Currencies

Highlights US-China relations in 2020 consist of a gentleman’s agreement to keep the Phase One trade deal in place and aggressive maneuvering in every other policy area. Stimulus is unlikely to be curtailed in the US or China yet, which means brinkmanship will eventually lead to a negative surprise for markets. But it is just as unlikely to come after the election as before. Joe Biden would only initially benefit Chinese equities – trade and tech conflict is a secular trend. North Korea is not a red herring, but South Korea is still a geopolitical investment opportunity more than a risk, especially relative to Taiwan. Feature Chart 1US Power Struggle Raises Risk To Rally The “everything is awesome” rally continues, with US tech stocks unfazed by rising domestic and international risks. However, according to The Lego Movie 2, everything is not that awesome. The Treasury market smells trouble and long-dated yields remain subdued, despite a substantial new dose of monetary policy dovishness (Chart 1, top panel). In the near term we agree with the bears and remain tactically long 10-year Treasuries. Global policy uncertainty remains extremely elevated despite dropping off a bit from the heights of the pandemic lockdowns. US uncertainty, which is now rising relative to global, will climb through November and possibly all the way through Inauguration Day on January 20 (Chart 1, bottom panels). A contested election is not a low-probability event now that President Trump is making a comeback in the election race. President Trump’s comeback could generate a counter-trend bounce in the US dollar (Chart 2A). His comeback is not based in online betting odds but in battleground opinion polls (Chart 2B). Former Vice President Joe Biden is currently polling the same against Trump as Hillary Clinton did in 2016. Chart 2ATrump Staging A Comeback, But US Consumers Flagging Chart 2BTrump Staging A Comeback, But US Consumers Flagging Why should Trump be less negative for the greenback than Biden? First, Trump is a protectionist who would turn to aggressive foreign and trade policy when it became clear that most of his other legislative priorities would not make it past the Democratic House of Representatives. Unilateral, sweeping tariffs against China, and possibly the EU and various other nations, would weigh on global trade and economic recovery and hence support the dollar. Second, Trump’s populism means he would pursue growth at all costs, which means that US growth would increase relative to that of the rest of the world. Democrats, by contrast, would raise taxes and regulations that would have to be offset by new spending, weighing on growth at least at first. Thus Trump would inject animal spirits into the US economy while dampening those spirits abroad; Biden would do the opposite. The dollar may not rally sustainably, but it would be flat or fall less rapidly than if Biden and the Democrats reduced trade risks abroad while deterring domestic private investment. It is not yet clear that Trump’s comeback will have legs. The nation is still in thrall to the pandemic, recession, and social unrest, which undermine a sitting president. US consumer confidence has fallen, as anticipated (Chart 2, bottom panel). Trump should still be seen as an underdog despite his incumbent status. A Trump comeback could precipitate a counter-trend bounce in the US dollar. Nevertheless, our quantitative election model gives Trump a 45% chance of victory, up from 42% last month. Florida has shifted back into the Republican column – albeit as a “toss up” state with a roughly even chance of going either way (Chart 3). The shift reflects improvement in state leading economic indexes as a result of the V-shaped recovery in the economy thus far. Chart 3Trump Nearly Regains Florida In Our Quantitative Election Model, Odds Of Victory 45% Assuming Trump signs a new relief bill in September, which is working its way through Congress as we speak, we will upgrade our subjective odds from 35% to something closer to our quantitative model (and the market consensus). While Trump is less negative for the dollar than Biden, the dollar may fall anyway, at least beyond any near-term bounce. First, monetary policy is ultra-dovish. As we go to press, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell has given a sneak preview of the Fed’s strategic review of monetary policy at the Kansas City Fed’s annual Jackson Hole summit (this time hosted in cyberspace instead of Wyoming). Powell met expectations that the Fed will adopt average inflation targeting. Inflation will be allowed to overshoot the 2% inflation target to compensate for periods of undershooting. Maximum employment will be the goal rather than an attempt to prevent excessive deviation from the Fed’s estimates of neutral unemployment. This means US growth and inflation will push real rates lower and weaken the dollar. Moreover, as mentioned, Trump’s big spending would eventually drive investors away from the dollar, especially in the context of global economic recovery. Trump, like Biden, would refuse to impose fiscal austerity amid high unemployment. The one area where he would be able to compromise with House Democrats would be spending bills, as in his first term. The US budget deficit and trade deficit would remain very large, showering the world with dollar liquidity. Risk-on currencies will attract buyers in a new global business cycle. Republicans and Democrats have released their policy platforms following their national conventions. We will revisit these platforms in detail in a future report. The Democratic platform is the one that matters most because the Democrats are more likely to win full control of Congress and thus be capable of enacting their preferred policies. Their platform is reflationary, but in seeking to rebalance the economy to reduce financial and social disparities through more progressive tax policy it would offset some of the fiscal spending. Biden would also moderate foreign policy and trade policy, launching a new dialogue with China to manage tensions. The dollar would fall faster in this environment. Bottom Line: President Trump is staging a comeback in the election campaign. If the comeback receives a boost from fiscal stimulus, Trump could pull off a Harry Truman-style surprise victory. This would precipitate a bounce in the US dollar in the near term. Over the medium term, the dollar should continue falling due to US debt monetization and global recovery. The Trump-Xi Gentleman’s Agreement Has Two Months Left Financial markets have largely ignored US-China strategic tensions this year because the two countries are puffing themselves up with monetary and fiscal stimulus. Going forward, either the stimulus will falter, or the US-China conflict will escalate to the point of triggering a negative surprise for markets. Chart 4US-China: Embracing While Struggling China is unlikely to pull back on stimulus measures. It cannot do so when unemployment has spiked and the economy is experiencing the weakest growth in over 40 years. Authorities said as much during the annual July Politburo meeting on the economy (a meeting that has often marked turning points in policy), when they pledged to maintain accommodative policy and to speed up local government issuance of special bonds. Money supply is growing briskly. The market is validating the signal from China’s easy monetary policies and robust credit expansion. Our China Play Index – which consists of the Australian dollar, iron ore prices, Brazilian equities, and Swedish equities – continues to rally smartly, breaking above its 2019 peaks (Chart 4, top panel). The risk to this view is that the People’s Bank of China may not provide additional monetary easing in the near term, as the Politburo signaled that monetary policy would be more flexible and targeted in the second half of the year. The three-month Shanghai interbank rate has been rising since April. Politically, Chinese authorities would benefit from releasing negative news or statements that would undermine President Trump’s reelection campaign. However, Beijing would not make consequential moves merely to spite Trump. Its primary interest lies in its own stability. Credit growth will continue growing at its current clip through most of the rest of the year and fiscal spending will expand, particularly to support infrastructure projects. The US Congress is also likely to add more stimulus before the election, as noted above. Thus with both countries stimulating, the risk is that they escalate their strategic confrontation to the point that it causes a negative surprise in financial markets. Will this occur? The US-China relationship in 2020 has been characterized by (1) a gentleman’s agreement to adhere to the Phase One trade deal, which was reaffirmed by top negotiators this week; (2) an aggressive pursuit of national interest in every other policy area. Beijing accelerated its power grab in Hong Kong; the US accelerated up its ban on Chinese tech. Chinese imports of US commodities are naturally much weaker than projected due to economic reality but neither side has an interest in exiting the deal. The renminbi continues to appreciate against the dollar on the back of Chinese and global recovery (Chart 4, second and third panels). Nevertheless a new burst of stimulus will lower the hurdle to President Trump taking additional punitive measures against China. The administration could have paused after its major decision to finalize its ban on business with Huawei and other tech firms, which ostensibly even extends to foreign firms that use US-designed parts in sales to China. It did not. Trump is maintaining the pressure with new sanctions over China’s militarization of the South China Sea. Washington is also likely to kick Chinese companies off US stock exchanges if they fail to meet transparency and accounting standards. Trump is not only burnishing his “tough on China” credentials against Democratic candidate Joe Biden – the US’s recent measures are unlikely to be repealed under either president in the coming years. Chart 5China Faces Internal And External Political Pressures Therefore stimulus will enable US actions and Chinese reactions that will eventually trigger a pullback in financial markets. Chinese tech equities are reflecting this headwind. Equities ex-tech are likely to outperform (Chart 5, top panel). A Biden victory does not prevent Trump from taking punitive measures against China on his way out of office, to solidify his legacy as the Man Who Confronted China, so Chinese tech will remain at risk. Biden would be more favorable for emerging market equities because his administration would speed the dollar’s decline. A change of government in the US would temporarily disrupt the US’s overall policy assault against China. Biden’s foreign and trade policies would be more predictable and orthodox than Trump’s. Over a twelve month period, after a shot across the bow to warn that he is not a lightweight, Biden would probably attempt a diplomatic reset with China – a new round of engagement and dialogue that would support the Chinese equity rally. Eventually this reset would fail, however, and Biden would all the while be working up a coalition of democracies to pressure China to change its behavior – not only on trade but also on unions, carbon emissions, and human rights. Externally focused Chinese companies will remain exposed to the harmful secular trend of US-China power struggle regardless of the US election outcome. Coming out of the secretive leaders’ conclave at the Beidaihe resort in August, it is clear once again that Chinese domestic politics is not conducive to smooth US-China relations. Chinese political risk remains underrated. Our GeoRisk indicator is gradually picking up on this trend, and so are other quantitative political risk indicators such as that provided by GeoQuant (Chart 5, second panel). President Xi Jinping has been dubbed the “Chairman of Everything” due to his tendency to promote a neo-Maoist personality cult and thus shift Chinese governance from consensus-rule to personal rule. He is once again reportedly considering taking on the title of “Chairman” of the Communist Party, a position that only Mao Zedong has held.1 More importantly he is re-energizing his domestic anti-corruption campaign, i.e. political purge, this time against law enforcement. Xi had already seized control of China’s domestic security forces but controlling the police is even more critical in a period of high unemployment, slow growth, and social unrest (Chart 5, third panel). Xi’s attempt to re-consolidate power ahead of the Communist Party centennial in 2021 and especially the twentieth national party congress in 2022 is already under way. China’s domestic and international political environment is a risk for the renminbi, which we noted is rallying forcefully on the global rebound. We will not join this rally until the US election is decided at minimum. With the US posing a long-term threat, Beijing is speeding up its attempts to diversify away from the US dollar, both in trade settlements and foreign exchange reserves. Reliance on the dollar leaves Chinese banks and companies vulnerable to US financial sanctions, which have harmed US rivals like Russia and Iran. Over the long run there is a lot of upside for the yuan given its very low level of global penetration (about 2% of both SWIFT transactions and global foreign exchange reserves) and yet China’s very high share of global trade (about 15%). Cross-border settlements in RMB are recovering gradually after the steep drop-off following 2016. Beijing is also allowing foreign investors greater access to onshore financial markets where they will hold more and more RMB-denominated assets. However, the yuan will not become a reserve currency anytime soon given China’s state-controlled economy and closed capital account. We favor the euro, yen, and other G7 currencies as alternatives to the dollar. Hong Kong equities have suffered from the combination of Xi Jinping’s centralization of power and the US-China strategic conflict. The above analysis suggests that while they may get a temporary reprieve, the secular outlook is uninspiring. However, the Hong Kong monetary authorities are capable of managing the dollar peg. They have been able to manage dollar strength over the past decade, including the COVID-19 dollar run-up, and foreign exchange reserves are more than ample. By contrast, a sharp drop in the dollar can be handled even more easily by printing additional HKD. Eventually shifting to a trade basket, or a renminbi peg, is to be expected. The US election may support the Chinese equity rally if Biden wins, but tech equities should continue to underperform the rest of the bourse due to US grand strategy. Bottom Line: We prefer to play China’s growth recovery via outside countries that export into China, such as Sweden, Australia, and Brazil. The US election may support the Chinese equity rally if Biden wins, but tech equities should continue to underperform the rest of the bourse due to US grand strategy which will remain focused on constraining China’s tech ambitions. North Korea Is Not A Red Herring – But Taiwan Is Entirely Underrated The Taiwan Strait remains the chief geopolitical risk. Xi Jinping’s reassertion of Beijing’s supremacy within China’s sphere of influence has led to a backlash in Taiwanese politics and a confrontational posture across the Strait that is being expressed in saber-rattling and low-level economic sanctions that could easily escalate. Chart 6Taiwan Remains #1 Geopolitical Risk Military exercises and jingoistic rhetoric are also heating up, not only directly relating to Taiwan but also in the neighboring South China Sea, which is critical to national security for all geopolitical actors in Northeast Asia. On August 26 Beijing testing two anti-ship ballistic missiles known as “aircraft carrier killers” in the South China Sea (the DF-21D and the DF-26B). We have long argued that the lack of clarity over whether the US would uphold its defense obligations to Taiwan makes the situation ripe for misunderstandings. The US Naval Institute has recently confirmed the validity of fears about a full-scale conflict in the near term.2 Neither Beijing nor Taipei nor Washington has crossed a red line. But China’s imposition of legislative dependency on Hong Kong highlights the incompatibility of the Communist Party’s governing model with western liberalism. The “one country, two systems” formulation has become unacceptable to the Taiwanese people, who want to preserve their autonomy indefinitely. The US ban on doing business with Huawei extends to foreign companies that use US parts or designs, squeezing Taiwanese companies (Chart 6, top panel). War is possible, but our base case still holds that the mainland will first use economic means. In particular it will impose economic sanctions, either precipitating or in response to a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. The market continues to underrate the enormous risk to the Taiwanese dollar, as captured by the low level of our risk indicators (Chart 6, second panel). We continue to recommend shorting Taiwan relative to emerging markets. Taiwan is a short relative to South Korea, in particular, which stands to benefit from any negative turn of events in cross-strait relations. Korean equities are finally perking up, though the US tech war with China is weighing on the South Korean tech sector (Chart 7, top panel). We see this as a geopolitical opportunity given that both China and the US will need South Korean companies as they divorce each other. Korean political risk, however, may also be shifting from adequately priced to underrated. The risk premium has trended upward since President Trump’s diplomatic overture to leader Kim Jong Un stopped making progress (Chart 7, second and third panels). We have largely dismissed concerns about North Korea since the reduction of tensions in late 2017 due to our assessment that diplomacy would remain on track throughout Trump’s first term. This has proved to be the case, but it is still possible that North Korea could prove globally relevant before the US election. Chart 7North Korea A Non-Negligible Risk The reason stems from rumors of Kim Jong Un’s health problems earlier this year. We noted at the time that it was suspicious that preparations for Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, to take on greater responsibilities within the Politburo of the Worker’s Party seemed to predate reports of Kim Jong Un’s illness. For the North Korean state to continue to promote her implies that something may indeed be amiss. In fact, she has missed two Politburo meetings after her aggressive public relations campaign against South Korea was called off this summer. It is possible she got too much attention as the Number Two person in the regime. The South Korean National Intelligence Service is debating her status with the Defense Ministry and Unification Ministry. What is clear is that Kim Jong Un is preparing a new five-year economic plan, to be launched in January 2021, and that he is eager to share any blame for disastrous internal conditions in the country amid the global pandemic and recession. The market is typically correct not to hyperventilate over North Korean risks, but after 2016 North Korea is no longer a “red herring.” First, any domestic power struggle would occur at an immensely inconvenient time given the breakdown in US-China trust. Second, as the North manages any internal problems through its opaque and untested political process, it could be pressed into making a show of force that would either embarrass and antagonize President Trump, or provoke a forceful response from a future President Biden, given that North Korea in theory has the raw capability to deliver a crude nuclear weapon to the continental United States. If any US president makes a show of force, it will antagonize China and could lead to a major standoff. This would upset the markets at least temporarily. We are long Korean equities and would also look favorably on Korean tech. A geopolitical risk premium could temporarily undercut these stocks if North Korean diplomacy fails around the US election. But the risk is globally relevant only if Pyongyang somehow sparks a standoff between the US and China. Otherwise a major Korean peninsula crisis is far less of a concern than that of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Financial Times. 2 See Admiral James A. Winnefeld and Michael J. Morell, "The War That Never Was?" US Naval Institute Proceedings 146: 8 (August 2020), usni.org. Section II: GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The leading providers of fundamental oil data differ sharply in their estimates of demand destruction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This will keep uncertainty over the trajectory of prices elevated this year. Our forecast of demand destruction and those of the US EIA and the IEA are clustered around 8mm b/d for 2020, while OPEC’s most recent estimate exceeds 9mm b/d. The rebound in actual demand, which is apparent in the data, a weakening USD and strengthening of global trade in the wake of global fiscal and monetary stimulus support our expectation of lower demand destruction. As mentioned last month, we believe the odds of a COVID-19 vaccine are high by year-end or early 2021 (Chart of the Week). Against this, bloated floating storage levels – and their attendant port congestion – threaten to slow crude-oil demand growth in Asia into 4Q20, particularly if China follows through on putting 19 very large crude carriers (VLCCs) filled with oil from the US on the water over the coming months. We continue to see the balance of risk favoring the upside for prices. We are raising our 2H20 Brent forecast $2/bbl to $46/bbl, and keeping our 2021 expectation at $65/bbl. WTI will trade ~ $3/bbl below those levels.   Feature OPEC continues to see a higher level of demand destruction in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic than BCA, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA). OPEC continues to see a higher level of demand destruction in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic than BCA, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA). The cartel’s economists are estimating global oil-demand destruction would be ~ 9mm b/d year-on-year (y/y) in 2020. In their August projections, the EIA’s and IEA’s expectations for demand destruction are closer to ours at ~ 8mm b/d for this year. In the past, we focused more on OPEC’s output estimates for members of the cartel, particularly for its leader and top producer, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). In this month’s report, and in subsequent reports, we are incorporating OPEC’s demand estimates as a direct input to our price-forecasting models. For 2020, we are giving it an equal weight to the apparent consensus we share with the EIA and IEA. Chart of the WeekActual Oil Demand Continues Strong Recovery The immediate effect of this will be to temper the effect of the stronger demand growth expectations we share with the EIA and IEA in this year’s price forecast, which will put us at $46/bbl on average for 2H20.1 The improvement in actual demand is apparent in our base case model up to July, as seen in the Chart of the Week. Much of this recovery is the result of the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus deployed globally by governments and central banks, which will continue to support the demand this year and next.2 This stimulus also is visible in global trade data – particularly in EM imports, which we follow closely, given their high sensitivity to changes in income (GDP). Our modeling indicates this recovery will continue to year-end (Chart 2). Chart 2EM Imports Recovery Likely Continues Weaker USD Will Support Oil-Demand Recovery Speculators have crowded into the short-dollar trade, which augurs for a near-term correction in the USD DXY futures. We expect the USD to continue to weaken on the back of the Fed’s aggressive monetary accommodation, in line with our Global Investment and FX strategists.3 This will support the continued rally in crude oil prices we expect for the balance of this year and next. There are a number of short-term risks to our bearish USD view, however. These are mainly due to the marginal improvement of the US economy vis-à-vis Europe, which is evident in the manufacturing and services PMIs (Chart 3). Improving mobility data, which is coincident with the decline in its number of COVID-19 cases vs Europe, also is supportive of the USD (Chart 4). In the trading markets, speculators have crowded into the short-dollar trade, which augurs for a near-term correction in the USD DXY futures. Close to 60% of the DXY index is accounted for by the Euro (Chart 5). Lastly, while global economic policy uncertainty has fallen from its recent peak, taking the USD lower with it, it still is elevated and continues to represent a risk to the USD bear market (Chart 6). Chart 3USD Bear Market Could Stall All else equal, a weakening USD will continue to support Brent prices, and with that the rest of the global oil complex. As long as EM growth continues to improve, these short-term USD effects discussed above will affect the DXY more than the broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) for the USD, which has a Euro weight of 18% and is a more representative gauge of USD strength vis-à-vis trade. Chart 4DXY Could Rally Briefly As US Recovers Chart 5Specs Have Crowded Into The Short USD Trade Chart 6A Weaker USD Will Boost Oil Prices OPEC 2.0 Discipline, Capital Markets Will Restrain Supply While we expect some of this US production to come back on line as prices improve, overall output in the shales likely will continue to fall until 2H21. OPEC 2.0 production discipline largely is responsible for the 6.1mm b/d y/y decline in global oil production we estimate. The producer coalition’s putative leaders – KSA and Russia – continue to lead by example, having removed 460k b/d and 900k b/d y/y, respectively, from the market (Chart 7, top panel). We expect this to continue into next year (Table 1). Outside OPEC 2.0, US oil production is estimated to have fallen ~ 2mm b/d from its peak of 12.9mm b/d in 4Q19, in line with our expectation. This is largely the result of significantly reduced shale-oil output (Chart 7, bottom panel). While we expect some of this US production to come back on line as prices improve, overall output in the shales likely will continue to fall until 2H21. Chart 7OPEC 2.0, US Shales Output Will Remain Constrained Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) We continue to expect the combination of sustained demand growth and constrained supply to tighten balances globally, producing a physical deficit this year and next (Chart 8). As before, we expect this physical deficit to translate into lower inventories in the OECD, as refiners are forced to draw down stocks to meet demand (Chart 9). Chart 8Supply-Demand Balances Continue To Tighten Chart 9Expect OECD Inventories To Draw Asia’s Floating Storage Set To Increase Additional imports of US crude by China threaten to increase floating storage levels in Asia, which likely will reduce Chinese demand for light-sweet barrels sourced ex-US, and reverse the tightening in Brent and WTI forward curves. The inventory draw in the US – the largest component of OECD crude inventories – could accelerate if China follows through on its planned increase in imports of US crude oil, consistent with reports oil companies there recently chartered 19 VLCCs.4 This apparently was done to comply with the Phase 1 trade deal China and the US negotiated earlier this year. While these imports of US crude into China will lower US inventories – most of the tankers are shipping from the US Gulf – they could add to the swollen floating storage levels currently clogging Chinese harbors, and reduce demand for additional crude until these stocks are absorbed either by refinery demand or strategic reserves (Chart 10). In this context, we also are watching the evolution of forward curves, particularly for Brent, as this surge in Chinese imports could back out other light-sweet crudes similar to those produced in the US – and similar to Brent, for that matter – leaving them distressed on the water looking for a home. There already is early evidence the Brent forward curve’s flattening and expected return to backwardation has stalled (Chart 11). Given this pause in the tightening of the forward curve over the next year, we are closing our 4Q20 backwardation trades at tonight’s close. Chart 10China’s US Crude Imports Will Swell Asia’s Floating Storage Chart 11Brent Forward Curves Weaken Over the Next 12 Months Bottom Line: Global crude oil markets continue to tighten, as demand recovers, and supply discipline remains intact. However, additional imports of US crude by China threaten to increase floating storage levels in Asia, which likely will reduce Chinese demand for light-sweet barrels sourced ex-US, and reverse the tightening in Brent and WTI forward curves. This is prompting us to exit our 4Q20 backwardation trades at tonight’s close. The balance of price risks continues to favor the upside, in our estimation. We are raising our 2H20 Brent forecast slightly by $2/bbl to $46/bbl, and keeping our 2021 expectation at $65/bbl. WTI will trade ~ $3/bbl below those levels (Chart 12). Chart 12BCA Oil Price Trajectory Unchanged   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight US natgas prices were up this week as Hurricane Marco and Laura approached the Gulf of Mexico (GoM). Oil and gas producers evacuated part of their offshore facilities and shut 61% of their natural gas production from the region. Cheniere reported it suspended operation at its Sabine Pass LNG export terminal located in the GoM. Still, abundant oil and gas storage in the US limits the price increase. Separately, the latest estimate of US LNG cargo cancellations for October delivery – down to only 10 cancelled vessels – confirms natgas price spreads relative to Asia have reached levels sufficient to incentivize additional exports of US gas, supporting Henry Hub prices (Chart 13). Base Metals: Neutral Copper theft is rising in Chile and Africa, boosting LME copper prices and pushing treatment and refining charges lower. In Chile, “About 40 incidents were reported in the first half of this year, up from six in 2014,” according to mining-journal.com. Falling spot supplies in the wake of COVID-19 mining restrictions likely explain the thefts and increases in the cash-to-three-month copper spread on the LME to $17.25/MT earlier this week. Precious Metals: Neutral We closed our long gold recommendation for a 20% profit after reaching our $1,950/oz stop loss on August 11. We remain positive on gold strategically based on our view the dollar will continue depreciating and the Fed will keep rates low even as inflation and inflation expectations move up. As we go to press, markets await Jerome Powell’s speech at the annual Jackson Hole summit, where he is expected to discuss the Fed’s strategic review of its monetary policy strategy. This could push inflation breakevens slightly higher, and real yields lower. We are recommending a buy order at $1,875/oz as spec positioning remains stretch (Chart 14). Ags/Softs:  Underweight The USDA reported 69% of the US soybean crop was rated in good to excellent condition this week, up sharply from last year’s level of 55%. However, this was down from last week’s level of 72%, which was supportive of prices. Separately, the Sino-US Phase 1 trade deal is back in the news this week, with reports the two countries agreed to resume shipments of soybeans on a record scale – in the range of 40mm tons for 2020, which would be 10% above record purchases by China set in 2016, according to bloomberg.com. China had turned to Brazil earlier in the year as the trade deal became mired in tit-for-tat tariff spats. Chart 13Natgas Prices Supported By Hurricane Laura Chart 14Gold Vs. USD Spec Positioning Stretched   Footnotes 1     We also reduced the pass-through of the supply-demand difference into the oil price forecast in this month’s report, based on recent research we’ve completed, which also tempers the impact of the stronger growth expectations we share with the EIA and IEA. 2     Please see Low Vol, High Uncertainty Keeps Oil-Price Rally On Tenterhooks published June 18, 2020, for additional discussion of global fiscal and monetary stimulus vis-à-vis oil markets. 3    Please see The Dollar And The Budget Deficit: From Theory To Practice, a Special Report published by BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy on August 14, 2020.  It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4    In July and August, China imported ~ 17mm barrels of US crude, according to S&P Global Platts.  Please see Crude moves higher amid China's US import boost ahead of key OPEC meet published by Platts August 17, 2020.  China reportedly charted 19 VLCCs to import ~ 37mm barrels of US crude beginning in August, according to worldoil.com.  Please see China charters 19 tankers for record U.S. crude oil shipment published August 21, 2020.    Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights A weak dollar and low bond yields have pushed up the S&P 500 more than anticipated. Cyclical forces favor loftier stock prices in 12 months. Froth creates short-term vulnerabilities that higher yields could catalyze. The lack of yield curve control along with an improving economic outlook and a decline in deflationary risks indicate that Treasury yields will move toward 1% in the coming months. Long-term investors should begin to add small-cap stocks to their core US holdings. Feature The S&P 500 recent all-time high flies in the face of a long list of tactical indicators that flag an elevated risk of correction. The strength of the US equity market is a testament to the power of policy stimulus, the perceived invincibility of tech titans and the hopes that the powerful economic recovery will continue. Although equities will climb in the coming year, a move up in yields should transfer the leadership from tech and growth stocks to value and traditional cyclicals. While these shifts usually do not spell the end of bull runs, often they generate periods of elevated volatility, especially when the displaced leaders account for 40% of market capitalization. Small-cap stocks look increasingly attractive. A Post Mortem We have been cyclically bullish since late March,1 but on June 25th we warned that the S&P 500 would churn between 2800 and 3200 for the rest of the summer.2 This view did not materialize for several reasons. We underestimated the impact of a weak dollar, which has given a second life to the equity bull market. When expressed in euros, the S&P 500 has been flat since June 5 (Chart I-1). Relative to gold, the S&P 500 is down by 9% since June 8, which further highlights how equities have been supported by a weak US currency and a plentiful money supply. Meanwhile, the S&P 500 has outperformed the EURO STOXX 50 by 7.8% since June 5; however, when we factor in the effect of the strong euro, US equities have steadily underperformed the Eurozone benchmark since early May (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Low bond yields have also buttressed US equities. Near-zero interest rates have allowed the valuation of growth stocks to hit extraordinary levels. The NASDAQ trades at 32-times 2020 earnings and 27-times 2021 EPS. The S&P tech is valued at 29-times 2020 EPS and 25-times next year’s profits. In the most extreme cases, the five tech stocks that have accounted for 31.7% of market gains since March 23 (Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet and Facebook) trade on average at 40-times 2020 EPS and 32-times 2021 earnings. Low bond yields have also buttressed US equities. Importantly, COVID-19 has had a positive influence on these same tech stocks. According to our European Investment Strategy colleagues, while spending on restaurant, entertainment and retail collapsed during the pandemic, outlays surged on Amazon, Apple products, Netflix subscriptions, etc.3 At the apex of the crisis, online retail sales expanded by 26.3% annually in the US, while bricks-and-mortar sales contracted by an unprecedented -17.7%. Meanwhile, global shipments of personal computers and servers are expanding by 11.2% and 21.5% annually, respectively (Chart I-2, top panel). Therefore, the largest sector of the S&P 500 is outperforming relative to the rest of the market (Chat I-2, bottom panel). As long as investors continue to expect COVID-19 to affect consumer behavior, they will pay a premium for tech stocks that benefit from the pandemic. Chart I-1The Weak Dollar Is Fueling The Recent Rally Chart I-2Earnings Have Supported Tech Stocks   Can Stocks Remain Unscathed? The outlook for stocks is positive, but near-term risks have not dissipated because short-term market conditions remain frothy. Watch for higher bond yields as the force to concretize the tactical risks. The following cyclical forces continue to act as crucial tailwinds for equities: The equity risk premium (ERP) remains low. Computations of ERP must factor in the expected expansion of earnings. To incorporate this alteration, we assume that long-term cash flows will grow in line with potential nominal GDP growth. However, we must also consider the absence of stability of the ERP’s mean. After this adjustment, the ERP is still consistent with significant additional gains for the S&P 500 (Chart I-3). Monetary policy is extraordinarily accommodative. Even when we account for the S&P 500’s elevated multiples, the exceptional jump in the BCA Monetary Indicator is large enough to push up equity prices (Chart I-4). Moreover, the strength of US housing activity indicators confirms that the Federal Reserve has pulled the right levers to boost domestic economic activity. For example, the NAHB Housing Market Index has reached a 22-year record, building permits in July grew at their fastest monthly rate in 30 years, and the Mortgage Applications Index for purchases rocketed to a 11-year high in August. Chart I-3A Low ERP Underpins Equities... Chart I-4...So Does Monetary Policy   The US economy continues to heal. For stocks to climb further on a cyclical basis, the market will need more than five tech giants leading the charge. Hence, earnings expectations for the rest of the market must also mount. Practically, the economy must recover its output loss and the pandemic must ebb. For now, the four-week moving average of initial unemployment claims is drifting lower, and the ISM New Orders-to-Inventories spread is consistent with a faster and more solid business cycle upswing. The ERP is still consistent with significant additional gains for the S&P 500. The global industrial sector outlook is brightening. Manufacturing and trade disproportionately contribute to fluctuations in global economic activity, therefore, they exert an outsized influence on the earnings of non-tech multinationals. The strength in Singapore’s electronics shipments indicates that our Global Industrial Activity Nowcast will accelerate (Chart I-5, top panel). Moreover, the rapid expansion in China’s credit flows points to a marked increase in Chinese imports, which will help industrial and commodity exporters around the world (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Core producer prices have bottomed. Core producer prices are a direct input in the corporate sector’s pricing power. A trough in this inflation gauge leads to stronger EPS and widening profit margins for the S&P 500 (Chart I-6). Chart I-5The Global Industrial Cycle Is Turning The Corner Chart I-6Easing Deflationary Pressures Will Help Profits   Investors should still wait to allocate new funds to the stock market. The stock market’s near-term outlook remains marked by short-term froth that dampens our cyclical optimism, especially because the market advance has been concentrated in a small group of equities. Chart I-7Tactical Froth The Exposure Index of the National Association of Active Investment Managers has hit 100.1 (Chart I-7). Such a lofty reading indicates that the price of stocks already incorporates optimistic expectations. From a contrarian perspective, this development boosts the probability that swing traders will face disappointments in the near future and will sell their equity holdings. Similarly, the put/call ratio is near a 10-year low, which confirms that traders have bought a lot of upside exposure to stocks without much protection against a pullback. This level of confidence is often a precursor to a significant correction. Finally, our Tactical Strength Indicator is 1.7-sigma above its mean. Historically, when this risk gauge has hit a reading above 1.3, there is a good probability that the S&P 500 will correct or move sideways (Chart I-8). A catalyst must emerge for those aforementioned vulnerabilities to morph into a correction. If Treasury yields move closer to 1%, then stocks will experience a significant pullback of 10% or more as the market rotates away from the leadership of growth stocks. This risk would be especially salient if real yields move up. As Chart I-9 illustrates, falling TIPS yields have been a pillar of the powerful rally of growth stocks. Moreover, low real yields are arithmetically necessary to justify the current level of market multiples exhibited by the S&P 500 (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Chart I-8The S&P 500 Is Vulnerable To A Correction Chart I-9Falling Real Yields Have Helped Growth Stocks   Growth and high-P/E ratio stocks are heavily represented in the tech and healthcare sectors, which together account for 42% of the S&P 500. This means that higher yields will likely temporarily drag down the entire market. Ultimately, leadership changes are painful events, but they rarely mark the end of bull markets. Can Yields Move Up? Chart I-10Positive Signs For Inflation It is time to tweak our bond market view because yields should soon move higher. For the past five months, we have written that yields offer minimal downside and that their asymmetric risk profile made government bonds an unappealing investment. We underweighted this asset class relative to stocks and recommended investors bet on higher inflation breakeven rates. However, forces are aligning to expect real rates to rise and thus, nominal yields should move up. The sequencing of the market’s response to QE increasingly favors lower bond prices. Our US Equity Strategy team recently highlighted that in 2009 stocks were the first asset to reflect the implementation of QE1 by the Fed.4 A weaker dollar followed. Bond yields started to perk up only after the USD deteriorated by enough, after stock prices had climbed by enough and after corporate spreads had narrowed by enough to ease financial conditions to stimulate the economy. So far, 2020 echoes the 2009 pattern and our Financial Conditions Index is more stimulatory than it was prior to the COVID-19 outbreak (see Chart III-36 in Section III). Chart I-11Commodities Point To Higher Yields... Inflation momentum confirms the risks to bonds. The apex of the deflationary shock has already passed. In July, core CPI excluding shelter rose by 0.84% month-on-month, which was the highest reading since 1981 when the Fed was combating the most violent inflation outbreak in generations. The upturn in core producer prices also warns that the annual inflation rate of core CPI should accelerate meaningfully by early 2021 (Chart I-10). The dollar’s weakness is another inflationary force. Import prices from China have already bottomed, which points to an escalation in goods inflation in the coming months. Firming commodity prices constitute another risk for yields. Our Commodities Advance/Decline line has recently broken out. This technical development is consistent with higher commodity prices and higher bond yields (Chart I-11). Rallying natural resources are inflationary, but they also indicate that the global economy is strengthening, which should put upward pressure on real interest rates. Strength in the housing sector also confirms that government bond yields have upside. As we highlighted above, a robust housing market is an important validation that monetary policy is very accommodative. By definition, the objective of loose policy is to boost future economic activity and eradicate deflationary pressures. The surge in lumber indicates bond prices are showing downside risk (Chart I-12). Additionally, the upswing in mortgage issuance is occurring as the Treasury and corporations boost their borrowings, which will generate more demand to use savings generated in the economy. The price of those savings will be higher real interest rates. Chart I-12...Especially Lumber The ebbing of COVID-19 also suggests that economic activity has scope to accelerate. Moreover, the House of Representatives reconvened to address the problems plaguing the US Postal Service ahead of the November elections. This early return to work gives Washington another opportunity to negotiate the stimulus bill that it failed to pass earlier this month. We still expect such a bill to ultimately become law because both Democrats and Republicans have too much to lose in November if the economy relapses in response of political paralysis. Declining infections and increased government support will bolster aggregate demand and put upward pressure on rates. The stock market’s near-term outlook remains marked by short-term froth that dampens our cyclical optimism. Market dynamics are also very negative for bonds. Our Valuation Index highlights that Treasurys are incredibly expensive (Chart I-13, top panel). Moreover, our Composite Technical Indicator remains overbought, though it has lost momentum. In this context, the lack of appetite for yield curve control or more QE demonstrated by the Federal Open Market Committee creates a genuine danger for bonds. Without these policies, bond yields will have trouble resisting the upward push created by our rising US Pipeline Inflation Pressures Index, our rebounding Nominal Cyclical Spending proxy (which is an average of the ISM Manufacturing headline index and Prices Paid component), and the uptick in the amount of liquidity sitting on commercial banks’ balance sheets (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Treasurys Are Expensive And Losing Momentum Chart I-14Building Cyclical Risks For Bonds   Thus, equities are at risk on a tactical basis because we anticipate that 10-year Treasury yields may climb towards 1%, including a rise in TIPS yields. The US election creates an additional near-term hurdle for stocks. As we wrote last month, President Trump will likely become more belligerent toward the US’s trading partners in the coming months. Moreover, Vice-President Joe Biden, who has a comfortable lead in the polls including in key swing states such as Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin wants to cancel half of the 2017 tax cuts.5  Small Over Big Long-term investors should expect stocks to beat bonds on a 5- to 10-year horizon, but equities will generate paltry real returns compared with the past 40 years. Elevated valuations for US equities are consistent with long-term annualized real rates of return of only 0.5% (Chart I-15). Moreover, the long-term outlook for profit margins is poor. As we wrote three months ago, mounting populism will result in redistributive policies that will lift the share of wages relative to GDP.6 Moreover, the shift of the US population to the left on economic matters will push up corporate tax rates. Increased labor costs and corporate taxes are negative for profit margins. If profit margins normalize, then equities will probably underperform the uninspiring expected returns implied by current market multiples. The surge in lumber indicates bond prices are showing downside risk. Investors can still generate generous returns through geographical and sectoral selection. We have highlighted how value stocks, industrials and materials, and EM and European equities will likely beat US equities.7 This month we will explore how US small-cap equities are also well placed to best the dismal projected real returns offered by their large-cap counterparts. Our BCA Relative Technical Indicator shows that small-cap stocks are 1.8-sigma oversold when compared with the S&P 500, which indicates a capitulation among investors toward these equities. The bifurcation is even greater if we compare small-cap equities with the S&P 100’s mega-caps that have driven up the US market in recent years. Incorporating these influences, our Cyclical Capitalization Indicator has moved in favor of small-cap stocks, which suggests that small-cap stocks will be rerated if the yield curve can steepen further (Chart I-16). Equities are at risk on a tactical basis because we anticipate that 10-year Treasury yields may climb towards 1%. Chart I-15Valuations And Profit Margins Threaten Long-Term Stock Returns Chart I-16Indicators Favor Small Cap Stocks Chart I-17A Debt Turnaround Would Help Small Cap Stocks Debt dynamics could also increasingly beneficial to small-cap equities. In the past few years, the heavy debt-to-EBITDA of smaller firms created a major headwind for small-cap investors. The indebtedness of small-cap stocks often decreases relative to large-caps when an economic recovery begins. This shift in leverage portends an increase in small-caps’ relative future returns (Chart I-17). Our negative bias toward the dollar and our positive view on commodities also benefit small-cap stocks. Since the early 1990s, increasing real commodity prices and a falling Dollar Index have coexisted with a robust performance of small-cap firms (Chart I-18). The negative US balance-of-payment dynamics, coupled with escalating inflation risks, will continue to weigh on the dollar, especially as various large EM nations try to diversify their reserves and payment systems away from the dollar.8 Meanwhile, a declining dollar, expanding global growth, monetary debasement, populism, inflation and a lack of investment in supply, all will accentuate the appeal of natural resources. The sectoral bias of small-cap indices will capitalize on these trends. Chart I-18Small Is Beautiful Chart I-19Small Cap Stocks Like Higher Yields   Finally, cyclical timing is also moving in favor of small-cap firms. Since 2014, the Russell 2000 has outperformed the S&P 500 when real yields moved higher (Chart I-19). Small-cap firms display a more marked pro-cyclicality than large firms. Additionally, the S&P 500 growth bias implies that the US large-cap benchmark underperforms the small cap indices when real yields increase.   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst August 27, 2020 Next Report: September 24, 2020   II. Global Semiconductor Stocks: A Hiatus Is Overdue In A Structural Bull Market The strength in global semiconductor sales in recent months has been due to one-off factors stemming from pandemic-related lockdowns. As the one-off demand surge subsides, global semiconductor sales will decline modestly toward the end of this year. In the near term, global semiconductor stock prices are vulnerable due to overbought conditions, excessive valuations and demand disappointment. The global semiconductor industry is at the epicenter of the US-China confrontation, and more US restrictions on chips sales to China are probable. This is another risk for this sector's share prices.   Nevertheless, the structural outlook for global semiconductor demand is constructive. Its CAGR may rise from 3% during 2014-2019 to 5% during 2020-2024.  Investor euphoria has taken hold of semiconductor stocks. Global semiconductor stock prices have skyrocketed by 68% from March lows and 96% from December 2018 lows. Meanwhile, global semiconductor sales during March-June rose only by 5% from a year ago. As a result, the ratio of market cap for global semiconductor stocks relative to global semiconductor sales has reached its highest level since at least the inception of data in 2003 (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Global Semi Sector: Market Cap-To-Sales Ratio Has Surged With semi equity multiples very elevated, their share prices have become even more sensitive to global semiconductor demand growth. Hence, the focus of this report is to try to gauge the strength of global semiconductor demand, both in the near term and structurally. The strength in global semiconductor sales in recent months has been due to one-off factors stemming from the lockdowns. Near-term semiconductor stock prices could disappoint due to weak chip demand from the smartphone sector and diminishing purchases of personal computers (PCs) and servers. However, structurally, we are positive on global semiconductor demand, which is underpinned by the continuing rollout of 5G networks and phones, a wider adoption of data centers, and further technological advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, edge computing and smaller nodes for chip manufacturing (Box II-1). Box II-1 Key Technologies Underpinning Potential Global Semiconductor Demand AI refers to the simulation of human intelligence in machines, for example, computers that play chess and self-driving cars. The goals of AI include learning, reasoning and perception. Cloud computing is the delivery of computing services – including servers, storage, databases, networking, software, analytics and intelligence – over the Internet (“the cloud”) to offer faster innovation, flexible resources and economies of scale. Edge computing is a form of distributed computing, which brings computation and data storage closer to where it is needed, to improve response times and save bandwidth. Technology node refers to the width of line that can be processed with a minimum width in the semiconductor manufacturing industry, such as technology nodes of 10 nanometers (nm), 7nm, 5nm and 3nm. The smaller the nodes are, the more advanced they are. Near-Term Headwinds Semiconductor demand worldwide grew by 6% year-on-year in the first half of this year. There has been a remarkable divergence between world semiconductor sales and the global business cycle (Chart II-2). The divergence between semiconductor sales and economic activity was most striking in the US and China. Semiconductor sales in China rose by 5% year-on-year in Q12020, and in the US they grew by 29% year-on-year in Q22020, despite a contraction in their aggregate demand during the same period. By contrast, Q2 annual growth of semiconductors sales was -2.2% for Japan, -17% for Europe and 1.8% for Asia ex. China and Japan (Chart II-3). Chart II-2World Semi Sales Diverged From The Global Business Cycle Chart II-3Strong Semi Sales In The US And China, But Not Elsewhere   The reasons why the US and China posted a surge in semiconductor demand while Europe and Japan experienced a contraction in domestic semiconductor sales are as follows: Most data center investment is occurring in the US and China. Chart II-4 shows that 40% of global hyperscale data centers are operating in the US, much larger than any other countries/regions. China, in turn, ranked second, with a global share of 8%. Chart II-4The US Has The Most Global Hyperscale Data Centers Demand contraction in Europe and Japan is due to semiconductor demand in these regions mainly originating from the automobile sector, where production was severely hit by the global pandemic. About 37% of European semiconductor sales were from last year’s automotive market. We believe the divergence between global economic activity and semiconductor sales, as demonstrated by Chart II-2 on page 3, has been due to one-off factors, as the global pandemic lockdowns have spurred semiconductor demand. Such a one-off demand boost will likely dissipate in the coming months. Traditional PCs and tablets: There has been a surge in demand for traditional PCs9 and tablets in the past six months. This was due to the significant increase in online activities, such as working from home, education, e-commerce, gaming and entertainment. Data from the International Data Corporation (IDC) has revealed that shipments of traditional PCs and tablets in volume terms had a strong year-on-year growth of 11.2% and 18.6%, respectively, in the period of April-June (Chart II-5). Looking forward, even renewed lockdowns will not lead to a similar rush to buy these products. Many households are already equipped to work from home and for other online activities. With many countries gradually opening their economies, such demand will diminish. The traditional PC and tablet sectors together account for about 13% of global chip demand (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Personal Computers Sales Have Surged Amid Lockdowns Server demand: Another major semiconductor demand contribution in Q2020 was from the server sector, which spiked by 21% year-on-year (Chart II-7). The surge in online activities triggered a strong demand for cloud services and remote work applications, both of which require computer servers to run on. Chart II-6The Breakdown Of Global Semiconductor Sales By Type Of Usage However, demand from the server sector is also set to diminish in 2H2020 and Q1 2021. Provided the inventories at major data center operators, including Microsoft, Google and Amazon, remain at high levels,10 global cloud service providers will likely reduce their orders of servers next quarter.11  Enterprises will also likely cut their investment in computer servers in 2H2020, as many of them had already increased their purchases of servers to prepare employees and business processes for remote working. We expect global server demand growth to soften in 2H2020. The Digitimes Research forecasted a 5.6% quarter-on-quarter contraction in 3Q2020 and a further cut in global sever shipment in the 4Q2020.10 The global server sector accounts for about 10% of global chip demand and, together with PCs and tablets, they make for 23% (please refer to Chart II-6 on page 5). Further, the smartphone sector – accounting for 27% of global semiconductor demand – will continue struggling in H2 this year. Chart II-7Server Sales Have Surged Amid Lockdowns Chart II-8Global Smartphone Shipments Will Likely Remain Weak In 2020H2   The global total smartphone demand has been hit severely, as households delayed their new smartphone purchases. According to Canalys’ data, global smartphone shipments dropped by 13% and 14% year-on-year in Q1 and Q2, respectively. We expect smartphone shipments to continue contracting over the next three-to-six months (Chart II-8). We believe global consumers will remain cautious in their spending on discretionary goods, such as smartphones, due to lowered incomes and increased job uncertainty. The IDC also forecasted that global smartphone shipments would not grow until 1Q2021.12 The Chinese smartphone sales showed a considerable weakness in July, with a 35% year-on-year contraction, which is much deeper than the 20% decline in H1 this year. 5G smartphone shipments also slowed last month, with a 21% drop from the previous month. The global semiconductor industry is at the epicenter of the US-China confrontation. Bottom Line: The strength in global semiconductor sales in recent months has been due to one-off factors stemming from the lockdowns. As this one-off demand subsides, global semiconductor sales will decline modestly toward the end of this year. Given the overbought conditions and the elevated equity valuations, global semiconductor stocks are currently vulnerable to near-term disappointments in semiconductor demand. At The Epicenter Of The US-China Rivalry Semiconductors are at the epicenter of the US-China confrontation. Ultimately, the US-China contention is about future technological dominance. That is access to technology and the capability to develop new technologies. China currently accounts for about 35% of the global semiconductor demand. US restrictions on semi producers worldwide to supply semiconductors to Chinese buyers constitute a major risk to semiconductor stock prices. On August 17, the US announced fresh sanctions that restrict all US and foreign semiconductor companies from selling chips developed or produced using US software or technology to Huawei, without first obtaining a license. In May, the US had already limited companies, such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), from making and supplying Huawei with its self-designed chips. In addition, the US recently threatened bans on Chinese-owned apps TikTok and WeChat, and signaled that it could soon restrict Alibaba’s operations in the US. Chart II-9Global Semi Companies' Sales To China Are Substantial The global semiconductor sector is highly vulnerable to further escalation in the tension between these two superpowers. Major global semiconductor companies’ sales are heavily exposed to China, and their revenue from China ranges from 16% to 50% of total (Chart II-9). We have been puzzled why global semi share prices have been rallying in spite of US limitations on semiconductor shipments to Huawei and its affiliated entities. One explanation could be that the Chinese companies that are not affiliated with Huawei are able to import semiconductors and then supply them to Huawei. If this is true, the US will have no other choice but to limit all semiconductor sales to China. This will be devastating for global semi producers given their large exposure to China. In anticipation of US punitive policies limiting its access to semiconductors, China had boosted its semiconductor imports over the past 12 months (Chart II-10, top panel). Chinese imports of integrated circuits rose by 12% year-on-year in 1H2020, which is much higher than the 5% year-on-year increase in Chinese semiconductor demand during the same period (Chart II-10, bottom panel). This gap suggests the country had restocked its semiconductor inventories. China has particularly restocked its imports of non-memory chips with imports of processor & controller and other non-memory chips in H1, surging by 30% and 20%, respectively, in US dollar terms (Chart II-11). For memory chips, the contraction in Chinese imports was mainly due to a decline in global memory chip prices. Chart II-10China Had Likely Restocked Its Semi Inventories Chart II-11Strong Chinese Imports In Non-Memory Chips   Bottom Line: The global semiconductor industry is at the epicenter of the US-China confrontation, and more restrictions on sales to China are probable. In turn, the restocked semiconductor inventory in China raises the odds of weakening mainland semiconductor import demand in H2 of this year. Structural Tailwinds Table II-1Global Semiconductor Demand CAGR Forecast Over 2020-2024 By Device We are optimistic on structural global semiconductor demand. Its nominal CAGR may rise from 3% during 2014-2019 to 5% during 2020-2024 in US dollar terms. Table II-1 shows our demand growth forecasts for global chips in the main consuming sectors over the next five years. The major contributing sectors during 2020-2024 will be 5G smartphones, servers, industrials, electronics and automotive manufacturing. The underlying driving forces are the continuing rollout of 5G networks and phones, the development of data centers, and further technological advancements in AI, cloud computing and edge computing. Currently, the world is still in the early stages of 5G network development. AI, cloud computing and edge computing are constantly evolving. With increasing adoption of 5G smartphones, computer servers and IoT devices, global semiconductor demand is in a structural uptrend (Box II-2). Box II-2 Key Components For The Virtual World In Development Data centers and cloud computing allow data to be stored and applications to be running off-premises and to be accessed remotely through the internet. Edge computing allows data from Internet of things (IoT) devices to be analyzed at the edge of the network before being sent to a data center or cloud. IoT devices contain sensors and mini-computer processors that act on the data collected by the sensors via machine learning. The IoT is a growing system of billions of devices — or things — worldwide that connect to the internet and to each other through wireless networks. AI technology empowers cloud computing, edge computing and IoT devices. 5G is at the heart of the IoT industry transformation, making a world of everything connected possible. Chart II-125G Phone Shipments In China Will Continue To Rise 5G Smartphone Currently, China is the world’s largest 5G-smartphone consumer and the leading 5G-adopter in the world. According to Digitimes Research, global 5G smartphone shipments will reach over 250 million units in 2020, with 170 million (68%) in China and only 80 million units in the world ex. China. Looking forward, 5G smartphone shipments are set to accelerate worldwide over the coming years. The 5G phone shipments in China will continue to rise. The 5G phone sales penetration rate in China is likely to rise from 60% in July to 95% by the end of 2022. In such a case, we estimate that the monthly Chinese 5G phone shipments will increase from the current 16 million units to about 25-30 million units in 2022 (Chart II-12). In the rest of the world, the 5G smartphone adoption pace will also likely speed up over the next five years. The 5G phone selling prices in the world outside China will drop, as more models are introduced and become more affordable. 5G smartphone prices have already fallen in China and will inevitably fall elsewhere. Chinese 5G smartphone producers will ship their low-priced 5G phones overseas, putting pressure on other producers to lower their prices. The 5G infrastructure development is accelerating in China and will accelerate in the rest of the world. Both China and South Korea have been very aggressive in their respective 5G network development. As of the end of June, China's top three carriers: China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom – which together serve more than 1.6 billion mobile users in the country – had installed 400,000 5G base stations against an annual target of 500,000. In comparison, as of April 2020, American carriers had only put up about 10,000 5G base stations.13  As the US is competing with China on the 5G front, the country will likely boost its investment in 5G network development aggressively over the next five years in order to catch up to, or even exceed, China. Importantly, the 5G smartphone has more silicon content than 4G smartphones. More silicon content means higher semiconductor value. Rising 5G smartphone sales and higher silicon content together will more than offset the loss in semiconductor sales due to falling global 4G smartphone shipments. Overall, global semiconductor stock prices have diverged from their sales and profits. Based on our analysis, we expect a CAGR growth of 4% in semiconductor demand from the global smartphone sector over the next five years, slightly lower than the 5% in previous five years (Table II-1 on page 10). This also takes into consideration that the 5G network will be more difficult and more expensive to develop than the 4G network. Servers Global server shipment growth will be highly dependent on both the pace and the scale of data center development (Box II-3). Data centers account for over 60% of global server demand.  Box II-3 Data Centers There are four main types of data centers – enterprise data centers, managed services data centers, colocation data centers, and cloud data centers. Data centers can have a wide range of number of servers. Corporate data centers tend to have either 200 (small companies), or 1000 servers (large companies). In comparison, a hyperscale data center usually has a minimum of 5,000 servers linked with an ultra-high speed, high fiber count network. Outsourcing and a move towards the cloud are driving the growth of the hyperscale data center. Instead of companies investing in physical hardware, they can rent server space from a cloud provider to both save their data and reduce costs. Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Apple and Alibaba are all top global cloud service providers. The more hyperscales to be built up, the higher the demand for servers. In 2019, about 13% of the total number of data centers in China were of the hyperscale and large-scale varieties. The plan of new infrastructure development announced earlier this year by Beijing was aiming to increase the number of hyperscale and large-scale data centers in China. Among current data centers either under construction or to be developed in the near future, 36% of them are hyperscale and large-scale data centers.   The future growth of data centers is promising. The global trend of data localization14 due to the concerns of data privacy and national security will also bolster a boom of data centers over the next five years. A growing number of countries are adopting data localization requirements, such as China, Russia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Vietnam and some EU countries. While the Chinese data center market is expected to expand by a CAGR of about 28% over 2020-2022,15 a report recently released by Technavio forecasted the global data center industry’s CAGR at over 17% during 2019-2023.  We forecast that the global semiconductor demand from servers will grow at a CAGR of 12% over 2020-2024. IoTs Technological advancements in AI, cloud computing and edge computing, in combination with 5G network development, will facilitate the IoTs adoption. According to the GSMA,16 46 operators in 24 markets had launched commercially available 5G networks by 30 January 2020. It forecasted that global IoT connections will be increased from 12 billion mobile devices in 2019 to 25 billion in 2025 with a CAGR at 13%.17   IoTs chips include the Artificial Intelligence of Things (AIoT) – a powerful convergence of AI and the IoT. IoTs is an interconnected network of physical devices. Every device in the IoT is capable of collecting and transferring data through the network. Looking forward, global demand of AI chips and IoT chips will have significant potential to grow with creation of “smarter manufacturing”, “smarter buildings”, “smarter cities”, etc. AI applications can be used in manufacturing processes to render them smarter and more automated. Productivity will be enhanced as machines achieve significantly improved uptime while also reducing labor costs. There are plenty of upsides in industrial semiconductor demand (Chart II-13). We expect the CAGR of industrial electronics to increase from 3.4% during 2014-2019 to 8% during 2020-2024. AI applications can create smart buildings by increasing connectivity across enterprise assets, enabling home network infrastructure (e.g., routers and extenders) and employing home-security devices (e.g., cameras, alarms and locks). AI applications can be used to create smart cities. A smart city is an urban area that uses different types of IoT electronic sensors to collect data. Insights gained from that data are used to manage assets, resources and services efficiently; in return, that data is used improve operations across the city. China has already developed about 750 trial sites of smart cities with different degrees of smartness in the past decade. As AI and 5G technology advances, the existing smart cities’ “smartness” will be upgraded and new trial smart cities will be implemented. Based on IDC data, China’s investment in smart cities will rise at a CAGR of 13.5% over 2020-2023 (Chart II-14). Globally, the U.S., Japan, European countries and other nations are also actively developing smart cities. According to a new study conducted by Grand View Research, the global smart cities market size is expected to grow at a CAGR of 24.7% from 2020 to 2027.18  Chart II-13Plenty Of Upside In Industrial Semi Demand Chart II-14China’s Investment In Smart Cities Will Continue To Grow   Automotive We expect the global automotive chip market to grow at a CAGR of 9% during 2020-2024, as in 2014-2019. The increase in consumption of semiconductors by the auto industry will continue to be driven by the market evolution toward autonomous, connected, electric and shared mobility. Most new vehicles now include some level of advanced driver assist systems (ADAS), such as adaptive cruise control, automatic brakes, blind spot monitoring, and parallel parking. The whole industry is progressing toward fully autonomous vehicles in the coming years. Increasing adoption of automotive chips and recovering car sales will revive automotive chip sales. In addition, rising penetration of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is beneficial to semiconductor sales, as NEVs contain higher semiconductor content than conventional vehicles. Conventional vehicles contain an average of a $330 value of semiconductor content while hybrid electric vehicles can contain up to $1,000 and $3,500 worth of semiconductors.19 Regarding other sectors, we are also positive on structural demand of storage and consumer electronics. AI applications generate vast volumes of data — about 80 exabytes per year, which is expected to increase by about tenfold to 845 exabytes by 2025.20 In addition, developers are now using more data in AI and deep learning (DL) training, which also increases storage requirements. With massive potential demand for storage, we estimate a CAGR of 7% over 2020-2024 (Table II-1 on page 10). A recent report from ABI Research predicts that the COVID-19 pandemic will increase global sales of wearables (such as a Fitbit or Apple Watch) by 29% to 30 million shipments of the devices this year. With contribution from wearables, we expect global semiconductor demand from the consumer sector to grow at a CAGR of 3% over 2020-2024, the same rate as in the previous five years. Bottom Line: Continuing rollout of 5G networks and phones, development of data centers, and further technological advancements in AI and cloud computing will provide tailwinds to structural global semiconductor demand, accelerating its CAGR growth from 3% during 2014-2019 to 5% during 2020-2024. Valuations And Investment Conclusions Most global semiconductor stocks are currently over-hyped. Critically, both DRAM and NAND prices have been deflating since January, reflecting weak demand for memory chips. Yet, share prices of memory producers have rallied (Chart II-15). Overall, global semiconductor stock prices have diverged from their sales and profits (Chart II-16). Chart II-15Falling Memory Prices Pose Risk To Memory Stocks Chart II-16Global Semiconductor Stocks Have Deviated From Profits   Consequently, the multiples of semiconductor stocks have spiked to multi-year highs (Chart II-17).  Even after adjusting for negative US real bond yields, valuations of semiconductor stocks are not cheap. Chart II-18 illustrates the equity risk premium for global semiconductor stocks is at the lower end of its range of the past 10 years. The ERP is calculated as forward earnings yield minus 10-year US TIPS yields. Chart II-17Global Semi Stocks: Elevated Valuations Chart II-18Equity Risk Premium For Global Semi Stocks Is Historically Low   It is impossible to time a correction or know what the trigger would be (US-China tensions have been our best guess). Nevertheless, we do not recommend chasing semiconductor stocks higher due to their overstretched technicals and valuations on the one hand and potential weakening demand in H2 on the other. In addition, the ratio of global semi equipment stock prices relative to the semi equity index correlates with absolute share prices of global semi companies. This is because equipment producers are higher-beta as they outperform during growth accelerations and underperform during growth slumps. The basis is that semi manufacturers have to purchase equipment if there is actual strong demand coming up and vice versa. The recent underperformance by global semi equipment stocks relative to the semi equity index might be an early sign of a potential reversal in semi share prices in absolute terms (Chart II-19). Chart II-19A Signal Of A Potential Reversal In Semi Share Prices Meanwhile, we believe the subsector- memory chip stocks - will outperform the overall semiconductor index amidst the potential correction, because they have lagged and are less over-extended. Finally, we remain neutral on Taiwanese and Korean bourses within the EM equity space for now. Escalation in US-China confrontation, as well as their exposure to semiconductors, put these bourses at near-term risk. That said, we are reluctant to underweight these markets because fundamentals in EM outside North Asia remain challenging.   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy III. Indicators And Reference Charts We continue to favor stocks at the expense of bonds, but equities are increasingly vulnerable because short-term sentiment and positioning measures are growing increasingly stretched. Three forces can prompt a correction. First, a rebound in yields toward 1% would cause turbulence for the S&P 500, because the index is dominated by growth stocks that are highly sensitive to fluctuations in the risk-free rate. Second, a dollar bounce would hurt the S&P 500 because a depreciating USD has fueled the US stock market rally since June. Finally, the US presidential election is drawing nearer; hence, the risk of potentially damaging political headlines is growing.  Despite these short-term risks, the main pillar supporting the rally remains intact: global monetary conditions are highly accommodative and the chance of inflation moving high enough to spook central bankers is minimal in the near future. Additionally, the fiscal spigots are open and governments around the world will ultimately continue to support their economies. Hence, any correction in the S&P 500 is unlikely to move beyond 15% or a level of 2900. Our cyclical indicators confirm the positive backdrop for stocks. While our Valuation Indicator has reached overvalued territory, our Monetary Indicator remains extremely accommodative. Moreover, our Technical Indicator is now flashing a clear buy signal. Putting all those forces together, our Intermediate-Term Indicator continues to support equities. Finally, our Revealed Preference Indicator strongly argues in favor of staying invested in equities. That being said, our Speculation Indicator has surged back up, thus the volatility of the rally should increase. Bonds remain extremely unappealing. Our Bond Valuation Index shows Treasurys as prohibitively expensive and our Composite Technical Indicator continues to lose momentum. So far, government bond yields have managed to remain stable at very low levels even if they have not declined further. Nonetheless, bonds have underperformed equities, which is a trend that will remain in place for many more quarters. Moreover, the pick-up in commodity prices and in various gauges of the business cycle suggests that bond yields should soon move higher, especially because the Fed is far from enthused at the concept of yield curve control. Our Cyclical Bond Indicator has turned higher and will soon flash an outright sell signal. The dollar continues to weaken after its recent breakdown. For now, the USD’s weakness has been concentrated among DM currencies. For the dollar to weaken further, EM currencies must begin to rally more markedly than they have until now, especially in Latin America. The firmness of the CNY is a good sign for the EM complex, but another clear up-leg in global growth must emerge before EM currencies can fully blossom. As a result, we are likely to have entered a temporary period of consolidation for the US dollar. The extremely oversold nature of our Dollar Composite Technical Indicator supports the idea that the dollar needs to digest its recent losses before its poor fundamentals force it lower once again. Finally, commodities have been a prime beneficiary of the weakness in the dollar and the combination of stable yields and improving economic activity. Our Composite Technical Indicator is now well into overbought territory which makes natural resource prices vulnerable to a pullback. A move up in yields as well as a short-term rebound in the dollar will likely catalyze any underlying technical risks to commodities. Gold will be particularly vulnerable to any such pullback, especially if higher real yields are the cause of the correction in natural resource prices. Despite these short-term worries, the outlook for commodities remains bright. As a result, we would use any correction to add exposure to the commodity complex. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "April 2020," dated March 26, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "July 2020," dated June 25, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see European Investment Strategy "An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs," dated July 30, 2020, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Equity Strategy "Inversely Correlated," dated August 25, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "August 2020," dated July 30, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2020," dated May 28, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "August 2020," dated July 30, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 8 Diversifying away from the dollar does not mean that the USD will lose its reserve status. However, a return to the share of FX reserves that prevailed in the first half of the 1990s will hurt the dollar, especially because the US net international investment position has fallen from -4.6% of GDP in 1992 to -57% today. 9 Traditional PCs are comprised of desktops, notebooks, and workstations. 10 Global server shipments to contract 5.6% sequentially in 3Q2020, says Digitimes Research 11 Global server shipments forecast to increase by 5% this year: TrendForce 12 IDC Expects Worldwide Smartphone Shipments to Plummet 11.9% in 2020 Fueled by Ongoing COVID-19 Challenges 13 America does not want China to dominate 5G mobile networks 14 “Data localization” can be defined as the act of storing data on a device that is physically located within the country where the data was created. Data localization requirements are governmental obligations that explicitly mandate local storage of personal information or strongly encourage local storage through data protection laws that erect stringent legal compliance obligations on cross-border data transfers. 15 The big data center industry ushered in another outbreak 16 The GSMA represents the interests of mobile operators worldwide, uniting more than 750 operators with almost 400 companies in the broader mobile ecosystem, including handset and device makers, software companies, equipment providers and internet companies, as well as organizations in adjacent industry sectors. 17 GSMA: 5G Moves from Hype to Reality – but 4G Still King 18 Smart Cities Market Size Worth $463.9 billion By 2027 19 The Automotive Semiconductor Market – Key Determinants of U.S. Firm Competitiveness 20 AI is data Pac-Man. Winning requires a flashy new storage strategy.

Dear clients, China Investment Strategy will take a summer break next week. We will resume our publication on September 9th. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist   Highlights The threat of US sanctions has sparked fears of disconnecting Chinese financial institutions from US dollar access, driving urgency to accelerate the RMB internationalization process. China’s RMB internationalization process suffered from a sizable setback in 2016, but the trend has reversed in 2018. Since then China has shifted the strategy to broaden and enhance the RMB’s market demand and functions, as well as to establish systems to facilitate the strategy. In the foreseeable future, the RMB’s role in the global economy is far from challenging the US dollar as the world's dominant reserve currency; China's near-term goal to promote the use of the RMB beyond its borders is to minimize disruptions to China’s trade and investment activities threatened by US financial sanctions. Feature Since 2018 and in the wake of intensifying confrontations between the US and China, the Chinese government has shifted its strategy in promoting the internationalization of the RMB. Authorities have moved from a symbolic international recognition of the RMB to a more pragmatic approach of creating real market demand for the currency. Chart 1China Has Been Shedding USD Assets It is not our baseline view that the US will take extreme measures and entirely cut off Chinese banks’ access to the US Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). However, Beijing’s decoupling from the US dollar (USD) has been in process, diversifying its forex reserves away from the US dollar (USD) and increasing the use of the RMB in cross-border trade and investment (Chart 1). In the foreseeable future, it is neither possible nor is Chinese policymakers’ intention for the RMB to challenge the USD as the world's dominant reserve currency. Rather, we think that under the threat of US sanctions, the near-term goal is to minimize disruptions to China’s trade and investment activities.  At the same time, the approach will make China “too big, too connected to fail” in the medium-to-long run and, therefore, minimize the potential for future threats of financial sanctions. China’s new approach to internationalize the RMB involves enhancing the currency’s three functions in the global market, and establishing and strengthening domestic systems to facilitate the enhancements: The RMB as an international settlement currency; The RMB as a commodity pricing currency; and The RMB as an international reserve currency. Most of these strategies still have a long way to go before having significant global market implications. However, these developments bear structural importance and investors should closely monitor them. RMB - An International Settlement Currency Chart 2Cross-Border RMB Settlement Is Picking Up The RMB’s role in cross-border trade settlement suffered a major setback in 2016 when investor confidence plummeted following a rapid devaluation in China’s currency and equities. The trend has reversed since 2018, partially due to the vigorous promotion of China’s domestic cross-border interbank settlement system (CIPS) (Chart 2). China established CIPS in 2015 after the US proposed to disconnect Russia from the SWIFT payment system.1 As of July 2020, the CIPS system had a total of 33 direct participants and 951 indirect participants, a 35% increase from 2018 with more than half of the participants outside China.2 According to the recently released PBoC RMB internationalization report, the CIPS system processed a total of 34 trillion yuan worth of cross-border RMB transactions in 2019, a 28% improvement from 2018 (Chart 3). Chart 3CIPS Has Been Steadily Expanding Nevertheless, the RMB’s share of international payments remains far behind the USD, euro and yen, and the RMB's role in cross-border settlement is well below its 2016 peak (Chart 4A and 4B). The dollar's dominant status is not only supported by the US’ strong and open economy, but also by its deep, liquid and highly efficient financial markets, which are impossible for any currencies or payment systems to replicate in the near future. However, establishing domestic financial payment and information exchange systems will likely be a main countermeasure countries will rush to take, if the US launches sanctions to cut off large economies like Russia and China from the USD and/or global financial system.  Chart 4AThe RMB’s Share Of International Payments Has Been Disproportional Compared To Its Share In Global Trade… Chart 4B...And Well Below Its 2016 Peak Chart 5Russia Has Largely Replaced USD Treasury Holdings With Gold Russia is by far the largest and most globally integrated country that came close to being cut off from SWIFT, and Beijing has clearly learned from Russia’s experience and countermeasure strategies. The proposal to disconnect Russia from SWIFT following the 2014 Crimea crisis never materialized, but in light of the threats and US financial sanctions, Russia established the SPFS, a domestic financial information exchange system to facilitate bank payments. The SPFS is far from the complete emancipation of SWIFT and payments through the SPFS are mostly intra-Russian settlements. However, this active counter-sanction measure, coupled with the Russian central bank’s aggressive reduction of USD-denominated assets in its forex reserves, seems to have achieved positive results (Chart 5). Three years after the establishment of SPFS, the US and Europe no longer target Russian bank payment functions in their further financial sanctions against Russia.3 In response to a US threat to impose economic sanctions against companies and banks dealing with Iran, Europe created a special financial settlement platform called Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) in 2019. Although none of the alternative systems can challenge the role of the US CHIPS or SWIFT systems, the trend of establishing and accelerating alternatives will incrementally diminish the effectiveness of such harsh financial actions by the US. RMB - An International Commodity Pricing Currency Table 1China Dominates Global Demand For Many Commodities We believe that the most important breakthrough in the RMB internationalization process in the past five years has been the strategic shift to promote the RMB’s pricing function. China is the largest trading partner of a growing number of countries with tightly linked supply chains. This generates a natural demand for RMB settlement in bilateral trade. More importantly, China’s dominance in global demand for bulk commodities gives the country an advantage in pricing power (Table 1). In March 2018, China established a RMB-denominated crude oil futures market in Shanghai, which has grown into the third-largest oil exchange market after WTI and Brent. Its cumulative turnover in two years reached nearly 30 trillion yuan with overseas customers in 19 countries and regions.4 Given the success of the Shanghai crude oil futures market, the Chinese government has been vigorously promoting the expansion of the RMB pricing function from crude oil to natural gas, iron ore, soybeans, corn and other bulk commodities. Going forward, we expect the RMB internationalization process to continue to develop through pricing and trading bulk commodities in Chinese currency.  This will lead to a higher correlation between the RMB and the currencies of some of China's Asian neighbors and commodity trade partners, and thus expand and strengthen the "RMB currency bloc" (Chart 6A and 6B). Chart 6AThe RMB Currency Bloc May Expand From Manufacturing Ecosystem... Chart 6B...To Commodity Supply Chain RMB - An International Reserve Currency The role of the RMB among official reserve managers, although still dismal compared to the USD and Euro, has accelerated since 2018. Its global share has doubled from Q4 2016 when the IMF began to include holdings of RMB in its currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER) (Chart 7). Shares of the USD- and Euro-denominated reserves have remained unchanged or declined during the same period. Among private investors, foreign investment in RMB-denominated assets has been the main source of China’s financial account surplus (Chart 8). China has hastened the opening of its onshore financial market to foreign institutional investors. In the past two years, major global stock and bond indexers –including MSCI, the S&P Dow Jones Indices, the FTSE Russell, and the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index – have added A-shares and onshore bonds to their flagship benchmarks. This means that foreign institutional investors have significantly boosted their allocation of RMB-denominated stocks and bonds (Chart 8, bottom panel). Financial assets, such as domestic RMB stocks, bonds, and loans and deposits held by foreign entities, climbed by 26.7% in 2019 over 2018. At the same time, China's domestic financial markets have gradually liberalized and even removed investment quotas for overseas institutional investors. Foreign investors currently account for 5.5% and 2.6% of the market value in Chinese equities and bonds, up from 3% and 2% in 2018, respectively. Chart 7The RMB Share In Global Reserves Remains Dismal, But Has Nearly Doubled Since 2016 Chart 8China Has Been Rapidly Expanding The Scope Of Foreign Participants In Its Onshore Financial Markets Bottom Line: The internationalization of the RMB will likely continue to accelerate in the face of decoupling from the US. It is a long process, but China will take advantage of its dominance in global demand to foster the RMB's role in both pricing and settlement in cross-border commodity trade. At the same time, China is rapidly expanding the scope of foreign participants in the country's onshore financial markets, by allowing more foreign banks and financial institutions to enter the market, and broadening the channels for the RMB’s international circulation.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1SWIFT is a system that provides information on international payments and calculations. The system unites more than 11,000 banking and financial institutions in 210 countries and the bank card payment function supported by the SWIFT system reflects a country's financial security. 2China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System release, July 31st, 2020. 3Xu Wenhong, The SWIFT System: A Focus on the U.S.–Russia Financial Confrontation, Russian International Affairs Council, February 3, 2020. 4Based on data from Shanghai International Energy Exchange. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Softening operating metrics, the falling US dollar, the reopening of the economy, all suggest that investors should avoid hypermarket stocks. A firming macro backdrop, the USD’s recent drop, along with the bearish signals from financial variables, all concur that investors should start a program of modestly shedding consumer staples exposure. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight, today. This move also pushes our S&P consumer staples sector to a modest below benchmark allocation. Table 1 Feature In our March 23 Weekly Report, when we identified 20 reasons to start buying equities, we published a cycle-on-cycle profile (Chart 1, top panel) of how the SPX performs following a greater than 20% drawdown. History suggested that, on average, new all-time highs would emerge sometime in early 2022! Unfortunately, this assessment proved offside as the S&P 500 made fresh all-time closing highs last week, less than five months from the March 23 trough. Chart 1Overstretched Nevertheless, comparing the current unprecedented SPX rebound with the historical recessionary profile remains instructive as it highlights how excessively stretched equities currently appear. The bottom panel of Chart 1 warns that the SPX is vulnerable to a snapback, were the SPX to return to the historical mean or median recovery profile. Likely rising (geo)political risks could serve as a near-term catalyst for a healthy pullback. Importantly, all of the SPX’s return since the March lows is due to the multiple expansion and then some, as forward EPS have taken a beating (not shown). Equities are long duration assets and given the drubbing in the discount rate, the forward P/E multiple has done all the heavy lifting. Chart 2 puts some historical context to the S&P 500 forward P/E going back to 1979 using I/B/E/S data. Empirical data supports finance theory and shows that the 40-year bull market in bond prices has caused a structural upshift to the SPX forward P/E. Chart 2Moving In Opposite Directions While low rates explain the near all-time highs in the SPX forward P/E, looking ahead we doubt that the SPX multiple can expand much further if we assume that the easy assist from ZIRP is behind us and will not repeat; i.e. the Fed will refrain from wrecking the US banking system by exploring NIRP. In contrast, our analysis suggests that a selloff in the bond market is the missing ingredient that will ignite a massive rotation out of growth stocks and into value and propel deep cyclicals versus defensives to uncharted territory. More specifically, the rallies in copper prices, crude oil and the CRB Raw Industrials index need confirmation from the bond market that they are demand, rather than supply driven. This backdrop will also shift equity returns within deep cyclicals away from a handful of tech stocks and toward other beaten down high operating leverage sectors (i.e. energy, industrials and materials) as we posited in our recent August 3 Special Report “Top 10 Reasons To Start Nibbling On Cyclicals At The Expense Of Defensives”. Zooming out and observing how investors have moved capital from one asset class to the next in the aftermath of QE5 is in order (Chart 3). First, the SPX enjoyed a V-shaped recovery from the March 23 lows. Then in early-May, as we first posited in our May 11 Weekly Report, the big EURUSD up-move was set in motion and investors started piling into short USD positions taking cue from the Fed’s QE5 that was directly targeting the US dollar with liquidity swaps. The debasing of the dollar served as a global reflator. Now the final piece of the QE5 puzzle is the bond market. Chart 3 highlights that in order for QE to work, counterintuitively a selloff in the bond market would confirm that the economy is healing and is ready to start standing on its own two feet. The jury is still out. With regard to the Fed’s remaining bullets, yield curve control (YCC) is one unorthodox tool that the FOMC could choose to deploy in the coming years. On that front, turning back in time and drawing parallels with the 1940s is instructive. In 1942 the Fed, at the behest of the Treasury, pegged long-term interest rates at 2.5% and ballooned its balance sheet in order to finance the government’s expenditures during WWII. The Fed surrendered its independence, and this YCC unwarrantedly stayed in place until 1951 when in the midst of the Korean War, the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord finally ended the peg of government long-dated bond interest rates.1 Chart 3Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally Chart 4WWII-Like Starting Point Chart 4 shows the ebbs and flows of the US government’s total debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal deficit as a percentage of output since 1940. While the debt-to-GDP profile fell from 1945 onward owing partially to a tight fiscal ship that the US subsequently ran, it troughed when the US floated the greenback. Since then, the US has been fiscally irresponsible running large budget deficits and the debt-to-GDP ratio has never looked back and very recently went parabolic (top panel, Chart 4). Charts 5 & 6 take a closer look at some macro variables in the 1940s and Charts 7 &  8 compare them to today. Chart 5The… Chart 6…1940s… First, YCC did not prevent the late-1948 recession (Chart 5, shaded areas). Crudely put, monetary stimulus is not a panacea for boom/bust cycles. Second, M2 growth was climbing at a 30%/annum rate, the money multiplier was on a secular advance and money velocity was surging especially in the first half of the 1940s (Chart 6). As a result and as expected, YCC caused three significant inflationary jumps (bottom panel, Chart 6) that aided the US government in bringing down the massive debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e. inflating its way out of a debt trap) that it had accumulated via large deficits in the front half of the 1940s (top panel, Chart 5). Third, interest rates were a coiled spring and once the Treasury-Fed Accord was signed, they exploded higher (fourth panel, Chart 5). Finally, equities fared well during the first three years of YCC until the end of WWII, but then suffered an outsized setback until mid-1949, before recovering and taking out the 1945 highs in 1951 (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 7...Compared With… Chart 8…Today Were the Fed to embark on YCC in the near-future in order to monetize the US government’s deficits, there are a few parallels to draw with the 1940s especially given that the starting point of debt-to-GDP is similar to the WWII figure (top panel, Chart 4). The Fed would likely lose its independence. This would be a paradigm shift. The Fed would crowd out fixed income investors, and flood the market with US dollars. M2 money stock would continue to surge. Few investors will be chasing US dollar assets including equities. The path of least resistance would be significantly lower for the US dollar as foreign investors would flee. This debt monetization along with a depreciating currency and swelling money supply would result in inflation rearing its ugly head, especially given that import prices would soar. What is difficult to envision is how the economy would perform during an inflationary impulse. Our sense is that the risk of stagflation would rise significantly, especially given the current inverse correlation between M2 growth and the velocity of money.2 In the stagflationary 1970s, any liquidity injections via higher M2 growth failed to translate into rising money velocity. Importantly, the “Nixon shock” effectively ended the Bretton Woods system and floated the US dollar causing a 40% devaluation from peak-to-trough (Chart 9). Tack on the oil related supply shock and stagflation reigned supreme in the 1970s, owing to cost-push inflation. Chart 9Dollar The Reflator In contrast during the 1940s, demand-pull inflation hit the economy rather hard, as the US was retooling its industrial base to win WWII alongside its allies. Also the US dollar was linked to gold since the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 and ten years later the Bretton Woods international monetary agreement ushered in the era of fixed exchange rates, which is a big difference from the 1970s.3 As a reminder, from a political perspective venturing down the inflation avenue is the least painful way of dealing with a debt burden, rather than pursuing tight fiscal policy which is synonymous with political suicide. From an equity perspective, owning commodity-levered sectors and other hard asset-linked equities including REITs would make sense as we highlighted in our recent inflation Special Report. Health care stocks would also shine in case of an inflationary spurt according to empirical evidence that we highlighted in the same Special Report. On the flip side, our inflation Special Report also revealed that shedding telecom services and utilities would be wise and most importantly avoiding technology stocks. Tech stocks are disinflationary beneficiaries as they are mired in constant deflation and have built business models not only to withstand, but also to thrive in deflation. Inflation is a tech killer as these growth stocks suffer when the discount rate spikes and causes valuations to move from a premium to a discount. Nevertheless, deflation/disinflation is more likely in the coming 12-to-18 months, whereas inflation is at least two-to-three years away as we mentioned in our recent inflation Special Report. This week we continue to augment our cyclicals versus defensives portfolio bent and take our defensive exposure down a notch by downgrading consumer staples to a modest below benchmark allocation via a downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index. Downgrade Hypermarkets To Underweight… Last summer we upgraded the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight as we were preparing the portfolio to withstand a recessionary shock given that the yield curve had inverted. Fast forward to the March carnage in the equity markets and this defensive move served our portfolio well. However, we did not want to overstay our welcome and set a stop in order to exit this position that was triggered in late-March netting our portfolio 26% in relative gains. More recently, we have been adding cyclical exposure to the portfolio and lightening up on defensives and as a continuation of this shift we are now compelled to downgrade the S&P hypermarkets to underweight. The economy is reopening and thus it no longer pays to seek refuge in safe haven hypermarket equities. In fact most of the macro indicators we track suggest the recession is over that will sustain severe downward pressure on relative share prices. Chart 10 shows that the ISM manufacturing new orders subcomponent has slingshot from below 30 to north of 60, junk spreads are probing all-time lows, consumer confidence has troughed and small and medium enterprises hiring intentions are on the mend. Moreover, the extraordinary fiscal expansion has brought spending forward and PCE is all but certain to skyrocket when the Q3 GDP figures get released in late-October, signaling that the easy money has been made in Big Box retailers (top panel, Chart 11). Similarly, discretionary spending should pick up the slack from staple-related purchases, further dampening the need to own hypermarket shares (middle & bottom panels, Chart 11). Chart 10Rebounding Macro Chart 11Returning to Normality On the operating front, while WMT is making strides in its online presence and offering mix, non-store retail sales are on a tear dominated by King AMZN (as a reminder we are overweight the S&P internet retail index). This is a secular trend and should continue unabated and in a relative sense continue to weigh on hypermarket profitability (bottom panel, Chart 12). Finally, a significant tailwind is turning into a severe headwind for this industry: import price inflation. The US dollar has reversed course and it is in a freefall. Historically, the greenback has been an excellent leading indicator of import price inflation and the current message is grim for hypermarket razor thin profit margins (import prices shown inverted, Chart 13). Chart 12Amazonification Is On Track Chart 13Currency Headwinds Adding it all up, softening operating metrics, the falling US dollar, the reopening of the economy, all suggest that investors should avoid hypermarket stocks. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5HYPC – WMT, COST. …Which Pushes Consumer Staples To A Below Benchmark Allocation The downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index tilts our S&P consumer staples sector to a modest below benchmark allocation. Countercyclical consumer staples stocks served their purpose and provided the support to our portfolio in the front half of the year when we needed them most. Now that the economic reopening is gaining steam and the government, the health care system and society are all ready to effectively deal with a flare up in the pandemic, the allure of defensive positioning has diminished. In other words, COVID-19 is currently a known known risk versus an unknown unknown risk early in the year, and defending against it now is more successful. Moreover, according to our mid-April research on what sectors investors should avoid during recessionary recoveries, consumer staples stocks trail the SPX on average by 660bps one year following the SPX trough. The current macro backdrop corroborates this analysis and underscores that the path of least resistance is lower for relative share prices. Not only is the ISM manufacturing survey on fire, but also consumer confidence is making an effort to trough (ISM manufacturing and consumer confidence shown inverted, Chart 14). Meanwhile, financial market variables emit a similarly bearish signal for safe haven staples stocks. Following a brief spike in the bond-to-stock ratio (BSR), the BSR has recently resumed its downdraft (top panel, Chart 15). Volatility has all but collapsed since soaring to over 80 in March, as the Fed has orchestrated a quashing of all asset class volatilities (middle panel, Chart 15). Lastly, the pairwise correlation between stocks in the S&P 500 has also nosedived bringing some semblance of normality back into equity markets (bottom panel, Chart 15). All three of these financial market variables will continue to exert downward pressure on relative share prices. Chart 14V-shaped Recovery… Chart 15...Across The Board On the US dollar front, while consumer goods manufacturers get a P&L translation gain from a depreciating currency, their export exposure is on par with the SPX and does not provide a relative advantage. In marked contrast, empirical evidence shows that relative profitability moves in tandem with the greenback and the USD recent weakness will undercut consumer staples profitability (bottom panel, Chart 16), especially via climbing input cost inflation. In sum, a firming macro backdrop, the US dollar’s recent drop, along with the bearish signals from financial variables, all concur that investors should start a program of modestly shedding consumer staples exposure. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P consumer staples index to underweight. Chart 16Mind the Gap Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/special_reports/treasury_fed_accord/background 2     The velocity of money “is the number of times one dollar is spent to buy goods and services per unit of time. If the velocity of money is increasing, then more transactions are occurring between individuals in an economy.” Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 3    Our colleagues from The Bank Credit Analyst recently illustrated how a strong dollar is good for the US economy on a medium term basis. Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations ​​​​​​​ Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 ​​​​​​​Favor value over growth

Dear clients, The Foreign Exchange Strategy will take a summer break next week. We will resume our publication on September 4th. Best regards, Chester Ntonifor, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Feature The economy of Hong Kong SAR1 has been held under siege by two tectonic forces. With the highest share of exports-to-GDP in the world, and at very close proximity to China, the epicenter of the pandemic shock, economic growth has been knocked down hard. The second shock to Hong Kong’s economy has been political instability. The extradition bill that was proposed in February 2019, followed by the enactment of the national security law this past June, has been accompanied by cascading street-wide protests and social unrest. The spirit of the bill is that crimes committed in Hong Kong can be trialed in China. The US has moved to impose sanctions on Hong Kong, as it no longer sees the city-state as autonomous, the latest of which is revoking its extradition treaty with the former colony. Some commentators have defined this as the end of the one country, two systems socio-economic model that has been in place since the handover from British rule in 1997. From a currency perspective, these shocks put in question the sustainability of the Hong Kong dollar (HKD) peg. Historically, currency pegs more often than not fail, especially in the midst of both geopolitical and economic turmoil. This was the story of the Asian Financial crisis in the late 1990s, and the Mexican peso crisis earlier that decade. Is the Hong Kong dollar destined for the same fate? If so, what are the potential adjustments in the exchange rate? Finally, what indicators can investors look to as a guide for any pending adjustment? A Historical Perspective Chart 137 Years Of Stability The HKD is no stranger to shifting exchange-rate regimes. Over the last 170 years, it has been linked to the Chinese yuan, backed by silver, pegged to the British pound, free-floating, and, since 1983, tied to the US dollar. Therefore, a bet on the unsustainability of the peg is historically justified. That said, the stability of the peg to the US dollar has survived 37 years of economic volatility, suggesting the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has been able to successfully navigate a post-Bretton Woods currency era (Chart 1).   Beginning as a bi-metallic monetary regime in the early 19th century, the HKD was initially linked to gold and silver prices, akin to the commodity–monetary standard that dominated that era. When Britain colonized Hong Kong in 1841, and as new trade alliances developed, the drawbacks of the bi-metallic monetary standard became apparent. As bilateral trade boomed, adjustments to imbalances (surpluses or deficits) could not occur through the exchange rate since it was fixed. Therefore, they had to occur through the real economy. This led to very volatile and destabilizing domestic prices. The stability of the peg to the US dollar has survived 37 years of economic volatility. Most Anglo-Saxon countries finally converted from bi-metallic exchange rates to the gold standard in the late 1800s, and strong ties to China dictated that Hong Kong naturally adopted the silver dollar in 1863. However, the silver system had the same drawbacks as the bi-metallic standard. Specifically, when your money supply is fixed, any increase in output leads to “few dollars chasing many goods.” This is synonymous with falling prices, just as “many dollars chasing few goods” is synonymous with rising inflation. The petri dish for this phenomenon was the post-World War I construction boom. A fixed money supply under the gold (and silver) standard meant rapidly falling prices globally. By the late 1920s, most countries had overvalued exchange rates relative to gold (and silver), that exerted powerful deflationary forces on their domestic economies. This forced most Western governments to debase fiat money vis-à-vis gold to stop price deflation. Correspondingly, China had to abandon the silver standard in November 1935, with Hong Kong shortly following suit. At the time of debasement, the United Kingdom was the leading economic power. As a colony, it made sense for the Hong Kong government to link the HKD to the British pound. The established rate was GBP/HKD 16, giving birth to the currency board system (Chart 2). Meanwhile, as a trading hub, a peg with an international currency made sense. The problems there were two-fold. First, the pound was still gold-linked. And second, Britain’s subsequent decline in economic power was accompanied by a series of sudden and dramatic devaluations in the pound, which was hugely disruptive to Hong Kong’s financial system. By 1972, the British government decided to float the pound, which effectively ended the GBP/HKD peg. Chart 2A History Of The HKD Peg In July 1972, the authorities made the decision to peg the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar at USD/HKD 5.65, which was another policy mistake. The switch made sense given the rising economic power of the US, as well as rising trade links (Chart 3). However, the dollar was also under a crisis of confidence following the Nixon devaluation in 1971. In February 1973, the HKD was freely floated. Chart 3The Peg Is Usually Against The Dominant Economic Power Counter-intuitively, the free-floating era for HKD was arguably the most volatile for its domestic economy. For one, discipline in monetary policy was gone. Money and credit growth exploded, inflation hit double-digits, home prices soared and the trade balance massively deteriorated. Political instability was also rife, given the uncertainty surrounding the end of British claims on the island. As the dialogue included China’s reclaim of political control over Hong Kong, there was uncertainty over the rule of law. This cocktail of political and economic uncertainty led to a 33% depreciation in the HKD between mid-1980 and October 1983. Panicked policymakers returned to the US dollar peg. Paul Volcker, then Federal Reserve chairperson, was establishing himself as the world’s most credible central banker, having dropped US inflation from almost 15% in 1980 to below 3% by 1983. Economic and financial links with the US also justified a peg. In August of 1983, the authorities announced a USD/HKD fixed rate of 7.80, which has remained in place since. The Current Peg: Advantages And Disadvantages Chart 4Fiscal Prudence In Hong Kong The advantage of the HKD peg is that the choice of the nominal anchor, the US dollar, renders it credible. First, the US dollar is an international reserve currency dominating international trade, which helps to facilitate settlements while instilling confidence among transacting participants. As a financial hub, this is crucial for Hong Kong. Meanwhile, such an anchor imposes fiscal discipline, since government deficits cannot be monetized by money printing. In the case where the government tries to be profligate, the rise in inflation will lower real rates and lead to capital outflows. This will force the HKMA to sell US dollars and absorb local currency. In the extreme case, the central bank can run out of reserves, causing the peg to collapse. Indeed, over the past several years, government debt in Hong Kong has been close to nil (Chart 4). The drawback of a fixed exchange rate regime is that a country or a region relinquishes control over independent monetary policy. In the case of Hong Kong, this means that interest rates are determined by the actions of the US Fed. Such a marriage was justified when the business cycles between the two economies were in sync, but in times of economic divergences, the fixed exchange rate leads to economic volatility. Chart 5Currency Peg And Internal Devaluation Chart 6Hong Kong Interest Rates In The Late 90's This divergence was clearly evident in the 1990s, as falling interest rates in the US supercharged a housing and stock market bubble in Hong Kong. When the Asian crisis finally came around in 1997, the lack of exchange-rate flexibility led to a vicious internal devaluation (Chart 5). A prolonged period of high unemployment and stagnant wages was needed for Hong Kong to finally improve its competitiveness. Most importantly, in 1998, in the depths of the Asian financial crisis, the peg attracted a concerted attack from speculators who believed a devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar alongside other regional currencies was inevitable. Their assault inflicted considerable pain, driving short-term HKD interest rates (Chart 6) and wiping out over a quarter of the local stock market in a matter of weeks. At the time, the Hong Kong government was successful in fending off the speculative attacks by intervening massively in both the foreign exchange and equity markets. Is An Adjustment Pending? If So, When?      Chart 7USD/HKD And Interest Rate Spreads As the above narrative suggests, the HKD is no stranger to socio-economic shocks and speculative attacks, and it has, more recently, weathered them pretty well. The more immediate question is whether the shift in the political landscape could be potent enough to crack the peg this time around. While plausible, it is unlikely for a few reasons. First, the HKD continues to trade on the stronger side of the peg as US interest rates have collapsed, wiping off any positive carry that would have catalyzed outflows. Fluctuations in the USD/HKD within the 7.75-7.85-band track the Libor-Hibor spread pretty closely (Chart 7). A currency board has unlimited ability to defend the strong side of the peg, since it can print currency and absorb foreign reserves (print HKDs and use these to buy USDs in this case). On the weak side, these foreign exchange reserves are drawn down. Therefore, any threat to the peg should be preceded by consistent trading on the weaker side, questioning the HKMA’s ability to keep selling FX reserves to defend the peg. Fluctuations in the USD/HKD within the 7.75-7.85-band track the Libor-Hibor spread pretty closely. Second, the Hong Kong peg remains extremely credible, since the entire monetary base is backed over two times by FX reserves (Chart 8). Even as a percentage of broad money supply, Hong Kong reserves are ample and very high by historical standards (Chart 8, bottom panel). Meanwhile, since 1983, the currency board system has undergone a number of reforms and modifications, allowing it to adapt to the changing macro environment. This represents a powerful insurance policy for the HKMA’s ability to defend the currency peg, significantly enhancing the system’s credibility. Chart 8Ample Foreign Exchange Reserves Chart 9Hong Kong Runs Recurring Surpluses Third, ever since the peg was instituted, Hong Kong has mostly run budget surpluses. As a result, government debt in Hong Kong is almost non-existent, as we illustrate above. This has removed any incentive to monetize spending, which remains an open argument in the US, Japan or even the euro area. One of our favored metrics on the health of a currency is the basic balance, and on this basis, Hong Kong scores much more favorably than the US. While Hong Kong has transitioned from being a goods exporter to that of services, it remains extremely competitive, with a healthy current account surplus of 5% of GDP (Chart 9). These recurring surpluses have propelled Hong Kong to one of the biggest creditors in the world, with a net international investment position that is a whopping 430% of GDP and rising (Chart 10).   Chart 10Hong Kong Is A Net Creditor To The World Fourth, over the past few years, productivity in Hong Kong has outpaced that of the US and most of its trading partners (Chart 11). This has lifted the fair value of the currency tremendously. This means it is more like that when the peg adjusts, the outcome will be HKD appreciation. On a real effective exchange rate basis, the HKD is not that overvalued compared to the US dollar, after accounting for the massive increase in relative productivity (Chart 12). It is notable that during the Asian financial crisis, currencies like the Thai bhat were massively overvalued, which is why the adjustment was back down toward fair value. Chart 11Hong Kong Is Highly Productive Chart 12Trade-Weighted HKD Is Slightly Expensive Fifth, there is a strong incentive for both Beijing and Hong Kong to defend the peg, because the relevance of Hong Kong is no longer as a shipping port, but as a financial center. The peg reduces volatility, as transactions are essentially dollarized. The relevance of Hong Kong in Asia can be seen by looking at the market capitalization of the Hang Seng index compared to that of the Topix index in Tokyo or the Shanghai Composite index. Any escalation in the US-China trade war, especially in the technology sphere, will only lead to more listings on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Equity flows through the HK-Shanghai and HK-Shenzhen stock connect program are rising, suggesting the market still considers Hong Kong an important intermediary in doing business with China (Chart 13).  On the political front, the most potent risk is that the US Treasury moves to unilaterally limit access to US dollars by Hong Kong banks. While this was discussed by President Trump’s top advisers, it was also dismissed as unwise due to the potential shock to the global financial system. Meanwhile, with massive swap lines with the Fed, Hong Kong’s international banks can always draw on US liquidity. Tariffs on Hong Kong goods are another option, but this again will not really deal a severe blow to the peg, since Hong Kong mainly re-exports, with very little in the way of domestic goods exports (Chart 14). Chart 13Hong Kong Is An Important Financial Center Chart 14Hong Kong Is Partially Insulated From Tariffs   Property Market Blues The property market is the one area in Hong Kong where a sanguine view is difficult to paint. Hong Kong is one of the most unaffordable cities on the planet, and high income inequality has been a reason behind resident angst. The gini coefficient, a measure of inequality in a society, is more elevated in Hong Kong compared to Singapore, China or even South Africa. After years of loose monetary policy, property prices in Hong Kong have completely decoupled from fundamentals. Housing is even more unaffordable now than it was back in 1997, and domestic leverage is very high. With such a high debt stock, even a gradual uptick in interest rates will have a significant impact on the debt service burden (Chart 15). Stocks and real estate prices are positively correlated, suggesting deleveraging pressures will likely be quite high if both unravel (Chart 16). Chart 15High Debt Service Burden##br## In Hong Kong Chart 16Hong Kong Stocks Are Tied To The Property Market However, there are offsetting factors. First, it is unlikely that interest rates in Hong Kong (or anywhere in the developed world for that matter) will rise anytime soon. COVID-19 has provided “carte blanche” in terms of global stimulus. More importantly, the US is at the forefront of this campaign, meaning interest rates in Hong Kong will remain low for a while. Second, in recent history, Hong Kong has proven that it has the resilience to handle volatility in the property markets. During the Asian crisis, property prices fell by 60%, yet no bank went bust. Share prices also collapsed but are much higher today, suggesting the drop was a buying opportunity. And with such a low government debt burden, any systemic threat to banks will nudge the authorities to bail out important companies and sectors. In terms of asset markets, the performance of the Hang Seng index relative to the S&P 500 is purely a function of interest rates. The US stock market is dominated by technology and healthcare that do well when interest rates fall, while banks and real estate dominate the Hong Kong market. So rising rates hurt the US stock market much more than Hong Kong (Chart 17). Meanwhile, the recent turmoil has made Hong Kong assets very cheap relative to its sister-city, Singapore (Chart 18). This suggests that a lot of the potential equity outflows have already occurred, based on today’s situation. Chart 17Interest Rates And The Hong Kong Stock Market Chart 18Hong Kong Has Cheapened Relative To Singapore The Future Of The Peg A peg to the Chinese RMB makes sense. The Hong Kong economy is now heavily tied to the Chinese economy, with over 50% of exports going to China (previously mentioned Chart 3). However, that will sound the death knell for Hong Kong’s status as a financial center, since the US dollar remains very much a reserve currency. There is also a risk that if Beijing uses RMB depreciation as a weapon in a blown-out confrontation with the US in the coming years, it will threaten the sustainability of the HKD peg, since it could inflate asset bubbles. What is more likely is that the option of re-pegging to the RMB comes many years down the road, when the yuan has become a fully convertible currency. The recent turmoil has made Hong Kong assets very cheap relative to its sister-city, Singapore. There is the option to assume another currency board akin to Singapore. This option makes sense, since this would give the HKMA scope to link to cheaper currencies, such as the yen and euro. Such an overhaul will require significant technical expertise and political will from both Beijing and Hong Kong. It is not very clear what the cost/benefit outcome would be of this initiative, but it is worth considering since the RMB itself is managed against other currencies. Finally, there is always the option to fully float the peg, but this is likely to increase volatility. As well, for policymakers, it makes sense to continue pegging the exchange rate to the US dollar as it depreciates against major currencies, since it ends up easing financial conditions for Hong Kong concerns.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China  Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades