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Highlights Financial markets in both mainstream EM and China are undergoing an adjustment that is not yet complete. EM equity and currency valuations are neutral. When valuations are neutral, the profit and liquidity cycles become the key drivers of share prices. Both these factors are currently headwinds to equity prices. Our investment strategy is to remain defensive going into the new year. Yet, the longer-term outlook is brighter. We see with high odds that the first half of the year will present an opportunity to turn positive on EM assets in absolute terms, and upgrade EM versus DM within global equity and fixed-income portfolios. Our checklist of fundamental factors that will cause us to turn bullish on EM and China include: (1) significant stimulus in China leading to a strong recovery in its credit impulse; (2) a rollover in Latin America’s core inflation that will open the door for monetary policy easing in these economies; and (3) the Fed abandoning its plans to hike rates, creating conditions for durable US dollar weakness. Feature Introduction: Beyond Omicron There is low visibility regarding the Omicron variant of the COVID-19 virus’s impact on societies and economies. We do not pretend to be experts in virology and on pandemics. So, in this 2022 outlook, we will focus on the macro fundamentals that go beyond Omicron. If the latter proves to be very disruptive for many economies, EM risk assets will sell off materially in the coming weeks. If Omicron proves to be a non-issue, macro fundamentals will prevail. In this case (and if our analysis is correct) EM risk assets will still fare poorly, at least in the early months of 2022. Chart 1The EM Selloff Has Been Occurring Since February 2021 Notably, the cross rate between the Swedish krona and Swiss franc correlates well with EM share prices and both had already been falling well before Omicron arrived (Chart 1). Overall, our investment strategy is to remain defensive going into the new year. Nevertheless, odds are significant that in H1 2022 there will be a buying opportunity in EM assets in absolute terms, and a better entry point to upgrade EM relative to DM within global equity and fixed-income portfolios. China’s Business Cycle And Macro Policy Will China ease policy substantially? It depends on how bad the economy, financial markets and business/consumer sentiment get. Beijing has already initiated piecemeal monetary and fiscal easing. However, if the growth slowdown is gradual and orderly, and financial markets do not panic, then policy easing will be measured. On the contrary, if growth tumbles sharply, business and consumer confidence deteriorate markedly and onshore share prices sell off hard, then policymakers will accelerate the stimulus. In a nutshell, substantial policy easing is not likely unless Chinese onshore stocks experience a meaningful deterioration. In the meantime, the Mainland economy will continue disappointing, and the path of least resistance for China-related plays is down: The annual change in excess reserves – that PBOC injects into the banking system – leads the credit impulse by six months (Chart 2, top panel). The former has stabilized but has not yet turned up. Hence, in the near term, the credit impulse will be stabilizing at very low levels but will not revive materially until spring 2022. This entails more growth disappointments in China’s old economy (Chart 2, bottom panel). In turn, the average of the manufacturing PMI’s new orders and backlog of orders series heralds more downside in EM non-TMT share prices (Chart 3). Chart 2China: An Economic Revival Is Not Imminent Chart 3EM Non-TMT Stocks Remain At Risk Property construction will not recover quickly. Marginal easing of real estate regulations and restrictions will not be sufficient to revive animal spirits among property developers and buyers. As we argued in a recent special report on the property market, real estate in China benefited from the biggest carry trade in the world over the past decade. With borrowing costs below the pace of house price appreciation, property developers in China have done what any business would do: they borrowed as much as they could and accumulated real estate assets in the forms of land, incomplete construction, and completed but unsold properties. Chart 4The Carry Trade In China's Real Estate The top panel of Chart 4 illustrates that developers have been starting many more projects than they have been completing. As a result, their unfinished construction has ballooned (Chart 4, bottom panel). Such a business model was profitable since developers’ borrowing costs were below the pace of real estate asset price appreciation. This dynamic will reverse going forward: real estate asset price appreciation will be below developers’ borrowing costs. Thus, property developers have every incentive to shed their assets as quickly as possible. This will discourage new land investment and new construction. In brief, odds are rising that the property market downtrend will be an extended one. In 2015, when property inventories swelled (Chart 4, bottom panel), it took outright monetization of residential properties by the PBOC through the PSL program1 to revive real estate demand and construction. Currently, anything short of aggressive monetization or a very large policy boost will be insufficient to reignite property market sentiment. Thus, the real estate market will continue to struggle. Chart 5 illustrates that real estate developer financing has dried up, heralding a significant contraction in floor space completion, i.e., construction activity. This will weigh on industrial commodities (Chart 5, bottom panel). Even if the government approves a larger special bond quota for local governments, traditional infrastructure spending is unlikely to accelerate meaningfully (Chart 6). The basis is that local governments will continue facing financing constraints from an ongoing slump in their land sales. The RMB 3.65 trillion special bond issuance quota in 2021 accounted for only 18% of local government on- and off-budget revenues. Meanwhile, land sales by local governments account for 40% of their on- and off-budget revenues. As the property market travails continue, local governments will not be able to materially increase traditional infrastructure spending.  Chart 5Less Funding = Less Completions = Less Commodity Demand Chart 6China: Traditional Infrastructure Has Been Weak In sum, the Chinese economy has developed formidable downward momentum that will not be easy to reverse. That said, authorities will likely begin injecting more stimulus in 2022 to secure a stable economy and financial markets in the second half of 2022, ahead of the important Party Congress. Bottom Line: The slowdown in the Chinese old economy will continue for now with negative ramifications for China-related financial markets. A buying opportunity for China plays leveraged to its old economy is likely sometime in 2022. Chinese Internet Stocks Chart 7Chinese Internet Stocks Are Not Cheap The outlook for Chinese TMT stocks remains uninspiring. We maintain that the regulatory changes affecting Chinese internet stocks are structural rather than cyclical in nature. There could be periods when the pace of regulatory clampdown eases, but these regulations will not be rolled back in any meaningful way. While Chinese platform companies’ equity valuations have already de-rated, these stocks are not cheap: their trailing and forward P/E ratios stand at 35 and 30, respectively (Chart 7). Their multiples will compress further for the following reasons: Their business models have to change because of regulatory requirements. Higher uncertainty about their future business models currently entails a higher equity risk premium. Authorities will cap these companies’ profitability like regulators do with monopolies and oligopolies, which heralds a lower return on equity. In addition, in line with the common prosperity policy, these companies will perform social duties – redistributing profits from shareholders to the society. All these will lower their profitability, warranting permanently lower multiples than those in the past 10 years. Beijing’s involvement in their management and the prioritization of national and geopolitical objectives over shareholder interests will lead foreign investors to dis-invest from these companies. Some large companies face non-trivial risks of delisting from the US. Last week, Beijing reportedly asked Didi to delist from the US due to concerns over its data security. For very different reasons, US and Chinese authorities do not want Chinese companies to be listed in the US. And when Chinese and US authorities do not want to see some of these stocks listed in the US, they will not be. Odds are rising that a few of them might be delisted in the coming years. In such a scenario, US institutional investors will offload their holdings of these companies. Chart 8China: Online Retail Sales Have Slowed Down In addition to the risk to multiples, these internet companies’ profits are also under threat. Chart 8 shows that online retail sales of goods and services have been lackluster compared to their torrid pace in the past 10 years. Bottom Line: The path of least resistance for Chinese internet/platform share prices remains down. Mainstream EM Economies In the majority of EM economies ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (herein referred to as mainstream EM), domestic demand will remain in the doldrums in H1 2022: Monetary policy has tightened in Latin America and Russia while real interest rates are elevated/restrictive in the ASEAN region. In countries where central banks have been hiking rates, domestic demand is bound to decelerate (Chart 9, top panel). In fact, domestic demand remains below pre-pandemic levels in many mainstream EMs (Chart 9, bottom panel). Rate hikes and/or high borrowing costs in real terms will continue to weigh on money and credit growth. The annual growth rates of broad money and bank loans have already reached record lows in both nominal and real terms (Chart 10). These are equity market-weighted aggregates for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan. Chart 9Mainstream EM: Domestic Demand Is At Risk Of A Relapse Chart 10Mainstream EM: Tepid Money And Credit Growth Chart 11Mainstream EM: No Fiscal Reprieve In 2022 For the same universe, the fiscal thrust in 2022 will be around -1% of GDP (Chart 11). Chart 12 illustrates the 2022 fiscal thrust – defined as the yearly change in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit – for individual countries. Only Turkey is projected to have a small positive fiscal thrust next year. The slowdown in China’s old economy will weigh on Asian economies and commodity producers elsewhere. Table 1 demonstrates that China is the top destination for Asian and commodity producing economies’ exports. Finally, political uncertainty and volatility will remain high in Latin America while geopolitical tensions will linger and escalate from time to time around Russia and Taiwan. We do not think political and geopolitical risks are fully reflected in these financial markets. This leaves these bourses vulnerable to these risks. Bottom Line: Economic growth in mainstream EM economies will disappoint, at least in H1 2022. What We Are Looking To Turn Bullish On EM Assets? Equities: A combination of the following will make us consider issuing a buy recommendation on EM equities: Significant stimulus in China leading to a strong recovery in its credit impulse (shown in Chart 2 above). A rollover in Latin America’s core inflation that will open the door for monetary policy easing in these economies. Regarding indicators, we would need to see all three of the following: EM M1 growth accelerates (Chart 13) Analysts’ net EPS expectations drop to their previous lows (Chart 14) Investor sentiment on EM equities declines to its previous lows (Chart 15). EM equity valuations are neutral in absolute terms. When valuations are neutral, share prices could rise or fall. In these cases, the profit cycle is the key driver of share prices. EM equity market cap-weighted narrow money (M1) growth suggests that EM EPS growth will decelerate well into 2022 (Chart 13 above). Such a profit slump is not yet priced in according to Chart 14. Chart 13An EM Profit Slump Is Imminent Chart 14Analysts Are Not Pricing In An EM Profit Slump Chart 15Investor Sentiment On EM Stocks Is Not Downbeat Chart 16Mainstream EM Currencies: Spot And Total Return Indexes Exchange Rates: The mainstream EM equity market cap-weighted currency spot rate versus the US dollar is not far from its 2020 spring lows. On a total return basis – when carry is taken into account – mainstream EM currencies are still above their March 2020 lows (Chart 16). Chart 17Mainstream EM: Real Effective Exchange Rates Critically, EM currencies are not particularly cheap (Chart 17). Given the lingering headwinds, they are likely to depreciate further. The mainstream EM aggregate real effective exchange rate will likely drop to one or two standard deviations below its mean before these currencies find a bottom (Chart 17). Barring a scenario in which the Omicron variant becomes a major drag on the US economy, the Federal Reserve will maintain its recent hawkish rhetoric due to rising core US inflation. This will support the US dollar and weigh on EM currencies. If Omicron produces a major selloff in financial markets, EM currencies will depreciate. In a nutshell, weak domestic demand and return on capital, political volatility, a slowdown in China and potentially lower commodity prices will all continue depressing EM currencies in the early months of 2022. In the following section about local rates, we list signposts that will make us turn positive on EM currencies Local Rates: EM local rates have gone up a great deal and they offer good value. However, as long as EM currencies do not find a floor, interest rates in high-yield local bond markets