Gov Sovereigns/Treasurys
Highlights Trump's election victory means that there is potential for policy settings to flip from "easy money, tight fiscal" to "tight money, easy fiscal" The market implications of that shift are dollar bullish, bond bearish and equity mixed. The major risk is that violent currency and bond market moves rekindle emerging market stress and/or choke off the recovery before fiscal spending kicks in. Trump's trade reform risks being a tax on growth. Businesses may opt to automate instead of hire. A variety of factors now make small caps appealing relative to large caps. Feature Contrary to the pre-election consensus, Donald Trump's election victory has prompted a risk-on rally, based on the notion that Trump's vision of fiscal largesse will be realized (Chart 1). Ultimately, it will only become clear what policy changes are on the table once Trump takes office in January. The consensus at BCA is that Trump will be "unbound" in his first two years as President. Thus, if Trump lives up to his campaign promises, fiscal stimulus and trade restriction will be tabled early in 2017. Chart 1Trump Moves As we argue below, trade restrictions should be viewed as a tax on growth. We have doubts about the link between job creation and tariffs. If anything, imposing tariffs on imports could incite a more intense wave of automation. After all, the cost of capital is still attractive relative to labor costs. Meanwhile, fiscal spending - if delivered even close to the size and scope that Trump has hinted at in his pre-election speeches - will boost GDP growth well above trend in 2017. If that occurs, the dynamic that has existed since 2010, i.e. "tight fiscal, exceptionally easy money policy" will rapidly flip to "easy fiscal, tight money". For the bond market and the U.S. dollar, the investment implications are clear: Treasuries are likely to head higher, and the pressure will be for the U.S. dollar to rise. Implications for equities are less certain. If the U.S. dollar rises, it might rekindle emerging world financial stress and undermine U.S. corporate profits. The rapid rise in yields may not easily be digested by the equity market and it is notable that corporate spreads have not rallied along with other risk assets in recent days. We are comfortable maintaining a defensive stance. Donald Trump said a lot of things to a lot of people during the campaign process. He can't possibly deliver on all of his promises, but earlier this week, BCA sent out a Special Report to all clients, outlining the implications of the election results and what we expect he can accomplish.1 We believe there are three that are especially important for investors to monitor: the potential for trade restrictions, gauging fiscal stimulus and monetary policy settings in this possibly new environment. Stagflation? Trump has repeatedly signaled his intention to restrict American openness to international trade and the U.S. president can revoke international treaties solely on their own authority. Trump can also impose tariffs. All of this is of course inflationary, and it's the nasty kind. We have repeatedly written in this publication that, historically, the U.S. economy only falls into recessions for two reasons. The first is growth-restrictive monetary policy and the second is an adverse supply shock that acts like a tax on growth, e.g. an oil price spike. Tariffs are akin to the latter. Chart 2 shows that as import penetration rose over the past 30 years, tradeable goods price inflation steadily fell. A simple read of the chart suggests that with barriers in place and as import penetration recedes, the process of the past 30 years will reverse and consumer goods prices will rise. This can easily be absorbed if it is accompanied by rising wages via the "onshoring" of jobs. But that is not a foregone conclusion. Instead of bringing manufacturing jobs back to the U.S., a more logical decision might be for businesses to further automate production. After all, earlier studies have already concluded that nearly half of all existing jobs are at high risk of being automated over the next decade or so.2 As Chart 3 shows, with the price of capital equipment and software still falling and the cost of capital so low relative to the cost of labor, the incentive to automate instead of hire is high. Chart 2Trade And Inflation Chart 3Tariffs May Lead To Robots, Not Jobs The bottom line is that increased tariffs will increase prices in the near term. But it is hardly clear that this will improve the lives of voters or create a more virtuous economic recovery. Opening The Fiscal Taps... In last week's report, we explored the potential for fiscal spending to turbocharge the U.S. economy. We warned that fiscal multipliers are probably not overly high in the current environment and the effectiveness of fiscal spending is highly dependent on the type of fiscal stimulus. Trump has called for significantly lowering both income and corporate taxes, although his main pitch has been infrastructure spending. The latter tends to have the highest multiplier effects, but can often take a long time to get underway. However, one important point is that Trump will face little political restraint, at least in his first two years in office. Gridlock will not be a problem given that all three Houses are now in GOP hands. And it will be difficult politically for Republicans in the Senate and House to stand in Trump's way given that he has just been elected on a populist platform; it would be seen as thwarting the will of the people. Over the past 28 years, each new president has generally succeeded in passing their signature items. Moreover, the GOP has historically not been that fiscally conservative. Overall, a Trump government will more than make up for the drag from weak state and local spending that we wrote about last week. Exactly how big of an impulse will only become clear once Trump takes office. ...And Tightening The Money Supply? Forecasts about the impact of fiscal spending on 2017 GDP growth are premature, since it is impossible to decipher an action plan from campaign rhetoric. And the severity of stagflation due to trade restrictions will be highly dependent on the form and scope of trade reform. Ergo, it is too early to make bold new assumptions about the path of Fed rate hikes. An aggressive fiscal plan that boosts GDP well above trend growth would force policymakers to revise their expected path of rate hikes higher. That would be a sea change from the past four years, when policymakers have consistently revised the neutral rate down. We are not worried about central bank independence or Janet Yellen's future. Donald Trump has, at various times, both praised and attacked Janet Yellen and current monetary policy settings. A review of the Fed may happen at some point, but we assert that investigating the Fed will not be a priority early in Trump's mandate. Market Action The bond market has already priced in more inflation and more growth for 2017 since Trump's victory. 10-year Treasury yields have surged to 2.15% and momentum selling could lift the 10-year Treasury yield even further into oversold territory. But that is not a case to become aggressively underweight duration. Dollar strength and rising bond yields have already tightened financial conditions significantly over the past several weeks. The risk is that these trends go too far in the near term, inflicting economic damage before fiscal spending kicks in. Given the easy monetary stance of central banks around the world, lack of significant fiscal stimulus elsewhere, economic growth outperformance in the U.S. and rising interest rates, the dollar should rise in the medium term. We remain dollar bulls. We have been surprised by the equity market action since November 8. Although we repeatedly wrote that a Trump victory was unlikely to have meaningful negative consequences for risk asset prices, we did not anticipate a rally. As for equities, our cautiousness toward risk assets in 2016 has been primarily focused on the ongoing headwinds for profits in a demand-deficient economy, especially while margins are falling and valuations are elevated (Chart 4). Greater fiscal spending would surely help to alleviate our concern, although that conclusion seems premature given the lack of contour to Trump's plans so far. Perhaps the greatest downside risk is a reaction from China. After all, Trump's anti-trade rhetoric has been pointed (mostly) at China and Asia. Recall that in August, 2015, the RMB was devalued just weeks ahead of an expected rate hike from the Fed. That devaluation sent shock waves through financial markets and ultimately delayed the Fed rate hike until the end of the year (Chart 5). A similar proactive policy move from Chinese policymakers should be on investors' radars. Overall, we remain comfortable with our cautious equity stance, albeit recent market action has created an entry point in favor of small relative to large cap stocks. Chart 4Equity Fundamentals Still Poor Chart 5China: Global Stability Risk? Enter Small Cap Bias We upgraded small caps relative to large caps to neutral in August. We now recommend investors make the full switch to a small cap bias relative to large caps. Small cap stocks were hit harder than large caps in the weeks leading up to the election, as investors shed riskier assets; we believe this provides a good entry point to a cyclical uptrend in small cap performance (Chart 6). True, at first glance, advocating for small cap exposure appears inconsistent with our overall defensive equity strategy. After all, small cap outperformance tends to be associated with risk-on phases. However, small cap stocks have a variety of other characteristics that currently make them appealing relative to larger caps. Chart 6(Part I) Favor Small/Large Caps Chart 7(Part II) Favor Small/Large Caps Small cap companies tend to be more domestically focused. We expect that U.S. growth will continue to outpace growth overseas. And particularly important, small cap companies, with their domestic focus, are better insulated from dollar strength (Chart 7). Small cap weightings are no longer geared toward cyclical sectors. As part of our cautious strategy, we remain focused on defensive vs. cyclical sectors. There are no major differences between large and small cap defensive and cyclical sector weightings (Table 1). Trump corporate tax reform, if implemented, will favor small, domestic firms. Because major corporations already have low effective tax rates, any lowering of the marginal rate will benefit small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the domestic oriented S&P 500 corporations. If corporate tax reform also includes closing loopholes that benefit the major multi-national corporations (MNCs), then this would diminish their current tax advantage vis-à-vis smaller companies. Table 1Similar Weightings For Small And Large Cap Cyclicals And Defensives Bottom Line: Small cap outperformance is typically associated with risk-on equity phases. However, valuations now favor small caps. Importantly, small caps are better insulated from dollar strength and are one way to play the domestic vs. global theme. Additionally, smaller firms will be the relative winners from corporate tax reform. Small caps are set to outperform large caps. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "U.S. Election: Outcomes & Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 "The Future Of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs To Computerisation?" Carl Frey and Michael Osborne, September 2013. Appendix Monthly Asset Allocation Model Update Our Asset Allocation (AA) model provides an objective assessment of the outlook for relative returns across equities, Treasuries and cash. It combines valuation, cyclical, monetary and technical indicators. The model was constructed as a capital preservation tool, and has historically outperformed the benchmark in large part by avoiding major equity bear markets. Please note that our official cyclical asset allocation recommendations deviate at times from the model's recommendation. The model is just one input to our decision process Chart 8. The model's recommended weightings for the major asset classes remained unchanged this month: neutral equity exposure at 60% (benchmark 60%), slightly overweight Treasury allocation at 40% (benchmark 30%) and underweight cash at 0% (benchmark 10%). The neutral portfolio recommendation for equities is in line with our qualitative defensive stance, in place since August 2015. Although the technical component of the equity model still has a "buy" signal, the breadth indicator has moved into less favorable territory relative to the momentum indicator. The monetary component has also slightly weakened but retains its positive bias for equities. The earnings-driven component continues to warrant caution as expectations for the outlook of corporate profits would need to be bolstered through stronger economic stronger growth over the medium term. Our qualitative stance for the allocation of Treasuries in balanced portfolios is neutral (since November 7, 2016) in contrast to the slightly overweight recommendation from our quantitative model. Even so, despite that the "buy signals" of the cyclical and technical components of the bond model still persist, the preference for Treasuries has diminished to some extent. Nevertheless, the valuation component continues trending towards expensive territory and a "buy signal" remains in place Chart 9. Chart 8Portfolio Total Returns Chart 9Current Model Recommendations Note: The asset allocation model is not necessarily consistent with the weighting recommendations of the Cyclical Investment Stance. For further information, please see our Special Report "Presenting Our U.S. Asset Allocation Model", February 6, 2009.
Highlights Today, we are sending out a previously scheduled Special Report, highlighting our thoughts on the how to assess the impact of China on global bond markets. This is an important topic that we hope you will find of great interest. We will not be offended, however, if that report sits in your inboxes for a day or two while the world awaits the results of today's U.S. Presidential election. Feature Global financial markets have been subject to extraordinary volatility over the past couple of weeks as the election campaign has drawn to a close. Investors have had to deal with the steady inflow of shifting poll results, overbearing media punditry, surprising FBI letters and wild conspiracy theories, all while trying to price the risks associated with two of the most polarizing presidential candidates in U.S. history. The recent narrowing of Hillary Clinton's lead in the polls has forced investors to seriously consider the possibility of a President Donald J. Trump, with all the change from the status quo that he represents. Given how markets have reacted to Trump closing the gap with Clinton - falling equity prices, higher volatility, lower bond yields and a weaker U.S. dollar - a Trump win could trigger a true risk-off market rout, with global investors wanting to avoid been burned by another political surprise after Brexit. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy still view a narrow Clinton victory as the most likely outcome, with admittedly lower conviction levels than usual for such an important election. Such is the problem of making predictions when polls are within margins of error. However, given the well-understood realities of the U.S. Electoral College map and the still-uphill climb needed for Trump to win, the result that would catch investors most off-guard would be The Donald pulling off the upset. From our perspective at BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy, a Clinton victory would keep the global economy on its current positive growth track in the near-term. This would shift bond investors' focus back over to the Fed and a likely December rate hike. However, a risk-off market move after a Trump win would represent the biggest risk to our current portfolio recommendations: We are positioned for rising global bond yields via an overall below-benchmark duration stance, given our view that we are in a cyclical growth upturn that is also pushing global inflation higher (more details on China's contribution to that can be found in the Special Report sent out today). In terms of regional bond allocation, we are favoring the areas with the lowest inflation rates and most credible dovish central banks, via an above-benchmark tilt in core Europe and a neutral stance on Japan and Canada. We are underweight the countries where central bankers are either in the process of raising rates (the U.S.) or will soon face a decision to tighten policy in the face of strong growth and rising inflation pressures (the U.K., Australia). We are also underweight Peripheral European debt (Italy, Spain, Portugal) versus Germany due to our concerns over decelerating growth in the Periphery combined with the ongoing stresses on Euro Area banks. We are overweight inflation protection (via linkers and CPI swaps) in the U.S. and U.K. where we see the greatest potential for rising inflation expectations. Within global credit markets, we are maintaining a defensive stance via underweights in U.S., Euro Area and Emerging Markets High-Yield (which are all overvalued and overlevered). Within Investment Grade corporates, we are only maintaining a neutral stance in the U.S. and above-benchmark tilts in the Euro Area and U.K. We are also neutral on Emerging Market hard currency debt, both sovereigns and corporates. In the event that Trump pulls out the win tonight, we would expect our overall below-benchmark duration call to suffer if bond yields declines in a risk-off move. However, our "break-even" level on that call allows some cushion to stick with the underweight, as we initiated the recommendation back in July when the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield was just below 1.60%. A return to those levels would be a 25bp decline from yesterday's closing level of 1.83%, which would be a massive move if it happened in a short period of time immediately after Trump was declared the winner. Yet if such large move in yields were to occur, it would almost certainly be in the context of a rout in global equity markets. Our underweight stance on high-yield corporates and Peripheral Europe would perform very well there. Our generally cautious stance on higher-quality corporates and Emerging Markets would likely cause minor hits only via our overweights in Europe, but with those markets supported by the ongoing central bank buying by the ECB and Bank of England, the losses should be relatively well-contained. There is also a risk that our overweights in inflation protection in the U.S. and U.K. would underperform, especially if the market rout turns into a lasting shock to global growth and inflation expectations. That will be difficult to determine in the immediate aftermath of a Trump win. Summing it all up, there are enough offsetting positions within our recommended portfolio to not suggest any changes into tonight's election. Let us hope that the election result is decisive enough that a winner can be declared tonight and this period of U.S. political uncertainty can end, whoever wins. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product
Highlights Chart 1Targeting 2% The Fed did its best to avoid roiling markets so close to today's election, but still managed to hint at a December rate hike. The post-meeting statement was tweaked so that now only "some further evidence" rather than "further evidence" is required in order to lift the funds rate. We remain below benchmark duration in anticipation of a December rate hike. Before the end of the year we expect our 12-month discounter to reach at least 40-50bps (meaning the market will expect a further 1-2 hikes in 2017) from its current level of 28bps, and for the 10-year Treasury yield to reach 1.95-2%. While our global PMI model pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.27%, the uptrend in the 10-year yield will face severe technical resistance as it approaches 2% (Chart 1). Positioning has already moved to net short duration, signaling that the bond sell-off is becoming stretched. While a Clinton victory would all but ensure a December rate hike, a Trump victory could cause a large enough market riot that the Fed delays until 2017. This would only be a brief hiccup in the return of the 10-year yield to the 1.95-2% range, and would not signal a long-lasting trend reversal. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +56bps in October, but have already given back -26bps of those gains so far this month (Chart 2). The index option-adjusted spread is -2bps tighter than at the end of September and, at 136bps, it remains very close to its historical average. Corporate credit performance faces two immediate risks. The first is today's election and the second is the prospect of a Fed rate hike in December. A Clinton victory would likely prompt a knee-jerk rally in risk assets and virtually ensure a rate hike next month. In that case we would be inclined to further trim exposure to credit risk in the coming weeks as the rate hike approaches. Already, we recommend investors avoid the Baa credit tier within a neutral allocation to investment grade corporates. In a recent report we pointed out that highly-rated credit (A-rated and above) performed well in the initial stages of last year's run-up in rate hike expectations, but then started to suffer once market-implied rate hike probabilities approached 100%.1 Conversely, a Trump victory would likely prompt a flight-to-safety event in markets which, depending on its severity, could also cause the Fed to delay the next rate hike into 2017. In that event, the prospect of delayed Fed tightening would make us more likely to increase credit exposure in the near term, especially if any knee-jerk sell-off in risk assets creates better value in corporates. Table 3Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* (Continued) Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Maximum Underweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +92bps in October, but has already underperformed the Treasury benchmark by -108bps so far in November. The index option-adjusted spread is +25bps wider since the end of September and, at 505bps, it is 16bps below its historical average. In a Special Report2 published last week we noted that while the default rate will not re-visit its previous lows (at least until after the next recession), it should decline from 5.4% to close to 4% during the next 12 months (Chart 3). However, even a slightly brighter default outlook will not be enough for junk bonds to sustain their current pace of outperformance. A simple model of lagged junk spreads and default losses explains more than 50% of the variation in 12-month high-yield excess returns. This model suggests that even with lower default losses, excess junk returns will be +264bps during the next 12 months (panel 3). The reason is that lower default losses are more than offset by the lower starting point for spreads. Junk spreads should also come under widening pressure in the very near term, as a December Fed rate hike spurs an increase in implied volatility. Maintain a maximum underweight allocation to high-yield and await a better entry point for spreads in the New Year. MBS: Overweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +2bps in October, but are underperforming the benchmark by -7bps so far in November. Year-to-date, MBS have outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by a mere +22bps. Since the end of September, the conventional 30-year MBS yield has risen +23bps, driven by a +21bps increase in the rate component. The option-adjusted spread has widened +2bps, while the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) has remained flat. Unattractive option-adjusted spreads and the prospect of further increases in issuance make for bleak long-run return prospects in MBS. However, the likelihood that Treasury yields will continue to rise in the near-term means that MBS could outperform due to a decline in the option cost component of spreads (Chart 4). We will likely reduce exposure to MBS once a December rate hike has been fully digested by the market, and the uptrend in Treasury yields starts to taper off. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for the third quarter, released yesterday, showed that banks continue to ease standards on GSE-eligible mortgage loans, while demand for these same loans continues to increase. The combination of easing lending standards and strengthening demand means that issuance is likely to continue its march higher, as does the persistent uptrend in existing home sales (bottom panel). Government Related: Overweight Chart 5Government Related Market Overview The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +5bps in October, but has already underperformed the Treasury benchmark by -9bps so far in November. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sub-sectors drove October's outperformance, returning +24bps and +14bps in excess of Treasuries respectively. Domestic Agency debt outperformed the Treasury benchmark by +3bps, while Supranationals (-7bps) and Sovereigns (-10bps) both underperformed. After adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration, Foreign Agency and Local Authority bonds still appear attractive relative to investment grade U.S. corporate debt. Sovereigns, on the other hand, appear modestly expensive. We continue to recommend avoiding Sovereign issues while remaining overweight the other sub-sectors of the government related index. In a recent report,3 we observed that the performance of sovereign debt relative to equivalently-rated and duration-matched U.S. corporate credit tends to track movements in the U.S. dollar. As such, a continued bull market in the U.S. dollar will remain a significant headwind for sovereigns. At the country level, the only nations whose USD-denominated debt offers a spread advantage over Baa-rated U.S. corporate debt are Hungary, South Africa, Colombia and Uruguay. Unusually, bullet agency debt outperformed callable agency debt last month even though Treasury yields moved higher (Chart 5). Within Domestic Agency bonds, we continue to favor callable over bullet issues on the expectation that this divergence will not persist. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by -12bps in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -152bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio is largely unchanged since the end of September, and remains close to its post-crisis average. In recent months, trends in M/T yield ratios have fluctuated alongside the betting market odds for today's Presidential election. A Trump victory would cause yield ratios to widen sharply, as President Trump's promised tax cuts would substantially de-value the tax advantage in municipal bonds. We expect yield ratios to tighten in the event that Clinton prevails, as any expectation of a Trump victory works its way out of the price. Due to attractive yield ratios relative to recent history, we are inclined to remain overweight municipal bonds in the near-term. However, we will likely downgrade the sector if yield ratios move back to previous lows. As we detailed in a recent Special Report,4 historical lags between the corporate and municipal credit cycles suggest that municipal bond downgrades will start to increase in the second half of next year, alongside a deterioration in state & local government balance sheets. Further, state & local government investment spending is poised to move higher next year, regardless of the election result, leading to even greater muni issuance (Chart 6). Elevated fund flows have offset the impact of strong issuance this year, the risk is that they will not keep pace going forward. Treasury Curve: Stay In Flatteners Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve has bear-steepened significantly since the end of September. The 2/10 Treasury slope has steepened +16bps and the 5/30 slope has steepened +14bps. As a result, our two curve flattener trades have struggled. Our 2/10 Treasury curve flattener has returned -41bps since initiation on September 6. Our 10/30 Treasury curve flattener has returned -25bps since initiation on September 20. Our other tactical trade - short December 2017 Eurodollar - has returned +16bps since initiation on July 12. All three of the above tactical trades are premised on the view that the Fed will deliver a rate hike in December, and that such a rate hike has not yet been fully discounted by the market. At present, we calculate that the market-implied probability of a December rate hike is 62%, as discounted in fed funds futures. The historical pattern suggests the yield curve should bear flatten as the rate hike probability approaches 100%. Unusually, the correlations between both the 2/10 and 10/30 Treasury slopes and the level of Treasury yields have moved into positive (bear-steepening) territory (Chart 7). This is especially unusual for the 10/30 slope, where the correlation has been firmly in negative (bear-flattening) territory since 2013. We continue to recommend holding curve flatteners, and expect both correlations to revert into negative (bear-flattening) territory in advance of a December rate hike, as they did last year. Any surge in bullish dollar sentiment between now and December would only increase the flattening pressure on the curve (bottom panel). So far bullish dollar sentiment has remained relatively flat, but we cannot discount a large increase in the run-up to the next rate hike, as occurred last year. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by +112bps in October. The 10-year breakeven rate has increased +8bps since the end of September, and currently sits at 1.68%. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate has increased substantially during the past couple months, and has now converged with the fair value reading from our TIPS Financial model (Chart 8). Rising expectations of a Fed rate hike and a flatter Treasury curve will weigh on TIPS during the next month, and we would not be surprised to see breakevens temporarily cease their uptrend as attention turns to Fed hawkishness following today's election. But we also expect that TIPS breakevens will resume their uptrend heading into next year. As we flagged in a recent report,5 the sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to core inflation has increased since the financial crisis. We posit that the reason for this increased sensitivity is that the Fed's ability to control long-dated inflation expectations has been impaired by the zero-lower bound on rates. As a result, the trend in breakevens is increasingly taking its cue from the realized inflation data. Realized inflation continues to trend steadily higher (bottom two panels), and diffusion indexes suggest that further gains are ahead (panel 4). Given that breakevens remain well below pre-crisis levels, we intend to remain overweight TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries and ride out any near-term volatility related to a Fed rate hike. ABS: Maximum Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +10bps in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +101bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by +8bps on the month, while non-Aaa issues outperformed by +24bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS has tightened -3bps since the end of September and, at 45bps, is considerably below its pre-crisis average (Chart 9). According to our days-to-breakeven measure, there still exists a valuation advantage in Aaa-rated auto ABS relative to Aaa-rated credit card ABS, but that advantage is rapidly evaporating (panel 3). We calculate that it will take 12 days of average spread widening for Aaa-rated auto ABS to underperform Treasuries on a 6-month horizon and 10 days of average spread widening for Aaa-rated credit card ABS to underperform. Moreover, credit card ABS exhibit superior collateral credit quality relative to autos. Credit card charge-offs remain near all-time lows, while the auto net loss rate appears to have bottomed (bottom panel). Further, the Fed's senior loan officer survey shows that auto lending standards have tightened for two consecutive quarters, while credit card lending standards were unchanged in Q3 following 25 consecutive quarters of net easing (panel 4). We recommend investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans within a maximum overweight allocation to consumer ABS. CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +4bps in October, bringing year-to-date outperformance up to +194bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS has tightened -3bps since the end of September, and remains very close to its pre-crisis average (Chart 10). The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for the third quarter, released yesterday, showed that banks continue to tighten standards on all classes of commercial real estate (CRE) loans (panel 3). The survey also shows that CRE loan demand continues to increase, though at a less rapid pace than in prior quarters. While CRE prices continue to march higher (bottom panel), tightening lending standards and a rising delinquency rate (panel 4) make us cautious on non-agency CMBS. Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by +4bps in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +105bps. Agency CMBS still offer 56bps of option-adjusted spread. This is greater than what is offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS (45bps) and conventional 30-year MBS (19bps) for a similar amount of spread volatility. We continue to recommend overweight positions in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Global PMI Model The current reading from our Global PMI Treasury model places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.27% (Chart 11). This model is based on a linear regression of the 10-year Treasury yield on three factors, using a post-financial crisis time interval.6 The three factors are: Global Growth: Measured using the Global Manufacturing PMI (sourced from JP Morgan and Markit) Global Growth Divergences: Proxied by bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar (sourced from Marketvane.net) Economic Uncertainty: Measured using the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (sourced from policyuncertainty.com) The correlation between the global PMI and the 10-year Treasury yield is strongly positive (panel 3). However, improving global growth is offset by any increase in bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar. For a given level of global growth any increase in bullish sentiment toward the dollar represents a drag on interest rate expectations. As such, bullish dollar sentiment enters our model with a negative sign (panel 4). The final component of our model - global economic policy uncertainty - captures changes in Treasury yields related to headline risk and "flights to quality". This factor enters our model with a negative sign - more uncertainty correlates with lower bond yields (bottom panel). Monetary Conditions And Rate Expectations The BCA Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) combines changes in the fed funds rate with changes in the trade-weighted dollar using a 10:1 ratio. Historically, economic downturns have been preceded by a break in this index above its equilibrium level - calculated using the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of potential GDP growth (Chart 12). Using assumptions for the time until the MCI converges with equilibrium and the annual appreciation of the trade-weighted dollar, it is possible to calculate the expected change in the fed funds rate for the cycle. The shaded region in Chart 13 shows the expected path for the federal funds rate assuming that the MCI reaches equilibrium at the end of 2019. The upper-end of the region corresponds to a scenario where the trade-weighted dollar depreciates by 2% per year and the lower-end of the region corresponds to a scenario where the dollar appreciates by 2% per year. The thick line through the middle of the region corresponds to a flat dollar. Chart 12Monetary Conditions Vs. Equilibrium Chart 13Fed Funds Rate Scenarios Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching", dated September 13, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Don't Chase The Rally In Junk", dated November 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: An Update", dated October 25, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Trading The Municipal Credit Cycle", dated October 18, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: An Update", dated October 25, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For additional details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Highlights Bond yields have room to move higher in the near run, but a move above 2% would represent a buying opportunity. U.S. elections are too close to call. Even if Trump wins, we caution that federal fiscal spending programs will have to work hard to offset the ongoing drag from sluggish state and local spending. Economic and inflation data will not stand in the way of a Fed rate hike in December. But heightened market volatility associated with the elections could still derail their plans. Feature October was a tough month for Treasuries, as the 10-year climbed 25 basis points since October 1. The sell-off puts Treasury yields closely in line with our bond strategists' estimate of fair value. This week, we review the factors that argue for or against a