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Executive Summary Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues In this report, we discuss our move last week to shift to a below-benchmark overall global duration stance in more detail. Our strongest conviction view on developed market government bonds is underweighting US Treasuries. The outcome of last week’s FOMC meeting, where the Fed committed to a rapid shift to restrictive US monetary policy, supports that position. Our strongest conviction overweight is on Japan, with the Bank of Japan both willing and able to maintain its cap on longer-term JGB yields. We are also overweight countries where it will be difficult for central banks to lift rates as much as markets expect – core Europe, Australia and Canada. The explosion in UK bond yields, and collapse of the British pound, seen after last week’s UK “mini-budget” shows that investors have not lost the power to punish fiscal and monetary policies that are non-credible - like a massive debt-financed tax cut at a time of high inflation. As a result, the Bank of England will now be forced to raise rates much more than we had been expecting, and Gilts will remain extremely volatile in the near-term. Bottom Line: Maintain a below-benchmark overall duration stance in global bond portfolios. Stay underweight US Treasuries. Upgrade exposure to government bonds in Japan and Canada to overweight, but tactically downgrade UK Gilts to underweight until a more market-friendly policy mix leads to greater stability of the British pound. Feature We shifted our recommended stance on overall global portfolio duration to below-benchmark in a Special Alert published last week. In this report, we go into the rationale for that move in more detail, and present specific details of that shift in terms of allocations by country across the various yield curves. Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyReduce Global Portfolio Duration To Below-Benchmark The global inflation and monetary policy backdrops remain toxic for bond markets. Last week saw interest rate increases from multiple developed economy central banks, including the Fed and Bank of England (BoE). The magnitudes of the rate hikes unnerved bond investors, with even the likes of perennial low yielders like the Swiss National Bank and Riksbank lifting rates by 75bps and 100bps, respectively. The Fed followed up its own 75bp hike by digging in its heels on the need for additional policy tightening after the 300bps of hikes already delivered this year (Chart 1). Fed Chair Jerome Powell strongly hinted that a policy-induced US recession is likely the only way to return overshooting US inflation back to the Fed’s 2% target. This triggered a breakout of the benchmark US 10-year Treasury yield above 3.5%. But the real fireworks in global bond markets occurred after the UK government announced its “mini-budget” last Friday that included massive tax cuts to be funded by debt issuance, triggering a sharp decline in the British Pound and spike in UK Gilt yields – a move that spilled over into other bond markets, pushing government bond yields to cyclical highs in the US and euro area. Chart 1Central Banks Keep Trying To “Out-Hawk” Each Other Chart 2Yields Are Now Driven By Rate Hike Expectations, Not Inflation We had been anticipating another move upward in global bond yields for this cycle, and we shifted to a below-benchmark overall global duration stance in advance of the Fed and BoE meetings last week. We see this next move higher in yields as being driven not by rising inflation expectations but by an upward repricing of interest rate expectations, leading to additional increases in real bond yields (Chart 2). Trying to pick a top in bond yields has now become a game of forecasting the level to which policy rates must rise in the current global monetary tightening cycle. On that front, there is still scope for rate expectations, and bond yields, to move higher in most developed market countries, justifying our downgrade of our recommended overall duration exposure to below-benchmark. Shifting rate expectations also lead to the changes in country bond allocations we announced last week. Rate Expectations And Country Bond Allocations Our proxy for medium-term nominal terminal rate expectations in developed market countries, the 5-year/5-year forward overnight index swap (OIS) rate, has been tracking 10-year bond yields very closely in the US and UK and, to a lesser extent, Europe (Chart 3). In those regions, the OIS curves are pricing in an increasing medium-term level of policy rates, leading to markets repricing government bond yields higher. In the US, the OIS curve is pricing in a 2023 peak for the fed funds rate of 4.67%, but with only a modest path of rate cuts in 2024 and 2025, leading to a 5-year/5-year OIS projection of 3.36% as of Monday’s market close. After the Gilt market rout, the UK OIS curve is now pricing in a 2023 peak Bank Rate over 6%, with our medium-term nominal rate proxy settling at 3.69%. In the euro area, the OIS curve is discounting a 2023 peak in the ECB policy rate of 3.22%, with a 5-year/5-year forward OIS rate of 2.7%. For all three of those regions, the market is now pricing in the highest peak in rates for the current tightening cycle. That is not the case in Canada or Australia, where rate expectations and longer-term bond yields are still below cyclical peaks (Chart 4). Japan remains the outlier, with the Bank of Japan’s yield curve control keeping 10-year JGB yields capped at 0.25%, even with the Japan OIS curve pricing in a medium-term terminal rate of 0.75%. Chart 3Rising Yields Reflect Higher Terminal Rate Expectations Chart 4Our High-Conviction Government Bond Overweights After looking at all the repricing of interest rate expectations and bond yields, we can determine our preferred government bond allocations within our strategic model bond portfolio framework. The US Remains Our Favorite Government Bond Underweight The new set of interest rate forecasts (“the dots”) presented at last week’s Fed meeting showed that the median FOMC member was forecasting the fed funds rate to rise to 4.4% by the end of 2022 and 4.6% by the end of 2023, before falling to 3.9% and 2.9% and the end of 2024 and 2025, respectively. Those are all significant increases from the June dots, where the expectations called for the funds rate to hit 3.4% by end-2022 and 3.8% by end-2023. The median Fed forecasts are now broadly in line with the pricing in the US OIS curve for 2022-2024, although the market expects higher rates than the FOMC in 2025 (Chart 5). Chart 5USTs Still Vulnerable To Additional Fed Hawkish Surprises There has been a lot of back and forth between the Fed and the markets this year, but the market has generally lagged the Fed interest rate projections for 2023 and 2024 before last week. Market pricing is now in line with the Fed dots, as investors have adjusted to the increasingly hawkish message from Fed officials that are focused solely on slowing growth, and tightening financial conditions, in an effort to bring US inflation down. We see the US Treasury curve as still vulnerable to additional hawkish messaging from the Fed, and a potentially higher-than-anticipated peak in the funds rate versus the FOMC dots. The US consumer is facing a lot of headwinds from higher interest rates and rising food and gasoline prices. However, the latter has fallen 26% from the June 13/2022 peak and is acting as a “tax cut” that also helps reduce US inflation expectations (Chart 6). Consumer confidence measures like the University of Michigan expectations survey have already shown improvement alongside the fall in gas prices, which has boosted real income expectations according to the New York Fed’s Consumer Survey (bottom panel). Even a subtle improvement in consumer confidence due to some easing of inflation expectations can help support a somewhat faster pace of consumer spending at a time of robust labor demand and accelerating wage growth. The Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker is now growing at a year-over-year pace of 5.7%, while the ratio of US job openings to unemployed workers remains near a record high (Chart 7). Fed Chair Powell has noted that the Fed must see significant weakening of the US jobs market for the Fed to consider pausing on its current rate hike path. So far, there is little evidence pointing to a loosening of US labor market conditions that would ease domestically-generated inflation pressures. Chart 6Lower Gas Prices Can Provide A Lift To US Consumer Spending Chart 7A Tight US Labor Market Will Keep The Fed Hawkish Chart 8Stay Underweight US Treasuries We expect overall US inflation to decelerate next year on the back of additional slowing of goods inflation, but will likely settle in the 3-4% range in 2023 given stubbornly sticky services inflation and wage growth. The Fed should follow through on its current interest rate projections, with a good chance that rates will need to be pushed up even higher in response to resilient labor market conditions in the first half of 2023. The risk/reward still favors higher US Treasury yields over at least the next 3-6 months, particularly with an improving flow of US data surprises and with bond investor duration positioning now much closer to neutral according to the JPMorgan client survey (Chart 8). Bottom Line: The US remains our highest conviction strategic government bond underweight in the developed markets. Recommended Allocations In Other Countries The path for monetary policy rates outside the US shows a similar profile as in the US, with a “front loading” of rate hikes to mid-2023 followed by modest rate cuts over the subsequent two years (Chart 9). The OIS-implied path for the level of rates is nearly identical in the US, Australia and Canada. On the other hand, markets are discounting much lower of levels of policy rates in Europe and Japan compared to the US, and a considerably higher path for rates in the UK (more on that in the next section). Chart 9Markets Priced For Global 'Front-Loaded' Rate Hikes We would lean against the US-like pricing of interest rates in Australia and Canada. Based on work we published in a recent Special Report along with our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy, the neutral real interest rate (“r-star”) is estimated to be deeply negative in Australia and Canada after adjusting for the high level of non-financial debt in those countries (Table 1). That financial fragility makes it much less likely that the Bank of Canada and Reserve Bank of Australia can raise rates as much as the Fed. Table 1Some Big Swings In Our R* Estimates When Including Debt US-like interest rates would almost certainly trigger a major downturn in house prices and household wealth given the inflated housing values in those two countries – the growth of which is already slowing rapidly in response to rate hikes delivered in 2022. We are maintaining our overweight recommendation on Australian government bonds, while we upgraded Canada to overweight from neutral after last week’s duration downgrade. Chart 10Move To Overweight Japan We are also staying overweight on German and French government bonds, as the ECB is unlikely to deliver the full extent of rate increases discounted in the European OIS curve. Our estimated debt-adjusted r-star is also quite negative in the euro area, suggesting that financial fragility issues (due to high government debt in Italy and high corporate debt in France) will likely limit the ECB’s ability to continue with recent chunky rate increases for much longer. In Japan, we continue to view JGBs as an “anti-duration” instrument, given the Bank of Japan’s persistence in maintaining negative interest rates and yield curve control. That makes JGBs a good overweight when global bond yields are rising and a good underweight when global bond yields are falling (Chart 10). Given our decision to reduce our recommended duration exposure to below-benchmark, the logical follow through decision is to upgrade JGBs to overweight. The only remaining country to consider is our view on UK Gilts, which has now become more complicated. Anarchy In The UK The selloff in the UK Gilt market has been stunning in its ferocity. Dating back to last Thursday’s 50bp rate hike by the BoE, the 10-year UK Gilt yield has jumped 120bps and now sits at 4.52%. The increase in yields was identical at the front-end of the Gilt curve, with the 2-year yield jumping 120bps to 4.68%.  The surge in longer-term Gilt yields stands out to the rise in bond yields seen outside the UK, as it also incorporates an increase in our estimate of the UK term premium – a move that was not matched in other countries (Chart 11). The rise in Gilt yields was also much more concentrated in real yields compared to inflation expectations (Chart 12), as markets aggressively repriced the path for UK policy rates after the UK government’s announced debt-financed fiscal package, including £45bn of tax cuts. Chart 11Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues Chart 12The Gilt Market Becomes Unhinged The UK’s National Institute for Economic And Social Research (NIESR) estimates that the combined impact of the tax cuts and additional spending measures would increase the UK government deficit by a whopping £150bn, or 5% of GDP. The NIESR also estimated that the fiscal measures, including the previously-announced plan for the UK government to cap energy price increases, would result in positive UK GDP growth in the 4th quarter and also lift annual real GDP growth to 2% over 2023-24. The UK government now faces a major credibility issue with markets on its announced fiscal plans. The sheer size of the package, coming at a time when the US economy was already operating at full employment with high inflation, invites a greater than expected monetary policy tightening response from the BoE. The UK OIS curve now forecasts a peak in rates of 6.3% in October 2023, up from the current 2.25%. That would be a massive move in rates in just one year from a central bank that has been relatively gun shy in lifting rates since the 2008 financial crisis, even during the current inflation overshoot. New UK Prime Minister Liz Truss, and her new Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng, have both noted they would prefer a mix of looser fiscal policy (aimed at boosting the supply side of the economy to lift potential growth) with tighter monetary policy that would prevent asset bubbles and inflation overshoots. While there is certainly merit in any plan designed to boost medium-term growth by lifting anemic UK productivity through supply-side reforms, the timing of the announcement could not have been worse. Just one day earlier, the BoE announced a plan to go forward with the sale of Gilts from its balance sheet accumulated during quantitative easing. The Truss government needs to find buyers for all the Gilts that must be issued to pay for the tax cuts and stimulus, but the BoE will not be one of them. In the end, however, the BoE’s expected path for interest rates matters more than the increase in Gilt supply in determining the level of Gilt yields and the slope of the Gilt curve. The NIESR estimates that the UK public debt/GDP ratio will rise to 92% by 2024-25, versus its pre-budget forecast of 88%. While that is a meaningful increase, the correlation between the debt/GDP ratio and the slope of the Gilt curve has been negative for the past few years (Chart 13, top panel). The stronger relationship is between the slope of the curve and the level of the BoE base rate (bottom panel), which is pointing to an inversion of the 2-year/30-year curve if the BoE follows market pricing and lifts rates to 6%. Our view dating back to the early summer was that a low neutral interest rate would prevent the BoE from lifting rates as much as markets were discounting without causing a deep recession, lower inflation and, eventually, a quick reversal of rate hikes. The huge UK fiscal stimulus package changes that calculus, as the nominal neutral rate that will be needed to bring UK inflation back to target is likely now much higher. We have always believed that when a thesis underlying an investment recommendation is challenged by new information, it is best to adjust the recommendation to reflect the new facts. Thus, this week, we are tactically downgrading UK Gilts to underweight in our model bond portfolio framework. We still see a significant medium-term opportunity to go overweight Gilts, as UK policy rates pushing into the 4-6% range are not sustainable. However, the BoE will likely have no choice to begin lifting rates at a much more aggressive pace to restore UK policy credibility, especially with the British pound under immense selling pressure (Chart 14). Despite rumors of an inter-meeting rate hike by the BoE this week to try and support the pound, that is likely too risky a step for the BoE to take as it would invite a battle with investors and currency speculators. Such a battle would be difficult to win without a more credible and market-friendly medium-term fiscal policy from the Truss government. Chart 13The BoE Matters More Than Debt Levels For Gilts Chart 14Tactically Move To Underweight UK Gilts   Bottom Line: We will review our UK Gilt stance once there are more clear signals of stability in the pound, but for now, we will step aside and limit our recommended exposure to Gilts – even after the huge selloff seen to date, which likely has more to go. Summarizing All The Changes In Our Model Bond Portfolio All the changes to our recommended duration exposure and country allocations after the past week, including the new weightings in our model bond portfolio, are shown in the tables on pages 14-16. To summarize: We moved the overall recommended global duration exposure to below-benchmark, and shifted the model bond portfolio duration to 0.9 years below that of the custom benchmark index. We increased the size of the US Treasury underweight, and moved Canada and Japan to overweight. We moved the UK to underweight, on top of the reduction in UK duration exposure that was part of last week’s move to reduce overall portfolio duration. We are also cutting exposure to UK investment grade corporates to underweight, as part of an overall move to reduce UK risk in the portfolio. We slightly increased the overweight in Germany. In next week’s report, we will present the quarterly performance review of our model bond portfolio and, more importantly, we will present out scenario-based return expectations after all the changes made this week. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com     GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)
Canadian headline inflation eased to 7.0% y/y (-0.3% m/m) in August, down from 7.6% y/y (0.1% m/m) in July. Notably, this is a positive surprise to consensus estimates which had expected a less pronounced deceleration to 7.3% y/y (-0.1% m/m). In…
Special Report Executive Summary Central banks are aggressively tightening policy around the world. Their ability to rein in inflation without causing a recession depends upon the level of the real neutral rates. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden have elevated r-stars, but the picture changes drastically when their large debt loads are factored in. While real policy rates remain below r-star across DM economies for now, a more rapid decline in supply-driven inflation would correct this situation. Consequently, a global recession does not constitute our base case for the next six months, although it is a growing threat. The ECB is front-loading interest rate increases while it can, but the destination of travel is not changing significantly. Global R-Star Bottom Line: The global r-star varies greatly around the world and debt sustainability concerns weigh on the real neutral rates of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden. The US economy remains best capable of handling higher interest rates.   Chart 1Rising Global Inflation Inflation around G10 economies has been very strong and much more durable than originally hoped. As a result, inflation now averages 7.1% on a headline CPI basis and 4.6% based on core CPI across among G10 economies (Chart 1). Central banks are tightening policy aggressively to prevent this elevated inflation from becoming entrenched. Essentially, they are aiming to avert the emergence of the kind of inflationary mentality that prevailed in the 1970s, which caused stubborn inflation during that decade. This exercise is fraught with difficulty. The objective is to achieve a policy setting that is slightly above the neutral rate of interest, but not too much so. On the one hand, keeping policy too accommodative will increase the chances that an inflationary mentality will emerge; on the other hand, if policy is tightened too much, a recession will become unavoidable and deflationary risks will escalate. A sense of where the neutral rate for major economies lies is therefore necessary to draw that line in the sand. To do so, we estimate the real neutral rate of interest for major DM economies using the methodology we introduced seven weeks ago, when we evaluated the neutral rates for the major Eurozone economies. This exercise shows that, at the current level of interest rates and inflation, policy among major economies remains accommodative. However, if inflation decelerates sharply in the coming months in response to declining global supply constraints and lower commodity prices, the recent increase in policy rates will have already gone a long way to normalizing monetary policy around the world. A Simple Approach The methodology we use is based on the approach developed by Holston, Laubach, and Williams (HLW)  to estimate the neutral real interest rate – or “r-star.” Specifically, we run regressions between the real interest rates in the US, Japan, the UK, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland versus trend GDP growth and current account balances, which approximate the savings-investment balance. Mimicking the HLW methodology, the inflation expectations used to extract real interest rates from nominal short rates reflect an adaptative framework whereby inflation expectations are a function of the ten-year moving average of core CPI.1  Table 1Unadjusted R-Stars The results are shown in Table 1. New Zealand, Australia, and Canada have the highest real-neutral rate of the major economies. They have had stronger growth over the past 20 years because of their rapid population growth caused by high immigration rates. Moreover, their commodity-based economies and their booming construction sectors pushed up investment rates, which requires high interest rates to attract sufficient savings to finance. Sweden and the US follow. These two economies have lower population growth rates than the commodity producers; nonetheless, they outperform Japan and the other European nations in the survey on that dimension. Moreover, they fare comparatively well in terms of productivity growth, which implies that their trend growth – a key driver of the neutral rate – is also higher than that of the UK, Japan, Switzerland, or the Euro Area. The US’s r-star shows up as being slightly below what would be expected based on its potential GDP growth. This surprising outcome most likely reflects the role of the dollar in global FX reserves and its standing at the core of the global financial system. These two characteristics of the greenback create an important demand for dollar-denominated assets that is dissociated from US domestic economic fundamentals. This additional demand biases downward the US real neutral rate and suggests that weak trend growth abroad and global excess savings remain important forces for US financial markets. Chart 2Japan's Dissociated Real Rates Japan displays a surprisingly elevated real neutral rate of 0.1%. This result reflects the limitation of the approach. Japanese interest rates have been at zero since the late 1990s and real rates have been negatively correlated with inflation because of this nominal rigidity (Chart 2). However, while Japanese inflation has averaged a paltry 0.2% since 1997, it has nonetheless fluctuated with commodity prices and global economic activity. As a result, real rates have been essentially dissociated from Japanese domestic drivers. Hence, an empirical approach based on the evolution of domestic economic variables yields poor results for Japan. Instead, the lack of inflation when public debt has increased by 200% of GDP over the past 32 years and Japan’s large net international investment position imply that its r-star is inferior to that of the other countries in the sample, and thus should lie below -1%. For the Eurozone, we use the average result of our July study, which estimated the neutral rates of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain independently. Germany flatters this estimate since its real neutral rate stands near 0%. An average, excluding Germany, would be closer to -0.5%, or well below the US r-star. Meanwhile, the Swiss r-star is depressed by both a low population growth and the Swiss exceptional savings generation, as highlighted by its current account surplus that has averaged 8% of GDP over the past 20 years. Finally, the UK’s r-star stands at the bottom of the pack. The UK’s productivity growth has been very poor over the past ten years, averaging 0.7% per annum. This points to a weak potential GDP for that economy. Moreover, the hurdles to UK growth have only increased in recent years with the implementation of Brexit, which is hurting the availability of labor in the country, while putting the UK at an even greater disadvantage in European markets, its largest export destination. What About Debt? This approach to estimating r-star ignores a key dimension: debt sustainability. If we factor in this crucial variable, the level of interest rates causing economic activity to decelerate changes drastically for many countries. Chart 3Massive Real Estates Bubbles Since 2000, real estate prices have surged by 280%, 220%, 170%, and 200% in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Sweden, respectively. These gains dwarf the house price appreciation observed in the US, the UK, Japan, or Germany (Chart 3, top panel). This outperformance of house prices is particularly problematic because it does not reflect more rapid underlying cash-flow growth from the assets. Instead, the main driver of the stronger house prices in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Sweden has been the explosion of their price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios (Chart 3, bottom two panels). Rising real estate prices boosted economic activity relative to the underlying trend GDP of these countries. As a result, the long-term growth numbers of these four nations potentially overstate their underlying rate of growth. Even more importantly, real estate prices and activity are extremely sensitive to interest rates. Therefore, the risk of bursting bubbles in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Sweden limits how high interest rates may rise there without causing growth to plunge and deflationary spirals to emerge. Chart 4Rapidly Rising Debt Loads The accumulation of debt in these four countries accentuates the threats to growth created by real estate activity. The private-sector debt of New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Sweden has risen much more quickly than has been the case in Germany and the US (Chart 4). Ultimately, these debt burdens create major headwinds against higher interest rates and suggest that the effective r-star of these nations lies well below the estimates constructed using only trend growth and the savings/investment balance. Table 2Drastic Changes Once Debt Is Accounted For To account for the private-sector leverage, we estimated new debt-adjusted r-stars. The impact of high debt loads on r-star estimates is evident in Table 2. The average real neutral rate of New Zealand, Australia, and Canada drops from 1.9% to -1.9%. In fact, Australia and Canada would sport the lowest r-star estimates of the nations under study. Sweden’s neutral rate also experienced a big decline from 0.6% to 0.2%. The US r-star estimate is also lowered by the addition of debt metrics in its equation, declining from 0.2% to -0.4%. The Eurozone average r-star experiences a significant decrease as well, driven mostly by Spain and France. The Swiss economy also sports a large private debt load, and its r-star is therefore curtailed from -0.75% to -1.3%. Finally, Japan’s r-star estimate barely changes, which confirms that the approach does not work well for that country. The greatest drawback of the method is that it is backward-looking. The main force that has brought down the global r-star over the past 20 years is the collapse in trend growth among most advanced economies (Chart 5). Consequently, neutral rates could improve from their current low levels if trend growth were to pick up in the coming years. On the positive side, the current age of the capital stock in both Europe and the US is extremely advanced (Chart 6), which suggests that a capex upturn is likely. Such an upturn would boost productivity and lift the r-star among most major economies. On the negative side, the growth of human capital is deteriorating as educational attainment stalls among most DM nations. The decline in the growth rate of human capital is a large threat to productivity over the coming decades. These problems are magnified in the Eurozone, as its high degree of economic fragmentation, lack of common fiscal policy, and higher regulatory burden create further handicaps to trend growth. Chart 5R-star And Global Growth Chart 6A Capex Revival? Bottom Line: Estimating the real neutral rates for the global economy often relies on trend growth and the savings/investment balance. However, such an approach often misses the vulnerability to higher interest rates created by high private-sector indebtedness. If this constraint is considered, the high r-star recorded in countries like New Zealand, Australia, or Canada is reduced dramatically. The US r-star also declines but significantly less so. As we already showed seven weeks ago, the same phenomenon is also visible in the Eurozone, albeit driven by France and Spain, not Germany or Italy. Investment Implications There are three main conclusions from the analysis above. First, the risk of a financial accident in commodity-producing economies is growing increasingly large. On the one hand, economies like New Zealand, Australia, and Canada are buoyed by the recent surge in commodity prices, with agricultural prices up 90% since their 2020 lows, metal prices up 68%, and energy prices up 340% since April 2020. On the other hand, the inflationary pressures created by robust commodity sectors invite the RBNZ, the RBA, and the BoC to lift interest rates quickly, which is hurting massively indebted private sectors. Already, in response to the 275bps and 300bps of hikes implemented by the RBNZ and the BoC, house prices in New Zealand have begun to buckle, down 12% and since their more recent peaks, and they are expected to plunge by as much as 25% in Canada by the end of next year. Chart 7NZD And CAD At A Disadvantage This suggests that non-commodity equities in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, especially financials, could experience significant periods of underperformance, both against their domestic equity benchmark and global market averages. Additionally, while the NZD, AUD, and CAD all benefit from improving terms of trades, the potential for domestic weakness is such that these currencies are likely to lag their historical sensitivity to commodity price fluctuations. In fact, according to BCA’s foreign exchange strategist, the New Zealand and Canadian dollars are among the most expensive currencies in the G10 (Chart 7), and thus, it is likely to underperform other pro-cyclical currencies once the USD bull market reverses. Second, the neutral rate in the US has risen by 200bps relative to the rest of the world over the past seven years. The US economy has undergone a long deleveraging period in the wake of the GFC, which means that its private-debt-to-GDP ratio has declined relative to other advanced economies. Consequently, the vulnerability of the US economy to higher interest rates has decreased, even if relative US trend growth has not improved meaningfully. The market implications of this pickup in the neutral rate are manifold. To begin with, it allows US rates to rise further relative to other DM economies. BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy team continues to underweight US Treasurys in global fixed-income portfolios, especially relative to German Bunds (Chart 8). As a corollary, it also means that US financials are likely to continue to outperform their foreign peers, especially Canadian and Australian ones which will bear the brunt of the negative consequences of their debt bubbles. The increase in the US r-star relative to the rest of the world has been a key contributor to the dollar rally. It helps explain why the recent dollar strength has not hurt relative profit growth (Chart 9). However, the dollar is trading at a 32% premium to its purchasing power parity, or the same overvaluation as in 1985 and 2001. Thus, with the worsening US balance of payment picture, the US dollar is vulnerable to an eventual improvement in global growth next year. Chart 8US Rate Differentials Have Upside Chart 9The US Fares Better Chart 10Easy Or Not? Finally, despite the recent increase in rates, the high level of inflation recorded around the world implies that real policy rates are still well below r-star for major global economies, whether one uses actual inflation or the smooth formulation recommended by the HLW paper (Chart 10). This suggests that a recession is unlikely, especially in the US. The recession threat is higher in Europe but has little to do with policy. It is mostly a consequence of the massive terms of trade shock caused by the sudden jump in European energy prices in the wake of the Ukrainian war. However, because policy remains accommodative even in Europe, it follows that the Eurozone economy will rebound quickly once the worst of the energy shock is over next spring. Some humility is required. It is hard to gauge how much of the inflation surge over the past 18 months reflects supply factors. If inflation suddenly becomes much weaker because the easing in supply constraints has a greater-than-anticipated impact on inflation, real interest rates would jump rapidly around the world. In this scenario, policy rates could rise quickly and overtake r-star. This would mean that the disinflation impulse could rapidly morph into an outright deflationary environment, which implies that the odds of a deflationary bust like the one experienced in 1921 is greater than the market currently prices in.  Bottom Line: The debt-fueled real estate bubbles in the dollar-bloc economies suggests that they are at a greater risk of a financial accident than the US or the Eurozone. As a result, their financial sector looks vulnerable. Meanwhile, the higher US r-star compared to that of the rest of the world will continue to support higher yields in the US rather than in Europe or Japan. This phenomenon has been hugely positive for the US dollar, but it has likely run its course. Finally, global real interest rates remain below r-star estimates. Hence, the current slowdown is likely to prove to be a mid-cycle slowdown and Europe will rebound quickly from a potential recession caused by the recent surge in its energy prices. The ECB Joins The 75bps Club Last week, the ECB increased interest rates by 75bps, which brought its deposit rate to 0.75%. Interestingly, the euro did not rally much in response to this policy decision, even though it has not been fully discounted by the market. At first glance, the lack of responsiveness from European assets seems strange, especially since the vote for a 75bps rate hike was unanimous. The ECB is taking advantage of strong economic numbers to push up rates rapidly. The Eurozone Q2 GDP growth was robust at 0.6%, while the unemployment rate hit an all-time low of 6.6%. Meanwhile, inflation continues to beat consensus forecasts, with Eurozone core CPI and headline CPI standing at 4.3% and 9.1%, respectively in August. Chart 11Big ECB Revisions The market believes that more rapid interest rate hikes now will not translate into a much higher terminal rate, with the expected rates for June 2023 moving from 2.2% on September 7th to 2.4% after last Thursday’s decision. The ECB may have increased its inflation forecasts for the whole horizon, but it has also brought down GDP forecasts to 0.9% and 1.9% in 2023 and 2024, respectively (Chart 11). Moreover, ECB President Christine Lagarde went out of her way to telegraph to investors that the number of upcoming hikes was finite. The jumbo hike does not spell the start of a euro rally—for now. First, the lack of major change in the ECB’s terminal deposit rate is more important than the more rapid pace of hikes for the remainder of 2022. Second, the Fed is also lifting rates faster than investors expected ahead of the Jackson Hole meeting three weeks ago. Third, the euro remains vulnerable to any flare-ups in the energy market. True, natural gas and electricity prices have recently fallen, but the situation in Ukraine continues to be highly fluid, which suggests that volatility will linger in the energy market over the coming weeks.   Despite the near-term hurdles, the euro’s medium-term outlook is brightening. We are gaining confidence in our thesis that energy prices will peak once natural gas inventories have reached approximately 90% by November. Additionally, the support of the Governing Council’s doves for a 75bps hike suggests that they received something in exchange for their votes. In our view, this “something” is an activation of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) before year-end. The TPI activation will allow for a normalization of the risk premia in the Italian debt market and will support the ECB’s ability to increase interest rates further down the road, despite the much lower r-star in Italy, Spain, and France than in Germany (Table 3). Table 3The Eurozone’s Different R-Stars Will Force The TPI’s Activation Bottom Line: The ECB may have delivered a jumbo hike last week, but its market impact was muted. Investors understand full well that the ECB is taking advantage of the recent bout of robust economic activity to front-load interest rate increases ahead of a likely economic contraction in Q4 2022 and Q1 2023. As a result, the terminal rate estimates have scarcely moved. Ultimately, we expect the ECB deposit rate to settle between 1.5% and 2% in the summer of 2023. While the move may not provide much of a boost to the euro in the near term, conditions are falling into place for a euro rally later this year.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     For the US, we opted for core PCE, since it is the benchmark inflation measure the Federal Reserve uses.
On Friday, markets got a dismal Labor Market report for Canada. The market consensus expected 15 thousand jobs to be added in August, however 39.7 thousand jobs were lost. This marks the third consecutive monthly decline, bringing the total loss since May to…
Executive Summary Our negative view on the summer rally is coming to fruition, with equities falling back on the negative geopolitical, macro, and monetary environment. China is easing policy ahead of its full return to autocratic government this fall. Yet the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis has only just begun. Tensions can still deal nasty surprises to global investors. It is essential to verify that relations will thaw after the US midterm and Chinese party congress is critical. Russia continues to tighten energy supply as predicted. Ukraine’s counter-offensive is pushing back the time frame of a ceasefire deeper into next year. Putin may declare victory and quit while he is ahead – but Russia will not be forced to halt its invasion until commodity prices fall significantly. Sweden’s election will not interfere with its NATO bid; Australia’s new government will not re-engage with China; Malaysia’s election will be a positive catalyst; South Africa’s political risks are reawakening; Brazil’s risks are peaking; Turkey remains a leading candidate for a negative “black swan” event. China’s Confluence Of Domestic And Foreign Political Risk Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 17.4% Bottom Line: Investors should stay defensive in the short run until recession risks and geopolitical tensions abate. Feature Last week we visited clients across South Africa and discussed a broad range of global macro and geopolitical issues. In this month’s GeoRisk Update we relate some of the key points in the context of our market-based quantitative risk indicators. While we were traveling, US-Iran negotiations reached a critical phase. A deal is said to be “closer” but we remain pessimistic (we still give 40/60 odds of a deal). The important point for investors is that the supply side of global oil markets will remain tight even if a deal is somehow agreed, whereas it will get much tighter if a deal is not agreed. China’s rollout of 1 trillion yuan ($146 billion) in new fiscal stimulus and rate cuts (5 bps cut to 1-year Loan Prime Rate and 15 bps cut to 5-year LPR) is positive on the demand side and supports our key view in our 2022 annual outlook that China would ease policy ahead of the twentieth national party congress. However, it is still the case that China is not providing enough stimulus to generate a new cyclical rally. Second quarter US GDP growth was revised slightly upwards but was still negative. Russia tightened control of European energy, as expected, increasing the odds of a European recession. Europeans are getting squeezed by rising energy prices, rising interest rates, and weak external demand. China Eases Policy Ahead Of Return To Autocracy China is facing acute political risk in the short term but it is also delivering more stimulus to try to stabilize the economy ahead of the twentieth national party congress this fall (Chart 1). The People’s Bank of China cut the benchmark lending rate by (1-year LPR) by 5 basis points, while authorities unveiled fiscal spending worth 1 trillion renminbi. Chart 1China's Confluence Of Domestic And Foreign Political Risk After the party congress, the regime is likely to “let 100 flowers bloom,” i.e. continue with a broad-based policy easing to secure the recovery from the Covid-19 shock. This will include loosening social restrictions and aggressive regulations against industrial sectors like the tech sector. It should also include some diplomatic improvements, especially with Europe. But it is only a short term (12-month) trend, not a long-term theme. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyRoulette With A Five-Shooter China’s return to autocratic government under General Secretary Xi Jinping is a new, negative, structural factor and is nearly complete. Xi is highly likely to secure another decade in power and promote his faction of Communist Party stalwarts and national security hawks. The period around the party congress will be uncertain and dangerous. The exact makeup of the next Politburo could bring some surprises but there is very little chance that Xi and his faction will fail to consolidate power. The nomination of an heir-apparent is possible but of limited significance since Xi will not step down anytime soon or in a regular, predictable manner. Larger stimulus combined with power consolidation could spur greater risk appetite around the world, as it would portend a stabilization of growth and policy continuity. However, China’s underlying problems are structural. The manufacturing and property bust can be delayed but not reversed. China’s foreign policy will continue to get more aggressive due to domestic vulnerability, prompting foreign protectionism, export controls, sanctions, saber-rattling, and the potential for military conflict. Bottom Line: Investors should use any rally in Chinese assets over the coming 12 months as an opportunity to sell and reduce exposure to China’s historic confluence of political and geopolitical risk. Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Only Beginning The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis has only just begun. The previous three crises ranged from four to nine months in duration. The current crisis cannot possibly abate until November at earliest. Taiwan’s political risk will stay high and we would not buy any relief rally until there is a firm basis for believing tensions have fallen (Chart 2). Chart 2Taiwan: The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis If this year’s crisis were driven by US and Chinese domestic politics – the US midterm election and China’s party congress – then both Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping would already have achieved what they want and could proceed to de-escalate tensions by the end of the year – i.e. before somebody really gets hurt. The two leaders could hold a bilateral summit in Asia in November and agree to uphold the one China policy and status quo in the Taiwan Strait. We have given a 40% chance to this scenario, though we would still remain pessimistic about the long-term outlook for Taiwan. But if this year’s crisis is driven by a change in US and Chinese strategic thinking as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s rising domestic instability, then there will not be a quick resolution on Taiwan. The crisis would grow next year, increasing the risk of aggression or miscalculation. We have given a 60% probability to this scenario, of which full-scale war comprises 20 percentage points. Bottom Line: Our geopolitical risk indicator for Taiwan spiked and Taiwanese equities rolled over relative to global equities as we expected. However, our oldest trade to capture the high long-term risk of a war in the strait – long Korea / short Taiwan – has performed badly despite the crisis. South Korea: China Stimulus A Boon But Not Geopolitics US-China rivalry – and the thawing of Asia’s once-frozen conflicts – is also manifest on the Korean peninsula, where the limited détente between the US and North Korea negotiated by President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un has fallen apart. South Korea’s situation is not as risky as Taiwan’s but it is nevertheless less stable than it appears (Chart 3). Chart 3South Korea: Lower Geopolitical Risk Than Taiwan South Korea resumed its full-scale joint military exercise with the US, the Ulchi Freedom Shield, from August 22 to September 1. The drills involve amphibious operations and a carrier strike group. Full-scale drills were scaled down or cancelled under the Trump and Moon Jae-In administrations with the hopes of facilitating diplomacy and reducing tensions on the peninsula. North Korea was to discontinue ballistic missile tests and threats to the United States. But after the 2020 election neither Washington nor Pyongyang considered itself bound by this agreement. This year the US went forward with Ulchi Freedom even though regional tensions were sky-high because of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the De-Militarized Zone in Korea. The US is flagging its regional interests and power bases. North Korea is increasing the frequency of missile tests this year and is likely to conduct an eighth nuclear test. On August 17, it fired two cruise missiles towards the Yellow Sea. Pyongyang does not want to be ignored amid so many other geopolitical crises. It is emboldened by the fact that Russia and China will not be voting with the US for another round of sanctions at the United Nations Security Council due to the war in Ukraine and tensions over Taiwan. On August 11, South Korea responded to China’s insistence that the new government should abide by the “Three No’s,” i.e. three negatives that the Moon administration allegedly promised China: no additional deployments of the US’s Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, no Korean integration into US-led missile defense, and no trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan. Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin told reporters upon his return from China that the three no’s were “neither an agreement nor a promise.” South Korea’s new and conservative President Yoon Suk-yeol is unpopular and gridlocked at home but he is using the opportunity to reassert Korean national interests, including the US military alliance. Tension with the North and cold relations with China are coming at a time when the economy is slowing down. Korean GDP grew by 0.7% in Q2 2022 on a quarter-on-quarter basis, supported by household and government spending, while exports and investments shrank. Roughly a quarter of Korean exports go to China, its biggest trading partner. Korean exports to China have suffered due to China’s economic woes but cold relations could bring new economic sanctions, as China has hit South Korea before over THAAD. With the Yoon administration planning to bring the fiscal deficit back to below 3% of GDP next year, and a broader backdrop of weak Chinese and global demand, it is hard to find bright corners in the Korean economy in the near term. With Yoon’s basement level approval rating, he will resort to foreign policy to try to revive his political capital. Saber rattling and tough talk with North Korea and China will increase tensions in an already hot region – geopolitical risk is bound to stay high on the back of the Taiwan crisis. Bottom Line: On a relative basis, due to the ironclad US security guarantee, South Korea is safer than Taiwan. Investors wanting exposure to Chinese economic stimulus, electric vehicles, and semiconductors should go long South Korea. But some volatility is likely because the North’s eighth nuclear test will occur in the context of high and rising regional tensions. Australia: Stimulus Is Positive But No “Thaw” With China Australia is blessed with strong geopolitical fundamentals but it is seeing a drop in national security and economic security due to the deterioration of China relations. Domestic political turmoil is one of the consequences (Chart 4). Most recently Australia has been roiled by the revelation that former Prime Minister Scott Morrison secretly ran five ministries during the pandemic: the ministries of Home, Treasury, Finance, Resources, and Health. Chart 4Australian Geopolitical Risk Limited After an investigation and review by the Solicitor General Stephen Donaghue, Morrison’s action was determined to be legal, although highly inappropriate and inconsistent with the principles of responsible governance. Morrison’s appointments to these ministries were approved by the Governor General but the announcement or publication of appointments has always been the prerogative of the government of the day. One might think that this investigation is merely politically motivated but the Solicitor General is an apolitical position unlike the Attorney General, and Donaghue had been serving with Morrison, guiding him about the constitutionality of a vaccine mandate during the pandemic. The new Labor Party government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has vowed to be more transparent and will seek to enshrine a transparency measure into the law. Its political capital will improve, which is helpful for its ability to achieve its chief election promises. With the change of the government, it was hoped that there would be a thaw in the Australia-China relationship. China is Australia’s largest export destination and it erected boycotts against certain Australian exports in 2020 in response to Prime Minister Morrison’s inquiry into the origin of Covid-19. Hence Australia’s new defense minister, Richard Marles, met with his Chinese counterpart, General Wei Fenghe, on the sideline of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, which rekindled the hope that a thaw might happen. Yet a thaw is unlikely for strategic reasons, as highlighted by the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Biden administration’s retention of former President Trump’s tariffs, and Australia’s fears of China’s rising influence in the Pacific Islands. The US and Australia are preparing for a long-term policy of containing China’s ambitions. A few days after his election, Prime Minister Albanese flew to Tokyo to attend a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), sending a signal that there will be policy continuity with respect to Australian foreign policy. On May 26, Chinese fighter jets flew closely to an Australian surveillance plane on its routine operation and released aluminum chaffs that were ingested by the P8’s engines. An Australian warship, the HMAS Parramatta, was tracked by a People’s Liberation Army nuclear power submarine and multiple aircrafts on its way back from Vietnam, Korea, and Japan as part of its regional presence deployment in June. Currently Australia is hosting the Pitch-Black military exercise, with 17 countries participating. This exercise will last for three weeks – focusing on air defense and aerial refueling. It will also see the German air force with 13 military aircrafts deployed to the Indo-Pacific region for the very first time. They will be stopping in Japan after the exercise. As Australia’s policy towards China is unlikely to change, geopolitical risk will remain elevated. On the economic front, Australia’s misery index is at the highest point since 2000, with an unemployment rate at 3% and inflation at 6%. GDP growth in the first quarter was 0.8% compared to 3.6% in Q4 2021, propped up by government and household consumption while investment and exports contracted. The good news for the government is that it is inheriting this negative backdrop and can benefit from cyclical improvements in the next few years. Since the Labor government lacks a single-party majority in the Senate (where it must rely on the Greens and independents), it will be difficult for the government to raise new taxes. So far, Albanese has indicated that the budget to be tabled in October will focus on pre-election promises, which includes childcare, healthcare, and energy reforms. At worst, Australian government spending will stay flat, but it is unlikely to shrink considering Labor’s narrow control of the House of Representatives. Australian equities have not outperformed those of developed market peers despite high industrial metal prices. The stock market’s weak performance is attributable to the stumbling Chinese economy (Chart 5). Australian exports to China in June are still down 14% from June of last year. Chinese economic woes will be a headwind to Aussie growth and equity markets until next year, when Chinese stimulus efforts reach their full effect. Chart 5Australian Equities Have Yet to Benefit from Industrial Metal Prices On the other hand, the value of Australian natural gas and oil exports in June grew by 118% and 211% respectively (Chart 6), compared to June of last year. Chart 6Geopolitics: A Boon and Bane to Aussie Growth​​​​​ Bottom Line: As China will continue stimulating the economy and global energy markets will remain tight, investors should look for opportunities in Aussie energy and materials stocks. Malaysia Closes A Chapter … And Opens A Better One? Rarely do we get to revisit our positive outlook on Malaysia – a Southeast Asian state with an ability to capitalize on the US break-up with China. On August 23, the embattled ex-prime minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, lost his final appeal at the Federal Court in Putrajaya after being found guilty in 2020 for abuse of power, criminal breach of trust, and money laundering tied to Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund, 1MDB. The high court instructed that he serves his 12-years prison sentence immediately, becoming the first prime minister to be imprisoned in the country’s 60-years plus of history. Political risk has weighed on the Malaysian economy for almost a decade starting with the contentious 2013 general election, which saw the collapse of non-Malay voter support for the ruling party. Then came the 2015 Wall Street Journal bombshell about 1MDB, and then the 2018 general election that resulted in Malaysia’s first change of government since independence. The pandemic also led to political crisis in 2020. Each crisis resulted in a successive weakening of animal spirits and ever lower investments, resulting in Malaysia’s loss of competitiveness (Chart 7). Malaysia’s cheap currency was unable to increase its competitiveness, due to the low investments in the economy, and reflected higher political risks in the country (Chart 8). Chart 7Political Risk Undermines Competitiveness​​​​​​ Chart 8Cheap Currency Reflects Political Risk​​​​​​ Nonetheless this entire saga has proved that Malaysia’s legal system is independent and that its political system is capable of holding policymakers accountable. The next general election will come in a matter of months and recent state elections bodes well for the institutional ruling party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), and its coalition, Barisan Nasional. The coalition is managing to claw back support from the Malay and non-Malay voters. The opposition had the bad luck of ruling during the pandemic and its rocky aftermath, which has helped to rehabilitate the traditional ruling party. We have long seen Malaysia as a potential opportunity. But we would advise investors to wait until the new election is held and a new government takes power before buying Malaysian equities. With the conclusion of its decade-long 1MDB saga, we would turn more bullish if the next election produces a sizeable and enduring majority, if the use of racial and sectarian rhetoric tones down, and if the governing coalition pursues pro-competitiveness policies. Bottom Line: Structurally, Malaysia is one of the largest exporters of semiconductors and will benefit from the US’s shift away from China and attempt to reconstruct supply chains so they run through the economies of allies and partners. Russia: Escalating To De-Escalate? Russia increased the number of active military personnel in a move that points to an escalation of the conflict with Ukraine and the West, even as Ukraine wages a counter-offensive against Russia in Crimea and elsewhere. The time frame for a ceasefire has been pushed further into next year. As long as the war escalates, European energy relief will be elusive. Our risk indicators will rise again (Chart 9). Chart 9Russia: Geopolitical Risk To Rise Again, Ceasefire Pushed Back Into Next Year Ukraine will not be able to drive Russians out of territory in which they are entrenched. It would need a coalition of western powers willing to go on the offense, which will not happen. Russia is also threatening to cut off the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, ostensibly removing one-fifth of Ukraine’s electricity. Once the Ukrainian counter-offensive grinds to a halt, a stalemate will ensue, incentivizing ceasefire talks – but not until then. The Europeans will have to support Ukraine now but will become less and less inclined to extend the war as they get hit with recession. Russia says it is prepared for a long war but that kind of rhetoric is necessary for propaganda purposes. The truth is that Russia does not have great success with offensive wars. Russia usually suffers social instability in the aftermath. The best indicator for the duration of the war is probably the global oil price: If it collapses for any reason then Russia’s war machine will fall short of funds and the Kremlin will probably have to accept a ceasefire. This what happened in 2014-15 with the Minsk Protocols. Putin will presumably try to quit while he is ahead, i.e. complete the conquest and shift to ceasefire talks, while commodity prices are still supportive and Europe is economically weak. If commodity prices fall, Russia’s treasury dries up while Europe regains strength. So while military setbacks can delay a ceasefire, Russia should be seen as starting to move in that direction. The deal negotiated with Turkey and the United Nations to ship some grain from Odessa is not reliable in the short run but does show the potential for future negotiations. However, a high conviction on the timing is not warranted. Also, the US and Russia could enter a standoff over the US role in the war, or NATO enlargement, at any moment, especially ahead of the US midterm election. Bottom Line: Ukraine’s counteroffensive and Russia’s tightening of natural gas exports increases the risk to global stability and economic growth in the short run, even if it is a case of “escalating tensions in order to de-escalate” later when ceasefire talks begin. Italy: Election Means Pragmatism Toward Russia Italy’s election is the first large crack in the European wall as a result of Russia’s cutoff of energy. The party best positioned for the election – the right-wing, anti-establishment party called the Brothers of Italy – will have to focus on rebooting Italy’s economy once in power. This will require pragmatism toward Russian and its natural gas. Regardless of whether a right-wing coalition obtains a majority or the parliament is hung, Italian political risk will stay high in the short run (Chart 10). Chart 10Italy: Election Brings Uncertainty, Then Economic Stimulus Although the center-left Democratic Party (PD) is narrowing the gap with the Brothers of Italy in voting intentions, it is struggling to put together an effective front against the right-wing bloc. After its alliance with the centrist Azione party and +Europa party broke down, PD’s chance of winning has become even slimmer. Even if the alliance revives, the center-left bloc still falls short of the conservative parties. Together, the right-wing parties account for just 33% of voting intentions (Democrats at 23%, Greens and Left Alliance at 3%, Azione and +Europa at 7%). By contrast, the right-wing bloc has a significant lead, with 46% of the votes (Brothers of Italy at 24%, Lega at 14%, Forza Italia at 8%). They also have the advantage of anti-incumbency sentiment amid a negative economic backdrop. Unless some sudden surprises occur, a right-wing victory is expected, with Giorgia Meloni becoming the first female prime minister in Italy’s history. This has been our base case scenario for the past several months. But what does a right-wing government mean for the financial markets? In an early election manifesto published in recent weeks, the conservative alliance pledged full adhesion to EU solidarity and dropped their previous euroskepticism. This helps them get elected and is positive for investors. However, there are also clouds on the horizon: In the same manifesto, the right-wing parties pledged to lower taxes for families and firms, increase welfare, and crack down on immigration. These programs will add to Italy’s huge debt pile and eventually lead to conflicts with the ECB and other EU institutions. In the manifesto, they stated that if elected, they would seek to amend conditions of Italy’s entitlement to the EU Recovery Fund, as the Russia-Ukraine war has changed the context and priorities significantly. This could potentially put the EU’s grants and cheap loans at risk. Under the Draghi government, Italy has secured about 67 billion euros of EU funds. According to the schedule, Italy will receive a further 19 billion Euros recovery funds in the second half of 2022, if it meets previously agreed upon targets. The new government will try to accept the funds and then make any controversial policy changes. On Russia, the conservative parties claimed that Italy would not be the weak link within EU. They pledged respect for NATO commitments, including increasing defense spending. Both Meloni and her Brothers of Italy have endorsed sending weapons to support Ukraine. Still, we think that due to Italy’s historical link with Russia and the need to secure energy supplies, the new government would be more pragmatic toward Russia. On China, Meloni has stressed that Italy will look to limit China’s economic expansion if the right-wing alliance wins. She stated that “Russia is louder at present and China is quieter, but [China’s] penetration is reaching everywhere.” China will want to use diplomacy to curb this kind of thinking in Europe. Meloni also stated that she would not seek to pursue the Belt and Road Initiative pact that Italy signed with China in 2019. In short, we stand firm on our recommendation of underweighting Italian assets at least until a new government is formed. Europe Gets Its Arm Twisted Further The United Kingdom is going through a severe energy, water, and inflation crisis – on top of the long backlog at the National Health Service – as it stumbles through the aftermath of Covid-19 and Brexit. The Conservative Party’s leadership contest is a distraction – political risk will not subside after it is resolved. The new Tory leader will lack a direct popular mandate but the party will want to avoid an early election in the current economic context, creating instability. The looming attempt at a second Scottish independence referendum will also keep risks high, as the outcome this time may be too close to call (Chart 11). Chart 11UK: Tory Leaders A Sideshow, Risks Will Stay High Germany saw Russia halt natural gas flows through Nord Stream 1 as the great energy cutoff continues. As we have argued since April, Russia’s purpose is to pressure the European economies so that they are more conducive to a ceasefire in Ukraine. Germany will evolve quickly and will improve its energy security faster than many skeptics expect but it cannot do it in a single year. The ruling coalition is also fragile, even though elections are not due anytime soon (Chart 12). Chart 12Germany: Geopolitical Risk Still Rising France’s political risk will also remain high (Chart 13), as domestic politics will be reckless while President Emmanuel Macron and his allies only control 43% of the National Assembly in the aftermath of this year’s election (Chart 14). Chart 13France: Lower Geopolitical Risk Than Germany Chart 14Macron Will Focus On Foreign Policy Spain is likely to see its coalition destabilized and early elections, much like Italy this year (Chart 15). Chart 15Spain: Early Elections Likely Sweden, along with Finland, will be joining NATO, which became clear back in April. In this sense it is at the center of Russia’s conflict with the West over NATO enlargement, so we should take a quick look at the Swedish general election on September 11. Currently the left-wing and right-wing blocs are neck and neck in the polls. While the current Social Democrat-led government may well fall from power, Sweden’s new pursuit of NATO membership is unlikely to change. The right-wing parties in Sweden are in favor of joining NATO. The two parties that oppose NATO membership are the left-wing Green and Left Party. The Social Democrats were pro-neutrality until the invasion of Ukraine and since May have spearheaded Swedish accession to NATO. The pro-neutrality bloc currently holds 43 seats in the 349-seats Riksdag. It has a supply-and-confidence arrangement with the current government and is currently polling at 13%. If it was willing and able to derail Sweden’s NATO bid, it would already have happened. So the general election in Sweden is unlikely to stop Sweden from joining. However, Russia does not want Sweden to join and the entire pre- and post-election period is ripe for “black swan” risks and negative surprises. One thing that could change with the election is Sweden’s immigration policy. The Social Democrats are pro-immigration (albeit pro-integration), while the right-wing bloc is less so. Sweden has received a great many asylum seekers since the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 and will be receiving more from Ukraine and Russia (Chart 16). Chart 16Asylum Seekers to Surpass 2015 Refugee Crisis Our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor points out that the increase in asylum seekers could augment Swedish labor force and increase its potential growth in the long run, while in the short run it could increase demand in the domestic economy. But an increase in demand could also exacerbate inflation in Sweden, especially considering how much the Riksbank is behind the curve vis-à-vis the ECB. Our European Investment Strategy recommends shorting EUR/SEK as Sweden is less vulnerable to Russian energy sanctions. Sweden produces most of its energy from renewable sources. Relative to Europe, Canada faces a much more benign political and geopolitical environment (Chart 17). However, within its own context, it will continue to see more contentious domestic politics as interest rates rise on a society with high household debt and property prices. The post-Covid-19 period will undermine the Justin Trudeau government over time, though it is not facing an election anytime soon. Canada continues to benefit from North America’s geopolitical advantage, though quarrels with China will continue, including over Taiwan, and should be taken seriously. Aside from any China shocks we expect Canadian equities to continue to outperform most global bourses. Chart 17Canada: Low Geopolitical Risk But Not Happy South Africa: The Calm Before The Storm South Africa’s economy remains in a low growth trap, which is contributing to rising political risk (Chart 18). Electricity shortages continue to dampen economic activity. Other structural issues like 33.9% unemployment, worsening social imbalances, and a split in the ruling party threaten to cause negative policy surprises. Chart 18South Africa: Institutional Ruling Party At Risk The South African economy has failed to translate growth outcomes into meaningful economic development, leaving low-income households (the median voter) increasingly disenfranchised, burdened, and constrained. Last year’s civil unrest was fueled by economic hardships that persist today. Without a significant and consistent bump to growth, social and political risks will continue to rise. Low-income households remain largely state dependent. Fiscal austerity has already begun to unwind, well before the 2024 election, in a bid to shore up support and quell rising social pressures (Chart 19). Chart 19South Africa: Fiscal Easing Ahead Of 2024 Vote The fact that the social scene is relatively quiet for now should not be seen as a sign of underlying stability. For example, two of the largest trade unions led a nationwide labor strike last week – while we visited clients in the country! – but failed to “shut down” the country as advertised. Labor union constituents noted the ANC’s economic failures, demanded immediate economic reform, and advocated for a universal basic income grant. This action blew over but the election cycle is only just beginning. Looking forward to the election, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s ANC is still viewed more favorably than the faction led by ex-President Jacob Zuma, but Ramaphosa has suffered from corruption allegations recently that have detracted attention from his anti-corruption and reform agenda and highlighted the party’s shortcomings once again. The ANC’s true political rival, the far-left Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), have so far failed to capitalize on the weak economic backdrop. The EFF is struggling with leadership battles, thus failing to attract as many soured ANC voters as otherwise possible. If the Economic Freedom Fighters refocus and install new leadership, namely a leader that better reflects the tribal composition of the country, the party will become a greater threat to the ANC. But the overall macro backdrop is a powerful headwind for the ANC’s ability to retain a parliamentary majority. Global macro tailwinds that supported local assets in the first half of the year are experiencing volatility due to China’s sluggish growth and now stimulus efforts. Cooling metals prices and slowing global growth have weighed on the rand and local equity returns. But now China is enacting more stimulus. China is South Africa’s largest trading partner, so the decision to ease policy is positive for next year, even though China’s underlying structural impediments will return in subsequent years. This makes it hard to predict whether South Africa’s economic context will be stable in the lead-up to the 2024 election. As long as China can at least stabilize in the post-pandemic environment in 2023, the ANC will not face as negative of a macro environment in 2024 as would otherwise be the case. Investors will need to watch the risk of political influence on the central bank. Recently the ANC resolved to nationalize the central bank. Nationalization is mostly about official ownership but a change in the bank’s mandate was also discussed. However, to change the bank’s mandate from an inflation target to an unemployment target, the ANC would need to change the constitution. Constitutional change requires a two-thirds vote in parliament, a margin the ANC does not hold. Constitutional change will become increasingly difficult if the ANC sheds more support in the 2024 general election, as expected. Bottom Line: Stay neutral on South Africa until global and Chinese growth stabilize. Political risk is rising ahead of the 2024 election but it is not necessarily at a tipping point. Brazil And Turkey: Election Uncertainty Prevails We conclude with two brief points on Brazil and Turkey, which both face important elections – Brazil immediately and Turkey by June 2023. Both countries have experienced different forms of instability as emerging middle classes face economic disappointment, which has led to political challenges to liberal democracy. Brazil – President Jair Bolsonaro’s popular support is rallying into the election, as expected, but it would require a large unexpected shift to knock former President Lula da Silva off course for re-election this October (Chart 20). Brazil’s first round vote will be held on October 2. If Lula falls short of the 50% majority threshold, then a second round will be held on October 30. Bolsonaro faces an uphill battle because his general popularity is weak – his support among prospective voters stands at 35% compared to Lula at 44% today and Lula at 47% when he left office in 2010. Meanwhile the macroeconomic backdrop has worsened over the course of his four-year term. Bolsonaro will contest the election if it is close so Brazil could face significant upheaval in the short run. Chart 20Brazil: Risk Will Peak Around The Election Turkey – President Recep Erdogan’s approval rating has fallen to 41%, while his disapproval has risen to 54%. It is a wonder his ratings did not collapse sooner given that the misery index is reaching 88%, with headline inflation at 78%. Having altered the constitution to take on greater presidential powers, Erdogan will do whatever it takes to stay in power, but the tide of public opinion is shifting and his Justice and Development Party is suffering from 21 years in power. Erdogan could interfere with NATO enlargement, the EU, Syria and refugees, Greece and Cyprus, North Africa and Libya, or Israel in a way that causes negative surprises for Turkish or even global investors. Turkey will be a source of “black swan” risks at least until after the general election slated for June 2023 (Chart 21). Chart 21Turkey: A Source Of 'Black Swans' We will revisit each these markets in greater detail soon. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Senior Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com ​​​​​​​Yushu Ma Research Analyst yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix Geopolitical Calendar
Canadian headline inflation rose at a slower 7.6% y/y (0.1% m/m) pace in July, down from 8.1% y/y (0.7% m/m) in June. Decelerating gasoline prices were the main contributor to easing inflation. Excluding gasoline, CPI rose 6.6% y/y from 6.5% y/y in June.…
Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary Chart 1The Dollar Has Broken Below The First Line Of Support The softer CPI print in the US boosted growth plays and pushed the DXY index below its 50-day moving average (Feature Chart). This suggests CPI numbers will remain the most important print for currency markets in the coming weeks and months. If US inflation has peaked, then the market will price a less aggressive path for Fed interest rates, which will loosen support for the dollar. At the same time, other G10 central banks are still seeing accelerating inflation. This will keep them on a tightening path. This puts the DXY in a tug of war. On the downside, the Fed could turn less hawkish. On the other hand, currencies such as the EUR, GBP and even SEK face high inflation but deteriorating growth. This will depress real rates. Within this context, the most attractive currencies are those with relatively higher real rates, and a real prospect of a turnaround in growth. NOK and AUD stand out as potential candidates. Our short EUR/JPY trade has been performing well in this context. Stick with it.  RECOMMENDATIONS INCEPTION LEVEL inception date RETURN Short EUR/JPY 141.20 2022-07-21 3.29 Bottom Line: Our recommended strategy is a neutral dollar view over the next three months, until it becomes clear inflation has peaked and global growth has bottomed. Feature The DXY index peaked at 108.64 on July 14 and has dropped to 105.1 as we go to press. There have been two critical drivers of this move. First, the 10-year US Treasury yield has fallen from 3.5% to 2.8%. With this week’s all important CPI release, which showed a sharp deceleration in the headline measure, bond yields may well stabilize at current levels for a while. Second, the drop in energy prices has boosted the JPY, SEK and EUR, which are heavily dependent on imported energy. Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyA Montreal Conversation On FX Markets Another development has been happening in parallel – as US inflation upside surprises have crested, so has the US price impulse relative to its G10 counterparts (Chart 1). To the extent that this eases market pricing of a hawkish Fed (relative to other G10 central banks), it will continue to diminish upward pressure on the dollar. Much will depend on the incoming inflation prints both in the US, and abroad. With the DXY having broken below its 50-day moving average, the next support level is at 103.6. This is where the 100-day moving average lies, which the dollar tested twice this year before eventually bouncing higher (Chart 2). The next few sections cover the important data releases over the last month in our universe of G10 countries, and implications for currency strategy. What is clear is that most foreign central banks are committed to their tightening campaign, which argues for a neutral stance towards the DXY for now. Chart 1US Inflation Momentum Has Rolled Over Chart 2The Dollar Has Broken Below The First Line Of Support US Dollar: Consolidation Chart 3The Conditions For A Fed Hike Remain In Place The dollar DXY index is up 10% year to date. Over the last month, the DXY index is down 2.1% (panel 1). Incoming data continues to make the case for a strong dollar. Job gains are robust. In June, the US added 372K jobs. The July release was even stronger at 528K jobs. This pushed the unemployment rate to a low of 3.5% (panel 2). Wages continue to soar. Average hourly earnings came in at 5.2% year-on-year in July. The Atlanta Fed wage growth tracker continues to edge higher across all income cohorts (panel 3). The June CPI print was above expectations at 9.1% for headline, with core at 5.9%. The July print for headline that came out this week was 8.5%, below expectations of 8.7%. At 5.9%, the core measure is still well above the Fed’s target (panel 4). June retail sales remained firm, but consumer sentiment continues to weaken. While the University of Michigan current conditions index increase from 53.8 to 58.1 in June, this is well below the January 2020 level of 115. Correspondingly, the Conference Board consumer confidence index fell from 98.7 to 95.7 in July. On June 17, the Fed increased interest rates by 75bps, as expected. The US entered a second consecutive quarter of GDP growth contraction in Q2, falling by an annualized 0.9%. The ISM manufacturing index was flat in July suggesting Q3 GDP is not starting on a particularly strong foot. The Atlanta Fed Q3 GDP growth tracker is, however, printing 2.5%. Unit labor costs are soaring, rising 10.8% in Q2. This is sapping productivity growth, which fell 4.6% in Q2.  The key for the dollar’s outlook is the evolution of US inflation and the labor market. For now, inflation remains sticky, and wages are rising. Meanwhile, labor market conditions remain robust. This will keep the Fed on a tightening path in the near term. We initially went short the DXY index but were stopped out. We remain neutral in the short term, though valuation keeps us bearish over a long-term horizon. The Euro: A European Hard Landing Chart 4The Euro Is At Recession Lows The euro is down 9.2% year to date. Over the last month, the euro is up 2.7%, having faced support a nudge below parity. Incoming data continues to suggest weak economic conditions, with a stagflationary undertone: The ZEW Expectations Survey for July was at -51.1, the lowest reading since 2011 (panel 1). The current account remains in a deficit, at -€4.5bn in May. Consumer confidence continues to plunge. The July reading of -27 is the worst since the 2020 Covid-19 crisis (panel 2). Despite the above data releases, the ECB surprised markets by raising rates 50bps. CPI continues to surprise to the upside. The preliminary CPI print for July came in at 8.9%, well above the previous 8.6% print. PPI in the euro area was at 35.8% in June, a slight decline from the May reading (panel 3). The German Ifo business expectations index fell to 80.3 in July. Historically, that has been consistent with a manufacturing PMI reading of 45 (panel 4). The Sentix confidence index stabilized in August but remains very weak at -25.2. This series tends to be trending, having peaked in July last year. We will see if the next few months continue to show stabilization. The ECB mandate dictates that it will continue to fight soaring inflation. As such, it may have no choice but to generate a Eurozone-wide recession. This is the key risk for the euro since it could push EUR/USD below parity again. We continue to sell the EUR/JPY cross. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY will collapse. In a risk-on environment, like this week, the yen can still benefit since it is oversold. Meanwhile, investors remain overwhelmingly bearish (panel 5). The Japanese Yen: Quite A Hefty Rally Chart 5Some Green Shoots In Japan The Japanese yen is down 13.4% year-to-date, the worst performing G10 currency (panel 1). Over the last month, the yen is up 3.3%. Incoming data in Japan has been worsening as the rising number of Covid-19 cases is hitting mobility and economic data. According to the Eco Watcher’s survey, sentiment among small and medium-sized Japanese firms deteriorated in July. Current conditions fell from 52.9 to 43.8. The outlook component also declined from 47.6 to 42.8. Machine tool order momentum, one of our favorite measures of external demand, continues to slow. Peak growth was at 141.9% year-on-year in May last year. The preliminary reading from July was at 5.5% (panel 2). Labor cash earnings came in at 2.2% year-on-year, a positive sign. Household spending also rose 3.5%. Rising wages could keep inflation momentum rising in Japan (panel 3). On that note, the Tokyo CPI report for July was also encouraging, with an increase in the core-core measure from 1% to 1.2%. The Tokyo CPI tends to lead nationwide measures. The labor market remains robust. Labor demand exceeds supply by 27%. The Bank of Japan kept monetary policy on hold on July 20th, a policy move that makes sense given incoming data. The BoJ still views a large chunk of inflation in Japan as transitory. For inflation to pick up, wages need to rise. While they are rising, inflation expectations remain well anchored, suggesting little rationale for the BoJ to shift (panel 4). That said, the yen is extremely cheap after being the best short this year (panel 5).  British Pound: Coiled Spring Below 1.20? Chart 6Cable Is Vulnerable The pound is down 9.8% year to date. Over the last month, the pound is up by 2.5%. Sterling broke below a soft floor of 1.20, but quickly bounced back and is now sitting at 1.22, as sentiment picked up (panel 1). We find the UK to have an even bigger stagflation problem than the eurozone. CPI came in at 9.4% in June. The RPI came in at 11.8%. PPI was at 24%. All showed an acceleration from the month of May (panel 2). Nationwide house price inflation has barely rolled over unlike other markets, increasing from 10.7% in June to 11% in July. The Rightmove national asking price was 9.3% higher year-on-year in July, compared to 9.7% in June (panel 3). Meanwhile, mortgage approvals have been in steady decline over the last two years, which points toward stagflation. Retail sales excluding auto and fuel fell 5.9% year-on-year in June, the weakest reading since the Covid-19 crisis. Consumer confidence is lower than in 2020 (panel 4). Trade data continues to be weak, which has dipped the current account towards decade lows (panel 5). The external balance is the biggest driver of the pound, given the huge deficit. The above environment has put the BoE in a stagflationary quagmire. Last week, they raised rates by 50 bps suggesting inflation is a much more important battle than growth. Politically, the resignation of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and broader difficulties for the Conservative Party, is fueling sterling volatility. We are maintaining our long EUR/GBP trade as a bet that at 1.03, the euro has priced in a recession (well below the 2020 lows), but sterling has not. On cable, 1.20 will prove to be a long-term floor but it will be volatile in the short term.  Australian Dollar: A Contrarian Play Chart 7Relatively Solid Domestic Conditions In Australia The AUD is down 2.3% year-to-date. Over the last month, the AUD is up 5.3%. AUD is fast approaching its 200-day moving average. If that is breached, it could signal that the highs of this year, above 76 cents, are within striking distance (panel 1). Inflation is accelerating in Australia. In Q2, the inflation reading was 6.1%, while the trimmed-mean and weighted-median measures were above the central bank’s 1-3% band (panel 2). As a result, the RBA stated the benchmark rate was “well below” the neutral rate. It increased rates by an additional 50bps in August, lifting the official cash rate to 1.85%. Further rate increases are likely. There are a few reasons for this. First, labor market conditions are the most favorable in decades. In June, unemployment reached 3.5%, its lowest level in 50 years, against a consensus of 3.8% (panel 3). The participation rate also increased to 66.8% in June from 66.7%, which has pushed the underutilization rate to multi-decade lows (panel 4). Despite this, consumer confidence continued its decline in August, dropping to 81.2 from 83.8. A pickup in Covid-19 cases and high consumer prices are the usual suspects. Beyond the labor market, monetary policy seems to be having the desired effect. Demand appears to be slowing as retail sales grew 0.2% month-on-month in June from 0.9%. Home loan issuance declined by 4.4% in June, driven by a 6.3% decline in investment lending. House price growth continued to decline in July, particularly in densely populated regions like Sydney and Melbourne. The manufacturing sector remains strong, with July PMI coming in at 55.7, suggesting the RBA might just be achieving a soft landing in Australia.  The external environment was largely favorable for the AUD in June, as the trade balance increased substantially by A$17.7bn with commodities rallying early in the month. However, commodity prices are rolling over. The price of iron for example, is down 24% from its peak in June. This will likely weigh on the trade balance going forward (panel 5). A weakening external environment are near-term headwinds for the AUD, but we will be buyers on weakness (panel 6).  New Zealand Dollar: Least Preferred G10 Currency Chart 8Near-Term Risks To NZD The NZD is down 6.1% this year. Over the last month, it is up 5% (panel 1). The Reserve Bank of New Zealand raised its official cash rate (OCR) in July by 50bps to 2.5%, in line with market expectations. Policymakers maintained their hawkish stance and guided towards increased tightening until monetary conditions can bring inflation within its target range of 1-3%. Inflation rose in Q2 to 7.3% from a 7.1% forecast, largely driven by rising construction and energy prices (panel 2). As of the latest data, monetary policy appears to be continuing to have the desired effect on interest rate sensitive parts of the economy. REINZ home sales declined 38.1% year-on-year in June. Home price growth continues to roll over (panel 3). The external sector continues to slow. Dairy prices, circa 20% of exports, saw a 12% drop in early August after remaining flat in July. The 12-month trailing trade balance remains in deficit. This is most likely due to a substantial slowdown in Chinese economic activity, given that China is an important trade partner with New Zealand. What is important is that the RBNZ’s “least regrets” approach seems to be working. Despite a cooling economy, sentiment seems to be stabilizing. ANZ consumer confidence improved to 81.9 in July from 80.5. Business confidence also improved to -56.7 from -62.6 (panel 4). Ultimately, the NZD is driven by terms of trade, as well as domestic conditions (panels 1 and 5). Thus, short-term headwinds from a deteriorating external sector do not make us buyers of the currency for now, though a rollover in the dollar will help the kiwi.  Canadian Dollar: Lower Oil, Hawkish BoC Chart 9The BoC Will Stay On A Hawkish Path The CAD is down 1.2% year to date. Over the last month, it is up 1.8%. The Canadian dollar did not fully catch up to oil prices on the upside. Now that crude is rolling over, CAD remains vulnerable, unless the dollar continues to stage a meaningful decline (panel 1). Canadian data has been rather mixed over the last month. For example: There have been two consecutive months of job losses. This is after a string of positive job reports. In July, Canada lost 31K jobs. In June, it lost 43K. The reasons have been mixed, from women dropping out of the labor force, to lower youth participation (the participation rate fell), but this is a trend worth monitoring (panel 2). CPI growth remains elevated and is accelerating both on headline and core measures(panel 3). Building permits and housing starts have started to roll over, as house price inflation continues to lose momentum. June housing starts were at 274K from 287.3K. June building permits also fell 1.5% month-on-month though annual inflation is still outpacing house price growth (panel 4). The Canadian trade balance is improving, hitting a multi-year high of C$5.05 bn in June. This has eased the need for foreign capital inflows. The BoC raised rates 100bps in July, the biggest interest rate increase in one meeting among the G10. Unless the labor market continues to soften, the BoC will continue to focus on inflation, which means more rate hikes are forthcoming. The OIS curve is pricing a peak BoC rate of 3.6% in 9 months (panel 5). Two-year real rates are still higher in the US compared to Canada. And the loonie has lost the tailwind from strong WCS oil prices. As such, unless the dollar softens further, the loonie will remain in a choppy trading pattern like most of this year.  Swiss Franc: A Safe Haven Chart 10The Franc Will Remain Strong Against The Euro For Now CHF is down 3.2% year-to-date and up 4.3% in the past month. The Swiss franc has been particular strong against the euro, with EUR/CHF breaching parity (panel 1). Switzerland remains an island of relative economic stability in the G10. Although slowing, the manufacturing PMI was a healthy 58 in July. The trade surplus was up to CHF 2.6bn in June, despite a strong franc. While most European countries are preparing for a tough winter with energy rationing, prospects for Switzerland, which derives only 13% of its electricity from natural gas, look more favorable.  Still, as a small open economy, Switzerland is feeling the impact of global growth uncertainty. The KOF leading indicator dropped to 90.1 in August with a sharp decline in the manufacturing component. This broader measure suggests the relative resilience of the manufacturing sector might not last long (panel 2). Consumer confidence also fell to the lowest level since the onset of the pandemic. Swiss headline inflation stabilized at 3.4% in July. The core measure rose slightly to the SNB’s 2% target (panel 3). The UBS real estate bubble index rose sharply in Q2, suggesting inflation is not only an imported problem. Labor market conditions also remain tight, with the unemployment rate at 2%, a two-decade low. The SNB will continue to embrace currency strength while inflation risks persist (panel 4), as can be seen by the decline in sight deposits and FX reserves (panel 5). The market is still pricing in another 50 bps hike in September although August inflation data that comes out before the meeting will likely be critical for that decision. CHF is one of the most attractive currencies in our ranking. Despite the recent outperformance, CHF is still down year-to-date against the dollar. A rise in safe-haven demand, and a possible energy crunch in winter will be supportive, especially against the euro.  Norwegian Krone: Oil Fields Are A Jewel Chart 11NOK Will Reap Dividends From Energy Exports NOK is down 7.4% year-to-date and up 7.1% over the last month. It is also up 4.2% versus the euro, despite softer oil prices (panel 1). Inflation in Norway continues to accelerate. In July, CPI grew 6.8% year-on-year, above the market consensus and the Norges Bank’s forecast. Underlying inflation jumped sharply to an all-time high of 4.5%, compared to the Bank’s 3.2% forecast made just over a month ago (panel 2). These figures are adding pressure on the central bank to increase the pace of interest rate hikes, with 50bps looking increasingly likely at the meetings in August and September. NOK jumped on the inflation news. The housing market is starting to show signs of slowing with prices down 0.2% on the month in July, the first decrease since December. This, together with household indebtedness (panel 3), makes the task of policy calibration challenging. Our bias is that a persistently tight labor market and strong wage growth (panel 4) will allow the bank to focus on inflation. Economic activity remains robust in Norway but is softening. The manufacturing PMI fell to 54.6 in July, while industrial production was down 1.7% month-over-month in June. Consumer demand remains frail with retail sales and household consumption flat in June from the previous month. On a more positive note, trade surplus remains near record levels and is likely to stay elevated as high European demand for Norwegian energy is likely to last at least through the winter (panel 5). As global risk sentiment picked up, the krone became the best performing G10 currency over the past month. If the risk appetite reverses, the currency is likely to feel some turbulence. Swedish Krona: Cheap, But No Catalysts Yet Chart 12SEK = EUR On Steroids SEK is down 10% year-to-date and up 5.6% over the past month. The vigorous rebound highlights just how oversold the Swedish krona is (panel 1). The Swedish economy grew 1.4% in Q2 from the previous three months, rebounding from a 0.8% contraction in the first quarter. This is impressive, given high energy prices and a slowdown in global economic activity. Going forward, growth is likely to slow. In July, the services and manufacturing PMIs declined, and consumer confidence fell sharply to the lowest reading in almost 30 years. Retail sales were down 1.2% month-on-month in June. The housing market is also feeling the pain of rising borrowing costs (panel 2). The Riksbank’s latest estimate sees a 16% decline in prices by the end of next year.  For now, inflation is still accelerating in Sweden. CPIF, the Riksbank’s preferred measure, increased from 7.2% to 8.5% in June. Headline inflation rose from 7.3% to 8.7% (panel 3). Headline inflation is likely to decline in July, given the drop in the price component of the PMIs, but inflation will remain well above target. This will keep real rates weak (panel 4). This suggests that the Riksbank is facing the same conundrum as the ECB: accelerate policy tightening and tip the economy towards recession or remain accommodative and risk inflation becoming more entrenched. Our bias is that the Riksbank is likely to frontload rate hikes as currently priced in the OIS curve, with a 50 bps hike in September, ahead of major labor union wage negotiations (panel 5). Much like the NOK, the Swedish krona rebounded strongly in the past month on global risk-on sentiment. Fundamentally, the krona remains more vulnerable to external shocks due to higher energy dependency and a strong dollar. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Artem Sakhbiev Research Associate artem.sakhbiev@bcaresearch.com Thierry Matin Research Associate thierry.matin@bcaresearch.com   Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
The Bank of Canada raised the policy rate by 100 bps on Wednesday, beating expectations of a 75bp hike. This move brings its target for the overnight rate to 2.5% and the central bank indicated that more hikes are coming. Headline CPI rose to 7.7% in May,…
Executive Summary Our recommended model bond portfolio outperformed its custom benchmark index by +24bps in Q2/2022, improving the year-to-date outperformance to a solid +72bps. The Q2 outperformance came entirely from the credit side of the portfolio (+35bps), led by underweights to US investment grade corporates (+28bps) and EM hard currency debt (+24bps). The rates side of the portfolio was down slightly (-11bps), with gains from underweights in US and UK inflation-linked bonds (a combined +24bps) helping offset the hit from overweights to German and French government bonds (a combined -30bps). Looking ahead, we continue to see more defensive positioning in growth-sensitive credit sectors like US investment grade corporate bonds and EM hard currency debt, rather than duration management, as providing the better opportunity to generate alpha in bond portfolios over the latter half of 2022. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months Bottom Line: In our model bond portfolio, we are maintaining an overall neutral duration stance and a moderate underweight of spread product versus developed market sovereign bonds. We are, however, reducing the recommended tilts in inflation-linked bonds by upgrading US TIPS to neutral and downgrading Canadian linkers to neutral. Feature Dear Client, We are about to take a mid-summer publishing break, as this humble bond strategist moves his family into a new home in a new city. Next week, you will be receiving a report written by BCA Research’s Chief US Bond Strategist, Ryan Swift. The following week, there will be no Global Fixed Income Strategy report published. Our next report will be published on July 26, 2022. Regards, Rob Robis Bond investors are running out of places to hide to avoid losses in 2022. The total return on the Bloomberg Global Aggregate index (hedged into USD) in the second quarter of this year was -4%, nearly matching the -6% loss seen in Q1. No sector, from government bonds to corporate debt to emerging market credit, could avoid the damage caused by hawkish central bankers belated responding to the worst bout of global inflation since the 1970s. Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyGFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2022 Review & Outlook: Trading The Consolidation Phase Global inflation rates will soon peak, led by slowing growth of goods prices and commodity prices. However, inflation will remain well above central bank targets across the bulk of the developed world, supported by more domestic sources like services prices, housing costs and wages. This will limit the ability for important central banks like the Fed and ECB to quickly pivot in a more dovish direction to support weakening growth – and bail out foundering bond markets. With that backdrop in mind, we present our quarterly review of the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio for the second quarter of 2022. We also present our recommended positioning for the portfolio for the next six months, as well as portfolio return expectations for our base case and alternative investment scenarios. As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), the model portfolio is a part of our service that complements the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors. We do this by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. Q2/2022 Model Bond Portfolio Performance: All About Credit Chart 1Q2/2022 Performance: Gains From Defensive Credit Positioning The total return for the GFIS model portfolio (hedged into US dollars) in the second quarter was -4.3%, outperforming the custom benchmark index by +24bps (Chart 1).1 In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated -11bps of underperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter outperformed by +35bps. In our previous quarterly portfolio performance review in April, we noted that the greater opportunities to generate outperformance for fixed income investors would come from more defensive allocations to spread product, rather than big directional moves in government bond yields. That forecast largely panned out, as global credit markets moved to price in the growing risk of a deep economic downturn. Declining nominal government bond yields provided some modest relief at the end of June, with markets modestly pricing out some of the rate hikes discounted over the next year amid deepening global recession fears. While we maintained a neutral stance on overall portfolio duration during the quarter, we did benefit from the fact that the decline in global bond yields in late June was concentrated more in lower inflation expectations than falling real yields. Thus, our underweight positioning in inflation-linked bonds, focused on the US and UK, helped add a combined +25bps of outperformance versus the benchmark (Table 1). Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Overall Return Attribution The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector in our model portfolio are presented in Charts 2 & 3. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Government Bond Performance Attribution Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector Biggest Outperformers: Underweight US investment grade Industrials (+19bps) Underweight UK index-linked Gilts (+15bps) Underweight US TIPS (+9bps) Underweight US investment grade Financials (+7bps) Underweight US MBS (+6bps) Underweight US Treasuries with maturities beyond ten years (+6bps) Biggest Underperformers: Overweight euro area investment grade corporates (-19bps) Overweight German government bonds with maturities beyond ten years (-14bps) Overweight French government bonds with maturities beyond ten years (-8bps) Overweight UK Gilts with maturities beyond ten years (-6bps) Overweight US CMBS (-4bps) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio for Q2/2022. Returns are hedged into US dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during Q2 (red for underweight, dark green for overweight, gray for neutral). Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Universe In Q2/2022 Ideally, we would look to see more green bars on the left side of the chart where market returns are highest, and more red bars on the right side of the chart were returns are lowest. That pattern largely held true in Q2/2022, especially at the tail ends of the chart. During a quarter where all the major asset classes in our portfolio lost money on a hedged and duration-matched basis, we outperformed by selectively underweighting the worst performers within the credit side of the benchmark portfolio universe. Notably, we were underweight EM USD-denominated Sovereigns (-1099bps), EM USD-denominated corporates (-816bps) and US investment grade corporates (-686bps) on the extreme right side of the chart. Some of our key overweight positions did relatively well, led by overweights in US CMBS (-148bps), Australian government bonds (-288bps) and euro area investment grade corporates (-378bps), all of which were on the left side of Chart 4. One of our key recommendations throughout the first half of 2022 - overweighting German government bonds (-517bps) and French government bonds (-657bps) versus underweighting US Treasuries (-283bps) - performed poorly in Q2. This was due to investors rapidly pricing in a far more aggressive series of ECB rate hikes than we expected, resulting in some convergence of US-European bond yield differentials. Importantly, core European bond yields have pulled back substantially over the last month, and by much more than US yields have declined. Most notably, the 2-year German yield, which began Q2 at minus-7bps and hit a peak of 1.2% on June 14, has now fallen all the way back to 0.4% as this report went to press. The 2-year US-Germany yield differential has already widened by 35bps in the first week of July, suggesting that our overweight core Europe/underweight US allocation is already contributing positively to the model bond portfolio returns for Q3. Bottom Line: Our model bond portfolio outperformed its benchmark index in the second quarter of the year by +24bps – a positive result coming largely from underweight positions in US corporate bonds, EM spread product and inflation-linked bonds in the US and UK. Future Drivers Of Model Bond Portfolio Returns Just as in Q2/2022, the performance of the model bond portfolio in Q3/2022 will be driven more by relative allocations between countries and spread product sectors, rather than big directional moves in bond yields or credit spreads. Overall Duration Exposure Chart 5A More Stable Backdrop For Global Bond Yields In terms of portfolio duration, we still see a stronger case for global bond yields to be more rangebound than trending, especially in the US. There has already been a major downward adjustment to global bond yields via lower inflation expectations and reduced rate hike expectations. A GDP-weighted average of major developed market 10-year inflation breakevens has already fallen from an April 2022 peak of 281bps to 216bps (Chart 5). That aggregate breakeven is now back to the levels that began 2022, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine that triggered a surge in global energy prices. We anticipate that additional declines in global inflation expectations – and the associated reductions in central bank rate hike expectations – will be harder to achieve over the latter half of 2022. “Stickier” inflation from services, housing costs and wages will remain strong enough to keep overall inflation rates above central bank targets, even as decelerating goods and commodity price inflation act to slow headline inflation rates. Our Global Duration Indicator, which is comprised of growth indicators like the ZEW expectations index for the US and Europe as well as our own global leading economic indicator, has fallen substantially and is signaling a decline in global bond yield momentum once realized inflation rates peak (Chart 6). Chart 6Our Duration Indicator Calling For Slowing Global Yield Momentum​​​​​​ Chart 7Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Neutral We see that as signaling more of a sideways action in bond yields over the next six months, rather than a big downward move, especially in the US. Thus, we are keeping the duration of the model bond portfolio close to that of the benchmark index (Chart 7). Government Bond Country Allocation We are sticking with our view that, for countries with active central banks (i.e. everyone but Japan), favoring markets where interest rate expectations are above plausible estimates of neutral policy rates should lead to outperformance from country allocation. In Chart 8, we show 10-year bond yields and 2-years-forward 1-month Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates for the US, euro area, UK, Canada and Australia. The shaded regions in the chart represent estimates of the range of neutral policy rates. In the case of the US, rate expectations and Treasury yields are now below the upper level of the range of neutral fed funds rates estimates, between 2-3%, taken from the latest set of FOMC economic projections. Hence, we are sticking with an underweight stance on US Treasuries with yields offering less protection against the Fed following through on its current guidance and lifting the funds rate into restrictive territory above 3%. In the other countries, rate expectations are above the range of neutral rate estimates, which suggests that bond yields have a bit more protection against hawkish central bank actions. That leads us to stay overweight core Europe, the UK and Australia in the government bond portion of the model bond portfolio. We are only keeping Canada at neutral, however, as we suspect that the Bank of Canada is more willing than other central banks to follow the Fed’s lead on taking rates to a restrictive level to help bring down elevated Canadian inflation. For other countries, we are staying neutral on Italian government bond exposure, for now, and underweight Japan (Chart 9). Chart 8Favor Countries Where Markets Expect Above-Neutral Rates​​​​​​ Chart 9Underweight JGBs, Stay Neutral Italy (For Now)​​​​​​ For Italy, we await news from the July 21 ECB meeting on the details of a proposal to help support Italian bond markets in the event of additional yield increases or spread widening versus Germany. It is clear from the history of the past decade that Italian bond returns suffer when the ECB is either hiking rates or slowing the growth of its balance sheet (top panel). In other words, it is difficult to recommend overweighting Italian bonds without the support of easy ECB monetary policy. Chart 10Our Inflation-Linked Bond Country Allocations For Japan, our recommendation is strictly related to our view on the move in overall global bond yields. The Bank of Japan is bucking the worldwide trend to tighten monetary policy because core Japanese inflation remains weak. This makes Japanese government bonds (JGBs) a good place for bond investors to “hide out” in when global bond yields are rising. Given our view that global bond yield momentum will slow – in line with the signal from our Global Duration Indicator – we do not see a strong cyclical case for overweighting low-yielding JGBs. On inflation-linked bonds, we are maintaining a cautious overall stance, with commodity prices decelerating, realized inflation momentum set to soon peak and central banks signaling more tightening ahead (Chart 10). This week, we are closing out our lone overweight recommendation on inflation-linked bonds in Canada, where we downgrading to neutral (3 out of 5, see the model bond portfolio table on page 24).2 At the same time, we are neutralizing our underweight stance on US TIPS, moving the allocation to neutral. We still see shorter-term TIPS breakevens as having downside from here, but longer-maturity breakevens have already made enough of a downward adjustment, in our view. Global Spread Product Turning to credit markets, we are maintaining our moderately cautious view on the overall allocation to credit versus government bonds. Slowing global growth momentum and tightening global monetary policy is not an environment where credit spreads can narrow, especially for growth-sensitive credit like corporate bonds and high-yield (Chart 11). Having said that – the spread widening seen in US and European corporate bond markets has introduced a better valuation cushion into spreads. Our preferred measure of spread product valuation – the historical percentile ranking of the 12-month breakeven spread – shows that investment grade spreads in the euro area are now in the top quartile (85%) of its history on a risk-adjusted basis (Chart 12). US investment grade spreads are now up into the second quartile (64%), which is a big improvement from the start of 2022 but not as much as seen in Europe. Chart 11Global Monetary Backdrop Turning More Negative For Credit​​​​​ Chart 12Corporate Spread Valuations Have Improved In The US & Europe​​​​​ European credit spreads likely need to be wide as a risk premium against the numerous risks the region is facing right now – slowing growth, an increasingly hawkish ECB, soaring energy prices and the lingering uncertainties stemming from the Ukraine war. However, a lot of bad news is now discounted in European spreads and, as a result, we are maintaining our overweight stance on European investment grade corporates, especially versus US investment grade where we remain underweight. High-yield spreads on both sides of the Atlantic look more attractive on a 12-month breakeven spread basis, but also on a default-adjusted spread basis (Chart 13). Assuming a moderate increase in the high-yield default rates in the US and Europe - consistent with a sharp slowing of economic growth but no deep recession - the current level of high-yield spreads net of expected default losses over the next year is above long-run averages. It is too soon to move to an overweight stance on high-yield, with the Fed and ECB set to tighten more amid ongoing growth uncertainty, but given the improved valuation cushion we see a neutral allocation to junk in both the US and Europe as appropriate in our model portfolio. Chart 13Junk Spreads Offer Value If Recession Can Be Avoided Finally, we remain comfortably underweight emerging market USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt. The backdrop is poor for emerging market bond returns, given slowing global growth, softening commodity prices, a tightening Fed and a strengthening US dollar (Chart 14). Chart 14Staying Cautious On EM Debt Exposure​​​​​​ Summing It All Up The full list of our recommended portfolio allocations can be seen in Table 2. The portfolio enters the second half of 2022 with the following high-level characteristics: Table 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months Chart 15Overall Portfolio Allocation: Underweight Spread Product Vs Governments the overall duration exposure remains at-benchmark (i.e. neutral) the portfolio has an underweight allocation to overall spread products versus government bonds, equal to four percentage points of the portfolio (Chart 15) the tracking error of the portfolio, or its expected volatility in excess of that of the benchmark, is 77bps – below our self-imposed 100bps tracking error limit (Chart 16) the portfolio now has a yield below that of the custom benchmark index, equal to -31bps on a currency-unhedged basis but a more modest “carry gap” of -10bps on a USD-hedged basis given the gains from hedging into USD (Chart 17). Chart 16Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate​​​​​​ Chart 17Overall Portfolio Yield: Below-Benchmark​​​​​​ Bottom Line: Looking ahead, our model bond portfolio performance will continue to be driven by the same factors in Q3/2022 as in the previous quarter: the relative performance of US bonds versus European equivalents for both government debt and corporate bonds, and the path for emerging market credit spreads. Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months After making the modest changes to our inflation-linked bond allocations in the US and Canada, which can be seen in the tables on pages 23-24, we now turn to our regularly quarterly scenario analysis to determine the return expectations for the portfolio for the next six months. On the credit side of the portfolio, we use risk-factor-based regression models to forecast future yield changes for global spread product sectors as a function of four major factors - the VIX, oil prices, the US dollar and the fed funds rate (Table 3A). For the government bond side of the portfolio, we avoid using regression models and instead use a yield-beta driven framework, taking forecasts for changes in US Treasury yields and translating those in changes in non-US bond yields by applying a historical yield beta (Table 3B). Table 3AFactor Regressions Used To Estimate Spread Product Yield Changes Table 3BEstimated Government Bond Yield Betas To US Treasuries For our scenario analysis over the next six months, we use a base case scenario plus two alternate “tail risk” scenarios. In the current environment, our scenarios center around the pace of global growth. Base Case (Slow Global Growth) Global growth momentum slows substantially, with firms cutting back on hiring and investing activity due to slowing corporate profit growth. An outright recession is avoided because softening energy prices help ease the drag on real spending power for consumers. China introduces more monetary and fiscal stimulus measures to boost growth. Global inflation peaks and eases on the back of slowing growth of goods prices and commodity prices, but the floor on inflation in the US and other developed markets is higher than central bank inflation targets due to sticky domestic price pressures. The Fed continues to hike at every policy meeting in H2/2022. There is a very mild bear flattening of the US Treasury curve, but with longer-term yields remain broadly unchanged over the full six month scenario period with the Fed not hiking by more than currently discounted. The Brent oil price retreats by -10%, the US dollar modestly appreciates by 2%, the VIX stays close to current levels at 28 and the fed funds rate reaches 3.25% by year-end. Resilient Growth Scenario Consumer spending surprises to the upside in the US and even Europe, as softer momentum of energy prices eases the relentless downward pressure on real incomes. Labor demand remains sold across the developed world, particularly with firms reluctant to do mass layoffs because of a perceived scarcity of quality labor. China enacts more policy stimulus with growth likely to fall below 2022 government targets. The Fed is forced to be more aggressive on rate hikes, given resilient US growth and inflation staying well above the Fed’s 2% target. The US Treasury curve bear-flattens into outright inversion, but with Treasury yields rising across the curve. The Brent oil price rises +20%, the VIX index climbs to 30, the US dollar appreciates by +3% thanks to a more aggressive Fed that lifts the funds rate to 3.75% by year-end. Recession Scenario A toxic combination of contracting corporate profits and negative real income growth drags the major developed economies into outright recession. Global inflation rates slow rapidly from current elevated levels, fueled by a rapid decline in commodity prices, but remain above central bank targets making it hard for the Fed and other major central banks to pivot dovishly to support growth. Chinese policymakers belatedly act to ease monetary and fiscal policy, but not by enough to offset the slow response from developed market policymakers. The Treasury curve moderately bull-steepens, although the absolute decline in nominal Treasury yields is relatively modest as the Fed will not pivot quickly to signaling policy easing with inflation still likely to remain above 2%. The Brent oil price falls -20%, the VIX index soars to 35, the US dollar depreciates by -3% (as lower US rates win out over slowing global growth) and the Fed pushes the funds rate to 2.75% before pausing after September. The excess return scenarios for the model bond portfolio, using the above inputs in our simple quantitative return forecast framework, are shown in Table 4A. The US Treasury yield assumptions are shown in Table 4B. For the more visually inclined, we present charts showing the model inputs and Treasury yield projections in Chart 18 and Chart 19, respectively. Table 4AGFIS Model Bond Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months Table 4BUS Treasury Yield Assumptions For The 6-Month Forward Scenario Analysis Chart 18Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis​​​​​ Chart 19US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis​​​​​​ Given our neutral overall duration stance, the return scenarios will be driven by mostly by the credit side of the portfolio. In the recession scenario where Treasury yields decline, there is a modest projected outperformance from the rates side of the portfolio coming through the underweight to low-beta JGBs. In all scenarios, financial market volatility is expected to stay at, or above, current levels as central banks will be unable to ease policy, even in the event of an actual recession, because of lingering high inflation. Thus, the return on the credit side of the model portfolio will be the main driver of performance, delivering a range of excess return outcomes between +47bps and +60bps. Bottom Line: The model bond portfolio should benefit in H2/2022 from the ongoing cautious stance on global spread product, focused on underweights to US investment grade corporates and EM hard currency debt.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high-quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 2     We are also closing out our Canadian breakeven widening trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations*
The Bank of Canada’s Q2 Business Outlook Survey reveals that businesses expect intense price pressures to persist. The share of surveyed firms that expect input prices to increase significantly over the coming 12 months remains unchanged at 47% while those…