Developed Countries
Highlights Maintain a pro-cyclical stance for the time being – overweight equities versus bonds, long commodities, overweight industrial equities, and underweight healthcare equities. But be warned, absent a continued decline in the bond yield and/or oil price, short-term positive impulses on the economy will fade and even turn negative later in the year. Hence in the summer months, look for opportunities to take profits in these pro-cyclical positions. U.K. economy plays can outperform once a cross-party parliamentary majority is found for a course of action that leads to an orderly Brexit (or no Brexit). Feature At the end of last year, we made a bold prediction: economies and financial markets would follow the opposite path in 2019 compared to 2018. Specifically we pointed out that “through most of 2018, global growth was decelerating while inflation was accelerating. Now this configuration is flipping: global growth is rebounding while inflation is set to collapse… 2019 will present investors a mirror-image pattern to 2018” (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekWhy 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Four months on, we are delighted to report that the mirror-image pattern is unfolding exactly as predicted. This year, stock markets are up sharply; bond markets have rallied; metal prices have made double-digit gains, growth-sensitive industrial shares are outperforming; while defensive healthcare shares are underperforming. All of these are the precise opposite of what happened in early 2018 (Chart 1-2 - Chart I-6). Chart I-2Equities: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Chart I-3Bonds: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Chart I-4Commodities: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Chart I-5Cyclicals: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Chart I-6Defensives: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Why 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 The basis for our bold prediction was twofold. We noted that China’s 6-month credit impulse “had gone vertical” (Chart I-7). Indeed, the rebound from the trough amounted to $500 billion (and still counting), equivalent to a near 1 percent shot in the arm for global GDP. Chart I-7China's 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Gone Vertical We also argued back then that “a racing certainty for early 2019 is that headline inflation will collapse. This is because the plunge in the crude oil price is about to feed through into headline consumer price indexes. Inevitably, it will seep through into core inflation too, via the impact on energy dependent prices such as transport costs.” “Coming at a time that central banks have professed a much greater reliance on incoming data, we can deduce that central banks will find it hard to tighten policy in the face of weaker headline and core inflation prints. Crucially though, the ECB and BoJ were not planning on tightening policy anyway, so the plunge in reported inflation will be much more impactful on the Federal Reserve.” Lo and behold. China’s PMI has rebounded sharply, and the Fed has stopped hiking rates. Still, central banks’ enhanced ‘data-dependency’ carries perils. The high-profile hard data – such as CPI inflation and GDP growth prints – on which monetary policy ‘depends’ is a record of what happened in the past, sometimes the distant past. This year’s market moves are the precise opposite of what happened in early 2018. Hence, enhanced data-dependency means that central banks are now ‘driving by looking through the rear-view mirror’ rather than looking at the current terrain. In turn, monetary policy expectations are driving bond and equity market valuations. By contrast, equity market growth expectations are based on the here and now; they move in synch with economic activity in real-time, leading even the survey-based PMIs. This also solves the puzzle as to why bonds and equities can sometimes give conflicting messages. Last year, the configuration of accelerating inflation with decelerating global growth hit equities and with a lose-lose: heavy pressure on both valuations and growth expectations. Furthermore, when interest rates rise from low levels they undermine the support for elevated risk-asset valuations in a viciously non-linear way. Chart I-8In 2018, Higher Bond Yields Pressured Equity Valuations At low interest rates, bond prices develop the same unattractive negative asymmetry as equities. Therefore, an extended period of ultra-low interest rates removes the need for an equity risk premium, and justifies sharply higher valuations for equities and other risk-assets. But in early 2018, as hawkish central banks pushed up 10-year global bond yield towards 2 percent, this process reversed viciously: bond prices lost their negative asymmetry, re-requiring an equity risk premium and sharply lower valuations for risk-assets at a time that growth expectations were also sliding (Chart I-8).1 By contrast, the early 2019 configuration of dovish central banks and accelerating short-term credit impulses has provided equities a ‘mirror-image’ win-win: a boost to both valuations and to growth expectations. What Happens Next In 2019? Chart I-9Headline Inflation Will Soon Tick Up Understand that the all-important impulses to an economy do not come from the level of the bond yield, oil price, net exports, inventories, and so on. The impulse always comes from the change in these metrics. And as the metrics cannot decline (or rise) incessantly, impulses always fade and then reverse. The oil price has rebounded 30 percent from its recent lows. Necessarily, this means that headline inflation prints will soon stabilise or even tick up (Chart I-9). Furthermore, central banks’ abrupt pivot to dovish has already happened. It would be hard to repeat or continue such a move. As central banks react to the inevitably backward-looking hard data prints, our expectation is that bond yields will stabilise or even tick up. Will equity markets also react positively to the better economic data prints? Not necessarily. To repeat, equity markets’ growth expectations move in synch with economic activity in real-time, leading even the survey-based PMIs. Equity markets never wait for the backward-looking data prints. China plays are tracking its short-term credit impulse which has gone vertical (Chart I-10). Hence, in 2019 to date, U.K. mining stocks are already up 25 percent; the Shenzhen Composite is already up 40 percent! Chart I-10China Plays Have Already Surged Still, the current win-win configuration can continue for a little while longer, given that a typical upswing in short-term credit impulses lasts around eight months. But be warned, absent a continued decline in the bond yield and/or oil price, short-term impulses will fade and even turn negative later in the year. The early 2019 configuration of dovish central banks and accelerating short-term credit impulses has provided equities a win-win. Hence, maintain a pro-cyclical stance for the time being – overweight equities versus bonds, long commodities, overweight industrial equities, and underweight healthcare equities. But our strong advice is: in the summer months, look for opportunities to take profits in all of these positions. When Will Brexit’s Groundhog Day End? We really would prefer not to talk about Brexit. It is not just that every day is Groundhog Day, every day is a shambolic Groundhog Day. Still, on a positive note this means that our investment strategy for Brexit has also remained a constant (Chart I-11). Chart I-11For Investors, Brexit Simplifies To A Binary Outcome It is not sufficient for the U.K. parliament to express what it is against (a no-deal Brexit); parliament must express what course of action it is for, leading to an orderly Brexit, or no Brexit, and that this course of action must also be acceptable to the EU27. At that point, irrespective of the exact course of action – a customs union, Common Market 2.0, or a confirmatory referendum in which ‘remain’ is an option – buy the pound, the FTSE250, and U.K. homebuilder shares. Theresa May’s overture to engage in a national unity strategy with the Labour Party is a step in the right direction. In this regard, Theresa May’s overture to engage in a national unity strategy with the Labour Party is a step in the right direction, because it finally puts national interest above party interest. To be clear, Brexit has been trapped in Groundhog Day because there is insufficient support among Conservative and DUP MPs for a relationship with the EU27 that would: Protect the cross-border supply chains which are vital to so many U.K. businesses. Avoid a hard customs border on the island of Ireland or between Ireland and Britain. Deliver on the narrow 52:48 vote to leave the EU, which was driven by a desire to control migration and the supremacy of the European Court of Justice; rather than a desire to strike independent trade deals, which is irrelevant for a majority of voters. The ray of light is that there is potentially a broader cross-party parliamentary majority for a course of action that would meet the above three conditions. Once it is found, U.K. economy plays can look forward to the “sunlit uplands”. Fractal Trading System* In line with the main body of this report, we continue to see evidence that the recent rally in bonds is technically extended. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to short the 10-year OAT. The profit target is 1.3 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short INR/PKR hit its 3 percent stop-loss and is now closed, leaving five open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance”, October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Overweight (Downgrade Alert) Last fall we felt all of the shoes had dropped in the S&P industrial conglomerates index: industrial conglomerate stalwart GE had cut their dividend to a token to $0.01 per share following awful guidance and the other key constituent members, MMM and HON, noted tariffs and trade wars factoring heavily in their own respective guidance cuts. The market had moved to a deeply negative position with valuations at post-GFC lows which we took as a contrarily positive signal that sentiment had moved too far and we upgraded the index to overweight based on valuations. Our call was somewhat early; GE took another month to reach a 20-yr low. However, since then the index has been smartly outperforming the broad market as GE has surged nearly 50% from the bottom and our expectation of a rerating has largely panned out (second and bottom panels). Bottom Line: With a valuation rerating underway, our contrarian thesis is weakening and we are compelled to add a downgrade alert. We believe this heavily international index would be a key beneficiary of easing in the U.S./China trade tussle which we anticipate to be the catalyst to execute our downgrade alert. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5INDCX - GE, MMM, HON, ROP.
Overweight Though the pure-play BCA defense index has retreated somewhat from the mid-2018 highs, our thesis remains solidly on the offensive. As a reminder, we have been overweight the pure-play BCA defense index since late-2015 and our strategy has been to add exposure on any meaningful pullbacks and keep this index as a structural overweight within the GICS1 S&P industrials index; we believe the current environment is an excellent opportunity to increase exposure. The timing of the current pullback is curious as it has occurred simultaneous to the rapid increase in defense outlays (second panel). Importantly, the CBO projects this level of spending to persist, even without a wartime buildup, as the upgrade of the military remains a core Trump administration policy goal. Considering the relative price of defense stocks is at roughly the same level as it was immediately before the 2016 election (top panel), little of this largesse appears to be priced in. The key offset to our bullish thesis was that valuations in the defense sector were high. However, that negative has evaporated along with the sector’s premium valuation since the beginning of 2019 (bottom panel). Accordingly, we reiterate our overweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the BCA defense index are: LMT, LLL, NOC, GD and RTN.
Our Global Fixed Income Strategy team’s European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor is slightly below the zero line, signaling no real need for any change to euro area monetary policy. The sharp slowing of economic growth last year, driven primarily by plunging…
Our Global Fixed Income Strategy team’s Fed Monitor has drifted lower over the past several months and now sits just above the zero line. This indicates that there is no pressure to hike interest rates, which is consistent with the Fed’s recent dovish turn.…
Two weeks ago, we highlighted that S&P 500 profit margins have likely peaked for the cycle and that our margin proxy, weighed down by mounting concerns over wage growth and nil pricing power, was pointing to a further decline (top panel). We are updating this today to show BCA’s Monetary Indicator (MI) and its confirming negative signal for SPX margins (MI shown inverted, second panel) These profit headwinds have been likely reflected in sell-side estimates that have forward EPS growth rates trailing forward revenue growth rates according to IBES data, implying contracting margins through the first nine months of the year. Including the slight year over year margin contraction in Q4/18, this means a full calendar year of falling margins. Grinding lower margins are a cause for short-term concern. Nevertheless, from a cyclical perspective we reiterate two important points: first, unit labor costs – the best measure of wage growth – remain muted as productivity growth has ramped up recently. Second, using empirical evidence dating back to the 1960s, the ultimate SPX profit margin mean reversion occurs during recessions, when EPS suffer a major setback; as a reminder, BCA’s review remains that the U.S. will avoid recession in the next 12 months. Thus, despite a near-term margin soft patch, we expect a mid-year margin inflection point courtesy of EPS growth green-shoots (please refer to Chart 3 from the March 18th Weekly Report).
Highlights Chart 1What’s The Downside? How low can it go? This is the question most investors are asking these days about the 10-year Treasury yield. Our answer is that it can’t go much lower unless the U.S. economy falls into recession, an event we don’t anticipate in 2019. Considering the main macro drivers of the 10-year Treasury yield, we find that the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 1), U.S. dollar bullish sentiment (not shown) and Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (not shown) are all close to mid-2016 levels. In other words, the economic growth and policy environment is almost identical to the one that produced a 1.37% 10-year Treasury yield in mid-2016. What’s preventing a return to mid-2016 yield levels is that the Fed has delivered nine rate hikes since then, and rising wage growth confirms that the output gap has closed considerably (bottom panel). In other words, with short-maturity yields much higher than three years ago, we would need to see a much more pronounced growth slowdown, i.e. PMIs well below 50, to re-produce a sub-2% 10-year Treasury yield. If 2019 continues to follow the 2016 roadmap and the Global PMI bottoms-out around 50, then the 10-year Treasury yield has probably already found its floor. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +268 bps. The Federal Reserve’s pause opens a window for corporate spreads to tighten during the next few months. We recommend overweight positions in corporate bonds for now, but will be quick to reduce exposure once spreads reach our near-term targets. Aaa spreads are already below target levels and we recommend avoiding that credit tier. Other credit tiers still have room to tighten, though Aa and A-rated bonds are only 3 bps and 5 bps above target, respectively (Chart 2).1 Once spreads reach more reasonable levels for this phase of the cycle, we will be quick to reduce corporate bond exposure because some indicators of corporate default risk are already sending warning signals.2 Most notably, corporate profits grew only 4.0% (annualized) in Q4 2018 while corporate debt rose 5.3% (annualized). The result is that our measure of gross leverage ticked higher for the first time since Q3 2017 (bottom panel). Going forward, with corporate profit growth likely to stabilize in the mid-single digit range, gross leverage will probably stay close to its current level. That would be consistent with a 3% speculative grade default rate, significantly above the 1.7% rate currently projected by Moody’s. Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview High-Yield: Overweight High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 23 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +566 bps. Junk spreads for all credit tiers remain above our near-term spread targets.3 At present, the Ba-rated option-adjusted spread is 235 bps, 55 bps above our target. The B-rated spread is 285 bps, 102 bps above our target. The Caa-rated spread is 802 bps, 244 bps above our target (Chart 3). Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview Elevated spreads mean that investors are currently well compensated for default risk, but that could change later in the year. In a recent report we showed that some leading default indicators – gross leverage, C&I lending standards and job cut announcements (bottom panel) – are showing signs of deterioration.4 Specifically, our model suggests that the speculative grade default rate could be 3% or higher during the next 12 months. Moody’s currently forecasts 1.7%. If the Moody’s forecast is correct, the high-yield default adjusted spread is 306 bps. If the Moody’s forecast turns out to be correct, then investors will take home a default-adjusted spread of 306 bps, well above the historical average of 250 bps. If our 3% forecast is correct, then the default-adjusted spread falls to 230 bps, slightly below the historical average (panel 4). In either case, investors are reasonably well compensated for bearing default risk, but that will change when spreads reach our near-term targets. We will be quick to cut exposure at that time. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +27 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 3 bps on the month, driven entirely by an increase in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The option-adjusted spread (OAS) held flat at 40 bps. Falling mortgage rates since the beginning of the year have caused an increase in refinancing activity, leading to some widening in nominal MBS spreads (Chart 4). However, the tepid pace of new issuance in recent years means that the existing mortgage stock is not very exposed to refinancing risk. Consider that, despite an 80 bps drop in the 30-year mortgage rate, the MBA Refinance index has only risen to 1290. The Refi index’s historical average is 1824. Chart 4MBS Market Overview Further, housing starts and new home sales appear to have stabilized, meaning that there is probably not much further downside for mortgage rates. As a consequence, we don’t see much more scope for MBS spread widening. While MBS spreads appear relatively safe, the sector does not offer attractive expected returns compared to the investment alternatives. For example, the index option-adjusted spread for conventional 30-year MBS is well below its average historical level (panel 3) and the sector offers less compensation than normal compared to corporate bonds (panel 4). MBS also offer a poor risk/reward trade-off compared to other Aaa-rated spread products, as we showed in a recent report.5 Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 23 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +115 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 13 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +334 bps. Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 53 bps and Foreign Agencies outperformed by 42 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +139 bps and +151 bps, respectively. Domestic Agencies outperformed by 11 bps in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +20 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +16 bps. The USD-denominated sovereign debt of most countries continues to look expensive relative to equivalently-rated U.S. corporate credit. However, in a recent report we highlighted that Mexican sovereign debt is an exception (Chart 5).6 Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Not only is Mexican sovereign debt cheap relative to U.S. corporates, but our Emerging Markets Strategy service has shown that the Mexican peso is cheap.7 The prospect of a stronger peso versus the U.S. dollar makes the spread on offer from Mexican sovereign debt look even more attractive. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 39 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +52 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio rose 1% in March, and currently sits at 82% (Chart 6). This is more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and right around the average of 81% that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview The Municipal / Treasury yield ratio for short maturities (2-year and 5-year) remains well below the yield ratio for longer maturities (10-year, 20-year and 30-year). In other words, the best value in the municipal bond space is at the long-end of the curve, and we continue to recommend that investors favor those maturities. Recently released data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows that state & local government revenue growth declined in Q4 2018, for the first time since Q2 2017. As a result, our measure of state & local government interest coverage fell from a lofty 17 all the way down to 5 (bottom panel). Positive interest coverage means that state & local governments are still generating sufficient revenue to cover current expenditures and interest payments, and we therefore don’t anticipate a surge in muni ratings downgrades any time soon. We also continue to note that municipal bonds tend to perform better in the middle-to-late phases of the economic cycle, while corporate credit delivers its best returns early in the recovery.8 Investors should maintain an overweight allocation to municipal debt. Treasury Curve: Adopt A Barbell Curve Positioning Treasury yields fell dramatically in March, as the Fed surprised markets with a larger-than-expected downward revision to its interest rate projections. The result is that the overnight index swap curve is now priced for 34 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months (Chart 7). Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 7 bps to end the month at 14 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 1 bp to end the month at 58 bps. In recent reports we urged investors to adopt barbell positions along the yield curve. In particular, investors should avoid the 5-year and 7-year maturities and instead focus their allocations at the very short and long ends of the curve.9 There are three main reasons to prefer a barbell positioning. First, the 5-year and 7-year yields are most sensitive to changes in our 12-month discounter. In other words, those yields fall the most when the market prices in rate cuts and rise the most when it prices in rate hikes. As long as recession is avoided, the market will eventually price rate hikes back into the curve. Favor the 2/30 barbell over the 7-year bullet. Second, barbells currently offer a yield pick-up relative to bullets. The duration-matched 2/10 barbell offers 10 bps more yield than the 5-year bullet (panel 4), and the duration-matched 2/30 barbell offers 9 bps more yield than the 7-year bullet. This means that investors will earn positive carry in barbell positions while they wait for rate hikes to get priced back in. Finally, all barbell combinations look cheap according to our yield curve fair value models (see Appendix B). TIPS: Overweight TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 44 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +76 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 7 bps to end the month at 1.88% (Chart 8). The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 8 bps to end the month at 1.98%. Both rates remain below the 2.3% - 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed’s target. Chart 8Inflation Compensation As we noted in last week’s report, with financial conditions no longer excessively easy, the Fed has pivoted to a more dovish stance in an effort to re-anchor inflation expectations at levels more consistent with its 2% target.10 This change should support wider TIPS breakevens, though investors will also need to see evidence of firming realized inflation before meaningful upside materializes. So far, such evidence is in short supply. Note that trimmed mean PCE inflation has rolled over again after having just touched 2% (bottom panel). Trimmed mean PCE is running at 1.84% year-over-year. Nevertheless, we would maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. First, our commodity strategists see further upside in the price of oil (panel 2), and second, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is 6 bps too low relative to the fair value from our Adaptive Expectations model (panel 4).11 ABS: Underweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +40 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 2 bps on the month and currently sits at 34 bps, exactly equal to its pre-crisis low (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview We showed in a recent report that Aaa-rated consumer ABS offer a relatively poor risk/reward trade-off compared to other U.S. fixed income sectors, a result that is echoed by the Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C.12 This should not be surprising given that Aaa ABS spreads are close to all-time lows. What is surprising is that ABS spreads are so tight while the consumer delinquency rate is rising (panel 3). Although the delinquency rate remains well below pre-crisis levels, it will likely continue to rise going forward. Household interest payments are rising quickly as a share of disposable income (panel 3) and banks are tightening lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans (bottom panel). We recommend an underweight allocation to consumer ABS, preferring to take Aaa spread risk in MBS and CMBS. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +146 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 2 bps to end the month at 73 bps, below its average pre-crisis level but somewhat higher than recent tights (Chart 10). Chart 10CMBS Market Overview In a recent report we noted that non-agency CMBS offer the best risk/reward trade-off of any Aaa-rated U.S. spread product.13 While we remain cautious on the macro outlook for commercial real estate, noting that prices are decelerating (panel 3) and banks are tightening lending standards (panel 4) amidst falling demand (bottom panel), we view elevated CMBS spreads as providing reasonable compensation for this risk for the time being. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +74 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 2 bps on the month and currently sits at 50 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector remains appropriate. Appendix A - The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. At present, the market is priced for 34 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We do not anticipate any rate cuts during this timeframe, and therefore recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Appendix B - Butterfly Strategy Valuation The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of +53 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 53 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of March 29, 2019) Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of March 29, 2019) Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C - Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Map employs volatility-adjusted breakeven spread analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Map does not incorporate any macroeconomic view. The horizontal axis of the Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps of excess return. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For further details on how we arrive at those spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Assessing Corporate Default Risk”, dated March 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Assessing Corporate Default Risk”, dated March 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting China’s Stimulus”, dated January 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The New Battleground For Monetary Policy”, dated March 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation
Governor Lowe refrained from cutting rates this month, but he acknowledged that the household sector continues to be hampered by dwindling real estate wealth and slowing income growth. Furthermore, he also highlighted that global growth has slowed and that…
At its best, an inverted yield curve is a signal from the bond market that the Fed has tightened monetary policy too much, heralding future rate cuts and a sharp slowdown. Anything affecting yields at the long end, however, has the potential to skew the…
An inverted yield curve has called eight of the seven recessions that have occurred over the last 50 years, making it a dependable leading indicator. Year-over-year contraction in the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Index (LEI) has compiled the same…