further rise in bond yields. Our conclusion is that the Treasury sell-off is likely to continue in the near run. Yields above 2% would represent a buying opportunity. The primary bearish driver for Treasuries in the next two months is the Fed. As we discuss below, recent economic data has been decent enough to meet the Fed's threshold for a rate hike and inflation indicators are moving towards the Fed's 2% target. Indeed, the FOMC statement released last Wednesday sent a mildly hawkish signal by highlighting that growth has improved, while both inflation expectations and realized inflation are tracking higher. The statement very much keeps a December rate hike in play, but it does not elevate the odds. In the FOMC meeting just prior to last year's rate hike, the Fed specifically mentioned the "next meeting" as a possibility for a rate increase. The Fed did not go as far this time around1 as policymakers are no doubt wary of spooking the markets when uncertainty is running high ahead of the U.S. election. Whether the Fed actually pulls the trigger in December will continue to hinge on the incoming economic data and the behavior of the markets following the election, but our base case remains that the Fed will follow through with a rate hike. The market is currently priced for a 65% chance of a rate move before the end of the year. This is roughly the same as the probability of a 2015 rate hike at this time last year (Chart 1). As long as the economic data remain reasonably firm, as we expect, then rate hike probabilities should follow last year's path and move to 100% by the December 13-14 FOMC meeting. Last year, the revision in the rate hike probability from November-December corresponded with a 35 bps rise in the 10-year Treasury. Chart 1Room For Expectations To Move Higher Since last year, the Fed has drastically downgraded its long-term rate projections. Recall that ahead of the December 2015 FOMC meeting, the Fed projected that the Fed funds rate would reach 1.4% in 2016. Since then, the Fed has revised downward its interest rate forecast to two rate hikes in 2017. Assuming the Fed does not revise these forecasts, it is unlikely that Treasuries respond as negatively as they did in 2015. Moreover, as we noted above, at 1.8% today, Treasuries are already roughly at fair value. During last year's sell-off, bond yields were starting from a substantially overbought level. This argues for a somewhat more muted reaction to a Fed rate hike, although we still expect yields could move higher. Beyond December, i.e. once the rate hike is priced in, our base case is that yields trend sideways for a time. The Fed's forecast for growth in 2017 is 2.0%, which would represent an increase of 0.5% from the first three quarters of 2016. If economic growth meets the Fed's expectation of 2%, then it is reasonable to expect that policymakers would increase twice next year, i.e. in line with their current forecasts. As shown in Chart 1, the Treasury market is not yet priced for this outcome: market participants currently assign only 80% odds to one rate hike by the end of 2017. The message is that the Fed, even with a reasonable (for the first time in years!) forecast for growth, will end up being a source of upward pressure on bond yields beyond 2017. There is nonetheless an important mitigating factor for bond yields: the U.S. dollar. A stronger currency represents a tightening of financial conditions that acts to depress expectations of future economic growth. This can spell trouble for risk assets and also lower the market-implied odds of future rate hikes. Indeed, a central bank can tighten monetary conditions, but does not have control over how much of the tightening comes via interest rates and how much through currency appreciation. In the current environment, the Fed knows that the process of normalizing interest rates will trigger bouts of volatility, because its actions will be exaggerated by movements in the currency. The bottom line is that we expect the Fed to tighten in December, followed by two more quarter-point hikes in 2017. Given that the bond market is not yet priced for this, the recent sell-off in bond yields will continue, perhaps to as high as 2%. Thereafter, we would expect Treasuries to trade in a fairly narrow range, with 2% representing the higher end of the band. A Coin Toss Election In the very near term, the U.S. elections pose an important risk to the view expressed above. For the past several months, market odds of a Trump Presidency have been positively correlated with the uncertainty index and negatively correlated with Treasury yields (Chart 2 and Chart 3). On the eve of the election, the race is once again too close to call. Our expectation has been that any flight-to-quality related to a Trump victory will be short-lived. However, with equity market multiples stretched and the earnings outlook still leaving much to be desired, equity markets are ripe for a correction. Chart 2Bond Market Tracks Uncertainty Chart 3Trump And Uncertainty In our September 26 Weekly Report, we warned that investors may be assigning too low odds of a Trump Presidential win. We posited that if the polls remained tight, the potential for further volatility was high. We followed up in mid-October, advising clients how to implement portfolio insurance against downside market risks, and specifically against a Trump election win. One recommended vehicle for insurance that we highlighted was the U.S. dollar, which is part of our Protector Portfolio (Chart 4 and Chart 5). We believe the currency will rally due to the combination of coming fiscal expansion and risk aversion flows on the back of a Trump win. True, this strategy has not held up in recent days, as the U.S. dollar has softened while Trump improves in the polls and risk assets have corrected. Still, the dollar's reputation as a safe-haven currency is well-deserved. It has consistently outperformed during times of crisis - even when the U.S. itself was the source, as most recently demonstrated during the summer 2011 budget impasse. Chart 4Protector Portfolio Components Chart 5Protector Portfolio Returns In a recent report,2 our geopolitical strategists outline several things to watch for on November 8, the day of the election, and in its immediate aftermath. The immediate developments most relevant for investors are anything that prolongs the period of uncertainty regarding voting. For example, the 2000 election is a reminder that the results may not be clear immediately. Although the 2000 election was held on November 7, the official result was not declared until November 26; Al Gore did not concede until December 12. This time, any number of things could delay declaring a winner, including a tie in the electoral college, or a "faithless elector," i.e. an electoral college member that does not cast his/her ballot for the candidate chosen by popular vote, and therefore causes the Supreme Court to intervene. A delay in declaring the election result would increase uncertainty and therefore be negative for risk assets. Longer term, the margin of victory has become important for policy. It is now clear that a Clinton win, if it were to happen, will be a narrow one. According to our Geopolitical Strategy team, it is almost guaranteed at this point that the chances of a Democratic sweep in the House of Representatives are zero. This is a positive development for the market as a Democratic sweep would mean a slew of anti-business regulation out of Congress. Nonetheless, a narrow win - with sub-50% of the vote - would give Hillary Clinton an extremely weak mandate. The probability of a compromise between the White House and GOP in Congress is therefore declining and puts in jeopardy any possibility of modest fiscal stimulus under a Clinton White House, or of corporate tax reforms. The likelihood of more fiscal spending in 2017 has become common lore among investors. Thus, a disappointment on that front would be negative for risk assets. Post-Election Government Spending Throughout the twists and turns of the U.S. election campaign, one higher conviction view that has endured at BCA is that popular sentiment is shifting away from fiscal austerity and that 2017 would feature more ambitious spending programs. That would be quite welcome, given that real government consumption and investment - at all levels of government - has been a drag on growth during most of the recovery since the Great Recession. Ongoing weakness at the Federal level is due to restraint in defense expenditure, while state and local spending has been weak due to a significant downtrend in tax revenues. It is notable that the decline in state tax revenues is not confined to oil-producing states. A recent report by the Rockefeller Institute compiled state tax revenue forecasts for 2017 and concludes that the decline in tax revenues from all sources (sales, income and corporate) will be slow to recover next year.3 Remember that states can only spend what they take in outside of infrastructure spending. If state and local governments can manage to cut the drag on real GDP to 0%, that would still leave a major onus for government spending on the federal government. Assuming the contribution to real GDP from state and local spending is zero, it would require a 6% annual growth in federal spending to return total government spending as a contribution to GDP back to its historic average of 0.4% (Chart 6). As Chart 7 shows, fiscal spending of that magnitude rarely occurs outside of recession. Chart 6(Part 1) How Much Fiscal Spending? Chart 7(Part 2) How Much Fiscal Spending? Importantly, how much long-term effect a fiscal boost will deliver depends on how well fiscal multipliers - which measure how much a dollar of increased government spending or reduced taxes raises output - are working. Indeed, the magnitude of fiscal multipliers continues to be a massive source of disagreement in policy circles. Recent work by the IMF suggests that the multiplier, in some economies and under certain interest rate settings, could be as high as four: for each dollar the U.S. government spends, it will generate another $4 dollars of GDP!4 Other academics put the fiscal multiplier at less than 0.5. The wide range of forecasts is due to several factors, but there are nonetheless some generally held principles: Fiscal stimulus tends to be more effective when the output gap is large: when output is well below its potential, the monetary policy response to an increase in spending is likely to be limited. In other words, fiscal multipliers are larger in recessions than in expansions.5 The type of fiscal stimulus matters, a lot. Table 1 shows a range of CBO estimates for different types of government activity. For example, income tax cuts on high income earners tend to have a low multiplier effect (well below 1), while direct spending by government, e.g. infrastructure outlays, tends to have a much higher multiplier (above 1). Multiplier effects tend to last no more than eight quarters when output is close to potential. Fiscal stimulus tends to have a more impressive impact, although short-lived (four quarters) when the output gap is large. Table 2 shows the CBO-estimated effect of an increase in demand over eight quarters under two different economic scenarios. The first is when monetary policy is constrained, and the second is when monetary policy responds to the increase in demand from government stimulus. Our guess is that we are currently somewhere in between the two economic scenarios presented: there is still an output gap and monetary policy is already off the zero bound. Thus, the fiscal multiplier is likely a little above than one, meaning that government spending does not "crowd out" private spending. Table 1Ranges For U.S. Fiscal Multipliers Table 2The Effect Of A $1 Increase In Aggregate Demand Over Eight Quarters Overall, government expenditures will contribute positively to GDP next year, though the amount of fiscal expansion is dependent on the political configuration in Washington after the elections. Similarly, the impact of any spending will depend on what form new fiscal measures takes. CBO research suggests that the fiscal multiplier will be slightly above 1. Business Sentiment: Neither Euphoria Nor Misery Without further participation from the government sector, the economy is likely to achieve above 2% real GDP growth. A more optimistic scenario could unfold if capex improves substantially and/or a Trump win significantly opens the fiscal taps. Recent private sector data shows that businesses are continuing on a mild expansion path. The ISM surveys of business confidence were little changed in October - sentiment among manufacturers is broadly unchanged, while respondents from the service sector were slightly less optimistic than the previous month (Chart 8). Still, the major indices remain above their boom/bust lines and respondents' comments suggest neither euphoria nor misery. Meanwhile, payrolls increased by 161,000 in October. Although this was slightly below the consensus forecast of 175,000, there was a cumulative 44,000 in upward revisions to the prior two months. Elsewhere, wages accelerated more than expected and average hourly earnings rose 0.4% m/m, pushing the annual growth rate to a new cyclical high of 2.8% (Chart 9). Chart 8ISM Surveys Are Steady Chart 9Wage Growth Is Perking Up To paraphrase from this week's FOMC statement, the employment report provides some further evidence that the U.S. economy is progressing towards the Fed's dual mandate. In itself, it reinforces the case for the Fed raise interest rates in December. It seems now that the only thing that could derail the Fed is an election surprise and related heightened market volatility. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151028a.htm 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "It Ain't Over 'Till The Fat Man Sings," dated November 1, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/state_revenue_report/2016-09-21-SRR_104_final.pdf 4 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1493.pdf 5 "How Powerful Are Fiscal Multipliers In Recessions? Alan Auerbach and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, NBER Reporter 2015, http://www.nber.org/reporter/2015number2/auerbach.html
