Currencies

Dear client, In lieu of our weekly bulletin next week, I will be hosting a webcast on Friday, January 28 at 11:00 am EST, to discuss recent dollar trends. I hope you all tune in. Kind regards, Chester Ntonifor Highlights While not often discussed, it is well known that the dollar is expensive. It is true that valuations tend to matter less until they trigger a tipping point. Such inflections usually coincide with huge external imbalances, especially generated by an overvalued exchange rate. The US dollar could be stepping into such a paradigm - the DXY is 1.5 standard deviations above fair value, at the same time as the goods trade deficit is hitting record lows, and real interest rates are deeply negative. More importantly, there has been limited precedence to such a dollar configuration. Historically, it has required much higher real interest rates, or an improving balance of payments backdrop, to justify such lofty valuations. Our trading model shows that selling a currency when it is expensive and buying it when it is cheap generates excess returns over time. Within our valuation ranking, the cheapest currencies are JPY, SEK and NOK. On a terms-of-trade basis, the AUD stands out as a winner. Feature Chart 1High Dollar Valuation And Ultra-Low Real Rates Is Unprecedented Valuations usually get little respect when it comes to medium-term currency movements. This has been especially the case over the last few years, where the macroeconomic environment has been by far the biggest driver of the US dollar. The bull market in the dollar from 2011 to 2020 coincided with higher real interest rates in the US, relative to the rest of the developed world. In fact, since 2008, no developed market central bank has been able to hike rates by more than 200bps, except for the US Federal Reserve. Our report last week focused on why aggressive interest rate increases by the Federal Reserve could be bullish for the US dollar in the short term, but eventually set the stage for depreciation. In this report, we argue that valuations will also become a more important factor for currency strategy over the next 1-2 years (Chart 1). The Dollar And The External Balance The framework to understand currencies and the external balance is straightforward - a rising trade deficit (imports > exports) requires a lower exchange rate to boost competitiveness in the manufacturing sector, or less spending to reduce the trade deficit. Reduced domestic spending is unlikely in most developed economies, given ample pent-up demand and loose fiscal policy. Therefore, the natural adjustment mechanism for countries running wide trade deficits will have to be the exchange rate. Within a broad spectrum of developed and emerging market currencies, the US dollar stands out as overvalued on a real effective exchange rate basis (Chart 2A and 2B). It is true that valuations tend to matter less until they trigger a tipping point. Such inflections usually occur with a shift in animal spirits, coinciding with huge external imbalances. In the US, these imbalances are already starting to trigger a shift. The US trade deficit is deteriorating, with the goods deficit hitting a record low of -$98bn in November. Over the last few years, it has become increasingly difficult to fund this widening trade deficit via foreign purchases of US Treasuries (Chart 3). Meanwhile, as we highlighted last week, substantial equity inflows over the last few years have started to roll over. In a nutshell, the basic balance in the US (the sum of the current account and foreign direct investment) is deteriorating at an accelerated pace (Chart 4). The US current account deficit for Q3 came in at -$214.8 billion, the widest in over a decade. This has reversed a lot of the improvement in the basic balance since the Global Financial Crisis. The dollar tends to decline on a multi-year basis when the basic balance peaks and starts deteriorating. Chart 4Deteriorating Balance Of Payments Dynamics US Balance Of Payments Chart 3It Is Becoming Increasingly Difficult To Fund The Widening Deficit Fiscal policy is likely to become tighter in the next couple of years, easing the domestic spending constraint for the exchange rate. That said, fiscal policy will remain loose compared to pre-pandemic levels and relative to underlying employment conditions. This has historically led to a deterioration in the external balance and pulled the real effective exchange rate of the dollar down (Chart 5). Chart 5The Dollar And The Budget Deficit Real Interest Rates And The Dollar It is remarkable that at a time when real rates are the most negative in the US, the dollar is as overvalued as it has been in decades on a simple PPP model. This is a perfect mirror image of the dollar configuration at the start of the bull market in 2010, where the dollar was cheap and real rates were more supportive (Chart 1). According to economic theory, a currency should adjust to equalize returns across countries. This is a no-arbitrage condition. In the early 80s, an overvalued dollar was supported by very positive real rates. The subsequent dollar declines thereafter also coincided with falling real interest rates. In fact, over the last decade, it has been an anomaly that the dollar is so strong despite relative real interest rates being so negative (Chart 6). Our view remains that the terminal interest rate for the US should be higher than what is currently discounted in the 10-year Treasury yield. According to the overnight index swap curve, the Fed will not hike interest rates past 1.75%. This is much lower than past cycles and will keep real interest rates low. This does not justify an expensive greenback. Our shorter-term interest rate model also shows the DXY as slightly expensive, even though short-term interest rates have moved in favor of the dollar over the past year (Chart 7). Chart 6The Level Of Relative Real Yields Also Matters Chart 7Our Timing Model Suggests ##br##A Pullback Other Considerations While real effective exchange rates and purchasing power parity models are among our favorite valuation gauges, they are not foolproof. Countries with structurally higher inflation (and so a higher real effective exchange rate), could also have higher productivity. According to the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis, competitiveness in the tradeable goods sector will boost wages across all sectors of the economy, leading to higher prices. This argument particularly resonates with proponents that suggest the US is a fast-growing economy, and so will tend to run a current account deficit, like Australia during the commodity boom of the early 2000s. Meanwhile, the US earns more on its overseas assets than it spends on its liabilities, suggesting that the funding gap will eventually close. Unfortunately, the overvaluation of the dollar has not been due to higher relative productivity in the US, especially when compared to other economies. Across a broad spectrum of developed and emerging market economies, the dollar is expensive according to our productivity models. The Chinese RMB (which is much overvalued on a PPP basis) is closer to fair value when productivity is taken into consideration (Chart 8). Meanwhile, the sizeable US deficit is not completely offset by its positive investment balance (Chart 9). This is occurring at a time when many faster growing countries (such as China for example) are generating current account surpluses (Chart 10A and 10B). In a nutshell, whether one looks at relative price levels, relative productivity trends, or relative real returns on government assets, the dollar is expensive. Chart 9The Positive Income Balance Has Not Helped The Us Investment Position Conclusion Last summer, we introduced a trading model for FX valuation enthusiasts. We used both our in-house purchasing power parity models (PPP) and our intermediate-term timing models as valuation tools. Since the 2000s, both valuation models have outperformed a buy-and-hold currency strategy with much lower volatility (Chart 11). Currency valuation tends to matter over the longer term, while the macro environment tends to dominate short-term currency trading. Given that the dollar has been overvalued for the last three to five years, the above analysis suggests we might be entering this “longer-term” tipping point where valuations will start to matter more going forward. Within our valuation ranking, the cheapest currencies are JPY, SEK and NOK. On a terms-of-trade and productivity basis, the AUD stands out as a winner. This is being reflected in a record-high basic balance surplus (Chart 12). In our trade tables, we went long AUD at 70 cents, and will upgrade this to a high conviction bet on signs that currency volatility is ebbing. Chart 11A Trading Rule Solely Based On Valuation Chart 12AUD And Balance Of Payments Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Forecast Summary

Highlights Our top five “black swan” risks for 2022: Social unrest in China; Russian invasion of all of Ukraine; unilateral Israeli strikes on Iran; a cyber attack that goes kinetic; and a failure of OPEC 2.0. Too early to buy the dip on Russian assets: President Biden says Putin will probably “move in” and re-invade Ukraine, Russian embassy staff have been evacuating Ukraine, the US and UK have been providing more arms to Ukraine, and the US is warning of a semiconductor embargo against Russia. Talks resume in Geneva on Friday. Tactically investors should take some risk off the table, especially if linked to Russia and Europe.  Stay short the Russian ruble and EM Europe; stay short the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar; stay long cyber security stocks; and be prepared for oil volatility. Convert tactical long equity trades to relative trades: long large caps versus small caps, long defensives versus cyclicals, and long Japanese industrials versus German industrials. Feature Chart 1Recession Probability And Yield Curve The 2/10-year yield curve is flattening and now stands at 79 bps, while the implied probability of a recession over the next 12 months troughed at 5.9% in April 2021, and as of December 2021 stood at 7.7% (Chart 1). Apparently stagflation and recession are too high of a probability to constitute a “black swan” risk for this year. Black swans are not only high impact but also low probability. In this year’s annual “Five Black Swan” report, the last of our 2022 outlook series, we concentrate on impactful but unlikely events. These black swans emerge directly from the existing themes and trends in our research – they are not plucked at random. The key regions are highlighted in Map 1. Black Swan #1: Major Social Unrest Erupts In China China’s financial problems are front and center risks for investors this year. They qualify as a “Gray Rhino” rather than “Black Swan” risk.1 It is entirely probable that China’s financial and property sector distress will negatively impact Chinese and global financial markets in 2022. What investors are not expecting is an eruption of social unrest in China that fouls up the twentieth national party congress this fall and calls into question the Communist Party’s official narrative that it is handling the pandemic and the underlying economic transition smoothly. Social unrest is a major risk around the world in the face of the new bout of inflation. Most of the democracies have already changed governments since the pandemic began, recapitalizing their political systems, but major emerging markets – Russia, India, Turkey, Brazil – have not done so. They have seen steep losses of popular support for both political leaders and ruling parties. There is little opinion polling from China and people who are surveyed cannot speak openly. It is possible that the government’s support has risen given its minimization of deaths from the pandemic. But it is also possible that it has not. Beijing’s policies over the past few years have had a negative impact on the country’s business elite and foreign relations. There are disgruntled factions within China, though the current administration has a tight grip over the main organs of power. Since President Xi is trying to clinch his personal rule this fall, sending China down a path of autocracy that proved disastrous under Chairman Mao Zedong, it is possible he will face surprise resistance. China’s economic growth is decelerating, clocking in at a 4.0% quarter-on-quarter growth rate at the end of last year. While authorities are easing policy to secure the recovery, there is a danger of insufficient support. Private sentiment will remain gloomy, as reflected by weak money velocity and a low propensity to spend among both businesses and households (Chart 2). The government will continue to be repressive in the lead up to the political reshuffle. At least for the first half of the year the economy will remain troubled. Structurally China is ripe for social unrest. It suffers from high income inequality and low social mobility, comparable to the US and Brazil, which are both struggling with political upheaval (Chart 3). Chart 2China's Private Sector Still Depressed​​​​​ ​​​​​​ In addition China is keeping a stranglehold over Covid-19. This “Zero Covid” policy minimizes deaths but suppresses economic activity. Strict policy has also left the population with a very low level of natural immunity and the new Omicron variant is even more contagious than other variants. Hence the regime is highly likely to double down to prevent an explosive outbreak. The service side of the economy will continue to suffer if strict lockdowns are maintained, exacerbating household and business financial difficulties (Chart 4). Yet in other countries around the world, government decisions to return to lockdowns have sparked unrest. Chart 4Zero Covid Policy: Not Sustainable Beyond 2022 China’s “Misery Index” (unemployment plus inflation) is rising sharply. While misery is ostensibly lower than that of other emerging markets, China’s unemployment data is widely known to be unreliable. If we take a worst-case scenario, looking at youth unemployment and fuel prices, misery is a lot higher (Chart 5). The youth, who are having the hardest time finding jobs, are also the most likely to protest if conditions become intolerable (Chart 6). Of course, if social unrest is limited to students, it will lack support among the wider populace. But it is inflation, not youth activism, that is the reason for China’s authorities to be concerned, as inflation is a generalized problem that affects workers as well as students. Chart 5China's Misery Index Is Higher Than It Looks​​​​​ Chart 6China's Troubled Youth Why would protesters stick their necks out knowing that the Communist Party will react ferociously to any sign of instability during President Xi Jinping’s political reshuffle? True, mainland Chinese do not have the propensity to political activism that flared up in protests in Hong Kong in recent years. Also the police state will move rapidly to repress any unrest. Yet the entire focus of Xi Jinping’s administration, since 2012, has been the restoration of political legitimacy and prevention of popular discontent. Xi has cracked down on corruption, pollution, housing prices, education prices, and has announced his “Common Prosperity” agenda to placate the low and middle classes.2 The regime has also cracked down on the media, social media, civil society, and ideological dissent to prevent political opposition from taking root. If the government were not concerned about social instability, it would not have been adopting these policies. Disease, often accompanied by famines or riots, has played a role in the downfall of six out of ten dynasties, so Beijing will not be taking risks for granted (Table 1). Table 1Disease And Downfall Of Chinese Dynasties Social instability would have a major impact as it would affect China’s stability and global investor sentiment toward China. Western democracies would penalize China for violations of human rights, leaving China even more isolated. Bottom Line: Investors should stay short the renminbi and neutral Chinese equities. Foreign investors should steer clear of Chinese bonds in the event of US sanctions. After the party congress this fall there will be an opportunity to reassess whether Xi Jinping will “let a hundred flowers bloom,” thus improving the internal and external political and investment environment, but this is not at all clear today. Black Swan #2: Russia Invades All (Not Just Part) Of Ukraine US-Russia relations are on the verge of total collapse and Russian equities have sold off, in line with our bearish recommendations in reports over the past two years. Russia’s threat of re-invading Ukraine is credible. Western nations are still wishy-washy about the counter-threat of economic sanctions, judging by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s latest comments, and none are claiming they will go to war to defend Ukraine.3 Russia is looking to remove the threat of Ukraine integrating militarily and economically with the West. The US and UK are providing Ukraine with defense weaponry even as Russia specifically demands that they cease to do so. President Putin may choose short-term economic pain for long-term security gain. The consensus view is that if Russia does invade, it will undertake a limited invasion. But what if Russia invades all of Ukraine? To be clear, a full invasion is unlikely because it would be far more difficult and costly for Russia. It would go against Putin’s strategy of calculated risk and limited conflict. Table 2 compares Russia and Ukraine in size and strength, alongside a comparison of the US and Iraq in 2002. This is not a bad comparison given that Ukraine’s and Iraq’s land area and active military personnel are comparable. Table 2Russia-Ukraine Balance Of Power 2022 Compared To US-Iraq 2002 Russia would be biting off a much bigger challenge than the US did. Ukraine’s prime age population is 2.5 times larger than Iraq’s in 2002, and its military expenditure is three times bigger. The US GDP and military spending were 150 and 250 times bigger than Iraq’s, while Russia’s GDP and military spending are about ten times bigger than Ukraine’s today. Iraq was not vital to American national security, whereas Ukraine is vital to Russia; Russia has more at stake and is willing to take greater risks. But Ukraine is in better shape to resist Russian occupation than Iraq was to resist American. The point is that the US invasion went smoothly at first, then got bogged down in insurgency, and ultimately backfired both in political and geopolitical terms. Russia would be undertaking a massive expense of blood and treasure that seems out of proportion with its goal, which is to neutralize Ukraine’s potential to become a western defense ally and host of “military infrastructure.” However, there are drawbacks to partial invasion. The remainder of the Ukrainian state would be unified and mobilized, capable of integrating with the western world, and willing to support a permanent insurgency against Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Russia has forces in Belarus, Crimea, and the Black Sea, as well as on Ukraine’s eastern border, giving rise to fears that Russia could attempt a three-pronged invasion of the whole country. In short, it is conceivable that Russian leaders could make the Soviet mistake of overreaching in the military aims, or that a war in eastern Ukraine could inadvertently expand into the west. If Russia tries to conquer all of Ukraine, the global impact will be massive. A war of this size on the European continent for the first time since World War II would shake governments and populations to their bones. The borders with Poland, Romania, the Baltic states, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland and the Black Sea area would become militarized (Map 2). NATO actions to secure its members and fortify their borders would exacerbate tensions with Russia and fan fears of a wider war. Trade flows would become subject to commerce destruction, affecting even neutral nations, including in the Black Sea. Energy supplies would tighten further, sending Russia and probably Europe into recession. The disruption to business and travel across eastern Europe would be deep and lasting, not only due to sanctions but also due to a deep risk-aversion that would affect foreign investors in the former Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact. Germany would be forced to quit sitting on the fence, as it would be pressured by the US and the rest of Europe to stand shoulder to shoulder in the face of such aggression. Finland and Sweden would be much more likely to join NATO, exacerbating Russia’s security fears. Russia would suffer a drastic loss of trade, resulting in recession, and its currency collapse would feed inflation (Chart 7). Chart 7Inflation Poses Long-Term Threat To Putin Regime Ultimately the consequences would be negative for the Putin regime and Russia as a result of recession and international isolation. But in the short run the Russian people would rally around the flag and support a war designed to prevent NATO from stationing missiles on their doorstep. And their isolation would not be total, as they would strengthen ties with China and conduct trade via proxy states in the former Soviet Union. Bottom Line: A full-scale invasion of all of Ukraine is highly unlikely because it would be so costly for Russia in military, economic, and political terms. But the probability is not zero, especially because a partial re-invasion could lead to a larger war. While global investors would react in a moderate risk-off matter to a limited war in eastern Ukraine, a full-scale war would trigger a massive global flight to safety as it would call into question the entire post-WWII peace regime in Europe. Black Swan #3: Israel Attacks Iran The “bull market in Iran tensions” continues as there is not yet a replacement for the 2015 nuclear deal that the US abrogated. Our 2022 forecast that the UAE would get caught in the crossfire was confirmed on January 17 when Iran-backed Houthi rebels expanded their range of operations and struck Abu Dhabi (Map 3). The secret war is escalating and US-led diplomacy is faltering. Iran is not going to give up its nuclear program. North Korea achieved nuclear arms and greater military security and is now developing first and second strike capabilities. Meanwhile Ukraine, which faces another Russian invasion, exemplifies what happens to regimes that give up nuclear arms (as do Libya and Iraq). Iran appears to be choosing the North Korean route. While we cannot rule out a minor agreement between President Biden and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, we can rule out a substantial deal that halts Iran’s nuclear and missile progress. Here’s why: Any day now Iran could reach nuclear “breakout capacity,” with enough highly enriched uranium to construct a nuclear device (Table 3).4 Table 3Iran’s Violations Of 2015 Nuclear Deal Since US Exit Within Iran’s government, the foreign policy doves have been humiliated and kicked out of office while the hawks are fully in control. No meaningful agreement can be reached before 2024 because of the risk that the US will change ruling parties again and renege on any promises. Iran is highly incentivized to make rapid progress on its nuclear program now. The US will not be able to lead the P5+1 coalition to force Iran to halt its program because of its ongoing struggles with Russia and China. China is striking long-term cooperation deals with Iran. Israel has a well-established record of taking unilateral action, specifically against regional nuclear programs, known as the “Begin Doctrine.”5 Israel’s threats are credible on this front, although Iran is a much greater operational challenge than Iraq or Syria. Iran’s timeline from nuclear breakout to deliverable nuclear weapon is 12-24 months.6 Iran’s missile program is advanced. Missile programs cannot be monitored as easily as nuclear activity, so foreign powers base the threshold on nuclear capability rather than missile capability. Iran had a strong incentive to move slowly on its nuclear and missile programs in earlier years, to prevent US and Israeli military interference. But as it approaches breakout capacity it has an incentive to accelerate its tempo to a mad dash to achieve nuclear weaponization before the US or Israel can stop it. Now that time may have come. The Biden administration is afraid of higher oil prices and Israeli domestic politics are more divided and risk-averse than before. And yet Iran’s window might close in 2025, as the US could turn aggressive again depending on the outcome of the 2024 election. Hence Iran has an incentive to make its dash now. The US and Israel will restate their red lines against Iranian nuclear weaponization and brandish their military options this year. But the Biden administration will be risk-averse since it does not want to instigate an oil shock in an election year. Israel is more likely than the US to react quickly and forcefully since it is in greatest danger if Iran surprises the world with rapid weaponization. Here are the known constraints on unilateral Israeli military action: Limited Israeli military capability: Israel would have to commit a large number of aircraft, leaving its home front exposed, and even with US “bunker buster” bombs it may not penetrate the underground Fordow nuclear facility.7 Limited Israeli domestic support: The Israeli public is divided on whether to attack Iran. The post-Netanyahu government recently came around to endorsing the US’s attempt to renegotiate the nuclear deal. Limited US support: Washington opposes Israeli unilateralism that could entangle the US into a war. Israel cannot afford to alienate the US, which is its primary security guarantor. Iranian instability: The Iranian regime is under economic distress due to “maximum pressure” sanctions. It is vulnerable to social unrest, not least because of its large youth population. These constraints have been vitiated in various ways, which is why we raise this Israeli unilateralism as a black swan risk: Where there’s a will, there’s a way: If Israel believes its existence will be threatened, it will be willing to take much greater operational risks. It has already shown some ability to set back Iran's centrifuge program beyond the expected.8 Israeli opinion will harden if Iran breaks out: If Iran reaches nuclear breakout or tests a nuclear device, Israeli opinion will harden in favor of military strikes. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has an incentive to take hawkish actions before he hands the reins of government over to a partner in his ruling coalition as part of a power-sharing agreement. The ruling coalition is so weak that a collapse cannot be ruled out. US opposition could weaken: Biden will have to explore military options if talks fail and Iran reaches nuclear breakout capacity. Once the midterms are over, Israel may have even more freedom to act, while a gridlocked Biden may be looking to shift his focus to foreign policy. Iranian stability: Iran’s social instability has not resulted in massive unrest or regime fracture despite years of western sanctions and a global recession/pandemic. Yet now energy prices are rising and Iran has less reason to believe sanction regimes will be watertight. From Israeli’s point of view, even regime change in Iran would not remove the nuclear threat once nuclear weapons are obtained. Finally, while Israel cannot guarantee that military strikes would successfully cripple Iran’s nuclear program and prevent weaponization, Israel cannot afford not to try. It would be a worse outcome to stand idly by while Iran gets a nuclear weapon than to attack and fail to set that program back. Hence the likeliest outcome over the long run is that Iran pursues a nuclear weapon and Israel attacks to try to stop it, even if that attack is likely to fail (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Game Theory: Will Israel Attack Iran? Bottom Line: A unilateral Israeli strike is unlikely but would have a massive impact, as 21% of global oil and 26% of natural gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and conflict could disrupt regional energy production and/or block passage through the strait itself. Black Swan #4: Cyber Attacks Spill Into Real World Investors are very aware of cyber security risks – it holds a respectable though not commanding position in the ranks of likely crisis events (Table 4). Our concern is that a cyber attack could spill over into the real world, impairing critical infrastructure, supply chains, and/or prompting military retaliation. Table 4Cyber Events Underrated In Consensus View Of Global Risks Russian attacks on US critical infrastructure by means of ransomware gangs disrupted a US fuel pipeline, meat-packing plant, and other critical infrastructure in 2021. Since then the two countries have engaged in negotiations over cyber security. The Russian Federal Security Bureau has cracked down on one of the most prominent gangs, REvil, in a sign that the US and Russia are still negotiating despite the showdown over Ukraine.9 Yet a re-invasion of Ukraine would shatter any hope of cooperation in the cyber realm or elsewhere. Russia is already using cyberattacks against Ukraine and these activities could expand to Ukraine’s partners if the military conflict expands. Should the US and EU impose sweeping sanctions that damage Russia’s economy, Russia could retaliate, not only by tightening energy supply but also by cyber attacks. Any NATO partners or allies would be vulnerable, though some states will be more reactive than others. Interference in the French election, for example, would be incendiary. The key question is: if Russia strikes NATO states with damaging cyber attacks, at what point would it trigger Article V, the mutual defense clause? There are no established codes of conduct or red lines in cyber space, so the world will have to learn each nation’s limits via confrontation and retaliation. Similar cyber risks could emerge from other conflicts. China is probably not ready to invade Taiwan but it has an interest in imposing economic costs on the island ahead of this fall’s midterm elections. Taiwan’s critical role in the semiconductor supply chain means that disruptions to production would have a global impact. Israel and the US have already used cyber capabilities to attack Iran and set back its nuclear program. These capabilities will be necessary as Iran approaches breakout capacity. Yet Iran could retaliate in a way that disrupts oil supplies. North Korea began a new cycle of provocations last September, accelerated missile tests over the past four months, and is dissatisfied with the unfinished diplomatic business of the Trump administration. In the wake of the last global crisis, 2010, it staged multiple military attacks against South Korea. South Korea may be vulnerable due to its presidential elections in May. The semiconductor or electronics supply chain could be interrupted here as well as in Taiwan. Bottom Line: There is no code of conduct in cyber space. As geopolitical tensions rise, and nations test the limits of their cyber capabilities, there is potential for critical infrastructure to be impaired. This could exacerbate supply chain kinks or provoke kinetic responses from victim nations. Black Swan #5: OPEC 2.0 Falls Apart The basis of the OPEC 2.0 cartel is Russian cooperation with Saudi Arabia to control oil supply and manage the forward price curve. Backwardation, when short-term prices are higher than long-term, is ideal for these countries since they fear that long-term prices will fall. In a world where Moscow and Riyadh both face competition from US shale producers as well as the green energy revolution, cooperation makes sense. Yet the two sides do not trust each other. Cooperation broke down both in 2014 and 2020, sending oil prices plunging. Falling global demand ignited a scramble for market share. Interestingly, Russian military invasions have signaled peak oil price in 1979, 2008, and 2014. Russia, like other petro-states, has greater room for maneuver when oil revenues are pouring in. But high prices also incentivize production, disincentivize cartel discipline, and trigger reductions in global demand (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Invasions And Oil Price Crashes Broadly speaking, Saudi oil production rose modestly during times of Russian military adventures, while overall OPEC production was flat or down, and Russian/Soviet production went up (Chart 9). Chart 9Saudi And OPEC Oil Production During Russian Military Adventures Since 2020, we have held that OPEC 2.0 would continue operating but that the biggest risk would come in the form of a renewed US-Iran nuclear deal that freed up Iranian oil exports. In 2014, the Saudis increased production in the face of the US shale threat as well as the Iranian threat. This scenario is still possible in 2022 but it has become a low-probability outcome. Even aside from the Iran dynamic, there is some probability that Russo-Saudi cooperation breaks down as global growth decelerates and new oil supply comes online. Bottom Line: The world’s inflation expectations are elevated and closely linked to oil prices. Yet oil prices hinge on an uneasy political agreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia that has fallen apart twice before. If Russia invades Ukraine, or if US withdraws sanctions on Iran, for example, then Saudi Arabia could make a bid to expand its market share and trigger price declines in the process. Two Bonus Black Swans: Turkey And Venezuela Turkey lashes out: Our Turkish Political Capital Index shows deterioration for President Recep Erdogan’s political capital across a range of variables (Table 5). With geopolitical pressures increasing, and domestic politics heating up ahead of the 2023 elections, Erdogan’s behavior will become even more erratic. His foreign policy could become aggressive, keeping the lira under pressure and/or weighing on European assets. Table 5Turkey: Erdogan’s Political Capital Wearing Thin Venezuela’s Maduro falls from power: Venezuelan regime changes often follow from military coups. These coups do not only happen when oil prices collapse – sometimes the army officers wait to be sure prices have recovered. Coup-throwers want strong oil revenues to support their new rule. An unexpected change of regimes would affect the oil market due to this country’s giant reserves. Bottom Line: Turkey’s political instability could result in foreign aggression, while Venezuela’s regime could collapse despite the oil price recovery. Investment Takeaways We are booking profits on our tactical long trades on large caps and defensive sectors. We will convert these to relative trades: long large caps over small caps, and long defensives over cyclicals. We also recommend converting our tactical long Japan trade into long Japanese industrials / short German industrials equities. If US-Russia diplomacy averts a war we will reconsider.     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      “Gray Rhino” is a term coined by author Michele Wucker to describe large and probable risks that people neglect or avoid. For more, see thegrayrhino.com. 2     Xi Jinping recently characterized the “common prosperity” agenda as follows: “China has made it clear that we strive for more visible and substantive progress in the well-rounded development of individuals and the common prosperity of the entire population. We are working hard on all fronts to deliver this goal. The common prosperity we desire is not egalitarianism. To use an analogy, we will first make the pie bigger, and then divide it properly through reasonable institutional arrangements. As a rising tide lifts all boats, everyone will get a fair share from development, and development gains will benefit all our people in a more substantial and equitable way.” See World Economic Forum, “President Xi Jinping’s message to The Davos Agenda in full,” January 17, 2022, weforum.org. 3     Chancellor Scholz, when asked whether Germany would avoid using the Nord Stream II pipeline if Russia re-invaded Ukraine, said, "it is clear that there will be a high cost and that all this will have to be discussed if there is a military intervention against Ukraine.” He was speaking with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. See Hans Von Der Burchard, “Scholz: Germany will discuss Nord Stream 2 penalties if Russia attacks Ukraine,” Politico, January 18, 2022, politico.eu. 4     For the Begin Doctrine, see Meir Y. Soloveichik, “The Miracle of Osirak,” Commentary, April 2021, commentary.org. 5     The estimate of 12-24 months to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile has been cited by various credible sources, including David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, “Highlights of Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 24, 2021, isis-online.org, and Eric Brewer and Nicholas L. Miller, “A Redline for Iran?” Foreign Affairs, December 23, 2021, foreignaffairs.com. 6     See Edieal J. Pinker, Joseph Szmerekovsky, and Vera Tilson, “Technical Note – Managing a Secret Project,” Operations Research, February 5, 2013, pubsonline.informs.org, as well as “What Can Game Theory Tell Us About Iran’s Nuclear Intentions?” Yale Insights, March 17, 2015, insights.som.yale.edu.  7     See Josef Joffe, “Increasingly Isolated, Israel Must Rely On Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategika 35 (September 2016), Hoover Institution, hoover.org. 8     The sabotage of the Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center at the Natanz nuclear facility in July 2020 “set back Iran’s centrifuge program significantly and continues to do so,” according to David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and John Hannah, “Iran’s Natanz Tunnel Complex: Deeper, Larger Than Expected,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 13, 2022, isis-online.org. For a recent positive case regarding Israel’s capabilities, see Mitchell Bard, “Military Options Against Iran,” Jewish Virtual Library, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, January 2022, jewishvirtuallibrary.org.  9     For the FSB and REvil, see Chris Galford, “Russian FSB arrests members of REvil ransomware gang following attacks on U.S. infrastructure,” Homeland Preparedness News, January 18, 2022, homelandprepnews.com. For the Colonial Pipeline and JBS attacks, and other ransomware attacks, see Jonathan W. Welburn and Quentin E. Hodgson, “How the United States Can Deter Ransomware Attacks,” RAND Blog, August 9, 2021, rand.org. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights On US inflation and the Fed: If the Fed adheres to its mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2% (from its current level above 4%). Yet, share prices will sell off before inflation converges toward the Fed’s target. On US TIPS yields: Rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US, support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. On China: Despite stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. Besides, a bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. On financial market divergences: Major selloffs evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. Hence, the nature of current market dynamics is more consistent with a major selloff than a short-term correction. On regional allocation within a global equity portfolio: Overweight the euro area and Japan, underweight the US and EM. Feature Ms. Mea is a long-time BCA client and an avid follower of the Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) service. Since 2017, I have been meeting with her twice a year to exchange thoughts on the global macro environment, to discuss the nuances of our views and to elaborate on investment strategy. We always publish our conversations for the benefit of all EMS clients. This virtual meeting took place earlier this week. Chart 1A Technical Breakout Is In US Bond Yields Ms. Mea: It has been two years since we last met in person. I did not imagine that world travel would stay so depressed for so long when the pandemic began two years ago. I have also been surprised by the recent behavior of financial markets. There have been divergences that I cannot reconcile, such as the woes in China’s real estate sector and resilient commodity prices, the diverging performance of the S&P 500, US small caps and a significant portion of NASDAQ-listed stocks. I will ask you about these later. But let’s start with your main macro themes. Since early last year, you have been advocating two macro themes: (1) China’s slowdown; and (2) rising and non-transitory US inflation. They were controversial a year ago but have now become widely accepted in the investment community. Financial markets have moved a great deal to reflect these macro themes. Don’t you think financial markets have already fully priced in these macro trends? Answer: You are right that these narratives have become well known and financial markets have been moving to price in these developments. However, our bias is that these themes are not yet fully priced in and these macro forces will continue to impact financial markets over the near term. Let’s first discuss US inflation and interest rate moves. Chart 1 illustrates that US government bond yields have broken above major resistance levels. Such a breakout technically entails higher yields. Odds are that US long-term bond yields will move up by another 50 basis points in the months ahead before they pause or reverse. The fundamental justification for higher US bond yields is as follows: The inflation genie is out of the bottle in the US. If the Fed adheres to its inflation mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2%. In December, trimmed-mean CPI and median CPI printed 4.8% and 3.8% respectively, well above the Fed’s preferred range of 2-2.25% for core inflation (Chart 2). Critically, these inflation measures are not impacted by volatile components. These measures strip out outliers like used and new car prices, auto parts, as well as energy and food. The core CPI and PCE inflation measures will drop this year but super core inflation will remain north of 3%, well above the Fed’s preferred range. Importantly, a wage inflation spiral is already underway in the US. Employees have experienced substantial negative wage growth in real terms in the past 12 months. Labor shortages are prevalent, and the employee quit rate is very high. Employees are demanding very high wage growth and employers will have little choice but to meet these demands (Chart 3). Chart 2US Super Core Inflation Suggests Broad-Based Inflationary Pressures Chart 3US Wages Will Be Accelerating Chart 4Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Comparison As a result, the only way to bring down core inflation toward its preferred target range is for the Fed to slow the economy down and curb employment and wage gains. Yet before core inflation converges to the Fed’s target, risk assets will sell off first. Practically, the Fed will talk hawkish and hike until something breaks. The breaking point will be a major selloff in US share prices. US equities have been priced to perfection on the assumption that US interest rates will remain low for many years. As interest rate expectations rise further, US equity multiples are under pressure (Chart 4). Ms. Mea: The recent rise in US bond yields has been largely driven by the real component (TIPS yields), not inflation breakevens. That would usually imply improving US growth prospects. Yet US stocks have corrected as TIPS yields rose. How do you explain this and what should investors expect going forward? Answer: Indeed, the latest rise in US bonds yields is primarily driven by increasing TIPS yields, not inflation breakevens (Chart 5) TIPS yields have not been driven by economic growth expectations in the past couple of years. TIPS yields are breaking out and more upside is likely for reasons unrelated to US economic growth: The Fed’s rhetoric and guidance. TIPS yields typically move with 5-year/5-year forward yields, i.e., expectations for US interest rates in the long run (Chart 6). One of reasons why forward interest rates and TIPS yields have been low is the Fed’s commitment to keep interest rates extremely depressed for so long. As the Fed’s rhetoric has recently changed, so are interest rate expectations and TIPS yields. Given that core inflation will not drop to the Fed’s target range any time soon, the Fed will likely escalate its hawkish rhetoric. Hence, TIPS yields will keep rising, until something breaks. Chart 5US Tips Yields Have Broken Out After A Base Formation Chart 6US TIPS Yields More With Long-Term Interest Rate Expectations TIPS demand/supply and momentum. The TIPS market is relatively small, and it has been rigged by the Fed in the past two years or so. As a part of its QE program, the Fed has been buying a large share of TIPS, and it now owns 22% of this market. As a result, TIPS yields have fallen irrespective of economic growth dynamics. As the QE program ends, the Fed will stop purchasing TIPS. There has also been a rush into TIPS by institutional investors. In a quest for inflation protection when the Fed was complacent about inflation, investors have been opting for TIPS. This has also depressed TIPS yields. As the US central bank sounds more hawkish, investors’ demand for inflation protection will likely diminish. In addition, TIPS prices have recently plunged dramatically. Large losses could prompt further liquidation by investors pushing TIPS yields much higher. All of the above and the fact that TIPS yields remain negative suggest that they will continue rising in the coming months. Chart 7Rising TIPS Yields Warrant A Stronger US Dollar Ms. Mea: Your point that TIPS yields will continue rising in the months ahead irrespective of US inflation and growth dynamics is interesting. So, what are the implications of rising US bond yields, especially TIPS yields, on various financial markets? Answer: Falling/low TIPS yields have benefited long duration plays like US stocks, and especially US growth stocks. Declining TIPS yields were a drag on the US dollar (Chart 7). Finally, they also prompted portfolio capital flows to EM. Consistently, rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US (Chart 4, above) support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. Ms. Mea: But aren’t US share prices positively correlated with US interest rates? Answer: Not always. Chart 8 illustrates that the correlation between the S&P 500 and US Treasury yields varied over time. Prior to the mid-1960s, it was positive. From 1966 until 1997, US equity prices were negatively correlated with US Treasury yields. Since 1997, US share prices have been positively correlated with US government bond yields (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8US Stock-Bond Correlation: A Paradigm Shift In 2022? Chart 9Early 2020s = Late 1960s? We believe US markets are now undergoing a major paradigm shift in the stock prices-bond yields correlation. The latter is about to turn negative like it did in the second half of the 1960s. In the mid-1960s, the reason why the stock-to-bond yields correlation turned negative was because US core inflation surged well above 2% in 1966 (Chart 8, bottom panel). This marked a paradigm shift in the relationship between equity prices and US Treasury yields. The same is happening now. As we wrote a year ago in our Special Report titled A Paradigm Shift In The Stock-Bond Relationship, the proper roadmap for the US stock-to-bond correlation is not the last 10 or 20 years, but the second half of the 1960s. After US core CPI surged substantially above 2%, the S&P 500 became negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 9). Ms. Mea: Let’s now turn to emerging markets. How will EM financial markets perform amid rising US bonds yields? Also, which US yields matter most for EM financial markets, US Treasury yields or TIPS? Answer: Neither US Treasury yields nor TIPS yields have a stable correlation with EM stock prices. Correlations between US nominal bond yields, EM currencies and EM domestic bond yields vary over time. However, US TIPS yields exhibit a reasonably strong positive correlation with mainstream EM local bond yields and the US dollar's exchange rate versus EM currencies (Chart 10). Mainstream EM includes 16 markets but excludes China, Korea and Taiwan. Hence, as US TIPS yields move up, it is reasonable to expect the US dollar to strengthen against mainstream EM currencies and their local bond yields to rise (Chart 10). Currency depreciation and rising domestic bond yields will prove to be toxic for the share prices of these mainstream emerging markets. To sum up, rising US TIPS yields will jeopardize the performance of EM equities, currencies, local rates and credit markets. Ms. Mea: Aren’t many EMs better prepared for rising US nominal/real yields than they were in 2013? Answer: Yes, they are: many EM countries that were running large current account deficits in 2013 now have current account surpluses or small deficits (Chart 11, top panel). Besides, mainstream EMs ramped up their foreign currency debt in the years preceding 2013 while their foreign debt has changed little in the past 6-7 years (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 10Rising TIPS Yields Are A Risk To EM Domestic Bonds Chart 11Mainstream EM: Less Vulnerable To The Fed Now Than in 2013 Table 1Current Account Balances In Individual EM Countries Table 1 illustrates the current account balance in individual developing countries. Further, the share of foreign investor holdings in EM local currency bonds has declined a great deal in the past 2 years (Table 2). Finally, many mainstream EM central banks have hiked rates aggressively and their local bond yields have already risen considerably in the past 12 months. These also provide some protection against fixed-income portfolio capital outflows. All in all, vulnerability from foreign portfolio capital outflows in EM is much lower than it was in 2013. Nevertheless, EM financial markets will not remain unscathed if US rates march higher, the US dollar rallies and US stocks wobble. Based on the parameters displayed in Tables 1 and 2, the most vulnerable countries among mainstream EMs are Peru, Colombia, Chile and Egypt. Table 2Foreign Ownership Of Domestic Bonds: January 2022 Versus October 2019 Chart 12China"s Construction Cycle In Perspective Ms. Mea: Let’s now move to your second theme - China’s slowdown. This is well known and arguably priced in financial markets. Importantly, policymakers have been ratcheting up stimulus. Don’t you think now is the time to upgrade the stance on Chinese stocks and China-related plays? Answer: Despite the new round of stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. As we wrote in last week’s report titled Chinese Equities: Valuations and Profits, Chinese corporate earnings are set to contract in the next 6 months. This means that the risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks in absolute terms is not yet attractive. Importantly, even though property market woes are well known and housing sales and starts have collapsed, housing construction activity has remained resilient (Chart 12). The bottom panel of Chart 12 demonstrates rising completions, which is one of reasons why raw materials prices have been resilient. However, new funding for property developers has dried up and they will be forced to scale back completions/construction activity. Historically, EM non-TMT share prices lagged the turning points in China’s money/credit impulses by several months (Chart 13). Even though the money/credit cycle is now bottoming, a buying opportunity in stocks will likely transpire in a few months. In brief, a tentative bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. Chart 13China"s Credit Cycle And EM Non-TMT Stocks Ms. Mea: Another topic I wanted to discuss today is divergences in global financial markets. Some equity markets have already fallen significantly, while the S&P 500 index as well as a couple of individual EM equity bourses (India, Taiwan and Mexico) have been firm. There have been massive divergences within the US equity market in general and the NASDAQ index in particular. Besides, EM high-yield corporate spreads have widened but EM investment grade corporate spreads remain tight. Finally, commodity prices have remained firm despite both China’s slowdown and US dollar strength. How should investors interpret these divergences? Answer: Such divergences in financial markets often occur during major selloffs. Notable financial market downturns evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns, where some markets lead while others lag. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. For example, the EM crises in 1997-98 did not occur simultaneously across all EM countries. It began in July 1997 with Thailand, then spread to Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia, and finally to the rest of Asia. By August 1998, Russian financial markets had collapsed, triggering the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) debacle. The last leg of the crisis appeared in Brazil and culminated in the real's devaluation in January 1999. Chart 14Domino Effect In 2007-08 Similarly, the US financial/credit crisis in 2007-08 commenced with the selloff in sub-prime securities in March 2007. Corporate spreads began widening, and bank share prices rolled over in June 2007. Next, the S&P 500 and EM stocks peaked in October 2007 (Chart 14). Despite these developments, commodity prices and EM currencies continued to rally until the summer of 2008 when they finally collapsed in the second half of that year (Chart 14, bottom panel). There was a domino effect in financial markets in both the 2015 and 2018 turbulences. Initially, the selloffs started in the weakest links while other parts were holding up. Then, the selloff spread to all without exception. For example, in 2018, US share prices and high-yield credit spreads were doing quite well until October 2018. Then, a broad-based selloff transpired in the fourth quarter of 2018.  Just as chains break at their weakest links, financial market selloffs begin in the most susceptible sectors. Overpriced US stocks with little or no profits and currencies with zero or negative interest rates have been most vulnerable to rising US interest rates. That is why these segments have sold off first in response to rising US nominal and real rates. Our hunch is that the selloff in global markets due to rising US interest rates will broaden in the coming months. This does not mean that global stocks on the verge of a major bear market, but a double-digit drop in global share prices is likely. The last asset class standing will be commodity prices. These will likely be the last affected by rising US interest rates because many investors buy commodities as an inflation hedge. Besides, oil prices have also been supported by the geopolitical tensions around Ukraine and Iran. It might take investor concerns about the US economy and a slowdown in global manufacturing to trigger a relapse in commodity prices. Chart 15Rising TIPS Yields = European Equities Outperforming US Ones Ms. Mea: What investment strategy do you recommend in the coming months? Answer: As US interest rates continue rising and China’s recovery fails to transpire immediately, EM financial markets remain at risk. Therefore, we recommend a defensive stance for absolute return investors in EM equity and fixed income. We are also continuing to short a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar. As for global equity regional allocation, the outlook for EM performance is less certain than it was in the past 12 months. Clearly, rising US/DM interest rates herald US equity underperformance versus other DM markets, like the euro area and Japan (Chart 15). The basis is that non-US equities are not as expensive as US ones and, hence, are less vulnerable to rising interest rates. Chart 16EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not US Bond Yields Whether EM outperforms or not is mainly contingent on the US dollar, rather than US bond yields. The top panel of Chart 16 demonstrates that EM relative equity performance against DM has a low correlation with US bond yields. Yet, EM equities will underperform their DM peers if the USD strengthens (the greenback is shown inverted on the bottom panel of Chart 16). However, if the greenback depreciates, EM will certainly outperform the US in both equity and the fixed income space. Putting it all together, asset allocators should overweight the euro area and Japan, and underweight the US and EM in a global equity portfolio. Ms. Mea: What about EM local bonds and EM credit markets? Answer: EM credit spreads will widen, and EM local yields will not drop as US bond yields head higher and EM exchange rates depreciate. We continue to recommend investors underweight EM credit versus US corporate credit, quality adjusted. As for local rates, we largely remain on the sidelines of this asset class. Our current recommendations are as follows: receiving 10-year rates in China and Malaysia, paying Czech 10-year rates and betting on 10/1-year yield curve inversions in Mexico and Russia. For a detailed list of our country recommendations for equities, credit, domestic bonds and currencies, please refer to Open Position Tables below. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The most important question is whether the Fed will hike interest rates by more than what is currently discounted in markets, or less. More hikes will trigger a set of cascading reactions. US bond yields will initially jump, boosting the dollar. But this process could also undermine growth stocks, and the US equity market leadership. Equity portfolio flows have been more important in financing the US trade deficit, than Treasury purchases, since 2020. Hence, a reversal in these flows will undermine a key pillar of support for the dollar. On the flip side, less rate hikes will severely unwind higher interest rate expectations in the US vis-a-vis other developed markets, especially in the euro area and Japan. This means we could be witnessing a shift in the dollar, where upside is capped, and downside is substantial. Feature Chart 1The Dollar In 2021 The two most important drivers of the dollar over the last few months have been the spread between US interest rates and other developed markets, as well as the relative performance of US equities (Chart 1). Rising interest rate expectations in the US have led to substantial speculative flows into the US dollar. The outperformance of the US equity market has also coincided with notable portfolio inflows into US equities in 2021. This cocktail of macro drivers has pinned the US dollar in a quandary. If rates rise substantially in the US, and that undermines the US equity market leadership, the dollar could suffer. If US rates rise by less than what the market expects, record high speculative positioning in the dollar will surely reverse. The Dollar And The Equity Market The traditional relationship between the dollar and the equity market was negative for most of the first half of the pandemic. Monetary easing by the Federal Reserve stimulated global financial conditions setting the stage for an epic bull market. The correlation between the S&P 500 and the DXY index was a near perfect inverse correlation for much of 2020 (Chart 2). Chart 3US Equity Portfolio Inflows Have Been Substantial Since 2020 Chart 2The Dollar In ##br##2020 The big change in 2021 is that this correlation has shifted, as the Fed has pivoted on monetary policy. This means that investors have been betting on higher stock prices in the US, as well as higher interest rates. In short, portfolio flows into US equities have surged (Chart 3). For the long-duration US equity market, higher interest rates could push it to a tipping point, where it starts to underperform other developed market bourses. This will reverse these equity portfolio flows, hurting the dollar in the process. Profits, Interest Rates And The Dollar The key driver of equity markets is profits in the short run, with valuation starting to matter over the longer run. This in turn becomes the key driver of cross-border equity flows. These flows help dictate currency movements. For much of the previous decade, US profits did much better than overseas earnings. For this reason, the US equity market outperformed, pulling the dollar up, as foreign equity purchases accelerated (Chart 4). The post-pandemic era has seen inflation rising across the world, changing the paradigm for US profits. High inflation, and consequently, higher bond yields, have been synonymous with an underperformance of US profits (Chart 5). Banks profit from higher rates, as they benefit from rising net interest margins. Materials, energy, and industrial stocks, benefit from higher inflation via rising commodity prices that boost their pricing power. In a nutshell, rising inflation tends to be better for value stocks and cyclicals, sectors that are underrepresented in the US. This means portfolio flows into US equities, one of the key drivers of the capital account surplus, could be on the cusp of a substantial reversal. Chart 4The Dollar And Relative Profits Chart 5Bond Yields And Relative Profits Second, valuation in the US has become extended as interest rates have fallen. More importantly, US valuations have been more sensitive to changes in interest rates, compared to other developed markets (Chart 6). This is because the US stock market has become increasingly overweight long duration sectors, like technology and healthcare. Higher rates will undermine the valuation premium these sectors command. This will cause the US equity market to derate relative to other cyclical bourses. Chart 6Relative Multiples And Bond Yields The key point is that the US equity market has been the darling of the last decade, and leadership is at risk from higher rates, via a reset in both relative valuation and relative profits. So, while the US market could perform well in 2022, higher rates could undermine its relative performance to overseas bourses. This will curtail equity portfolio inflows, as capital tends to gravitate to markets with higher expected returns. The Dollar And Relative Interest Rates Over the long term, bond flows are the overarching driver of the currency market. Most market participants expect the Fed to be among the most hawkish in 2022. This is clear in the pricing of the Eurodollar versus Euribor December 2022 contract, or just the relative path of two-year US bond yields versus other markets. This in turn has helped drive speculative positioning in the US dollar towards record highs (Chart 7). Correspondingly, US Treasury inflows have accelerated in recent months, even though real interest rates have not risen that much (Chart 8). In level terms, the trade deficit (that hit a record low of -US$80bn in November) is being helped financed by renewed foreign interest in US Treasurys. Chart 8Interest Rates And Treasury Flows Chart 7Record Dollar Speculative Positions We see two major contradictions in the pricing of US interest rates, relative to other developed markets. First, rising inflation is a global phenomenon and not specific to the US. If inflation proves sticky, other central banks will turn a tad more hawkish to defend their policy mandates. If inflation subsides, the Fed might not be as aggressive in tightening policy as the market expects. This will unwind speculative long positions in the dollar. It will also slow portfolio inflows into US Treasuries. Second, the reality is that outside the ECB and the BoJ, most other developed market central banks have already tightened monetary policy ahead of the Fed. The ability of any central bank to tighten policy will depend on the health of the labor market, and the potential for a wage inflation spiral. One data point that has caught our attention is the participation rate across G10 economies - it is notable that the US has one of the lowest participation rates (Chart 9A). Given that many countries have seen their participation rate recover to pre-pandemic levels, it suggests upside in the US rate. This will be especially the case if fiscal stimulus, which could wane, has been a key reason why the US participation rate has stayed low. In a nutshell, the low participation rate in the US could be a reason the Fed lags market expectations for aggressive rate increases this year. On the flip side, a higher participation rate in places like Canada, Norway, and Australia, could allow their central banks to normalize policy faster than the market expects. There has been a loose correlation between relative changes in the participation rate, and relative changes in inflation across G10 economies (Chart 9B).  Chart 9BThe US Relative Participation Rate And Relative Inflation Chart 9AUS Labor Force Participation Is Low, But Improving Finally, relative monetary policy tends to be driven by relative growth. US growth remains robust but has been rolling over relative to other developed markets (Chart 10). This is occurring at a time when China is easing monetary policy, which tends to buffet non-US growth. Higher non-US growth could also tip the bond and currency market narrative that the Fed will tighten much faster than other G10 central banks. Chart 10Non-US Growth Is Improving, Relative To US Growth Conclusion The above analysis suggests we could be entering a paradigm shift in the dollar, where any response by the Fed could eventually trigger the same outcome. Higher rates than the market expects will initially boost the US dollar. But this process will also undermine the US equity market leadership, reversing substantial portfolio inflows in recent years. On the flip side, fewer rate hikes will severely unwind higher rate expectations in the US vis-a-vis other developed markets. Our concluding thoughts from our 2022 outlook, which are consistent with our views herein, were as follows: The DXY could touch 98 in the near term but will break below 90 over the next 12-18 months. An attractiveness ranking reveals the most appealing currencies are JPY, SEK, and NOK, while the least attractive are USD and NZD. Policy convergence will be a key theme at the onset of 2022. Stay long EUR/GBP and AUD/NZD as a play on this theme. Look to buy a currency basket of oil producers versus consumers. We went long the AUD at 70 cents. Terms of trade are likely to remain a tailwind for the Australian dollar. The AUD will benefit specifically in a green revolution.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Forecast Summary

Highlights In this week’s report we update our Chart Pack, updating familiar charts that underscore our strategic themes and cyclical/tactical views. Social unrest in Kazakhstan points to two of our strategic themes: great power struggle and populism/nationalism. A sneak preview of our Black Swan risks for the year: Iran crisis, Russian aggression, and a massive cyber attack. Recent market moves reinforce the BCA House View that investors will rotate out of US growth stocks and into global cyclicals and value plays.  We are sticking with our current tactical and cyclical views and trades. Feature Since releasing our key views for 2022, bond yields have surged, tech shares have sold off, and social unrest has erupted in Central Asia. These developments have both structural and cyclical drivers and are broadly supportive of our investment strategy. First, a brief word about Kazakhstan. The surge in unrest this week is a new and urgent example of one of our strategic themes: populism and nationalism. Long-accumulating Kazakh nationalism is blowing up and forcing the autocratic regime to complete an unfinished political leadership transition that began three years ago. Russia is now forced to intervene militarily to maintain stability in this important satellite state. If instability is prolonged, Russia will be weakened in its high-stakes standoff against the United States and the West over Ukraine. China’s interest in Kazakhstan is also threatened by the change in political orientation there. We will provide a full report on this topic soon but for now the investment implication is to stay short Russian equities. In the rest of this report we offer our newly revised chart book for investors to consider as they gird for a year that promises to be anything but dull. The purpose of the chart book is to update a succinct series of charts that underpin our key themes and views. Many of these charts will be familiar to regular readers but here they are updated with some notable points highlighted in the text. A Waning Pandemic And Global Growth Falling To Trend The Omicron variant of COVID-19 is causing a surge of new cases and hospitalizations around the world, which will weigh on economic activity in the first quarter. However, this variant does not appear to be a game changer. While it is highly contagious, not as many people who go to the hospital end up in the intensive care unit (Chart 1). China is in a difficult predicament that will continue to constrict the global supply side of the economy. Chinese authorities maintain a “zero COVID” policy that emphasizes draconian social restrictions to suppress COVID cases and deaths to minimal levels (Chart 2A). ​​​​​ But Chinese-made vaccines are not as effective as western alternatives, particularly against Omicron, as discussed in our flagship Bank Credit Analyst. Hence China cannot open its economy without risking a disastrous wave of infections. When China shuts down activity, as at the Yantian port last spring, the rest of the world suffers higher costs for goods (Chart 2B). Chart 3Global Growth Will Fall Back To Trend Global economic growth is decelerating from the peaks of the extreme rebound (Chart 3). The historic fiscal stimulus of 2020 (Chart 4A) is giving way to negative fiscal thrust, or a decline in budget deficits, that will take away from growth (Chart 4B). Chart 5Inflation Will Moderate But Remain A Long-Term Risk Yet a recession is not the likeliest scenario since growth is expected to stabilize given the resumption of activity across the world due to an improved ability to live with the virus. The Federal Reserve is considering hiking interest rates faster than the market had expected given that the unemployment rate is collapsing and core inflation is surging. The persistence of the pandemic’s supply disruptions adds to concerns. At the same time, a wage-price spiral is not yet taking shape, as our bond strategist Ryan Swift shows. Productivity is growing faster than real wages and long-term inflation expectations remain within reasonable ranges, at least for now (Chart 5). Three Strategic Themes In our annual outlook (“2022 Key Views: The Gathering Storm”)  we revised our long-term mega themes: 1. Great Power Struggle The US’s relative decline as a share of global geopolitical power, despite a brief respite last year, is indicated in Charts 6-8. ​​​​​ ​​​​​ Chart 8America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) 2. Hypo-Globalization An ongoing globalization process, yet one that falls short of potential, is shown in Charts 9-10. A tentative improvement in our multi-century globalization chart is misleading – it is due to lack of data reporting by several countries, which artificially suppresses the denominator.  Chart 9Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Chart 10AFrom 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization While trade sharply rebounded from the pandemic, the global policy setting is now averse to ever-deeper dependency on international trade. Chart 10BFrom 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization​​​​​ 3. Populism and Nationalism The post-pandemic cycle will see these structural trends reaffirmed. Charts 11-12 shows a rising Misery Index, or sum of unemployment and inflation, a source of political turmoil that will both reflect and feed these trends. Chart 11Misery Indexes Signal More Unrest, Populism, And Nationalism​​​​​​ Chart 12EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022​​​​​ Chart 12 highlights major markets that have local or nationwide elections in 2022-23, where policy fluctuations are already occurring with various investment implications. We are tactically bullish on South Korea and Brazil, strategically but not tactically bullish on India, and bearish on Turkey. Russia’s domestic sociopolitical problems are not all that different from Kazakhstan’s and its response may be outwardly aggressive, so we are bearish. Three Key Views For 2022 Our annual outlook also outlined three key views for this year: 1. China’s Reversion To Autocracy The government will ease policy to secure the economic recovery so that President Xi Jinping can clinch his personal rule for at a critical Communist Party personnel reshuffle this fall (Chart 13). Chart 13China Will Easy Policy Ahead Of Political Reversion To Autocracy A stabilization of Chinese demand in 2022 will be positive for commodities, cyclical equity sectors, and emerging markets. ​​​​​​ Policy easing will not lead to a sustainable rally in Chinese equities, as internal and external political risks remain high (Charts 14A & 14B). A “fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis”  is likely in the short run while a military conflict is not unlikely over the long run. ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​2. America’s Policy Insularity The Biden administration is focused on domestic legislation and the midterm elections, due November 8, 2022. Biden’s approval rating has deteriorated further, putting the Democrats in line for a loss of around 40 seats in the House and four seats in the Senate, judging by historic patterns (Chart 15). But our sense is that the Senate is still in play – Democrats probably will not lose four Senate seats – but they are likely to lose control of both chambers as things stand. However, the Democrats still have a subjective 65% chance of passing a partisan budget reconciliation bill, which would be a badly needed victory. The “Build Back Better” plan would include a minimum corporate tax and various social programs. Another round of fiscal reflation would reinforce the Federal Reserve’s less dovish pivot. Chart 16US Still At Peak Polarization Polarization will remain at historic peaks leading up to the election, as the Democrats will need “wedge issues” to drive enthusiasm among their popular base in the face of Republican enthusiasm. For decades polarization has correlated with falling Treasury yields and US tech sector equity outperformance (Chart 16). Midterm election years tend to see flat equity performance and falling yields, albeit with yields higher when a single party controls government, as is the case this year. 3. Petro-State Leverage Globally, commodity markets continue to tighten on the supply side. Our Commodity & Energy Strategist Bob Ryan outlines the situation admirably: The supply side is tightening in oil markets, where OPEC 2.0 producers have been unable to restore output under their agreement to return 400,000 barrels per day each month since August 2021. It is true in base metals, where the energy crisis in Europe and Asia are constricting supplies, particularly in copper. And it is true in agricultural commodities, where high natural gas prices are driving fertilizer prices higher, which will push food prices up this year. Demand for these commodities will increase as Omicron becomes the dominant COVID-19 strain, keeping consumption above production, particularly in oil. These are long-term trends. Oil and natural gas markets will probably remain tight throughout the decade, as will base metal markets. This is going to put enormous stress on the global energy transition to renewable energy over the next 10 years. The ascendance of left-of-center political parties in critical base-metal exporting states, and rising ESG initiatives, will increase costs for energy and metals producers; and global climate activism in boardrooms and courtrooms will push costs higher as well. Higher prices will be necessary to recover these cost increases. In this context, energy producers gain geopolitical leverage. Their treasuries become flush with cash and they see an opportunity to pursue foreign policy objectives. Conflicts involving oil producers are more likely when oil prices are swinging up (Chart 17). This trend is on display in Russia’s dispute with the West, where Europe is struggling with a surge in natural gas prices due to Russian supply constraints that weaken its resolve in the showdown over Ukraine (Chart 18, top panel). Chart 18Energy Prices: Biden's And Europe's Problem​​​​​ Yet even in the energy-independent US, the Biden administration is wary of pursuing policies against Russia or Iran that would ignite a bigger spike in prices at the pump during an election year (Chart 18, bottom panel). Biden will have to attend to foreign policy this year but will be defensive. Petro-states are not immune to domestic problems, including social unrest. Many of them are poor, unequal, misgoverned, and suffering from inflation. Iran is a prime example. Yet Iran has not collapsed under sanctions so far, the world is recovering, and Tehran has the advantage in its negotiations with the US because it can stage attacks across the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Military incidents could drive oil prices into politically punitive territory. Three Black Swans For 2022 This brings us to three “Black Swans” or low-probability, high-impact events for 2022. We will publish our regular annual report on this year’s black swans soon. For now we offer a sneak preview: 1. Iran Crisis In Middle East The fear of being abandoned by the US has kept Israel from acting unilaterally so far (Chart 19A). ​​​​​​ ​​​​ But an attack is not impossible if Iran reaches “breakout” levels of highly enriched uranium – and the global impact of an attack could be catastrophic (Chart 19B). The news media have been conspicuously quiet about Iran. Taken together, this scenario is pretty much the definition of a black swan. 2. Russian Aggression Abroad There is a 50% chance that Russia will stage a limited re-invasion of Ukraine to secure its control of territory in the east or along the Black Sea coast. Chart 20Black Swan #2: Russian Aggression Abroad Within this risk, there is a small chance (less than 5%) that Russia would invade all of Ukraine. We do not expect this and neither do other analysts. The total conquest of Ukraine is unlikely when Russia’s domestic conditions are weak and it faces so much unrest in other parts of its sphere of influence (including Belarus and Kazakhstan). As we go to press, Russia is staging a military intervention in Kazakhstan, which could expand. Kazakhstan could create a way for Russia to avoid its self-induced pressure to take military action against Ukraine. But most likely Russia and Kazakhstan will quell the unrest, enabling Russia to sustain the threat of a partial re-invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s low approval rating often triggers new foreign adventures and financial markets are pricing higher risks (Chart 20). 3. Massive Cyber Attack Amid the pandemic and inflation surge, investors have forgotten about the huge risks facing businesses and individuals from their extreme dependency on remote work and digital services. A cyber war is also raging behind the scenes. So far it has not spilled into the physical realm. Yet Russia-based ransomware attacks in 2021 showed that vital US infrastructure is vulnerable. Cyber stocks have topped out amid the recent tech selloff (Chart 21A). But the global average cost of data breaches is skyrocketing. Governments are devoting more resources to network security and cyber-security (Chart 21B), which should be positive for earnings. Chart 21ABlack Swan #3: Massive Cyber Attack​​​​​ Chart 21BBlack Swan #3: Massive Cyber Attack​​​​​ Investment Takeaways The revised Geopolitical Risk Index does not show as pronounced of an uptrend as the version published last year but it is still higher than in the late 1990s (Chart 22). Our reading of all available evidence points to rising geopolitical risk – at least until the current challenge to US global supremacy leads to a new equilibrium. Global policy uncertainty is also rising on a secular basis and maintaining its correlation with the trade-weighted dollar, which has rebounded despite the global growth recovery and rise in inflation (Chart 23). We remain neutral on the dollar. Chart 23A Secular Rise In Global Uncertainty Gold has fallen from its peaks during the onset of the pandemic and real rates suggest it will fall further. But we hold it as a hedge against geopolitical risk as well as inflation (Chart 24). Chart 24Stay Long Gold As Hedge Against Geopolitical Crisis As Well As Inflation The evidence is inconclusive about whether global investors will rotate away from US assets this year. The US share of global equity capitalization is stretched. Long-dated Treasuries will eventually reflect higher inflation expectations (Chart 25). Chart 25No Substitute For The USA Yet​​​​​ Chart 26Waiting For Rotation​​​​​ US equity outperformance continues unabated and emerging market equities are still underperforming their developed peers (Chart 26). Cyclically investors should take the opposite side of these trends but not tactically. The renminbi is tentatively peaking against both the dollar and euro. As expected, China’s policymakers are shifting toward preserving economic stability (Chart 27). Stabilization may require a weaker renminbi, though producer price inflation is also a factor for the People’s Bank to consider. Chart 27Strategically Short Renminbi And Taiwanese Dollar Taiwanese stocks continue to outperform Korean stocks (to our chagrin) but they have not broken above previous peaks relative to global equities. Nor has the Taiwanese dollar broken above previous peaks versus the greenback (Chart 28). So far Taiwan has avoided the fate of semiconductor stocks, which have sold off. This situation presents a buying opportunity for semi stocks but we remain short Taiwan as a bourse because it is central to US-China strategic conflict. Chart 28Strategically Short Taiwan​​​​​​ Chart 29Strategically Short Russia And EM Europe​​​​​​ Chart 30Safe Havens Look Attractive Russia and eastern European assets continue to underperform developed market peers as geopolitical risks mount across the former Soviet Union (Chart 29). Russia’s negotiations with the US, NATO, and the EU in January will help us to gauge whether tensions will break out to new highs. Assuming Russia succeeds in quashing Kazakh unrest, it will be necessary for the US to offer concessions to Russia to prevent the Ukraine showdown from worsening Europe’s energy crisis. Safe havens caught a bid in early 2021 and have not yet broken down. Our geopolitical views support building up safe-haven positions (Chart 30). Presumably one should favor global cyclical equities as the pandemic wanes and global growth stabilizes. But cyclicals are struggling to outperform defensives (Chart 31A). Chart 31AFavor Cyclicals On China's Stabilization​​​​​ Chart 31BFavor Cyclicals On China's Stabilization​​​​​ ​​​​​​​China’s policy easing is positive in this regard, although the new wave of fiscal-and-credit support is only just beginning and financial markets will remain skeptical until the dovish policy pivot is borne out in hard data (Chart 31B). Global value stocks have ticked up again versus growth stocks, suggesting that the choppy process of bottom formation continues (Charts 32A & 32B). Chart 32AValue’s Choppy Bottom Versus Growth Stocks​​​​​​ Chart 32BValue’s Choppy Bottom Versus Growth Stocks ​​​​​     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights US economic data remains robust, but economic surprises are rolling over relative to other G10 countries. Meanwhile, the Fed is turning a tad more hawkish, which is positive for the greenback in the short term but could hurt growth over a cyclical horizon.  A hawkish Fed and dovish PBoC could set the stage for an economic recovery outside the US. We are not fighting the Fed (dollar bullish in the near term), and most of our trades are at the crosses. These include long EUR/GBP, long AUD/NZD and long CHF/NZD. We also have a speculative long on AUD/USD. We were stopped out of our short USD/JPY trade at break even and will look to reinstate at more attractive levels. Feature The dollar was the best performing G10 currency last year (Chart 1), which begs the question if this outperformance will be sustained in 2022. In this week’s report, we go over a few key data releases in the last month and implications for currency markets. Most recently, PMI releases across the developed world have remained robust but are peaking (Chart 2). The key question is whether the slowdown proves genuine, and if so, whether the US can maintain economic leadership versus the rest of the G10. Chart 2AGlobal PMIs Are Softening, Especially In The US Chart 2BGlobal PMIs Are Softening, Especially In The US The next key question is what central banks do about inflation. It is becoming clearer that rising prices are not a US-centric phenomenon but a global problem (Chart 3). Our bias is that central banks cannot meaningfully diverge on the inflation front. This will create trading opportunities. Chart 3AInflation Is A Global Problem Chart 3BInflation Is A Global Problem Over the next few pages, we look at the latest data releases and implications for currency strategy. US Dollar: Strong Now, Weaker Later? The dollar DXY index fell 0.4% in December and is up 0.5% year to date. A growth rotation from the US to other economies continues, even though US economic data over the last month remains rather robust. The latest release of the ISM manufacturing index remained strong at 58.7 for December, but this has rolled over from 61.1 in the previous month. More importantly, the prices paid index fell from 82.4 to 68.2. This suggests inflationary pressures are coming in, which could assuage tightening pressure on the Federal Reserve.  In other data, the trade deficit continues to widen, hitting a record -$97.8bn in November. Durable goods orders for November rose 2.5%, the biggest increase in six months. The consumer confidence index from the Conference Board has also rebounded, rising to 115.8 in December. Home prices are also rising, with an increase of almost 20% year on year in October. This suggests monetary conditions in the US remain very easy, relative to underlying demand. A tighter Fed is what the US needs, but the perfect calibration of monetary policy could prove difficult to achieve. The Fed minutes this week highlighted a preference for a faster pace of policy normalization, in the face of a tightening labor market and persistent inflationary pressures. This put the US dollar in a quandary, relative to other developed market currencies. If the US tightens monetary policy, while China eases, it strengthens the dollar in the near term, but tightens US financial conditions that have been the bedrock of US demand. This will suggest peak US demand in the coming months, and a bottoming in demand for countries that are more sensitive to Chinese monetary conditions. Chart 4AUS Dollar Chart 4BUS Dollar The Euro: All Bets On China? The euro was up 0.4% in December. Year-to-date, the euro is down 0.5%. Inflation continues to rise in the eurozone, which begs the question of how long the ECB can remain on a dovish path and maintain credibility on its inflation mandate. PPI came out at 23.7% year-on-year, the highest in several decades. Core consumer price index (CPI) in the eurozone is at 4.9%, a whisker below US levels. Economic data remain resilient in the euro area, despite surging Covid-19 cases. The ZEW expectations survey rose to 26.8 in December from 25.9. The trade balance remains in a healthy surplus (though rolling over). In a nutshell, economic surprises in the eurozone have been outpacing those in the US over the last month. The ECB continues to maintain a dovish stance, keeping rates on hold and reiterating that inflation should subside in the coming quarters. According to their forecasts, inflation is headed below 2% by the end of 2022. This could prove wrong in a world where inflation is sticky globally and driven by supply-side factors. In the near term, we expect a policy convergence between the ECB and the BoE. As such, we are long EUR/GBP on this basis. Over the longer term, we expect the ECB to lag the Fed, and thus we will fade any persistent strength in the euro. Chart 5AEuro Chart 5BEuro The Japanese Yen: The Most Hated Currency The Japanese yen was down 2% in December. It is also down 0.6% year-to-date. Overall, the yen was the worst performing G10 currency in 2021. Good news out of Japan continues to be underappreciated, while bad news is well discounted. Industrial production rose 5.4% in November, from a contraction the previous month, and the Jinbun Bank manufacturing PMI edged higher in December to 54.3. Retail sales are inflecting higher, and the national CPI has bottomed, easing pressure on the Bank of Japan to remain ultra-accommodative. The bull case for the yen remains intact. First, as we have witnessed recently, it will perform well in a market reset, given it is the most shorted G10 currency. Second, and related, the yen tends to do well with rising volatility, which we should expect in the coming months. Third, Covid-19 infections in Japan remain low, meaning should global cases rollover, Japan could be quicker in jumpstarting an economic recovery. Finally, an equity market rotation from expensive markets like the US towards cheaper and cyclical markets like Japan, will benefit the yen via the portfolio channel. From a valuation standpoint, the yen is the cheapest G10 currency according to our PPP models. We were long the yen and stopped out at break even (114.40). We will look to re-enter this trade at more attractive levels. Chart 6AJapanese Yen Chart 6BJapanese Yen British Pound: Near-Term Volatility The pound was up 1.9% in December. Year-to-date, cable is flat. UK data continues to moderate from high levels, similar to the picture in the US. Covid-19 infections continue to surge, but the December manufacturing PMI remains resilient at 57.9. Retail sales and house prices are also robust, and the latest CPI print for November, at 5.1%, justifies the interest rate hike by the Bank of England last month. The near-term path for the pound will be dictated by portfolio flows, and the ability of the BoE to deliver aggressive rate hikes already priced in the market. With the UK running a basic balance deficit, a dry up in foreign capital could hurt the pound. This will also be the case if the BoE does not deliver as many hikes as is discounted by markets. A rollover in energy costs (electricity prices are collapsing), and potentially, inflation could be catalyst. The post-Brexit environment also remains quite volatile.  This short-term hiccup underpins our long EUR/GBP call. Longer term, incoming data continues to strengthen the case for the BoE to tighten policy. At 4.2%, the unemployment rate is at NAIRU. Wages are also inflecting higher. As such, the pound should outperform over the longer-term, as the BoE continues to normalize policy. Chart 7ABritish Pound Chart 7BBritish Pound Australian Dollar: Top Pick For 2022 The Australian dollar was up 2.2% in December. Year-to-date, the Aussie is down 1.4%. Covid-19 continues to ravage Australia, prompting the government to adopt measures such as threatening to deport superstar athletes who refuse to be vaccinated. Combined with the zero-Covid policy in China (Australia’s biggest export partner), the economic outlook remains grim in the near term. In our view, such pessimism opens a window to be cautiously long AUD. First, speculators are very short the currency. Second, low interest rates are reintroducing froth in the property market that the authorities have fought hard to keep a lid on. Home prices in Sydney and Melbourne are rising close to 20% year-on-year. Most inflation gauges are also above the midpoint of the RBA’s target. Our playbook is as follows: China eases policy, allowing Australian exports to remain strong. This will allow the RBA to roll back its dovish rhetoric, relative to other central banks. This will also trigger a terms of trade recovery and interest rate support for the AUD. We are cautiously long AUD at 70 cents, and recommend investors stick with this position. Chart 8AAustralian Dollar Chart 8BAustralia Dollar New Zealand Dollar: Up Versus USD, But Lower On The Crosses The New Zealand dollar was up 0.25% in December, while down 1.1% year to date. The Covid-19 situation is much better in New Zealand, compared to its antipodean neighbor, but recent economic developments still have a stagflationary undertone. Headline CPI and house prices are rising at the fastest pace in decades, but wage growth remains very muted. With the RBNZ that now has house price considerations in its mandate, the risk is that further rate hikes hamper the recovery. Data wise, the trade balance continues to print a deficit as domestic demand in China remains tepid. New Zealand currently has the highest G10 10-year government bond yield, suggesting marginally tighter financial conditions. Meanwhile, portfolio flows into New Zealand have turned negative in recent quarters, especially driven by defensive equity outflows. Overall, the kiwi will benefit from a recovery in China but less so than the AUD, which is much shorted and has a better terms of trade picture. As such we are long AUD/NZD. Chart 9ANew Zealand Dollar Chart 9BNew Zealand Dollar Canadian Dollar: Next Up After AUD? The CAD was up 1.4% in December. Year to date, the loonie is down 0.7%. The key driver of the CAD in 2022 remains the outlook for monetary policy, and the path of energy prices. We are optimistic on both fronts. On monetary policy, CPI inflation remains above the central bank’s target, house prices are rising briskly, and the trade balance continues to improve meaningfully. This provides fertile ground for tighter monetary settings. Employment in Canada is already above pre-pandemic levels and has now settled towards trend growth of around 2%. This suggests a print of 30,000 - 40,000 jobs (27,500 in December), is in line with trend. The unemployment rate continues to drop, hitting 6.0%. Oil prices also remain well bid, as outages in Libya offset planned production increases by OPEC. Should Omicron also fall to the wayside, travel resumption will bring back a meaningful source of demand. Net purchases of Canadian securities continue to inflect higher, as the commodity sector benefits from a terms-of-trade boom. We are buyers of CAD over a 12–18-month horizon. Chart 10ACanadian Dollar Chart 10BCanadian Dollar Swiss Franc: Line Of Defense The Swiss franc was up 0.8% in December and has fallen by 0.9% year to date. The Swiss economy continues to fare well amidst surging Covid-19 infections. Meanwhile, as a defensive currency, the franc has benefitted from the rise in volatility, especially compared to other currencies like the New Zealand dollar over the course of 2021 (we are long CHF/NZD). Economic wise, the unemployment rate has dropped to 2.5%, inflation is rising briskly, and house prices remain very resilient. This is lessening the need for the central bank to maintain ultra-accommodative settings. It is also interesting that the Swiss franc is well shorted by speculators engaging in various carry trades. Our baseline is that the Swiss National Bank is likely to lag the rest of the G10 in lifting rates from -0.75%, currently the lowest benchmark interest rate in the world. That said, this is well baked in the consensus suggesting any risk-off event or pricing of less monetary accommodation in other markets will help the franc. One area of opportunity is being long EUR/CHF, where the market has priced a very dovish ECB, even relative to the SNB. We are long this cross (which could suffer in the short term) but should rise longer term.  Chart 11ASwiss Franc Chart 11BSwiss Franc Norwegian Krone: A Beta Play On A Lower Dollar The Norwegian krone was up 2.7% in December and is down 0.9% year to date. Norway was a developed market beacon of how to handle the pandemic until the more contagious Omicron variant started to ravage the economy. The latest data prints suggest core CPI is falling and house price appreciation is rolling over. Headline inflation remains strong, and the latest retail sales release shows 1% growth month on month for November suggesting some resilience amidst the pandemic. The Norges Bank has been the most orthodox in the G10, raising interest rates and promising to continue doing so in the coming quarters. Should Omicron prove transient and oil prices stay resilient, this will be a “carte blanche” for the Norges bank to keep normalizing policy.  Norway’s trade balance and terms of trade remain robust. Meanwhile, portfolio investment in some unloved sectors in Norway could provide underlying support for the NOK. We are buyers of the NOK on weakness. Chart 12ANorwegian Krone Chart 12BNorwegian Krone Swedish Krona: A Play On China The SEK was up 0.3% in December and is down 1% year to date. The performance of the Swedish economy continues to strengthen the case for the Riksbank to tighten monetary policy. In recent data, the trade balance remains in a surplus as of November, household lending is rising 6.6% year on year (November), retail sales remain robust, and PPI is inflecting higher. Manufacturing confidence also improved in December, along with improvement in labor market conditions.  The Riksbank will remain data dependent, but it has already ended QE. It remains one of the most dovish G10 central banks and is slated to keep its policy rate flat at 0% at least until 2024. This could change if inflationary pressures remain persistent. A bounce in Chinese demand could be the catalyst that triggers this change.  We have no open positions now in SEK, but will look to go short USD/SEK and EUR/SEK should more evidence of a Swedish recovery materialize. Chart 13ASwedish Krona Chart 13BSwedish Krona Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Forecast Summary

Highlights For the time being, US core inflation will not drop anywhere close to the Fed’s target range. The Fed will continue tightening until something breaks. US bond yields and the US dollar are heading higher. The S&P500 will need to drop meaningfully for the Fed to stop tightening. The Fed’s tightening and the US dollar’s persistent strength amid the lack of recovery in the Chinese business cycle will eventually produce a drawdown in commodity prices in the coming months. Absolute-return investors should stay defensive on EM risk assets and asset allocators should continue to underweight EM versus DM in global equity and credit portfolios. Feature We are starting the year with a review of a few macro pillars of our view that will shape global financial markets in the coming months. US Core Inflation Will Prove Sticky… Chart 1Average Of All Core US Inflation Measures The average of seven various US core inflation measures – core CPI, core PCE, trimmed-mean CPI, median CPI, sticky core CPI, trimmed-mean PCE and market-based core PCE – has surged to 4% (Chart 1). Although the core inflation rate could decline in 2022 as supply bottlenecks ease and base effects become more favorable, it is unlikely to drop below 3%. Instead, it will remain well above the Fed’s inflation target. If the Fed adheres to its mandate, it will have to hike rates until inflation heads toward 2%. US core inflation will not drop toward 2% unless the economy slows materially. Consumer and business inflation expectations have risen substantially. US consumer inflation expectations for one and three years ahead have risen to 4-6%, and US non-farm businesses have been able to raise prices by 4.5% y/y in Q3 (Chart 2). We can say the genie – inflation and inflation expectations – is out of bottle and it will be hard to put it back in. Importantly, labor market shortages will persist, and employee wage demand will be strong. Employees’ current wage growth expectations are based on their inflation expectations in the next one to three years, not the next decade. Even though longer term inflation expectations remain somewhat muted, they will not prevent high wage growth. Critically, inflation has “eaten” into employee income: real wage growth – adjusted for headline consumer price inflation – has been negative in 2021 (Chart 3). Consistently, employees know their compensation has lagged inflation and will be demanding significant wage hikes in 2022. Chart 3Inflation Is "Eating" Into Wages In The US Chart 2US Inflation Expectations Have Risen Sharply   In short, a wage-price spiral of moderate proportions is unfolding. Given tight labor market conditions, businesses will have no choice but raise wages considerably and then try to pass the higher costs on to their consumers. … Prompting Higher US Bond Yields … Despite the surge in core inflation to a 30-plus year high, US bond yields have remained low. The long end of the US yield curve has continued to be suppressed even as the market participants raised their rate hike expectations. Not only has the expected terminal Fed funds target rate not risen much, but also the bond term premium has remained negative. The bond term premium is akin to the equity risk premium. Pronounced uncertainty about the US inflation outlook as well as elevated bond volatility warrant a higher bond term premium (Chart 4). … Which Will Push The US Dollar Higher… Rising US interest rate expectations will lead to a stronger greenback. Our US Dollar Liquidity Indicator points to continued firmness in the broad trade-weighted US dollar ( the latter is shown inverted in this chart) (Chart 5). Chart 5US Dollar Liquidity And The US Dollar Chart 4Inflation Uncertainty And High Bond Volitility Herald A Higher Term Premium   Our framework for the relationship between currencies and their interest rates is as follows: Scenario 1: When inflation is high or rising fast, the central bank is willing to hike rates and the economy can withstand higher borrowing costs, the currency will appreciate. Scenario 2: When inflation is high or rising fast and the central bank is unwilling to hike rates, the currency will depreciate. This is the case when the central bank falls behind the curve. Scenario 3: When the central bank is tightening but the economy cannot handle higher borrowing costs, the currency will depreciate. The US economy is presently able to handle higher interest rates. Hence, the US dollar is currently driven by the dynamics described in Scenario 1, i.e., rising interest rates will support the greenback. Chart 6US Household Finances Are Healthy Our rationale is that US interest rate sensitive sectors like housing and car sales have been restrained by supply shortages – not weak demand. In fact, there is large pent-up demand for both housing and autos and a reasonable rise in borrowing costs will not thwart this demand. Besides, US household debt and debt servicing costs have declined substantially in the past 10 years (Chart 6). US households are no longer highly indebted. This development – along with robust wage gains – will allow households to borrow more and service their debt. Finally, unlike in many other Anglo-Saxon countries, in the US it is long-term rates – rather than short ones – that matter for household debt servicing. Mortgages make up 70% of household debt in the US and the mortgage rate is tied to the 30-year bond yield. In many other advanced and emerging economies, mortgage rates are more influenced by the central bank policy rate than long-term bond yields. As a result, the US economy will be able to endure monetary tightening by the Fed better than other developed and emerging economies can handle rate hikes from their central banks. Specifically, mainstream EM economies (EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) will slow markedly as and if their central banks hike rates further (Chart 7). There is, however, a caveat: Even though Main Street America will be able to withstand a reasonable amount of rate hikes, Wall Street might not be able ride out these rate hikes. The difference is the starting point – US equity valuations are very high. … And Will Herald A US Equity Correction And Sector Rotation The spike in US core inflation is likely to engender a negative correlation between US share prices and bond yields, as was the case in 1966. We first made this argument in last year’s Special Report titled A Paradigm Shift In The Stock-Bond Relationship (Chart 8). Chart 7Mainstream EM: Monetary Tightening Will Dampen Growth Chart 8S&P500 And Bond Yields Correlation Will Turn Negative   The current episode in the US is akin to the second half of the 1960s when US core inflation and bond yields rose after decades of lingering at very low levels. Starting in 1966, US share prices became negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 9 – bond yields are shown inverted). Going forward, the S&P 500 will often take its cue from US bond yields: stocks will rally when bond yields decline, and tumble when bond yields rise. Given that we expect US Treasury yields to rise in the coming months (10-year yields will move well above 2%), the S&P 500 is likely to correct. The key risk to this view is the massive amount of cash on the sidelines, and widespread investor willingness to buy any dip in US equities. The absolute level of US retail money market funds currently stands at a formidable $1 trillion (Chart 10, top panel). However, this just represents a mere 2% of the US equity market cap (Chart 10, bottom panel). Hence, if institutional investors begin selling stocks, retail investors might not be able to support the market. Chart 9Early 2020s = Late 1960s? Chart 10Cash on Sidelines: A Lot Or Not So Much? Chart 11EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not Bond Yields Furthermore, rising US bond yields will cause US value stocks to outperform US growth stocks. Will EM stocks outperform US or DM ones as US bond yields rise? The top panel of Chart 11 illustrates that there has been no stable correlation between US bond yields and EM versus DM relative equity performance. Yet, there is a strong relationship between EM relative equity performance and the US dollar (Chart 11, bottom panel). If the broad trade-weighted US dollar rallies, EM stocks will underperform their DM counterparts (the greenback is shown inverted in the bottom panel of Chart 11). A sell-off in US stocks and bonds and the greenback’s rally will tighten US financial conditions considerably. The Fed is putting a lot of weight on financial conditions, especially when they are becoming restrictive. As US financial conditions tighten, the Fed will likely pivot, i.e., soften its hawkish stance. The Fed would likely argue that tight financial conditions will slow growth, which will in turn bring down inflation. Such a Fed pivot will potentially mark the end of a US dollar rally, enable American share prices to rise again, and EM stocks to start outperforming. However, we are not there yet. Bottom Line: For the time being, US core inflation will not drop anywhere close to the Fed’s target range. Hence, the Fed will continue tightening until something breaks. It will take a meaningful drop in the S&P500 (~20%) to make the Fed stop tightening. Commodity Prices Commodity prices have been caught between two opposing forces: US inflation and China’s slowdown. Worries about US inflation have made investors buy inflation hedges, and commodities are traditionally viewed as an inflation hedge. Yet, there is a caveat: Inflation is proliferating in the US but not in China. On the contrary, Chinese imports of key commodities contracted dramatically in H2 2021 (Chart 12). We are surprised that commodity prices have been so resilient despite shrinking Chinese commodity imports. Our sense is that commodity prices have been held up by two forces: strong global manufacturing activity and financial demand from investors. As for the green revolution, we believe it will be a major bullish force for select commodities in a couple of years. At the moment, however, it is not large enough to offset the slowdown in the Chinese economy. It might take investor concerns about US demand and/or a slowdown in global manufacturing to trigger a relapse in commodity prices. Rising US interest rates and a continued dollar rally will eventually result in a meaningful drawdown in commodity prices. Chart 13 demonstrates that the declines in the Swedish manufacturing PMI new orders-to-inventory ratio and the Swedish krona/Swiss franc cross rate point to downside risks in raw materials prices. Chart 12Chinese Imports Of Key Commodities Have Shrunk Chart 13A Red Flag For Commodities From Industrial Sweden   Bottom Line: Commodity prices have so far ignored China’s slowdown. However, the Fed’s tightening and the US dollar’s persistent strength amid the lack of recovery in the Chinese business cycle will eventually produce a drawdown in resource prices in the coming months. Investment Strategy For EM Chart 14EM Equities: No Profit Growth, No Bull Market EM share prices have been falling in absolute terms despite the strength in the S&P 500. The EM equity index will drop further due to the dismal EM profit outlook and the continued de-rating of Chinese TMT stocks. In absolute terms, the EM equity index is at the same level as it was in 2011 because EM EPS in USD has not expanded at all since 2011 (Chart 14). Investors are reluctant to pay high multiples for EM companies because they have produced zero earnings growth over the past 10 years. Besides, higher US bond yields and continued strength in the US dollar will lead to higher EM sovereign and corporate bond yields. EM non-TMT share prices typically wobble when EM US dollar borrowing costs rise (Chart 15). Chart 15Rising EM USD Borrowing Costs Are Bearish For EM Non-TMT Stocks We continue to recommend underweighting EM in a global equity portfolio. EM always underperforms DM when the greenback rallies. We maintain our short positions in a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar. Rising US bond yields and a firm greenback will continue weighing on EM fixed income markets – both local currency and US dollar ones. Fixed-income investors should favor US corporate credit over EM corporate and sovereign credit, quality adjusted. In local rates, we are betting on yield curve inversion in Russia and Mexico, receiving rates in China and Malaysia and paying rates in the Czech Republic. For the full list of our fixed-income, currency and equity recommendations, please refer to the tables below. These are also available on our website. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations