debt Sustainability And Full Employment: The Role Of Fiscal And Monetary Policy Policymakers should strive to stabilize the ratio of debt-to-GDP over the long haul, while also ensuring that the economy stays near full employment. The accompanying chart shows the tradeoffs involved. The DD schedule depicts the combination of the primary fiscal balance and the gap between the borrowing rate and GDP growth (r minus g) that is consistent with a stable debt-to-GDP ratio. In line with the debt sustainability equation derived in Box 1, the slope of the DD schedule is simply equal to the debt/GDP ratio. Any point below the DD schedule is one where the debt-to-GDP ratio is rising, while any point above is one where the ratio is falling. The EE schedule depicts the combination of the primary fiscal balance and r - g that keeps the economy at full employment. The schedule is downward-sloping because an increase in the primary fiscal balance implies a tightening of fiscal policy, and hence requires an offsetting decline in interest rates. Any point above the EE schedule is one where the economy is operating at less than full employment. Any point below the EE schedule is one where the economy is operating beyond full employment and hence overheating. Suppose there is a structural shift in the economy that causes the neutral rate of interest – the rate of interest consistent with full employment and stable inflation – to increase. In that case, the EE schedule would shift to the right: For any level of the fiscal primary balance, the economy would need a higher interest rate to avoid overheating. The arrows show three possible “transition paths” to a new equilibrium. Scenario #1 is one where policymakers raise rates quickly but are slow to tighten fiscal policy. This results in a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. Scenario #2 is one where policymakers tighten fiscal policy quickly but are slow to raise rates. This results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Scenario #3 is one where the government drags its feet in both raising rates and tightening fiscal policy. As the economy overheats, real rates actually decline, sending the arrow initially to the left. This effectively allows policymakers to inflate away the debt, leading to a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Note: In Scenario #2, and especially in Scenario #3, the DD line will become flatter (not shown on the chart to avoid clutter). Consequently, the final equilibrium will be one where real rates are somewhat higher, but the primary fiscal balance is somewhat lower, than in Scenario #1. Footnotes 1 One can equally define the interest rate and GDP growth rate in nominal terms (see Box 1 for details). 2 Japan is a good example of this point. The primary budget deficit averaged 5% of GDP between 1993 and 2010, a period when government net debt rose from 20% of GDP to 142% of GDP. Since then, Japan’s primary deficit has averaged 5.1% of GDP, but net debt has risen to only 156% of GDP (and has been largely stable for the past two years). 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Most Important Trend In The World Has Reversed And Nobody Knows Why,” dated February 1, 2019. 4 Olivier Blanchard, “Public Debt And Low Interest Rates,” Peterson Institute for International Economics and MIT American Economic Association (AEA) Presidential Address, (January 2019). 5 Paolo Mauro, Rafael Romeu, Ariel Binder, and Asad Zaman, “A Modern History Of Fiscal Prudence And Profligacy,” IMF Working Paper, (January 2013). 6 The Italian 10-year bond yield is 2.83% while nominal GDP growth is 2.64%. Multiplying the difference by net debt of 118% of GDP results in a required primary surplus of .22% of GDP that is necessary to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. This is lower than the IMF’s 2018 estimate of cyclically-adjusted government primary surplus of 2.14%. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China’s Savings Problem,” dated January 25, 2019. 8 Please note that my colleague, Arthur Budaghyan, BCA’s Chief EM strategist, remains bearish on both EM and DM equities and expects EM to underperform DM over the coming months. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights A sooner-than-anticipated end to the Federal Reserve’s balance-sheet runoff should give a welcome boost to international liquidity conditions. Moreover, reflationary efforts in China, cautious global central banks, and easing global financial conditions all point to a rebound in economic surprises. This will support pro-cyclical versus defensive currencies and argues against a strong USD. At this point, it is too early to tell how long a pro-cyclical FX stance will be warranted. Sell NZD/CAD. Feature Since the turn of the year, this publication has argued that a correction in the dollar was increasingly likely, and that the main beneficiaries of this move should be the more pro-cyclical currencies. Because U.S. domestic fundamentals remain much stronger than the rest of the G10’s, our preference has been to favor commodity currencies versus the yen instead of playing dollar weakness outright. This theme remains in place for now. However, we are increasingly concerned about the dollar and think the outperformance of commodity currencies could last longer than originally expected. Essentially, an end to the Federal Reserve’s balance-sheet runoff, more cautious central banks, and easier global financial conditions could set the stage for a significant rebound in commodity currencies. U.S. Excess Reserves Vs. Commodity Currencies Whether it is from Governor Lael Brainard, Cleveland Fed President Loretta Mester, or the FOMC minutes, the message is clear: The days of the Fed’s balance sheet runoff are numbered. Ryan Swift, BCA’s Chief U.S. Bond Strategist, has written at length that the Fed’s balance sheet attrition has had a limited direct impact on U.S. growth. However, Ryan and the FOMC members both agree that a smaller balance sheet impacts the ability of the Fed to control the level of the fed funds rate.1 With less excess reserves in the banking system, the New York Fed has to intervene more often to keep the policy rate below its ceiling. This might seem like a very technical point, but it is an important one for many FX markets. Prior to the financial crisis, expanding excess reserves on U.S. commercial banks would coincide with improving dollar-based liquidity. Moreover, since 2011, reserves even lead our financial liquidity index (Chart I-1). Since there is 14 trillion of USD-denominated foreign-currency debt around the world, these fluctuations in U.S. excess reserves, and thus global liquidity, can have an impact on the price of assets most levered to global growth conditions. Chart I-1U.S. Excess Reserves Contribute To The Global Liquidity Backdrop Chart I-2 illustrates that commodity currencies are indeed very responsive to changes in U.S. excess reserves, particularly when these pro-cyclical currencies are compared to counter-cyclical ones like the JPY. Meanwhile, the trade-weighted dollar tends to move in the opposite direction of excess reserves, reflecting the dollar’s countercyclical nature (Chart I-3). This relationship, however, is not as tight as the one between commodity currencies and the reserves. Chart I-2Improving Growth In Excess Reserves Leads To Stronger Commodity Currencies... Chart I-3...And To A Weaker Greenback A corollary to the growing consensus within the FOMC to end the balance-sheet runoff sooner than later is that the contraction in excess reserves will end. A bottoming in the rate of change of the reserves is consistent with a rebound in commodity currencies, especially against the yen, and with a correction in the dollar. Gold prices are very sensitive to global liquidity conditions. Today, not only is the yellow metal moving closer to the US$1350-US$1370 zone that marked its previous highs in 2016, 2017, and 2018, but also, the gold rally is broadening, as exemplified by the advance / decline line of gold prices versus nine currencies, which is making new highs (Chart I-4, top panel). This indicates that the precious metal could punch above this resistance level. Gold is probably sniffing out an improvement in global liquidity conditions. Since rising gold prices tend to lead EM high-yield bond prices higher (Chart I-4, bottom panel), investors need to monitor this move closely. Chart I-4A Broadening Gold Rally Is Consistent With Easing Liquidity Conditions Bottom Line: The growing chorus among FOMC members singing the praises of the end of the Fed’s balance-sheet runoff points toward a significant slowdown in U.S. excess reserves attrition. While this may not be a significant development for U.S. domestic economic variables, it should help liquidity conditions outside the U.S. While this could weigh on the greenback, the probability is higher that it will help commodity currencies in the short run, especially against the yen. Global Policy And Commodity Currencies In China, new total social financing hit CNY 4.6 trillion in January, well above the normal seasonal strength. Accordingly, the Chinese fiscal and credit impulse is starting to improve (Chart I-5). While this rebound is currently embryonic, our Geopolitical Strategy team has argued that a massive increase in Chinese credit this January would indicate a change in Beijing’s economic priorities.2 The Chinese government may be trying to limit the downside to growth, and reflation may expand. This would result in a further pick-up in the credit impulse. Chart I-5The Chinese Credit Impulse May Be Bottoming Easing EM financial conditions – courtesy of rebounding EM high-yield bond prices – and rising Chinese credit flows should ultimately lead to improving growth conditions across EM. As a result, our diffusion index of EM economic activity – which tallies improvements across 23 EM economic variables – should bounce from currently very depressed levels. Such a recovery is normally associated with a weaker trade-weighted dollar, a stronger euro, rising commodity prices and rising commodity currencies – both against the USD and the JPY (Chart I-6). Chart I-6IF EM Growth Conditions Improve, This Will Have A Profound Impact On the FX Market We can expand this line of thinking to the global economy. Our Leading Economic Indicator Diffusion Index, which compares the number of countries with a rising LEI versus those with a falling LEI, already rebounded five months ago. Historically, this signals an upcoming rebound in the BCA global LEI. Additionally, other major central banks are also sounding an increasingly cautious tone. This should accentuate the easing in global financial conditions that began in late December, creating another support for global growth. However, global investors remain very pessimistic on global growth, as exemplified by this week’s very poor global growth expectations computed from the German ZEW survey (Chart I-7). This dichotomy between depressed growth expectations and burgeoning green shoots suggests that risk asset prices have room to rally further in the coming quarter or two. Chart I-7Investors Remain Pessimistic About Growth, Yet Green Shoots Are Popping Up These dynamics are positive for commodity currencies and negative for the dollar. This cycle, the pattern has been for the trade-weighted dollar to correct and hypersensitive pro-cyclical currencies like the AUD and the NZD to perk up only after our Global LEI diffusion index has trough, and around the same time as risk asset prices rebound (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Thinking About Growth, Asset Prices, The Dollar, And Commodity Currencies Treasury yields will most likely also be forced higher by improving risk asset prices and economic activity, especially as bond market flows suggest T-notes currently are a coiled spring. The U.S. Treasury International Capital System data released at the end of last week was very revealing. The press emphasized the large-scale selling of Treasurys from the Cayman Islands – interpreted as selling by hedge funds. Missing from the picture was the enormous buying from these same players over the past 12 months, which corresponded with falling yields and a rallying trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-9). It was a sign of growing fear that pushed up the price of bonds. Chart I-9Hedge Funds Have Room To Liquidate Their Treasury Holdings If, as we expect, global growth beats dismal expectations and risk assets rebound further, the countercyclical dollar should correct. This will further ease global financial conditions and justifying even more a wholesale liquidation of stale bond holdings by hedge funds and further pushing the Fed toward resuming its hiking campaign faster than the market is currently anticipating. This combination is highly bond bearish. Unsurprisingly, this means that the yen, which normally trades closely in line with U.S. Treasury yields, is likely to weaken. Hence, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY could experience significant upside over the coming months (Chart I-10). Chart I-10A Bond Bearish Backdrop Is Also Bad For The Yen Bottom Line: Global growth conditions are evolving away from a dollar-bullish, commodity currency-bearish backdrop. Not only is the dollar-based liquidity set to improve, but China is also releasing the proverbial brake. Additionally, a generally more cautious tone among global central banks will contribute to easing global financial conditions. These developments are likely to result in a period of positive global economic surprises – and an environment where the greenback weakens and where pro-cyclical currencies outperform. But For How Long? It remains a question mark as to how long this pro-growth cycle will last. Parts of the dynamics described above are very self-defeating. If global growth conditions and asset prices rebound strongly, the Fed will be in a better position to increase rates once again. This could quickly curtail the improvement in global financial conditions and favor a strong dollar. Additionally, it is not clear how far Beijing will go in terms of pushing reflation through the Chinese economy. Chinese policymakers are worried about too-pronounced a slowdown but are equally worried about too much debt in their economy, and do not want to repeat the debt binge witnessed in 2010 and 2016. Therefore, they may be much quicker to lift their foot off the gas pedal. This conflicting attitude is best illustrated by recent opposing remarks made by Chinese policymakers. On the one hand, Premier Li-Keqiang expressed concerns regarding the January credit surge, suggesting that some Chinese policymakers are already trying to dampen expectations that stimulus will be substantial. On the other hand, the PBoC sounded utterly unconcerned. Moreover, as our Emerging Markets Strategy service highlights, EM earnings are likely to continue to suffer from the lagged effect of China’s previous tightening. This creates the risk that even if global growth rebounds, EM stock prices, EM FX and all related plays do not follow. This would maintain the dollar-bullish environment and hurt pro-cyclical commodity currencies while supporting the yen. Despite these risks, it is nonetheless too early to tell how short-lived this period of dollar softness and commodity currency strength will be. After all, the dollar is a momentum currency. If the dollar weakness gathers steam, a virtuous cycle could emerge: improving global growth begets a weaker dollar, a weaker dollar begets easier global financial conditions, easier global financial conditions beget stronger growth, and so on. Gold prices may hold the key to cut this Gordian knot. If gold cannot maintain its recent gains, then the pro-cyclical positioning will not be valid for more than three months. However, if gold prices can remain at elevated levels or even rally further, then this pro-cyclical positioning will stay appropriate for at least six to nine months. What is clear is that for now, buying risk in the FX space makes sense. Bottom Line: At this point, too many crosscurrents are at play to evaluate confidently the length of any rally in pro-cyclical currencies relative to defensive ones. Since easier financial conditions ultimately force the Fed to resume hiking and since it is far from clear how committed to reflation Chinese policymakers are, our base case remains that this move will last a quarter or so. However, the fact that a falling dollar further eases global financial conditions, fomenting greater global growth in the process, suggests that a virtuous circle that create additional dollar downside can also emerge. Gold may provide early signals as to when investors should once again adopt a defensive posture. Sell NZD/CAD Something exceptional happened three months ago. For the second time in 25 years, Canadian policy rates fell in line with New Zealand’s. As Chart I-11 shows, this last happened from 1998 to 1999, when NZD/CAD subsequently depreciated 26%. However, today Canada’s and New Zealand’s current accounts are roughly in line while back then New Zealand had a substantially larger deficit, such a decline is unlikely to repeat itself. Nonetheless, we posit that NZD/CAD possesses ample downside. Chart I-11Bad News For NZD/CAD First, like in 1998-‘99, the real trade-weighted NZD exhibits a larger premium to its fair value than the real trade-weighted CAD (Chart I-12). In fact, the relative premium of the NZD to the CAD is roughly comparable as it was back then. Moreover, our Intermediate-Term Timing Model for NZD/CAD reinforces this message as it suggests that short-term valuations are also stretched (Chart I-13). Chart I-12NZD/CAD Is Pricey... Chart I-13...And Our Short-Term Valuation Metric Agrees Second, the New Zealand economy is currently weaker than that of Canada. Relative consumer confidence and business confidence have been in a downward trend for three years. Historically, while NZD/CAD can deviate from such dynamics, ultimately this cross tends to revert toward relative growth trends. The recent collapse in New Zealand’s economic surprises relative to Canada’s suggests that the timing for such a reversion is increasingly ripe, as there is currently scope for investors to discount a more hawkish Bank of Canada than Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Indeed, 1-year/1-year forward yields in Canada have fallen much more relative to the BoC overnight rate than similar forwards have fallen relative to the RBNZ policy rate. Third, New Zealand real bond yields have collapsed relative to Canada’s. As Chart I-14 illustrates, NZD/CAD tends to follow real yield differentials. So far, NZD/CAD has been less-weak than the real-yield gap would imply, but from late 2003 to early 2005 this cross also managed to defy gravity for an extended time, only to ultimately succumb to the inevitable. Chart I-14Falling Real Yield Spreads Will Weigh On NZD/CAD Fourth, as the top panel of Chart I-15 illustrates, the performance of kiwi stocks relative to Canadian equities tend to lead NZD/CAD, especially at tops. While tentative, the ratio of New Zealand to Canadian stocks seems to have peaked in early 2016. Supporting this judgment, kiwi profits have fallen relative to their Canadian counterparts and relative net earnings revisions are following a similar path – a move normally associated with a weaker NZD/CAD (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Chart I-15Relative Stock Market Dynamics Look Poor Fifth, terms of trades are becoming a growing headwind for NZD/CAD (Chart I-16). The price of agricultural commodities relative to energy products drives this pair, reflecting the comparative advantages of the two countries. BCA’s Commodity & Energy service is currently much more positive on the outlook for the energy complex than the agricultural complex. NZD/CAD is a perfect instrument to implement this view, especially now that the NZD suffers from a very rare negative carry against the CAD. Chart I-16A Negative Tems-Of-Trade Shock For NZD/CAD Bottom Line: NZD/CAD is set to experience an important fall. The NZD currently suffers from a very rare negative carry against the CAD. The last time this happened, a large depreciation ensued. Moreover, valuations and economic trends argue in favor of shorting this pair. Finally, relative bond yields, equity dynamics and term-of-trade outlooks also point to a lower NZD/CAD. Sell at 0.900, with a stop at 0.927 for a target of 0.800. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Caught Offside”, dated February 12, 2019, and the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, titled “The Great Unwind”, dated September 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled “China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks,” dated February 20, 2019 available at gps.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: Capacity Utilization underperformed expectations, coming in at 78.2%. However, Michigan Consumer Sentiment outperformed expectations, coming in at 95.5. Finally, the NAHB Housing Market Index also surprised to the upside, coming in at 62. The DXY has fallen by 0.2% this week. We remain bullish on the U.S. dollar on a cyclical basis, given that the Fed will end up hiking rates more than expected. However, the current easing of monetary conditions by Chinese authorities should tactically hurt the dollar and help commodity currencies. Moreover, the fact that the Fed announced that it might bring about an end to the balance sheet runoff sooner than expected will further help global liquidity conditions. The real question now is how long the coming dollar correction will last? Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area has been mixed: The annual growth in construction output underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.7%. The current account balance also surprised to the downside, coming in at 33 billion euros. However, the Zew Survey – Economic sentiment, though negative, surprised to the upside, coming in at -16.6. EUR/USD has risen by 0.4% this week. We remain bearish on EUR/USD on a cyclical basis; given that, we expect real rates to rise much faster in the U.S. than in the euro area. This is because we think that the U.S. economy will remain stronger than Europe’s, a consequence of the fact that the former has experienced a significant private sector deleveraging since 2008 while the latter has not. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 2019 Key Views: The Xs And The Currency Market - December 7, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Machinery orders yearly growth outperformed to the upside, coming in at 0.9%. Hurt by a very sharp contraction in shipments to China, the yearly growth of Japanese exports also surprised to the downside, coming in at -8.4%. However, imports yearly growth outperformed to the upside, coming in at -0.6%. USD/JPY has risen by 0.2% this week. We are bearish towards the yen on a tactical basis as the current upturn in liquidity conditions should hurt safe haven currencies. Moreover, reflationary efforts by Chinese Authorities should provide a boon to risk assets and make low yield currencies like the yen even less attractive. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Yen Fireworks - January 4, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been strong: Retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel yearly growth both outperformed expectations, coming in at 4.2% and 4.1%. Moreover, the yearly growth of average hourly earnings excluding bonus also surprised positively, coming in at 3.4%. GBP/USD has risen by 0.9% this week. We expect that a soft Brexit deal remains the most probable outcome out of Westminster. Thus, this factor, along with how cheap the pound is, make us bullish on the pound on a long-term basis. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Deadlock In Westminster - January 18, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been mixed: The wage price index yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.5%. However, the employment change surprised to the upside, coming in at 39.1 thousand in January. The participation rate also surprised positively, coming in at 65.7%. AUD/USD has fallen 0.7% this week. We are positive on the AUD on a tactical basis. Global monetary conditions have eased thanks to the rising Chinese credit and more cautious global central banks. Moreover, the announcement that the Fed is looking to halt its balance sheet reduction sooner than expected has provided further relief. However, the fundamentals of Australia remain poor, and thus long-term investors should continue to avoid this currency, Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 CAD And AUD: Jumping Higher To Plunge Deeper - February 1, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: The business PMI in January fell to 53.1. However, the input of the producer price index on a quarter-over-quarter basis surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.6%. NZD/USD depreciated by 0.7% this week. While NZD/USD might have some upside in the short term, we remain bearish on the NZD/USD on a cyclical basis. Both the short-term and long-term interest rates in New Zealand are lower than in the U.S., while the real trade-weighted NZD is trading at 7% premium to its fair value. Thus, the kiwi is relatively overvalued which means that any tactical upside of NZD won’t have legs. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The recent data in Canada has been neutral: The December new housing price index stays unchanged at 0%, on both month-over-month and year-over-year basis. The CAD has risen by 0.2% against USD this week. As BCA anticipates oil prices to strengthen more, we also expect the CAD to outperform the AUD and the NZD over the next few months. However, we remain bearish on CAD/USD on a structural basis. The unhealthy housing market in Canada could be a potential risk to the Canadian financial industry and the economy as a whole. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 CAD And AUD: Jumping Higher To Plunge Deeper - February 1, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 The recent data in Switzerland has been positive: The December exports increased to 19,682 million, while the imports increased to 16,639 million. The trade balance in December thus increased to 3,043 million, surprised to the upside. EUR/CHF has been flat this week. We are bullish on EUR/CHF on a cyclical basis. Easy global financial conditions should hurt safe haven currencies like the franc. Moreover, we believe that the SNB will continue to play a heavily dovish bias in order to counteract the fall in inflation caused by the surge in the franc last year. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive: January trade balance increased to 28.8 million, from previous 25 billion. USD/NOK was flat this week. In general, we are overweight the krone, since we believe the pickup in oil prices will help the Norwegian economy, ultimately boosting the performance of NOK against the EUR, the SEK, the AUD and the NZD. Moreover, the NOK is undervalued and currently trading at a large discount to its fair value, which could further lift the performance of the NOK on a cyclical basis. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been negative: January unemployment rate has increased to 6.5%. Moreover, the monthly inflation rate comes in at -1%, surprising to the downside. USD/SEK rallied by more than 1% this week. We remain bearish on EUR/SEK since the SEK is currently trading at a discount to its long-term fair value. Moreover, there are many signs pointing to a Swedish economy rebound. The negative rate in the country and easy financial conditions could stimulate the domestic demand and if global growth perks up, the weak inflation readings will prove transitory. The Riksbank has already abandoned it pledge to suppress the krona and it will move this year to lift rates again. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Political economy – i.e., the interplay between critical nation states’ policies and markets – often trumps straightforward supply-demand analysis in oil. This is because policy decisions affect production and consumption, along with global trade. These decisions, in turn, determine constraints states – central and tangential – confront in pursuit of their interests. Presently, U.S. policies toward Venezuela and Iran dominate oil supply considerations, while Sino – U.S. trade tensions and their effect on EM consumption dominate the demand side. In this month’s balances assessment, we revised some of our supply-side assumptions to include the high probability U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions will have to be extended until Venezuela stabilizes. OPEC 2.0 appears to be flexible -- positioning for either an extension of waivers, or sanctions. This keeps our baseline oil-supply assumptions fairly steady this year as the coalition adjusts to changes in Venezuela’s output. Adjustments could be volatile, however. On the demand side, we continue to expect growth of 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020. Steadier production and unchanged demand assumptions lower our price forecasts slightly to $75/bbl and $80/bbl this year and next for Brent, with WTI trading $7.0/bbl and $3.25/bbl below those levels, respectively (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekExpect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Highlights Energy: Overweight. Nigeria’s elections, scheduled for this past weekend, were unexpectedly postponed until Saturday. Political leaders urged Nigerians to “refrain from civil disorder and remain peaceful, patriotic and united to ensure that no force or conspiracy derail our democratic development.”1 Nigeria produces ~ 1.7mm b/d of oil. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Estimated LMEX, CME, SHFE and bonded Chinese warehouse copper inventories are down 29.8% y/y, which will continue to be supportive of prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium is trading ~ $111/oz over gold, as concerns over supply deficits persist. The last time this occurred was on November, 2002. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese buyers are believed to have cancelled as much as 1.25mm bushels of soybean purchases last week, according to feedandgrain.com. Feature The analytical framework informing global political economy provides a useful augmentation to our standard supply-demand analysis, particularly now, when U.S. policy continues to play a pivotal role in the evolution of oil fundamentals. In particular, we believe the near-term evolution of oil prices hinges on how events in Venezuela play out, following the imposition of U.S. trade and financial sanctions directed against the state-owned PDVSA oil company and the Maduro regime. The evolution of the U.S.’s PDVSA sanctions will directly determine whether waivers on Iranian export sanctions granted by the Trump administration in November are extended when they expire in May.2 These tightly linked evolutions, in turn, will drive OPEC 2.0 production policy, and whether its production-cutting agreement is extended beyond its June 2019 termination. As we discussed recently, we see OPEC 2.0 building its flexibility to adjust quickly to either an extension of the waivers on Iranian sanctions, or to accommodate the termination of these sanctions at the end of May. Given the state of the market, which we discuss below, we believe waivers on Iranian export sanctions almost surely will be extended when they expire in May. Global Oil Markets Are Tightening Our supply assumptions are driven by our assessment that global spare capacity of just over 2.5mm b/d could accommodate the loss of Venezuelan oil exports with little difficulty (in a matter of months), aside from a further tightening at the margin in the heavy-sour crude oil market (Chart of the Week and Table 1). In fact, the loss of up to 1mm b/d or more of Iranian exports – versus the ~ 800k b/d we now expect if waivers are extended until December – could also be accommodated by OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity, given the rebuilding of this potential output on the back of OPEC production cuts, which have the effect of increasing spare capacity (Chart 2).3 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply – Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) However, should this combination of events be realized, an unplanned outage similar to the one that removed ~ 1mm b/d of Canadian production due to wildfires in the summer of 2016, with Venezuela production falling toward 650k b/d and Iranian exports even partially constrained, could move the oil market perilously close to the limits of global spare capacity, which now stands just over 2.5mm b/d, based on the EIA’s reckoning. This would increase the risk of dramatically higher prices, simply because the flex in the system would approach zero. Iranian Waivers Hinge On Venezuela The manner in which U.S. sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro regime evolve – in particular, whether regime change is affected – will determine whether waivers on the oil-export sanctions the U.S. re-imposed on Iran last November are extended beyond their end-May terminal point. In turn, this will affect OPEC 2.0’s production policies, particularly after its production-cutting agreement expires in June. In our current model of OPEC 2.0 production, we now expect its 2019 production to continue to decline in 1H19, to drain the overhang resulting from the ramp-up member states undertook in preparation for U.S. sanctions against Iran. This policy was substantially reversed with the last-minute granting of waivers to eight importing countries by the Trump administration prior to sanctions kicking in in November. This led to a sharp sell-off in crude oil prices in 4Q18, as market participants re-calibrated the supply side of global balances. In 2H19, our base case assumes OPEC 2.0’s production rises by ~ 900mm b/d (December vs. July 2019 level), to smooth out the loss of Venezuelan output as it falls to 650k b/d by the end of this year from just under 1.1mm b/d now. The goal of this policy is to quickly drain global inventories to levels comfortably below the five-year average (in 1H19), and then to keep Brent prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range over 2H19 – end-2020 (Chart 3). We expect core OPEC 2.0 countries, led by KSA, core GCC states and Russia production to rise by more than 500k b/d in 2H19 (vs. 1H19 levels), to maintain inventories at desired levels and prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range. Chart 3Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses To this end, we assume core OPEC 2.0’s production rises in 2020 to 33.52mm b/d from 32.98mm b/d in 2019, led by a ~ 200k b/d increase from KSA – which takes its output to ~ 10.4mm b/d from ~ 10.2mm b/d in 2019. We expect Russian production to rise to 11.7mm b/d from ~ 11.5mm b/d in 2019. Additional output hikes come from core OPEC and other non-OPEC producers (Chart 4, Table 1). Chart 4OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 We do not try to forecast how the sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro government play out – i.e., whether the incumbent government survives, or whether a peaceful or violent regime change occurs. If Venezuela were to descend into civil war, or were to experience a violent revolution, the outcome would be unpredictable and the rebuilding of that economy – regardless of who emerges to take control of the state – would require years. Likewise, if President Maduro and the military leaders supporting him were to quietly decamp, it still would require years to rebuild that country’s oil industry and economy.4 We view the odds of a confrontation between the U.S. and Venezuela’s benefactors/creditors as extremely low. We believe the U.S. would revive the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and that Russia and China most likely would concede Venezuela is within the U.S.’s sphere of influence, as neither intend to project the force and maintain the supply lines such a confrontation would require.5 Because the resolution of the political uncertainty in Venezuela is unsure and the outcome unknowable – particularly when unplanned outages represent such a non-trivial risk to global supply at the margin – we strongly believe waivers granted on U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil exports will be extended at least by 90 to 180 days when they expire at the end of May. As we discuss above, global spare capacity is insufficient to cover the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian output, and still have the flexibility required to meet a large unplanned outage over the course of this year or next. For this reason, Iranian sanctions will not be immediately re-imposed following the termination of U.S. waivers on exports from that state; importers most likely will be increasing their liftings of Iranian crude, in line with the extension of the waivers we expect over the course of 2H19 (Chart 5). Oil Demand Continues To Hold Up We continue to expect global oil demand to grow by 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020, led as always by strong EM demand growth, with China and India at the forefront (Table 1). DM demand growth is expected to slow this year, but put in a respectable performance, as well. EM commodity demand growth generally has been trending down at a slow and constant pace since the beginning of 2018, as we discussed last week when we presented our new Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index. The index indicates demand is not as stellar as it was during the synchronized global upturn of 2017, but that it also is not as bad as sentiment and expectations would indicate.6 Pulling It All Together On balance, we expect the combination of stronger OPEC 2.0 output, plus an 800k b/d increase in U.S. shale-oil production, which lifts total U.S. crude-oil output from 12.42mm b/d to 13.49mm b/d next year, is enough to keep Brent prices close to $80/bbl next year, vs. the $75/bbl we expect this year (Chart 6). We revised our expectation for WTI slightly, and now expect it to trade ~ $7.0/bbl under Brent this year and at a $3.75/bbl discount next year. Chart 6Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... The OPEC 2.0 production discipline and lower U.S. shale-oil output, coupled with strong – not stellar – demand growth combine to allow OECD commercial oil inventories (crude and products) to resume drawing and to fall comfortably below OPEC 2.0’s 2010 – 2014 five-year average target (Chart 7). This will be supportive of the Brent backwardation trade we recommended on January 3, 2019 which now is up 265.5%, as of Tuesday’s close. Chart 7... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling Bottom Line: We revised our supply estimates, and now expect OPEC 2.0 to cover lost Venezuelan output arising from the imposition of U.S. sanctions on PDVSA and the continued deterioration of that state’s oil industry. Because global spare capacity cannot handle the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian oil exports at the same time and still cover a large unplanned outage, we expect the waivers on U.S. sanctions of Iranian oil exports to be extended for up to 180 days following their termination at the end of May. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year as oil markets balance. We expect WTI to trade ~ $7.0/bbl below Brent this year, and $3.25/bbl under in 2020. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Nigeria Election 2019: Appeal For Calm After Shock Delay,” published February 16, 2019, by bbc.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition of OPEC states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC states led by Russia, which recently agreed to cut production by ~ 1.2mm b/d to drain commercial oil inventories and re-balance markets globally. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee meets in April to assess the production-cutting deal it reached in November, which is set to expire in June. The full coalition meets in May to set policy going forward. This is just ahead of the expiration of U.S. waivers on Iranian oil exports. For a discussion of OPEC 2.0’s production optionality, please see “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy January 24, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We are watching the evolution of the partial closure of the offshore Safaniya field in KSA about two weeks ago closely. With 1mm b/d capacity, this is the world’s largest offshore producing field; no updates have been provided by KSA this week. 4 Please see “What Next For Venezuela,” by Anne Kreuger published by project-syndicate.org on February 15, 2019 for a discussion. 5 We note here that Gazprombank, the Russian bank, froze PDVSA’s accounts over the weekend to avoid running afoul of U.S. sanctions against the company. Please see “Russia’s Gazprombank decided to freeze PDVSA accounts – source,” published by reuters.com February 17, 2019. See also “What Comes Next For Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies February 12, 2019, which details how U.S. sanctions amount to the equivalent of a full-on embargo by forcing payment for Venezuelan oil to be deposited in accounts that cannot be accessed by the government or PDVSA. 6 We discuss our global demand outlook in last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, in an article entitled “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in