Europe

Highlights There is some evidence that the euro could gravitate to 1.50 over the next few years. The key assumption is that the equilibrium rate of interest will rise in the euro area relative to that in the US. Our bias is that fair value for the euro is closer to 1.35, or 15% above current levels. Over the very near term, the risks are tilted towards the downside. But while EUR/USD could punch below 1.15, an undershoot towards parity is highly unlikely. In our FX portfolio, we are long EUR/CHF and short EUR/GBP. We would buy the euro outright below 1.15. Feature The markets have rejoiced at the success of a few vaccine trials and are looking forward to a return to normalcy in 2021. Around the world, equity markets have rallied in symphony. Even secular dogs such as the Japanese Nikkei, which has been in a relative bear market for many decades, broke to fresh 21-year highs. Copper prices are rising fervently, and measures of risk, such as the VIX index or high-yield corporate spreads, are collapsing to pre-pandemic levels both in the US and Europe. As a procyclical currency, the euro has also been quite cheerful. Bullish sentiment on the euro is at a decade high and the currency has rallied 11% from the lows, commensurate with the drop in the DXY index (Chart 1). As a share of total open interest, 80% of speculators are bullish on the euro. Historically, sentiment at this level has been usually associated with the euro being closer to 1.50. Chart 1Sentiment On The Euro Is Elevated Chart 2The Euro Is Lagging Copper Prices The juxtaposition of much welcomed good news and elevated sentiment sets the euro in a very precarious tug of war. Standard theory suggests that the post-pandemic trade may already be priced into the common currency, given bullish sentiment. This augurs for a reversal. On the other hand, other measures also suggest that the rally in the euro has more room to run. For example, copper prices and the euro have tended to move together, and the red metal suggests EUR/USD should be above 1.20 (Chart 2). Similarly, EUR/JPY has lagged the stellar performance of global equity prices. Is the lagging performance of EUR/USD sending the right signal, suggesting caution? Or is the common-currency a coiled spring ready to head much higher in 2021? How To Forecast The Euro According to Bloomberg forecasts, the euro will be at 1.25 by the end of 2022 (Chart 3). By our reckoning, these forecasts are much too pessimistic. The key driver of the EUR/USD exchange rate is the relative growth profile between the euro area and the US, how that profile is likely to evolve in the future, and the implication for relative monetary policies. Anything else that tries to predict the euro is a subset of this much bigger question. How is growth in the euro area likely to evolve compared to the US? There are many ways to approach this issue, with surprisingly similar results. The key driver of the EUR/USD exchange rate is the relative growth profile between the euro area and the US. The first is just to take the IMF growth estimates at face value. According to the Fund, the euro area economy is projected to contract by 8.3% this year, almost double that of the US, which is 4.3%. But by next year, the economy is expected to bounce back more fervently. Euro area growth is expected to advance by 5.2% compared to 3.1% in the US. Much of the rise will be due to a surge in investment within the euro area, especially driven by pent-up demand in the peripheral countries. This growth acceleration is projected to continue well into 2023. Back-of-the envelope calculations suggest that this will pin EUR/USD around 1.35 (Chart 4) Chart 3Few Expect The Euro Above 1.25 Chart 4EUR/USD And Relative Growth The Case For European Growth We tend to side with the IMF’s forecasts and even argue that this might actually be on the conservative side for the euro area. There are two major reasons for this, both of which are bilaterally important. First, the neutral rate of interest in the euro area may have moved a step function higher relative to the US. The standard dilemma for the euro zone is that interest rates have always been too low for the most productive nation, Germany, but too expensive for others, such as Spain and Italy. The silver lining is that the European Central Bank (ECB) has now lowered domestic interest rates and eased policy to the point where they are accommodative for all euro zone countries.1 Bond yields in peripheral Europe are collapsing relative to those in Germany and France (Chart 5). This makes it much easier for the less-productive, peripheral countries to borrow and invest. This will boost productivity, lifting the neutral rate. Chart 5The Neutral Rate In The Euro Area Second and equally important, the periphery has become as competitive as the core. Through labor market reforms, internal devaluation, and recurring recessions throughout the last decade, unit labor costs in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have converged with that in Germany and France. This has effectively eliminated the competitiveness gap that had accumulated over the past two decades (Chart 6). Even Italy, which remained saddled with a rigid and less productive workforce, has seen unit labor costs begin to crest. Chart 6Southern Europe Is Competitive Again According to the Holston-Laubach-Williams estimates at the NY Fed, the natural rate of interest in the euro area is now higher than in the US, something that has rarely occurred over the 20-year history of the common currency. Based on these estimates, the euro could gravitate towards 1.50 (Chart 7). Chart 7EUR/USD And The Neutral Rate US Versus Europe Chart 8Productivity In Europe Has Lagged In today’s world, 1.50 for the euro is certainly very high and will surely stir up some action from the ECB well before we approach these levels. As most of my colleagues would argue, no central bank wants a strong currency.2 But how can we gauge the above premise that the neutral rate of interest should be higher in the euro area due to the tectonic shifts over the last few years? One way is to look at trend productivity growth. Since the 1960s, up until the Great Financial Crisis, trend productivity growth was around 2.2% in the US and 2.8% in the euro area. However, since 2009, productivity growth has been 0.6% per year in the euro area and 1.1% in the US (Chart 8). In other words, the European debt crisis has substantially subdued productivity growth in the euro area. If indeed the crisis is behind us, and we assume European productivity growth returns back to trend over the next 10 years, while making up for the shortfall relative to the US, this will pin it at roughly 1.6% higher in Europe relative to the US. Cumulatively, that is a rise of around 20%. Meanwhile, we highlighted last week that the euro was undervalued by over 10%.3 This pins the euro above 1.50. The Euro At Parity And Inflation Chart 9US Versus Euro Area Inflation While the euro might gravitate higher in the next few years, it is unlikely to do so in a straight line. Meanwhile, deflation is a key near-term threat for the euro (Chart 9). With the ECB clearly telegraphing that it will do more easing in December, the relative monetary policy stance is not favorable. That said, there are three key points to consider about inflation. First, most G10 central banks were unable to meet their inflation mandate when output gaps were closing and the economy was at full employment. This makes it less likely they will meet their mandate anytime soon. This is not just an ECB problem, but one for the Fed, BoJ, and even the RBA. Second, inflation tends to be a global phenomenon in the developed world, meaning desynchronized cycles in inflation dynamics are quite rare. Finally, with balance sheets expanding everywhere in the G10, the potential for higher inflation once output gaps close will be universal. European productivity growth will have to outpace that in the US by roughly 1.6%, to play catch up. Going forward, an agreement on the mutualization of European debt means we can begin to expect more synchronized business cycles as fiscal stabilizers kick in. The reason is that both fiscal and monetary policy can now be synchronized across member states. This makes shortfalls in inflation less likely. Finally, while deflation can be a sign of an expensive currency, there is little evidence that this is the case for the euro. The euro area continues to sport very healthy trade and current account surpluses, a sign that the euro remains very competitive among its trading partners. Intra-European trade represents a large share of cross-border transactions in Europe, meaning currency considerations are less important. In 2019, most member states had a share of intra-EU exports of between 50% and 75%. The bottom line is that disappointing inflation dynamics could lead to a knee-jerk selloff in the euro, but this should be an opportunity to accumulate long positions. The Cyclical Catalyst Ultimately, European growth is cyclically tied to export growth. And with a huge concentration of cyclical sectors, such as financials, industrials, materials and energy, in European bourses, the euro tends to be largely driven by pro-cyclical flows. Earnings revisions between the euro area and the US have generally led the EUR/USD exchange rate by about 9-12 months (Chart 10).  Chart 10EUR/USD Tracks Relative Profits So far, the signs are positive. The impulse from Chinese credit is providing a release valve for European exports (Chart 11). So even if social distancing remains in place for longer than people expect, it still allows economies that are geared more towards manufacturing such as Europe, Japan, and China to keep churning higher. This could boost European earnings in a meaningful way. Chart 11Chinese Demand For European Goods Fortunately for investors, European equities, especially those in the periphery, remain unloved, given that they are trading at some of the cheapest cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings multiples in the developed world (Chart 12A). Over the next decade, it would be surprising if some of these “old economy” stocks did not unwind their discount via both rising earnings and multiples. Many emerging markets, including China, still depend on “old-economy” materials such as oil, and industrial machinery, that Europe sells. The impulse from Chinese credit is providing a release valve for European exports. Even in the commodity space, cyclical metals like copper are still massively underperforming safe havens like gold. This has largely  tracked the discount between European stocks and US stocks. A bet on a reversal could prove very profitable (Chart 12B).   Chart 12AEuro Stocks Are Cheap Chart 12BEuro Stocks Could Rerate Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "EUR/USD And The Neutral Rate Of Interest," dated June 14, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Nobody Wants A Strong Currency," dated November 17, 2020, gfis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Updating Our PPP Models," dated November 13, 2020. fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights COVID-19 In Europe: The latest surge in COVID-19 cases in Europe has unnerved investors who now see renewed national lockdowns increasing the risk of a double-dip European recession and continued deflationary pressures. ECB: The signals from last week’s ECB policy meeting could not be more clear – the central bank will deliver new stimulus measures in December in response to the second wave of coronavirus sweeping through the euro area. This will be a combination of policies focused on expanding and extending the existing bond-buying vehicles and TLTROs, rather than cutting policy rates deeper into negative territory. European Bond Strategy: Stay overweight core European government debt, particularly versus US Treasuries. Remain overweight Italian and Spanish government bonds, as well, which remain supported by both ECB asset purchases and perceptions of increases European fiscal integration. Stay cautious on euro area corporate debt, however, as the renewed recession risk comes at a time when yields and spreads offer poor protection from future credit downgrades and defaults. Feature Chart of the WeekA Bad Time For A Second Wave Today’s long anticipated US election will be the focus for investors in the coming days (and, potentially, weeks) as all votes are counted. We have discussed our views on the potential bond market impact of the election - bearish for US Treasuries with both Joe Biden and Donald Trump promising big fiscal stimulus in 2021 – in our previous two reports. We will provide an update of those views as soon as we get clarity on the election result. This week, we discuss a new concern for jittery markets - the explosion of new COVID-19 cases in Europe that has already led to governments imposing aggressive lockdown measures. The timing of the new viral surge could not be worse for the euro area economy, which had recovered smartly from the massive lockdown-related demand shock this past spring. Real GDP for the entire euro area exploded higher at a 12.7% rate in Q3/2020, a big rebound from the 11.8% drop in Q2. Yet the second wave of coronavirus is starting to weigh on the more domestically focused service sectors most vulnerable to lockdowns and declining consumer confidence (Chart of the Week). From the perspective of European fixed income strategy, the imposition of lockdowns will only force the ECB to turn more dovish at a time when Europe is already in deflation, as was strongly signaled at last week’s ECB policy meeting. This will support the performance of euro area government bond markets, both in absolute terms and especially versus US Treasuries where yields are drifting higher and should continue to do so after the US election. Another Deflationary Shock To Europe From The Virus The surge in COVID-19 cases has hit the euro area hard and fast. France has seen the most stunning increase, with a population-adjusted daily increase of 596 new cases per million, a nearly six-fold increase in just two months (Chart 2). Importantly, this second wave has so far been nowhere near as lethal as the first wave. The “case fatality ratio” – confirmed deaths as a percentage of confirmed cases – is down in the low single digits for the largest euro area countries (bottom panel). The imposition of lockdowns will only force the ECB to turn more dovish at a time when Europe is already in deflation, as was strongly signaled at last week’s ECB policy meeting. Even with this second wave being less deadly, governments are taking no chances. France and Germany announced national lockdowns last week for at least the month of November, and Italy and Spain have put new restrictions on activity as well. The new lockdowns are already denting consumer confidence across the euro area and this trend will continue as people choose to spend less time outside of their homes to avoid infection. If the case numbers do not begin to stabilize and the lockdown measures extend into December or beyond, governments will likely be forced to consider new fiscal stimulus measures. According to the latest IMF Fiscal Monitor, the largest euro area economies are projected to have a negative “fiscal thrust” – the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance as a share of potential GDP – in 2021 of at least -3% of GDP (Chart 3). Chart 22nd Wave Of European Coronavirus Is Far Less Lethal Chart 3A Big European Fiscal Drag Coming Next Year In the case of Italy, the fiscal thrust is expected to be a whopping -6.6% of GDP. The main cause is reduced government spending as the massive temporary stimulus measures to fight the 2020 COVID-19 recessions roll off. Chart 4The ECB Has A Deflation Problem A fresh set of lockdowns will result in a need for more government support measures for unemployed workers, especially those in service-related industries like hospitality and tourism most exposed to lost business as consumers stay home. This poses a serious problem in countries like Spain and Italy that saw a rise in unemployment during the first lockdown but have seen no reversal since (Chart 4). More elevated unemployment rates suggest a lack of inflationary pressure, a point confirmed by recent inflation data. Overall headline HICP inflation fell to -0.3% in September, while core inflation is now a mere +0.4%. Headline HICP inflation rates are now below 0% in the largest euro area economies (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), while core HICP inflation in Italy fell to -0.3% in September. The collapse in oil prices earlier in 2020 has been the main cause of the negative headline inflation prints in the euro area, but is not the only source of weak inflation. According to a decomposition of inflation presented in the Bank of Italy’s October 2020 Economic Bulletin, a falling contribution from services inflation was responsible for about one-third of the entire decline in euro area headline HICP inflation since January (Chart 5). This comes from the part of the euro area economy most exposed to COVID-19 restrictions, highlighting the deflationary risk of the second wave. Chart 5Euro Area Deflation Is Mostly, But Not Only, Driven By Oil Simply put, the second wave of COVID-19 could not have come at a worse time. The euro area economy is still dealing with excess capacity and deflation, made worse by previous appreciation of the euro, with a looming fiscal tightening next year. Policymakers need to spring into action to help provide support for the euro area economy during this time, starting with the ECB. The second wave of COVID-19 could not have come at a worse time. The euro area economy is still dealing with excess capacity and deflation, made worse by previous appreciation of the euro, with a looming fiscal tightening next year. Bottom Line: The latest surge in COVID-19 cases in Europe has unnerved investors who now see renewed national lockdowns increasing the risk of a double-dip European recession and continued deflationary pressures. The ECB Will Deliver New Stimulus In December At last week’s policy meeting, ECB President Christine Lagarde announced that the Governing Council would reassess its monetary policy stance at the December meeting, when a new set of economic projections would be presented that factored in the negative impact of the second COVID-19 wave. Lagarde was very candid about the expected outcome of that next meeting, when she stated that the ECB would “recalibrate its instruments” based on the new economic forecasts. Chart 6European Banks Are Tigthening Lending Standards In our view, the ECB’s next policy options can only realistically focus on three options: Cutting policy rates deeper into negative territory Increasing the size, or altering the composition of its bond-buying programs Altering the terms of its current Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) We view a rate cut as a low probability outcome. Not only are policy rates at or below 0%, but it is not clear that a cut would even help boost the demand or supply of new loans. According to the ECB’s latest Bank Lending Survey, euro area banks tightened credit conditions in Q3/2020 (Chart 6). Worsening perceptions of risk and a deteriorating economic outlook were cited as the main reasons for tightening lending standards. The tightening was most severe in Spain, but Italy also saw a big swing away from the easing standards seen in the Q2/2020 survey. Within the details of the Q3/2020 survey, the demand for loans from companies was expected to improve in Q4/2020. The demand for housing and consumer credit increased due to favorable borrowing conditions and a softening in negative contribution from consumer sentiment. Not only are policy rates at or below 0%, but it is not clear that a cut would even help boost the demand or supply of new loans. The ECB’s bond buying programs – the Asset Purchase Program (APP) and the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) – were deemed to have a positive impact on bank liquidity and financing but a negative impact on profitability. Chart 7Low Interest Rates Are Crushing European Bank Stocks Therein lies the problem of the ECB’s negative interest rate policy and large-scale bond buying – it has lowered borrowing costs for euro area governments, consumers and businesses, but has crushed the profits of Europe’s banks. That can be seen when looking at the ongoing miserable performance of euro area bank stocks, which continue to plumb new lows. The relative performance of euro area banks versus the broad equity market benchmark index tracks the slope of government bond yield curves quite closely in the major euro area economies (Chart 7), highlighting the link between the level of euro area interest rates and bank profits. In Chart 8A, we show the Tier 1 capital ratio, as well as the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio for the five largest banks in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. The message from the chart is clear – European banks remain well capitalized, with double-digit Tier 1 capital ratios well in excess of regulatory minimums, and have a relatively low share of assets that are non-performing. This is especially true in Italy, where the NPL ratio has collapsed from a high of 20% to 7% over the past five years. In Chart 8B, we present the return on equity and return on asset ratios for the same banks presented in the previous chart. Most large euro area banks suffer from a very low return on assets, not materially above 0%, reflecting the non-existent interest rates banks earn on their government bond holdings as well as the low rates on their loan books. Chart 8AEuropean Banks: The Good News Chart 8BEuropean Banks: The Bad News So given the fragile state of euro area bank health, and with banks already tightening lending standards in anticipation of slower economic activity because of second wave lockdowns, we can rule out a policy interest rate cut as an option to ease policy in December. This leaves only two other easing options, both associated with an expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet – more asset purchases of sovereign bonds and encouraging bank lending through cheap funding via TLTROs (Chart 9). The impact of either policy in offsetting slowing growth is debatable. Government bond yields are already miniscule, if not outright negative, across the euro area and do not represent a hindrance to increased government spending. The ECB can tweak some of the terms of the existing TLTRO programs, like maturity or the price of funding, but that may not encourage new lending if both borrowers and lenders fear a double-dip recession because of the second wave. The pressure is on the ECB to do something to stem the decline in euro area inflation. Nonetheless, the pressure is on the ECB to do something to stem the decline in euro area inflation. While real interest rates are still negative, they are increasingly becoming less so as inflation expectations continue to drift lower. The 5-year/5-year forward EUR CPI swap rate is now down to 1.1%, and was last trading near the ECB’s inflation target of just under 2% in 2013-14 (Chart 10). Unsurprisingly, the rising real rate backdrop has helped boost the value of the euro, especially versus the US dollar, which has suffered under the weight of falling real US interest rates this year. Chart 9The ECB Can Only Expand Its Balance Sheet In the end, greater fiscal stimulus will be the only option available to get Europe through the second wave. All the ECB can do is provide a backdrop of loose monetary policy that supports easy financial conditions, so that any stimulus will have the maximum effect on growth. Chart 10Deflation Is Pushing Up Real Rates In Europe Bottom Line: The signals from last week’s ECB policy meeting could not be more clear – the central bank will deliver new stimulus measures in December in response to the second wave of coronavirus sweeping through the euro area. This will be a combination of policies focused on expanding and extending the existing bond-buying vehicles and TLTROs, rather than cutting policy rates deeper into negative territory. Stay Overweight European Government Bonds, But Stay Cautious On Euro Area Credit With the ECB set to deliver some form of easing in December, core European bond yields are likely to remain stable over at least the next six months. The ECB has shown no reservations about expanding its balance sheet via bond purchases when needed. A surge of buying similar in size to that of the first COVID-19 wave is not out of the question if Europe faces a double-dip second wave recession (Chart 11). Chart 11Stay Overweight Core European Government Bonds Chart 12Italian BTPs Are Preferable To Euro Area Corporate Credit In an environment where we see US Treasury yields having more upside on the back of post-election fiscal stimulus, this makes the likes of German bunds and French OATs good “defensive” lower-beta plays to replace high-beta US Treasury exposure in global USD-hedged bond portfolios. We also like core Europe as a pure spread trade versus Treasuries, as we see scope for the UST-Bund spread to widen further – a tactical trade we initiated last week (see our Tactical Overlay table on page 15). We continue to recommend overweighting Italian government bonds as the preferred way to add scarce yield to a European bond portfolio with an asset that will directly benefit from more ECB buying.  We continue to recommend overweighting Italian government bonds as the preferred way to add scarce yield to a European bond portfolio with an asset that will directly benefit from more ECB buying (Chart 12). The ECB has already been purchasing a greater share of Italy in the PEPP, allowing significant deviations from the Capital Key weights that limit purchases in the older APP. ECB President Lagarde noted last week that those deviations will continue over the life of the PEPP, which should help support further declines in Italian bond yields over at least the next six months. We are maintaining a relatively cautious stance on European credit, however, even with the ECB likely to make a move in December. The renewed recession risk from the second wave comes at a time when low yields and spreads for euro area corporate bonds offer poor protection from future credit downgrades and defaults. We continue to prefer owning US corporate credit, both investment grade and high-yield, versus US equivalents in USD-hedged bond portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns