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Highlights The interim “phase 1” trade agreement reached last week represents a significant step forward towards reaching a détente in the China-U.S. trade war. Regardless of what happens next in the Brexit negotiations, a hard exit will be avoided. Stay long the pound. U.S. earnings growth is likely to be flat in the third quarter, in contrast to bottom-up expectations of a year-over-year decline. Earnings growth should pick up as global growth reaccelerates by year end. Stronger global growth will put downward pressure on the U.S. dollar. Remain overweight global equities relative to bonds over a 12-month horizon. Cyclical stocks should start to outperform defensives. Financials will finally have their day in the sun. Favorable Tradewinds In our Fourth Quarter Strategy Outlook published two weeks ago, we argued that global equities had entered a “show me” phase, meaning that tangible evidence of a de-escalation in the trade war and a recovery in global growth would be necessary for stock indices to move higher.1  We received some positive news on the trade front last Friday. In exchange for suspending the planned October 15th hike in tariffs from 25% to 30% on $250 billion of Chinese imports, China agreed to purchase $40-$50 billion of U.S. agricultural products per year, improve market access for U.S. financial services companies, and enhance the transparency of currency management. Admittedly, there is still much to be done. The text of the agreement has yet to be finalized. Both sides are aiming to conclude the deal by the time of the APEC summit in Santiago, Chile on November 16-17. Considering that a number of key issues remain unresolved, including what sort of enforcement and resolution mechanisms will be included in the deal, further delays or even a breakdown in the talks are possible. The interim deal agreed upon last week also punts the thorny issue of how to handle intellectual property protections to a “phase 2” of the negotiations slated to begin soon after “phase 1” is wrapped up. According to the independent and bipartisan U.S. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, U.S. producers lose between $225 and $600 billion annually from IP theft.2 China has often been considered among the worst offenders. Given the importance of the IP issue, meaningful progress will be necessary to ensure that tariffs of 15% on about $160 billion of Chinese imports are not introduced on December 15th. Trump Wants A Deal Despite the many hurdles that remain, last week’s developments significantly raise the prospects of a détente in the 18 month-long trade war. As a self-professed “master negotiator,” President Trump has put his credibility on the line by describing the negotiations as a “love fest,” calling the trade pact “the greatest and biggest deal ever made for our Great Patriot Farmers,” and saying that he has “little doubt” that a final agreement will be reached. Just as he did with NAFTA’s successor USMCA – a deal that is substantively similar to the one it replaced – Trump is likely to shift into marketing mode, trumpeting the “tremendous” new deal that he has negotiated on behalf of the American people. From a political point of view, this makes perfect sense. Rightly or wrongly, President Trump gets better marks from voters on his handling of the economy than anything else (Chart 1). A protracted trade war would undermine the U.S. economy, thereby hurting Trump’s re-election prospects. Chart 1Trump Gets Reasonably High Marks On His Handling Of The Economy, But Not Much Else Chart 2Chinese Business Are Not Paying The Bulk Of The Tariffs Notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, the evidence firmly suggests that U.S. consumers, rather than Chinese businesses, are paying the bulk of the tariffs. Chart 2 shows that U.S. import prices from China have barely declined, even as tariff rates on Chinese imports have risen. To the extent that the latest rounds of tariffs are focused on Chinese goods for which there is little U.S. or third-country competition, the ability of Chinese producers to pass on the cost of the tariffs will only increase. If all the tariff hikes that have been announced were implemented, the effective tariff rate on Chinese imports would rise from around 15% as of late August to as high as 25% in December (Chart 3). Such a tariff rate would reduce U.S. household disposable incomes by over $100 billion, wiping out most of the gains from the 2017 tax cuts. Trump can’t let the trade war reach this point. Chart 3Successive Rounds Of Tariffs Have Started To Add Up Will China Play Hardball? One risk to a favorable resolution to the trade war is that China will increasingly see Trump as desperate to make a deal. This could lead the Chinese to take a hardline stance in the negotiations. While this risk cannot be dismissed, we would downplay it for three reasons: First, even though China’s exporters have been able to maintain some degree of pricing power during the trade war, trade volumes have still suffered, with exports to the U.S. down nearly 22% year-over-year in September. Second, as the crippling sanctions against ZTE have demonstrated, China remains highly dependent on U.S. technologies. This gives Trump a lot of leverage in the trade negotiations. Chart 4Who Will Win The 2020 Democratic Nomination? Third, as Trump himself likes to say, China will find it easier to negotiate with him in his first term in office than in his second. Hoping that Trump would lose his re-election bid might have made sense for China a few months ago when Joe Biden was riding high in the polls; but now that Elizabeth Warren has emerged as the favorite to secure the Democratic nomination, that hope has been dashed (Chart 4). As we noted several weeks ago, China is likely to find Warren no less vexing on trade matters than Trump.3  All this suggests that China, just like Trump, will look for ways to cool trade tensions over the coming weeks. Brexit Breakthrough? As we go to press, the prospects for a Brexit deal have brightened. Although the details have yet to be released, the proposed deal would effectively put Northern Ireland in a veritable quantum superposition where it is both in the European common market and in the U.K. at the same time. This feat will be achieved by keeping Northern Ireland within the U.K. political jurisdiction but still aligned with EU regulatory standards. Negotiations could still go awry. Despite Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s assurance that he secured “a great new deal,” the Conservative’s coalition partner, the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party, is still withholding its support for the accord. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has also rejected the deal, saying that it is even worse than Theresa May’s originally proposed pact. Regardless of what transpires over the coming days, we continue to think that a hard Brexit will be avoided. Throughout the entire Brexit ordeal, we have argued that there was insufficient political support within the British ruling class for a no-deal Brexit. That conviction has only grown as polling data has revealed that an increased share of voters would choose to stay in the EU if another referendum were held (Chart 5). We have been long the pound versus the euro since August 3, 2017. The trade has gained 6.6% over this period. Investors should stick with this position. Based on real interest rate differentials, GBP/EUR should be trading near 1.30 rather than the current level of 1.16 (Chart 6). We expect the cross to move towards its fair value as hard Brexit risks diminish further. Chart 5Brexit Angst: A Case Of Bremorse Chart 6Substantial Upside In The Pound   Global Growth Prospects Improving Chart 7Growth Slowdown Has Been More Pronounced In The Soft Data Chart 8Manufacturing Output Rebounds Amid The ISM Slump A détente in the trade war and a resolution to the Brexit saga should help support global growth. The weakness in the economic data has been much more pronounced in so-called “soft” measures such as business surveys than in “hard” measures such as industrial production (Chart 7). Notably, U.S. manufacturing output has stabilized over the past three months, even as the ISM manufacturing index has swooned (Chart 8). As sentiment rebounds, the soft data should improve. Global financial conditions have eased significantly over the past five months, thanks in large part to the dovish pivot by most central banks (Chart 9). The net number of central banks cutting rates generally leads the global manufacturing PMI by 6-to-9 months (Chart 10). In addition, the Fed’s decision to start buying Treasurys again will increase dollar liquidity, thus further contributing to looser financial conditions. Chart 9Easier Financial Conditions Will Boost Global Growth   Chart 10The Effects Of Easing Monetary Policy Should Soon Trickle Down To The Economy Stepped-up Chinese stimulus should also help jumpstart global growth. Chinese money and credit growth both came in above expectations in September. The PBoC has been cutting reserve requirements, which has helped bring down interbank rates. Further cuts to the medium-term lending facility are likely over the remainder of this year. Changes in Chinese credit growth lead global growth by about nine months (Chart 11). Chart 11Chinese Credit Should Support The Recovery In Global Growth Stay Overweight Global Equities While the road to finalizing a “phase 1” trade deal in time for the APEC summit is likely to be a bumpy one, we continue to reiterate our recommendation that investors overweight global stocks relative to bonds over a 12-month horizon. We expect to upgrade EM and European equities over the coming weeks once we see a bit more evidence that global growth is bottoming out. Ultimately, the trajectory of stocks will hinge on what happens to earnings. The U.S. earnings season began this week. As of last week, analysts expected S&P 500 EPS to decline by 4.6% in Q3 relative to the same quarter last year according to data compiled by FactSet. Keep in mind, however, that EPS growth has beaten estimates by around four percentage points since 2015 (Chart 12). Thus, a reasonable bet is that U.S. earnings will be flat this quarter, clearing a low bar of expectations. Chart 12Actual EPS Has Generally Beaten Estimates Chart 13Earnings And Nominal GDP Growth Tend To Move In Lock-Step The fact that 83% of the 63 S&P 500 companies that have reported earnings thus far have beaten estimates – better than the historic average of 64% – supports the view that current Q3 estimates are too dour. Looking out, earning growth should pick up as nominal GDP growth accelerates (Chart 13). European and EM equities generally outperform the global benchmark when global growth is speeding up (Chart 14). This is due to the more cyclical nature of their stock markets. In addition, as a countercyclical currency, the dollar tends to weaken in a faster growth environment. A weaker dollar disproportionately benefits cyclical stocks (Chart 15).   Chart 14EM And Euro Area Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves Chart 15Cyclical Stocks Will Outperform If The Dollar Weakens We would include financials in our definition of cyclical sectors. As global growth improves, long-term bond yields will increase at the margin. Since central banks are in no hurry to raise rates, yield curves will steepen. This will boost bank profits and share prices (Chart 16). Cyclical stocks are currently quite cheap compared to defensives (Chart 17). Likewise, non-U.S. equities are quite inexpensive compared to their U.S. peers, even if one adjusts for differences in sector composition across regions. While U.S. stocks trade at 17.5-times forward earnings, international stocks trade at a more attractive forward PE ratio of 13.7. The combination of higher earnings yields and lower interest rates abroad implies that the equity risk premium is roughly two percentage points higher outside the United States (Chart 18). Chart 16Steeper Yield Curves Will Benefit Financials Chart 17Cyclical Stocks Are More Attractive Than Defensives   Chart 18The Equity Risk Premium Is Quite High, Especially Outside The U.S. We expect to upgrade EM and European equities over the coming weeks once we see a bit more evidence that global growth is bottoming out.   Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see Global Investment Strategy, “Fourth Quarter 2019 Strategy Outlook: A ‘Show Me’ Market,” dated October 4, 2019. 2 “Update to IP Commission Report: The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017. 3Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Elizabeth Warren And The Markets,” dated September 13, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Pervasive global policy uncertainty continues to fuel USD safe-haven demand. This keeps the Fed’s broad trade-weighted dollar index for goods close to record highs, which continues to stifle oil demand. At present, we do not expect this pervasive uncertainty to dissipate. For this reason, we are lowering our oil-demand growth expectation slightly for this year and next. Our estimate of global supply growth is slightly lower for this year and next, as well; we continue to expect OPEC 2.0 to maintain production discipline and for capital markets to restrain U.S. shale-oil growth.1 Our price forecast for 4Q19 is $66/bbl on average, an estimate that includes a risk premium reflecting continued tension in the Persian Gulf. Our updated supply-demand balances for 2020 reduce our Brent price forecast to $70/bbl versus our earlier expectation of $74/bbl. We continue to expect WTI to trade $4.00/bbl below Brent next year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. The Trump administration likely will not renew Chevron’s waiver to operate in Venezuela when it expires October 25. This raises the likelihood the country’s oil output will fall below 300k b/d, down from the 650k b/d we currently estimate.2 Production could revive next year, if Russian or Chinese firms step in to fill the void. This is not certain, however, as the U.S. is pressing both to end their support for the Maduro regime. Separately, the Aramco IPO could occur as early as November, according to press reports. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper treatment and refining charges in Asia are staging a recovery, clocking in at $56.70/MT at the end of last week, according to Metal Bulletin’s Fastmarkets. The MB index fell to a record low of $49.20/MT in late August. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold volatility remains elevated – standing at 15.1% p.a. on the COMEX – as markets continue to process news re a partial easing of tensions in the Sino-US trade war. Geopolitical tensions, which now encompass Turkey-US relations, remain elevated. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Uncertainty around a partial deal involving ag exports from the U.S. to China remains high, as negotiators deliberately minimize expectations of a successful outcome. The big sticking point appears to be whether U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports due to kick in in December will be removed. Feature Uncertainty arising from global economic policy risk continues to dominate commodity markets. This has been the case going on three years. While it is ubiquitous, it is difficult to isolate. In earlier research, we noted the tightening of global financial conditions – largely the result of the Fed’s rates normalization policy, which resulted in four rate hikes last year, and China’s deleveraging policy – were responsible for the sharp slowing of oil demand seen in 2H18-1H19.3 Recently concluded research allows us to extend our earlier thesis to account for the effect of pervasive global policy uncertainty over the past three years, which has dominated our analysis of commodity markets generally, oil in particular. To wit: We find a strong, positive correlation between uncertainty, as measured by the Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index, and the Fed's USD broad trade-weighted index for goods (TWIBG) from January 2017 to now (Chart of the Week).4 Chart of the WeekUSD Absorbs Global Policy Uncertainty USD Absorbs Global Uncertainty Sudden policy shifts have, over the past three years, resulted in a steady increase in the level of the GEPU index. Prior to 2017, the correlations between the GEPU index and the USD TWIBG were running at 33% and 63% for the periods 2000 to 2016 and 2010 to 2016, the post-GFC period for y/y returns. However, as right- and left-wing populism gained ground globally and monetary policy generally became more “data dependent” and ad hoc at the Fed, ECB and BoJ, the GEPU and USD TWIBG indices became highly correlated, surpassing 90% (Chart 2).5 This period saw the U.S. become more and more assertive vis-à-vis trade and foreign policy, particularly in re China, Iran and Venezuela, which caused those states to implement their own policy responses. In addition, as monetary policy generally became increasingly accommodative, central banks – and policy analysts – became less certain about the effects of their policies on the broader economy (e.g., the Fed shifting away from rates normalization, the ECB’s re-launching of QE, and the BoJ’s interest-rate targeting regime). Chart 2Co-Movement In GEPU, USD TWIBG Often, commodity markets were forced to adjust to sudden policy changes – e.g., the imposition of trade tariffs against China, or the granting of waivers to Iran’s eight largest importers in November 2018 just before oil-export sanctions were re-imposed. Sudden policy shifts have, over the past three years, resulted in a steady increase in the level of the GEPU index. Increasing uncertainty translated into a steadily increasing USD TWIBG, with safe-haven demand for dollars rising, as the Chart of the Week indicates. To date, we have not decomposed the drivers of monetary conditions, particularly in re central-bank accommodation versus global economic policy uncertainty on the evolution of the USD. The GEPU index hit a record high in August 2019, while the USD TWIBG hit a record in September 2019. It is possible the effects of general policy uncertainty could be cumulative – as earlier uncertainties remain unresolved and new ones are added to the global mix (e.g., US-Turkey foreign-policy tensions now have been added to other geopolitical risks). It is entirely possible global monetary policy easing – particularly from the Fed – is accommodating safe-haven demand accompanying higher uncertainty. If the Fed were to tighten while uncertainty remains elevated the USD could rally sharply and impact commodity demand even more. Persistent USD Strength Lowers Oil Price Forecast Based on our analysis, the effects of the uncertainty we observe in the USD above are transmitted to GDP globally, which feeds through to commodity demand. As the USD strengthens, it raises the local-currency cost of commodities and the cost of servicing USD-denominated debt ex-US. In addition, on the supply side, a stronger dollar lowers local production costs at the margin, which stokes deflation globally.  All else equal, these effects push oil prices lower by reducing demand and increasing supply at the margin. On the back of a stronger USD and persistent uncertainty, we are once again lowering our estimate of global demand growth. This is most pronounced in EM economies (Chart 3), but there are feedback effects into DM in the form of reduced trade volumes, which hits manufacturing economies like Germany harder than service-dominated economies like the US. On the back of a stronger USD and persistent uncertainty, we are once again lowering our estimate of global demand growth to 1.13mm b/d this year and 1.40mm b/d in 2020 (Chart 4). This is down slightly from 1.2mm b/d this year and 1.5mm b/d next year. In line with the U.S. EIA, we also lowered our estimate of 2018 demand, which has the effect reducing the level of demand we expect in 2019 and 2020. Chart 3Local-Currency Oil Costs Are High Chart 4BCA Research Supply-Demand Balances We maintain our expectation fiscal and monetary stimulus globally will revive demand, but, given the deleterious effects of global uncertainty and its effects on demand via the USD, we are moderating our position some, as the downward adjustment to consumption indicates. On the supply side, we expect KSA’s output to be fully restored by November, and for production in the Kingdom to average 9.9mm b/d in October and November. We are expecting overall OPEC 2.0 output growth of 250k b/d on average in the 2Q20 to 4Q20 interval, down from our previous growth estimate of 500k b/d. In the US, we expect shale-oil output to grow 900k b/d in 2020, versus 1.3mm b/d in 2019, which will leave overall U.S. crude output at 13.3mm b/d next year on average, as capital-market constraints continue to act as a governor on total output (Chart 5). Chart 5U.S. Shale-Oil Output Will Remain Capital-Constrained Overall, we expect global supply to finish 2019 at 100.8mm b/d and at 102.3mm b/d next year, which is down slightly from our earlier estimates (Table 1). Even with demand moderating, we expect inventories to continue to draw this year and into 3Q20 before they resume building, as the combination of OPEC 2.0 production discipline and capital markets constrain output (Chart 6). Chart 6OECD Oil Inventories On Track To Draw Table 1 Investment Implications Continued voluntary and involuntary production restraint will allow global inventories to draw despite slightly lower demand. Given our supply-demand expectations, we forecast Brent will trade lower next year, at $70/bbl on average versus our earlier expectation of $74/bbl. This is ~ $10/bbl above the median consensus. We continue to expect WTI to trade $4.00/bbl below Brent next year. Continued voluntary and involuntary production restraint will allow global inventories to draw despite slightly lower demand, which will keep Brent and WTI forward curves backwardated next year (WTI was in a slight carry earlier this week, while Brent was backwardated). We would caution that any resolution of the profound uncertainty currently dogging global markets could unleash pent-up demand that would sharply rally commodities generally, and oil in particular. This could take the form of a broad trade agreement that ends the Sino-US trade war – an unlikely, but not impossible,  turn of events – or an unexpected reduction in tensions in the Persian Gulf, again, unlikely but not impossible. Bottom Line: Resolution of global policy uncertainty would revive commodity demand, as safe-haven USD demand gives way to higher consumer spending, renewed growth in global trade and investment. Until then, uncertainty will continue to hamper commodity demand growth, particularly for oil.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      OPEC 2.0 is the moniker we coined for the producer coalition formed at the end of 2016 to regain control of production following the disastrous market-share war launched by OPEC in 2014, which took Brent prices from above $100/bbl to $26/bbl by early 2016.  The coalition is led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. 2      Please see Venezuelan oil output could be halved without Chevron waiver extension: analysts, posted by S&P Global Platts October 14, 2019.  3      Please see our report entitle Central Bank Easing Key To Oil Prices, published September 5, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4      This GEPU is a monthly GDP-weighted index of newspaper headlines containing a list of words related to three categories – “economy,” “policy” and “uncertainty.”  Newspapers from 20 countries representing almost 80% of global GDP (on an exchange-weighted basis) are scoured monthly to create the index.  Please see GEPU and Baker-Bloom-Davis for additional information. 5      Both series are plotted as percent changes y/y in Chart 2. For the 2017 - 2019 period, the coefficient of determination for this model is 0.81 using a regression of the USD on the GEPU.  There was no statistically significant relationship between them either from 2000 to 2016, or from 2010 to 2016.  Insert SOFTS text here Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Analysis on Turkey is available below. Highlights A dovish Fed or robust U.S. growth does not constitute sufficient conditions for a bull market in EM. China’s business and credit cycles are much more important factors for EM than those of the U.S. A recovery in the Chinese economy and global manufacturing is not imminent. The common signal reverberating from various financial markets is that the risks to the global business cycle are still skewed to the downside. Feature Current investor perceptions of emerging markets are mixed. Some expect EM to benefit greatly from low U.S. interest rates. These investors view even a partial trade deal between the U.S. and China as sufficient for EM to embark on a bull market. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team disagrees with this narrative. We deliberated the significance of the U.S.-China confrontation to EM in our September 19 report; therefore, we will not go over this subject here. Rather, in this report we discuss some of the more common misconceptions surrounding EM currently, and infer what these mean for investment strategies. Perception 1: The share of resource sectors (materials and energy) in the EM equity benchmark has declined substantially. This along with the expanded role of consumers and consumer stocks (Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu) in EM economies and equity markets has made their share prices less exposed to the global trade cycle and commodities prices. Reality: It is true that in many EM bourses, the weight of consumer stocks has been growing. Nevertheless, their financial markets in general, and equity markets in particular, remain very sensitive to the global trade cycle and commodities prices. Chart I-1 illustrates that the aggregate EM equity index has historically been and continues to be strongly correlated with the global basic materials stock index. The latter includes mining, steel and chemical companies. Global materials stocks also exhibit a very strong correlation with Chinese banks’ share prices. Moreover, global materials stocks also exhibit a very strong correlation with Chinese banks’ share prices (Chart I-2). The rationale for the high correlation is that both mainland banks’ profits and global demand for basic materials are driven by a common factor: China’s business cycle. Chart I-1EM And Global Materials Stocks Move Together Chart I-2Chinese Bank And Global Materials Share Prices Are Highly Correlated For example, construction in China is contracting (Chart I-3), which entails both higher NPLs for Chinese banks and lower demand for basic materials. China accounts for about 50% of global consumption of industrial metals, cement and many other basic materials. Finally, EM ex-China bank stocks also correlate strongly with global basic materials share prices. The basis is as follows: Many emerging economies export raw materials, and commodities price fluctuations impact their business cycle, exports and exchange rates. Chart I-3China: Construction Activity Is Contracting Chart I-4High-Yielding EM: Currencies And Local Bond Yields Historically, in high-yielding EM markets, currency depreciation has led to higher interest rates and lower bank share prices, and vice versa (Chart I-4). Lately, EM bond yields have not risen in response to EM currency depreciation. However, we believe this correlation will soon be re-established if EM currencies continue drifting lower.  In short, China’s money/credit cycles drive not only the mainland’s business cycle, banking profits and NPLs, but also global trade and commodities prices. The latter two - via their impact on exchange rates and in turn interest rates - have historically explained credit and domestic demand cycles in high-yielding EM. Perception 2:  EM stocks are a high-beta play on the S&P 500, i.e., EM equities outperform when the S&P 500 rallies, and vice versa. Reality: Since 2012, the beta for EM equity versus the S&P 500 has often been below one (Chart I-5). Furthermore, since 2012, EM share prices often failed to outpace their DM peers during global equity rallies. Indeed, EM relative equity performance versus DM, as well as the EM ex-China currency total return index, have been closely tracking the relative performance of global cyclicals versus global defensive stocks (Chart I-6). Chart I-5EM Equities Beta To The S&P 500 Chart I-6Global Cyclicals-To-Defensives Equity Ratio And EM   In short, EM equities and currencies have been, and will remain, sensitive to the global business cycle rather than the S&P 500. Since 2012, the latter has - on several occasions - decoupled from the global manufacturing and trade cycles. Perception 3:  EM stocks, currencies and fixed-income markets are very sensitive to U.S. interest rates. Hence, a dovish Fed will lead to EM currency appreciation.  Reality: Chart I-7 reveals that EM currencies, total returns on EM local currency bonds in U.S. dollar terms and EM sovereign credit spreads do not exhibit a strong relationship with U.S. Treasury yields. U.S. interest rate expectations have a much smaller impact on EM financial markets than commonly perceived by the investment community.  Overall, U.S. interest rate expectations have a much smaller impact on EM financial markets than commonly perceived by the investment community.  Chart I-7EM And U.S. Bond Yields: No Stable Correlation Chart I-8China Cycle And EM Stocks Led U.S. Bond Yields On the contrary, the declines in U.S. bond yields in both 2015/16 and in 2018/19 were due to the growth slowdown that emanated from China/EM. The top panel of Chart I-8 illustrates that Chinese import growth rolled over in December 2017, yet U.S. bond yields rolled over in October 2018. What is more, EM share prices have been leading U.S. bond yields in recent years, not the other way around (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Perception 4:  If the U.S. avoids a recession, EM risk assets will recover. Chart I-9EM Profits Are Driven By Chinese Not U.S. Business Cycle Reality: EM per-share earnings contracted in 2012-2014 and in 2019, despite reasonably robust growth in U.S. final demand (Chart I-9, top panel). This suggests that even if the U.S. economy avoids a recession, that will not be a sufficient condition to be bullish on EM. EM corporate profits are highly driven by China’s business cycle. The bottom panel of Chart I-9 illustrates that mainland domestic industrial orders have been the key driver of EM corporate profit cycles since 2008. Perception 5:  EM equities, fixed-income markets and currencies are cheap. Reality: EM stocks are not cheap. They are fairly valued. Equity sectors with very poor fundamentals have very low multiples. Hence, they are “cheap” for a reason. These include Chinese banks, state-owned enterprises in various countries and resource companies. Equity segments with robust fundamentals are overpriced. Given that Chinese banks, state-owned enterprises in various countries, resource companies, and cyclical businesses have very large market caps, EM market-cap based equity valuation ratios are low – i.e., they appear cheap.  To remove the impact of these large market cap segments, we constructed and have been publishing the following valuation ratios: median, 20% trimmed mean and equal-sub-sector weighted (Chart I-10). Each of these is calculated based on the average of trailing and forward P/E ratios, price-to-book value, price-to-cash earnings and price-to-dividend ratios. EM equities relative to DM are not cheap either. Chart I-11 demonstrates the same ratios – median, 20% trimmed-mean and equal-sub-sector weighted values for EM versus DM. Chart I-10EM Equities Are Not Cheap Chart I-11Relative To DM EM Stocks Are Not Cheap Further, when valuations are not at extremes as in the case of EM equities at the moment, the profit cycle holds the key to share price performance over a 6 to 12-month horizon. EM earnings are presently contracting in absolute terms, and underperforming DM EPS. Two currencies that offer value are the Mexican peso and Russian ruble. Chart I-12EM Local Yields Are Low In Absolute Terms And Relative To U.S. In the fixed-income space, EM local bond yields are very low in absolute terms and relative to U.S. Treasury yields (Chart I-12). EM sovereign and corporate spreads are not wide either. As to exchange rates, the cheapest currencies are those with the worst fundamentals, such as the Argentine peso, Turkish lira and South African rand. The majority of other EM currencies are not very cheap. Two currencies that offer value are the Mexican peso and Russian ruble. Yet foreign investors are very long these currencies, and a combination of lower oil prices and portfolio outflows from broader EM will weigh on these exchange rates as well. Takeaways And Investment Strategy Chart I-13EM Currencies And Industrial Metals Prices EM risk assets and currencies exhibit the strongest correlation with global trade and commodities prices. Chart I-13 indicates that the EM ex-China currency total return index closely tracks commodities prices. This corroborates the messages from Chart I-1 on page 1 and Chart I-6 on page 4.  China’s business and credit cycles are much more important for EM than those of the U.S. A dovish Fed or strong U.S. growth are not sufficient reasons to bet on an EM bull market. A recovery in the Chinese economy and global manufacturing is not imminent. Individual EM countries’ domestic fundamentals such as return on capital, inflation, banking system health, competitiveness and politics drive individual EM performance. On these accounts, the outlook varies among EM. Readers can find analyses on specific EM economies in our Countries In-Depth page. Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM stocks, credit and currencies versus their DM counterparts.  Absolute-return investors should outright avoid EM, or trade them on the short side. Within the EM equity space, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, Central Europe, Korea ex-tech, Thailand and the UAE. Our underweights are South Africa, Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong, Turkey and Colombia. The path of least resistance for the U.S. dollar is up. Continue shorting the following basket of EM currencies versus the dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. We are also short the CNY versus the greenback. As always, the list of our country allocations for local currency bonds and sovereign credit markets is available at the end of our reports – please refer to page 16. Take Cues From These Markets We suggest investors take cues from the following financial market signals. They are unequivocally sending a downbeat message for global growth and risk assets: The ratio between Sweden and Swiss non-financial stocks in common currency terms is heading south (Chart I-14). Swedish non-financials include many companies leveraged to the global industrial cycle, while Swiss non-financials are dominated by defensive stocks. Hence, the persistent decline in this ratio presages a continued deterioration in the global industrial sector. Where is the next defense line for this ratio? To reach its 2002 and 2008 nadirs, it will need to drop by another 10%. In the interim, investors should maintain a defensive posture. Chart I-14A Message From Swedish And Swiss Equities Chart I-15A Breakdown In The Making? U.S. FAANG stocks appear to be cracking below their 200-day moving average. The relative performance of global cyclical versus global defensive stocks is relapsing below the three-year moving average that served as a support last December (Chart I-15). U.S. FAANG stocks appear to be cracking below their 200-day moving average (Chart I-16). If this support gives, the next one will be about 17% below current levels. Finally, U.S. high-beta share prices are on the verge of a breakdown (Chart I-17). The next technical support is 10% below current levels. Chart I-16FAANG Are On The Support Line Chart I-17U.S. High-Beta Stocks Are On The Edge Bottom Line: The common message reverberating from these financial markets corroborates our fundamental analysis that a global business cycle recovery is not imminent, and that global risk assets in general, and EM financial markets in particular, are at risk of selling off further. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Turkey: Is The Mean-Reversion Rally Over? Turkish financial markets have rebounded to their respective falling trend lines (Chart II-1). Are they set to break out or is a setback looming? Chart II-1Back To Falling Trend Chart II-2TRY Is Cheap Pros The economy has undergone a considerable real adjustment and many excesses have been purged: The current account balance has turned positive as imports have collapsed. Going forward, lower oil prices are likely to help the nation’s current account dynamics. The lira has become cheap (Chart II-2).  According to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs, the currency is one standard deviation below its fair value. Core and headline inflation have fallen, allowing the central bank to cut interest rates aggressively. However, the exchange rate still holds the key: if the currency depreciates anew, local bonds yields will rise and the ability of the central bank to reduce borrowing costs further will diminish. Finally, private credit and broad money growth have decelerated substantially and are contracting in inflation-adjusted terms (Chart II-3). Chart II-3Money & Credit Have Bottomed Chart II-4Banks Have Been Aggressively Buying Government Bonds The recent gap between broad money and private credit growth has been due to commercial banks buying government bonds (Chart II-4). When a commercial bank purchases a security from non-banks, a new deposit/new unit of money supply is created. Banks’ purchases of government bonds en masse have capped domestic bond yields. However, if pursued aggressively, such monetary expansion could weigh on the currency’s value.   Cons Presently, potential sources of macro vulnerability in Turkey are: Foreign debt obligations (FDOs) – which are calculated as the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months – are at $168 billion, which is sizable. The annual current account surplus has reached only $4 billion and is sufficient to cover only 2.5% of FDOs, assuming the capital and financial account balance will be zero. Clearly, Turkey needs to both roll over most of its foreign debt coming due and attract foreign capital to finance a potential expansion in its imports if its domestic demand is to recover. Critically, $20 billion of net FX reserves, excluding gold, swap lines with foreign central banks and net of domestic banking and non-banking corporations’ foreign exchange deposits, are not adequate either to cover foreign debt obligations. Even though headline and core inflation measures have fallen, wage inflation remains rampant (Chart II-5). If wage inflation does not drop substantially very soon, rapidly rising unit labor costs will feed into inflation leading to negative ramifications for the exchange rate. This is especially crucial in Turkey given President Erdogan has undermined the central bank’s credibility and is resorting to populist measures to revive his popularity. Finally, Turkish banks remain under-provisioned. Currently, the banking regulator is requiring banks to boost their non-performing loans (NPL) ratio to 6.3% of total loans.This a far cry from the 2001 episode when the NPL ratio shot up to 25% (Chart II-6).   Even though interest rates rose much more in 2001 than last year, the private credit penetration in the economy was very low in the early 2000s. A higher credit penetration usually implies weaker borrowers have borrowed money and heralds a higher NPL ratio. Typically, following a credit boom and bust, it is natural for the NPL ratio to exceed 10%. We do not think Turkish banks stocks, having rallied a lot from their lows, are pricing in such a scenario. Chart II-5Surging Wages Are A Risk Chart II-6NPL Ratio Is Unrealistic Investment Recommendation We recommend both absolute-return investors and asset allocators not to chase Turkish financial markets higher. Renewed market volatility lies ahead. Given we expect foreign capital outflows from EM, Turkish companies and banks will encounter difficulties in rolling over their external debt and attracting foreign capital into domestic markets. This will produce a new downleg in the exchange rate. In turn, currency depreciation will weigh on performance of local bonds as well as sovereign and corporate credit. Stay underweight.   Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations