Ghana

Highlights Political and corporate climate activism will increase the cost of developing the resources required to produce and deliver energy going forward – e.g., oil and gas wells; pipelines; copper mines, and refineries. Over the short run, the fastest way for investor-owned companies (IOCs) to address accelerated reductions in CO2 emissions imposed by courts and boards is to walk away from the assets producing them, which could be disruptive over the medium term. Longer term, state-owned companies (SOCs) not facing the constraints of IOCs likely will be required to provide an increasing share of the resources needed to produce and distribute energy. The real difficulty will come in the medium term. Capex for critical metals like copper languishes, just as the call on these metals steadily increases over the next 30 years (Chart of the Week). The evolution to a low-carbon future has not been thought through at the global policy level. A real strategy must address underinvestment in base metals and incentivize the development of technology via a carbon tax – not emissions trading schemes – so firms can innovate to avoid it. We remain long energy and metals exposures.1 Feature And you may ask yourself, "Well … how did I get here?" David Byrne, Once In A Lifetime Energy markets – broadly defined – are radically transforming from week to week. The latest iteration of these markets' evolution is catalyzed by climate activists, who are finding increasing success in court and on corporate boards – sometimes backed by major institutional investors – and forcing oil and gas producers to accelerate CO2 emission-reduction programs.2 Climate activists' arguments are finding increasing purchase because they have merit: Years of stiff-arming investors seeking clarity on the oil and gas producers' decarbonization agendas, coupled with a pronounced failure to provide returns in excess of their cost of capital, have given activists all of the ammo needed to argue their points. Chart of the WeekCall On Metals For Energy Will Increase This activism is not limited to the courts or boardrooms. Voters in democratic societies with contested elections also are seeking redress for failures of their governments to effectively channel mineral wealth back into society on an equitable basis, and to protect their environments and the habitats of indigenous populations. This voter activism is especially apparent in Chile and Peru, where elections and constitutional conventions likely will result in higher taxes and royalties on metals IOCs operating in these states, which will increase production costs and ultimately be passed on to consumers.3 These states account for ~ 40% of world copper output. IOCs Walk Away Earlier this week, Exxon walked away from an early-stage offshore oil development project in Ghana.4 This followed the unfavorable court rulings and boardroom setbacks experienced by Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Exxon recently (referenced in fn. 2). While the company had no comment on its abrupt departure, its action shows how IOCs can exercise their option to put a project back to its host government, thus illustrating one of the most readily available alternatives for energy IOCs to meet court- or board-mandated CO2 emissions targets. If these investments qualify as write-offs, the burden will be borne by taxpayers. As climate activism increases, state-owned companies (SOCs) not facing the constraints of IOCs likely will be required to provide an increasing share of the resources – particularly oil and gas – needed to produce and distribute energy going forward. This is not an unalloyed benefit, as the SOCs still face stranded-asset risks, if they invest in longer-lived assets that are obviated by a successful renewables + grid buildout globally. That is a cost that will have to be compensated, when the SOCs work up their capex allocations. Still, if legal and investor activism significantly accelerates IOCs' capex reductions in oil and gas projects, the SOCs – particularly those in OPEC 2.0 – will be able to expand their position as the dominant supplier in the global oil market, and could perhaps increase their influence on price levels and forward-curve dynamics (Chart 2).5 Chart 2OPEC 2.0s Could Expand If Investor Activism Increases Higher Call On Metals At present, there is a lot of talk about the need to invest in renewable electricity generation and the grid structure supporting it, but very little in the way of planning for this transition. Other than repeated assertions of its necessity, little is being said regarding how exactly this strategy will be executed given the magnitude of the supply increase in metals required. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the refined copper market, which has been in a physical deficit – i.e., production minus consumption is negative – for the last 6 years (Chart 3). Physical copper markets in China, which consumes more than 50% of refined output, remain extremely tight, as can be seen in the ongoing weakness of treating charges and refining charges (TC/RC) for the past year (Chart 4). These charges are inversely correlated to prices – when TC/RCs are low, it means there is surplus refining capacity for copper – unrefined metal is scarce, which drives down demand for these services. Chart 3Coppers Physical Deficit Likely Persist Chart 4Chinas Refined Copper Supply Remains TightTheoretically, high prices will incentivize higher levels of production. However, after the last decade’s ill-timed investment in new mine discoveries and expansions, mining companies have become more wary with their investments, and are using earnings to pay dividends and reduce debt. This leads us to believe that mining companies will not invest in new mine discoveries but will use capital expenditure to expand brownfield projects to meet rising demand. In the last decade, as copper demand rose, capex for copper rose from 2010-2012, and fell from 2013-2016 (Chart 5). During this time, the copper ore grade was on a declining trend. This implies that the new copper brought online was being mined from lower-grade ore, due to the expansion of existing projects(Chart 6). Chart 5Copper Capex Growth Remains Weak Chart 6Copper Ore-Quality Declines Persist Through Capex Cycle Capex directed at keeping ore production above consumption will not be sufficient to avoid major depletions of ore supplies beginning in 2024, according to Wood Mackenzie. The consultancy foresees a cumulative deficit of ~ 16mm MT by 2040. Plugging this gap will require $325-$500 billion of investment in the copper mining sector.6 The Case For A Carbon Tax The low-carbon future remains something of a will-o'-the-wisp – seen off in the future but not really developed in the present. Most striking in discussions of the low-carbon transition is the assumption of resource availability – particularly bases metals –in, e.g., the IEA's Net Zero by 2050, A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, published last month. In the IEA's document, further investment in hydrocarbons is not required beyond 2025. The copper, aluminum, steel, etc., required to build the generation and supporting grid infrastructure will be available and callable as needed to build all the renewable generation the world requires. The document is agnostic between carbon trading and carbon taxes as a way to price carbon and incentivize the technology that would allow firms and households to avoid a direct cost on carbon. A real strategy must address the fact that most of the world will continue to rely on fossil fuels for decades, as development goals are pursued. Underinvestment in base metals and its implications for the buildout of generation and grids has to be a priority if these assets are to be built. Given the 5-10-year lead times base metals mines require to come online, it is obvious that beyond the middle of this decade, the physical reality of demand exceeding supply will assert itself. A good start would be a global effort to impose and collect carbon taxes uniformly across states.7 This would need to be augmented with a carbon club, which restricts admission and trading privileges  to those states adopting such a scheme. Harmonizing the multiple emissions trading schemes worldwide will be a decades-long effort that is unlikely to succeed. Such schemes also can be gamed by larger players, producing pricing distortions. A hard and fast tax that is enforced in all of the members of such a carbon club would immediately focus attention on the technology required to avoid paying it – mobilizing capital, innovation and entrepreneurial drive to make it a reality. This would support carbon-capture, use and storage technologies as well, thus extending the life of existing energy resources as the next generation of metals-based resources is built out. In addition, a carbon tax raises revenue for governments, which can be used for a variety of public policies, including reducing other taxes to reduce the overall burden of taxation. Lastly, a tax eliminates the potential for short-term price volatility in the pricing of carbon – as long as households and firms know what confronts them they can plan around it.  Tax revenues also can be used to reduce the regressive nature of such levies. Investment Implications The lack of a coherent policy framework that addresses the very real constraints on the transition to a low-carbon economy makes the likelihood of a volatile, years-long evolution foreordained. We believe this will create numerous investment opportunities as underinvestment in hydrocarbons and base metals production predisposes oil, natural gas and base metals prices to move higher in the face of strong and rising demand. We remain long commodity index exposure – the S&P GSCI and GSCI Commodity Dynamic Roll Strategy ETF (COMT), which is optimized to take advantage of the most backwardated commodity forward curves in the index. These positions were up 5.3% and 7.2% since inception on December 7, 2017 and March 12, 2021, respectively, at Tuesday's close. We also remain long the MSCI Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK), which is up 33.9% since it was put on December 10, 2020. Expecting continued volatility in metals – copper in particular – we will look for opportunities to re-establish positions in COMEX/CME Copper after being stopped out with gains. A trailing stop was elected on our long Dec21 copper position established September 10, 2020, which was closed out with a 48.2% gain on May 21, 2021. Our long calendar 2022 vs short calendar 2023 COMEX copper backwardation trade established April 22, 2021, was closed out on May 20, 2021, leaving us with a return of 305%.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 offered no surprises to markets this week, as it remained committed to returning just over 2mm b/d of production to the market over the May-July period, 70% of which comes from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), according to Platts. While Iran's return to the market is not a given in OPEC 2.0's geometry, we have given better than even odds it will return to the market beginning in 3Q21 and restore most of the 1.4mm b/d not being produced at present to the market over the course of the following year. OPEC itself expects demand to increase 6mm b/d this year, somewhat above our expectation of 5.3mm b/d. Stronger demand could raise Brent prices above our average $63/bbl forecast for this year (Chart 7). Brent was trading above $71/bbl as we went to press. Base Metals: Bullish BHP declared operations at its Escondida and Spence mines were running at normal rates despite a strike by some 200 operations specialists. BHP is employing so-called substitute workers to conduct operation, according to reuters.com, which also reported separate unions at both mines are considering strike actions in the near future. Precious Metals: Bullish The Fed’s reluctance to increase nominal interest rates despite indications of higher inflation will reduce real rates, which will support higher gold prices (Chart 8). We agree with our colleagues at BCA Research's US Bond Strategy that the Fed is waiting for the US labor market to reach levels consistent with its assessment of maximum employment before it makes its initial rate hike in this interest-rate cycle. Subsequent rate changes, however, will be based on realized inflation and inflation expectations. In our opinion, the Fed is following this ultra-accommodative monetary policy approach to break the US liquidity trap, brought about by a rise in precautionary savings due to the pandemic. In addition, we continue to expect USD weakness, which also will support gold and precious metals prices. We remain long gold, expecting prices to clear $2,000/oz this year. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn prices fell more than 2% Wednesday, following the release of USDA estimates showing 95% of the corn crop was planted by 31 May 2021, well over the 87% five-year average. This was in line with expectations. However, the Department's assessment that 76% of the crop was in good-to-excellent condition exceeded market expectations. Chart 7 Chart 8 Footnotes 1     Please see Trade Tables below. 2     Please see OPEC, Russia seen gaining more power with Shell Dutch ruling and EXCLUSIVE BlackRock backs 3 dissidents to shake up Exxon board -sources published by reuters.com June 1, 2021 and May 25, 2021. 3    Please see Chile's govt in shock loss as voters pick independents to draft constitution published by reuters.com May 17, 2021, and Peru’s elite in panic at prospect of hard-left victory in presidential election published by ft.com June 1, 2021.  Peru has seen significant capital flight on the back of these fears.  See also Results from Chile’s May 2021 elections published by IHS Markit May 21, 2021 re a higher likelihood of tax increases for the mining sector.  The risk of nationalization is de minimis, according to IHS. 4    Please see Exxon walks away from stake in deepwater Ghana block published by worldoil.com June 1, 2021. 5    Please see OPEC 2.0's Production Strategy In Focus, which we published on May 20, 2021, for a recap our how we model OPEC 2.0's strategy.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see Will a lack of supply growth come back to bite the copper industry?, published by Wood Mackenzie on March 23, 2021. 7     Please see The Challenges and Prospects for Carbon Pricing in Europe published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies last month for a discussion of carbon taxes vs. emissions trading schemes.     Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights We estimate total Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) investment will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020. The size of BRI investments is about 47 times smaller than China's annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Therefore, a slump in domestic capital spending in China will fully offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets from BRI. Investors should consider buying these bourses in sell-off. On a positive note, BRI leads to improved global capital allocation, allows China to export its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, and boosts recipient countries' demand for Chinese exports. Feature China's 'Belt and Road' Initiative (BRI) is on an accelerating path (Chart I-1), with total investment expected to rise from US$120 billion to about US$170 billion over the next three years. Chart I-1Accelerating BRI Investment From China The BRI has been one of the central government's main priorities since late 2013. The primary objectives of the BRI are: To export China's excess capacity in heavy industries and construction to other countries - i.e., build infrastructure in other countries; To expand the country's international influence via a grand plan of funding investments into the 69 countries along the Belt and the Road (B&R) (Chart I-2); To build transportation and communication networks as well as energy supply to facilitate trade and provide China access to other regions, especially Europe and Africa; To facilitate the internationalization of the RMB; To speed up the development of China's poor (and sometimes restive) central and western regions, namely by turning them into economic hubs between coastal China and the BRI countries in the rest of Asia; To boost China's strategic position in central, south, and southeast Asia through security linkages arising from BRI cooperation, as well as from assets (like ports) that could provide military as well as commercial uses in the long run. From a cyclical investment perspective, the pertinent questions for investors are: How big is the current scale of BRI investment, and where is the funding coming from? Will rising BRI investment be able to offset the negative impact from a potential slowdown in Chinese capex spending? Which frontier markets will benefit most from Chinese BRI investment? Chart I-2The Belt And Road Program China's BRI: Scale And Funding Scale China has been implementing its strategic BRI since 2013. To date it has invested in 69 B&R countries through two major approaches: infrastructure project contracts and outward direct investment (ODI). The first approach - investment through projects - is the main mechanism of BRI implementation. BRI projects center on infrastructure development in recipient countries, encompassing construction of transportation (railways, highways, subways, and bridges), energy (power plants and pipelines) and telecommunication infrastructure. The cumulative size of the signed contracts with B&R countries over the past three years is US$383 billion, of which US$182 billion of projects are already completed. However, the value of newly signed contracts in a year does not equal the actual project investment occurred in that year, as generally these contracts will take several years to be implemented and completed. Table I-1 shows our projection of Chinese BRI project investment over the years of 2017-2020, which will reach US$168 billion in 2020. This projection is based on two assumptions: an average three-year investing and implementation period for BRI projects from the date of signing the contract to the commercial operation date (COD) of the project, and an average annual growth rate of 10% for the total value of the annual newly signed contracts over the next three years. Table I-1Projection Of Chinese BRI Project Investment Over The Years 2017-2020 The basis for the first assumption is that the majority of the completed BRI projects were by and large finished within three years, and most of the existing and future BRI projects are also expected to be completed within a three-year period.1 The second assumption of the 10% future growth rate is reasonable, given the 13.5% average annual growth rate for the past two years, but from a low base. These large-scale infrastructure projects were led mainly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and often in the form of BOTs (Build-Operate Transfers), Design-Build-Operate (DBOs), BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfers), BOO (Build-Own-Operate) and other types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). After a Chinese SOE successfully wins a bid on an infrastructure project in a hosting country, the company will typically seek financing from a Chinese source to fund the project, and then execute construction of the project. After the completion of the project, depending on the terms pre-specified in the contract, the company will operate the project for a number of years, which will generate revenues as returns for the company. The second approach - investing into the recipient countries through ODI - is insignificant, with an amount of US$14.5 billion last year. This was only 12% of BRI project investment, and only 8.5% of China's total ODI. Chinese ODI has so far been mainly focused on tertiary industries, particularly in developed countries that can educate China in technology, management, innovation and branding. Besides, most of the Chinese ODI has been in the form of cross-border M&A purchases by Chinese firms, with only a small portion of the ODI targeted at green-field projects, which do not lead to an increase in demand for commodities and capital goods. Therefore, in this report we will only focus on the analysis of project investment as a proxy of Chinese BRI investment, as opposed to ODI. The focal point of this analysis is to gauge the demand outlook for commodities and capital goods originating from BRI. The Sources Of Chinese Funding The projected US$120 billion to US$170 billion BRI investment every year seems affordable for China. This is small in comparison to about US$3-3.5 trillion of new money origination, or about US$3 trillion of bank and shadow-bank credit (excluding borrowing by central and local governments) annually in the past two years. The financing sources for China's BRI investment include China's two policy banks (China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), two newly established funding sources (Silk Road Fund and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank), Chinese commercial banks, and other financial institutions/funds. Table I-2 shows our estimate of the breakdown of BRI funding in 2016. Table I-2BRI Funding Sources In 2016 China Development Bank (CDB): As the country's largest development bank, the CDB has total assets of US$2.1 trillion, translating into more than US$350 billion of potential BRI projects over the next 10 years, which could well result in US$35 billion in funding annually from the CDB. The Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM): The EXIM holds an outstanding balance of over 1,000 BRI projects, and has also set up a special lending scheme worth US$19.5 billion over the next three years. This will increase EXIM's BRI lending from last year's US$5 billion to at least US$6.5 billion per year. Silk Road Fund (SRF): The Chinese government launched the SRF in late 2014 with initial funding of US$40 billion to directly support the BRI mission. This year, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged a funding boost to the SRF with an extra 100 billion yuan (US$15 billion). Therefore, SRF funding to BRI projects over the next three years will be higher than the US$6 billion recorded last year. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): The AIIB was established in October 2014 and started lending in January 2016. It only invested US$1.7 billion in loans for nine BRI projects last year. The BRI funding from the AIIB is set to accelerate as the number of member countries has significantly expanded from an original 57 to 80 currently. Chinese commercial banks: Chinese domestic commercial banks, the largest source of BRI funding, have been driving BRI investment momentum. Chinese commercial banks currently fund about 62% of BRI investment and the main financiers are Bank of China (BoC) and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). After lending about US$60 billion over the past two years, the BOC plans to provide US$40 billion this year. The ICBC has 412 BRI projects in its pipeline, involving a total investment of US$337 billion over the next 10 years, which will likely result in an annual US$34 billion in BRI investment. The China Construction Bank (CCB) also has over 180 BRI projects in its pipeline, worth a total investment of US$90 billion over the next five to 10 years. Only three commercial banks will likely fund US$80 billion of BRI projects over the next three years. A few more words about the currency used in BRI funding. The U.S. dollar and Chinese RMB will be the two main currencies employed in BRI funding. Chinese companies can get loans denominated either in RMBs or in USDs from domestic commercial banks/policy banks/special funds/multilateral international banks to buy machinery and equipment (ME) from China. For some PPP projects that involve non-Chinese companies or governments (i.e. those of recipient countries), the local presence can use either USD loans or their central bank's Chinese RMB reserves from the currency swap deal made with China's central bank. China has long looked to recycle its large current account surpluses by pursuing investments in hard assets (land, commodities, infrastructure, etc.) across the world, to mitigate its structural habit of building up large foreign exchange reserves that are mostly invested in low-interest-bearing American government securities. Risky but profitable BRI infrastructure projects are a continuation of this trend. China had so far signed bilateral currency swap agreements worth an aggregate of more than 1 trillion yuan (US$150 billion) with 22 countries or regions along the B&R. The establishment of cross-border RMB payment, clearing and settlement has been gaining momentum, and the use of RMB has been expanding gradually in global trade and investment, notwithstanding inevitable setbacks. Bottom Line: We estimate total BRI investment with Chinese financing will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020, and Chinese financial institutions will be capable of funding it. Can BRI Offset A Slowdown In China's Capex? From a global investors' perspective, a pertinent question around the BRI program is whether the BRI-funded capital spending can offset the potential slowdown in China's domestic investment expenditure. This is essential to gauge the demand outlook for industrial commodities and capital goods worldwide. Our short answer is not likely. Table I-3 reveals that in 2016, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in China was estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics to be at RMB 32 trillion, or $4.8 trillion. Table I-3China's GFCF* Vs. China's BRI Investment Expenditures Meantime, China-funded BRI investment expenditure amounted to US$102 billion in 2016. In a nutshell, last year GFCF in China was about 47 times larger than BRI investment expenditures. The question is how much of a drop in mainland GFCF would need to take place to offset the projected BRI investment. The latter will likely amount to US$139 billion in 2018, US$153 billion in 2019 and US$168 billion in 2020. Provided estimated sizes of Chinese GFCF in 2017 are RMB 33.5 trillion (US$4.9 trillion), it would take only 0.4% contraction in GFCF in 2018, 0.3% in 2019 and 2020 to completely offset the rise in BRI-related investment expenditure (Table 3). Chart I-3Record Low Credit Growth... We derive these results by comparing the expected absolute change in BRI capital spending expenditures with the size of China's GFCF. The expected increases in BRI in 2018, 2019 and 2020 are US$20 billion, US$14 billion and US$15 billion. Given the starting point of GFCF in 2017 was US$4.9 trillion, it will take only about 0.4% of decline in $4.9 trillion to offset the $20 billion rise in BRI. In the same way, we estimated that it would take only an annual 0.3% contraction in nominal GFCF in China to completely offset the rise in BRI capital spending in both 2019 and 2020. To be sure, we are not certain that the GFCF will contract in each of the next three years. Yet, odds of such shrinkage in one of these years are substantial. As always, investors face uncertainty, and they need to make assessments. Is an annual 0.4% decline in China's GFCF likely in 2018? In our opinion, it is quite likely, based on our money and credit growth, as illustrated in Chart I-3. Importantly, interest rates in China continue to drift higher. A higher cost of borrowing and regulatory tightening on banks and shadow banking will lead to a meaningful deterioration in China's credit origination. The latter will weigh on investment expenditures. The basis is that the overwhelming portion of GFCF is funded by credit to public and private debtors, and aggregate credit growth has already relapsed. Chart I-4 and Chart I-5 demonstrate that money and credit impulses lead several high-frequency economic variables that tend to correlate with capital expenditure cycles. Chart I-4Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... Chart I-5...Slowing Capital Expenditure Therefore, we conclude that meaningful weakness in the GFCF is quite likely in 2018, and that it will spill out to 2019 if the government does not counteract it with major stimulus. By and large, odds are that a slump in domestic capital spending in China offset the rise in BRI-related capital expenditures. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service has written substantively on motives surrounding China's capital spending and how it is set to slow, and we will not cover these topics. Some reasons why investment spending is bound to slow include: considerable credit excesses/high indebtedness of companies; misallocation of capital and resultant weak cash flow position of companies; non-performing assets on banks' and other creditors' balance sheets and their weak liquidity position. To be sure, investors often ask whether or not material weakness in mainland growth will lead the authorities to stimulate. Odds are they will. Yet, before the slowdown becomes visible in economic numbers, financial markets will likely sell-off. In brief, policymakers are currently tightening and will be late to reverse their policies. Finally, should one compare the entire GFCF, or only part of it? There is a dearth of data to analyze various types of capital spending. In a nutshell, Chart I-6 reveals that installation accounts for roughly 70% of investment, while purchases of equipment account for the remaining 18%. Therefore, we guess the composition of BRI projects will be similar to structure of investment spending in China, and hence it makes sense to use overall GFCF as a comparative benchmark. In addition, the GFCF data is a better measure for Chinese capital spending over Chinese fixed asset investment (FAI) data, as the FAI number includes land values, which have risen significantly over the years and already account for about half of the FAI (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chart I-7GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI Bottom Line: While it is hard to forecast and time exact dynamics over the next several years, odds are that the next 12-24 months will turn out to be a period of a slump in China's capital spending. This will more than offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Implication For Frontier Markets The BRI, which currently covers 69 countries, will keep expanding its coverage for the foreseeable future. Insofar as it is a way for China to create new markets for its exports, Beijing has no reason to exclude any country. In practice, however, certain countries will receive greater dedication, for the simple reason that their development fits into China's political, military and strategic interests as well as economic interests. As most of the investments are infrastructure-focused, aiming to improve transportation, energy and telecommunication connectivity as well as special economic zones, the recipient countries, especially underdeveloped frontier markets, will benefit considerably from China's BRI. Table I-4 shows that Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets, as the planned BRI investment in those countries amounts to a significant amount of their GDP. Chart I-8 also shows that, in terms of current account deficit coverage by the Chinese BRI funding, the three countries that stand to benefit most are also Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana. Table I-1The B&R Countries That Benefit From ##br##China's BRI Investment (Ranged From High-To-Low) Chart I-8Chinese BRI Funding's Impact On ##br##External Account Of B&R Countries Of these, clearly Pakistan and Kazakhstan have the advantage of attracting China's strategic as well as economic interest: Kazakhstan offers China greater access into Central Asia and broader Eurasia; Pakistan is a large-population market that offers a means of accessing the Indian Ocean without the geopolitical complications of Southeast and East Asia. These states also neighbor China's restive Xinjiang, where Beijing hopes economic development can discourage separatist and terrorist activities. Pakistan Pakistan is a key prospect for China's exports in of itself, and in the long run offers a maritime waystation and an energy transit hub separate from China's other supply lines. For China, it is a critical alternative to Myanmar and the Malacca Strait. In April 2015, China announced a remarkable US$46.4 billion CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) investment plan in Pakistan, equal to 16.4% of Pakistani GDP. It is expected to be implemented over five years. In particular, the planned US$33.2 billion energy investment will increase Pakistan's existing power capacity by 70% from 2017 to 2023. On the whole, China's CPEC plan will be significantly positive to economic development in Pakistan in the long run, but in the near term it is still not enough to boost the nation's competitiveness (Chart I-9A, top panel). Chart I-9AOur Calls Have Been Correct Chart I-9BTop 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most ##br##From Chinese BRI Investment Also, as about 40% of the investment has already been invested over the previous two years, odds are that China's CPEC investment will go slower and smaller this year and over the next few years. BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service's recent tactical bearish call on Pakistani stocks has been correct, with a 25% decline in the MSCI Pakistan Index in U.S. dollar terms since our recommendation in March (Chart I-9B, top panel).2 We remain tactically cautious for now. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is a key transit corridor for Chinese goods to enter Europe and the Middle East. In June 2017, Chinese and Kazakh enterprises and financial institutions signed at least 24 deals worth more than US$8 billion. China's BRI investment in Kazakhstan facilitated the country's accelerated economic growth (Chart I-9A, middle panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service reiterates its positive view on Kazakhstan equities because of a recuperating economy, considerable fiscal stimulus and rising Chinese BRI investment (Chart I-9B, middle panel).3 Ghana Ghana is not strategic for China (it is a minor supplier of oil). Instead, it illustrates the fact that BRI is not always relevant to China's strategic or geopolitical interests. Sometimes it is simply about China's need to invest its surplus U.S. liquidity into hard assets around the world. Of course, Ghana itself will benefit considerably from the committed US$19 billion BRI investment, which was announced only a few months ago. This is a huge amount for the country, equaling 45% of Ghana's 2016 GDP. This massive fresh investment will boost Ghana's economic growth in both the near and long term (Chart I-9A, bottom panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service upgraded its stance on the Ghanaian equity market from negative to neutral in absolute terms at the end of July, and we also recommended overweighting the bourse relative to the broader MSCI EM universe (Chart I-9B, bottom panel).4 Our positive view on Ghana remains unchanged for now and we are looking to establish a long position in the absolute terms in this bourse amid a potential EM-wide sell-off. Other Macro Ramifications Industrial goods and commodities/materials are vulnerable. BRI will not change the fact that a potential relapse in capital spending in China will lead to diminishing growth in commodities demand. If there is a massive slowdown in property market like China experienced in 2015, which is very likely due to lingering excesses, Chinese commodity and industrial goods demand could even contract (Chart I-10). Notably, mainland's imports of base metals have been flat since 2010, and imports of capital goods shank in 2015 even though GDP and GFCF growth were positive (Chart I-11). The point is that there could be another cyclical contraction in Chinese imports of commodities and industrial goods, even if headline GDP and GFCF do not contract. Chart I-10Chinese Capital Goods Imports Could Contract Again Chart I-11Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further As China accounts for 50% of global demand of industrial metals and it imports about US$ 589 billion of industrial goods and materials annually, either decelerating growth or outright demand contraction will be negative news for global commodities markets and industrial goods producers. China's Exports Have A Brighter Outlook China's machinery and equipment (ME) exports account for 47% of total exports, and 9% of its GDP (Table I-5). The BRI investment will boost Chinese ME exports directly through large infrastructure projects. Table I-5Structure Of Chinese Exports (2016) Meantime, robust income growth in the recipient countries will boost their demand for household goods (Chart I-12). China has a very strong competitive advantage in white and consumer goods production, especially in low-price segments that are popular in developing economies. Therefore, not only is China exporting its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, but the BRI is also boosting recipient countries' demand for Chinese household and other goods exports. Adding up dozens of countries like Ghana can result in a meaningful augmentation in China's customer base. Notably, Chinese total exports have exhibited signs of improvement as Chinese ME exports and exports to the major B&R countries have contributed to a rising share of total Chinese exports since 2015 (Chart I-13). Chart I-12BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of ##br##Capital And Consumer Goods Chart I-13Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports ##br##Due To Rising BRI Investment BRI Leads To Improved Global Capital Allocation BRI is one of a very few global initiatives that improves the quality of global capital allocation. Therefore, it is bullish for global growth from a structural perspective. By shifting capital spending from a country that has already invested a lot in the past 20 years (China) to the ones that have been massively underinvested, BRI boosts the marginal productivity of capital. One billion dollars invested in the underinvested recipient countries will generate more benefits than the same amount invested in China. Risks To BRI Projects Notable deterioration in the health of Chinese banks may meaningfully curtail BRI funding, as Chinese non-policy banks will likely need to provide 60% of BRI projects' funding. Political stability/changes in destination countries: As most infrastructure projects have been authorized by the top government and need their cooperation, any changes in the recipient countries' governments or regimes may slow down or deter BRI projects. China already has a checkered past with developing countries where it has invested heavily. This is because of its employment of Chinese instead of local labor, its pursuit of flagship projects seen as benefiting elites rather than commoners, its allegedly corrupt ties with ruling parties, and perceived exploitation of natural resources to the neglect of the home nation. As China's involvement grows, local politics will be more difficult to manage, requiring China to suffer occasional losses due to political reversals or to defend its assets through aggressive economic sanctions, or even expeditionary force. For now, as there are no clear signs that any these risks are imminent, we remain positive on the further implementation of China's BRI program. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 China has long been known to use three-year periods - as distinct from its better known "five year plans" - for major domestic initiatives. In 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission re-emphasized three-year planning periods for "continuous, rolling" implementation. 2 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand", published March 13, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Kazakhstan: A Touch Less Dependent On Oil Prices", published March 28, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Ghana: Sailing On Chinese Winds", published July 31, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com.