The Tactical Asset Allocation model can provide investment recommendations which diverge from those outlined in our regular weekly publications. The model has a much shorter investment horizon - namely, one month - and thus attempts to capture very tactical opportunities. Meanwhile, our regular recommendations have a longer expected life, anywhere from 3-months to a year (or longer). This difference explains why the recommendations between the two publications can deviate from each other from time to time. Highlights Chart 1Model Weights In October, the model outperformed global equities in USD and local-currency terms; it also outperformed the S&P 500 in local-currency terms, while performing in line with the S&P in USD terms. For November, the model trimmed its allocation to cash and stocks and boosted its weighting in bonds (Chart 1). The model increased its weighting in French, Dutch, and Swedish stocks at the expense of the U.S., Japan, Germany, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Emerging Asia. Within the bond portfolio, allocation to New Zealand and the U.K. was increased, while the allocation to U.S., Australian and Spanish paper was reduced. The risk index for stocks deteriorated in October, while the bond risk index improved noticeably. Feature Performance In October, the recommended balanced portfolio gained 0.6% in local-currency terms, and was down 1% in U.S. dollar terms (Chart 2). This compares with a loss of 1.4% for the global equity benchmark, and a 1% loss for the S&P 500 index. Given that the underlying model is structured in local-currency terms, we generally recommend that investors hedge their positions, though we do provide recommendations from time to time. The higher allocation to EM stocks in October was timely, but the boost to bonds was a drag on the model's performance. Weights The model cut its allocation to stocks from 67% to 66% and increased its bond weighting from 21% to 26%. The allocation to cash was decreased from 12% to 8%, while commodities remain excluded from the portfolio (Table 1). The model reduced its allocation to New Zealand equities by 3 points, Emerging Asia by 2 points and U.S., Japan, Germany and Switzerland by 1 point each. Meanwhile, it increased allocation to Dutch, French and Swedish stocks by 4 points, 3 points and 1 point, respectively. In the fixed-income space, the allocation to U.K. and New Zealand paper was increased by 6 points and 5 points respectively, while allocation to Australia, Spain and the U.S. was cut by 3 points, 2 points and 1 point, respectively. Chart 2Portfolio Total Returns Table 1Model Weights (As Of October 27, 2016) Currency Allocation Local currency-based indicators drive the construction of our model. As such, the performance of the model's portfolio should be compared with the local-currency global equity benchmark. The decision to hedge currency exposure should be made at the client's discretion, though from time to time, we do provide our recommendations. The dollar appreciated in October and investors should position for additional dollar strength. Our Dollar Capitulation Index seems to be breaking out to the upside following a pattern of lower highs. Since 2008, such breakouts have been followed by a significant rally in the broad trade-weighted dollar (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* And Capitulation Capital Market Indicators Our model continues to exclude commodities from the portfolio. The risk index for this asset class remains at the highest level in over two years (Chart 4). For the first time since June 2014, the risk index for global equities is above the neutral line (Chart 5). The higher overall risk reflects deteriorating liquidity and momentum readings. Our model cut its weighting in equities for the third month in a row. Chart 4Commodity Index And Risk Chart 5Global Stock Market And Risk The value component of the risk index for U.S. stocks improved in October, but this was overshadowed by worsening liquidity and momentum readings. The model slightly trimmed its allocation to U.S. equities (Chart 6). Even after the latest small uptick in the risk index for Dutch equities, it remains one of the lowest among the model's universe. The allocation to this bourse was increased. (Chart 7). Chart 6U.S. Stock Market And Risk Chart 7Netherlands Stock Market And Risk The risk index for U.K. stocks declined slightly in October, but remains firmly in high-risk territory both compared to its own history and its global peers. This asset class remains excluded from the portfolio (Chart 8). The model slightly upgraded Swedish equities, despite a worsening risk index. The continued favorable liquidity backdrop remains a boon for Swedish stocks (Chart 9). Chart 8U.K. Stock Market And Risk Chart 9Swedish Stock Market And Risk After declining for four consecutive months, the overall risk index for bonds is not at extreme high-risk levels anymore. The increase in yields has helped completely unwind overbought conditions, as per our momentum indicator. The model used the latest selloff to increase its allocation to bonds (Chart 10). The risk index for U.S. Treasurys declined markedly in October, but a few other markets also feature improved risk readings. As a result, the model downgraded U.S. Treasurys (Chart 11). Chart 10Global Bond Yields And Risk Chart 11U.S. Bond Yields And Risk The selloff in New Zealand bonds has pushed the momentum indicator into oversold territory, boosting the allocation to this asset class (Chart 12). The risk index for euro area bonds remains firmly in the high-risk zone even after a notable decline. However, there are select bond markets in the common-currency area that have relatively more favorable risk readings (Chart 13). Chart 12New Zealand Bond Yields And Risk Chart 13Euro Area Bond Yields And Risk Within the euro area, Italian bonds feature a risk reading that has fallen below the neutral line. While the cyclical indicator continues to move into more bond-negative territory, it is currently being offset by the oversold reading on the momentum indicator (Chart 14). U.K. gilt yields moved up as the post-Brexit inflation backdrop became gilt-unfriendly and growth surprised on the upside. Now, with momentum moving from overbought to oversold over just a couple of months, any negative economic surprises could potentially weigh on gilt yields. The model has added this asset class to the portfolio (Chart 15). Chart 14Italian Bond Yields and Risk Chart 15U.K. Bond Yields And Risk A more hawkish Fed could push the dollar higher. The 13-week momentum measure for the USD remains above, but close to the neutral line. The recovery of the 40-week rate of change from mildly negative levels which have represented a floor since 2012 would suggest that a new leg in the dollar bull market is in the offing (Chart 16). Both the 13-week and 40-week momentum measures for the euro are below the neutral line (Chart 17). Growing monetary divergences could continue weighing on EUR/USD before the technical indicators are pushed into more oversold territory. Fears of hard Brexit knocked down the pound. The 13-week rate of change is now close to its post-Brexit lows, while the 40-week rate of change measure is at the most oversold level since 2000 (excluding the great recession). At these technical levels the pound seems overdue to find a temporary bottom (Chart 18). Chart 16U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* Chart 17Euro Chart 18Sterling Miroslav Aradski, Senior Analyst miroslava@bcaresearch.com
Highlights ECB Monetary Policy: Euro Area inflation will likely remain below the European Central Bank (ECB) 2% target for the next few years due to persistent excess capacity in Europe. The ECB will signal this at the December monetary policy meeting, providing the justification to extend their quantitative easing (QE) asset purchase program beyond the current March 2017 expiration date. ECB QE Changes: The constraints imposed on the ECB's bond purchases are self-imposed, and can be easily altered in the event of potential "shortages" of available debt for the QE program. Fears of a potential taper of ECB buying because of those constraints, which have bearish implications for Euro Area bond yields, are overstated. Country Allocation: Move to an above-benchmark stance on core European government debt, which are a low-beta safe haven in the current environment of a cyclical rise in global bond yields. Feature After spending the past couple of months fretting over the next move by the U.S. Federal Reserve or the Bank of Japan, investors' attention shifted to Europe last week. With the current European Central Bank (ECB) government bond quantitative easing (QE) program set to expire in March of next year, the markets were seeking any sort of guidance on whether the ECB will end the program as scheduled, or extend the program beyond March - perhaps with a reduction ("taper") in the size of the bond buying. ECB President Mario Draghi provided no new information at the post-meeting press conference last Thursday, leaving bond investors in limbo until the December meeting when the results of the ECB's assessment of their QE program will be published. Some alterations of the program will likely be announced, but it is too soon for the ECB to consider ending their QE program. With regards to the title of this Weekly Report - the most likely outcome is that the ECB will extend the QE program past March 2017, but will tinker with the rules of QE in an effort to pretend that the central bank is still following a prudent logic for its purchases. Fears of an early taper are overstated, and this makes core European government debt a potential oasis of safety while global bond yields remain in a bear phase. Plenty Of Reasons For The ECB Not To Taper This talk of a tapering of ECB asset purchases following the scheduled end of the current QE program seems premature. After all, neither the ECB's own economic forecasts, nor those of its Survey of Professional Forecasters, are calling for inflation to get close to the 2% target until at least 2018 (Chart of the Week). The ECB staff will prepare a new set of forecasts for the December policy meeting that will include projections for 2019 - perhaps these new estimates will have inflation finally reaching the 2% goal. But in the absence of a credible forecast of inflation returning to target, the ECB will be hard pressed to signal any move to a less-accommodative monetary policy. Headline Euro Area inflation is currently only 0.4%, despite a recent increase in the oil price denominated in Euros, which has been a reliable directional indicator for Euro Area inflation (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekNo Need For An ECB Taper Chart 2European Inflation Is Stubbornly Low The steady decline in the Euro Area unemployment rate over the past three years has coincided with a move higher in overall labor compensation, but this has been purely a "volume" effect resulting from steadily increasing employment growth. With the entire region not yet at full employment, there has been minimal upward pressure on wages or inflation in domestically focused sectors like services (bottom panel). In other words, the lack of Euro Area inflation is a direct function of the excess capacity in Euro Area product and labor markets. According to the IMF, the Euro Area output gap will not close until 2020, which will limit any rise in inflation over the rest of the decade (Chart 3). It will take a more prolonged period of above-trend economic growth to close the output gap, reducing the Euro Area unemployment rate below the full employment NAIRU level, before any recovery in wages or core inflation can take place (bottom panel). This lack of realized inflation is weighing on Euro Area inflation expectations and creating some potential credibility problems for the ECB. As we have discussed in earlier Weekly Reports, inflation expectations in much of the developed economies seem to follow an "adaptive" process, where expectations are formed in lagged response to actual inflation.1 If central banks are fully credible in their ability to use monetary policy to fight inflation (and demand) shortfalls, then those forward-looking expectations should eventually gravitate towards the central bank inflation target. However, if there is a large and persistent shock to realized inflation, then inflation expectations can deviate from the central bank target for an extended period. Using a 5-year moving average of realized headline CPI inflation as a proxy for inflation expectations is a reasonably good (albeit simple) approximation of this adaptive process (Chart 4). The current 60-month moving average for Euro Area headline inflation is 0.6%, not far from the 5-year Euro Area CPI swap rate of 0.9%. However, if the ECB's inflation forecasts for the next two years come to fruition (1.2% in 2017, 1.6% in 2018), then the 5-year moving average will continue to decline, as those higher inflation figures would not offset the sharp fall in inflation witnessed over the past few years. Chart 3Excess Capacity Holding Inflation Down Chart 4Inflation Expectations Will Stay Low Simply put, the ECB's current projections are not consistent with inflation expectations hitting the 2% target by 2018, and likely even beyond that. The ECB will be presenting new projections in December, but it would take a significant upgrade of their growth and inflation forecasts to "move the needle" on longer-term inflation expectations. Perhaps a move away from fiscal austerity across the Euro Area could trigger an upgrade on growth expectations, as that would imply a faster pace of growth and a more rapidly narrowing output gap. However, while the topic of greater fiscal spending has been heating up in the halls of governments in Washington, London and Tokyo, there has been little sign that Euro Area governments are about to open the fiscal spigots anytime soon (and certainly not before elections in Germany and France in 2017). Chart 5European Banks Getting More Cautious? ECB Still Needs To Support Loan Growth The state of Euro Area banks, and what it means for future lending activity, is another factor for the ECB to consider before contemplating any move to a less-accommodative monetary policy. The current growth rates of money and credit are showing no signs of significant deceleration (Chart 5). The latest ECB Euro Area bank lending survey, released last week, did show a modest decline in the net number of banks reporting easier lending standards to businesses, as well as a reduction in the number of banks reporting increasing loan demand from firms. The ongoing hit to European bank profitability from the current negative interest rate environment could be playing a role in the banks moving to a less easy environment for lending. As can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 5, there is a reliable leading relationship between Euro Area bank equity prices and the growth in bank lending to businesses. The downturn in Euro Area bank stocks in 2016, which has been driven by declining profit expectations, could pose a risk to credit growth in the months ahead. According to a special question asked within the ECB's bank lending survey, a net 82% of respondents reported that the ECB's negative deposit rate has damaged banks' net interest income over the past six months.2 In that same survey, a net 12% of banks reported a boost to loan demand from the ECB's negative interest rate policy, and a net 15% of banks reported that the additional liquidity provided by the ECB bond purchases went towards extending loans to businesses. So while negative interest rates may be hurting bank profit margins, the impact of the ECB's QE is helping offset that to some degree by providing banks with capital gains on their bond portfolios that can be used to finance lending. So without any sign that inflation will soon approach the ECB's target, thus requiring a potential tapering of QE or even a move away from negative interest rates, the prudent course for the ECB to take to support Euro Area credit demand, and economic growth, is to continue with the QE program beyond the March 2017 expiration date. That will require some changes to the ECB's rules of the program, but, in the end, these are only self-imposed constraints. Bottom Line: Euro Area inflation will likely remain below the ECB 2% target over the next few years due to persistent excess capacity in Europe. The ECB will signal this at the December monetary policy meeting, providing the justification to extend their quantitative easing asset purchase program beyond the current March 2017 expiration date. The ECB Has Some Policy Options To Avoid A Taper Tantrum Core European bond yields have been depressed by the ECB's QE program, which have acted to push down both the future expected path of interest rates and the term premium (Chart 6). This has helped anchor real bond yields in negative territory, even with inflation expectations at such low levels. But any signs of potential slowing of the pace of QE buying could quickly unwind this effect, which makes the ECB's next steps so critical for the path of global bond yields. In Chart 7, we show the level and growth rate for the ECB's monetary base, along with five potential future scenarios: The ECB ends their QE program in March 2017, as currently planned; The ECB extends QE for six months to September 2017, at the current pace of €80bn in bond buying per month; The ECB extends QE program for twelve months to March 2018, at a pace of €80bn per month; The ECB extends QE to September 2017, but reduces the pace of purchases to €60bn per month; The ECB extends QE to March 2018, but cuts to €60bn per month. Chart 6ECB QE Still Holding Down Yields Chart 7ECB Needs To Keep The Monetary Base Growing As can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 7, the growth rate of the ECB's monetary base (and the asset side of their balance sheet) will decelerate sharply in 2017 & 2018 if the ECB does end the QE program as scheduled next March. Extending the program, however, does push out the rapid deceleration phase for monetary base into 2018. This is of critical importance for the Euro Area bond market, as both the outright level and term premium component of German Bund yields have been broadly correlated with the growth rate of the monetary base (Chart 8). In other words, extending the ECB QE program into the future is most important to prevent a "taper tantrum" in European bonds, by signalling to the markets that the ECB wishes to maintain low interest rates for longer. The ECB could even announce a reduction in the pace of purchases, along with an extension, and bond yields should remain well-behaved. This will also help prevent an unwanted appreciation of the Euro, the value of which currently reflects the far easier monetary stance in Europe (Chart 9). Chart 8An ECB Taper Would Be Bad For Bunds Chart 9An Easy-For-Longer ECB Will Weigh On The Euro Given the persistent debates within the ECB (and between the ECB and some Euro Area governments) about the long-run merits of QE, the combination of both an extension and reduction in QE purchases could be the compromise option that satisfies all parties. Alternatively, the ECB could choose to maintain the pace of bond purchases but alter the selection rules governing the program. Given the recent concerns in bond markets that the ECB is "running out of bonds to buy", changing the rules of the QE program is a sensible way for the central bank to free itself from the self-imposed shackles on its bond purchases. There are three options that the ECB can consider: Moving away from strictly allocating the bond purchases according to the ECB "capital key", which essentially weights the bond purchases by the size of each economy; Raising the issuer limits on QE, which limits the ECB to holding no more than 33% of any single issuer or individual bond issue; Reducing the current yield floor on QE, which prevents the ECB from buying any bonds with yields below the ECB deposit rate, which is currently -0.4%; We think option 1 is the least likely to occur, as this would imply buying a greater share of countries with more problematic debt profiles, like Italy or Portugal. There is little chance of such a strategy being well received by the governments in Berlin and Brussels, and the ECB would likely wish to avoid a major political confrontation by allowing larger deviations from the capital key Option 2 is an easier solution to implement. The 33% issuer constraint was always an arbitrary level that was aimed more at bonds with so-called "collective action clauses", where a majority of bondholders can force a decision on all bondholders in the event of a debt restructuring. It is understandable why the ECB would not want to become to decision-making counterparty in the event of a future messy bond restructuring in Europe. However, the ECB's ownership percentages within each Euro Area country are nowhere near the 33% limit at the moment (Chart 10) and, at the current pace and composition of buying, that 33% limit will not even be reached for Germany anytime soon.3 There is room for the ECB to raise the issuer limits, as it has already done for some other parts of its asset purchase programs, like bonds issued by European Union supranationals.4 Chart 10ECB Holdings Are Far From The 33% Issuer Limit Chart 11Lowering The Yield Floor For QE Makes Sense Option 3 is the most binding constraint of all on the ECB purchases, as very large shares of the European government bond market are now trading below the ECB's -0.4% deposit rate (Chart 11). In the case of Germany, nearly 70% of all QE-eligible debt is trading below the ECB's yield floor, which has raised investor concerns that the ECB will soon be unable to buy enough German debt at the current pace of purchases. However, that yield floor constraint is completely arbitrary - there is nothing stopping the ECB from buying bonds trading at a yield below the deposit rate, other than (we suspect) a desire to impose some sort of price discipline on the QE buying to make the ECB appear more credible with its purchases. Chart 12The QE Yield Floor Can Be Changed If the ECB decided to lower the yield floor below the current -0.4% deposit rate, this would open up a greater share of the core European bond markets to QE buying (Chart 12). This would also change the current market narrative that the ECB will soon run out of German bonds to buy. In the end, the most likely path the ECB will take following its December re-assessment of its QE program is a combination of lowering the yield floor on QE bond purchases below -0.4% and raising the issuer limits above 33%. There appears to be plenty of leeway for the ECB to alter their purchases, but without necessarily reducing the monthly pace of buying. Combined with an extension of the end-date of the QE program beyond March, this should alleviate any concerns that the ECB will soon hit a wall with its asset purchases. Bottom Line: The constraints imposed on the ECB's bond purchases are self-imposed, and can be easily altered in the event of potential "shortages" of available debt for the QE program. Fears of a potential taper of ECB buying because of those constraints are overstated. Investment Implications: Move To An Above-Benchmark Stance On Core European Bonds With the ECB having no need to end its QE program early, the case for moving to an overweight stance on core Europe is a strong one. As we noted in our last Weekly Report, favoring bond markets of countries with the lowest inflation rates is a logical investment strategy in the current environment of a modest cyclical upturn in global growth and inflation.5 That justifies our current below-benchmark recommendation on U.S. and U.K. government debt, as both realized inflation and expected inflation are rising in both countries. That leaves the Euro Area and Japan as possible candidates to move to above-benchmark weightings, given their defensive properties as low-beta bond markets. Although with the Bank of Japan now pegging the Japanese government bond (JGB) yield curve with a 10-year yield at 0%, we do not see a compelling investment case for overweighting JGBs as a defensive trade. If an investor wants safety at a 0% yield - with no chance of a capital gain from a decline in yields - than owning T-bills, or even gold, is just as viable as owning JGBs. We recently upgraded Japan to neutral in our recommended portfolio allocation, and we see no reason to move from that. Thus, core European bonds stand out as the candidate to upgrade as a defensive trade during the current bond bear phase, which we expect will continue until at least December when the Fed is expected to deliver another rate hike in the U.S. We see a case for moving to above-benchmark for both Germany and France, but especially so in the latter. The beta of bond returns between France and both the U.S. (Chart 13) & U.S.(Chart 14) is very low, making French bonds a good market to favor at the expense of U.S. Treasuries and U.K. Gilts in currency-hedged bond portfolios. Chart 13French Bonds Are Low Beta To USTs... Chart 14...And To U.K. Gilts Bottom Line: Move to an above-benchmark stance on core European government debt, which are a low-beta safe haven in the current environment of a cyclical rise in global bond yields. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Why Are Global Inflation Expectations Still So Low", dated March 1, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The Q4 2016 ECB Euro Area Bank Lending Survey can be found at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/blssurvey_201610.pdf. 3 Please note that the denominator in the percentages shown in Chart 10 include only bonds with maturities that are eligible for ECB QE purchases, omitting bonds that will mature in less than 2 year and more than 30 years. 4 For more details on that change to the supranational issuer limits, please see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp-qa.en.html. 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Return Of The Bond Vigilantes", dated October 18, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Duration: Treasury yields will continue to rise as a December Fed rate hike is priced in. A surge in bullish dollar sentiment between now and December would cause us to back away from our below-benchmark duration stance. Spread Product: Maintain a neutral allocation to spread product, favoring convexity over credit risk. A surge in bullish dollar sentiment between now and December would cause us to downgrade spread product relative to Treasuries. TIPS: The increased sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to core inflation argues for a continued overweight position in TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries. Sovereign Debt: Continue to favor U.S. corporate credit over USD-denominated sovereign government debt within a neutral allocation to spread product. Feature About one month ago, we outlined how we expected our investment strategy to evolve over the remainder of this year and into 2017.1 Our continued expectation that the Fed will lift rates in December leads us to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and a neutral allocation to spread product2 until a December rate hike has been fully discounted by the market. Chart 1Dollar Sentiment: A Key Indicator Beyond December, our investment strategy will depend largely on how the dollar responds to an upward re-rating of rate expectations. Strong dollar appreciation would likely cause us to reverse our below-benchmark duration stance and become even more cautious on spread product. Conversely, a tame dollar could mean that the sell-off in bonds and rally in spreads have further to run. The dollar has appreciated by close to +2% since early September and bullish sentiment toward the dollar has also edged higher (Chart 1). However, so far the increases appear muted compared to the rapid dollar appreciation that occurred in the run-up to last December's rate hike. The reason we care about the dollar is that a stronger currency represents a tightening of financial conditions that acts to depress expectations of future economic growth. This can spell trouble for risk assets and also lower the market-implied odds of future rate hikes. For example, spread product was performing well last year until rate hike expectations started to move higher in late October. As the market began to anticipate a December Fed rate hike, it did not take long for the combination of higher rate expectations and increasingly bullish dollar sentiment to weigh on risk assets (Chart 2). The Market Vane survey of bullish sentiment toward the dollar surged above 80% last December, and this tightening of financial conditions is what prompted the sell-off in spread product and sharp decline in Treasury yields that kicked off 2016. Chart 2More Bullish Dollar Sentiment Is A Risk For Spread Product With last year's example in mind, the relevant question for current investment strategy is: How much dollar appreciation can the market tolerate before Treasury yields reverse their uptrend and credit spreads start to widen? To answer that question we make an assessment of U.S. and global growth relative to this time last year. All else equal, if U.S. growth is improved compared to last year, then it should require a greater dollar appreciation to have a similar impact on yields and spreads. Relatedly, if the growth outlook outside of the U.S. is improved, then it would mean that the dollar's reaction to rising U.S. rate expectations might not be as strong. On this note, there is some evidence pointing toward a more resilient U.S. and global economy than at this time last year. In the U.S., our preferred leading indicators suggest that growth contributions from capital spending, housing, net exports, government spending and inventories should all move higher in the coming quarters (Chart 3). This should act to offset a likely moderation in consumer spending growth (Chart 4). All in all, the domestic U.S. growth outlook appears similar to - if not slightly better than - what was seen at this time last year. There is more cause for optimism in the global growth indicators. The aggregate global PMI and LEI are tracking close to levels seen last year, but rising diffusion indexes suggest that further increases are likely (Chart 5). Already, manufacturing PMIs in all the major economic blocs have entered clear uptrends (Chart 5, bottom two panels). This suggests that the global growth outlook is actually much brighter than at this time last year, and improved diffusion indexes suggest that the global recovery has also become more synchronized. Chart 3U.S. Growth Outlook Improving... Chart 4...Outside Of Consumer Spending Chart 5Global Growth On The Upswing The implication of a U.S. economic outlook that is broadly similar to last year and an improved outlook for global growth is that the U.S. dollar may not react as strongly to rising Fed rate hike expectations in 2016 as it did in 2015. If this turns out to be the case, then the performance of spread product should also be more resilient and the uptrend in Treasury yields is less likely to reverse. Bottom Line: We continue to track the dollar and dollar sentiment closely to inform our near-term investment strategy. While dollar sentiment has edged higher, it has not yet reached the elevated levels seen last year. A more synchronized global growth recovery makes such a spike in bullish dollar sentiment less likely this time around. What Is A High Pressure Economy? Chart 6What A "High Pressure Economy" Looks Like Fed Chair Janet Yellen introduced a new buzzword to the market two weeks ago when she suggested in a speech3 that "it might be possible to reverse the adverse supply-side effects [of the financial crisis] by temporarily running a 'high-pressure economy' with robust aggregate demand and a tight labor market." Some investors took this to mean that the Fed would be increasingly tolerant of inflation overshooting its 2% target. We think this interpretation is incorrect, although we do think that Yellen's description of a "high pressure economy" provides a lot of information about the Fed's reaction function. More than anything, Yellen's speech was a response to recent trends in the labor market. The downtrend in the unemployment rate started to abate late last year, even though the economy has continued to add jobs at an average pace of just under +200k per month. A sharp rebound in the labor force participation rate has prevented the unemployment rate from falling, despite robust job growth (Chart 6). It is this dynamic that Yellen refers to when she talks about a "high pressure economy". Essentially, her theory suggests that, despite the low unemployment rate, the economy might be able to continue to add jobs without inflation spiking higher. Put differently, the unemployment rate might be less useful as an input to the Fed's forecast of future inflation than in past cycles. The key implication for investors is that if the Fed doesn't trust the unemployment rate to provide a signal about future inflation, then it is forced to rely on the actual inflation data for guidance. In our view, core PCE and core CPI inflation are now the two most important inputs to the Fed's reaction function. On that note, while last week's September core CPI release was soft, both core CPI and core PCE remain in uptrends that began in early 2015. Further, diffusion indexes suggest that these uptrends will persist (Chart 7). The Fed's increased focus on core inflation also has implications for our TIPS call. The sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to realized core inflation has shifted higher since the Great Recession (Chart 8). In our view, this has occurred because of how the zero-lower-bound on interest rates has constrained the Fed's ability to influence investor expectations. Chart 7The Inflation Uptrend Is Intact Chart 8TIPS Breakevens & Core Inflation When the fed funds rate was well above the zero-lower-bound, investors could reasonably assume that the Fed would act to offset any temporary price shocks. As such, long-maturity TIPS breakevens remained in a relatively narrow range and were mostly influenced by perceptions about the stance of Fed policy. In a zero-lower-bound world, investors can reasonably question whether the Fed has the ability to offset a deflationary price shock. As such, inflation expectations are increasingly driven by the actual inflation data rather than the Fed. With the Fed and the market both increasingly taking their cues from the actual inflation data, it means that the Fed will likely remain sufficiently accommodative for core PCE to return to target and also that TIPS breakevens will move higher alongside the trend in realized inflation. Bottom Line: The increased sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to core inflation argues for a continued overweight position in TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries. Sovereign Credit: A Dollar Story Chart 9Sovereign Debt & The Dollar As noted above, in the current environment the path of the U.S. dollar takes on increased importance for our entire portfolio strategy. However, there is one sector of the fixed income market where the dollar is always paramount - USD-denominated sovereign debt. Specifically, we refer to the Barclays Sovereign index which consists of the U.S. dollar denominated debt of foreign governments, mostly emerging markets.4 In the long-run, the performance of sovereign debt relative to equivalently-rated and duration-matched U.S. corporate credit tends to track movements in the dollar and bullish sentiment toward the dollar (Chart 9). When the dollar appreciates it makes USD-denominated debt more expensive to service from the perspective of a foreign issuer, and therefore causes sovereign debt to underperform domestic alternatives. As stated above, we do not anticipate a near-term spike in the dollar, like what was witnessed near the end of last year. However, given that the Fed is much further along in its tightening cycle than other major central banks, the long-run bull market in the U.S. dollar should remain intact. This will continue to be a major headwind for sovereign debt. Further, the recent performance of sovereign debt relative to U.S. credit has bucked its traditional correlations with the dollar. Notice that the beta between sovereign excess returns and the dollar has moved into positive territory (Chart 9, bottom two panels). Historically, the correlation does not remain at these levels for long and sovereign debt should underperform as the more typical negative correlation is re-established. At present, there is not even an attractive valuation argument for sovereign debt relative to U.S. credit. The spread differential between the Sovereign index and an equivalently-rated, duration-matched U.S. credit index is well below zero (Chart 10), and only the USD-debt of Hungary, South Africa, Colombia and Uruguay offer spreads that appear attractive relative to the U.S. Credit index (Chart 11). Chart 10No Spread Pick-Up In Sovereigns Chart 11USD-Denominated Sovereign Debt By Issuing Country Bottom Line: Continue to favor U.S. corporate credit over USD-denominated sovereign government debt within a neutral allocation to spread product. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching", dated September 13, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 We favor negatively convex assets (MBS) over credit within a neutral allocation to spread product, on the view that negatively convex assets will outperform as yields head higher in advance of a December rate hike. In anticipation of a December Fed rate hike we are also maintain a short position in the December 2017 Eurodollar futures contract as well as positions in 2/10 and 10/30 curve flatteners. The three trades have returned: +20bps, -23bps and +4bps respectively. 3 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20161014a.htm 4 The largest issuers in the Barclays Sovereign Index are: Mexico (22%), Philippines (14%) and Colombia (11%). Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights When interest rates are ultra-low, central banks have no margin for policy error. A small loosening or tightening has the potential to produce either a stall or catastrophic turbulence. The analogy is flying a plane at high altitude. Bond investors should have a strong preference for U.S. T-bonds over German bunds (currency hedged). Currency investors should prefer the euro over the dollar. For equity investors, valuations do not appear structurally attractive anywhere, once a sufficient equity risk premium is factored in. But a setback in the region of 5-10% could create a tactical entry point. Feature As the ECB Governing Council convenes for its October monetary policy meeting, an experience familiar to pilots1 provides a perfect analogy for central banks' very limited margin for error. Pilots call the experience "flying in coffin corner." Chart of the WeekUnusually High Turbulence For The German 30-Year Bund Next time you're in a plane climbing to 35,000 feet, here's something to think about; or perhaps, not to think about. As the plane gains altitude, its stall speed increases while its upper speed limit simultaneously decreases. For the pilot, this means less and less margin for error (Figure I-1). The plane's stall speed is the minimum speed to generate sufficient lift. At higher altitude, as the air gets thinner, the stall speed increases. Meanwhile, the plane's upper speed limit is set by the speed of sound. Airliners cannot fly too close to the speed of sound because the sonic shockwave produces violent and catastrophic turbulence. At higher altitude, as the air temperature drops, so does the speed of sound. Which means the plane's upper speed limit decreases. By the time the plane has reached the rarefied atmosphere of 35,000 feet, these lower and upper speed limits are barely 25 knots (30mph) apart,2 leaving almost no room for flight data misinterpretation or pilot error.3 Hence, at high altitude pilots morbidly say they are "flying in coffin corner." Analogously, in the rarefied atmosphere of zero or near-zero interest rates, central bank policy is also in coffin corner. When short-term and long-term interest rates approach the zero bound, there is no room for economic data misinterpretation or policy error. A small loosening or tightening of monetary policy has the potential to produce either a stall or catastrophic turbulence (Figure I-2 and Chart of the Week). Figure I-1Flying At High Altitude ##br## Has No Margin For Error Figure I-2Monetary Policy At Ultra-Low Rates ##br##Has No Margin For Error Avoiding A Stall At today's zero or near-zero interest rates in the euro area, a small loosening of monetary policy risks stalling the banking system, and thereby stalling the economy. A bank's core business is simple. Take in deposits, and lend them out at a higher interest rate than the deposit-rate - with the difference in the two defining the bank's net interest margin. A part of the net interest margin is a compensation for the risk of non-performing loans. This should be profit-neutral if correctly priced. The other large part of the net interest margin comes from the interest rate term-structure, as loans tend to be long-term while deposits are short-term. Hence, all else being equal, the bank's profitability suffers as the term-structure flattens. For a while, the bank can protect its profitability by cutting the interest rate paid on short-term deposits to well below the policy rate. However, once the policy rate hits zero, this profit-protection strategy hits a wall - because a negative deposit rate would risk an exodus of deposits into cash or cash-substitutes. Alternatively, the bank could charge a higher rate to borrowers, but this would tighten credit conditions. The third possibility is for the bank to suffer a hit to its already-thin net lending margin, but this would also tighten credit conditions. The pressure on the bank's profitability and share price would increase the cost of equity, making it harder to raise capital (Chart I-2). Given that an insufficient capital buffer is a major constraint to euro area bank lending, this would be a de facto tightening of credit conditions. The paradox is that at the zero bound, the smallest additional monetary loosening - via interest rate cuts or QE - risks stalling euro area bank credit creation (Chart I-3). Thereby it risks stalling economic growth. Chart I-2The ECB's QE Has Hurt Bank Valuations Chart I-3The Interplay Between Bank Profits And Bank Credit Creation Avoiding Violent Turbulence An extended period of ultra-low interest rates, and a commitment to keep them structurally low, has compressed the yields on government bonds pushing up their prices. As competing asset classes, the prices of corporate bonds and equities have also increased. This phenomenon is called the Portfolio Balance Effect. The big problem is that the prices of riskier assets have increased by more than is justified by the portfolio balance effect alone. This distortion is the result of a behavioural finance phenomenon called Mental Accounting Bias. Mental Accounting Bias describes the irrational distinction between the return from an investment's yield and that from its capital growth. The distinction is irrational because the money that comes from yield and the money that comes from capital growth is perfectly fungible.4 Rationally, what should matter is an investment's total return. But psychologically, the distinction between yield and capital is very stark. Fears about self-control cause people to compartmentalise yield as spending money and capital as saving money. Hence, people who want their investments to generate spending money - say, retirees - have an irrational focus on yield. Traditionally, the safe income from cash and government bonds satiates the people who irrationally focus on yield. However, in recent years, central banks' extended experiments with ZIRP, NIRP and QE have forced these yield-focussed investors out of cash and government bonds into risky investments. And just like every distortion, this phenomenon has generated memes to justify the act: 'reach for yield', 'search for yield', and 'there is no alternative' (TINA). But the irrational focus on yield instead of total return has artificially bid up the prices of risky investments. To the point that they no longer offer a sufficient risk premium5 for the very real possibility of substantial losses over a 5-10 year horizon (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). The unfortunate thing is that as central bankers have little expertise in psychology or behavioural finance, they have been blind to the very dangerous behavioural distortion that their monetary policy experiments have unwittingly unleashed. Chart I-4A Positive Yield On Equities##br## Can Produce A Negative 5-Year Return... Chart I-5...And Even A Negative ##br##10-Year Return The risk is that the smallest monetary tightening could trigger an aggressive unwinding of this behavioural distortion. Recall the violent turbulence in global financial markets at the start of the year after just one 25bps rate hike from the Federal Reserve. Now consider what might happen if the Fed hiked again and the ECB simultaneously announced a rapid tapering of its QE program. How Must The Pilots Fly? In a rarefied atmosphere, pilots have very little margin to alter speed without inducing a stall or violent turbulence. The same applies to central banks today. The ECB has the hardest piloting task. It is becoming difficult to justify the current aggressive pace of QE given the danger of stalling the euro area banking system; and given that the euro area's nominal GDP and nominal wage bill are both growing at a very respectable 3% (Chart I-6). But an abrupt end to the ECB's QE could create violent turbulence in QE-distorted financial markets. Chart I-6What Deflation Threat? Euro Area Nominal GDP And The Wage Bill Growing At 3% Hence, the ECB's best course of action is to hint at a very gradual deceleration of QE to start at some point in the second half of 2017. Turning to developed economy central banks in general, we remind readers of a very powerful observation. Since 2008, no major central bank has been able to hike interest rates by more than 1.75%. And every central bank that has hiked rates has had to start unwinding those hikes within a year, ultimately taking the policy rate to a new all-time low (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Since 2008, All Rate Hikes ##br##Have Been Quickly Reversed Chart I-8Will The U.S. Be ##br##Any Different? No Given the turbulence that rate hikes will generate in the financial markets and/or the economy, we fully expect the Federal Reserve to go through exactly the same experience. The important upshot is that global central bank policy through 2017-18 will be considerably less divergent than is discounted. Bond yields could creep higher in the short term. But on a 1-year horizon, bond investors should have a strong preference for U.S. T-bonds over euro area bonds, and especially over German bunds (currency hedged). Over the same horizon, currency investors should prefer the euro over the dollar. For equity investors, valuations do not appear structurally attractive anywhere once a sufficient equity risk premium is factored in. Moreover, the potential for ECB QE-tapering combined with expectations for a Fed rate hike could generate some near-term turbulence. That said, a setback in the region of 5-10% could create an excellent entry point for a 3-month trade. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. Last week's long silver/short lead pair trade has bounced sharply. And the short U.K. A-rated corporate bonds trade has achieved its 4% profit target. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. 1 Your author is a former pilot in the Royal Air Force reserve. 2 For an Airbus A330. 3 Tragically, a combination of flight data misinterpretation and pilot error at 35,000 feet was disastrous for Air France flight AF447 flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris in June 2009. Going through a storm, the airspeed indicator started giving a false reading and the pilot took the wrong corrective action, resulting in a catastrophic stall. 4 Assuming no difference in tax treatment of income and capital gains. 5 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Great Distortion... And How It will End" dated September 15, 2016 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations