Commodities & Energy Sector

Dear Client, We had an error in our oil balances/forecasts report from 18 November 2021 resulting from a double counting of select US onshore production figures.  This has been corrected below. Highlights Higher oil production will restrain price increases in the short term, and give the impression the burst in inflation is transitory. Re-opening of airline travel and releasing of pent-up demand will absorb much of the higher output by year-end 2022. We are doubtful a US SPR release is forthcoming, as its impact would be trivial. Likewise, we do not expect the US to limit or ban exports of crude oil again, as it would unbalance markets. We are maintaining our Brent forecasts for 2022 and 2023 at $80 and $81/bbl. We again include a caveat, noting upside price risk is increasing going forward, due to inadequate capex (Chart of the Week). Stronger inflation prints going into 1Q22 will test the conviction underpinning central bankers' view that the current bout of price increases is transitory. If inflation appears to be more persistent going into 2H22, the Fed and other systemically important central banks likely will signal earlier-than-expected policy-rate hikes. This would be negative for commodities, as it would raise debt-service costs and investment hurdle rates, and reduce consumption. Higher oil prices and tighter monetary policy will temper demand. If capex is not forthcoming, however, prices will have to rise sharply to destroy demand. Feature It hardly deserves mention that the US has been hectoring the leadership of OPEC 2.0 to increase oil production, in order to reduce the cost of gasoline and home-heating fuels going into the winter … And, there's a mid-term election next year. The Biden administration also has been threatening – if that is the proper term – to release barrels from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), and reportedly asked China to consider a similar release.1 The leadership of OPEC 2.0, on the other hand, is flagging the risk to stronger oil prices from higher production next year. Much to the chagrin of the Biden administration, the coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia will not be increasing output by more than the 400k b/d it agreed to earlier this year. OPEC 2.0 will keep this up until June or July 2022, when most of its output sidelined by the COVID-19 pandemic will have been returned to the market. We expect the core Gulf-state producers – mostly KSA – will want to maintain ~ 3mm b/d of spare capacity thereafter. Chart of the WeekStable Oil-Price Trajectory Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Production Continues To Lift Higher Oil Output Expected Overall OPEC 2.0 production is expected to total 52.3mm b/d next year and 53.1mm b/d in 2023 (Chart 2). Most of the increase in the coalition's production will be accounted for by its core producers – KSA, Russia, Iraq, the UAE and Kuwait (Table 1). The "Other Guys" – i.e., those producers in OPEC 2.0 that can only maintain existing output levels or are managing continual declines in output – will account for a decreasing share of the coalition's production (Chart 3).2 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Including drilled-but-uncompleted wells (DUCs), we expect an additional 600k b/d from US shale-oil producers next year, which would take their output up to 8.39mm b/d, and another 350k b/d increase in their output in 2023. Output in the Lower 48 (L48) states of the US overall is expected to increase to 9.65mm b/d next year and 9.93mm b/d in 2023 (Chart 4). The increase in L48 output will continue to be led by higher shale-oil production, notably from the prolific Permian Basin play (Chart 5). US Gulf of Mexico and Alaska production tops up our total average output forecasts in the States to 11.89mm b/d next year and 12.20mm b/d in 2023. Chart 4US L48 Production Continues To Grow Demand Continues To Expand On the demand side, we continue to expect 2021 consumption growth of ~ 5.0mm b/d this year. Our growth expectation for 2022 and 2023 remains close to ~ 4.6mm b/d and 1.3mm b/d, respectively. We also expect demand to cross back over 100mm b/d in the current quarter, as can be seen in Table 1. As has been our wont during the recovery from the pandemic, we expect DM demand to level off next year after a stout recovery, and for EM demand to pick up the baton and lead global oil-consumption growth in the next two years (Chart 6). We remain bullish re the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines using mRNA technology globally, which will allow EM economies to step up growth. Re-opening of DM and EM economies will continue, pushing refined-product demand above 2019 levels next year, including jet-fuel toward the end of 2H22. Chart 6EM Oil Demand Growth Will Take The Lead Oil Market Remains Balanced Our supply-demand balances are largely unchanged from last month. This keeps global crude-oil markets in a physical deficit for most of next year. We expect OPEC 2.0's core producers will maintain their production-management strategy – i.e., keeping the level of supply below the level of demand. Producers in the price-taking cohort outside the coalition – chiefly the US, Canada and Brazil – will lift production subject to capital-market constraints on producing oil profitably (Chart 7). This supply-demand dynamic keeps inventories drawing through this year, then leveling off in 2022 and rebounding slowly in 2023 (Chart 8). Chart 7Global Crude Markets Mostly Balanced Chart 8Crude Inventories Continue To Draw   Global crude-oil inventories could come under pressure during the 2021-22 winter, if natural-gas markets remain supply-constrained. This week, the Russian state-owned supplier and operator of Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline delivering Russian gas to Germany was told it must comply with German law before its gas will be allowed to flow. It is unlikely this will be done this year.3 This could keep demand for oil higher at the margin, as we noted earlier.4 Oil's Known Unknowns: Capex, Inflation The big unknowns – and risks – to our view are when and how much capex is going to be deployed in the oil and gas exploration-and-production space, and what we can expect from the Fed and other systematically important central banks if inflation looks to be persistent. OPEC 2.0 leaders and officials from the price-taking cohort agree that the dearth of capex for the industry threatens to destabilize oil and gas markets in the near future. Among the 90 international oil and gas producers tracked quarterly by the US EIA capex has collapsed (Chart 9). The industry appears to have made shareholder and investor interests their priority, so as to be competitive in the pursuit of capital that all firms engage in. This also is true for state-owned entities, which also compete for capital and access to technology. These firms and producers will continue to work to produce oil and gas profitably. Still, they likely will continue to find an unreceptive audience to invest in these energy sources; Governments and policymakers are actively discouraging investment in fossil fuels. This risks setting in motion a process in which supply erodes much faster than demand – similar to what is happening in coal markets presently – and prices for fossil fuels rocket higher. This is not a strategy, particularly as it disregards the fact there is insufficient renewables capacity and storage to cover the energy from hydrocarbons that is being lost because of the lack of a transition policy at any level. Recent strong inflation prints are a small-scale example of how this process could play out over the next decade or longer. When China eliminated Australian coal imports earlier this year in favor of Indonesian supplies, and forced its coal mines to shut as part of its dual-circulation policy to become more self-reliant, the resulting shortages set off chain reactions in global natural gas markets. European gas prices shot higher, which, along with higher Asian and American natgas prices, sent food prices soaring on the back of higher fertilizer prices.5 Shipping bottlenecks and container shortages worldwide exacerbated these problems. CBs' Inflation View Challenged Going into 2022, central bankers' view that the current bout of price increases is transitory is going to be put to the test. If inflation appears to be more persistent going into 2H22 – after hoped-for one-offs in coal, gas, oil and food markets are worked out – the Fed and other systemically important central banks likely would start signaling earlier-than-expected policy-rate hikes. This would be negative for commodities generally, as it would raise debt-service costs and investment hurdle rates, and reduce consumption. Higher oil prices and tighter monetary policy will temper demand. These inflationary pressures can be addressed, but this will require a serious re-thinking of the strategy the world needs to pursue if it is to pull off a successful energy transition. Such a strategy will have to give greater consideration to the role of fossil fuels in this transition. If capex is not forthcoming, however, oil prices will have to rise to destroy demand. This will feed into inflation, and ultimately could result in stagflation, as economic growth grinds lower. Investment Implications The level of uncertainty surrounding oil and gas prices remains elevated, given the background condition of 90% odds we see a La Niña in the Northern Hemisphere's winter (Nov21 – Mar22), and ~ 50% chance it persists into the Spring (March-May22). This could leave markets with colder-than-normal temperatures past the end of winter, as it did last year. Given this uncertainty, we remain long the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF, to keep our exposure to higher prices and a return to higher backwardation.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Natural-gas price volatility in Europe and the EU exploded higher once again, following reports the German government would not certify Nord Stream 2 (NS2) unless and until it complies with German law (Chart 10). The European Commission also is setting conditions for its approval. Lastly, outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel said further sanctions against Russia were possible if the pipeline was used against Ukrainian interests.6 The EU's TTF natural gas benchmark is up 24% this week alone, on the back of this news, while the UK's benchmark Balancing Point index is up 7%. These higher costs will feed into food costs, given the importance of natural gas to fertilizer markets, accounting for ~ 70% of fertilizer costs.7 Given the higher likelihood of another La Niña in the Northern Hemisphere (90% odds from the US Climate Prediction Center), we expect continued volatility in gas prices. Base Metals: Bullish Steel demand in China has been contracting after the government began tightening the supply of credit to the property sector following the Evergrande debt crisis. Construction makes up approximately one-fourth of total Chinese steel demand. At the same time, supply has been falling as, in addition to government regulation to curb carbon emissions, steel mills have voluntarily cut output due to decreasing margins on the back of soft demand. The fact that Chinese steel prices have been falling since their highs in May this year indicates that demand is dropping faster than supply (Chart 11). Reduced Chinese steel demand is feeding through to demand for iron ore – the main steel input in China – while disruptions in the top two iron ore exporters, Australia and Brazil are easing, increasing the possibility of an oversupplied market. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold ended last Thursday above $1,860/oz for the first time since mid-June after the October CPI data release showed that the US had its biggest inflation surge in nearly 30 years. As long as the Federal Reserve does not turn more hawkish, consecutive months of high CPI prints will mean low real rates well into 2022, which will reduce the opportunity cost of holding gold. The high US twin deficits – which as of Q3 2021 was 17.44% of GDP – support the long-term dollar bearish view our colleagues at BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy hold. A weak dollar over the next 12-18 months will increase the inflation-hedge appeal of the yellow metal relative to the greenback. Chart 11   Footnotes 1     We note in passing the Biden administration has been mostly successful in getting massive fiscal and monetary stimulus deployed into the US economy, which has increased household savings and potential spending power dramatically, as our colleagues in BCA's US Investment Strategy noted in their 1 November 2021 report Half-Empty Or Half-Full?: "Massive fiscal transfers and an unprecedented increase in household wealth will support consumption and keep the economy from stagnating." We cannot view higher gasoline prices in the wake of this stimulus and growth as an economic emergency of the sort the SPR is designed to address. Nor can we view the pick-up in mobility – particularly in air travel expected shortly with the re-opening of routes closed due to the pandemic – as a supply-side emergency. 2     It's worthwhile mentioning here that OPEC 2.0 has been returning less than the 400k b/d every month it agreed due to shortfalls in production outside the core group broken out in Table 1. Reduced capex and maintenance is responsible for this. Higher oil prices might allow this group within the coalition to attract additional capex, but, given the uncertain long-term support for such exploration-production-maintenance investment, this will remain a long-term challenge to these producers. Lastly, we continue to expect Iran to return to markets as a bona fide exporter; we expect its production to return to 3.70-3.85mm b/d by 2H22. 3    Please see Nord Stream 2: Germany halts approval of Russian gas link published on November 16, 2021. 4    Please see last month's oil balances and price-forecast report Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside, published 21 October 2021. 5    Please see our October 14, 2021 report entitled Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher, and last week's report entitled Risk Of Persistent Food-Price Inflation for additional discussion. 6    Please see fn 3 above. 7     Please see fn 5 above.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations

Highlights Geopolitical conflicts point to energy price spikes and could add to inflation surprises in the near term. However, US fiscal drag and China’s economic slowdown are both disinflationary risks to be aware of.  Specifically, energy-producers like Russia and Iran gain greater leverage amid energy shortages. Europe’s natural gas prices could spike again. Conflict in the Middle East could disrupt oil flows.    President Biden’s $1.75 trillion social spending bill is a litmus test for fiscal fatigue in developed markets. It could fail, and even assuming it passes it will not prevent overall fiscal drag in 2022-23. However, it is inflationary over the long run. China’s slowdown poses the chief disinflationary risk. But we still think policy will ease to avoid an economic crash ahead of the fall 2022 national party congress.  We are closing this year’s long value / short growth trade for a loss of 3.75%. Cyclical sectors ended up being a better way to play the reopening trade. Feature Equity markets rallied in recent weeks despite sharp upward moves in core inflation across the world (Chart 1). Inflation is fast becoming a popular concern and we see geopolitical risks that could drive headline inflation still higher in the short run. We also see underrated disinflationary factors, namely China’s property sector distress and economic slowdown.     Several major developments have occurred in recent weeks that we will cover in this report. Our conclusions: Biden’s domestic agenda will pass but risks are high and macro impact is limited. Congress passed Biden’s infrastructure deal and will probably still pass his signature social spending bill, although inflation is creating pushback. Together these bills have little impact on the budget deficit outlook but they will add to inflationary pressures.  Energy shortages embolden Russia and Iran. Winter weather is unpredictable, the energy crisis may not be over. But investors are underrating Russia’s aggressive posture toward the West. Any conflict with Iran could also cause oil disruptions in the near future. US-China relations may improve but not for long. A bilateral summit between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping will not reduce tensions for very long, if at all. Climate change cooperation is an insufficient basis to reverse the cold war-style confrontation over the long run. Chart 1Inflation Rattles Policymakers The investment takeaway is that geopolitical tensions could push energy prices still higher in the short term. Iran and Russia need to be monitored. However, China’s economic slowdown will weigh on growth. China poses an underrated disinflationary risk to our views. US Congress: Bellwether For Fiscal Fatigue While inflation is starting to trouble households and voters, investors should bear in mind that the current set of politicians have long aimed to generate an inflation overshoot. They spent the previous decade in fear of deflation, since it generated anti-establishment or populist parties that threatened to disrupt the political system. They quietly built up an institutional consensus around more robust fiscal policy and monetary-fiscal coordination. Now they are seeing that agenda succeed but are facing the first major hurdle in the form of higher prices. They will not simply cut and run. Inflation is accompanied by rising wages, which today’s leaders want to see – almost all of them have promised households a greater share of the fruits of their labor, in keeping with the new, pro-worker, populist zeitgeist. Real wages are growing at 1.1% in the US and 0.9% across the G7 (Chart 2). Even more than central bankers, political leaders are focused on jobs and employment, i.e. voters. Yet the labor market still has considerable slack (Chart 3). Almost all of the major western governments have been politically recapitalized since the pandemic, either through elections or new coalitions. Almost all of them were elected on promises of robust public investment programs to “build back better,” i.e. create jobs, build infrastructure, revitalize industry, and decarbonize the energy economy. Thus while they are concerned about inflation, they will leave that to central banks, as they will be loathe to abandon their grand investment plans.  Chart 2Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Still, there will be a breaking point at which inflation forces governments to put their spending plans on hold. The US Congress is the immediate test of whether today’s inflation will trigger fiscal fatigue and force a course correction.      Chart 3Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment President Biden’s $550 billion infrastructure bill passed Congress last week and will be signed into law around November 15. Now he is worried that his signature $1.75 trillion social spending bill will falter due to inflation fears. He cannot spare a single vote in the Senate (and only three votes in the House of Representatives). Odds that the bill fails are about 35%. Democratic Party leaders will not abandon the cause due to recent inflation prints. They see a once-in-a-generation opportunity to expand the role of government, the social safety net, and the interests of their constituents. If they miss this chance due to inflation that ends up being transitory then they will lose the enthusiastic left wing of the party and suffer a devastating loss in next year’s midterm elections, in which they are already at a disadvantage.   Biden’s social bill is also likely to pass because the budget reconciliation process necessary to pass the bill is the same process needed to raise the national debt limit by December 3. A linkage of the two by party leaders would ensure that both pass … and otherwise Democrats risk self-inflicting a national debt default. The reconciliation bill is more about long-term than short-term inflation risk. The bill does not look to have a substantial impact on the budget outlook: the new spending is partially offset by new taxes and spread out over ten years. The various legislative scenarios look virtually the same in our back-of-the-envelope budget projections (Chart 4). However, given that the output gap is virtually closed, this bill combined with the infrastructure bill will add to inflationary pressures. The fiscal drag will diminish by 2024, not coincidentally the presidential election year 2024, not coincidentally the presidential election year. The deficit is not expected to increase or decrease substantially between 2023 and 2024. From then onward the budget deficit will expand. The increased government demand for goods and services and the increased disposable income for low-earning families will add to inflationary pressures. Other developed markets face a similar situation: inflation is picking up, but big spending has been promised and normalizing budgets will marginally weigh on growth in the next few years (Chart 5). True, growth should hold up since the private economy is rebounding in the wake of the pandemic. But politicians will not be inclined to renege on campaign promises of liberal spending in the face of fiscal drag. The current crop of leaders is primed to make major public investments. This is true of Germany, Japan, Canada, and Italy as well as the United States. It is partly true in France, where fiscal retrenchment has been put on hold given the presidential election in the spring. The effect will be inflationary, especially for the US where populist spending is more extravagant than elsewhere. The long run will depend on structural factors and how much the new investments improve productivity. Bottom Line: A single vote in the US Senate could derail the president’s social spending bill, so the US is now the bellwether for fiscal fatigue in the developed world. Biden is likely to pass the bill, as global fiscal drag is disinflationary over the next 12 months. Yet inflation could stay elevated for other reasons. And this fiscal drag will dissipate later in the business cycle. Russia And Iran Gain Leverage Amid Energy Crunch The global energy price spike arose from a combination of structural factors – namely the pandemic and stimulus. It has abated in recent weeks but will remain a latent problem through the winter season, especially if La Niña makes temperatures unusually cold as expected. Rising energy prices feed into general producer prices, which are being passed onto consumers (Chart 6). They look to be moderating but the weather is unpredictable.   There is another reason that near-term energy prices could spike or stay elevated: geopolitics. Tight global energy supply-demand balances mean that there is little margin of safety if unexpected supply disruptions occur. This gives greater leverage to energy producers, two of which are especially relevant at the moment: Russia and Iran.      Russia’s long-running conflict with the West is heating up on several fronts, as expected. Russia may not have caused the European energy crisis but it is exacerbating shortages by restricting flows of natural gas for political reasons, as it is wont to do (Chart 7). Moscow always maintains plausible deniability but it is currently flexing its energy muscles in several areas: Chart 6Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Ukraine: Russia has avoided filling up and fully utilizing pipelines and storage facilities in Ukraine, where the US is now warning that Russia could stage a large military action in retaliation for Ukrainian drone strikes in the still-simmering Russia-Ukraine war.    Belarus: Russia says it will not increase the gas flow through the major Yamal-Europe natural gas pipeline in 2022 even as Belarus threatens to halt the pipeline’s operation entirely. Belarus, backed by Russia, is locked in a conflict with Poland and the EU over Belarus’s funneling of migrants into their territory (Chart 8). The conflict could lead not only to energy supply disruptions but also to a broader closure of trade and a military standoff.1 Russia has flown two Tu-160 nuclear-armed bombers over Belarus and the border area in a sign of support. Moldova: Russia is withholding natural gas to pressure the new, pro-EU Moldovan government. Russia’s main motive is obvious: it wants Germany and the EU to approve and certify the new Nord Stream II pipeline. Nord Stream II enables Germany and Russia to bypass Ukraine, where pipeline politics raise the risk of shortages and wars. Lame duck German Chancellor Angela Merkel worked with Russia to complete this pipeline before the end of her term, convincing the Biden administration to issue a waiver on congressional sanctions that could have halted its construction. However, two of the parties in the incoming German government, the Greens and the Free Democrats, oppose the pipeline. While these parties may not have been able to stop the pipeline from operating, Russia does not want to take any chances and is trying to force Germany’s and the EU’s hand. The energy crisis makes it more likely that the pipeline will be approved, since the European Commission will have to make its decision during a period when cold weather and shortages will make it politically acceptable to certify the pipeline.2 The decision will further drive a wedge between Germany and eastern EU members, which is what Russia wants. EU natural gas prices will likely subside sometime next year and will probably not derail the economic recovery, according to both our commodity and Europe strategists. A bigger and longer-lasting Russian energy squeeze would emerge if the Nord Stream II pipeline is not certified. This is a low risk at this point but the next six months could bring surprises. More broadly, the West’s conflict with Russia can easily escalate from here. First, President Vladimir Putin faces economic challenges and weak political support. He frequently diverts popular attention by staging aggressive moves abroad. There is no reason to believe his post-2004 strategy of restoring Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet space has changed. High energy prices give him greater leverage even aside from pipeline coercion – so it is not surprising that Russia is moving troops to the Ukraine border again. Growing military support for Belarus, or an expanded conflict in Ukraine, are likely to create a crisis now or later.   Second, the US-Germany agreement to allow Nord Stream II explicitly states that Russia must not weaponize natural gas supply. This statement has had zero effect so far. But when the energy shortage subsides, the EU could pursue retaliatory measures along with the United States. Of course, Russia has been able to weather sanctions. But tensions are already escalating significantly.  After Russia, Iran also gains leverage during times of tight energy supplies. With global oil inventories drawing down, Iran is in the position to inflict “maximum pressure” on the US and its allies, a role reversal from the 2017-20 period in which large inventories enabled the US to impose crippling sanctions on Iran after pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal (Chart 9). Iran is rapidly advancing on its nuclear program and a new round of diplomatic negotiations may only serve to buy time before it crosses the “breakout” threshold of uranium enrichment capability as early as this month or next. In a recent special report we argued that there is a 40% chance of a crisis over Iran in the Middle East. Such a crisis could ultimately lead to an oil shock in the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz.  Chart 9Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Bottom Line: Russia’s natural gas coercion of Europe could keep European energy prices high through March or May. More broadly Russia’s renewed tensions with the West confirm our view that oil producers gain geopolitical leverage amid the current supply shortages. Iran also gains leverage and its conflict with the US could lead to global oil supply disruptions anytime over the next 12 months. Until Nord Stream II is certified and a new Iranian nuclear agreement is signed, there are two clear sources of potential energy shocks. Moreover in today’s inflationary context there is limited margin of safety for unexpected supply disruptions regardless of source. Xi’s Historical Rewrite China continues to be a major source of risk for the global economy and financial markets in the lead-up to the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. While Chinese assets have sold off this year, global risk assets are still vulnerable to negative surprises from China.  The five-year political reshuffle in 2022 is more important than usual since President Xi Jinping was originally supposed to step down but will instead stick around as leader for life, like China’s previous strongmen Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.3 Xi’s rejection of term limits became clear in 2017 and is not really news. But Xi will fortify himself and his faction in 2022 against any opposition whatsoever. He is extremely vigilant about any threats that could disrupt this process, whether at home or abroad.  The Communist Party’s sixth plenary session this week highlights both Xi’s success within the Communist Party and the sensitivity of the period. Xi produced a new “historical resolution,” or interpretation of the party’s history, which is only the third such resolution. A few remarks on this historical resolution are pertinent: Mao’s resolution: Chairman Mao wrote the first such resolution in 1945 to lay down his version of the party’s history and solidify his personal control. It is naturally a revolutionary leftist document. Deng’s revision of Mao: General Deng Xiaoping then produced a major revision in 1981, shortly after initiating China’s economic opening and reform. Deng’s interpretation aimed to hold Mao accountable for “gross mistakes” during the Cultural Revolution and yet to recognize the Communist Party’s positive achievements in founding the People’s Republic. His version gave credit to the party and collective leadership rather than Mao’s personal rule. Two 30-year periods: The implication was that the party’s history should be divided into two thirty-year periods: the period of foundations and conflict with Mao as the party’s core and the period of improvement and prosperity with Deng as the core. Jiang’s support of Deng: Deng’s telling came under scrutiny from new leftists in the wake of Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. But General Secretary Jiang Zemin largely held to Deng’s version of the story that the days of reform and opening were a far better example of the party’s leadership because they were so much more stable and prosperous.4 Xi’s reaction to Jiang and Deng: Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has shown an interest in revising the party’s official interpretation of its own history. The central claim of the revisionists is that China could never have achieved its economic success if not for Mao’s strongman rule. Mao’s rule and the Communist Party’s central control thus regain their centrality to modern China’s story. China’s prosperity owes its existence to these primary political conditions. The two periods cannot be separated.  Xi’s synthesis of Deng and Mao: Now Xi has written himself into that history above all other figures – indeed the communique from the Sixth Plenum mentions Xi more often than Marx, Mao, or Deng (Chart 10). The implication is that Xi is the synthesis of Mao and Deng, as we argued back in 2017 at the end of the nineteenth national party congress. The synthesis consists of a strongman who nevertheless maintains a vibrant economy for strategic ends. What are the practical policy implications of this history lesson? Higher Country Risk: China’s revival of personal rule, as opposed to consensus rule, marks a permanent increase in “country risk” and political risk for investors. Autocratic governments lack institutional guardrails (checks and balances) that prevent drastic policy mistakes. When Xi tries to step down there will probably be a succession crisis. Higher Macroeconomic Risk: China is more likely to get stuck in the “middle-income trap.” Liberal or pro-market economic reform is de-emphasized both in the new historical resolution and in the Xi administration’s broader program. Centralization is already suppressing animal spirits, entrepreneurship, and the private sector.  Higher Geopolitical Risk: The return to autocracy and the withdrawal from economic liberalism also entail a conflict with the United States, which is still the world’s largest economy and most powerful military. The US is not what it once was but it will put pressure on China’s economy and build alliances aimed at strategic containment. Bottom Line: China is trying to escape the middle-income trap, like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, but it is trying to do so by means of autocracy, import substitution, and conflict with the United States. These other Asian economies improved productivity by democratizing, embracing globalization, and maintaining a special relationship with the United States. China’s odds of succeeding are low. China will focus on power consolidation through fall 2022 and this will lead to negative surprises for financial markets.    China Slowdown: The Disinflationary Risk While it is very unlikely that Xi will face serious challenges to his rule, strange things can happen at critical junctures. Therefore the regime will be extremely alert for any threats, foreign or domestic, and will ultimately prioritize politics above all other things, which means investors will suffer negative surprises. The lingering pandemic still poses an inflationary risk for the rest of the world while the other main risk is disinflationary:    Inflationary Risk – Zero COVID: The “Covid Zero” policy of attempting to stamp out any trace of the virus will still be relevant at least over the next 12 months (Chart 11). Clampdowns serve a dual purpose since the Xi administration wants to minimize foreign interference and domestic dissent before the party congress. Hence the global economy can suffer more negative supply shocks if ports or factories are closed.  Inflationary Risk – Energy Closures: The government is rationing electricity amid energy shortages to prioritize household heating and essential services. This could hurt factory output over the winter if the weather is bad. Disinflationary Risk – Property Bust: The country is still flirting with overtightening monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies. Throughout the year we have argued that authorities would avoid overtightening. But China is still very much in a danger zone in which policy mistakes could be made. Recent rumors suggest the government is trying to “correct the overcorrection” of regulatory policy. The government is reportedly mulling measures to relax the curbs on the property sector. We are inclined to agree but there is no sign yet that markets are responding, judging by corporate defaults and the crunch in financial conditions (Chart 12). Chart 12China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil Evergrande, the world’s most indebted property developer, is still hobbling along, but its troubles are not over. There are signs of contagion among other developers, including state-owned enterprises, that cannot meet the government’s “three red lines.” 5 Credit growth has now broken beneath the government’s target range of 12%, though money growth has bounced off the lower 8% limit set for this year (Chart 13). China is dangerously close to overtightening.   China’s economic slowdown has not yet been fully felt in the global economy based on China’s import volumes, which are tightly linked to the combined credit-and-fiscal-spending impulse (Chart 14). The implication is that recent pullbacks in industrial metal prices and commodity indexes will continue. Chart 13China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening Chart 14China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt ​​​​​​​Until China eases policy more substantially, it poses a disinflationary risk and a strong point in favor of the transitory view of global inflation.    It is difficult for China to ease policy – let alone stimulate – when producer prices are so high (see Chart 6 above). The result is a dangerous quandary in which the government’s regulatory crackdowns are triggering a property bust yet the government is prevented from providing the usual policy support as the going gets tough. Asset prices and broader risk sentiment could go into free fall. However, the party has a powerful incentive to prevent a generalized crisis ahead of the party congress. So we are inclined to accept signs that property curbs and other policies will be eased. Bottom Line: The full disinflationary impact of China’s financial turmoil and economic slowdown has yet to be felt globally.     Biden-Xi Summit Not A Game Changer As long as inflation prevents robust monetary and fiscal easing, Beijing is incentivized to improve sentiment in other ways. One way is to back away from the regulatory crackdown in other sectors, such as Big Tech. The other is to improve relations with the United States. A stabilization of US ties would be useful before the party congress since President Xi would prefer not to have the US interfering in China’s internal affairs during such a critical hour. No surprise that China is showing signs of trying to stabilize the relationship.   The US is apparently reciprocating. Presidents Biden and Xi also agreed to hold a virtual bilateral summit next week, which could lead to a new series of talks. The US Trade Representative also plans to restart trade negotiations. The plan is to enforce the Phase One trade deal, issue waivers for tariffs that hurt US companies, and pursue new talks over outstanding structural disputes. The Phase One trade deal has fallen far short of its goals in general but on the energy front it is doing well. China will continue importing US commodities amid global shortages (Chart 15). The summit alone will have a limited impact. Biden had a summit with Putin earlier this year but relations could deteriorate tomorrow over cyber-attacks, Ukraine, or Belarus. However, there is some basis for the US and China to cooperate next year: Iran. Xi is consolidating power at home in 2022 and probably wants to use negotiations to keep the Americans at bay. Biden is pivoting to foreign policy in 2022, since Congress will not get anything done, and will primarily focus on halting Iran’s nuclear program. If China assists the US with Iran, then there is a basis for a reduction in tensions. The problem is not only Iran itself but also that China will not jump to enforce sanctions on Iran amid energy shortages. And China is not about to make sweeping structural economic concessions to the US as the Xi administration doubles down on state-guided industrial policy. Meanwhile the US is pursuing a long-term policy of strategic containment and Biden will not want to be seen as appeasing China ahead of midterm elections, especially given Xi’s reversion to autocracy. What about cooperation on climate change? The US and China also delivered a surprise joint statement at the United Nations climate change conference in Scotland (COP26), confirming the widely held expectation that climate policy is an area of engagement. These powers and Europe have a strategic interest in reducing dependency on Middle Eastern oil (Chart 16). Climate talks will begin in the first half of next year. However, climate cooperation is not significant enough alone to outweigh the deeper conflicts between the US and China. Moreover climate policy itself is somewhat antagonistic, as the EU and US are looking at applying “carbon adjustment fees” to carbon-intensive imports, e.g. iron and steel exports from China and other high-polluting producers (Chart 17). While the EU and US are not on the same page yet, and these carbon tariffs are far from implementation, the emergence of green protectionism does not bode well for US-China relations even aside from their fundamental political and military disputes. Bottom Line: Some short-term stabilization of US-China relations is possible but not guaranteed. Markets will cheer if it happens but the effect will be fleeting. Chinese assets are still extremely vulnerable to political and geopolitical risks.   Investment Takeaways Gold can still go higher. Financial markets are pricing higher inflation and weak real rates. Gold has been our chief trade to prepare both for higher inflation and geopolitical risk. We are closing our long value / growth equity trade for a loss of 3.75%. We are maintaining our long DM Europe / short EM Europe trade. This trade has performed poorly due to the rally in energy prices and hence Russian equities. But while energy prices may overshoot in the near term, investors will flee Russian equities as geopolitical risks materialize. We are maintaining our long Korea / short Taiwan trade despite its being deeply in the red. This trade is valid over a strategic or long-term time horizon, in which a major geopolitical crisis and/or war is likely. Our expectation that China will ease policy to stabilize the economy ahead of fall 2022 should support Korean equities.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     Over the past year President Alexander Lukashenko’s repression of domestic unrest prompted the EU to impose sanctions. Lukashenko responded by organizing an immigration scheme in which Middle Eastern migrants are flown into Belarus and funneled into the EU via Poland. The EU is threatening to expand sanctions while Belarus is threatening to cut off the Yamal-Europe pipeline amid Europe’s energy crisis. See Pavel Felgenhauer, “Belarus as Latest Front in Acute East-West Standoff,” Jamestown Foundation, November 11, 2021, Jamestown.org. 2     Both Germany and the EU must approve of Nord Stream II for it to enter into operation. The German Federal Network Agency has until January 8, 2022 to certify the project. The Economy Ministry has already given the green light. Then the European Commission has two-to-four months to respond. The EU is supposed to consider whether the pipeline meets the EU’s requirement that gas transport be “unbundled” or separated from gas production and sales. This is a higher hurdle but Germany’s clout will be felt. Hence final approval could come by March 8 or May 8, 2022. The energy crisis will put pressure for an early certification but the EU Commission may take the full time to pretend that it is not being blackmailed. See Joseph Nasr and Christoph Steitz, “Certifying Nord Stream 2 poses no threat to gas supply to EU – Germany,” Reuters, October 26, 2021, reuters.com. 3    Xi is not serving for an “unprecedented third term,” as the mainstream media keeps reporting. China’s top office is not constant nor were term limits ever firmly established. Each leader’s reign should be measured by their effective control rather than technical terms in office. Mao reigned for 27 years (1949-76), Deng for 14 years or more (1978-92), Jiang Zemin for 10 years (1992-2002), and Hu Jintao for 10 years (2002-2012).  4    See Joseph Fewsmith, “Mao’s Shadow” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 43 (2014), and “The 19th Party Congress: Ringing In Xi Jinping’s New Age,” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 55 (2018), hoover.org.  5    Liability-to-asset ratios less than 70%, debt-to-equity less than 100%, and cash-to-short-term-debt ratios of more than 1.0x.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Open Trades & Positions 

Highlights There is a high risk of a global demand shortfall in 2022. This is because consumer demand for services will remain well below its pre-pandemic trend… …while the recent booming demand for goods is crashing back to earth. Stay overweight 30-year T-bonds. In the equity market, underweight the ‘reflation’ sectors: specifically, underweight banks and basic resources. Stay overweight animal care. Overweight the interactive entertainment sector (look out for a Special Report on this sector coming out very soon). Fractal analysis: Overweight gas distribution. Feature Chart of the WeekSpending On Services In The US Is Still Far Below The Pre-Pandemic Trend. Will It Catch Up In 2022? With inflation surging, you would be forgiven for thinking that global demand is red-hot. Sadly, global demand is not red-hot. Two years after the pandemic began, the lynchpin of demand – consumer spending on services – remains far below its pre-pandemic trend. For example, US consumer spending on services is around $420 billion, or 5 percent, below where it should be (Chart I-1). A similar story holds true in the UK and France (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Spending On Services Is Still Far Below The Pre-Pandemic Trend In The UK... Chart I-3...And France Still, overall US consumer spending is on trend. Just. But only thanks to an unprecedented largesse of fiscal and monetary stimulus. Begging the question, what will happen when the stimulus ends? If overall stimulated spending is just on trend while spending on services is in deficit, it means that spending on goods is in a mirror-image $420 billion surplus. Which, given the smaller share of spending on goods, equates to 8 percent above where it should be. One misconception is that the surplus in goods spending is concentrated in durables. While this was true six months ago, two-thirds of the current surplus is in nondurables, dominated by clothing and shoes, food and drink at home, and games, toys and hobbies (Chart I-4). Chart I-4US Overspend On Durables Is Now $140 Bn, While Overspend On Nondurables Is $280 Bn Looking ahead, if the demand for goods crashes back to earth, as seems to be happening now, then the demand for services will have to catch up to its pre-pandemic trend. Otherwise there will be a deficit in aggregate demand. So, the crucial question for 2022 is, will services spending catch up to its pre-pandemic trend? Services Spending Will Remain Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Many people believe that the deficit in US services spending is due to the underspend in bars, restaurants, and hotels. In fact, this is another misconception. The underspending on ‘food services and accommodations’ is now a negligible $30 billion out of the $420 billion deficit. In which case, where is the deficit? Surprisingly, the biggest component is a $160 billion underspend on health care (Chart I-5). In particular, the spending on ‘outpatient physician services’ levelled off a year ago well below its pre-pandemic level (Chart I-6). A plausible explanation is that many doctor’s appointments have shifted to online, requiring much lower spending. The result is that health care consumption has slowed its convergence to the pre-pandemic trend, implying that a deficit could be persistent. Chart I-5US Underspend On Health Care ##br##Is $160 Bn Chart I-6US Spending On Physician Services Is Far Below The Pre-Pandemic Trend A second major component of the deficit is a $110 billion underspend on recreation services, as consumers have shunned the large or dense crowds in amusement parks, sports centres, spectator sports, and theatres. Some of this shunning of crowds will be long-lasting (Chart I-7). Chart I-7US Underspend On Recreation Services Is $110 Bn A third major component of the deficit is a $60 billion underspend on public transportation, as people have likewise shunned the personal proximity required in mass transit systems and aeroplanes. Some of this shunning of transport that requires personal proximity will also be long-lasting (Chart I-8). Chart I-8US Underspend On Public Transportation Is $60 Bn Worryingly, the recent spending on both recreation services and public transportation has stopped converging with the pre-pandemic trend. Admittedly, this might be a blip due to the delta wave of the pandemic, and spending could re-accelerate once this wave subsides. On the other hand, it would be prudent to assume that the delta wave was not the last wave of the pandemic and that further waves could arrive in 2022. Pulling all of this together, large parts of services spending will remain persistently below their pre-pandemic trend. Eventually, new and innovative types of services will plug this deficit, but this will take time. Therefore, we conservatively estimate that, at the end of 2022, US consumer spending on services will still be below its pre-pandemic trend by at least $200 billion, or 2.5 percent. Other major economies, like the UK and France, will suffer similar deficits. Goods Spending Will Crash Back To Earth Let’s now switch to the other side of the ledger, and assess to what extent the underspend in services can be countered by an overspend in goods. Spending on durables is already crashing back to earth. A surplus of $500 billion in March has collapsed to $140 billion now, and we fully expect it to fall back to zero. The reason is that durables, by their very definition, provide long-duration utility. Meaning that there are only so many cars, smartphones, and gadgets that any person can own. But what about the current $280 billion surplus on nondurables – can that be sustained? The biggest component of the nondurables surplus is a $85 billion, or 20 percent, overspend on clothes and shoes. Some of this overspend is justified by a wardrobe transition to the post-pandemic way of working and living. But clothes and shoes, though classified as nondurable, are in fact quite durable. Meaning that once the wardrobe transition is complete, we do not expect people to spend 20 percent more on clothes and shoes than they did before the pandemic (Chart I-9). Chart I-9US Overspend On Clothes And Shoes Is $85 Bn A second major component of the nondurables surplus is a $75 billion, or 7 percent, overspend on food and beverages at home. To a large extent, this has been a displacement of the underspending on eating and drinking out. But given that this underspend on eating and drinking out has almost normalised, we expect the overspend on eating and drinking at home to fade (Chart I-10). Chart I-10US Overspend On Food And Drink At Home Is $75 Bn A third major component of the nondurables surplus is a $45 billion, or 16 percent, overspend on recreational items: games, toys, hobbies, and pets and pet products (Chart I-11 and Chart I-12). To a large extent, this has been a displacement of the underspend on recreation services involving crowds, which will last. Hence, we expect the nondurable surplus on recreational items also to last, to the benefit of the animal care sector and the interactive (electronic) entertainment sector. Chart I-11US Overspend On Games, Toys, And Hobbies Is $45 Bn Chart I-12Spending On Pets Is ##br##Booming Pulling all of this together, we expect the $140 billion surplus on durables to disappear fully, and the $280 billion surplus on nondurables to fade to well below $200 billion. Therefore, given that the deficit on services is likely to be above $200 billion, there is a high risk of a consumer demand deficit in 2022. Four Investment Conclusions The ultra-long end of the bond market is figuring out that without sustained above-trend demand, you cannot get sustained inflation. And to repeat, if demand is barely on trend after an unprecedented largesse of fiscal and monetary stimulus, then what will happen when the stimulus ends? All of which leads to four investment conclusions: Stay overweight 30-year T-bonds. In the equity market, underweight the ‘reflation’ sectors: specifically, underweight banks and basic resources. Stay overweight animal care. Overweight the interactive entertainment sector (look out for a Special Report on this sector coming out very soon). Gas Distribution Is Oversold Finally, one of the paradoxes of skyrocketing natural gas prices is that it has badly hurt the gas distributors which, for the most part, have not been able to pass on the higher prices in full to end users. The resulting margin squeeze has caused a sharp recent underperformance, which is now fragile on its 65-day/130-day composite fractal structure (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Gas Distribution Is Oversold Given this fractal fragility combined with the recent correction in natural gas prices, a recommended trade would be to overweight global gas distribution versus banks, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Chart I-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Chart I-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Dear Client, Next week I will be hosting and attending client events, both virtual and in person. Our next report, on November 24 will be a recap of my observations from the meetings with our clients. Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Executive Summary Chart Of The DayThe Gap Between Chinese Manufacturing Input And Output Prices Reached Multi-Year High     Producer price inflation in China will likely peak in the next two quarters, but inflation could remain elevated well into 2022. Chinese producers will continue to pass on inflation to domestic and foreign consumers. Core CPI is only a notch below its pre-pandemic level; rising energy and food prices, along with improved service sector consumption, will push up headline consumer prices next year. Lack of meaningful policy easing is creating an air pocket for China’s economy, with significant near-term risks for a faster-than-expected economic slowdown. We continue to prefer the CSI500 Index over the broader onshore market. Bottom Line: China’s business cycle has rapidly matured while inflation remains a risk. We are still underweight Chinese equities in a global portfolio. Within Chinese stocks, we continue to favor CSI500 Index which has a greater exposure to external demand. Feature Chart 1Persistently Negative Economic Surprises China’s economic conditions deteriorated in the third quarter. Chart 1 shows that the nation’s economic surprise index remains in deep contraction. However, the combination of power shortages and persistent supply-side price pressures has limited policy choices, particularly the traditional measures used to stimulate the economy. We are closely monitoring the BCA China Play Index and the relative performance of domestic infrastructure stocks versus global equities as proxies for reflation; neither is signaling a significant improvement (Chart 2). The outlook for Chinese stocks in the next 6 to 12 months remains dim. Chinese corporate profit growth has peaked, and input cost pressure on domestic producers may prove to be stickier than the market has currently priced in (Chart 3). Chart 2Reflation Proxies Are Not Signaling A Major Economic Upturn Chart 3Corporate Profit Growth Has Peaked Producer Price Inflation Remains A Near-Term Risk China’s producer price index (PPI) inflation may stay high longer than the market is expecting. Supply-side pressures and bottlenecks will abate, but perhaps not as fast as investors expect. Moreover, energy prices will likely remain elevated into 2022 and labor shortages in the urban areas will further exacerbate inflationary pressures. As discussed in a previous report, the surge in China’s manufacturing output and prices has been driven by strong US consumer demand for goods. Robust external demand this year occurred as China’s industrial sector had gone through years of capacity reduction and domestic de-carbonization efforts gained momentum.  Chart 4Expanding Mining Capacity Takes Time Capacity in the mining sector will expand in the next 6 to 12 months if the power crunch persists. However, the 2015/16 supply-side reforms significantly reduced China’s upstream industry’s capability to produce. Given the capital-intensive nature of upstream industries, expanding production output often takes a long time. Chart 4 shows the significant lag between mining’s higher product prices, which indicate rising demand and tighter supply, and improved output and investment in the sector.  The industrial sector’s capacity utilization rate remains elevated. China’s manufacturers can ramp up output more easily compared with mining enterprises. However, both manufacturing investment growth and output in volume have been falling (Chart 5). The wide gap between manufacturing input and output prices means that the profit margin among producers of manufacturing goods has been squeezed, giving them little incentive to expand business operations (Chart 6). Chart 5Manufacturing Investment Growth And Output Volume Have Been Falling Chart 6The Gap Between Chinese Manufacturing Input And Output Prices Reached Multi-Year High In addition, PPI inflation may be slow to decline for the following reasons: Coal futures prices have been clobbered since mid-October in the wake of government regulatory measures to curb speculation in the domestic commodity exchange market (Chart 7). However, the plunge does not solve the supply shortage issue. Coal prices at China’s major ports have been trending sideways and remain at historic highs (Chart 8). Chart 7Regulators Have Squashed Coal Price Speculations In Commodity Exchanges... Chart 8...But Coal Prices At Ports Remain High   Regulators have allowed electricity producers to boost prices by as much as 20% to industrial users. We estimate that a 20% increase in electricity prices can add anywhere from half to one percentage point to PPI. The recovery in the global service sector will provide support to oil prices (Chart 9). BCA’s Commodity and Energy Strategy service expects energy prices to soften in the next 12 months, but not by as much as the markets are discounting. Our latest forecast sets Brent crude oil at an average $81/bbl in 2021Q4, $80/bbl in 2022 (versus market expectations of $77/bbl) and $81/bbl in 2023 (versus market expectations of $71/bbl) (Chart 10). Chart 9Oil Prices Find Support From Recovery In Global Service Activity China’s domestic demand has weakened, particularly in the construction sector. Prices for steel rebar, iron ore and cooper have all rolled over and/or fallen sharply (Chart 11). Nonetheless, the prices remain well above pre-pandemic levels and policy-induced production cuts may limit the downside. Labor shortages in China’s urban areas have not improved. Reverse migration has increased since early last year when China imposed travel restrictions to contain domestic COVID transmission. Workers from rural areas opted to remain in their hometowns rather than return to work in urban areas. As of Q3 this year, there were still about 2 million fewer migrant workers than in the pre-COVID years, which has exacerbated an urban labor shortage that existed before the pandemic (Chart 12). Chart 11Commodity Prices In China Have Rolled Over, But Downside May Be Limited Chart 12Migrant Workers Are Slow To Return To Urban Jobs Bottom Line: PPI should peak in the next one to two quarters as supply bottlenecks ease and the base factor wanes. However, China’s industrial capacity and labor market remain tight. Producer inflationary pressures may sustain longer than investors expect. Passing On Costs To Consumers Chart 13Households Are Paying Higher Prices For Durable Goods And Daily Necessities The weakness in demand from Chinese households has kept consumer price inflation subdued so far this year. Nonetheless, Chinese producers have started to pass on supply-side cost pressures to consumers, both domestic and foreign. Rising raw material costs have pushed up the price of Chinese consumer durable goods, such as home appliances (Chart 13). Consumer prices for fuel have reached the highest level since the data collection started in 2016. The cost of consumer daily necessities is also climbing: households are paying more for utilities (water, electricity and fuel) compared with pre-pandemic years and prices are at 2013 highs. Escalating electricity prices will further strengthen inflationary pressures on the CPI. While residential electricity costs are strictly regulated in China and are unlikely to rise in the near future, price inflation passthroughs will be mainly via higher costs on both consumer goods and services. If the 20% increase in electricity costs among Chinese manufacturers is passed onto consumers, it could potentially push up the CPI by about 0.2 -0.4 percentage points. The cost of food and vegetables has also jumped since early October. Given the high likelihood of La Niña this winter, food inflation could further mount and potentially push the headline CPI close to the PBoC’s 3% inflation target next year. The recovery in China’s service sector has lagged due to domestic COVID flareups and subsequent lockdowns (Chart 14A and 14B). However, service CPI has recovered to above its pre-pandemic level, with strong rebounds in tourism and transportation (Chart 15). Given that China is accelerating vaccine boosters, an improvement in the domestic COVID situation next year could further support the service sector’s consumption and prices.   Chart 14AService Sector Recovery In China Has Lagged... Chart 14BService Sector Recovery In China Has Lagged... Chart 15...But Prices Have Not Chart 16Chinese Export Growth Remained Buyout Through October China’s exporters are passing on inflation to their foreign customers too. Newly released trade data highlights buoyant export growth through October (Chart 16). Even though goods consumption in the US will likely converge to its long-term trend next year, inventories are at multi-year lows while global industrial production growth remains well above trend (Chart 17). China’s export growth may stay strong in the next two quarters, as suggested by our regression-based modelling (Chart 18). Exporters have been charging US and global customers less than average prices (Chart 19). Robust demand for consumer and capital goods from the US and Europe should give China’s exporters sustained pricing power. Chart 17Extremely Low Inventories In The US Will Benefit Chinese Exports Chart 18Above-Trend Growth In Global Industrial Production Will Also Support Chinese Exports Bottom Line: China’s producers will continue to pass on inflation to their domestic and foreign customers. Chart 19Chinese Export Prices Are Below Global Average Chart 20Favor CSI500 Index Over A-Shares Investment Conclusions China’s authorities will unlikely use policy measures to cool domestic demand, but they will be constrained by lingering inflationary risks driven by external consumption and supply-side pressures in the next six months. Monetary and fiscal policies will ease to counter the slowdown in the economy, but reflationary measures will be gradual. We expect the money and credit impulse to bottom in Q4, but the rebound will be subdued. As such, domestic demand will remain sluggish and economic growth will likely decelerate faster than the onshore market has currently discounted. While we maintain a cautious stance on Chinese stocks in general, we continue to favor the CSI500 Index relative to the broader A-share market. External demand growth may remain above trend in the next six months. The CSI500 has a larger exposure to the global economy and lower valuation relative to China’s broad onshore market, and should still have some upside potentials. (Chart 20).   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance

  Nearly two-thirds of the S&P 500 companies reported their Q3 earnings, and the earnings season is drawing to a close. 83% of companies have beaten the street expectations with an average earnings surprise standing at 11% (40% earnings growth vs. 29% expected on October 1, 2021). Sales beats are only marginally worse: 77% of the companies have exceeded expectations with an average sales surprise of 3%. Quarter-on-quarter earnings growth is 0.25% exceeding expected 6% contraction. Compared to Q3-2019, eps CAGR is 12%. Chart 1 Financials, Energy, and Health Care have delivered the largest earnings surprises. Financials have done well on the back of the robust M&A activity, while the unfolding energy crisis has lifted the overall S&P 500 Energy complex. Pent-up demand for the elective medical procedures has translated into strong Health Care earnings.   Industrials and Materials were amongst the worst: China-related headwinds continue to weigh on both of these sectors. However, some analysts expect China to ease in Q1-2022, providing a tailwind for these sectors.  Most companies commented that supply chain bottlenecks and soaring shipping costs are the major headwinds. However, as we see, most have navigated a challenging economic environment swimmingly. Strong pricing power and operating leverage have preserved margins and earnings so far. Looking ahead, companies’ ability to raise prices further is waning (Chart 1), while costs continue marching up. These factors are the ubiquitous reasons for a negative guidance – 52.6% of companies are guiding lower for Q4-2021 (compare that to 32.7% previous quarter). Bottom Line: Companies are exceeding analysts’ expectations both in terms of sales and earnings growth.