will not decline. Critically, US dollar returns on EM local currency bonds are primarily determined by exchange rates. Hence, a buying opportunity for international investors in EM high-yield local bonds will coincide with a bottom in their currencies. We recommend turning positive on mainstream EM currencies versus the US dollar if two out of these three conditions are met: The Fed abandons its intention to hike rates. Significant stimulus in China leading to a strong recovery in its credit impulse Mainstream EM’s aggregate real effective exchange rate drops more than one standard deviation below its mean (Chart 17). Chart 18EM Credit Spreads Are Driven By The EM Business Cycle And Currencies Credit Markets: As we discussed in a report published earlier this year titled A Primer on EM USD Bonds, the two key drivers of EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads are economic growth and the exchange rate (Chart 18). A positive turn on the EM/China business cycles and their currencies will make us immediately bullish on EM sovereign credit. As for high-yield Chinese USD property developers’ bonds, they are not a buy given their extremely high indebtedness and the dismal outlook for real estate. Investment Strategy Odds are that there will be a buying opportunity in EM equities, fixed income and currencies in 2022. The checklists we highlighted above outline what we will be monitoring to make us turn positive on EM equities, local rates, exchange rates and credit. Our current investment stance is as follows: There is likely to be more downside in EM equities in absolute terms. They will also continue underperforming their DM peers. We downgraded EM equities from neutral to underweight on March 25, 2021 and this strategy remains intact. Within the EM benchmark, our overweights are Korea, Singapore, China (favoring A shares over investable stocks), Vietnam, Russia, central Europe and Mexico. Our equity underweights are Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia. We recommend a neutral allocation to all other bourses in mainstream EM. A word on India, Korea and Mexico is warranted. We will publish a report on India next week. Concerning our overweight in the Korean bourse, lower DRAM prices and China’s slowdown have weighed on its performance in 2021 (Chart 19). However, weakness in semiconductor prices will prove to be short lived as the semiconductor industry is in a structural upswing. Besides, Korea and Mexico are two countries in the EM universe that will benefit from the US industrial boom – one of our major multi-year themes. Chart 20 shows that Korea’s relative equity performance versus the overall EM benchmark closely tracks global industrials relative share prices versus global non-TMT stocks. Chart 19A Soft Spot In The DRAM Industry Chart 20Overweight The KOSPI Within The EM Equity Space The path of least resistance for EM currencies versus the US dollar is presently down. We continue to recommend shorting the following basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar: BRL, CLP, COP, PEN, ZAR, KRW, THB and PHP. Last week, we recommended adding the Indonesian rupiah to this list and today we are booking profits on the short position in TRY. The currencies that we currently favor are CNY, INR, MYR, SGD, TWD, RUB, CZK and MXN. In local rates, we have been betting on the yield curve flattening in Mexico and Russia, have been recommending receiving 10-year swap rates in China and Malaysia as well as paying 10-year rates in the Czech Republic. In the EM credit space, we continue to recommend underweighting EM versus US corporate credit, quality adjusted. As with equities, we downgraded this allocation from neutral to underweight on March 25, 2021. Within the EM credit space, we favor sovereign versus corporate credit, quality adjusted. For EM sovereign credit and domestic bond portfolios, our recommended allocations across various countries are shown in the tables enclosed below. Finally, today we are closing our volatility trades: long EM equity volatility and EM currency volatility. Both positions were initiated on February 4, 2021 and have been profitable.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1Pledged Supplementary Lending was in effect in 2014-2018: The PBOC lent at very low interest rates to the three policy banks who in turn re-lent to local governments and regional property developers (mainly in tier-2 and smaller cities). These entities then bought slums from their owners, putting cash in their hands to purchase new and better properties. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act will increase US government non-defense spending to around 3% of GDP, a level comparable to the 1980s-90s and larger than the 2010s.   Democrats are increasingly likely to pass their ~$1.75 trillion social spending bill, with odds at 65%. The budget reconciliation process necessary to pass this bill is also necessary to raise the national debt limit by December 3, so Congress is unlikely to fail.    The Democratic spending bills will reduce fiscal drag very marginally in 2022-24 and will occasionally increase fiscal thrust thereafter. Republicans are unlikely to repeal much of the spending in coming years. Limited Big Government is a new strategic theme. The federal government is permanently taking a larger role in the economy – but this role will still be limited by voters, who do not favor socialism. Biden’s approval rating will stabilize at a low level. Immigration, crime, and especially inflation will determine the Democrats’ fate in the 2022 midterms. Gridlock is likely. The stock market has already priced the infrastructure bill and it will continue to rally on the rumor that reconciliation will pass. But growth has outperformed value, contrary to expectations. Feature Democrats in the House of Representatives finally passed the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which consists of $550 billion in brand new spending and $650 billion in a continuation of existing levels of spending to cover the next ten years. The legislation passed with 228 votes in the House, ten more than needed, due to 13 Republican votes, making it “bipartisan” (Chart 1). The contents of the bill are shown in Table 1. Republicans supported the bill because of its focus on traditional infrastructure – roads, bridges, ports – but they also agreed to more modern elements such as $65 billion on broadband Internet and $36 billion on electric vehicles and environmental remediation. Implementation of the bill will be felt in 2023-24, in time for the presidential election, as committees will need to be set up to identify and approve projects. Table 1Itemized Infrastructure Plan While $550 billion is not a lot in a world of multi-trillion dollar stimulus bills, nevertheless it makes for a 34% increase in federal non-defense investment to levels consistent with the 1980s-90s (Chart 2). The new government spending will amount to 3% of GDP per year over the next ten years, a non-trivial amount of stimulus even though the big picture of the budget deficit remains about the same (Chart 3). The passage of the infrastructure bill will increase, not decrease, the odds of Biden and the Democrats passing their $1.75 trillion social spending bill via the partisan budget reconciliation process. Subjectively we put the odds at 65% in the wake of infrastructure, although recent events suggest that the odds could be put even higher. While left-wing Democrats failed to link the infrastructure and social spending bills, as we argued, nevertheless the passage of infrastructure was a requirement for the key swing voter in the Senate, Joe Manchin of West Virginia. Manchin is negotiating on the reconciliation bill, suggesting he will vote for it, and he will ultimately capitulate because he will not want to be blamed for a default on the US national debt. The US will hit the national debt ceiling on December 3 and the only reliable means for the Democrats to raise the ceiling is reconciliation. The other critical moderate Democratic senator, Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, seems to have capitulated, after securing a removal of corporate and high-income individual tax hikes from the bill. Far-left senators might make a last stand, holding up reconciliation and winning some last-minute concession. Six House Democrats refused to vote for the infrastructure bill (including New York House member Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez). However, progressives lost leverage after the Democrats’ losses in the off-year elections. Moreover the debt ceiling will force the hand of the progressives as well as the moderates. Any such hurdles will ultimately be steamrolled by the president and Democratic Party leaders. Combined with infrastructure, the net deficit impact of the infrastructure and reconciliation bills will range from $461 billion to $1 trillion (Table 2). Our scenarios vary based on how much credence we give to Democratic revenue raisers, since many of these are gimmicks and accounting tricks to make the bill look more fiscally responsible than it really is. At the most the US is looking at an increase in the budget deficit of less than 0.5% of GDP per year in the coming years. Table 2Biden Administration Tax-And-Spend Scenarios Investors should think of Biden’s legislative efforts as very marginally reducing fiscal drag rather than increasing fiscal thrust, at least in the short run. The budget deficit is normalizing after hitting unprecedented peacetime extremes at the height of the global pandemic and social lockdowns. The shrinking deficit subtracts from aggregate demand in 2022-2024. But the new spending bills will remove a small part of that drag during these years, as highlighted in Chart 4. More importantly the US Congress is signaling that fiscal policy is back in action and that fiscal retrenchment is a long way off. Over the long run, new spending will add marginally to fiscal thrust and aggregate demand, suggesting that the US government’s contribution to the economy will grow a bit in the latter part of the 2020s, namely if Democratic legislation survives the 2024 election. For the most part it probably will, as it is very difficult to repeal entitlements or slash government spending even with Republican majorities, as witnessed with the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) in 2017. Chart 5Polarization Of Economic Sentiment Declining The polarization of economic sentiment – i.e. divergence in partisan views of the economy – has fallen since the pandemic and will likely continue to fall as the business cycle continues (Chart 5). Both presidential candidates offered infrastructure packages – they only differed on how to fund it. With the government taking a larger role in the economy – and yet the Republicans likely to rebound in future elections – the result is one of our new strategic themes: limited big government. The heyday of “limited government,” from President Ronald Reagan through George W. Bush, has ended. But the new popular and elite consensus in favor of “Big Government” can be overrated – the US political system is defined by checks and balances that will limit the pace and magnitude of the big government trend, and at times even seem to reverse it. Hence investors should think of US fiscal policy and government role in the economy as limited big government. Political Implications Of Bipartisan Infrastructure President Biden’s approval rating has collapsed since this summer when he suffered from perceptions of incompetence on both the delta variant of COVID-19 and the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Democratic infighting, which delayed the passage of his legislation, also hurt him (Chart 6). However, these are all passing narratives, with the exception of the incompetence narrative, which could become a lasting threat to Biden if not addressed. Biden’s signing of the infrastructure bill will stabilize his approval rating. Biden will probably end up somewhere between Presidents Obama and Trump. Voters will most likely upgrade their assessment of his handling of the economy over the coming year, at least marginally. But on foreign policy he will remain extremely vulnerable since he faces numerous immediate crises in coming years. American presidential disapproval has trended upwards since the 1950s of President Eisenhower. Disapproval peaks during recessions and wars. As the economy improves, Biden’s disapproval will fall, but foreign crises and wars are likely in today’s fraught geopolitical environment (Chart 7). A few opinion polls suggest that Republicans have taken the lead over the Democrats in generic opinion polling regarding support for the parties in Congress. These polls are outliers and may or may not become the norm over the next year. Democrats have fallen from their peaks but Republicans still suffer from significant internal divisions (Chart 8). Voters continue to identify mostly as political independents, with a notable downtrend in the share of voters who see themselves as Republicans or Democrats in recent years (Chart 9). Independent voters have marked leanings, right or left. While the leftward lean of independents has peaked, they are not leaning to the right. The infrastructure bill and even reconciliation bill will support Democratic identification. But the sharp rise in immigration, crime, and potentially persistent inflation will support Republicans. These last will become the critical political issues going forward. The democratic socialist or progressive agenda has already been checked by voters and Democrats can only double down on that agenda at their own peril. The infrastructure bill’s passage may give a boost to perceptions of Democratic odds of maintaining the Senate in the 2022 midterm elections – that question is still up in the air, even as the House is very likely to return to Republican control (Chart 10). Chart 9Independent Voters Still Rule An under-the-radar beneficiary of the bipartisan infrastructure bill is Congress itself. Since 2014, public approval of Congress has gradually recovered from historic lows. The level is still low, at 27%, but the upward trend is notable for suggesting that a fiscally active Congress gains popular approval (Chart 11). New social spending will also increase Congress’s image, first for “doing something,” and second for expanding the social safety net, which more than half of voters will approve.  Partisan gridlock after 2022 could reverse the trend, as Republicans may find or invent a reason to impeach President Biden in retribution for President Trump’s impeachments. But our best guess is that Congress will remain above its low point as long as fiscal support – limited big government – remains intact. Aggressive tax hikes or spending cuts, or a national debt default, could reverse the recovery of this institution. Investment Takeaways The infrastructure bill’s passage may have supported the recent rally in stocks but it is not the main driver. Infrastructure stocks had largely discounted the bill’s passage by spring and our BCA Infrastructure Basket has underperformed the broad market since then. In absolute terms, infrastructure stocks have reached new highs and show a rising trajectory (Chart 12). The infrastructure bill has not delivered as expected when it comes to sectors or investment styles. Cyclicals have outperformed defensives, as expected. But value stocks have hit new lows relative to growth stocks, contrary to our expectation this year (Chart 13). Chart 12Infrastructure Was Already Priced Chart 13Wall Street Looks Well Beyond Infrastructure External factors – namely China’s policy tightening and bumps in the global recovery – weighed on cyclicals and value plays, especially relative to Big Tech (Chart 14). Growth stocks have surged yet again on low bond yields, positive earnings surprises, and secular trends like innovation and digitization. The American economy looks robust as the year draws to a close. The service sector is recovering smartly from the delta variant. Non-manufacturing business activity is surging and new orders are exploding upward relative to inventories (Chart 15). Service sector employment has suffered from shortages. Chart 14External Factors Weigh On Infrastructure Plays Chart 15Service Sector Recovery Underway Inflation risks are trickling into consumer and voter consciousness as Christmas approaches and prices rise at the pump (Chart 16). The Democrats’ two big bills will mitigate the damage they face in next year’s midterm elections – the Senate is still in competition. But a persistent inflation problem will overwhelm their legislative accomplishments. Voters will connect the dots between large deficit spending and inflationary surprises (not to mention any Democratic changes that reinforce the extremely dovish stance of the Fed). The normal political cycle will count heavily against the Democrats in 2022 regardless of inflation. But voters simultaneously face historic spikes in immigration and crime – and the former, at least, will get worse and not better over the next 12 months. Predicting inflation is a mug’s game but wage growth suggests it will remain a substantial risk in 2022 – and the structural shift in favor of big government, even if it is limited big government due to the political cycle, is inflationary on the margin. Chart 16Voters Awakening To Inflation   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix  

  Nearly two-thirds of the S&P 500 companies reported their Q3 earnings, and the earnings season is drawing to a close. 83% of companies have beaten the street expectations with an average earnings surprise standing at 11% (40% earnings growth vs. 29% expected on October 1, 2021). Sales beats are only marginally worse: 77% of the companies have exceeded expectations with an average sales surprise of 3%. Quarter-on-quarter earnings growth is 0.25% exceeding expected 6% contraction. Compared to Q3-2019, eps CAGR is 12%. Chart 1 Financials, Energy, and Health Care have delivered the largest earnings surprises. Financials have done well on the back of the robust M&A activity, while the unfolding energy crisis has lifted the overall S&P 500 Energy complex. Pent-up demand for the elective medical procedures has translated into strong Health Care earnings.   Industrials and Materials were amongst the worst: China-related headwinds continue to weigh on both of these sectors. However, some analysts expect China to ease in Q1-2022, providing a tailwind for these sectors.  Most companies commented that supply chain bottlenecks and soaring shipping costs are the major headwinds. However, as we see, most have navigated a challenging economic environment swimmingly. Strong pricing power and operating leverage have preserved margins and earnings so far. Looking ahead, companies’ ability to raise prices further is waning (Chart 1), while costs continue marching up. These factors are the ubiquitous reasons for a negative guidance – 52.6% of companies are guiding lower for Q4-2021 (compare that to 32.7% previous quarter). Bottom Line: Companies are exceeding analysts’ expectations both in terms of sales and earnings growth.    

Special Report

This week we continue our series of thematic Special Reports. Over the past few months, we have covered the EV Revolution and Generation Z. In this report, we conduct a “deep dive” analysis of Cybersecurity as an investment theme for equity investors. Spoiler Alert: We recommend Cybersecurity as a structural and tactical overweight. For a shorter investment horizon, the recent pullback and deflated valuation premium present a good entry-point. A Primer On Cybersecurity What Is Cybersecurity? Cybersecurity focuses on protecting computers, networks, programs, and data from unauthorized and/or unintended access. A wide range of malicious activities fall under the umbrella of cybercrime: Theft and damage of personal and financial data, theft of money, embezzlement, demands for ransom, theft of intellectual property, and illicit and illegal use of computers' processing power or cloud storage. The methods the hackers use are breaches, phishing, privileged-access credential abuse, and endpoint security attacks. Cybersecurity Index ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR) is a NASDAQ index launched in 2010, that encapsulates publicly traded companies that operate in the Cybersecurity space, whether by providing infrastructure or services. Cybersecurity is a theme that spans several different industries: It is dominated by Software (57%) and Computer Services (29%). The remaining 14% are split between Telecommunications Equipment and Defense (Chart 1). The space includes both legacy providers and aggressive cloud-only newcomers. Cybersecurity Vs Software Services The S&P 500 Software and Services Industry Group Index (Software and Services) is HXR’s best proxy – the correlation of monthly returns is 65%. Compared to Software and Services, HXR index performance has been volatile and more recently underwhelming. Cybersecurity was underperforming for the past six months (Chart 2). There are several reasons for Cybersecurity lagging Software and Services. Chart 2Cybersecurity Has Underperformed Software And Services First, companies in the former are much younger and smaller than in the latter (Chart 3), and the size effect has been at play. Second, the industry composition of the two indexes is different, with HXR's allocations to Telecom and Defense sectors being slightly more defensive in nature. Last, and most important, Cybersecurity stocks surged early in the pandemic on the back of lockdowns and a ubiquitous shift to remote work, and hence some of the performance and profits growth were “borrowed” from the future. Chart 3Cybersecurity Theme Is Exposed To The Size Effect Cybercrime Statistics Cybercrime statistics are sobering, with the number of occurrences increasing fast, and financial damage reaching catastrophic amounts. Cybercrime will cost the world $6 trillion in 2021, and $10.5 trillion annually by 2025,1 representing one of the greatest transfers of wealth in history. The average total cost of a data breach is $4.24 million in 2021, which is up from $3.86 million in 2020.2 US ransomware attacks cost an estimated $915 million in 2020.3 93% of companies deal with rogue cloud apps usage.4 86.2% of surveyed organizations were affected by a successful cyberattack.5 The cost and damage of cyberattacks underpins why Cybersecurity has risen from being an accessory to becoming a “must-have” for companies’ survival (Charts 4 and 5). Chart 5Cybercrime Losses Spur Demand For Cybersecurity   Key Cybersecurity Verticals And Companies Cybersecurity has evolved over time. Legacy non-cloud incumbents that used to offer on-premises anti-virus software, such as NortonLifeLock, are morphing into or giving way to cloud-based solutions and software-as-a-service (SaaS) providers. These cutting-edge security players leverage Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to preempt threats, as opposed to reacting to them. In addition, the advantage of the cloud-based solutions is that there is no hardware to buy or manage. The Cybersecurity universe can be split into three major categories: Physical Network Infrastructure, Digital Network Infrastructure, and Cloud And Data Security. Physical Network Infrastructure Companies in this segment provide a mix of digital and physical solutions including supplying communication appliances such as routers and other network hardware. This segment has two incumbents: Cisco Systems (CSCO) and Juniper Networks (JNPR). Digital Network Infrastructure Companies focus on providing broad server and network security against a wide range of attacks. Product offerings may also include firewalls and AI threat detection. A10 Networks (ATEN) and Akamai Technologies (AKAM) operate in this segment. Cloud And Data Security The key verticals of Cloud And Data Security are Endpoint Protection, Secure Web Gateways, Identity Access Management, and Detection and Blocking of malicious emails. Most companies in this space offer cloud-based solutions and SaaS and have products in each of the four data security categories. Companies that roll up a variety of security software functions into a cloud- based service comprise a broad segment called Secure Access Service Edge, or SASE. Fortinet (FTNT), Check Point Software (CHKP), Palo Alto Networks (PANW), and Zscaler (ZS) are all SASE. These companies replace existing gateways, virtual private networks (VPN), edge routers, and firewalls. SASE is expected to have 57% growth in spending in 2021, with 40% compounded growth through 2024.6 Endpoint Protection Platforms help customers secure end-user devices such as mobile devices, laptops, and servers. To be one step ahead of cyber adversaries, these cloud-based companies offer SaaS that deploys AI and ML algorithms to detect and predict threats based on the analysis of the vast data collected across the entire platform. Crowdstrike, Check Point, and SentinelOne are the segment leaders. Secure Web Gateways prevent unsecured traffic from entering an internal network through external web applications. This is executed by the providers acting as a middleman so that users can bypass their internal networks to connect to the applications by leveraging providers data-cloud. These cloud-only companies’ SaaS and Firewall-as-a-Service secure customer access to internally and externally managed applications, such as email or customer relationship management. Fortinet, Zscaler, Palo Alto Networks (PANW), AvePoint (AVE), and Cloudflare (NET) are the best-of-breed players in this space. Identity Access Management (IAM) focuses on enabling access to networks only to authorized users. Multi-factor authentication, application programming interface (API) access management, and single sign-on (SSO) are a few identity solutions that fall under this vertical. Okta (OCTA) and Ping Identity (PING) are the leading players in this space. Their cloud native solutions offer access to all applications within a single portal using the same authentication. Detection And Blocking Of Malicious Emails – Companies in this segment detect and block emails that include known or unknown malware, malicious URLs, and impersonation of legitimate contacts. Mass and spear phishing is becoming a preferred gateway for cyber criminals and is becoming epidemic – 95% of cyberattacks use email. These providers complement traditional detection techniques with AI to identify fake logos and detect anomalous email patterns and high-risk links. Mimecast (MIME) and Check Point (CHKP) are active in this segment. Key Industry Drivers Digitization, Remote Work, And Shift To Cloud Increase Demand For Cybersecurity The pandemic-driven shift to remote work, broad-based migration to cloud computing, development of the Internet-of-Things – every new digital process and asset create new potential targets for hackers. The sophistication of the attacks is also on the rise, deploying AI, ML, and 5G. There appears also to be cooperation among different hacker groups. This year alone, high-profile data breaches, such as Kaseya, Accellion, Pulse Secure, and Solar Winds, affected universities, defense firms, S&P 500 companies, and government agencies. These developments, as troubling as they are, are a boon for Cybersecurity companies. Cybersecurity is becoming business-critical. Despite its celebrity status, this is an industry that is still in the early innings, and ubiquitous digitization requires increasingly more complex cyber defenses. Cyber-Space: A New Realm Of (Geo)Political Conflict Generally the risk of a major exogenous shock affecting global markets from a cyber incident is underrated (Table 1). The world is inherently an anarchic place because nations are sovereign and there is not a single world government to enforce international law. However, nations periodically work out codes of conduct and norms of behavior to impose limitations on conflict and chaos. The post-WWII and post-Cold War global order is an example. A tolerably functional international order is beneficial for global trade and investment flows. Increasingly international rules and norms are being challenged. The decline of the US and Europe in economic, technological, and military weight – relative to the rest of the world – has given rise to a “multipolar” distribution of power in which the rules of the road are contested. Disputes over sovereignty, territory, maritime rights, and air space have been escalating for over a decade in the areas around Russia, China, and the Mediterranean region. Table 1Cyber Event Underrated In Consensus View Of Global Risks Cyber-space is a new realm or domain of human activity. Because it is international, it is inherently ungovernable, and because it is new, nations have not had decades in which to establish basic rules or norms. It is very close to pure anarchy. Given that overall geopolitical competition is rising in the context of multipolarity, cyber-space is an attractive arena for nations to pursue their objectives because it presents fewer constraints – nations can act more independently and aggressively with limited accountability. Cyber gives nation-states (and their proxy groups) greater anonymity and plausible deniability. Russia can directly intervene in American social and political life through state-backed cyber agents, or it can condone the actions of criminal groups that conduct ransomware attacks. Nations can also use cyber tools to pursue state economic goals that align with broader strategic goals. For example, China can pursue technological upgrades for state-backed industry through cyber-theft. The trend for the foreseeable future is for governments to invest in Cybersecurity and cyber-capabilities in order to fortify this new and lawless realm of competition. Russia and China have attempted to seal off their cyber-space to prevent interference from foreign powers. They have also used cyber capabilities to take advantage of the relatively unregulated cyberspace of the liberal democracies. The democracies are now attempting to increase control over their own cyber domains. They need to protect critical infrastructure but also are increasingly focused on patrolling the ideological space. Finally, while nations are often deterred from aggression by conventional militaries, cyber-space creates an avenue to pursue interests aggressively with minimal risk of physical conflict. The US and Israel will continue to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program. Russia will continue to use cyber tools to try to reclaim dominance in the former Soviet Union. And China could resort to cyber-attacks against Taiwan if it is not yet willing to pursue an extremely difficult and risky amphibious invasion. Governments and corporations will deal with extreme uncertainty in this environment. They will have to invest in Cybersecurity. But they will also run the risk that at some point cyber-meddling will go too far and provoke real-world retaliation. President Biden reflected the sentiment of the US political establishment during a speech in July at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence: “I think it’s more likely we’re going to end up, if we end up in a war – a real shooting war with a major power – it’s going to be as a consequence of a cyber breach of great consequence and it’s increasing exponentially, the capabilities.”7 This risk will reinforce the need for more robust cyber defenses to prevent physical harm to a nation’s people and wealth. Hence what governments will not be able to do is penalize or break up their Cybersecurity corporations. Cyber firms will see strong public and private demand without the regulatory pressure that other tech companies (especially social media) will face. Corporate Spending On Cybersecurity Services Is Soaring According to IDC, the global Cybersecurity market is expected to grow from $125 billion in 2020 to $175 billion by 20248 at an 8.8% CAGR. After all, companies that purchased or implemented automated security features in their businesses can reduce potential cyber-attack losses by more than 50%, making it a worthwhile investment. Both large and small businesses are yet to fully implement Cybersecurity defenses. According to an IDG cybersecurity survey,9 91% of organizations are increasing their Cybersecurity budgets in 2021 (compared to 96% in 2020). Companies invest to prevent malicious attacks, and protect an increasingly distributed IT environment, and securely connect their remote workforce (Chart 6). According to an IBM security survey, only 25% of responders stated that they had fully implemented automated security. Clearly, demand for cyber defenses is poised for strong growth. Public Spending Commitments Will Fortify Cyber Defenses In response to the numerous breaches, the current US administration is placing a high priority on defensive cyber programs. Within the broader $6 trillion Biden budget request to Congress, $10 billion will be allocated to civilian government Cybersecurity in 2022 (Chart 7), bringing the total federal IT spending to just over $58 billion. Since 2017, US government departments have seen the Cybersecurity share of their basic discretionary funding rise steadily from 1.38% to 1.73%. The Biden administration’s broader legislative agenda includes expanding broadband Internet, building infrastructure, and regearing the US energy grid. New cyber vulnerabilities will emerge and both public and private entities will need to invest in security. Chart 8 further reveals the importance of Federal software spending to Cybersecurity equity performance. Our bet is that increases in Federal software spending outlays will lead to outperformance of HXR relative to the Software and Services index. Chart 8Stepped Up Government Spending Will Lift Cybersecurity Stocks Key Drivers Of Profitability Sales Growth Cybersecurity sales year-over-year growth is soaring at 40% this year and dwarfs the rate of sales growth of Software and Services (Chart 9). This is consistent with a joint survey by IDC and Bloomberg Intelligence Services, which found that worldwide Cybersecurity spending will outpace general software spending by almost 4.9% annualized from 2020 to 2024 (Chart 10).10 Chart 9Cybersecurity Sales Are Soaring R&D Investing Has Slowed Cybersecurity companies have been investing in R&D aggressively prior to the pandemic. Intellectual property is a competitive advantage in this space, and R&D has likely been ramped up in “arms races”, with different industry players building their competitive moats. Recently, spending on R&D has eased. We believe that this slowdown is temporary as companies need to stay competitive and fend off threats from cybercriminals (Chart 11). Earnings Growth Despite robust revenue growth, year-over-year earnings growth has recently slowed (Chart 12). Shift to remote work in 2020 resulted in a demand surge that has pulled profits forward. However, despite economic normalization and a return to the pre-pandemic trends, the structural shifts towards cloud and remote work are here to stay, while cybercriminals are getting increasingly more creative and aggressive. As a result, earnings growth is bound to pick up going forward. Chart 11R&D Investment Has Slowed Down Chart 12After Lockdown Surge, Earnings Growth Is Normalizing Valuations Currently, HXR is trading at 37x forward earnings, and 104x trailing, which translates into an 13% premium to Software and Services. While this valuation premium appears high, it is low compared to historical values (Charts 13 & 14). The former hefty premium has been deflated by recent underperformance (18%). There is also a meaningful discount to Software and Services when it comes to the Price-To-Sales metric, which is, arguably, the best gauge of value for growing companies. Chart 13Relative Valuation Premium Is Low Compared To Pre-Pandemic Highs Chart 14Cybersecurity Is Cheap By Price-To-Sales Metric From a valuation standpoint, Cybersecurity stocks are exorbitantly expensive, yet we can make a case that they are attractive compared to their own history, and these levels signify an opportunity to build a new position in this theme. How To Invest In Cybersecurity ETFs There are a number of highly liquid ETFs, such as CIBR, BUG, and HACK, powered by the Cybersecurity theme, cutting across several industry groups (Table 2 & Appendix). These passively managed funds have relatively high expense ratios. Direct indexing may be preferable as a basket of the Cybersecurity stocks is relatively easy to assemble. Given that the CIBR ETF has predominantly US companies, is most liquid, and has the highest AUM, it is our vehicle of choice for capturing the Cybersecurity theme. Table 2Cybersecurity ETFs S&P 500 Investors with an S&P500-only mandate may create a Cybersecurity basket from five major players spread across several sectors to gain direct exposure to the large-cap Cybersecurity universe: Cisco (CSCO), Juniper (JNPR), Fortinet (FTNT), NortonLifeLock (NLOK), and Akamai (AKAM). These companies represent the entire network security market, with CSCO and JNPR providing exposure to physical network infrastructure, AKAM representing the Digital Network Infrastructure vertical, FTNT covering Digital Data Security, and finally NLOK a legacy player focused on End Point Protection. It is important to note that some of the fastest growing and innovative players, such as Crowdstrike, Okta, and Zscaler, are outside of the S&P 500 as their market capitalizations are too small. Investment Implications Cybersecurity is increasingly important for businesses in the US and abroad, with demand for solutions surging. As a result, Cybersecurity is a structural investment theme, which warrants a long-term position in most equity portfolios. As with any investment into an emerging technology or theme, it is likely to be volatile, but the long-term upside should justify day-to-day jitters. Also, our analysis demonstrates that now is a good time to build a tactical overweight in Cybersecurity stocks. These stocks have been languishing for a few months, losing some of the valuation froth generated by the work-from-home hype. As a result, most of the cybersecurity stocks are attractively valued compared to history and are poised for a rebound on the back of robust demand for their services. Bottom Line Global digital transformation as well as rising geopolitical tensions create fertile ground for attacks by both cyber criminals and malicious state actors. The cyber defenses of most private and public companies are still ill-prepared, and the space is poised for a robust growth since Cybersecurity is a “must have” for survival. This growing market has attracted a plethora of new cybersecurity players which provide cloud-based SaaS solutions, and are well-versed in deploying AI and ML to counter cyber threats. While many of these companies are still young with relatively small capitalization, their potential is enormous. We recommend tactical and structural overweights to the theme.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Arseniy Urazov Senior Analyst ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com Appendix     Footnotes 1     Special Report: Cyberwarfare In The C-Suite, Cybercrime Magazine, Nov 13, 2020.  2     IBM and Ponemon Institute Research 3    Emsisoft 4    Imperva 2019 Cyberthreat Defense Report 5    CyberEdge Group 2021 Cyberthreat Defense Report 6    Barron’s, Security Software Stocks Should Have Strong Q2 Results. Here’s Why, July 12, 2021. 7     Nandita Bose, “Biden: If U.S. has ‘real shooting war’ it could be result of cyber attacks,” Reuters, July 28, 2021, reuters.com. 8    IDC, “Ongoing Demand Will Drive Solid Growth for Security Products and Services, According to New IDC Spending Guide,” Aug 13, 2020. 9    Cybersecurity at a Crossroads: The Insight 2021 Report", IDG Research Services, 2021. Respondents included more than 200 C-level IT and IT security executives in organizations with an average of 21,300 employees across a wide range of industries. 10   Source: Bloomberg Intelligence (Mandeep Singh - Senior Industry Analyst), August 25, 2021 & IDC.

With 119 S&P 500 companies having reported Q3-2021 earnings, it’s time to take a pulse of the interim results. So far, the blended earnings growth rate is 34.8% while actual reported growth rate is 49.9%. The blended sales growth rate is 14.4%, while the actual reported rate is 16.6%. Analysts expected Q3-2021 earnings to be 6% below the Q2-2021 level. As of now, this quarter’s earnings are only 3% lower. Most of the companies that have reported are beating analysts’ forecasts are surprising to the upside. Currently, 83% of companies reported EPS above expectations, with five out of eleven sectors delivering an impressive 100% beat score. In terms of the magnitude of the beats, the overall number currently stands at 14% with Financials and Technology leading the pack. However, these results are bound to change as more companies report: less than 5% of the market cap has reported within the Energy, Materials, Real Estate, and Utilities sectors. The big theme for the current earnings season is input cost inflation. Many industrial giants, including Honeywell (HON), are complaining about supply-chain cost increases, and their potential adverse effect on margins. As a result, many companies are reducing guidance for the fourth quarter. So far, there are 59 positive pre-announcements, and 45 negative. On the bright side, the majority of companies are reporting that demand for their products remains strong, potentially offsetting some of the cost increases. This is especially the case with consumer demand: a few consumer staples companies, such as P&G, commented that their recent price hikes have not dampened demand for their products and have fortified their bottom line against rising costs. Bottom Line: The earnings season is gaining speed, and so far, it appears that Q3-2021 growth expectations are set at a low bar, that is easy to clear for most companies.

Special Report

Highlights Contrary to popular belief, the correlation between changes in interest rates and equity returns is not fixed: Stock prices have generally risen as yields have fallen over the last four decades, but there is no rule that states equity returns and bond yields will be inversely related. Tech stocks’ tight recent inverse correlation with interest rates is a new phenomenon and we expect it will be temporary: Relative differences in earnings have driven relative returns since the global financial crisis and their mirror image correlation with interest rates was a pandemic anomaly that has already withered. Rising interest rates are not a good reason for equity investors to reduce their Tech exposures: The conventional wisdom is not always wrong, but it almost never generates alpha. In this case, we believe the crowd has fallen for a fleeting illusion that will not persist. Feature Table 1Lapping The Field Perhaps nothing has lately generated more consensus agreement among equity strategists and other top-down observers than the claim that Tech stocks are particularly vulnerable to rising interest rates. Thanks to the Tech sector’s track record of generating outsized growth (Table 1), its future earnings streams are expected to be larger for longer than other sectors’, making them somewhat akin to long-maturity bonds from a duration perspective. Go-go growth stocks and Treasuries make for strange bedfellows, no matter how logical the earnings-stream reasoning may appear to be at first glance, and we view the application of duration concepts to equities as a stretch in any event. In this Special Report, we make the case that the recently observed tight inverse correlation between relative Tech sector performance and the 10-year Treasury yield is anomalous and should not be expected to persist. Right Church, Wrong Pew Duration is the weighted-average term to maturity of a bond’s cash flows and describes its price sensitivity to changes in interest rates. It is an essential feature of fixed income markets but attempts to extend the concept to equities necessarily fall flat. Bondholders receive interest and principal payments subject to a contractually fixed schedule that makes valuing a bond, especially one with negligible credit risk, a simple exercise in arithmetic. The present value of any bond (PV) is equal to the sum of its discounted series of cash flows, as in the equation , where x = one of a series of n semi-annual payments, r = the discount rate and t = the time in years when the next payment will be received. Assuming that all the interest payments and the principal payment will be received on time, the only variable term in the bond present value equation is the discount rate, r. As r appears solely in the denominator, a bond’s present value is inversely related to its moves. The cash streams accruing to stockholders are inherently unpredictable, however, and the present value of an equity interest is subject to fluctuations in the realized and estimated future values of x as well as changes in discount rate r. Forces that move r may or may not also move x and it is uncertain whether the numerator or denominator will exert a greater impact if they move together, as they might be expected to do in the case of the high-growth Tech sector. The explanatory power of changes in interest rates weakens as cash flow uncertainty increases. Month-over-month changes in the 10-year Treasury note yield1 explain virtually all the variation in one-month Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Index total returns (Chart 1, top panel). As cash flows become more uncertain with the introduction of modest credit risk, the correlation slips to -40% (Chart 1, middle panel). It weakens even further and flips its sign with equities, which have done better since the financial crisis when the 10-year yield rises than when it falls (Chart 1, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Duration is a metric for measuring bonds’ price sensitivity to changes in interest rates. Because of the uncertain nature of a company’s future cash flows and the multitude of independent variables that influence them, duration is an ill fit with equities. The Post-Crisis Experience The empirical record poses several challenges to the conventional wisdom about Tech stocks and interest rates, beginning with their desultory relationship in the first ten years following the financial crisis. From 2009 through 2018, changes in the 10-year yield are unable to explain any of the variability in relative Tech returns, though they exhibit a tight correlation beginning in 2019 (Chart 2). Tech stocks were utterly indifferent to the yield spikes of 2009 and 2010-11, as well as the sharp intervening decline in 2010, and only began to separate themselves from the field following the Brexit vote, outperforming the overall S&P 500 by 30 percentage points in just two years while the 10-year yield rose from 1.5% to 3%. They then proceeded to blow away the index as yields fell from 2.75% at the end of 2018 to 0.5% at the mid-2020 COVID bottom and have since fought the index to a draw despite a 100-basis point backup above 1.6%. Chart 2Nothing More Than A Lockdown Fling In contrast to their all-over-the-map relationship with the level of interest rates, Tech stocks have exhibited a consistently tight fit with relative trailing earnings. A quantitatively inclined visitor from outer space viewing Chart 3 might reasonably conclude that relative Tech stock performance is fully explained by earnings, and all other variables are noise. The series have moved nearly in lockstep with each other and show that Tech’s relative trailing P/E multiple has been quite stable since the crisis. Until relative prices and relative earnings began heading in separate ways as the latter began to slip this Spring, Tech’s relative post-crisis outperformance had entirely been earned, not given. Chart 3Case Closed? Multiples provide an opportunity for interest rate changes to re-enter the discussion. In a direct sense, Tech earnings are comparatively immune to moves in interest rates (the sector’s biggest constituents have immaterial amounts of debt and do not sell big-ticket items that have to be financed), though one might expect the price investors are willing to pay to claim a share of their comparatively backloaded future cash flows may well fluctuate with them. Chart 4, however, shows that the Tech sector’s relative forward multiple has not exhibited a consistent relationship with rates – the correlation between multiples and rates was positive and fairly strong from 2009 through 2018 but weakened and turned negative beginning in 2019. From 1995, when the forward multiple series began, through 2008 (not shown in the chart) the relationship was very weak and negative, generating an r-squared of just 1.4%. Chart 4Defying The Duration Intuition The relationship between relative four-quarter forward earnings expectations and the 10-year yield sheds some light on how so many observers have been hoodwinked into mistaking correlation for causation. Excepting stretches at the beginning and the end of the 2009-2018 period, when relative forward estimates paid no heed to swings in interest rates, they exhibited a modest negative correlation with the 10-year yield (Chart 5). They moved together with one mind across all of 2020, but that solidarity appears anomalous when viewed against the entire post-crisis record generally and the years that bracket it specifically. In 2018-19, the two years preceding peak pandemic conditions, and 2021, the year following them, Tech’s relative forward earnings expectations have been flatly indifferent to the rate backdrop. Chart 5One-Off We submit that the recently observed tight correlation between the 10-year yield and relative forward earnings expectations is an isolated pandemic phenomenon. As bond yields plunged in 2020 due to extraordinary monetary accommodation and fears of a worst-case economic outcome, Tech’s heavy concentration of pandemic winners shot the lights out in terms of actual and projected earnings. Away from the narrow 2020 sample, however, the other twelve years of post-crisis data suggest that there’s no relationship between forward earnings expectations and interest rates. Tech outearned the broader market at a steady rate for the ten years preceding the pandemic without regard for the rates market’s gyrations. Investment Implications Interest rates are a red herring for explaining variations in relative Tech stock performance. The ubiquity of the view that Tech stocks’ relative performance will be heavily influenced by changes in interest rates turns out to be another instance in which something everybody knows turns out not to be true. This finding does not make us Tech bulls; we think the big-picture backdrop is sufficiently mixed to justify our US Equity Strategy and Global Asset Allocation services’ neutral recommendations. We simply wanted to call out the flaws in a popular notion before it becomes even more entrenched. Changes in interest rates do not solely effect equity prices via a denominator effect. They impact the numerator as well. The numerator impacts are multifaceted and vary based on which factor comes to the fore in a given instance. They are much harder to anticipate and therefore hold much more promise for investors who can suss them out in advance. The denominator effect is immediately apparent to any undergraduate who has been introduced to the time value of money and therefore isn’t likely to generate alpha. What’s more, as Tech stocks’ relative performance history illustrates, the relationship between equities and rates is not fixed. The rise of globalization and the Fed’s post-Volcker inflation vigilance ushered in a multi-decade disinflationary trend that ultimately culminated in rampant deflation fears following the global financial crisis. Now that concerns about stagflation have shunted aside concerns about secular stagnation, investors are much less likely to cheer rate backups while wringing their hands over rate declines. As Arthur Budaghyan, BCA’s Chief Emerging Markets strategist, has written, the about-face in market perceptions of interest rates could flip the correlations between equity prices and interest rates from positive (stocks advance as rising interest rates are perceived as evidence of economic improvement) to negative (stocks fall when rates rise and rise when rates fall). Our colleague Jonathan LaBerge, managing editor of the Bank Credit Analyst, has noted that extended valuations increase growth stocks’ vulnerability to rising interest rates. We do not disagree, but they do not have all that much to fear if the backup in Treasury yields is in line with our US Bond Strategy service’s year-end 2021 and 2022 targets of 1.75% and 2-2.25%, respectively. Tech’s outperformance may well have run its course – relative performance is extended, the law of large numbers makes it increasingly difficult to sustain historic growth rates, the legal and regulatory outlook is darkening and a shift from pandemic winners to pandemic losers may be in train – but rising rates alone are not a good basis for trimming Tech exposures.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to a parallel shift in the yield curve, but we use the 10-year Treasury yield as a proxy for the entire curve in our simple regressions of asset class returns against price changes.

In a recent daily report, we analyzed relative performance of the S&P 500 sectors and styles under different US 10-year Treasury yield (UST10Y) regimes. Today we expand our analysis and map relative performance of the S&P 500 sectors and styles under the distinct US Treasury yield curve regimes, defined as a three-months change between 10-year and 2-year yields. To analyze sector and style performance by regime, we calculate contemporaneous three-months relative returns of sectors and styles. To summarize the results, we calculate median relative return of each sector/style in each regime. We subtract total period median to remove the sector and style biases in the long-term performance. In a flattening yield curve environment, Defensives, Quality, and Growth tend to outperform, as it indicates scarcity of growth. Accordingly, Real Estate, Technology, Utilities, and Communications Services also outperform. Yield curve steepening is usually associated with growth acceleration. This regime gives boost to more economically sensitive and capex intensive sectors and styles: Value, Small caps, and Cyclicals. Bottom Line: The shape of the US Treasury yield curve will be an important variable to monitor going forward, as it has a substantial effect on relative sector and style performance. ​​​​​​​

Foreword Today we are publishing a charts-only report focused on the S&P 500, and GICS 1 sectors.  Many of the charts are self-explanatory; to some, we have added a short commentary. The charts cover macro, valuations, fundamentals, technicals, and the uses of cash. Our goal is to equip you with all the data you need to make investment decisions along these sector dimensions. We also include performance, valuations and earnings growth expectation tables for all styles, sectors, industry groups, and industries (GICS 1, 2 and 3). We hope you will find this publication useful. We alternate between Styles and Sector chart pack updates on a bi-monthly basis. Changes In Positioning Downgrade Growth to an equal weight and upgrade Value to an equal weight.  Upgrade Small to an overweight and downgrade Large to an underweight. Downgrade Technology to equal weight by reducing overweight in Software and Services.  We remain overweight Semiconductors and Equipment. We are on board with the ongoing market rotation: We were waiting for a decisive shift in rates and a dissipation of the Covid-19 scare as a signal to initiate this repositioning (Chart 1). Chart 1Performance Of S&P 500 Sectors And Styles Overarching Investment Themes: Rotation Has Begun! Taper Tantrum 2.0: With tapering imminent and monetary tightening around the corner, both real yields and nominal yields are up sharply over the past couple of weeks (Chart 2A).  Chart 2ARates Are Up Sharply Chart 2BProbability Of Two Rate Hikes In 2022 Has Been Climbing Market expects two rate hikes by the end of 2022: Although Chairman Powell has explicitly separated the decision to taper from the timing of the first rate hike, which he conditioned on full employment and which is “a long way off,” the market is still spooked by the timing and the speed of rate hikes. Currently, the probability of two rate hikes in 2022 stands at around 40%, rising sharply over the past two weeks (Chart 2B). The BCA house view is that the Fed will start hiking in December of 2022. Market rotation is on: Rising yields and a recent decline in Delta variant infections have triggered a fast and furious style and sector rotation. Higher rates put pressure on rate-sensitive sectors and styles, such as Growth, Technology, Communication Services, and Real Estate. While the “taper tantrum” pullback affects the entire US equity market, areas most geared to rising rates, such as Cyclicals, Financials, and Small Caps fare the best (Chart 3). An easing of the Delta scare has led to the “reopening” trade outperforming the ”work-from-home” trade.   Chart 3Rotation Away From Rate-sensitive Sectors And Styles Macro Economic slowdown is finally priced in: At long last, deteriorating economic data is fully digested by investors. The Citigroup Economic Surprise index is still in negative territory (Chart 4A) but has turned decisively. The markets move on the second derivative and a “less bad” economic surprise is a major positive for the markets. Chart 4ADeterioration Of Economic Data Is Finally Priced In Chart 4BSupply Bottleneck Are Not Easing Supply-chain disruptions are not abating: Shipping costs continue their ascent. The average delay of cargo ships traveling between the Far East and North America is 12 days – compare that to 1 day in January 2020.1 The ISM PMI Supplier Performance index increased from 69.5 in August to 73.4 indicating that supply bottlenecks are not easing (Chart 4B). There are also significant backlogs of goods (Chart 5A), and plenty of new orders. It will take time for supply chains to normalize, with most industry participants expecting the situation to improve only in 2022. Chart 5AManufacturers Are Overwhelmed Chart 5BA Whiff Of Stagflation? Labor shortages: Companies are still struggling to fill job openings. According to the US Census Survey, “pandemic layoff” or “caring for children” were the top reasons for not working. The number of people not working because of Covid-19 infections or fear of Covid spiked at the end of August.2  This explains the August jobs report. The ugly “S” word: With the ubiquitous shortage of input materials and labor, along with transportation delays, suppliers are simply unable to meet demand for goods, pushing prices higher.  Stagflation may be rearing its ugly head: The Dallas Fed manufacturing index is showing a divergence, with prices moving higher while business activity is shifting lower. This is not the case with the ISM PMI index components, but investors need to be vigilant (Chart 5B). Americans are in a worse mood: Consumer confidence survey readings continue on a downward path. The combination of higher prices for everyday goods, the loss of purchasing power, the discontinuation of supplementary unemployment benefits, and paychecks not adjusted for inflation weigh on consumer sentiment. On the positive side, jobs are still plentiful.  Valuation And Profitability Despite recent turbulence and rotations across sectors and styles, consensus is still expecting 15% YoY earnings growth over the next 12 months. However, QoQ growth rates look very different as we remove the base effect: Growth is expected to dip this coming quarter (Q3, 2021), and stay modest for most of 2022. This is a low bar that should be easy for companies to clear, although supply disruptions may dent corporate earnings. In the meantime, valuations remain elevated at 20.7 forward earnings (Chart 6). Chart 6Earnings Growth Expectations Are Modest Sentiment There are still inflows into US equities, but they are easing. This can be explained by FOMO (fear of missing out), and lots of cash sitting on the sidelines that many retail investors aim to park in US equities.  (Chart 7A). However, this is changing as rising rates render the TINA (“there is no alternative”) trade much less attractive. Chart 7AInflows Into US Equities Are Easing Chart 7BCapex Is On The Rise Uses Of Cash Capex: Capital goods orders are soaring, pointing to robust capex.  The latest S&P estimates suggest that capex will rise 13% this year.3 This points to economic normalization, and attests to corporate confidence in economic growth. It is also a likely byproduct of shortages that plague the US supply chain – companies are expanding their capacity. (Chart 7B). Investment Implications Low for longer is over: The Fed has committed to tapering within the next 2-3 months.  Unless this intention is derailed by another Covid scare or a significant deterioration in economic growth, we are now convinced that rates will move up to hit the BCA house view of 1.7%-1.9% by year-end. S&P 500:  There is plenty of rotation under the hood; yet we expect US equities to hold their own into the balance of the year as, for now, monetary and fiscal policy remain easy, and earnings growth is likely to surprise on the upside. Severe and prolonged supply disruptions are a key risk to this view, as they chip away from economic growth, and cut into companies sales growth and profitability. Growth vs. Value: With rates rising into year-end, interest-rate sensitive stocks, such as Growth and the Technology sector, are under pressure.  Since we opened overweight Growth and underweight Value position on June 14, Growth has outperformed S&P 500 by 4.1%, and Value underperformed by 4.5%.  We do not want to overstay our welcome, and are neutralizing both sides of the trade, bringing positioning to an equal weight.  Technology has beaten the S&P 500 by 2.2%, and we are shifting to an equal weight positioning by reducing overweight of the Software Industry Group. We remain overweight Semiconductors and Equipment. We are closing our overweight to Growth and underweight to Value allocation. We reduce overweight to Technology. Chart 7C Cyclicals vs. Defensives:  The onset of the Delta variant is dissipating, and we expect consumer cyclicals to rebound as more people are willing to travel and eat out. We also believe that the parts of the Industrials sector most exposed to restocking of inventories, infrastructure, and construction will perform strongly. Small vs. Large: We are upgrading Small from neutral to an overweight, and downgrade Large to an underweight. Small is highly geared to rising rates. It is also cheaper than Large, and most of the earnings downgrades are already in the price. We are now constructive on this asset class.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   S&P 500 Chart 8Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 9Profitability Chart 10Valuations And Technicals Chart 11Uses Of Cash Communication Services Chart 12Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 13Profitability Chart 14Valuations And Technicals Chart 15Uses Of Cash Consumer Discretionary Chart 16Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 17Profitability Chart 18Valuations And Technicals Chart 19Uses Of Cash Consumer Staples Chart 20Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 21Profitability Chart 22Valuations And Technicals Chart 23Uses Of Cash Energy Chart 24Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 25Profitability Chart 26Valuations And Technicals Chart 27Uses Of Cash Financials Chart 28Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 29Profitability Chart 30Valuations And Technicals Chart 31Uses Of Cash Health Care Chart 32Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 33Profitability Chart 34Valuations And Technicals Chart 35Uses Of Cash Industrials Chart 36Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 37Profitability Chart 38Valuations And Technicals Chart 39Uses Of Cash Information Technology Chart 40Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 41Profitability Chart 42Valuations And Technicals Chart 43Uses Of Cash Materials Chart 44Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 45Profitability Chart 46Valuations And Technicals Chart 47Uses Of Cash Real Estate Chart 48Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 49Profitability Chart 50Valuations And Technicals Chart 51Uses Of Cash Utilities Chart 52Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 53Profitability Chart 54Valuations And Technicals Chart 55Uses Of Cash       Footnotes 1     Source: eeSea 2     US Census Household Pulse Survey, Employment Table 3. 3    S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Global Ratings; Universe is Global Capex 2000   Recommended Allocation

Chart 1Cyclicals Styels and Sectors Outperform In The Rising Rates Environment In a recent daily report, we analyzed performance of the S&P 500 sectors before and after the 2013 tapering announcement. Today we expand our analysis and map relative performance of the S&P 500 sectors and styles under the different US 10-year Treasury yields (UST10Y) regimes, i.e., rates rising vs rates falling.1  As expected, deep cyclicals, such as Energy, Financials, and Industrials fare best in a rising rates environment, while Communication Services and Health Care outperform when rates head south (Chart 1, top panel). Styles’ performance across regimes is broadly consistent with the sector performance. Specifically, Small Caps, thanks to their high exposure to deep cyclicals, post the best performance when UST10Y is rising. Meanwhile, defensives are a mirror image of Small Caps and outperform once global growth starts softening (Chart 1, bottom panel). Finally, we bring one more dimension to our analysis and calculate the performance of the long-duration Technology and Health Care sectors, under different rates and yield curve regimes (Chart 2).  To do so, we overlap rates and yield curve regimes and calculate median performance of each cell. Both Technology and Health Care underperform when rates are rising, and the yield curve is steepening: Long end of the curve is most important for discounting cash flows. Chart 2Performance of Technology and Health Care Sectors Is Also A Function Of Changes Of The Yield Curve The current environment of rising rates and flattening yield curve is empirically a goldilocks scenario for these sectors as a flattening yield curve signifies that the long-term rate, which is more important for discounting future cash flows, is falling and the P/E contraction phase will be limited.  It will also be offset by the growth in earnings as rising long rates indicate higher growth. Falling rates are also good for Tech stocks regardless of the direction of change in the yield curve.  The Health Care sector behaves somewhat differently: It tends to underperform when rates are falling but the yield curve is steepening as such scenario is not dire enough for Defensives to outperform. Bottom Line: Cyclical sectors and high beta styles tend to outperform in a rising rates environment. At the same time, the performance of Technology and Health Care stocks is more nuanced: rising Treasury rates are not necessarily bad for these sectors if the yield curve is flattening.   Footnotes 1 Methodology: We calculate three months change in UST10Y and calculate median of three months contemporaneous relative returns for each sector at each regime.  To remove historical performance biases, we subtract sector median relative return for the whole period.  

Special Report

HighlightsSince 2008, US equity outperformance versus global ex-US stocks has not been driven by stronger top-line growth. Instead, it has been caused by a narrowly-based increase in profit margins, the accretive impact of share buybacks on the EPS of US growth stocks, and an outsized expansion in equity multiples. To a lesser extent, the dollar has also boosted common currency relative performance.There are significant secular risks to these sources of US equity outperformance over the past 14 years. Elevated tech sector profit margins are likely to lead to increased competition and higher odds of regulatory action, leveraging has reduced the ability of US companies to continue to accrete EPS through changes to capital structure, relative multiples are not justified by relative ROE, and the US dollar is expensive and is likely to fall over a multi-year horizon.In absolute terms, we forecast that US stocks will earn annualized nominal total returns of between 1.8 - 4.7% over the coming decade, assuming 4-5% annual revenue growth, flat profit margins, a constant 2% dividend yield, and a constant equity risk premium. Long-maturity bond yields are below their equilibrium levels and are likely to rise in real terms over time, which will weigh on elevated equity multiples.Over the coming 6-12 months, our view that US 10-Year Treasury yields are likely to rise argues for an underweight stance toward growth versus value stocks. In turn, this implies that US stocks will underperform global stocks, especially versus developed markets ex-US.The risks that we have highlighted to the sources of US outperformance suggest that US stocks may be flat versus their global peers over the long-term, arguing for a neutral strategic allocation. It also suggests that investors should be prepared to accept more volatility in order to reduce the gap between expected and desired returns, and should look towards riskier investments and asset classes (such as real estate and alternative investments) as potential portfolio return enhancements.Feature Chart II-1The US Has Massively Outperformed Other Equity Markets Since The Global Financial Crisis The US equity market has vastly outperformed its peers since the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. Chart II-1 highlights that an investment in US stocks at the end of 2007 is now worth over 4 times the invested amount, versus approximately 1.6 times for global ex-US stocks (when measured in US dollar terms). The chart also shows that USD-denominated total returns have been roughly the same for developed markets ex-US as they have been for emerging markets, highlighting the exceptional nature of US equities.In this report we provide a deep examination of the sources of US equity performance, their likely sustainability, and what this implies for long-term investor return expectations. US stocks have not outperformed because of stronger top-line (i.e. revenue) growth, and instead have benefitted from a narrowly-based increase in profit margins, active changes to capital structure that have benefitted stockholders, an outsized expansion in equity multiples relative to global stocks, and a structural appreciation in the US dollar.We conclude that there are significant risks to all of these sources of outperformance, and that a neutral strategic allocation to US equities is now likely warranted. We also highlight that, while a strategic overweight stance is still warranted toward stocks versus bonds, investors should no longer count on US stocks to deliver returns that are in line with or above commonly-cited absolute return expectations. This argues for a greater tolerance of volatility, and the pursuit of riskier investments and asset classes (such as real estate and alternative investments) as potential portfolio return enhancements.A Deep Examination Of US Outperformance Since 2008Breaking down historical total return performance is the first step in judging whether US equities are likely to outperform their global ex-US peers on a structural basis. Below we deconstruct US and global total return performance over the past 14 years into six different components, and analyze the impact of some of these components on a sector-by-sector basis. The six components presented are:Total revenue growth for each equity market, in local currency termsThe change in profit marginsThe impact of changes in capital structure and index compositionThe change in the trailing P/E ratioThe income return from dividendsThe impact of changes in foreign exchangeThe sum of the first three factors explains the total growth in earnings per share over the period, and the addition of the fourth factor explains each market’s local currency price return. Income returns are added to explain total return over the period, with the sixth factor then explaining common currency total return performance. The FX effect for US stocks is zero by construction, given that we measure common currency performance in US$ terms. Chart II-2Strong US Returns Have Not Been Due To Strong Top Line Growth Chart II-2 presents the annualized absolute impact of these factors for the MSCI US index since 2008. The chart highlights that U.S. stock prices have earned roughly 11% per year in total return terms over the past 14 years, with significant contributions from revenue growth, multiple expansion, margins, and the return from dividends.Interestingly, however, Chart II-3 highlights that US equities have not significantly outperformed on the basis of the first factor, total local currency revenue growth, at least relative to overall global ex-US stocks (see Box II-1 for more details). DM ex-US stocks have experienced very weak revenue growth since 2008, but this has been compensated for by outsized EM revenue growth. It is also notable that US revenue growth has actually underperformed US GDP growth over the period, dispelling the notion that US equity outperformance has been due to strong top-line effects.Chart II-3The US Has Outperformed Due To Margins, Capital Structure, Multiples, And The Dollar Box II-1Proxying The Impact Of Changes In Shares OutstandingWe proxy the impact of changes in shares outstanding (and thus the impact of equity dilution / accretion) by dividing each index’s market capitalization by its stock price. This measure is not a perfect proxy, as changes in index composition (such as the addition/deletion of index constituents) will change the index’s market capitalization but not its stock price. We also calculate total revenue for each market by multiplying local currency sales per share by the market cap / stock price ratio, meaning that the total revenue growth figures shown in Chart II-3 should best be viewed as estimates that in some cases reflect index composition effects.However, Chart II-B1 highlights that adjusting the market cap / stock price ratio for the number of firms in the index does not meaningfully change our overall conclusions. This approach would imply a larger dilution effect for DM ex-US than suggested in Chart II-3, and a smaller effect for emerging markets (due to a significant rise in the number of EM index constituents since 2008). In addition, global ex-US revenue growth is modestly lower than US revenue growth when using this approach. But this gap would account for a fraction of US equity outperformance over the period, underscoring that the US has massively outperformed global ex-US stocks due to margin, capital structure, and multiple expansion effects. Chart II-B1The US Has Not Meaningfully Outperformed Due To Revenue Growth, No Matter How You Slice It Chart II-3 also highlights that global ex-US stocks have modestly outperformed the US in terms of the fifth factor, the income return from dividends. This has almost offset the negative FX return (the sixth factor) from a net rise in the US dollar over the period.What is clear from the chart is that the second, third, and fourth factors explain almost all of the difference in total return between US and global ex-US stocks since 2008. The US experienced a significant increase in profit margins versus a modest contraction for global ex-US, a modest fillip from changes in capital structure and index composition versus a substantial drag for ex-US stocks, and a sizable rise in equity multiples that has outpaced what has occurred around the globe in response to structurally lower interest rates. Chart II-4US Margin Outperformance Has Been Narrowly-Based The significant rise in aggregate US profit margins over the past 14 years has often been attributed to the strong competitiveness of US companies, but Chart II-4 highlights that the aggregate change mostly reflects a narrow sector composition effect. The chart shows the change in US and global ex-US profit margins by level 1 GICS sector since 2008, and underscores that overall profit margins outside of the US have fallen mostly due to lower oil prices. Conversely, in the US, profit margins have substantially risen in only three out of ten sectors: health care, information technology, and communication services.Chart II-5 highlights that global ex-US equity multiples have risen in a majority of sectors since 2008, but not by the same magnitude as what has occurred in the US. De-rating in the resource sector partially explains the gap, but stronger US multiple expansion in the heavily-weighted consumer discretionary, information technology, and communication services sectors appears to explain most of the gap in multiple expansion.Chart II-5Multiples Have Risen Globally, But More So For Broadly-Defined US Tech Stocks Finally, Charts II-6 & II-7 highlights that there has been a strong growth versus value dimension to the impact of changes in capital structure and index composition on regional equity performance. The charts show that equity dilution and other changes to index composition have caused a similar drag on the returns from value stocks in the US and outside the US. However, the charts also highlight that the more important effect has been the accretive impact of share buybacks on the EPS of US growth stocks, which has not been matched by growth stocks outside of the US. As noted in Box II-1, part of this gap may be explained by an increase in the number of companies included in the MSCI Emerging Markets index, but Chart II-8 highlights that the global ex-US ratio of market capitalization to stock price has still risen significantly over the past 14 years, in contrast to that of the US even after controlling for the number of index components. Chart II-6There Has Been A Strong Style Dimension…  Chart II-7…To The Impact Of Changes In Capital Structure And Index Composition  Chart II-8The Accretive Impact Of US Growth Stock Buybacks Has Not Been Matched Globally The bottom line for investors is that there have been multiple factors contributing to US equity outperformance since 2008, but aggregate top-line growth has not been one of them. Broadly-defined technology companies (including media & entertainment and internet retail firms) have been responsible for nearly all of the relative rise in profit margins and most of the relative expansion in multiples over the past 14 years, and US growth stocks have benefitted from the accretive impact of share buybacks to a larger degree than what has occurred globally.The Relative Secular Return Outlook For US StocksWe present below several structural risks to the continued outperformance of US equities for the factors that have been most responsible for this performance over the past 14 years. In some cases, these risks speak to the potential for US outperformance to end, not necessarily that the US will underperform. But even the cessation of US outperformance along one or more of these factors would be significant, as it would imply a potential inflection point in the most consequential trend in regional equity performance since the 2008/2009 global financial crisis.Profit MarginsChart II-9 presents the 12-month trailing combined profit margin for the US consumer discretionary, information technology, and communication services sector versus that of the remaining sectors. The chart underscores the points made by Chart II-4 in time series form, namely that the net increase in overall US profit margins since 2008 has been narrowly based. Chart II-9The US Profit Margin Expansion Has Been Driven By Broadly-Defined Tech Stocks Over a 6-12 month time horizon, the clear risk to US profit margins is an end to the COVID-19 pandemic. The profitability of broadly-defined tech stocks has surged during the pandemic, in response to a significant shift toward online goods purchases and elevated spending on tech equipment. A durable end to the pandemic is likely to reverse some of these spending patterns, which will likely weigh on margins for broadly-defined tech stocks. Chart II-10The Regulatory Risks Facing Big Tech Are Real Over the longer term, the risk is that extremely elevated profit margins are likely to increase the odds of regulatory action from Washington and invite competition. On the former point, our US Political Strategy service has highlighted that a bipartisan consensus in public opinion holds that Big Tech needs tougher regulation (Chart II-10), and this consensus grew substantially over the controversial 2020 political cycle.1 This regulatory pressure is currently best described as a “slow boil,” as not all surveys show strong majorities in favor of regulation, and Republicans and Democrats disagree on the aims of regulation.But the bottom line is that Big Tech is likely to remain in the hot seat after the various controversies of the pandemic and 2016-2020 elections, just as big banks faced tougher regulation in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis. This underscores that a “slow boil” may turn into a faster one at some point over the secular horizon, which would very likely weigh on profit margins. Elevated tech sector profit margins makes regulatory action more likely because policymakers will perceive a stronger ability for these firms to weather a “regulatory shock.”On the latter point about competition, it is true that broadly-defined tech stocks follow a “platform” business model that will be difficult to supplant. These companies benefit from powerful network effects that have taken years to accrue, suggesting that they will not be rapidly replaced by competitors.Still, the experience of Microsoft in the years following its meteoric rise in the second half of the 1990s provides a cautionary tale for broadly-defined tech stocks today. In the late-1990s, it was difficult for investors to envision how Microsoft’s near-total product dominance of the PC ecosystem could ever be displaced, but it eventually lost market share due to the rise of mobile devices and their competing operating systems.In addition, Microsoft’s fundamental performance suffered even before the rise of the modern-day smartphone & mobile device market. Chart II-11 highlights the annualized components of Microsoft’s price return from 1999-2007 versus the late-1990s period, which underscores that changes in margins, changes in multiples, and stock price returns may be persistently negative in a scenario in which revenue growth slows (even if revenue growth itself remains positive).Chart II-11Microsoft Offers A Cautionary Tale For Dominant Business Models Some of the reversal of Microsoft’s fortunes during this period were self-inflicted, and the firm also suffered from an economy-wide slowdown in tech equipment spending as a result of the 2001 recession that persisted into the early years of the subsequent recovery. But the key point for investors is that company and sector dominance may wane, and the fact that broadly-defined tech sector profit margins are extremely elevated raises the risk that further increases may not materialize.Capital Structure And Index CompositionAs noted above, the beneficial impact from changes in capital structure and index composition for US equities has occurred due to the accretive impact of share buybacks on the EPS of US growth stocks, which has not been matched by growth stocks outside of the US.In our view, this accretive impact has occurred for two reasons. First, US growth stocks have taken advantage of historically low interest rates and leverage to shift their capital structure to be more debt-focused over the past 14 years. Second, this shift has been aided by the fact that US growth stocks have experienced stronger cash flows than their global peers, which have been used to service higher debt payments.However, Charts II-12 and II-13 suggest that this process may be in its late innings. Chart II-12 highlights that the US nonfinancial corporate sector debt service ratio (DSR) did indeed fall below that of the euro area following the global financial crisis, but that this reversed in 2016. At the onset of the pandemic, the US nonfinancial corporate sector DSR was rising sharply, and was approaching its early-2000 highs. During the pandemic, the corporate sector DSR has continued to rise in both regions, but this almost exclusively reflects a (temporary) decline in operating income, not a surge in corporate sector debt or a rise in interest rates.Not all of the pre-pandemic rise in the US corporate sector DSR was concentrated in broadly-defined tech stocks, but some of it likely was. The key point for investors is that the US nonfinancial corporate sector had a lower capacity to leverage itself relative to companies in the euro area at the onset of the pandemic, which implies a less accretive impact on relative earnings per share in the future. Chart II-13 reinforces this point by highlighting that the uptrend in relative cash flow for US growth stocks, versus global ex-US, appears to have ended in 2015. The uptrend has continued in per share terms, but this appears to be flattered by the impact of buybacks itself. Chart II-12Can The US Continue To Accrete EPS Through Stock Buybacks?  Chart II-13US Growth Companies Are No Longer Generating More Cash Than Their Global Peers  Admittedly, we see no basis to conclude that the persistent earnings dilution that has occurred in emerging markets over the past 14 years will end, or even slow, over the secular horizon. This underscores that emerging markets will need to generate stronger revenue growth to prevent the dilution effect from acting as a continued drag on EM vs. US equity performance, and it is an open question as to whether this will occur. Thus, for now, we have more conviction in the view that capital structure and index composition changes may contribute less to US equity outperformance versus developed markets ex-US over the coming several years.Equity MultiplesThere are three arguments against the idea that US equity multiples will continue to expand relative to those of global ex-US stocks. First, Chart II-14 highlights a point that we have made in previous Bank Credit Analyst reports, which is that aggressive multiple expansion in the US has now rendered US stocks to be the most dependent on low long-maturity bond yields than at any point since the global financial crisis. Chart II-14US Stocks Are The Most Dependent On Low Bond Yields In Over A Decade Over the coming 6- to 12-months, we strongly doubt that US 10-year Treasury yields will rise outside of the range that would be consistent with the US equity risk premium from 2002 to 2007 (discussed in further detail in the next section). But the chart also shows that this range is now clearly below trend nominal GDP growth, suggesting that higher interest rates on a structural basis may cause outright multiple contraction for US stocks. This is particularly true for growth stocks, which have been responsible for a significant portion of US equity outperformance, given their comparatively long earnings duration. Chart II-15US Multiples Are Not Justified By Higher Return On Equity Second, it has been often argued by some investors that a premium is warranted for US stocks given their comparatively high return on equity, but Chart II-15 highlights that this is not the case. The chart shows the relative price-to-book ratio for the US versus global and developed markets ex-US compared with regression-based predicted values based on relative return on equity. The chart clearly highlights that the US price-to-book ratio is meaningfully higher than it should be relative to global stocks, especially when compared to other developed markets. Versus DM ex-US, the only comparable period that saw a relative P/B – relative ROE deviation of this magnitude occurred in the late-1980s, when US stocks were meaningfully less expensive than relative ROE would have suggested. This relationship completely normalized in the years that followed, which would imply a substantial relative multiple contraction for US stocks over the coming several years were the gap shown in Chart II-15 to close.Third, Chart II-16 presents the share of US stock market capitalization accounted for by the largest 10% of stocks by size. The chart highlights that the concentration of US market capitalization has risen to an extreme level that has only been reached in two other cases over the past century. Historically, prior stock market concentration has been associated with future increases in the equity risk premium, underscoring that broadly-defined US tech sector concentration bodes poorly for future returns. Chart II-16The US Stock Market Is Now Extremely Concentrated The Foreign Exchange EffectAs a final point, Chart II-17 illustrates the degree to which US relative performance has meaningfully benefitted from a rise in the US dollar since 2008. The chart highlights that an equity market-weighted dollar index has risen 20% from its late-2007 level, which has boosted US common currency relative performance.The US dollar was arguably modestly undervalued just prior to the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, but Chart II-18 highlights that it is now meaningfully overvalued versus other major currencies. Over a multi-year horizon, this argues against further relative common currency gains for US stocks from the foreign exchange effect. Chart II-17The US Dollar Has Helped US Common Currency Performance...  Chart II-18…And Is Now Expensive  The Absolute Secular Return Outlook For US StocksOver a secular horizon, the most common method for forecasting equity returns is to predict whether earnings are likely to grow faster or slower than nominal potential GDP growth, and whether equity multiples are likely to rise or fall.For the reasons described above, we have no plausible basis on which to forecast that US profit margins are inclined to rise further over time given how extended they have become. This suggests that a reasonable long-term earnings forecast should be closely linked to one’s forecast for revenue growth. Chart II-19S&P 500 Revenue Is Low Relative To US GDP, And May Rise Over The Next Decade Chart II-19 presents S&P 500 revenue as a percent of nominal GDP, and underscores a fact that we noted above: revenue growth for US equities has underperformed US GDP since the global financial crisis. This undoubtedly has been linked to the fallout from the crisis and other exogenous shocks like the massive decline in energy prices in 2014/2015, which are unlikely to be repeated. Over the next ten years, the US Congressional Budget Office is forecasting nominal potential growth of roughly 4%; allowing for a potential rise in US equity revenue to GDP suggests that investors should expect earnings growth on the order of 4-5% per year over the coming decade, if extremely elevated profit margins are sustained. Chart II-20Multiples Seem To Predict Future Returns Well… Unfortunately for equity investors, there are slim odds that US equity multiples will continue to rise or even stay at their current level. Equity valuation has been shown to have nearly zero ability to predict stock returns over a 6-12 month time horizon or even over the following 3-5 years, but 10-year regressions relating current valuations on future 10-year compound returns tend to be highly predictive (Chart II-20). Utilizing this approach, today’s 12-month forward P/E ratio would imply a 10-year future total return of just 2.9% (Chart II-21). That, in turn, would imply a annual drag of 3-4% from multiple contraction over the coming decade, given our 4-5% earnings growth forecast and a historically average dividend yield of roughly 2%.One problem with the method shown in Charts II-20 and II-21 is the fact that the relationship between today’s P/E ratio and 10-year future returns captures more than the impact of potentially mean-reverting multiples. It also includes any correlation between the starting point of valuation and subsequent earnings growth, which is likely to be spurious. This effect turns out to be important: we can see in Chart II-21 that the strong fit of the relationship is influenced by the fact that the global financial crisis occurred roughly 10-years after the equity market bubble of the late-1990s. Chart II-21...But That Depends Heavily On The Tech Bubble / GFC Relationship Astute investors may infer a legitimate causal link between these two events, via too-easy monetary policy. But from the perspective of forecasting, predicting future returns based on prevailing equity multiples confusingly mixes together three effects: the relative timing of business cycles, the impact of changes in interest rates, and the potential mean-reverting nature of the equity risk premium.In order to disentangle these effects for the purposes of forecasting, we present a long-history estimate of the US equity risk premium based on Robert Shiller’s Irrational Exuberance dataset (Chart II-22). We define the equity risk premium as earnings per share (as reported) as a percent of the S&P 500, minus the real long-maturity interest rate. We calculate the real rate by subtracting the BCA adaptive inflation expectations model – essentially an exponentially smoothed version of actual inflation – from the nominal long-term bond yield. Chart II-22The US ERP Seems Normal Based On A Very Long Term History... The chart highlights that this estimate of the ERP is currently exactly in line with its median value since 1872. Chart II-23 presents essentially the same conclusion, based on data since 1979, using the forward operating P/E ratio for the S&P 500 and the same definition for real bond yields.This implies that, if interest rates were at equilibrium levels, investors would have a reasonable basis to conclude that equity multiples would be unchanged over a secular investment horizon. However, as we have highlighted several times in previous reports, long-maturity government bond yields are likely well below equilibrium levels. Chart II-24 highlights that long-maturity US government bond yields have not been this low relative to trend growth since the late-1970s. Chart II-23...And Based On The Forward Earnings Yield Over The Past Four Decades  Chart II-24Interest Rates Are Well Below Equilibrium, And Are Likely To Rise Over Time  We presented in an April report why a gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but that a decline in the equilibrium real rate of interest (“r-star”) only appeared to be permanent due to persistent, non-monetary policy shocks to aggregate demand that occurred over the course of the last economic cycle.2In a scenario where the US output gap turns positive, inflation rises modestly above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited over the coming 6-18 months, it seems reasonable to conclude that the narrative of secular stagnation may ultimately be challenged and that investor expectations for the neutral rate may converge toward trend rates of economic growth. This would weigh on equity multiples, and thus lower equity total returns from the 6-7% implied by our earnings forecast and income return assumption. Chart II-25US Stocks Are Likely To Earn Annual Total Returns Between 1.8-4.7% Over The Next Decade Were real long-maturity bond yields to rise by 100-200bps over the coming decade, this would imply annualized total returns of between 1.8 - 4.7% from US stocks, assuming 4-5% annual revenue growth, flat profit margins, a constant 2% dividend yield, and a constant ERP (Chart II-25). While this would beat the returns offered by bonds, implying that investors should still be structurally overweight equities versus fixed-income assets, it would also fall meaningfully short of the average pension fund return objective (Chart II-26), as well as the absolute return goals of many investors. Chart II-26Future Returns From US Stocks Will Greatly Disappoint Investors Investment Conclusions Chart II-27Over The Coming Year, Favor Value And Global Ex-US Stocks Over the coming 6-12 months, our view that 10-year US Treasury yields are likely to rise supports an overweight stance toward value versus growth stocks. Chart II-27 highlights that the underperformance of growth argues for an underweight stance toward US stocks within a global equity portfolio, especially versus developed markets ex-US.Over a longer-term horizon, there are two key investment implications from our research. First, the risks that we have highlighted to the sources of US outperformance over the past 14 years suggests that investors should not bank on a continuation of this trend over the next decade. We have not made the case in this report for the outperformance of global ex-US stocks, merely that the continued outperformance of US stocks now rests on an unreliable foundation. This may suggest that US relative performance will be flat over the structural horizon, arguing for a neutral strategic allocation. But even the cessation of US outperformance would be a significant development, as it would end the most consequential trend in regional equity performance in the post-GFC era.Second, investors should expect meaningfully lower absolute returns from US stocks over the next decade than what they have earned since 2008/2009, barring a continued rise in the already stretched profit margins of broadly-defined tech stocks. A structurally overweight stance is still warranted toward equities versus fixed-income, but even a 100% equity allocation is unlikely to meet investor return expectations in the high single-digits. As a consequence, global investors should be prepared to accept more volatility in order to reduce the gap between expected and desired returns, and should look towards riskier investments and asset classes (such as real estate and alternative investments) as potential portfolio return enhancements.Jonathan LaBerge, CFAVice PresidentThe Bank Credit AnalystFootnotes1  Please see US Political Strategy "Forget Biden's Budget," dated June 2, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com2  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst “R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks,” dated March 31, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com