Emerging Markets

Special Report

Dear Clients, This week we offer you a Special Report on Russia and cyber security by our colleague and friend, Elmo Wright. Elmo recently retired from US Army civil service after 43 years working in intelligence, either on active duty, reserves, or as a civilian. From 2018 to 2020, he served as the senior civilian executive at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center. He has served on five continents and provided analysis of the most pressing global trends in national security and intelligence. In this Special Report with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team, Elmo analyzes Russia’s cyber capabilities and argues that structural and cyclical factors, including COVID-19, will ensure the continued salience of Russian and global cyber security challenges in the coming years. His thesis reinforces our recommendation that investors buy cyber security equities. Elmo’s work for this report is in his personal capacity and does not represent any position of the US government. Only publicly available information was used as background research material for Elmo’s contribution to the report. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Highlights As the US elections come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated. Cyber security stocks offer a way for investors to capitalize on our long-term themes of nationalism, multipolarity, and de-globalization. The ISE Cyber Security Index offers value relative to the broad NASDAQ and S&P 500 indexes as well as the S&P tech sector. Feature   As the national elections in the US come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Indeed Russia is making headlines even as we go to press. This report aims to provide context for Russian cyber capabilities in general as a contributor to overall geopolitical instability (Chart 1). We forecast Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. Chart 1Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections As background, the word cyber is commonly accepted to be derived from cybernetics, a phrase attributed to Norbert Wiener, an MIT scientist. The phrase itself is related to the ancient Greek word for steering or helmsman, in other words, control. Chart 2Russian Excellence In Math Makes It Competitive In Cybernetics Russia has a long history of excellence in science, especially theoretical work in mathematics and physics (Chart 2). Those fields can explain natural phenomena in formulas and mathematical relationships. The Soviets believed that centralized state planning that manipulated data in formulas could lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the society. Although central state economic planning did not work out for the Soviet economy, Soviet military science built on the concept of data relationships in formulas to develop its theory of troop control, a derivative of reflexive control, that is, the presenting of data to the recipient, either friendly or enemy, in order to get that recipient to act in a way favorable to Soviet military plans. One can see the Soviets embraced the idea of cybernetics as very congruent to their desire for top down control. Russia, as the core part of the Soviet Union, retained significant numbers of scientists and mathematicians who were naturally drawn to the ability of computers to take data and manipulate that data according to formulas. Other Russian scientists and mathematicians emigrated to the West where their expertise was rewarded in the rise in the use of computers to manipulate data. Over time, the term cyber has come to be associated with many aspects of computers, especially the intellectual and physical structures hidden behind the direct interface of a person with a keyboard and screen. Russian expertise in the use of computers to do cyber work was not limited to working for the State. As the Soviet Union broke apart and many people lost their jobs working for the State, there were those persons who took their talents to criminal ventures. And in the symbiotic nature of society in Russia, many of those who went into criminal ventures were former intelligence and security personnel who could maintain their connection to the official organizations that were successors to the KGB, the GRU, and others. Senior Russian military officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted the growth of nonmilitary means of achieving strategic goals, and specifically in the information space. Gerasimov, in an article in 2013, has been widely quoted that all elements of national power have to be harnessed, including cyber capabilities. One Soviet and Russian military concept that relates to the information space is maskirovka, the use of camouflage, deception, and disinformation to confuse the enemy. Maskirovka is intimately connected with the Soviet/Russian concept of “active measures”. Active measures include actions taken generally by intelligence services to provide propaganda, false information, and otherwise sow discord and confusion among the enemy ranks at all levels of war as well as in the political, economic, and social spheres. In today’s time period, cyber, especially social media, offers the opportunity for the wide spread of aspects of maskirovka and active measures to all users, as well as targeted groups (Chart 3). Reporting indicates a continued Russian emphasis on cyber as a means for active measures concealed by maskirovka. Chart 3Social Media Offers Russia An Opportunity For The Spread Of Maskirovka Wikileaks has provided a platform for the dissemination of information normally hidden from the general public. It is noteworthy how much of the information on the Wikileaks platform relates to the US and the West, and relatively little on Russia. Possible factors that explain that characteristic include the disparity in penalties for disclosing information between the US and the West versus Russia; the greater number of journalists and other persons involved in the media, both for profit and personal reasons, in the West; and the language barriers involved in understanding Russian versus English. A final possible factor in Wikileaks greater dissemination of Western information might be an aspect of active measures undertaken by Russia. Russia is the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US. There are numerous actions attributed to Russian state actors in the cyber field in the recent past (Table 1). They include a distributed denial of service attack on Estonia (2007); hacking the Ministry of Defense in the country of Georgia during a military conflict (2008); attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (2015); and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel recently publicly named and shamed Russia for a cyber-attack on Germany circa 2015 (Appendix). Table 1Russian State Actors Responsible For Many Of This Year’s Cyber Attacks Senior US officials have cited Russia as the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US, both for espionage and state sponsored attacks against US national security capabilities such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure; as well as for criminal activity such as ransom ware and identity theft. Russian use of cyber, both state sponsored and sponsoring criminal actors, has been the top threat to the US in each of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Chart 4). Although the 2020 annual threat assessment was not made public in Congressional testimony, there’s little reason to suspect that Russian use of cyber would not continue to be cited as the top threat. Chart 4Russian Use Of Cyber Is A Top Threat To The US Other nation states have state sponsored cyber capabilities which are of national security concern to the US, including China, Iran, and North Korea. These nation states are called out in the US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessments. Each of these nation states has been identified as committing intelligence and economic cyber attacks against the US and other Western nations. The recent speech by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation designates China as the top threat. Given the nature of the internet, the pathway of a cyber attack will likely bounce around multiple countries before reaching its intended target. As the Director notes, forensic identification of the source of a cyber attack takes time and expertise. However, there is a clear record of specifically identifying the state sponsored entity that commits attacks on US or Western government information technology and infrastructure. More likely than confusing one state sponsored cyber actor from one country to another would be the potential blending of criminal elements across national boundaries. In this case, cyber criminal elements with Russian backgrounds or connections are clearly the most capable. The stages of cyber conflict include reconnaissance, penetration, mapping, exfiltration, and operations. The US National Security Agency has an extensive technical cyber threat framework which goes into much detail. Cyber security professionals note the ongoing actions in cyber space and the attempts by elements suspected to be linked to Russia to gain and maintain access to US networks for potential military operations, or to exfiltrate data for criminal or other purposes. Part of the frustration of cyber security experts is the lack of transparency and timely reporting of those affected by malign cyber activities. Although some cyber activities may go on for multiple months, the exfiltration of data, or the emplacement of malware may only take a few seconds. Many networks lack the ability to detect penetration and mapping. Companies with large resources devoted to cyber security may have that investment negated if they have affiliations with other companies with lax cyber security which can allow for hostile intrusions into the connected network. Unfortunately, public and open attribution for cyber attacks has lagged. As an example, although the attack on the Democratic National Committee email servers was noted in 2016, it was not until 2018 that specific Russian individuals were charged with the crime. Factors that cause lags in public and open attribution include the difficulty of tracing specific computer code through cyberspace; the disjointed nature of the internet; the lack of an easy and accepted mechanism for involvement of US intelligence agencies in providing assistance to private sector parties; and the reticence of individuals and organizations negatively affected by cyber attacks to publicly disclose their injuries. Chart 5Unlike Nuclear Doctrine, Cyber Lacks A Framework To Control Escalation Doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons developed over a period of years in the US and the West and in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets developed a coherent doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that was understandable to the West. Arms control agreements between nuclear powers established mechanisms for controlling escalation of tensions (Chart 5). The Soviet doctrine was adopted by the Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia and Western nations continue to have a common understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in military affairs that allows for discussion of escalation and de-escalation. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. This is reflected in the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 which notes “The absence of international legal norms regulating inter-State relations in the information space…” The US Director of National Intelligence also noted this lack of agreement in his annual threat assessment testimony of 2017. The rapid growth of the internet, and reliance on it by government and private sectors reflects its founding as an open system, vulnerable to negative actors and actions (Chart 6). The intermingling of hardware and software, the information infrastructure used both by individuals and states, by the private sector and by government, makes separating doctrine and practice for cyberwar from legitimate use very difficult. Since non-cyber military capabilities, both conventional, and nuclear, rely upon the use of commercial information technology infrastructure, the use of offensive cyber is subject to the problem of blowback. As the NotPetya incident of 2018 indicated, damage from malware installed on one computer can rapidly spread across networks, industries, and international boundaries. The code for StuxNet and the code released by the more recent hack of CIA cyber tools have been noted in other cases of cyber attacks. Chart 6Rapid Growth Of Internet Raises Vulnerability To Harmful Actions The view of the international cyber environment by Russia is very similar to views in the US and the West. The Russian national security doctrine of 2015 notes “... An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential … The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.” Although much of the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 is concerned with noting threats to Russia’s information space, what might be called counterintelligence in other documents, there are key comments that note the suitability of using attacks in the information space as an effective means of projecting Russian power, such as “… improving information support activities to implement the State policy of the Russian Federation …” As per usual Soviet and Russian state doctrinal documents, the 2016 doctrine notes all the negative activity of other actors in this field. This practice is consistent with historical Soviet and Russian open press documents which ascribe to other states the activities in which Russia engages or plans to engage. Cyber-crime is rising despite deterrence. Unlike other forms of national security alliances, such as for intelligence, there is little public literature on cyber alliances, especially for offensive action. For example, the US and Israel have never publicly acknowledged a government alliance to emplace the StuxNet virus into the Iranian nuclear development program. Should there be offensive cyber alliances in the West, it is likely they fall along traditional intelligence and defense lines. There is no public reporting on any sort of offensive cyber alliances that involve Russia. There are public efforts at common standards for information technology security, but these efforts are foundering on citizen and government concerns over privacy, as well as commercial proprietary advantage. It is an open question as to whether cyber alliances among friendly nations would deter would-be cyber attackers or hackers. Certainly