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Highlights The US-China trade talks will continue despite Hong Kong. The UK election will not reintroduce no-deal Brexit risk – either in the short run or the long run. European political risk is set to rise from low levels, but Euro Area break-up risk will not. There is no single thread uniting emerging market social unrest. We remain constructive on Brazil. Feature Chart 1Taiwan Indicator To Rise Despite Ceasefire President Trump signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act into law on November 27. The signing was by now expected – Trump was not going to veto the bill and invite the Senate to override him with a 67-vote at a time when he is being impeached. He does not want to familiarize the Senate with voting against him in supermajorities. The Hong Kong bill will not wreck the US-China trade talks, but it is a clear example of our argument that strategic tensions will persist and cast doubt on the durability of the “phase one trade deal” being negotiated. It is better to think of it as a ceasefire, as Trump’s electoral constraint is the clear motivation. Trump is embattled at home and will contend an election in 11 months. He will not impose the tariff rate hike scheduled for December 15. A relapse into trade war would kill the green shoots in US and global growth, which partly stem from the perception of easing trade risk. Only if Trump’s approval rating collapses, or China stops cooperating, will he become insensitive to his electoral constraint. Will China abandon the talks and leave Trump in the lurch? This is not our base case but it is a major global risk. So far China is reciprocating. Xi Jinping’s political and financial crackdown at home, combined with the trade war abroad, has led to an economic slowdown and an explosion in China’s policy uncertainty relative to America’s. A trade ceasefire – on top of fiscal easing – is a way to improve the economy without engaging in another credit splurge. The US and China will continue moving toward a trade ceasefire, despite the Hong Kong bill. The move toward a trade ceasefire will probably keep our China GeoRisk Indicator from rising sharply over the next few months. However, our Taiwan indicator, which we have used as a trade war proxy at times, may diverge as it starts pricing in the heightened political risk surrounding Taiwan’s presidential election on January 11, 2020 (Chart 1). Sanctions, tech controls, Hong Kong, Taiwan, North Korea, Iran, the South China Sea, and Xinjiang are all strategic tensions that can flare up. Yes, uncertainty will fall and sentiment will improve on a ceasefire, but only up to a point. China’s domestic policy decisions are ultimately more important than its handling of the trade war. At the upcoming Central Economic Work Conference authorities are expected to stay focused on “deepening supply-side structural reform” and avoiding the use of “irrigation-style” stimulus (blowout credit growth). But this does not mean they will not add more stimulus. Since the third quarter, a more broad-based easing of financial controls and industry regulations is apparent, leading our China Investment Strategy to expect a turning point in the Chinese economy in early 2020. This “China view” – on stimulus and trade – is critical to the outlook for the two regions on which we focus for the rest of this report: Europe and emerging markets. Assuming that China stabilizes, these are the regions where risk assets stand to benefit the most. Europe is a political opportunity; the picture in emerging markets is, as always, mixed. United Kingdom: Will Santa Bring A Lump Of Coal? The Brits will hold their first winter election since 1974 on December 12. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party has seen a tremendous rally in opinion polls, although it has stalled at a level comparable to its peak ahead of the last election in June 2017 (Chart 2). Another hung parliament or weak Tory coalition is possible. Yet the Tories are better positioned this time given that the opposition Labour Party is less popular than two years ago, while the Liberal Democrats are more capable of stealing Labour votes. The Tories stand to lose in Scotland, but the Brexit Party of Nigel Farage is not contesting seats with them and is thus undercutting Labour in certain Brexit-leaning constituencies. Markets would enjoy a brief relief rally on a single-party Tory majority. This would enable Johnson to get his withdrawal deal over the line and take the UK out of the EU in an orderly manner by January 31. The question would then shift to whether Johnson feels overconfident in negotiating the post-Brexit trade agreement with the EU, which is supposed to be done by December 31, 2020. This date will become the new deadline for tariff increases, but it can be extended. Johnson is as unlikely to fly off the cliff edge next year as he was this year, and this year he demurred. Negotiating a trade agreement is easier when the two economies are already integrated, have a clear (yet flexible) deadline, and face exogenous economic risks. Our political risk indicator will rise but it will not revisit the highs of 2018-19 (Chart 3). The pound’s floor is higher than it was prior to September 2019. Chart 2Tories Look To Be Better Positioned For A Single Party Majority Chart 3UK Risk Will Rise, But Not To Previous Highs Bottom Line: A hung parliament is the only situation where a no-deal Brexit risk reemerges in advance of the new Brexit day of January 31. The market is underestimating this outcome based on our risk indicator. But Johnson himself prefers the deal he negotiated and wishes to avoid the recession that would likely ensue from crashing out of the EU. And a headless parliament can prevent Johnson from forcing a no-deal exit, as investors witnessed this fall. We remain long GBP-JPY. Germany: The Risk Of An Early Election Germany is wading deeper into a period of political risk surrounding Chancellor Angela Merkel’s “lame duck” phase, doubts over her chosen successor, and uncertainty about Germany’s future in the world. The federal election of 2021 already looms large. Our indicator is only beginning to price this trend which can last for the next two years (Chart 4). On October 27 Germany’s main centrist parties suffered a crushing defeat in the state election of Thuringia. For the first time, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) not only lost its leadership position, but also secured less vote share than both the Left Party and the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Chart 5, top panel). Chart 4Germany Is Heading Toward A Period Of Greater Political Risk The AfD successfully positioned itself with the right wing of the electorate and managed to capture more undecided voters than any other party (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 5The Right-Wing AfD Outperformed In Thuringia … While the rise of the AfD (and its outperformance over its national polling) may seem alarming, Germany is not being taken over by Euroskeptics. Both support for the euro and German feeling of being “European” is near all-time highs (Chart 6). The question is how the centrist parties respond. Merkel’s approval rating is at its lower range. Support for Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), Merkel’s chosen successor, is plummeting (Chart 7). Since AKK was confirmed as party chief, the CDU suffered big losses in the European Parliament election and in state elections. Several of her foreign policy initiatives were not well received in the party.1 In October 2019, the CDU youth wing openly rejected her nomination as Merkel’s successor. At the annual CDU party conference on November 22-23, she only narrowly managed to avoid rebellion. She is walking on thin ice and will need to recover her approval ratings if she wants to secure the chancellorship. Meanwhile the CDU will lose its united front, increasing Germany’s policy uncertainty. Chart 6... But Euroskeptics Will Not Take Over Germany Germany’s other major party – the Social Democratic Party (SPD) – is also going through a leadership struggle. Chart 7The CDU Party Leader Is Walking On Thin Ice Chart 8A Return To The Polls Would Result In A CDU-Green Coalition In the first round of the leadership vote, Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and Klara Geywitz (member of the Brandenburg Landtag) secured a small plurality of votes with 22.7%, just 1.6% more than Bundestag member Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans (finance minister of North Rhine-Westphalia from 2010-17). The latest polling, and Scholz’s backing by the establishment, implies that he will win but this is uncertain. The results of the second round will be published on November 30, after we go to press. What does the SPD’s leadership contest mean for the CDU-SPD coalition? More likely than not, the status quo will continue. Scholz is an establishment candidate and supports remaining in the ruling coalition until 2021. Esken is calling for the SPD to leave the coalition, but Walter-Borjans has not explicitly supported this. An SPD exit from the Grand Coalition would likely lead to a snap election, not a favorable outcome for stability-loving Germans. A return to the polls would benefit the Greens and AfD at the expense of the mainstream parties, and would likely see a CDU-Green coalition emerge (Chart 8). Given that a majority of voters want the SPD to remain in government (Chart 9), and that new elections would damage the SPD’s prospects, we believe that the SPD is likely to stay in government until 2021, even if the less established Esken and Walter-Borjans win. The risk is the uncertainty around Merkel’s exit. October 2021 is a long time for Merkel to drag the coalition along, so the odds of an early election are probably higher than expected. Chart 9Germans Prefer The SPD Remains In Government Chart 10Climate Spending Closest Germany Gets To Fiscal Stimulus (For Now) Chart 11There Is Room For More Fiscal Stimulus In Germany, If Needed What would a Scholz win mean for the great debate over whether Germany will step up its fiscal policy? If the establishment duo wins the SPD leadership, the Grand Coalition remains in place, and the economy does not relapse, we are unlikely to see additional fiscal stimulus in the near future. Scholz argues that additional stimulus would not be productive, as the slowdown is due to external factors (i.e. trade war).2 The recently released Climate Action Program 2030 is the closest to fiscal stimulus that we will see. This package will deliver additional spending worth 9bn euro in 2020 and 54bn euro until 2023 (Chart 10). We are unlikely to see additional fiscal stimulus from Germany in the near future. Bottom Line: Germany is wading into a period of rising political uncertainty. In the event of a downward surprise in growth, there is room to add more fiscal stimulus (Chart 11). But there is no change in fiscal policy in the meantime, e.g. no positive surprise. France: Macron Takes Center Stage While Merkel exits, President Emmanuel Macron continues to position himself as Europe’s leader – with a vision for European integration, reform, and political centrism. But in the near term he will remain tied down with his ambitious domestic agenda. France is trudging down the path of fiscal consolidation. After exiting the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2018, and decreasing real government expenditures by 0.3% of GDP, France’s budget deficit is forecasted to decline further (Chart 12). Macron’s government is moving towards balancing its budget primarily by reducing government expenditures to finance tax cuts and decrease the deficit. Macron’s reform efforts following the Great National Debate – tax cuts for the middle class, bonus exemptions from income tax and social security contributions, and adjustment of pensions for inflation – have paid off.3 His approval rating is beginning to recover from the lows hit during the Yellow Vest protests (Chart 13). These reforms will be financed by lower government expenditures and reduced debt burden as a result of accommodative monetary policy. Chart 12Fiscal Consolidation In France Chart 13Macron's Reform Efforts Have Paid Off Overall, France has proven to a very resilient country in light of a general economic slowdown (Chart 14, top panel). Business investment and foreign direct investment, propped up by gradual cuts in the corporate income tax rate, have remained steady, and confidence remains strong (Chart 14, bottom panels). France is consumer driven and hence somewhat protected from storms in global trade. Chart 14French Economy Resilient Despite Global Slowdown Chart 15Ongoing Strikes Will Register In French Risk Indicator Bottom Line: France stands out for remaining generally stable despite pursuing structural reforms. Strikes and opposition to reforms will continue, and will register in our risk indicator (Chart 15), but it is Germany where global trends threaten the growth model and political trends threaten greater uncertainty. On the fiscal front France is consolidating rather than stimulating.   Italy: Muddling Through This fall’s budget talks caused very little political trouble, as expected. The new Finance Minister Roberto Gualtieri is an establishment Democratic Party figure and will not seek excessive conflict with Brussels over fiscal policy. Italy’s budget deficit is projected to stay flat over 2019 and 2020. The key development since the mid-year budget revision was the repeal of the Value Added Tax hike scheduled for 2020, a repeal financed primarily by lower interest spending.4 Equity markets have celebrated Italy’s avoidance of political crisis this year with a 5.6% increase. Our own measure of geopolitical risk has dropped off sharply (Chart 16). But of course we expect it to rise next year given that Italy remains the weakest link in the Euro Area over the long run. The left-leaning alliance between the established Democratic Party and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement hurt both parties’ approval ratings. In fact, the only parties that have seen an increase in approval in the last month are the League, the far-right Brothers of Italy, and the new centrist party of former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Italia Viva (Chart 17). We expect to see cracks form next year, particularly over immigration, but mutual fear of a new election can motivate cooperation for a time. Chart 16Decline In Italian Risk Will Be Short Lived Chart 17The M5S-PD Alliance Damaged Their Approval Bottom Line: Italy’s new government is running orthodox fiscal policy, which means no boost to growth, but no clashing with Brussels either. Spain: Election Post Mortem Chart 18A Gridlocked Parliament In Spain The Spanish election produced another gridlocked parliament, as expected, with no party gaining a majority and no clear coalition options. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) emerged as the clear leader but still lost three seats. The People’s Party recovered somewhat from its April 2019 defeat, gaining 23 seats. The biggest loser of the election was Ciudadanos, which lost 47 seats after its highly criticized shift to the right, forcing its leader Alberto Rivera to resign. The party’s seats were largely captured by the far-right Vox party, which won 15.1% of the popular vote and more than doubled its seats (Chart 18). Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez has arranged a preliminary governing agreement with Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias, but it is unstable. Even with Podemos, Sanchez falls far short of the 176 seats he needs to govern. In fact, there are only three possible scenarios in which the Socialists can reach the required 176 seats and none of these scenarios are easy to negotiate (Chart 19). The first – a coalition with the People’s Party – can already be ruled out. The other two require the support of the smaller pro-independence party, which will be difficult for Sanchez to secure, given that he hardened his stance on Catalonia in the days leading up to the election. Chart 19No Simple Way To A Majority Government The next step for Sanchez is to be confirmed as prime minister in an “investiture” vote, likely on December 16.5 He would need 176 votes in the first round (or a simple majority in the second round) to gain the confidence of Congress. He looks to fall short (Chart 20).6 If he fails to be confirmed, Sanchez will have another two months to form a government or face the possibility of yet another election. Chart 20Sanchez Set To Fall Short In Investiture Vote Spain’s indecision is leading to small conflicts with Brussels. Last week, the European Commission placed Spain under the preventative arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, stating that the country had not done enough to reach its medium-term budget objective.7 The European Commission’s outlook on Spain is slightly more pessimistic than that of the Spanish government (Chart 21). Deficit projections could worsen if a left-wing government takes power that includes the anti-austerity Podemos – which means that Spain is the only candidate for a substantial fiscal policy surprise. Chart 21A Fiscal Policy Surprise In Spain? Chart 22Spanish Risk Will Keep Rising We expect our Spanish risk indicator to keep rising (Chart 22). The silver lining is that Spain’s turmoil – like Germany’s – poses no systemic risk to the Euro Area. Spain could also see an increase in fiscal thrust. Stay long Italian government bonds and short Spanish bonos. Bottom Line: We remain tactically long Italian government bonds and short Spanish bonos. Italian bonds will sell off less in a risk-on phase and rally more in a risk-off phase, and relative political trends reinforce this trade. Emerging Markets: Global Unrest Civil unrest is unfolding across the world, grabbing the attention of the global news media (Chart 23). The proximate causes vary – ranging from corruption, inequality, governance, and austerity – but the fear of contagion is gaining ground. Chart 23Pickup In Civil Unrest Raising Fear Of Contagion A country’s vulnerability to unrest can be gauged by two main factors: political voice and underlying economic conditions. • Political Voice: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, specifically voice and accountability, corruption, and rule of law, provide proxies for political participation (Chart 24). The aim is to assess whether there is a legitimate channel for discontent to lead to change. Countries with low rankings are especially at risk of experiencing unrest when the economy is unable to deliver. Chart 24Greater Risk Of Unrest Where Political Voice Is Absent • Economic Conditions: Last year’s tightening monetary conditions, the manufacturing and trade slowdown, the US-China trade war, and a strong US dollar have weighed on global growth this year. This is challenging, especially for economies struggling to pick up the pace of growth (Chart 25). It translates to increased job insecurity, in some cases where insecurity is already rife (Chart 26). The likelihood that economic deterioration spurs widespread unrest depends on both the level and change in these variables. The former political factor is a structural condition that becomes more relevant when economic conditions deteriorate. Chart 25The Global Slowdown Weighed On Growth In Regions Already Struggling … Chart 26… And Raise Job Insecurity Chart 27Brazilian Risk Unlikely To Reach Previous Highs BCA Research is optimistic on global growth as we enter the end game of this business cycle. Nevertheless risks to this view are elevated and emerging market economies are still reeling from the past year’s slowdown. This makes them especially sensitive to failures on the part of policymakers. As a result, policymakers will be more inclined to ease monetary and fiscal policy and less inclined to execute structural reforms. Brazil is a case in point. Our indicator is flagging a sharp rise in political risk (Chart 27). This reflects the recent breakdown in the real – which can go further as the finance ministry has signaled it is willing to depreciate to revive growth. Meanwhile the administration has postponed its proposals to overhaul the country’s public sector, including measures to freeze wages and reduce public sectors jobs. On the political front, President Jair Bolsonaro’s recent break from the Social Liberal Party and launch of a new party, the Alliance for Brazil, threatens to reduce his ability to get things done. This move comes at a time when Brazil’s political landscape is being shaken up by former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s release from jail, pending an appeal against his corruption conviction. The former leader of the Worker’s Party lost no time in vowing to revive Brazil’s left. Our risk indicator might overshoot due to currency policy, but we doubt that underlying domestic political instability will reach late-2015 and mid-2018 levels. Brazil has emerged from a deep recession, an epic corruption scandal, and an impeachment that led to the removal of former president Dilma Rousseff. It is not likely to see a crisis of similar stature so soon. Bolsonaro’s approval rating is the lowest of Brazil’s recent leaders, save Michel Temer, but it has not yet collapsed (Chart 28). An opinion poll held in October – prior to Lula’s release – indicates that Bolsonaro is favored to win in a scenario in which he goes head to head against Lula (Chart 29). Justice Minister Sergio Moro, who oversaw the corruption investigation, is the only candidate that would gain more votes when pitted against Bolsonaro. He is working with Bolsonaro at present and is an important pillar of the administration. So it is premature to pronounce Bolsonaro’s presidency finished. Chart 28Bolsonaro’s Approval, While Relatively Low, Has Not Collapsed Chart 29Bolsonaro Not Yet Finished The problem, as illustrated in Charts 25 and 26, is that Brazil still suffers from slow growth and an uninspiring job market – longstanding economic grievances. This will induce the administration to take a precautionary stance and slow the reform process. The result should be reflationary in the short run but negative for Brazil’s sustainability over the long run. There is still a positive path forward. Unlike the recently passed pension cuts and the public sector cuts that were just postponed – both of which zap entitlements from Brazilians – the other items on the reform agenda are less controversial. Privatization and tax reform are less politically onerous and will keep the government and economy on a positive trajectory. Meanwhile the pension cuts are unlikely to be a source of discontent as they will be phased in over 12-14 years. Thus, while the recent political events justify a higher level of risk, speculation regarding the likelihood of mass unrest in Brazil – apart from the mobilization of Worker’s Party supporters ahead of the municipal elections next fall – is overdone. Bottom Line: The growth environment in emerging markets is set to improve in 2020. US-China trade risk is falling and China will do at least enough stimulus to be stable. Moreover emerging markets will use monetary and fiscal tools to mitigate social unrest. This will not prevent unrest from continuing to flare. But not every country that has unrest is globally significant. Brazil is a major market that has recently emerged from extreme political turmoil, so a relapse is not our base case. Otherwise one should monitor Hong Kong’s impact on the trade deal, Russia’s internal stability, and the danger that Iranian and Iraqi unrest could cause oil supply disruptions. In the event that the global growth rebound does not materialize we expect Mexico and Thailand – which have better fundamentals – to outperform. Our long Thai equity relative trade is a strategic defensive trade.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Merkel’s Successor Splits German Coalition With Rogue Syria Plan,” dated October 22, 2019 and “Merkel's Own Party Wants Outright Huawei Ban From 5G Networks,” dated November 15, 2019, available at bloomberg.com. 2 Please see “Scholz Says No Need for German Stimulus After Dodging Recession,” dated November 14, 2019, available at bloomberg.com. 3 Please see “France: Draft Budgetary Plan For 2020,” dated October 15, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. 4 Please see “Analysis of the Draft Budgetary Plan of Italy,” dated November 20, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. 5 Please see “Investiture calendar | Can a government be formed before Christmas?” dated November 14, 2019, available at elpais.com. 6 If Sanchez convinces PNV, BNG, and Teruel Exists to vote in his favor for both rounds of the vote, he would need ERC and Eh Bildu to abstain in order to win. However, given that the PSOE has stated that it will not even negotiate with Eh Bildu, it is likely that this party will vote against Sanchez, giving the opposition 168 votes. In this case, Sanchez would not only need PNV, BNG, and Teruel in his favor, but also the support of either CC or ERC, both unlikely scenarios. 7 Please see “Commission Opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plan of Spain,” dated November 20, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. Appendix Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator  Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
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Special Report Highlights Net inflows into US assets have been rolling over since the beginning of 2019, given that the repatriation associated with the 2017 tax cuts was a one-off effect. Besides, fading interest rate differentials are making US Treasuries less attractive, which is a headwind for the greenback.  A trade war ceasefire between the US and China should improve the balance of payments dynamics for export-oriented nations. We maintain a pro-cyclical stance.  A revival in oil demand and curbs on supply should underpin oil prices through 2020, which could lift the trade balances of Norway and Canada. However, we expect the Canadian dollar to underperform, weighed by pipeline constraints and the divergence between WCS and WTI prices. Stay short CAD/NOK. Feature The balance of payments is one of the key indicators we watch on a regular basis to gauge the direction of exchange rates. While the power of BoP on currency moves differs from one country to another, it provides a big picture view of a country's transactions with other nations. Generally speaking, persistent surpluses are usually associated with appreciation in currencies, and vice versa. Ongoing trade disputes since early 2018 have caused some fluctuation in current account balances globally. Political uncertainties and rising protectionism have also limited foreign investments in some countries. Going forward, should global growth stabilize amid a possible trade détente, export-oriented regions will have more scope to improve their balance of payments dynamics. In what follows we present balance of payments across G10 through five categories: the trade balance, the current account balance, foreign direct investment, the basic balance, and lastly, portfolio investment. United States Chart 1US Balance Of Payments The US trade deficit has been more or less flat, lingering around 3% of GDP. The trade deficit mostly comes from manufactured goods. On the positive side, the US has been producing and exporting more petroleum and related products, which has decreased oil demand from abroad. Meanwhile, exports of pharmaceutical products are on the rise. The current account is at a smaller deficit of 2.5% of GDP, thanks to a positive net international investment position. Foreign direct investment had been increasing due to repatriation by US companies since the 2017 Trump tax cuts. If this one-off tax break was a source of US dollar strength in 2018, that support is now gone. Meanwhile, dollar strength since the beginning of 2018 may have made US assets less attractive to foreign investors. Since the beginning of 2019, net inflows into US assets have been rolling over, and have fallen to 0.9% of GDP. This has brought the US basic balance down to -1.6% of GDP. In terms of portfolio investment, US bond markets are still appealing to foreign investors, but interest rate differentials are moving against the greenback. Total foreign purchases of US Treasury bonds have been negative this year, of which official purchases stand at US$350 billion of net outflows. In short, the path of least resistance for the US dollar is down, due to a widening current account deficit, waning foreign direct investment, fading interest rate differentials and increasing dollar liquidity. Euro Area Chart 2Euro Area Balance Of Payments The slowdown in global trade has hit European exports, but the trade balance is still sporting a “healthy” surplus of 1.7% of GDP, albeit far below its peak. As a result, the current account as of September 2019 was still at a healthy level of 2.7% of GDP. Should a US-China "phase one" deal be finalized, the trade balance in the euro area is likely to rebound going into 2020. Foreign direct investment has been increasing to the point of being at its highest level over the past 20 years, or 1% of GDP. This has been aided in part by the peripheral countries, further evidence that we are getting a convergence in competitiveness across Eurozone countries. The cheap euro and lower cost of capital have helped. As a result, the basic balance for the euro area reached a new high of 3.8% of GDP in September 2019. Portfolio investment into the euro area has stopped deteriorating since the beginning of 2017 and is now sporting net inflows of 0.8% of GDP. European purchases of both foreign equities and foreign bonds are falling, probably a sign that domestic assets are becoming more attractive. For example, ETF inflows are accelerating. The restart of the European Central Bank’s asset purchase program will continue to act as an anchor for spread convergence in the euro area. Meanwhile, a rally in European equities will be another signal of recovery in the euro area. A healthy current account balance and improving foreign investments both signal a higher euro going forward. Japan Chart 3Japanese Balance Of Payments The trade slowdown has dealt a small blow to Japan’s current account balance. The trade deficit widened further in 2019, reaching -0.5% of GDP in Q3. Exports have been falling for a 10th consecutive month, weighed down in part by lower sales of auto parts and semiconductor equipment. But these will pick up should a trade truce be reached. Among its major trading partners, sales to the US, China and other Asian countries have fallen, but have risen in the Middle East and Western Europe. That said, Japan’s large net international investment position has helped keep the current account surplus at an elevated level of 3.4% of GDP. Foreign direct investment in Japan has been dismal for many years due to an offshoring of industrial production. Net FDI is currently standing at -4% of GDP, which has brought the basic balance below zero for the first time since 2016. The recent deceleration is further evidence that corporate Japan needs structural reforms. Portfolio investment remains in negative territory mostly due to Japanese residents' large purchases of foreign long-term bonds. Going forward, fund inflows to Japan could face more headwinds with the proposed change to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. The change aims to lower the minimum stake for foreign investors without government approval from 10% to 1%. Other changes include requiring foreign directors to seek permission before becoming a board member. That said, Japan’s large net international investment position, which produces a high current account surplus, will continue to make the yen a safe haven amid global uncertainties. United Kingdom Chart 4UK Balance Of Payments So far, a cheap pound has not yet staunched the deterioration in UK balance of payments. The UK trade deficit remained wide at 7% of GDP in the third quarter. Among its major trading partners, the trade deficit comes mainly from Germany and China, offset by a smaller surplus from the US, the Netherlands and Ireland. Net receipts are positive, but the current account balance is still in negative territory at -5% of GDP. The Brexit imbroglio has led to an exodus of foreign direct investment. Many international companies are fleeing the UK, but to the extent that we get a quick resolution after the December elections, the uncertainty is likely to subside. Portfolio investment in the UK has been volatile over the past few years and has not really helped dictate any discernable trend in the UK basic balance. More recently, inflows into UK gilts have been £19 billion in the second quarter, while flows into equities are also improving. Relative interest rate differentials are also likely to move in favor of the UK, especially if reduced uncertainty provides scope for the Bank of England to hike interest rates. At a minimum, compared with other European nations, gilts remain appealing to international investors. We remain positive on the pound and are long GBP/JPY in our portfolio. Canada Chart 5Canadian Balance Of Payments The Canadian trade deficit has been hovering near -1% of GDP over the past few years. The goods trade deficit narrowed this year, led mostly by an increase in energy exports and lower imports of transportation equipment. Further improvement in energy product sales will require an improvement in pipeline capacity and a smaller gap between WCS and Brent crude oil prices. The current account deficit has been narrowing, now standing at -2% of GDP, the smallest since 2008. This is helped by net receipts, especially driven by a rise in direct investment income. FDI has been the bright spot in Canadian BoP dynamics. FDI inflows have been in part helped by increased cross- border M&A activities. Net FDI into Canada now accounts for 2.7% of GDP. This has brought the basic balance back above zero for the first time since 2015. Portfolio investment is positive on a net basis, but the trend looks quite worrisome. Foreign entities are fleeing Canada. In the meantime, Canadian investment in foreign securities is on the rise, reaching C$6 billion in Q3. Profitability, liquidity concerns and a global push towards sustainable investing are making Canadian energy and mining companies unappealing for foreign capital. Moreover, with elevated house prices and depressed interest rates, the outlook for banking profitability is also concerning. A drop in the US dollar will help the loonie in the short term. Over the longer term, however, we prefer to be underweight the Canadian dollar, especially via the Australian dollar and the Norwegian krone, which have a better macro outlook. Australia Chart 6Australian Balance Of Payments Australia has seen the best balance of payments improvement among the G10. The Australian trade balance soared this year and now stands at 2.5% of GDP, the highest in several years. Terms of trade, which have increased by 45% since their 2016 bottom, have been one of the main drivers. Exports of iron ore and concentrates increased by 64% year-on-year in September 2019, adding to the positive trade balance. Ergo, Australia is benefitting from both a price and volume boost. Trade has lifted the current account to be on track to post its first surplus since the ‘70s. Going forward, we expect Australian trade to continue improving amid the US-China trade détente. Foreign direct investment dipped slightly in 2019, but from very elevated levels. At present, it still stands at 3.5% of GDP. This has allowed for a very healthy basic balance surplus of 2.9% of GDP. The largest sources of Australian foreign direct investment are the US and the UK. The FDI inflows tend to be concentrated in the mining and manufacturing sectors and generate a negative income balance for Australia. This has been part of the reason behind the country’s chronic current account deficit, but it is impressively becoming less and less important. Portfolio investment in Australia plunged in 2019, and now stands at -4.2% of GDP. This has been driven by an exodus from the bond market. The repatriation of capital back to the US probably helped exacerbate this trend. The Australian dollar is likely to rebound from a contrarian perspective. We are playing Aussie dollar strength via the New Zealand and Canadian dollars. New Zealand Chart 7New Zealand Balance Of Payments New Zealand is also benefitting from a terms-of-trade boost. The trade deficit marginally narrowed to -1.7% of GDP in the third quarter. Exports rose by 4% year-on-year in the third quarter, while imports rose by 3.6% year-on-year. Terms of trade increased in 2019, mainly driven by a rise in dairy and meat prices. It appears the pork crisis in China is benefitting New Zealand exports. As a result, the current account deficit narrowed slightly to 3.4% of GDP. Foreign direct investment in New Zealand rose sharply to 3.1% of GDP, partly driven by reinvestment in the banking sector. This almost brought the basic balance back into positive territory. If this trend continues, it will be the first time the basic balance is in positive territory in two decades. Portfolio investment in New Zealand has been deteriorating, with net outflows of $6.2 billion in the second quarter. This is almost 4% of GDP on an annualized basis. The withdrawal of equity and investment fund shares by foreign entities, as well as divestment of debt securities by the general government, are some of the reasons behind falling portfolio investment. In a nutshell, increased portfolio investment in New Zealand will be predicated on a terms-of-trade shock that boosts margin growth for agricultural exporters, or a policy shift that boosts domestic return on capital. We like the kiwi versus the dollar, but are underweight against its pro-cyclical peers, namely the Australian dollar and the Swedish krona. Switzerland Chart 8Swiss Balance Of Payments The Swiss trade balance has been in a structural surplus, and hugely underpins the nation’s large current account surplus. The improvement this year, a rebound to 5.4% of GDP in the third quarter, is notable. The increase in exports has been partly driven by higher sales of chemical and pharmaceutical products, jewelry, and metals. Combined with income inflows from its large net international investment position, this has produced a current account balance of 10.7% of GDP. The slowdown in foreign direct investment has eased sharply from a record-low of -16% to -8% of GDP. Tax breaks from the US Jobs Act in 2017 allowed for favorable divestment of FDI in Switzerland and repatriation back to the US. This was a one-off that is now behind us, which explains why the basic balance is shifting back into surplus territory, to the tune of 2.5% of GDP.  Portfolio investment has been gradually improving and now stands at 0.3% of GDP. Swiss paper and equities (which are defensive) have benefitted from increased safe-haven demand this year. The Swiss franc is likely to continue its slow structural appreciation in the years to come, interspersed with bouts of volatility. In the short-term, however, the Swiss National Bank is likely to use the currency to fight deflationary pressures. This suggests the EUR/CHF has upside tactically. Sweden Chart 9Swedish Balance Of Payments The Swedish trade balance has been in structural decline since 2004 and turned negative in 2016. A large component of Swedish exports are machinery and automobiles which have suffered stiff competition from other global giants. The good news is that the weak krona is starting to help. The third-quarter trade balance shifted to a surplus for the first time since 2016 and is currently standing at 0.2% of GDP. Combined with inflows from Sweden’s external investments, this has nudged the current account balance to 3.3% of GDP. Despite net FDI inflows falling to -2.1% of GDP, the basic balance still managed to remain stable at 1.2% of GDP due to the improvement in the current account balance. The recent decline in Swedish FDI has mirrored those in other countries. However, Swedish exports will benefit from a trade détente as well as from a broader improvement in global growth. This should stem FDI outflows. Net portfolio investment in Sweden has been volatile in recent years, but our expectation is for improvement. A weak krona has typically helped the manufacturing sector with a lag of 12 months. Moreover, with the krona trading at a large discount to its long-term fair value, foreign investors will likely benefit from both equity and currency returns, should cyclical stocks continue to outperform defensives. In summary, Sweden’s basic balance should recover to levels that have prevailed over the past few years. Norway Chart 10Norwegian Balance Of Payments The bottom in oil prices since 2016 has gone a long way towards improving Norway’s trade balance. Net trade has fallen marginally this year due to lower exports of oil and natural gas, but still stands at 7.2% of GDP. The trade balance is the primary driver of the current account balance, and the latter now stands at 6.4% of GDP. Norway has seen an exodus of foreign capital from both direct and portfolio investment.  Net FDI and portfolio investment stand at -3% and -4% of GDP, respectively. Declining oil production in the North Sea has been partly responsible for falling FDI. On the portfolio side of the equation, it has been mainly due to increased purchases of foreign equities and bonds, especially via the Oil Fund. Concerns around sustainable investing have also likely diverted investors away from Norwegian assets. Despite this, Norway still sports a basic balance surplus of 3.4% of GDP. Eventually, this basic balance will move from being supported by trade to income inflows from Norway’s large net international investment position. The Norwegian krone is cheap on many metrics, and is one of our favorite petrocurrencies at the moment. Should global growth stabilize, which will revive oil demand, inflows into Norway should improve.   Kelly Zhong Research Analyst kellyz@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
An analysis on Brazil is available below. Feature Chart I-1Poor Performance By EM Stocks, Currencies And Commodities I had the pleasure of meeting again with a long-term BCA client Ms. Mea last week during my trip to Europe. Ms. Mea and I meet on a semi-annual basis, where she has the opportunity to query my analysis and view. In our latest meeting, she was more perplexed than usual by the global macro developments and financial market dynamics. Ms. Mea: All the seemingly positive news on the trade front is pushing up global share prices. In fact, a substantial portion -if not all -of the global equity price gains have occurred on days when there has been positive news surrounding the US-China trade negotiations. Given EM financial markets were the most damaged by the trade war, one would have thought that EM markets would outperform in a rally stemming from progress in negotiations. Yet this has not occurred. EM currencies have failed to advance (a number of currencies are in fact breaking down), EM sovereign credit spreads are widening and the relative performance of EM vs. DM share prices has relapsed (Chart I-1). What is causing this disconnect? Answer: The disconnect is due to a somewhat false narrative that the global trade and manufacturing recession as well as the EM/China slowdown were primarily caused by the US-China trade confrontation. The principal reason behind the global manufacturing and trade recession has been a deceleration in Chinese domestic demand. The latter can only partially be attributed to the US-China trade tariffs and tensions. Chart I-2 illustrates that mainland exports are not contracting while imports excluding processing trade1 are down 5% from a year ago. This implies that China’s growth slump has not been due to a contraction in its exports but rather due to weakness in its domestic demand. The principal reason behind the global manufacturing and trade recession has been a deceleration in Chinese domestic demand. The basis as to why mainland exports have held up so well is because Chinese exporters have been re-routing their shipments to the US via other countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan. Critically, the key force driving EM currencies and risk assets has been Chinese imports (Chart I-3). Mainland imports continue to shrink, with no recovery in sight. This is the reason why EM risk assets and currencies have performed so poorly, even amid the global risk-on environment. Chart I-2Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Chart I-3China Imports Drive EM Currencies   Ms. Mea: Are you implying that a ceasefire in the trade war will not help Chinese growth rebound, and in turn support EM economies? The “Phase One” agreement and possible reductions in US tariffs on imports from China may help the Middle Kingdom’s exports, but not its imports. Crucially, the Chinese authorities will likely be reluctant to augment their credit and fiscal stimulus if there is a “Phase One” deal with the US. Absent greater stimulus, China’s domestic demand is unlikely to stage a swift recovery. In the case of a “Phase One” agreement, a mild improvement in business confidence in China and worldwide is likely, but a major upswing is doubtful. The basis is that business people around the world have witnessed the struggles faced by the US and China in their negotiations. They will likely doubt the ability of both nations to reach a structural resolution – and rightly so. Investors should realize that the Chinese economy does not depend on exports to the US nearly as much as is commonly believed. Importantly, global investors are miscalculating China’s negotiating strategy and tactics. We put much greater odds than many other investors on the possibility that China will continue to drag out the negotiations without signing the “Phase One” agreement. This could easily derail the global equity rally. Investors should realize that the Chinese economy does not depend on exports to the US nearly as much as is commonly believed. China’s shipments to the US have been around 3.3% of GDP, even before the trade war began. The value-added to the economy/income generated from China’s exports to the US is less than 3% of its GDP. In contrast, capital spending accounts for the largest share (42%) of China’s GDP. In turn, investment outlays are driven by the credit cycle and fiscal spending, rather than by exports. Chart I-4China: Stimulus And Business Cycle Ms. Mea: Turning to stimulus in China, the authorities have been easing for about a year. By now, the cumulative effect of this stimulus should have begun to revive the mainland’s domestic demand. Why do you still think China’s business cycle has not reached a bottom? Answer: Indeed, our credit and fiscal spending impulse has been rising since January. Based on its historical relationship with business cycle variables – it leads those variables by roughly nine months – China’s growth should have troughed in August or September (Chart I-4). However, the time lags between the credit and fiscal spending impulse and economic cycle are not constant as can be seen in Chart I-4. On average, the lag has been nine months but has also varied from zero (at the trough in early 2009) to 18 months (at the peak in 2016-‘17). Relationships in economics – as opposed to those in hard sciences – are not constant and stable. Rather, correlations and time lags between variables vary substantially over time. In addition, the magnitude of stimulus is not the only variable that should be taken into account. The potential multiplier effect is also significant. One way to proxy the multiplier effect is via the marginal propensity to spend by households and companies. In our opinion, the prime cause behind households’ and businesses’ reluctance to spend is the weak property market. Our proxies for Chinese marginal propensity to spend by companies and households have been falling (Chart I-5). This entails that households and businesses in China remain downbeat, which caps their expenditures, in turn offsetting the positive impact of stimulus. In our opinion, the prime cause behind households’ and businesses’ reluctance to spend is the weak property market. Without rapidly rising property prices and construction volumes, boosting sentiment and growth will prove challenging. We discussed the current conditions and outlook of China’s property market in last week’s report. Construction is the single largest sector of the mainland economy, and it is in recession: floor area started and under construction are all shrinking (Chart I-6). Chart I-5China: A Weak Multiplier Effect Chart I-6China Construction Is In Recession   It is difficult to envision an improvement in manufacturing and a rebound in demand for commodities/materials and industrial goods without a recovery in construction. Notably, Chart I-6 displays the most comprehensive data on construction, as it encompasses all residential and non-residential construction by property developers and all other entities. Ms. Mea: Why are some global business cycle indicators turning up if, as you argue, the global manufacturing slowdown originated from Chinese domestic demand and the latter has not yet turned around? Answer: At any point of the business cycle, it is possible to find data that point both up and down. Our ongoing comprehensive review of global business cycle data leads us to conclude that the improvement is evident only in a few circumstances, and is not broad-based. In particular: In China and the rest of EM, there is no domestic demand recovery at the moment. China and EM ex-China capital goods imports are shrinking (Chart I-7). Chinese consumer spending is also sluggish (Chart I-8). The rise in China’s manufacturing Caixin PMI over the past several months is an aberration. Chart I-7EM/China Capex Is Very Weak Chart I-8No Recovery For Chinese Consumers     In EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan, narrow and broad money growth are underwhelming (Chart I-9). These developments signify that EM policy rate cuts have not yet boosted money/credit and domestic demand. We elaborated on this in more detail in our recent report. The basis for such poor transmission is banking-system health in many developing countries. Banks remain saddled with non-performing loans (NPLs). The need to boost provisions and fears of more NPLs continues to make banks reluctant to lend. Besides, real (inflation-adjusted) lending rates are high, discouraging credit demand. In the US and euro area, consumption – outside of autos – as well as money and credit growth have never slowed in this cycle. The slowdown has largely been due to exports and the auto sector. The latter may be bottoming in the euro area (Chart I-10). This might be behind the improvement in some business surveys in Europe. Chart I-9EM Ex-China: Money Growth Is At Record Low Chart I-10Euro Area’s Auto Sales: Is The Worst Over?   European business survey data are mixed, but the weakest segment - manufacturing – remains lackluster. In particular, Germany’s IFO index for business expectations and current conditions in manufacturing have not improved (Chart I-11, top panel). Similarly, the Swiss KOF economic barometer remains downbeat (Chart I-11, top panel). The only improvement is in Belgian business confidence, and a mild pickup in the euro area manufacturing PMI (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Chart I-11European Manufacturing And Business Confidence   In the US, shipping and carload data are rather grim. They are not corroborating the marginal improvement in the US manufacturing PMI. Overall, at this point there are no signs that domestic demand is recovering in China and the rest of EM, which have been the epicenter of the slowdown. The improvement is limited to some data in the US and Europe. Consistently, US and European share prices have been surging, while EM equities have dramatically underperformed. Ms. Mea: What about lower interest rates driving multiples expansion in both DM and EM equities? Answer: Concerning multiples expansion, our general framework is as follows: So long as corporate profits do not contract, lower interest rates will likely lead to equity multiples expansion. However, when corporate earnings shrink, the latter overwhelms the positive effect of a lower discount rate on multiples, and share prices drop along with lower interest rates. DM corporate profits are flirting with contraction, but are not yet contracting meaningfully. Hence, it is sensible that US and European stocks have experienced multiples expansion. In contrast, EM corporate earnings are shrinking at a rate of 10% from a year ago as illustrated in Chart I-12. The basis for an EM profit recession is the downturn in Chinese domestic demand and consequently imports. EM per-share earnings correlate much better with Chinese imports (Chart I-13, top panel) than US ones (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12EM Profits And Share Prices Chart I-13EM EPS Is Driven By China Not The US   In fact, we have documented numerous times in our reports that EM currencies and share prices correlate well with China’s business cycle/global trade/commodities prices, more so than with US bond yields. This does not mean that EM share prices are insensitive to interest rates. They are indeed sensitive to their own borrowing costs, but not to US Treasury yields. Chart I-14 demonstrates that EM share prices move in tandem with inverted EM sovereign US dollar bond yields and EM local currency bond yields. Similarly, emerging Asian share prices correlate with inverted high-yield Asian US dollar corporate bond yields (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Chart I-14EM Share Prices And EM Bond Yields Chart I-15Chinese Bond Yields Herald Relapse In EM Stocks And Currencies In short, EM share prices typically sell off when EM borrowing costs rise – regardless if it is driven by mounting US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Looking forward, exchange rates hold the key. A relapse in EM currencies will push up both the US dollar and local currency bond yields in many EMs. That will in turn warrant a setback in EM share prices. Ms. Mea: What about the correlation between EM performance and Chinese local rates? Answer: This is an essential relationship. Chart I-15 demonstrates that EM share prices and currencies have a strong positive correlation with local interest rates in China. The rationale is that all of them are driven by China’s business cycle. Relapsing interest rates in China are presently sending a bearish signal for EM risk assets and currencies. Ms. Mea: What does all this mean for investment strategy? A few weeks ago, you wrote that if the MSCI EM equity US dollar index breaks above 1075, you would reverse your recommended strategy. How does this square with your fundamental analysis that is still downbeat? Answer: My fundamental analysis on EM/China has not changed: I do not believe in the sustainability of this EM rebound in general, and EM outperformance versus DM in particular. The key risk to my strategy on EM stems from the US and Europe. It is possible that US and European share prices continue to rally. EM share prices typically sell off when EM borrowing costs rise – regardless if it is driven by mounting US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Notably, the high-beta segments of the US equity market and the overall Euro Stoxx 600 index are flirting with major breakouts (Chart I-16A and I-16B). If these breakouts transpire, the up-leg in US and European share prices will be long-lasting. This will also drag EM share prices higher in absolute terms. This is why I have placed a buy stop on the EM equity index. Chart I-16AUS High-Beta Stocks Chart I-16BEuropean Equities: At A Critical Juncture   That said, I have a strong conviction that EM will continue to underperform DM, even in such a scenario. Hence, I continue to recommend underweighting EM versus DM in both global equity and credit portfolios. As we have recently written in detail, the global macro backdrop and financial market dynamics in such a scenario will resemble 2012-2014, when EM currencies depreciated, commodities prices fell and EM share prices massively underperformed DM ones (Chart I-17). Further, I am not arguing that the current global trade and manufacturing downtrends will persist indefinitely. The odds are that the global business cycle, including China’s, will bottom sometime next year. The point is that EM share prices have decoupled from fundamentals – namely corporate earnings growth – since January. The point is that EM share prices have decoupled from fundamentals – namely corporate earnings growth – since January (please refer to Chart I-12 on page 8). This is an unprecedented historical gap, making EM stocks, currencies and credit markets vulnerable to continued disappointments in EM corporate profitability. Ms. Mea: What market signals give you confidence in poor EM performance going forward? Answer: Even though the S&P 500 has broken to new highs, multiple segments of EM financial markets have posted extremely disappointing performance. These include: Small-cap stocks in EM overall and emerging Asia as well as the EM equal-weighted equity index have struggled to rally (Chart I-18). Chart I-17EM Underperformed During 2012-14 Bull Market Chart I-18Various EM Equity Indexes: Failure To Rally Is A Bad Omen   Various Chinese equity indexes – onshore and offshore, small and large – have failed to advance and continue to underperform the global equity index. EM ex-China currencies and industrial commodities prices have remained subdued (please refer to Chart I-1 on page 1). Ms. Mea: Would you mind reminding me of your country allocation across various EM asset classes such as equities, credit, currencies and fixed-income? Answer: Within an EM equity portfolio, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, central Europe, Korea and Thailand. Our equity underweights are Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey, South Africa and Colombia. We continue recommending to short an EM currency basket including ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Today, we add the BRL to our short list (please refer to the section below on Brazil). As to the country allocation within EM local currency bonds and sovereign credit portfolios, investors can refer to our asset allocation tables below that are published at the end of each week’s report and are available on our web site. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Brazil: Deflationary Pressures Warrant A Weaker BRL The Brazilian real is breaking below its previous support. We recommend shorting the BRL against the US dollar. The primary macro risk in Brazil is not inflation but rather mounting deflationary pressures. Inflation has fallen to very low levels, to the bottom of the central bank’s target range (Chart II-1). Deflation or low inflation is dangerous when there are high debt levels. The Brazilian government is heavily indebted. With nominal GDP growth still below government borrowing costs and a primary budget balance at -1.3% of GDP, the public debt trajectory remains unsustainable as we discussed in previous reports (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Brazil: Undershooting Inflation Target Chart II-2Public Debt Dynamics Are Still Not Sustainable   The cyclical profile of the economy is very weak as shown in Chart II-3. Tight fiscal policy and a drawdown of foreign exchange reserves have caused money growth to slow. That in turn entails a poor outlook for the economy, which will reinforce the deflationary trend. Accordingly, Brazil needs to reflate its economy to boost nominal GDP, which is the only scenario where the nation escapes a public debt trap. Yet, fiscal policy is straightjacketed by the spending cap rule, which stipulates that government spending can only grow at the previous year’s IPCA inflation rate. Federal government spending is set to grow only at the low nominal rate of 3.4% in 2020. Hence, monetary policy is the sole tool available for policymakers to reflate. Both bond yields and bank lending rates remain elevated in real terms. This hampers any recovery in the business cycle. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend by companies and consumers is declining, foreshadowing weaker economic activity ahead (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Brazil: The Economy Is Weak Chart II-4Brazil: Propensity To Spend Is Declining   The central bank is determined to reduce interest rates further. As such, they cannot control the exchange rate. Indeed, the Impossible Trinity thesis states that in an economy with an open capital account (like in Brazil), the authorities cannot control both interest and exchange rates simultaneously. Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes stated in recent days that tight fiscal and easy monetary policies are consistent with a lower currency value. Brazilian policymakers are open to the idea of a weaker exchange rate and will not defend the real. Their currency market interventions are intended to smooth volatility in the exchange rate but not preclude depreciation. In fact, currency depreciation is another option to boost nominal growth that the nation desperately needs. Brazilian policymakers are open to the idea of a weaker exchange rate and will not defend the real. Their currency market interventions are intended to smooth volatility in the exchange rate but not preclude depreciation. Commodities prices remain an important driver of the Brazilian real (Chart II-5). These have failed to rebound amid the risk-on regime in global financial markets. This suggests that the path of least resistance for commodities prices is down, which is bad news for the real. Brazil’s current account deficit is widening and has reached 3% of GDP (Chart II-6). Notably, not only are export prices deflating but export volumes are also shrinking (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Chart II-5BRL And Commodities Prices Chart II-6Widening Current Account Deficit   Chart II-7The BRL Is Not Cheap Meanwhile, the nation’s foreign debt obligations – the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months – are at $190 billion, all-time highs. As the real depreciates, foreign currency debtors (companies and banks) will rush to acquire dollars or hedge their dollar liabilities. This will reinforce the weakening trend in the currency. Finally, the Brazilian real is not cheap - it is close to fair value (Chart II-7). Hence, valuation will not prevent currency depreciation. Bottom Line: We are initiating a short BRL / long US dollar trade. Investors should remain neutral on Brazil within EM equity, local bonds and sovereign credit portfolios. Investors with long-term horizon should consider the following strategy: long the Bovespa, short the real. This is a bet that Brazil will succeed in reflating the economy at the detriment of the currency. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Processing trade includes imports of goods that undergo further processing before being re-exported.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights The seemingly interminable discussions around the “phase one” deal touted by US and Chinese trade negotiators notwithstanding, base metals prices are primed for a rally. The bottoming in base metals prices indicates industrial activity, particularly in EM economies, will turn higher, which will lift aggregate demand. The signaling from base metals markets is consistent with our proprietary industrial activity models, including our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast, which continue to show industrial activity has bottomed and is turning up. Year-on-year growth in supply and demand of aluminum and copper – the largest components of the LMEX index – is diverging: Consumption is outpacing production, which is forcing inventories to draw hard. Any increase in demand will rally prices. Given our view, we are going long the LMEX index at tonight’s close. We recommend this as a tactical position at present and are including a 10% stop-loss; however, we could move this to a strategic position. Feature Despite the seemingly interminable back-and-forth between US and Chinese negotiators working on “phase one” of the Sino-US trade deal, base metals prices are signaling a revival of global economic growth, particularly in EM economies, in 2020. This is consistent with the growth indications being picked up in our proprietary models and reflected in global PMIs. The proximate cause of this revival in economic activity is the global monetary accommodation systemically important central banks have been pursuing for the better part of 2019, and the likely implementation of the long-awaited “phase one” Sino-US trade deal. Fiscal policy space remains available for systematically important economies – e.g., China, Germany and the US – and we expect such stimulus to be deployed next year. Fundamentally, global base metals inventories continue to draw hard, as the rates of growth in consumption and production diverge. Any recovery in organic growth – particularly in EM demand – would spark a rally. Base Metals In The Role Of Leading Economic Indicators We use metals prices to confirm the signals coming from the proprietary models we use to gauge economic growth prospects. Base metals prices often are used as indicators of global economic activity, particularly EM nominal and real GDP growth (Chart of the Week). Indeed, US Federal Reserve Board economists recently noted base metals prices are “often viewed by policymakers and practitioners as early indicators of swings in economic activity and global risk sentiment.”1 These metals prices are more sensitive to changes in global growth than other commodities (e.g., oil, which has its own idiosyncratic factors driving the evolution of prices). For this reason, we use these prices to confirm the signals coming from the proprietary models we use to gauge economic growth prospects. Our research indicates base metals prices are more closely linked to EM activity than DM activity, which makes them especially useful to our analysis of commodity markets generally, particularly oil. This is true also of our proprietary models by construction – EM demand drives commodity demand. Together, the base metals prices and our models contain complementary information that is useful in gauging growth prospects, particularly for EM economies (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekBase Metals Often Function As Gauges of GDP Growth Chart 2Base Metals Prices, BCA's GIA Model Both Are Sensitive to EM Growth Prospects We’ve found base metals prices to be timely indicators of turning points in EM GDP cycles, similar to the Fed’s findings (Table 1). In particular, the LMEX, IMF Base Metals index, and high-grade copper prices lead nominal and real EM GDP by anywhere from one to three months. However, for the entire sample correlation, which goes from 1995 to present, our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index and Global Commodity Factor (GCF) have the highest correlation with nominal and real EM GDP. Table 1Correlation Between EM GDP And Indicators Of Global Activity Our proprietary indicators – GIA index, GCF, EM Import Volume Model (EMIV Model) – have been signaling a revival in commodity demand for several months (Chart 3). The model we’ve developed to track freight, similar to our EMIV Model, also is signaling a recovery in global trade (Chart 4).3 Chart 3BCA's Proprietary Models Also Closely Aligned with EM Growth Chart 4EM Import Volumes Closely Follow Freight Base Metals Stocks Drawing Hard Supply in the biggest components of the LMEX – copper and aluminum – is contracting, while demand is holding up or slightly growing. This is causing global stocks to draw hard, as incremental demand is met from inventory. Any stimulus coming out of China, which accounts for more than half of global base metals demand would propel prices in these markets higher. Global refined aluminum inventories have been drawing sharply as growth rates in production and consumption diverge (Chart 5). Global ali inventories now stand at 1.76mm MT, down 24% y/y. On average, global consumption has exceeded production by 7.2k MT this year. A similar set of fundamentals is forcing copper inventories to draw hard, as well, where consumption has exceeded production by 22.6k MT this year (Chart 6). Global copper inventories are down ~ 20% y/y, and continue to fall. Chart 5Ali Consumption Outpaces Production, Forcing Stocks To Draw Hard Chart 6Copper Stocks Draw Hard On Similar Fundamental Pressure The only thing preventing a sustained rally in these markets is organic demand growth, which the global accommodation by systematically important central banks is directed toward reviving. PBOC policymakers in China have drawn attention to their capacity for additional monetary stimulus, even though they have held off on goosing money and credit supply this year. A prolonged weakening of GDP growth in China likely would push policymakers to move to a more accommodative stance on monetary policy. Net, weak demand growth is offsetting upside price pressure as production contracts in key base metals markets. That said, EM demand ex-China for base metals likely will increase, if our economic activity gauges and prices are correct in the signals they are generating. Any stimulus coming out of China, which accounts for more than half of global base metals demand would propel prices in these markets higher. Expect Higher Base Metals Demand In 2020 Both our GIA index and base metals prices are good predictors of EM economic activity – overall EM and EM ex-China – which inclines us to expect growth to revive there as well. We are expecting base metals consumption to move higher next year, given the uptick we are seeing in base metals markets and from our economic activity gauges, particularly our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast, which is a weighted combination of the individual models we use as a contemporaneous indicator (Chart 7).4 Chart 7Base Metals Demand Set To Recover in 2020 Chart 8Global Financial Easing Will Lift Base Metals Part of this will be led by improving Chinese demand, which accounts for more than 50% of base metals demand globally (Chart 8). We expect global financial conditions to remain supportive, and for total social financing in China to provide additional tailwinds to metal prices. This will keep aluminum demand in China stable-to-higher (Chart 9) along with copper demand (Chart 10). Both our GIA index and base metals prices are good predictors of EM economic activity – overall EM and EM ex-China – which inclines us to expect growth to revive there as well.5 Chart 9Chinese Aluminum Consumption... Chart 10...And Copper Demand Will Recover Given our view, we are going long the LMEX Index at tonight’s close. Bottom Line: Base metals prices and price indexes are telling a similar story to the gauges we’ve constructed to follow EM growth prospects, hence commodity demand prospects. Fundamentally, these markets continue to tighten, as supply growth remains significantly behind demand growth and stocks continue to draw hard. The y/y changes in the metals price indexes likely have bottomed and will be moving higher. Our GIA and GCF indicators concur. Taking the information contained in our proprietary indexes and base metals prices together drives our expectation for stronger base metals demand next year, which, given the state of supply growth and inventories, points to higher prices. Given our view, we are going long the LMEX Index at tonight’s close. We recommend this as a tactical position and will await confirmation of a robust recovery in demand before moving it to a strategic position. For that reason, we are including a 10% stop-loss; however, we could move this to a strategic position. Chart 11Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Also Works Against Base Metals Demand The same forces that are hindering a strong recovery in oil demand – chiefly the elevated level of global economic uncertainty, which keeps the USD well bid – also are at play in the base metals markets. USD strength keep the cost of base metals high in local-currency terms, which retards demand, and encourages increased supply at the margin, as the local-currency cost of production is suppressed (Chart 11). It will be difficult to go all-in on a commodity price rally until this uncertainty is resolved, or at least reduced.     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Brent prices closed at one-month high on Tuesday, surpassing $64/bbl. We expect this trend to continue as demand – mainly from EM – picks up in the coming months, as signaled by our proprietary indicators. Next week will be critical for the 2020 oil market balance. OPEC’s Joint Technical Committee will meet on December 3, OPEC on December 5, and OPEC and non-OPEC countries – i.e. OPEC 2.0 – on December 6. The current market consensus seems to be that OPEC 2.0 will agree to maintain the current production curtailments for three additional months, which would take their deal to keep 1.2mm b/d off the market to the end of June. Non-complying countries – mainly Iraq – can be expected to encounter pressure to further reduce production in line with their quotas. In our global oil market balances, we assume OPEC 2.0 will extend the current quota until year-end 2020. Nonetheless, this could be announced gradually throughout the year. Base Metals: Neutral. Base metals moved higher on Tuesday following positive developments in the US-China trade talks. Top negotiators from both countries spoke by phone earlier this week and Trump signal its administration was in the “final throes of a very important deal.”6 We expect a ceasefire to be signed this year, which will revive sentiment at the margin. Moreover, copper and aluminum prices will be supported by rising EM GDP next year (see this week’s front section for details). Copper prices are up 2% since last Thursday. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices held above our $1,450/oz stop-loss despite the risk-on sentiment fueled by encouraging discussions between the US’s and China’s top negotiators. For next year, we believe the Fed will remain accommodative and will not risk de-railing the recovery pre-emptively, even as inflation moves above target. This will support gold prices. The Fed will only tighten more aggressively once inflation breakeven rates are well anchored in the 2.3% to 2.5% range identified by our US Bond strategists. Appearing before the New York Association of Business Economics this week, Fed Governor Lael Brainard argued for a flexible average inflation target that would allow for a sustained period of inflation running above 2% to offset the last decade of inflation averaging far below the current 2% target.7 This is part of the undergoing review of how the Fed conducts monetary policy, led by Vice Chair Richard Clarida. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The slow corn harvest forced the USDA to delay the end of its weekly crop progress report. 84% of corn harvest was complete, below the five-year average of 96%. This season’s corn harvesting has been the slowest since 2009. Wheat rallied on Monday amid fund buying, with its most active contract for March delivery up almost 3%. The rally continued from last week when European wheat prices climbed over unfavorable weather conditions, particularly in France, where the condition of the grain was revised down to a four-year low. The soybean market has faced pressure over doubts a Sino-US trade deal will be concluded. China has turned to Brazil to lock in supplies. The January 2020 futures contract on the CME sank to its lowest level since September. Footnotes 1     In a recent study, The Fed researchers used the IMF’s Base Metals index as a leading indicator of GDP growth. The IMF’s index is highly correlated with the London Metal Exchange Index (LMEX) we use from time to time to assess base metals markets. However, the LMEX, unlike the IMF’s index, does not include iron ore, which can, at times, cause these indexes to diverge. Please see Caldara, Dario, Michele Cavallo, and Matteo Iacoviello (2016), Oil Price Elasticities and Oil Price Fluctuations, International Finance Discussion Papers 1173, published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2    We find two-way Granger-causality between EM GDP and the IMF’s base-metals price index, the LMEX index, and our Global Industrial Activity Index (GIA), Global Commodity Factor (GCF), and shipping rates proxy, which we discuss below. Close to 75% of the LMEX Index is accounted for by aluminum and copper. Aluminum account for 14% of the IMF index, while copper makes up 30% of the index. 3    The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity. These statistics are highly correlated with trade-related activity, which, since most of this involve trade in manufactured goods, is important to global industrial activity. The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different real commodity prices. The EMIV model tracks EM import volumes which are reported with a two-month lag by the CPB in the Netherlands, which we update to current time using FX rates for trade-sensitive currencies, commodity prices and interest rates variables. We are also following shipping indexes, which are highly correlated with global trade volumes. 4    Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast is a coincident indicator of commodity demand, comprised of our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and our Global Commodity Factor (GCF) and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models. 5    EM GDP ex-China is more correlated with base metals prices and our GIA index, while US GDP and IP is only slightly impacted by them. 6    Please see U.S.-China trade deal close, Trump says; negotiations continue published November 26, 2019 by reuters.com. 7    Please see Fed's Brainard calls for 'flexible' average inflation target published November 26, 2019 by reuters.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades
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Special Report The Hidden Sales Recession Of 2015 In 2015, the nominal sales of global listed companies shrank by -11.3 percent, marginally worse than the -11.0 contraction suffered during the Great Recession of 2008.  But because few people are aware of the depth of this latter sales recession, we are calling it the ‘hidden sales recession of 2015’ (Feature Chart).  Chart I-1The Hidden Sales Recession Of 2015 Significantly, all of the major stock markets suffered sales recessions in 2015, even when their domestic economies were expanding healthily (Chart I-2). Which starkly illustrates that the performance of stock markets often has little, or no, connection with the performance of their domestic economies. Chart I-2All The Major Stock Markets Suffered Sales Recessions In 2015 The euro area and UK economies grew strongly in 2015, yet the nominal sales of listed European companies contracted by -7 percent. Meanwhile, the sales of listed companies in the US shrank -3 percent, and in China by -10 percent. However, among the major stock markets, the worst pain was felt by the UK stock market where total nominal sales plunged -20 percent (Charts 3-5). Chart I-3US Listed Companies' Sales Shrank 3 Percent Despite A Growing Economy Chart I-4European Listed Companies' Sales Shrank 7 Percent Despite A Growing Economy Chart I-5UK Listed Companies' Sales Shrank 20 Percent Despite A Growing Economy The particularly sharp contraction in UK stock market sales, with their heavy exposure to the oil and resource sectors, points to the cause of the sales recession of 2015: the interrelated weakness in emerging markets, oil and other commodity prices, and a surging dollar. What Caused The Hidden Sales Recession Of 2015? In 2015, Chinese policymakers started tightening policy to lean against a putative credit bubble. This exacerbated a slowdown in Chinese growth that was already underway. In turn, China’s slowdown set off a domino effect in other emerging economies which relied on China as a major export market. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve signalled its intention to exit its extended period of zero interest rate policy, arguing that extraordinarily easy monetary policy was no longer appropriate for a US economy that had returned to normality. On the other sides of the Atlantic and Pacific though, the ECB and the BoJ were moving monetary policy in the opposite direction, obsessed by the persistent undershoot of inflation relative to the two percent target. This combination of tighter monetary policy in the US combined with looser policy in the euro area and Japan precipitated a surge in the value of the dollar. The surging dollar worsened China’s problems. With the yuan pegged to the dollar, the stronger dollar hurt the competitiveness of Chinese companies. But when China loosened the peg in August 2015, it just unleashed another problem: capital outflows.  The price of WTI plunged from a $107 peak in mid-2014 to just $27 in early 2016. Crucially, the synchronized slowdown across emerging economies hit the demand for commodities, catalysing a collapse in prices across the whole commodity complex. The price of WTI plunged from a $107 peak in mid-2014 to just $27 in early 2016 (Chart I-6); metal markets also suffered, the copper price fell from $7000 to $4500; as did agricultural commodities like soybeans whose prices almost halved. This collapse in commodity prices simply added further pressure on emerging economies that are major commodity producers, like Brazil. Chart I-6The Sales Recession Of 2015 Was About A Collapse In Prices In Key Sectors Of The Economy In turn, the problems in the emerging economies and commodity complex set off other negative feedback loops that further hurt prices. For the significant portion of emerging market debt that is denominated in dollars, a stronger dollar meant a greater debt burden and danger of default. At the same time, the collapse in the oil price endangered the financial viability of the heavily indebted US shale oil producers and thereby their corporate bonds.     To summarise, the stock market sales recession of 2015 was partly about a slowdown in sales volumes. But it was more about a collapse in the prices in certain key sectors of the economy, namely oil, materials, and industrials. And as nominal sales are the product of sales volumes and prices, the nominal sales of listed companies suffered as sharp a recession in 2015 as in 2008. Why Does The Hidden Sales Recession Of 2015 Matter Today? The experience of 2015 painfully illustrates that the nominal sales of the dominant companies in a stock market may have little, or no, connection with their domestic economy, or indeed with conventional measures of the global economy. The reason is that the stock market, which by definition only includes publicly listed companies, has different sector skews compared with the whole economy. This is particularly true for those European stock markets where sector skews make them over exposed to the oil, materials, and industrial sectors, whose output prices can show wild swings that swamp the impact of sales volumes. The years 2010-11 and 2017-18 witnessed a strong catch-up in listed companies’ nominal sales. But after this snapback phase, nominal sales revert to a more moderate trend-like rate of growth. Chart I-7After A Sales Recession, There Is A Snapback There is another important message for today. After a sharp contraction in nominal sales caused by either volumes or prices plunging, as in 2008 and 2015, the first part of the recovery from overly-depressed levels tends to be the sharpest. This sharp snapback phase tends to last no more than two years. So the years 2010-11 and 2017-18 witnessed a strong catch-up in listed companies’ nominal sales. But after this snapback phase, nominal sales revert to a more moderate trend-like rate of growth (Chart I-7). Clearly, the sharp snapback phase is most powerful for the most beaten-up sectors during the nominal sales recession, such as energy and materials. For such ‘value cyclicals’, nominal sales growth tends to outperform that of the aggregate stock market in the snapback, and then underperform once the snapback is over (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8Energy Outperforms In The Snapback, Then Underperforms Chart I-9Materials Outperform In The Snapback, Then Underperform Chart I-10Healthcare Underperforms In The Snapback, Then Outperforms The corollary is that the sectors that did not suffer much during the sales recession, such as healthcare do not have a snapback phase. Hence, for such a ‘growth defensive’, nominal sales strongly underperform the aggregate market during the two year snapback, and then outperform once the snapback is over (Chart I-10). Let’s conclude with some brief investment thoughts. First, for mainstream stock markets, nominal sales and earnings can grow in 2020, but the growth rate will not be as strong as in the snapback phase of 2017-18. Without any support from lower bond yields and the associated multiple expansion for stocks, this means that stock markets are likely to deliver low single digit returns. Second, value cyclicals such as energy and materials outperformed in the snapback phase from 2017 to mid-2019, but now appear to be rolling over into an underperformance phase. Structurally underweight energy and materials. For mainstream stock markets, nominal sales and earnings can grow in 2020, but the growth rate will not be as strong as in the snapback phase of 2017-18.  Third, a growth defensive such as healthcare underperformed sharply in the snapback phase, but now appears to be back in an outperformance phase. Stay structurally overweight healthcare.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com