the growth of complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center would indicate that statements of deterrence and even prosecutions are failing to reduce cyber attacks (Chart 7). Chart 7Cyber Attacks Are On The Rise Both the US national intelligence community and private sector cybersecurity companies agree Russia has a sophisticated state sponsored effort to acquire intelligence via hacking and insert favorable themes into cyberspace via the use of social media. There is also agreement that Russia state elements have a close relationship with criminal elements which can provide a plausibly deniable means of engaging in cyber warfare activities favorable to Russia, as well as engaging in activities for illegal economic advantage. For example, see this quote from the CYBEREASON Intel team: “The crossing of official state sponsored hacking with cybercriminal outfits has created a specter of Russian state hacking that is far larger than their actual program. This hybridization of tools, actors, and missions has created one of the most potent and ill-defined advanced threats that the cybersecurity community faces. It has also created the most technically advanced and bold cybercriminal community in the world. When, as a criminal, your patronage is the internal security service that is charged with tracking and arresting cybercrime, your only concern becomes staying within their defined bounds of acceptable risk and not what global norms, laws, or even domestic Russian law states.” The US Department of Justice in June 2020 noted a Russian national was sentenced to prison for malicious cyber activities. Key points of his illegal activity were the operation of websites open only to Russian speakers, and the vetting or recommendation of other criminals before allowing entry to the websites. One analysis of this situation notes the ties to Russian state security organs and personnel which likely held up the Russian national’s extradition for trial in the US. Government leaders in the US have noted the potential for major cyber attacks in the US affecting physical infrastructure and causing significant economic and social damage, including further attacks on the political election process. However, they have been reticent to state any explicit sort of retaliation. The US Cyber Command notes it is actively combatting hostile cyber actors. Therefore, the question remains open as to what level of cyber attacks would be considered serious enough to be treated as an act of war by the US. There has been public speculation of both Russian and Chinese implants of malware into the US information technology infrastructure that might be activated in the case of open hostilities. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated, especially since US based forces would have to transit oceans, taking many days, when cyber operations could happen in seconds. Russian “gray zone” tactics, that is, actions short of large scale conventional war, many of which involve cyber attacks, active measures, and maskirovka, are the subject of much Department of Defense planning and action. To combat such gray zone activity analysis from the RAND Corporation notes the need for a spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions, which would involve commercial partners and allied nations. The difficulty of coordinating such counter action is one reason the Russians continue their gray zone efforts. Russia’s unique characteristics, some of which are weaknesses compared to the US and the West, are indicative of why Russia engages in state sponsored as well as criminal cyber activities (Chart 8). Russian scientific history, the intertwining of state and criminal elements, and continent-spanning location are factors which promote the use of cyber. Russia’s economic position vis-à-vis the US, Russia’s relative lack of military power projection capability beyond the states on its borders (the Near Abroad), except for its nuclear forces, and Russia’s declining demographic situation are negative factors which push Russia to use cyber as a cost effective means of advancing national security and economic policy (Chart 9). Despite US and Western imposed sanctions on Russia for past misdeeds, none of the factors noted above will be changed in the near future. Therefore, those factors, and published Russian doctrine should indicate to Western governments and businesses that Russia will continue to use cyber as a means to advance Russian national security objectives, as well as a means to siphoning off wealth from the West via criminal activities. Chart 8Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Chart 9Deteriorating Demographics Also Drive Russia’s Cyber Activities US preparedness for Russian cyber activity in the upcoming months should be greater given several factors. First, there is clearly awareness of a Russian cyber threat to US interests across government and in the private sector. Second, the US has established new organizations, shifted resources of money and people, and had practice defending against cyber attacks since the 2016 US election cycle. However, the US information technology infrastructure is vast and porous, making it hard to protect against every threat. Russian cyber actors, both state sponsored and criminal, are smart and persistent. Investment Takeaways Cyber security companies offer a way for investors to capitalize on major themes arising from the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. These themes include not only changes in worker behavior, e-commerce, corporate culture, and network security, but also our major geopolitical themes like nationalism and the retreat from globalization. Reports as we go to press that Russian hackers have targeted vaccine developers in the US, UK, and Canada underscore the point. The trend is not limited to Russia or COVID-19 vaccines. It is all too apparent from the actions of Russia and China – as well as the increasing efforts by the US and its allies to patrol their own cyber realms, IT systems, and ideological discourse – that governments view the Internet as a frontier to be conquered and fortified rather than as a free space of human exchange in which globalization can operate unfettered (Map 1). Map 1Governments View The Internet As A Frontier To Be Conquered Formal measures of country risk are inadequate but provide some perspective as to which countries and companies are least prepared. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations body charged with monitoring information technology and communications. It ranks countries according to their commitment to cyber security and their exposure to cyber security risks (Chart 10). Chart 10Countries Have An Imperative To Strengthen Cyber Security We take these rankings with a grain of salt knowing that advanced countries like the US and UK rank near the top of the list, and yet are the prime targets of hackers and thus face enormous cyber security risks. What is clear is that no country is safe and every country has an economic and national security imperative to strengthen its cyber security. These indexes also suggest that several European countries are less well prepared than one would think and that emerging markets are grossly underprepared. China, Russia and Iran should not be thought of only as aggressors – they will increasingly become targets as the West seeks to counteract them. As Russia expands operations it becomes a target of cyber counter-strikes as well as economic sanctions. And as China accelerates its drive to become a high tech giant, it encourages economic decoupling from the West and retaliation for its use of cyber-theft and state-based hacking. China, Russia, and Iran will also increasingly become victims of cyber attacks. There are two main cyber security equity indexes – the NASDAQ CTA Cybersecurity Index (NQCYBR) and NASDAQ ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR). These indexes trade in line with each other and have rallied extensively since the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 11). Investors are aware that the surge in working from home and companies conducting operations off-site, as well as geopolitical great power struggle, have created extensive new vulnerabilities and capex requirements. Chart 11Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... On April 24, we recommended that investors go long the ISE index relative to the S&P 500 information technology sector. We are also going long the ISE index relative to the NASDAQ on a strategic horizon. Chart 12... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector Tech has been the prime beneficiary of the COVID-19 crisis while the necessary corollary of the tech companies’ continued success is the need for security of their information, property, and customers (Chart 12). We also favor the ISE index because it has a slightly heavier cyclical component due to the fact that 13% of its companies are in the industrial sector, compared to 10% for the CTA index. The industrial side should benefit more as economies reopen and recover. These indexes are tracked by two ETFs. The First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF (CIBR) tracks the NASDAQ CTA index with an emphasis on larger companies, while the ETFMG Prime Cyber Security ETF (HACK) tracks the ISE index, companies with market capitalization lower than $250 million, and a slightly lower exposure to the communications sector as opposed to IT and software. The HACK ETF has lagged the CIBR this year so far and offers an opportunity for investors to invest in data protection and up-and-coming firms. Over the past ten years cyber security has proven to be a volatile investment space with rapidly increasing competition for market share. But the secular tailwinds are powerful and a diversified exposure to the sector will be rewarding for investors positioning for the post-COVID-19 world. Elmo Wright Consulting Editor Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix TableMajor Cyber-Attacks Over The Past Decade   Footnotes Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” May 23, 2017. Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” March 6, 2018. Coats, Dan. “Annual Threat Assessment Opening Statement,” January 29, 2019. CyberReason Intel Team, “Russia And Nation-State Hacking Tactics: A Report From Cybereason Intelligence Group,” cybereason.com, June 5, 2017. Department of Justice, “Russian National Sentenced To Prison For Operating Websites Devoted To Fraud And Malicious Cyber Activities”, June 26, 2020. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers And Their Criminal Conspirators For Hacking Yahoo And Millions Of Email Accounts, Fsb Officers Protected, Directed, Facilitated And Paid Criminal Hackers”, March 15, 2017. Gerasimov, Vasily. “The Value Of Science In Prediction,” Military Industrial Courier, Feb 27, 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Internet Crime Complaint Center Marks 20 Years From Early Frauds to Sophisticated Schemes, IC3 Has Tracked the Evolution of Online Crime,” May 8, 2020. Fedorov, Yuriy Ye. “Arms Control In The Information Age” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Galeotti, Mark. “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ And Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story Of Notpetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack In History,” Wired Magazine, August 22, 2018. Krebs, Brian. “Why Were the Russians So Set Against This Hacker Being Extradited?,” Krebs on Security, Nov 18, 2019. Lusthaus, Jonathan. “Cybercrime in Southeast Asia Combating a global threat locally,” May 20, 2020. Mattis, James. Department of Defense, “Summary Of The 2018 National Defense Strategy Of The United States Of America”. Meakins, Joss. “Living in (Digital) Denial: Russia’s Approach To Cyber Deterrence,” Russia Matters, July 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Doctrine Of Information Security Of The Russian Federation,” Dec 5, 2016. Nakasone, Paul. “Cybercom Commander Briefs Reporters At White House,” Department of Defense video briefing, Aug 2, 2018. National Security Agency, “NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework V2”, a report from: Cybersecurity Operations The Cybersecurity Products And Sharing Division, 29 November 2018. Pettijohn and Wasser. “Competing In The Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, 2019. Putin, Vladimir. “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Dec 31, 2015. Russian National Security Strategy 31 Dec 2015, Russia Matters. Snegovaya, Maria. “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins Of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 22, 2015. Tsygichko, V. N. “About Categories of “Correlation Of Forces” for Potential Military Conflicts in the New Era,” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Wiener, Norbert, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, (1948).

Highlights Exogenous risks will remain more of a threat to grain prices than out-of-whack fundamentals, which are closer to balance than not, as the USDA’s World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) indicate. COVID-19-induced public-health risks leading to renewed lockdowns – particularly in the US, where infection rates are rampaging ahead of its trading partners’ – remain at the forefront of these exogenous risks (Chart of the Week). Headline-grabbing grain purchases notwithstanding, fraying Sino-US trade, diplomatic and military relations again threaten these markets, particularly soybeans. China promises to retaliate against actions taken by US President Donald Trump in response to a new security law Beijing foisted on Hong Kong at the end of June, which sharply curtails freedom and autonomy. Sino-US military tensions in the South China Sea remain elevated. Countering these risks, a weaker USD – in line with our House view – would boost demand for grains as EM income growth picks up. Still, global economic policy uncertainty will remain a formidable headwind to a weaker USD. Feature Grains generally are closer to balance than not globally, which suggests the next market-moving developments – outside weather – will be caused by news exogenous to fundamentals (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekCOVID-19 Infection Surge In US Could Lead To Renewed Lockdowns The four key markets tracked by the UN’s Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) – corn, wheat, rice and soybeans – are in “a generally comfortable global supply situation. However, in many parts of the world, local markets brace for the looming impacts of COVID-19, amid uncertainties related to demand, logistics and even access to food.”1 Chart 2Grain Markets Close To Balanced The USDA sees corn markets tightening in the coming 2020-21 crop year beginning in September, with US production down 995mm bushels on the back of lower plantings and harvests.2 Output ex-US is expected to be largely unchanged, while Chinese corn demand will pick up in response to higher soybean feed usage. Stocks in China, Argentina, the EU, Canada, and Mexico, are expected to be lower leading to a net decline in global inventories. US soybean stocks are expected to increase, but this will be offset by declines in Brazil and China, reducing global bean inventories by some 1.3mm tons to 95.1mm, based on USDA estimates. The USDA’s soybean export commitments to China (i.e., outstanding sales plus accumulated exports) are 1.8mm tons higher than last year at 16.2mm tons, but still are well below historic levels (Chart 3). The US slack has been picked up by Brazilian exports, which have been aided by a weak BRL and record bean crops. A weaker USD and a resumption of Sino-US bean trade would reverse this. Wheat and rice stocks are expected to increase globally. Wheat inventories are expected to hit record highs globally, with China accounting for a little more than half of these stocks, and India accounting for 10%. Rice supplies are expected to increase more than demand globally, lifting ending stocks for the 2020-21 crop year to a record 186mm tons; China and India account for 63% and 21% of these inventories, respectively, in the USDA’s estimates. Chart 3Sino-US Trade Tensions Reduce Soybean Exports Chart 4Rising US COVID-19 Infections Are A Risk, But Won’t Derail Global Recovery Sources Of Market-Moving News The public-health fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic continues, particularly in the US, which is seeing a second wave of infections multiplying rapidly. With markets largely in line with fundamentals, the three most likely sources of market-moving “new news” affecting grain markets – outside weather – will come from public-health developments, particularly in the US; political developments affecting global trade, particularly the escalating Sino-US diplomatic tensions; and FX-market developments, which will continue to process these developments in real time. The public-health fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic continues, particularly in the US, which is seeing a second wave of infections multiplying rapidly (Chart 4). While we do not except a repeat of the massive lockdowns earlier this year, rising infection rates do place increasing strains on public-health resources, which could force officials to reimpose lockdowns locally. The global recovery from the pandemic remains uneven, with China’s recovery apparently ahead of most other states in terms of returning its economy to normal. China was first to be hit by the virus and first to largely recover, due to its more extensive lockdowns. Rising geopolitical tensions centered on China could throw global trade patterns into disarray again, just as the world is attempting to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic. For grain markets, China remains an attractive destination for exporters, given the premium grains and soybeans trade at relative to other destinations (Chart 5). This should keep China’s imports of grains robust in the near future, particularly for corn (Chart 6). Chart 5China Grains Prices Are Attractive To Exporters While economics favor movement of grains – and other commodities – to China, rising geopolitical tensions centered on China could throw global trade patterns into disarray again, just as the world is attempting to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic. Chart 6China Should Remain Well Bid For Corn A new security law foisted on Hong Kong by Beijing at the end of June limiting freedom and autonomy drew sharp responses from the US and EU. President Trump this week signed an order ending Hong Kong’s preferential status as a US trading partner in the wake of the new law, and threatened direct sanctions against Chinese officials involved in enforcing the law.3 The European Union issued a statement on July 1, which decried the passage of the law by the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, expressing “grave concerns about this law which was adopted without any meaningful prior consultation of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council and civil society.”4 In addition to this political turmoil, the US and China are engaged in a war of words over China’s territorial claims on the South China Sea, which is contested by states surrounding the sea and branded as illegal by the US.5 The US and China carried out simultaneous large-scale naval exercises earlier this month, raising concerns of an unintended military confrontation.6 Weaker USD Will Buoy Grain Markets We are aligned with our House view expecting a weakening of the USD, driven by the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus from the US; lower real rates in the US, and America’s apparent inability to successfully contain the COVID-19 pandemic to the degree other states (e.g., China) have (Chart 7). This implies the US is at a greater risk of a marked slowdown in its ongoing economic recovery. These factors will support flows to markets ex-US, pressuring the USD lower. For grain markets this will be bullish for demand. A weaker USD lifts EM GDP growth, which boosts industrial activity (Chart 8). Higher income boosts demand for protein, which drives demand for corn and soybeans used as animal feed, and grain consumption (wheat and rice).7 Chart 7USD Weakness Expected As Real Rates Fall, Deficits Rise Chart 8Weaker USD Boosts EM Income, Which Lifts Protein and Grain Demand   On the supply side, a higher (lower) US dollar decreases (raises) the local costs of production for ag exporting countries with a certain lag. A persistently high (low) dollar will incentivize (disincentivize) crop planting in these countries – allowing producers to increase local currency profits from USD-denominated ag exports. This pushes up (down) global supply at the margin. Hence, over relatively long periods, ag prices and the US dollar tend to trend in opposite directions. We cannot ignore the USD’s role as a safe-haven, which is particularly evident during periods of financial, economic and geopolitical stress. Longer term, disparities in monetary and fiscal policies, interest rates, and economic activity between the US and other DM economies will dominate the evolution of the dollar. In our simulations for the USD’s trajectory between now and the end of the year, a 5% depreciation of the USD would lift the CCI grains and oilseed index 13%, while a 5% strengthening of the dollar would push the index down by -8% by December 2020 (Chart 9).8 Should this weakening in the USD materialize, we can expect US grains’ stocks-to-use ratios to fall, which would reinforce price strength in grains (Chart 10). Chart 9USD Weakness Will Buoy Grains While the weaker-dollar scenarios are our favored evolution, we cannot ignore the USD’s role as a safe-haven, which is particularly evident during periods of financial, economic and geopolitical stress (Chart 11). Chart 10Weaker USD Would Lower STU Ratios, And Provide Support To Grain Prices Chart 11USD's Safe-Haven Status Could Keep Dollar Well Bid Bottom Line: Global grain markets are closer to balance than not, leaving exogenous risks – i.e., a COVID-19 second wave, renewed Sino-US trade and military tensions, and a stronger USD – as the key threats to grain prices. The impact of these exogenous risks will be filtered through to grain markets – and commodities generally – via FX markets. While we expect a weaker USD to prevail, in line with our House view, we cannot gainsay the dollar’s safe-haven role and its attraction during times of tension and crisis.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight As we go to press, Brent prices are steady at ~ $43/bbl as market participants await OPEC 2.0's Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee decision on next month's output levels. The group is reportedly set to ease production curtailment to 7.7mm b/d starting next month from 9.7mm b/d in July. This would add to the growing concerns about the impact on oil demand of mounting COVID-19 cases in the US and in EM economies. Still, Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister reiterated the effective cuts would be deeper as countries that overproduced in May/Jun will have to compensate with extra cuts over the coming months. Our global oil balances point to a supply deficit in 2H20. Thus, prices will recover if a correction were to occur. Base Metals: Neutral Copper prices surged by 5% since last week and have now completely recovered from the damaging COVID-19 shock – up 4% ytd. Fears of strike over wages at Antofagasta’s Zaldivar mine in Chile – following unionized workers rejection of a pay offer – and of virus-related mine disruptions in Latin America, combined with strong imports numbers out of China for the month of June supported the recent rally.9 In USD terms, Chinese imports growth recovered to 2.7% from -16.7% in May as stimulus programs start impacting the real economy (Chart 12). Precious Metals: Neutral Gold and silver prices are up 19% and 9% ytd. Silver rose to $19.5/oz as of Tuesday’s close, pushing the gold-to-silver ratio down to 93 after several weeks at ~ 100. Silver prices are supported by both safe-haven and industrial demand at the moment, which is pushing its equilibrium value higher, based on our silver price model (Chart 13). Our long Dec/20 silver futures trade is up 6.4% since inception on July 2, 2020. Ags/Softs:  Underweight On Tuesday the corn market shrugged off the biggest Chinese single-day purchase of U.S. corn and the USDA’s report of a 2% decline in corn crop conditions rated good to excellent. Despite this arguable bullish news, corn prices were still down on prospects of large carryovers both this season and the next marketing year, which begins in September. Going forward, the USDA cattle on feed inventory figure as well as ethanol demand will be key to assessing the evolution of corn carryovers. Feed and residual use of corn went down in the latest WASDE report, with year-to-date cattle on feed inventory lower than 2019, due to consumer stockpiling during the pandemic. With the beginning of grilling season well on its way re-stocking will be a challenging task. Chart 12Chinese Stimulus Will Lift Import Growth Chart 13Higher Equilibrium Value of Silver     Footnotes 1     Please see the UN’s AMIS Market Monitor for July 2020. 2     Please see World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) published by the USDA July 10, 2020. 3    Reuters reports that per the executive order signed by Trump this week, “U.S. property would be blocked of any person determined to be responsible for or complicit in ‘actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong.’”  In addition, the order requires US officials to “revoke license exceptions for exports to Hong Kong.”  Hong Kong passport holders no longer will be accorded special treatment under the order as well.  Please see China vows retaliation after Trump ends preferential status for Hong Kong published by reuters.com July 14, 2020. 4    Please see Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the adoption by China’s National People’s Congress of a National Security Legislation on Hong Kong. This was issued by the EU July 1, 2020. 5    Please see South China Sea dispute: China's pursuit of resources 'unlawful', says US published by bbc.com July 14, 2020.  See also China Pushes Back Against U.S. Statement on South China Sea Claims, ASEAN Stays Silent published by news.usni.org July 14, 2020. 6    Please see U.S. Carriers Send a Message to Beijing Over South China Sea published by foreignpolicy.com July 9, 2020. 7     In our modeling, we find that ag prices are generally less responsive to short-term changes in the US dollar compared to oil or base metals, but that they follow a common trend with the dollar over the long term. 8    These percent changes scale linearly in percentage terms, so a 10% weakening of the USD would lift the index 26%. 9    Please see Workers at Antofagasta's Zaldivar copper mine in Chile vote to strike: union published by reuters.com on July 10, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights The EM equity benchmark’s concentration in the top six stocks – that in turn correlate with US FAANGM – has risen substantially. Hence, the outlook for US mega-cap stocks will continue to significantly impact the EM equity benchmark. US FAANGM stocks have been closely tracking the trajectory of – and share many other similarities with – previous bubbles. Hence, it is risky to dismiss the mania thesis. That said, it is impossible to know how long this equity mania will last, how far it will go and what will trigger its volte-face. Odds of a repeat of the 2015 boom-bust cycle in Chinese equities are low. The rally in Chinese stocks and commodities might be due for a pause. Feature Concentration Risk Chart 1EM: Mega-Caps Stocks Versus The Equal-Weighted Index The EM equity index's hefty gains since the late-March lows have largely been at the hands of about six stocks: Alibaba, Tencent, TSMC, Samsung, Naspers and Meituan-Dianping (Chart 1). The latter is a Chinese web-service platform company, while Naspers derives 75% of its revenue from its equity ownership in Tencent and 25% from a Russian internet company. For ease of reference, we refer to the big four (Alibaba, Tencent, Samsung and TSMC) as EM ATST. Table 1 illustrates that the top six companies combined account for about 24.3% of the MSCI EM equity market cap. For comparison, US FAANGM (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google and Microsoft) account for 25% of the S&P 500 market cap. The remainder of the EM equity universe – including all Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks other than the six mega caps listed above – has rallied less (Chart 1). This is very similar to the dynamics in the US equity market, where the equally-weighted index has substantially diverged from the FAANGM index (Chart 2). Table 1Market Cap Weights & Performance Since March Lows Chart 2US: FAANGM Versus The Equal-Weighted Index   Table 2MSCI EM Stocks: Country Weights The EM ATST’s exponential rise has also boosted their respective country weightings in the MSCI EM equity benchmark. Table 2 demonstrates that China, Korea and Taiwan together account for 65% of the EM benchmark, India for 8% and all other 22 countries combined for 27%. Note that the market cap ($1.7 trillion) of the remaining 22 countries is almost as large as the market cap of the top six EM individual stocks. On the whole, concentration in the EM benchmark is as high as ever. Apart from global trade and Chinese growth, there are two other forces that will define the direction of EM mega-cap stocks: (1) rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, and (2) a continuous mania or bust in “new economy” stocks. We discuss the latter in the following section. Escalating tensions between the US and China, including North Korea’s potential assault on South Korea, pose risks to Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks. This is one of the critical reasons why we have been reluctant to chase these markets higher, despite upgrading our outlook on Chinese growth. If these bourses relapse, their sheer weight in the EM benchmark will pull the index down. The EM equity index’s outperformance in recent weeks has been due to the surge in both EM mega-cap stocks and Chinese share prices more broadly. Bottom Line: The EM equity benchmark concentration has risen substantially due to outsized gains in several “new economy” stocks. What’s more, the EM equity index’s outperformance in recent weeks has been due to the surge in both EM mega-cap stocks and Chinese share prices more broadly (we discuss the latter below). If the global mania in “new economy” stocks persists, EM ATST could well drive the overall EM equity index higher. Conversely, if “new economy” shares roll over for whatever reason, the EM equity benchmark’s advance will reverse. A Bubble Or Not? An assessment of the sustainability of the rally in US FAANGM stocks is critical for investors in the EM equity benchmark if for no other reason than the concentration hazard. We present the following considerations in assessing whether the FAANGM and EM ATST rally is or is not a mania: First, the exponential rally in FAANGM stocks is not a new phenomenon: It has been taking place over the past 10 years. Our FAANGM index – an equal-weighted average of six stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google and Microsoft) – has increased 20-fold in real (inflation-adjusted) US dollar terms since January 2010. Its rise is on par with the magnitude of the bull market in the Nasdaq 100 index in the 1990s and Walt Disney in the 1960s, and well exceeds other bubbles, as illustrated in Chart 3. All price indexes on Chart 3 are shown in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Chart 3Each Decade = One Mania All these manias and bubbles started with excellent fundamentals, and price gains were initially justified. Toward the end of the decade, however, their outsized gains attracted momentum chasers and speculators, catapulting share prices exponentially higher. Second, a financial mania requires: (1) solid past performance; (2) a story that can capture investors’ imaginations, and (3) plentiful liquidity. The “new economy” stocks fit all of these criteria: They have delivered super-sized performance over the past 10 years; They easily capture ordinary people’s imaginations – the average person on the street knows that FAANGM and EM ATST stocks benefit from people working from home and spending more time online; The Federal Reserve and many other central banks are injecting enormous amounts of liquidity into their respective economies. Third, there is a striking similarity between the FAANGM rally and previous bubbles: The mania-subjects of the preceding decades assumed global equity leadership early in their respective decade, rose steadily throughout, and went exponential at the very end of the decade. The latest parabolic surge in FAANGM stocks along with its duration (10 years of global equity outperformance and leadership) and magnitude (20-fold price appreciation in real inflation-adjusted terms) conspicuously resembles those of previous bubbles. Interestingly, the majority of previous bubbles peaked and tumbled around the turn of each decade, the exception being Walt Disney – the Nifty-Fifty bubble of the 1960s – which rolled over in 1973. Given FAANGM stocks have been closely tracking the trajectory of previous bubbles, it will not be surprising if 2020 ends up marking the peak for “new economy” stocks. Fourth, the last exponential upleg in the tech and telecom bubble of 1999-2000 occurred amid a one-off demand surge for tech hardware and software. The Y2K scare – worries that computers and networks around the world might malfunction on the New Year/new millennium eve – spurred many companies to order new hardware and upgrade their systems and networks. As a result, there was a one-off boom in orders in the global technology industry in the fourth quarter of 1999 and first quarter of 2000. Chart 4Orders For Computers And Electronics Have Remained Resilient Investors extrapolated this one-off demand surge into the future, mistaking it for recurring growth. As a result, they assigned extremely high valuations to these tech stocks in the first quarter of 2000. Similarly, since March, working and shopping from home has sharply increased demand for web services, online shopping, cloud computing and tech hardware. The top panel of Chart 4 demonstrates that US manufacturing orders for computers and electronic products did not contract in the March-May period, while orders for capital goods have plunged since March. Similarly, Taiwanese exports – which are heavy on tech hardware – are holding up well despite the crash in global trade (Chart 4, bottom panel). Some of this demand strength is structural, but part of it is one-off and non-recurring. Certainly, one should not extrapolate their recent growth rates into the future. However, investors are prone to extrapolation and chasing winners. Fifth, valuations of US FAANGM and EM ATST are elevated. Trailing P/E ratios for EM ATST stocks are shown in Table 3. Table 3Price-To-Earnings For Top 6 EM Stocks All in all, provided both US FAANGM and EM ATST consist of admirable companies with great competitive advantages and business models, it is tempting to dismiss the bubble argument. Nevertheless, there are enough similarities with previous manias to compel investors to be vigilant. Even great companies have a fair price, and substantial price overshoots will not be sustainable. We sense a growing number of investors deem US FAANGM and EM ATST stocks as invincible. When some stocks are regarded as unbeatable, their top is not far. Our major theme for the past decade – elaborated in the report, How To Play EM In The Coming Decade1 published in June 2010 – has been as follows: Sell commodities / buy health care and technology. Until 2019, we were recommending being long EM tech/short EM resource stocks. Unfortunately, since 2019, the corrections in EM “new economy” stocks have proved to be too short and fleeting, and we were unable to buy-in. Their share prices have lately gone parabolic: They are now in a full-blown mania phase. As to global equity leadership change from growth to value stocks, we maintain that major leadership rotations typically occur during or at the end of an equity selloff, as we elaborated in our October 3, 2019 report (Charts 5 and 6). Chart 5EM vs DM: Leadership Rotation Requires Market Turbulence Chart 6Growth vs Value: Leadership Rotation Requires Market Turbulence Apparently, the February-March selloff did not produce a shift in equity leadership. Barring a major selloff, “new economy” stocks will likely continue to lead. Chart 7Fed Rate Cuts Did Not Prevent The S&P 500 Bubble From Unravelling Finally, easy money policies encourage speculation and contribute to the build-up of manias. However, when a bubble starts unravelling, low interest rates are often unable to avert the bust. For example, when the tech bubble began bursting in 2000, the Fed cut rates aggressively and US bond yields plunged. Yet, low interest rates did not prevent tech share prices from deflating further (Chart 7). Bottom Line:  It is impossible to know how long this equity mania will last, how far it will go and what will trigger its volte-face. One thing is certain: there is a lot of froth – particularly in terms of valuation and positioning – in these “new economy” stocks. Yet, these excesses could last longer and get larger. A Mania In Chinese Equities? Many commentators have rushed to compare the latest surge in Chinese stocks with the exponential advance in the first half of 2015. We do not think this rally will go on without interruption for another five months like it did back then. Our rationale is as follows:   The Chinese authorities are much more vigilant now, and they will try to induce periodic corrections to avoid another mania and bust similar to those that occurred five years ago. The Chinese authorities are much more vigilant now, and they will try to induce periodic corrections to avoid another mania and bust similar to those that occurred five years ago. Both China’s MSCI Investable and CSI 300 equity indexes are retesting their previous highs (Chart 8). In the past they failed to break above these levels, and this time is likely to be no different, at least for now. The latest spike is more likely to be the final hurrah before a setback. Critically, the 12-month forward P/E ratio for China’s MSCI Investible index has also risen to its previous peaks (Chart 9, top panel). This has occurred with little improvement in the 12-month forward EPS (Chart 9, bottom panel). In short, share prices have run ahead of the business cycle and are already pricing in a lot of profit recovery. Chart 8Chinese Stocks Are At Their Previous Highs Chart 9Chinese Investable Stocks: A Rally Driven By P/E Expansion Chart 10Chinese Onshore Stocks: A Two-Tier Market Most of the rally since the March lows has been due to “new economy” stocks. Share prices of “old economy” companies did not do that well before July. Tech stocks in the onshore market have gone parabolic (Chart 10, top panel). This contrasts with lackluster performance of materials, industrials, and property stocks (Chart 10, bottom panels). Critically, in the onshore market, tech stocks are trading at the following trailing P/E ratios: the market cap-weighted P/E is 155, and the median P/E is 60. Needless to say, these valuations are outright expensive.   Bottom Line: Odds of a repeat of the 2015 boom-bust cycle are low. The rally in Chinese stocks might be due for a pause. On June 18, we upgraded Chinese stocks to overweight from neutral within the EM benchmark, a recommendation that remains intact. We have a much lower conviction on the absolute performance of Chinese stocks in the near-run. China And Commodities An important question to address is whether the rally in commodities in general and copper in particular are signals of a sustainable recovery in the mainland economy. Without a doubt, economic conditions in China have been improving, and infrastructure spending has been accelerating. However, the magnitude of the upswing in copper prices is excessive relative to the strength of the Chinese economy. The spike in resource prices in general and copper in particular has been due to three forces: (1) China’s unprecedented super-strong imports; (2) global investors buying commodities; and (3) output cuts. It is highly unlikely that commodity demand in China is this strong. In our opinion, this reflects restocking. Chart 11 shows that Chinse imports of copper and copper products surged by 100% in June from a year ago, while imports of steel products increased by 100% and oil import volumes rose by 34%. It is highly unlikely that commodity demand in China is this strong. In our opinion, this reflects restocking. Provided cheap credit availability, wholesalers, intermediaries or users of commodities have rushed to buy before prices rise further. In the case of copper, it will take several months before the real economy absorbs that much of the red metal. Hence, China’s copper imports are poised to relapse in the coming months.   Chart 12 illustrates that investors’ net long positions in copper have risen to their highest level since early 2019. Consistently, the July Bank of America/Meryl Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey revealed that as of early July, portfolio managers had built up their largest net long positions in commodities since July 2011.   Not only oil but also copper and iron ore prices have benefitted from production declines. Due to surging COVID infections, Chile and Peru have sharply reduced copper output and Brazil has curtailed iron ore production. Chart 11Chinese Imports Of Commodities Have Surged Chart 12Investors Have Gone Long Copper Simultaneous buying of commodities by China and global investors as well as production cuts have considerably benefited resource prices as of late. Our suspicion is that commodities inventories in China have become elevated. This entails reduced purchases by China, and by extension an air pocket in commodities prices in the months ahead. Bottom Line: The rally in resources in general and copper in particular is at risk of a correction. We remain long gold/short copper.     Investment Strategy In absolute terms, the risk-reward of EM share prices is not attractive. However, as we have argued in the past two months, FOMO (fear-of-missing-out) mania forces could take share prices higher. The timing of a reversal is never easy especially when a FOMO-driven mania is alive. For now, for asset allocators we reiterate a below-benchmark allocation in EM stocks within a global equity portfolio. However, a breakdown in the trade-weighted US dollar will prompt us to upgrade EM within the global equity benchmark (Chart 13). The broad trade-weighted dollar is teetering on an edge but has not yet broken down (Chart 14). In sum, global equity portfolios should be ready to upgrade their EM allocation to neutral on signs that the broad trade-weighted US dollar is breaking down. Chart 13EM vs DM: Is The Downtrend Intact? Chart 14The Broad Trade-Weighted Dollar Is On An Edge   As we argued last week, the US dollar could weaken against DM currencies amid the next selloff in global share prices. This is why last week we switched our short positions in an EM currency basket from the US dollar to an equally-weighted basket of the euro, the Swiss franc and Japanese yen. This strategy remains valid. The US dollar is at risk versus DM currencies. However, EM exchange rates may not be out of the woods, given their poor fundamentals on the one hand and potential geopolitical risks in North Asia on the other. We are neutral on both EM local currency bonds and EM sovereign and corporate credit.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "How To Play EM In The Coming Decade," dated June 10, 2010. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations