Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Equities

Special Report Highlights Trump won by stealing votes from Democrats in the Midwest. His victory implies a national shift to the left on economic policy. Checks and balances on Trump are not substantial in the short term. U.S. political polarization will continue. Trump is good for the USD, bad for bonds, neutral for equities. Favor SMEs over MNCs. Close long alternative energy / short coal. Feature "Most Americans do not find themselves actually alienated from their fellow Americans or truly fearful if the other party wins power. Unlike in Bosnia, Northern Ireland or Rwanda, competition for power in the U.S. remains largely a debate between people who can work together once the election is over." -- Newt Gingrich, January 2, 2001 Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (and a potential Secretary of State pick), was asked on NBC's Meet the Press two days before the U.S. election whether he still thought that "competition for power in the U.S. remains largely a debate between people who can work together once the election is over." Gingrich made the original statement in January 2001, merely weeks after one of the most contentious presidential elections in U.S. history was resolved by the Supreme Court. Gingrich's answer in 2016? "I think, tragically, we have drifted into an environment where ... it will be a continuing fight for who controls the country." Despite an extraordinary victory - a revolution really - by Donald J. Trump, the fact of the matter remains that the U.S. is a polarized country between Republican and Democratic voters. As of publication time of this report, Trump lost the popular vote to Secretary Hillary Clinton. His is a narrower victory than either the epic Richard Nixon win in 1968 or George W. Bush squeaker in 2000. Over the next two years, the only thing that matters for the markets is that the U.S. has a unified government behind a Republican president-elect and a GOP-controlled Congress. We discuss the investment implications of this scenario below and caution clients to not over-despair. On the other hand, we also see this election as more evidence that America remains a deeply polarized country where identity politics continue to play a key role. What concerns us is that these identity politics appear to transcend the country's many cultural, ethical, political, and economic commonalities. Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. are fusing into almost ethnic-like groupings. To bring it back to Gingrich's quote at the top, that would suggest that the U.S. is no longer that much different from Bosnia or Northern Ireland.1 Election Post-Mortem Chart II-1Election Polls Usually ##br##Miss By A Few Points Donald Trump has won an upset over Hillary Clinton, but his campaign was not as much of a long-shot as the consensus believed. U.S. presidential polls have frequently missed the final tally by +/- 3% of the vote, which was precisely the end result of the 2016 election (Chart II-1). Therefore, as we pointed out in our last missive on the election, Trump's victory was not a "wild mathematical oddity."2 Why Did Trump Win The White House? Where Trump really did beat expectations was in the Midwest, and Wisconsin in particular. He ended up outperforming the poll-of-polls by a near-incredible 10%!3 His victories in Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania were well within the range of expectations. For example, the last poll-of-polls had Trump leading in both Florida (by a narrow 0.2%) and Ohio (by a solid 3.5%), whereas Clinton was up in Pennsylvania by the slightest of margins (just 1.9% lead). He ended up exceeding poll expectations in all three (by 2% in Florida, 6% in Ohio, and 3% in Pennsylvania), but not by the same wild margin as in Wisconsin. When all is said and done, Trump won the 2016 election by stealing votes away from the Democrats in the traditionally "blue" Midwest states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. This was a far more significant result than his resounding victories in Ohio (which Obama won in 2012) or Florida (where Obama won only narrowly in 2012). Our colleague Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist of the Global Investment Strategy, correctly forecast that Trump would be competitive in all three Midwest states back in September 2015! We highly encourage our clients to read his "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," as it is one of the best geopolitical calls made by BCA in recent history.4 As Peter had originally thought, Trump cleaned up the white, less-educated, male vote in all of the three crucial Midwest states. He won 68% of this vote in Michigan, 71% in Pennsylvania, and 69% in Wisconsin. To do so, Trump campaigned as an unorthodox Republican, appealing to the blue-collar white voter by blaming globalization for their job losses and low wages, and by refusing to accept Republican orthodoxy on fiscal austerity or entitlement spending. Instead, Trump promised to outspend Clinton and protect entitlements at their current levels. This mix of an outsider, anti-establishment, image combined with a left-of-center economic message allowed Trump to win an extraordinary number of former Obama voters. Exit polls showed that Obama had a positive image in all three Midwest states, including with Trump voters! For example, 30% of Trump voters in Michigan approved of the job Obama was doing as president, 25% in Pennsylvania, and 27% in Wisconsin. That's between a quarter and a third of eventual people who cast their vote for Trump. These are the voters that Republicans lost in 2012 because they nominated a former private equity "corporate raider" Mitt Romney as their candidate. Romney had famously argued in a 2008 New York Times op-ed that he would have "Let Detroit go bankrupt." Obama repeatedly attacked Romney during the 2011-2012 campaign on this point. Back in late 2011, we suspected that this message, and this message alone, would win President Obama his re-election.5 Why is the issue of the Midwest Obama voters so important? Because investors have to know precisely why Donald Trump won the election. It wasn't his messages on immigration, law and order, race relations, and especially not the tax cuts he added to his message late in the game. It was his left-of-center policy position on trade and fiscal spending. Trump is beholden to his voters on these policies, particularly in the Midwest states that won him the election. Final word on race. Donald Trump actually improved on Mitt Romney's performance with African-American and Hispanic voters (Table II-1). This was a surprise, given his often racially-charged rhetoric. Meanwhile, Trump failed to improve on the white voter turnout (as percent of overall electorate) or on Romney's performance with white voters in terms of the share of the vote. To be clear, Republicans are still in the proverbial hole with minority voters and are yet to match George Bush's performance in 2004. But with 70% of the U.S. electorate still white in 2016, this did not matter. Table II-1Exit Polls: Trump's Win Was Not Merely About Race Congress: No Gridlock Ahead Republicans exceeded their expectations in the Senate, losing only one seat (Illinois) to Democrats. This means that the GOP control of the Senate will remain quite comfortable and is likely to grow in the 2018 mid-term elections when the Democrats have to defend 25 of 33 seats. Of the 25 Senate seats they will defend, five are in hostile territory: North Dakota, West Virginia, Ohio, Montana, and Missouri. In addition, Florida is always a tough contest. Republicans, on the other hand, have only one Senate seat that will require defense in a Democrat-leaning state: Nevada (and in that case, it will be a Republican incumbent contesting the race). Their other seven seats are all in Republican voting states. As such, expect Republicans to hold on to the Senate well into the 2020 general election. In the House of Representatives, the GOP will retain its comfortable majority. The Tea Party affiliated caucuses (Tea Party Caucus and the House Freedom Caucus) performed well in the election. The Tea Party Caucus members won 35 seats out of 38 they contested and the House Freedom Caucus won 34 seats out of 37 it contested. The race to watch now is for the Speaker of the House position. Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the incumbent House, is likely to contest the election again and win. Even though his support for Donald Trump was lukewarm, we expect Republicans to unify the party behind Trump and Ryan. A challenge from the right could emerge, but we doubt it will materialize given Trump's victory. The campaign for the election will begin immediately, with Republicans selecting their candidate by December (the official election will be in the first week of January, but it is a formality as Republicans hold the majority). Bottom Line: Trump's victory was largely the product of former Obama voters in the Midwest switching to the GOP candidate. This happened because of Trump's unorthodox, left-of-center, message. Trump will have a friendly Congress to work with for the next four years. How friendly? That question will determine the investment significance of the Trump presidency. Investment Relevance Of A United Government Most clients we have spoken to over the past several months believe that Donald Trump will be constrained on economic policies by a right-leaning Congress. His more ambitious fiscal spending plans - such as the $550 billion infrastructure plan and $150 billion net defense spending plan - will therefore be either "dead on arrival" in Congress, or will be significantly watered down by the legislature. Focus will instead shift to tax cuts and traditional Republican policies. We could not disagree more. GOP is not fiscally conservative: There is no empirical evidence that the GOP is actually fiscally conservative. First, the track record of the Bush and Reagan administrations do not support the adage that Republicans keep fiscal spending in check when they are in power (Chart II-2). Second, Republican voters themselves only want "small government" when the Democrats are in charge of the White House (Chart II-3). When a Republican President is in charge, Republicans forget their "small government" leanings. Chart II-2Republicans Are Not ##br##Fiscally Responsible Chart II-3Big Government Is Only ##br##A Problem For Opposition Presidents get their way: Over the past 28 years, each new president has generally succeeded in passing their signature items. Congress can block some but probably not all of president's plans. Clinton, Bush, and Obama each began with their own party controlling the legislature, which gave an early advantage that was later reversed in their second term. Clinton lost on healthcare, but achieved bipartisan welfare reform. For Obama, legislative obstructionism halted various initiatives, but his core objectives were either already met (healthcare), not reliant on Congress (foreign policy), or achieved through compromise after his reelection (expiration of Bush tax cuts for upper income levels). Median voter has moved to the left: Donald Trump won both the GOP primary and the general election by preaching an unorthodox, left-of-center sermon. He understood correctly that the American voter preferences on economic policies have moved away from Republican laissez-faire orthodoxies.6 Yes, he is also calling for significant lowering of both income and corporate tax rates. However, tax cuts were never a focal point of his campaign, and he only introduced the policy later in the race when he was trying to get traditional Republicans on board with his campaign. Newsflash: traditional Republicans did not get Trump over the hump, Obama voters in the Midwest did! Investors should make no mistake, the key pillars of Trump's campaign are de-globalization, higher fiscal spending, and protecting entitlements at current levels. And he will pursue all three with GOP allies in Congress. What are the investment implications of this policy mix? USD: More government spending, marginally less global trade, and pressure on multi-national corporations (MNCs) to scale back their global operations should be positive for inflation. If growth surprises to the upside due to fiscal spending, it will allow the Fed to hike more than the current 57 bps expected by the market by the end of 2018. Given easy monetary stance of central banks around the world, and lack of significant fiscal stimulus elsewhere, economic growth surprise in the U.S. should be positive for the dollar in the long term. At the moment, the market is reacting to the Trump victory with ambivalence on the USD. In fact, the dollar suffered as Trump's probability of victory rose in late October. We believe that this is a temporary reaction. We see both Trump's fiscal and trade policies as bullish. BCA's currency strategist Mathieu Savary believes that the dollar could therefore move in a bifurcated fashion in the near term. On the one hand, the dollar could rise against EM currencies and commodity producers, but suffer - or remain flat - against DM currencies such as the EUR, CHF, and JPY.7 Bonds: More inflation and growth should also mean that the bond selloff continues. In addition, if our view on globalization is correct, then the deflationary effects of the last three decades should begin to reverse over the next several years. BCA thesis that we are at the "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" should therefore remain cogent.8 As one of our "Trump hedges," our colleague Rob Robis, Chief Strategist of the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy, suggested a 2-year / 30-year Treasury curve steepener. This hedge is now up 18.7 bps and we suggest clients continue to hold it. Fed policy: Trump's statements about monetary policy have been inconsistent. Early on in his campaign he described himself as "a low interest rate guy", but he has more recently become critical of current Federal Reserve policy - and Fed Chair Janet Yellen in particular - claiming that while higher interest rates are justified, the Fed is keeping them low for "political reasons." What seems certain is that Janet Yellen will be replaced as Fed Chair when her term expires in February 2018. Yellen is unlikely to resign of her own volition before then and it would be legally difficult for the President to remove a sitting Fed Chair prior to the end of her term. But Trump will get the opportunity to re-shape the composition of the Fed's Board of Governors as soon as he is sworn in. There are currently two empty seats on the Board need to be filled and given that many of Trump's economic advisers have "hard money" leanings, it is very likely that both appointments will go to inflation hawks. Equities: In terms of equities, Trump will be a source of uncertainty for U.S. stocks as the market deals with the unknown of his presidency. In addition, markets tend to not like united government in the U.S. as it raises the specter of big policy moves (Table II-2). However, Trump should be positive for sectors that sold off in anticipation of a Clinton victory, such as healthcare and financials. We also suspect that he will continue the outperformance of defense stocks, although that would have been the case with Clinton as well. Table II-2Election: Industry Implications In the long term, Trump's proposal for major corporate tax cuts should be good for U.S. equities. However, we are not entirely sure that this is the case. First, the effective corporate tax rate in the U.S. is already at its multi-decade lows (Chart II-4). As such, any corporate tax reform that lowers the marginal rate will not really affect the effective rate. Why does this matter? Because major corporations already have low effective tax rates. Any lowering of the marginal rate will therefore benefit the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the domestic oriented S&P 500 corporations. If corporate tax reform also includes closing loopholes that benefit the major multi-national corporations (MNCs), then Trump's policy will not necessarily benefit all firms in the U.S. equally. Chart II-4How Low Can It Go? Investors have to keep in mind that Trump has not run a pro-corporate campaign. He has accused American manufacturing firms of taking jobs outside the U.S. and tech companies of skirting taxes. It is not clear to us that his corporate tax reform will therefore necessarily be a boon for the stock market. In the long term, we like to play Trump's populist message by favoring America's SMEs over MNCs. If we are ultimately correct on the USD and growth, then export-oriented S&P 500 companies should suffer in the face of a USD bull market and marginally less globalization. Meanwhile, lowering of the marginal corporate tax rate will benefit the SMEs that do not get the benefit of K-street lobbyist negotiated tax loopholes. Global Assets: The global asset to watch over the next several weeks is the USD/RMB cross. China is forced by domestic economic conditions to continue to slowly depreciate its currency. We have expected this since 2015, which is why we have shorted the RMB via 12-month non-deliverable forwards (NDF). Risk to global assets, particularly EM currencies and equities, would be that Beijing decides to depreciate the RMB before Trump is inaugurated on January 20. This could re-visit the late 2015 panic over China, particularly the narrative that it is exporting deflation. Our view is that even if China does not undertake such actions over the next two months, Sino-American tensions are set to escalate. It is much easier for Trump to fulfill his de-globalization policies with China - a geopolitical rival with which the U.S. has no free trade agreement - than with NAFTA trade partners Canada and Mexico. This will only deepen geopolitical tensions between the two major global powers, which has been our secular view since 2011. Finally, a quick note on the Mexican peso. The Mexican peso has already collapsed half of its value in the past 18 months and we believe the trade is overdone. Investors have used the currency cross as a way to articulate Trump's victory probability. It is no longer cogent. We believe that the U.S. will focus on trade relations with China under a Trump presidency, rather than NAFTA trade partners. Our Emerging Markets Strategy believes that it is time to consider going long MXN versus other EM currencies, such as ZAR and BRL. Investors should also watch carefully the Cabinet appointments that Trump makes over the next two months. Since Carter's administration, cabinet announcements have occurred in early to mid-December. Almost all of these appointments were confirmed on Inauguration Day (usually January 20 of the year after election, including in 2017) or shortly thereafter. Only one major nomination since Carter was disapproved. These appointments will tell us how willing Trump is to reach to traditional Republicans who have served on previous administrations. We suspect that he will go with picks that will execute his fiscal, trade, and tax policies. Bottom Line: After the dust settles over the next several weeks, we suspect that Trump will signal that he intends to pursue his fiscal, trade, immigration, and tax policies. These will be, in the long term, positive for the USD, negative for bonds (including Munis, which will lose their tax-break appeal if income taxes are reduced), and likely neutral for equities. Within the equity space, Trump will be positive for U.S. SMEs and negative for MNCs. This means being long S&P 600 over S&P 100. Lastly, close our long alternative energy / short coal trade for a loss of -26.8%. Constraints: Don't Bet On Them Domestically, the American president can take significant action without congressional support through executive directives. Lincoln raised an army and navy by proclamation and freed the slaves; Franklin Roosevelt interned the Japanese; Truman tried to seize steel factories to keep production up during the Korean War. Truman's case is almost the only one of a major executive order being rebuffed by the Supreme Court. The Reagan and Clinton administrations have shown that a president thwarted by a divided or adverse congress will often use executive directives to achieve policy aims and satisfy particular interest groups and sectors. Though the number of executive orders has gone down in recent administrations (Chart II-5), the economic significance has increased along with the size and penetration of the bureaucracy (Chart II-6). The economic impact of executive orders is always debatable, but the key point is that the president's word tends to carry the day.9 Chart II-5Rule By Decree Chart II-6Executive Branch Is Growing Trade is a major area where Trump would have considerable sway. He has repeatedly signaled his intention to restrict American openness to international trade. The U.S. president can revoke international treaties solely on their own authority. Congressionally approved agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cannot be revoked by the president, but Trump could obstruct its ongoing implementation.10 He would also have considerable powers to levy tariffs, as Nixon showed with his 10% "surcharge" on most imports in 1971.11 Bottom Line: Presidential authority is formidable in the areas Trump has made the focus of his campaign: immigration and trade. Without a two-thirds majority in Congress to override him, or an activist federal court, Trump would be able to enact significant policies simply by issuing orders to his subordinates in the executive branch. Long-Term Implications: Polarization In The U.S. Does the Republican control of Congress and the White House signal that polarization in America will subside? We began this analysis by focusing on the investment implications when Republicans control the three houses of the American government. But long-term implications of polarization will not dissipate. Investors may overstate the importance of a Republican-controlled government and thus understate the relevance of continued polarization. We doubt that Donald Trump is a uniting figure who can transcend America's polarized politics, especially given his weak popular mandate (he lost the popular vote as Bush did in 2000) and the sub-50% vote share. And, our favorite chart of the year remains the same: both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton have entered the history books as the most disliked presidential candidates ever on the day of the election (Chart II-7). Chart II-7Clinton And Trump Are Making (The Wrong Kind Of) History According to empirical work by political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, polarization in Congress is at its highest level since World War II (Chart II-8). Their research shows that the liberal-conservative dimension explains approximately 93% of all roll-call voting choices and that the two parties are drifting further apart on this crucial dimension.12 Chart II-8The Widening Ideological Gulf In The U.S. Congress Meanwhile, a 2014 Pew Research study has shown that Republicans and Democrats are moving further to the right and left, respectively. Chart II-9 shows the distribution of Republicans and Democrats on a 10-item scale of political values across the last three decades. In addition, "very unfavorable" views of the opposing party have skyrocketed since 2004 (Chart II-10), with 45% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats now seeing the other party as a "threat to the nation's well-being"! Chart II-9U.S. Political Polarization: Growing Apart Chart II-10Live And Let Die Much ink has been spilled trying to explain the mounting polarization in America.13 Our view remains that politics in a democracy operates on its own supply-demand dynamic. If there was no demand for polarized politics, especially at the congressional level, American politicians would not be so eager to supply it. We believe that five main factors - in our subjective order of importance - explain polarization in the U.S. today: Income Inequality And Immobility The increase in political polarization parallels rising income inequality in the U.S. (Chart II-11). The U.S. is a clear and distant outlier on both factors compared to its OECD peers (Chart II-12). However, Americans are not being divided neatly along income levels. This is because Republicans and Democrats disagree on how to fix income inequality. For Donald Trump voters, the solutions are to put up barriers to free trade and immigration while reducing income taxes for all income levels. For Hillary Clinton voters, it means more taxes on the wealthy and large corporations, while putting up some trade barriers and expanding entitlements. This means that the correlation between polarization and income inequality is misleading as there is no causality. Rather, rising income inequality, especially when combined with a low-growth environment, shifts the political narrative from the "politics of plenty" towards "politics of scarcity." It hardens interest and identity groups and makes them less generous towards the "other." Chart II-11Inequality Breeds Polarization Chart II-12Opportunity And Income: Americans Are Outliers Generational Warfare The political age gap is increasing (Chart II-13). This remains the case following the 2016 election, with 55% Millennials (18-29 year olds) having voted for Hillary Clinton. The problem for older voters, who tend to identify far more with the Republican Party, is that the Millennials are already the largest voting bloc in America (Chart II-14). And as Millennial voters start increasing their turnout, and as Baby Boomers naturally decline, the urgency to vote for Republican policymakers' increases. Chart II-13The Age Gap In American Politics Chart II-14Millennials Are The Biggest Bloc Geographical Segregation Noted political scientist Robert Putnam first cautioned that increasing geographic segregation into clusters of like-minded communities was leading to rising polarization.14 This explains, in large part, how liberal elites have completely missed the rise of Donald Trump. Left-leaning Americans tend to live in a left-leaning community. They share their morning cup-of-Joe with Liberals and rarely mix with the plebs supporting Trump. And of course vice-versa. University of Toronto professors Richard Florida and Charlotta Mellander have more recently shown in their "Segregated City" research that "America's cities and metropolitan areas have cleaved into clusters of wealth, college education, and highly-paid knowledge-based occupations."15 Their research shows that American neighborhoods are increasingly made up of people of the same income level, across all metropolitan areas. Florida and Mellander also show that educational and occupational segregation follows economic segregation. Meanwhile, the same research shows that Canada's most segregated metropolitan area, Montreal, would be the 227th most segregated city if it were in the U.S.! This form of geographic social distance fosters increasing polarization by allowing voters to remain aloof of their fellow Americans, their plight, needs, and concerns. The extreme urban-rural divide of the 2016 election confirms this thesis. Immigration Chart II-15Racial Composition Is Changing Much as with income inequality, there is a close correlation between political polarization and immigration. The U.S. is on its way to becoming a minority-majority country, with the percent of the white population expected to dip below 50% in 2045 (Chart II-15). Hispanic and Asian populations are expected to continue rising for the rest of the century. For many Americans facing the pernicious effects of low-growth, high debt, and elevated income inequality, the rising impact of immigration is anathema. Not only is the country changing its ethnic and cultural make-up, but the incoming immigrants tend to be less educated and thus lower-income than the median American. They therefore favor - or will favor, when they can vote - redistributive policies. Many Americans feel - fairly or unfairly - that the costs of these policies will have to be shouldered by white middle-class taxpayers, who are not wealthy enough to be indifferent to tax increases, and may be unskillful enough to face competition from immigrants. There is also a security component to the rising concern about immigration. Although Muslims are only 1% of the U.S. population, many voters perceive radical Islam to be a vital security threat to the nation. As such, immigration and radical Islamic terrorism are seen as close bedfellows. Media Polarization The 2016 election has been particularly devastating for mainstream media. According to the latest Gallup poll, only 32% of Americans trust the mass media "to report the news fully, accurately and fairly." This is the lowest level in Gallup polling history. The decline is particularly concentrated among Independent and Republican respondents (Chart II-16). With mainstream media falling out of favor for many Americans, voters are turning towards social media and the Internet. Facebook is now as important for political news coverage as local TV for Americans who get their news from the Internet (Chart II-17). Chart II-16A War Of Words Chart II-17New Sources Of News Not Always Credible The problem with getting your news coverage from Facebook is that it often means getting news coverage from "fake" sources. A recent experiment by BuzzFeed showed that three big right-wing Facebook pages published false or misleading information 38% of the time while three large left-wing pages did so in nearly 20% of posts.16 The Internet allows voters to self-select what ideological lens colors their daily intake of information and it transcends geography. Two American families, living next to each other in the same neighborhood, can literally perceive reality from completely different perspectives by customizing their sources of information. Chart II-18Gerrymandering ##br##Reduces Competitive Seats In addition to these five factors, one should also reaffirm the role of redistricting, or "gerrymandering." Over the last two decades, both the Democrats and Republicans (but mainly the latter) have redrawn geographical boundaries to create "ideologically pure" electoral districts. Of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives, only about 56 are truly competitive (Chart II-18). This improves job security for incumbent politicians and legislative-seat security for the party; but it also discourages legislators from reaching across the ideological aisle in order to ensure re-election. Instead, the main electoral challenge now comes from the member's own party during the primary election. For Republicans, this means that the challenge is most often coming from a candidate that is further to the right. Incumbent GOP politicians in Congress therefore have an incentive to maintain highly conservative records lest a challenge from the far-right emerges in a primary election. Given that the frequency of elections is high in the House of Representatives (every two years), legislators cannot take even a short break from partisanship. Redistricting deepens polarization, therefore, by changing the political calculus for legislators facing ideologically pure electorates in their home districts. Bottom Line: Polarization in the U.S. is a product of structural factors that are here to stay. Trump's narrow victory will in no way change that. But How Much Worse? Political polarization is not new. Older readers will remember 1968, when social unrest over the Vietnam War was at its height. Richard Nixon barely got over the finish line that year, beating Vice-President Hubert Humphrey by around 500,000 votes.17 Another contested election in a contested era. Chart II-19Party Is The Chief Source Of Identity Our concern is that the Republican and Democrat "labels" - or perhaps conservative and liberal labels - appear to be ossifying. For example, Pew Research showed in 2012 that the difference between Americans on 48 values is the greatest between Republicans and Democrats. This has not always been the case, as Chart II-19 shows. We suspect that the data would be even starker today, especially after the divisive 2016 campaign that has bordered on hysterical. This means that "Republican" and "Democrat" labels have become real and almost "sectarian" in nature. In fact, one's values are now determined more by one's party identification than race, education, income, religiosity, or gender! This is incredible, given America's history of racial and religious divisions. Why is this happening? We suspect that the shift in urgency and tone is motivated at least in part by the changing demographics of America. Two demographic groups that identify the most with the Republican Party - Baby Boomers and rural or suburban white voters - are in a structural decline (the first in absolute terms and the second in relative terms). Both see the writing on the political wall. Given America's democratic system of government, their declining numbers (or, in the case of suburban whites, declining majorities) will mean significant future policy decisions that go against their preferences. America is set to become more left-leaning, favor more redistribution, and become less culturally homogenous. Not only are Millennials more socially liberal and economically left-leaning, but they are also "browner" than the rest of the U.S. As we pointed out early this year, 2016 was an election that the GOP could reasonably attempt to win by appealing exclusively to white and older voters. The "White Hype" strategy was mathematically cogent ... at least in 2016.18 It will get a lot more difficult to pursue this strategy in 2020 and beyond. Not impossible, but difficult. We suspect that conservative voters know this. As such, there was an urgency this year to lock-in structural changes to key policies before it is too late. Donald Trump may have been a flawed messenger for many voters, but it did not matter. The clock is ticking for a large segment of America and therefore Trump was an acceptable vehicle of their fears and anger. Bottom Line: Polarization in the U.S. is likely to increase. Two key Republican/conservative constituencies - Baby Boomers and rural or suburban white voters - are backed into the corner by demographic trends. But it also means that a left counter-revolution is just around the corner. And we doubt that the Democratic Party will chose as centrist of a candidate the next time around. Final Thoughts: What Have We Learned Chart II-20Credit No Longer Hides Stagnant Income 1. Economics trump PC: Civil rights remain a major category of the American public's policy concerns. However, the Democratic Party's prioritization of social issues on the margins of the civil rights debate has not galvanized voters in the face of persistent negative attitudes about the economy. More specifically, the surge in cheap credit since 2000 that covered up the steady decline of wages as a share of GDP has ended, leaving households exposed to deleveraging and reduced purchasing power (Chart II-20). American households have lost patience with the slow, grinding pace of economic recovery, they reject the debt consequences of low inflation with deflationary tail risks, and they resent disappointed expectations in terms of job security and quality. Concerns about certain social preferences - as opposed to basic rights - pale in comparison to these economic grievances. 2. Polls are OK, but beware the quant models that use them: On two grave political decisions this year, in two advanced markets with the "best" quality of polling, political modeling turned out to be grossly erroneous. To be fair, the polls themselves prior to both Brexit and the U.S. election were within a margin of error. However, quantitative models relying on these polls were overconfident, leading investors to ignore the risks of a non-consensus outcome. As we warned in mid-October - with Clinton ahead with a robust lead - the problem with quantitative political models is that they rely on polling data for their input.19 To iron-out the noise of an occasional bad poll, political analysts aggregate the polls to create a "poll-of-polls." But combining polls is mathematically the same as combining bad mortgages into securities. The philosophy behind the methodology is that each individual object (mortgage or poll) may be flawed, but if you get enough of them together, the problems will all average out and you have a very low risk of something bad happening. Well, something bad did happen. The quantitative models were massively wrong! We tried to avoid this problem by heavily modifying our polls-based-model with structural factors. Many of these structural variables - economic context, political momentum, Obama's approval rating - actually did not favor Clinton. Our model therefore consistently gave Donald Trump between 35-45% probability of winning the election, on average three and four times higher than other popular quant models. This caused us to warn clients that our view on the election was extremely cautious and recommend hedges. In fact, Donald Trump had 41% chance of winning the race on election night, according to the last iteration of our model, a very high probability.20 3. Professor Lichtman was right: Political science professor Allan Lichtman has once again accurately called the election - for the ninth time. The result on Nov. 8 strongly supports his life's work that presidential elections in the United States are popular referendums on the incumbent party of the last four years. Structural factors undid the Democrats (Table II-3), and none of the campaign rhetoric, cross-country barnstorming, or "horse race" polling mattered a whit. The Republicans had momentum from previous midterm elections, Clinton had suffered a strong challenge in her primary, the Obama administration's achievements over the past four years were negligible (the Affordable Care Act passed in his first term). These factors, along with the political cycle itself, favored the Republicans. Trump's lack of charisma did not negate the structural support for a change of ruling party. Investors should take note: no amount of mathematical horsepower, big data, or Silicon Valley acumen was able to beat the qualitative, informed, contemplative work of a single historian. Table II-3Lichtman's Thirteen Keys To The White House* 4. Non-linearity of politics: Lichtman's method calls attention to the danger of linear assumptions and quantitative modeling in attempting the art of political prediction. Big data and quantitative econometric and polling models have notched up key failures this year. They cannot make subjective judgments regarding whether a president has had a major foreign policy success or failure or a major policy innovation - on all three of those counts, the Democrats failed from 2012-16. There really is no way to quantify political risk because human and social organizations often experience paradigm shifts that are characterized by non-linearity. Newtonian Laws will always work on planet earth and as such we are not concerned about what will happen to us if we board an airplane. Laws of physics will not simply stop working while we are mid-air. However, social interactions and political narratives do experience paradigm shifts. We have identified several since 2011: geopolitical multipolarity, de-globalization, end of laissez-faire consensus, end of Chimerica, and global loss of confidence in elites and institutions.21 5. No country is immune to decaying institutions: The United States has, with few exceptions, the oldest written constitution among major states, and it ensures checks and balances. But recent decades have shown that the executive branch has expanded its power at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches. Moreover, executives have responded to major crisis - like the September 11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis - with policy responses that were formulated haphazardly, ideologically divisive, and difficult to implement: the Iraq War and the Affordable Care Act. The result is that the jarring events that have blindsided America over the past sixteen years have resulted in wasted political capital and deeper polarization. The failure of institutions has opened the way for political parties to pursue short-term gains at the expense of their "partners" across the aisle, and to bend and manipulate procedural rules to achieve ends that cannot be achieved through consensus and compromise. 6. U.S. is shifting leftward when it comes to markets: Inequality and social immobility have, with Trump's election, entered the conservative agenda, after having long sat on the liberals' list of concerns. The shift in white blue-collar Midwestern voters toward Trump reflects the fact that voters are non-partisan in demanding what they want: they want to retain their existing rights, privileges, and entitlements, and to expand their wages and social protections. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Except that it is better armed. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "U.S. Election: Trump's Arrested Development," dated November 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, Wisconsin polling was rather poor as most pollsters assumed that it was a shoe-in for Democrats. One problem with polling in Midwest states is that they were, other than Pennsylvania and Ohio, assumed to be safe Democratic states. Note for example the extremely tight result in Minnesota and the absolute dearth of polling out of that state throughout the last several months. 4 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," dated September 4, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. General Elections And Scenarios: Implications," dated July 11, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It," dated November 4, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Only a two-thirds majority of Congress, or a ruling by a federal court, can undo an executive action, and that is exceedingly rare. The real check on executive orders is the rotation of office: a president can undo with the stroke of a pen whatever his predecessor enacted. Congress has the power of the purse, but it is sporadic in its oversight and has challenged less than 5% of executive orders, even though those orders often re-direct the way the executive branch uses funds Congress has allocated. More often, Congress votes to codify executive orders rather than nullify them. 10 Trump is not alone in calling for renegotiating or even abandoning NAFTA. Clinton called for renegotiation in 2008, and Senator Bernie Sanders has done so in 2016. 11 In Proclamation 4074, dated August 15, 1971, Nixon suspended all previous presidential proclamations implementing trade agreements insofar as was required to impose a new 10% surcharge on all dutiable goods entering the United States. He justified it in domestic law by invoking the president's authority and previous congressional acts authorizing the president to act on behalf of Congress with regard to trade agreement negotiation and implementation (including tariff levels). He justified the proclamation in international law by referring to international allowances during balance-of-payments emergencies. 12 The "primary dimension" of Chart II-8 is represented by the x-axis and is the liberal-conservative spectrum on the basic role of the government in the economy. The "second dimension" (y-axis) depends on the era and is picking up regional differences on a number of social issues such as the civil rights movement (which famously split Democrats between northern Liberals and southern Dixiecrats). 13 We have penned two such efforts ourselves. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Polarization In America: Transient Or Structural Risk?," dated October 9, 2013, and "A House Divided Cannot Stand: America's Polarization," dated July 11, 2012," available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone. New York: Simon and Schuster. 15 Please see Martin Prosperity Institute, "Segregated City," dated February 23, 2015, available at martinprosperity.org. 16 Please see BuzzFeedNews, "Hyperpartisan Facebook Pages Are Publishing False And Misleading Information At An Alarming Rate," dated October 20, 2016, available at buzzfeed.com. 17 Nonetheless, due to the third-party candidate George Wallace carrying the then traditionally-Democratic South, Nixon managed to win the Electoral College in a landslide. 18 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: The Great White Hype," dated March 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "You've Been Trumped!," dated October 21, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 20 For comparison, Steph Curry, the greatest three-point shooter in basketball history, and a two-time NBA MVP, has a career three-point shooting average of 44%. With that average, he is encouraged to take every three-pointer he can by his team. In other words, despite being less than 50%, this is a very high percentage. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategy Outlook 2015 - Paradigm Shifts," dated January 21, 2015, and "Strategy Outlook 2016 - Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Regardless of who wins the U.S. election, the gaping mismatch between fundamentals and broad market valuations remains intact, but will be in jeopardy of re-converging should the Fed signal an intention to tighten monetary conditions through next year. As previously outlined, our view is that the economy, particularly the corporate sector, will struggle further if financial conditions become more restrictive and/or election uncertainty persists. The non-financial corporate sector's return on equity has already fallen to its lowest level in more than 60 years. Yet the median price/sales and price/earnings ratios are flirting with all-time highs. That divergence is not sustainable, given the direct link between ROE, profit growth and valuations. Central bank benevolence has underwritten this gap, and any ebbing in financial liquidity is a potential catalyst for it to close.
Gold shares have bounced of late, aided by U.S. political uncertainty and a bullish long-term backdrop. Indeed, the likelihood of a prolonged period of negative to ultra-low real interest rates is high given startlingly low potential GDP growth in most of the developed world. Gold shares typically do well in the aftermath of a debt binge. When we took profits in August, we advised that we would look to return to an overweight position once tactical downside risks had been reduced. Are we there yet? Extreme bullishness toward the yellow metal has not yet fully unwound. While the share price ratio has dropped back to its 200-day moving average, cyclical momentum remains stretched, as measured by the 52-week rate of change. Sentiment in the commodity pits is still elevated, flows into gold ETFs are still strong and net speculative positions have not yet made a full retreat. The implication is that there could be additional selling pressure in the coming weeks. In terms of potential buy triggers, anything that causes the U.S. dollar to lose its bid is a strong candidate. Ironically, a Fed rate hike could produce such an outcome, contrary to popular wisdom. In our view, the U.S. (and global) economy cannot handle tighter financial conditions, and a rise in interest rates would need to be offset by a weaker currency. Gold shares perform well when economic expectations are faltering, and a hawkish Fed would likely raise global economic fears. Stay neutral, but stay tuned.
Bank stocks have moved higher, following the sell-off in global bond markets and steepening in yield curves sparked initially by the Bank of Japan's curve targeting shift and a reversal of incremental easing expectations from the Bank of England. However, we are not convinced that the relative performance bear market is over. Bank profits have not been able to outpace the broad corporate sector since the beginning of 2015, even though loan growth has been healthy and overall earnings were crushed by the implosion in commodity prices during that period, allowing most other sectors to show earnings outperformance. Now loan growth is rolling over and credit quality is beginning to erode. Perhaps more worrying is that banks are no longer pruning cost structures, which is unusual given that credit standards are tightening on most credit products outside of traditional mortgages. In the last 25 years, or as far back as we have the data, bank stocks lagged the broad market after bank employment started rising. The only exception was in the aftermath of the tech bubble, when all non-TMT sectors outperformed. If banks continue to expand their wage bill, without a widening in net interest margins and/or reversal in increased loan loss reserving, bank profits will fail to match the growth rate of the overall S&P 500. We recommend selling into strength.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Bank profits are unlikely to match those of the broad market if the Fed hikes interest rates and loan demand cools. Sell into strength. Gold shares are looking increasingly attractive, but we will refrain from upgrading until the U.S. dollar is closer to a peak. Drug pricing power is worse than government data suggests, warranting a downshift in our previously upbeat view toward pharmaceutical equities. Recent Changes S&P Health Care - Removed from our high conviction list. Upgrade Alert Gold Shares - Currently neutral. Downgrade Alert S&P Pharmaceuticals Index - Currently overweight. S&P Biotech Index - Currently overweight. Table 1 Feature Chart 1From Greed To Fear The gaping mismatch between fundamentals and broad market valuations remains intact, but will be in jeopardy of re-converging should the Fed signal an intention to tighten monetary conditions through next year. As previously outlined, our view is that the economy, particularly the corporate sector, will struggle further if financial conditions become more restrictive and/or election uncertainty persists. Indeed, investors have been scrambling to buy protection, aggressively bidding up near-term VIX contracts, especially relative to longer-term contracts. While it is tempting to view this increase in fear as a contrary positive, this measure typically sinks lower when investors turn cautious. Chart 1 shows that tactical broad market vulnerability still exists. On a more fundamental basis, the non-financial corporate sector's return on equity has already fallen to its lowest level in more than 60 years (Chart 2). Yet the median price/sales and price/earnings ratios are flirting with all-time highs (Chart 2). That divergence is not sustainable, given the direct link between ROE, profit growth and valuations. Central bank benevolence has underwritten this gap. Third quarter earnings have failed to impress thus far, keeping the equity market locked in a tight range. So far, one nascent trend is that domestic and consumer-linked equities appear to be gaining traction at the expense of global, business-dependent sectors. We expect the complexion of earnings contributions to become more lopsided in the quarters ahead, in support of most of these budding trend changes. The inevitable upshot of a strong U.S. dollar is deteriorating profit breadth. Chart 3 shows that the number of industry groups experiencing rising forward earnings estimates is likely to erode as the currency strengthens. Clearly, industries most reliant on exports and/or capital spending are most vulnerable. The corporate sector has run up debt levels and is struggling to generate profit growth. In turn, business spending has been compromised, as measured by the contraction in core durable goods orders (Chart 3). On the flipside, consumers have rebuilt their savings and are enjoying the benefits of a positive wealth effect. The increase in real wage and salary growth is underpinning real median household income. The latter surged 5.2%, posting the largest percentage increase in the history of the data. Consumer income expectations are well supported (Chart 3, top panel). The implication is that consumption-oriented plays should be well positioned to deliver profit outperformance, even if the labor market slows. From an investment theme perspective, the upshot is domestic-oriented areas are poised to make a comeback relative to globally-exposed sectors after a burst of speed in recent months (Chart 4). Net earnings revisions are already shifting in that direction, with more upside ahead based on U.S. dollar strength, as well as dirt cheap relative valuations (Chart 4). Chart 2A Disturbing Mismatch Chart 3Consumers Are Stronger Than Corporates Chart 4Favor Domestic Vs. Global One exception is the banking sector, where there is limited scope for earnings outperformance and/or valuation expansion. Bank Stocks Are Showing Signs Of Life, But... Bank stocks have moved higher, following the sell-off in global bond markets and steepening in yield curves sparked initially by the Bank of Japan's curve targeting shift and a reversal of incremental easing expectations from the Bank of England. However, we are not convinced that the relative performance bear market is over. A Special Report published on October 3 surveyed the performance of banks during Fed tightening cycles, to help put context around the widely held view that Fed rate hikes will bolster bank stocks on a sustained basis. History shows there has been only a loose relationship between the Fed funds rate and net interest margins. It would take rising rate expectations within the context of a steeper yield curve, improving credit quality and rapid loan growth to justify an optimistic profit outlook. Bank profits have not been able to outpace the broad corporate sector since the beginning of 2015 (Chart 5, top panel), even though loan growth has been healthy and overall earnings were crushed by the implosion in commodity prices during that period, allowing most other sectors to show earnings outperformance. Will another 25 bps interest rate hike remedy this? The Fed is keen to hike rates partially because it views them as being overly accommodative for an economy operating close to full employment, and is keen to reestablish firepower in advance of the next economic downturn. But there is scant evidence of economic overheating to support the view that rates have been 'too low'. Inflation and inflation expectations, while up from very depressed levels, are still historically low and the economy is struggling to grow at, let alone above, trend. Consequently, a strident Fed would boost the odds of a policy mistake. The market appears to share that view, given the failure of the yield curve to stop narrowing since the taper talk started, notwithstanding the recent blip up (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 5Why Would Bank Profits Outperform Now? Chart 6Beware U.S. Dollar Strength Now that the USD is strengthening anew, the odds of imported deflation have climbed, to the detriment of corporate profits and bank stock relative performance (Chart 6, top panel). While nominal yields have backed up, real 2-year yields have declined, which is not consistent with an upgrading in economic expectations. Indeed, C&I loan growth has dropped sharply in recent weeks (Chart 6). By extension, it is hard to envision long-term yields rising much, if at all, which will keep net interest margins thin. Furthermore, if overall earnings remain stuck in neutral, corporate credit quality will undoubtedly worsen given the debt binge in recent years. Non-performing loans have only just begun to increase. Higher interest rates will not solve these problems. Instead, the downturn in credit quality could accelerate via more onerous debt servicing requirements, given the lack of a corporate sector balance sheet cushion. Perhaps more worrying is that banks are no longer pruning cost structures, which is unusual given that credit standards are tightening on most credit products outside of traditional mortgages. In the last 25 years, or as far back as we have the data, bank stocks lagged the broad market after bank employment started rising. The only exception was in the aftermath of the tech bubble, when all non-TMT sectors outperformed (Chart 7). If banks continue to expand their wage bill, without a widening in net interest margins and/or reversal in increased loan loss reserving, bank profits will fail to match the growth rate of the overall S&P 500. The optimal, but not exclusive, time for banks to outperform is typically exiting recession, when policy is easing and the yield curve is steepening, and in the late innings of an expansion. In fact, productivity is sagging throughout the financial sector. Financial sector employment is probing new highs (Chart 8), reflecting a more onerous cost structure required to meet regulatory obligations. Employment is now growing faster than sales, a reliable indication of flagging productivity. The implication is that financial sector profits will continue to lag those of the broad market. Chart 7Beware Rising Bank Employment Chart 8Sectoral Productivity Drain Bottom Line: Strength in bank stocks is a chance to sell. Is It Time To Buy Back Gold Shares? Gold shares are bouncing after having been punished in the last few months. Overheated technical conditions and prospects for a more hawkish Fed led us to recommend taking profits in August, despite a positive long-term outlook. Indeed, the likelihood of a prolonged period of negative to ultra-low real interest rates is high given startlingly low potential GDP growth in most of the developed world. Gold shares typically do well in the aftermath of a debt binge, as proxied by our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM, shown advanced, Chart 9). It is unnerving that the CHM has suffered such a broad-based deterioration without any back up in interest rates. Low interest rates and tight credit spreads have cushioned what has otherwise been a stark erosion in debt servicing capabilities: there is little scope for a parallel upshift in the global interest rate structure. These are bullish conditions for gold shares, as captured by the upbeat reading in our Cyclical Gold Indicator (Chart 9, top panel). As such, when we took profits we advised that we would look to return to an overweight position once tactical downside risks had been reduced. Are we there yet? Chart 10 suggests that extreme bullishness toward the yellow metal has not yet fully unwound. While the share price ratio has dropped back to its 200-day moving average, cyclical momentum remains elevated, as measured by the 52-week rate of change. Sentiment in the commodity pits is still elevated, flows into gold ETFs are still strong and net speculative positions have not yet made a full retreat (Chart 10), especially in view of the recent politically-motivated pop in market volatility. The implication is that there could be additional selling pressure in the coming weeks. Chart 9Cyclically Appealing, But... Chart 10... Still Tactically Frothy Chart 11The Currency Is Critical In terms of potential buy triggers, anything that causes the U.S. dollar to lose its bid is a strong candidate. Ironically, a Fed rate hike could produce such an outcome, contrary to popular wisdom. In our view, the U.S. (and global) economy cannot handle tighter financial conditions, and a rise in interest rates would need to be offset by a weaker currency. Gold shares perform well when economic expectations are faltering (Chart 11, shown inverted), and a hawkish Fed would likely raise global economic fears. On the flipside, a go-slow Fed could keep the currency bid. That would allow the economy more time to heal and recover, and possibly overheat, thereby potentially boosting future returns on capital, certainly relative to other countries where output gaps remain larger. Bottom Line: Stay neutral on gold stocks, but put them on upgrade alert in recognition that an upgrade back to overweight could occur sooner rather than later, i.e. by yearend, depending on macro dynamics. What To Do With Drug Stocks? A number of drug wholesalers reported earnings misses and provided disappointing guidance, specifically citing worse than expected generic pricing pressure, enough to offset ongoing branded drug price increases. In the current environment of political uncertainty toward health care companies, the knee jerk reaction has been to abandon all pharmaceutical-related equities, regardless of exposure to branded or generic medicines. Our pharmaceutical equity view has noted that the time to worry about the pace of drug price increases would be if they sparked a change in consumption patterns and/or buyer behavior. The fact that major buying groups such as health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers are balking at generic drug price increases constitutes such a shift. Consumer spending on drugs has slowed, albeit that has not been confirmed by neither strong retail drug store sales nor booming hospital employment (Chart 12). Nor is there an unwanted inventory build (Chart 12). Nevertheless, in light of new information, which implies that company-reported pricing pressure is worse than current government data shows, we are downgrading our outlook for drug-related shares. Still, rather than sell after the index has already taken a large hit, pushing relative performance to oversold and undervalued levels (Chart 12), we will await a more opportune moment to lighten positions, especially in view of our preference for defensive equities. Keep in mind that the drug price increases are still well in excess of the overall rate of inflation as branded drug prices continue to rise (Chart 13), and earnings stability should be increasingly desirable as the U.S. dollar climbs. In the meantime, drug-related shares are now on downgrade alert and the overall health care sector is off our high-conviction list. The good news is that other parts of the health care sector should benefit if drug inflation cools. For instance, a reduction in the rate of drug price increases, and in the case of generics, outright price cuts, is a blessing for the S&P managed care industry. Cost inflation had been perking up, but should ease in the coming quarters as drug expenses abate. Health insurance premiums are growing at a faster rate than overall inflation, while job growth remains decent (Chart 14), underscoring that top-line growth is still outpacing that of the overall corporate sector. If cost inflation eases while revenue climbs, the index should move to at least a market multiple from its current discounted valuation. Importantly, technical readings have improved. Chart 12Under The Gun... Chart 13... But Pricing Power Remains Strong Chart 14Celebrating Reduced Cost Inflation Cyclical momentum has begun to reaccelerate from neutral levels after unwinding overbought conditions (Chart 14), suggesting that a breakout to new relative performance highs is in the offing. Bottom Line: The pain in drug-related shares should provide a gain to health care insurers. Stay overweight the S&P managed care index. However, look to lighten the S&P pharmaceutical and biotech indexes on a relative performance bounce in the coming weeks, both are now on downgrade alert. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and growth over value.
Dear Client, In addition to this week's regular Weekly Report, you should have also received a Client Note written by my colleague Marko Papic discussing the upcoming U.S. presidential election. Marko argues that the election is now too close to call. Donald Trump's resilience in the polls continues to baffle most observers. Not us. Back in September of 2015, when most pundits were laughing off Trump's chances, we wrote a report arguing that Trump's rhetoric would resonate with voters much more than most people thought possible. That report, entitled "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," is as relevant today as it was back then. Best regards, Peter Berezin Highlights Spare capacity has narrowed substantially within the developed world. Most of the decline in spare capacity is attributable to lackluster supply, rather than stronger demand. Potential GDP growth is likely to remain weak over the coming years. Narrowing output gaps will put upward pressure on inflation. We are long Japanese and German inflation protection. As spare capacity continues to dwindle, forward guidance will become a more effective tool for central banks. At least in this respect, central bankers may find themselves with a few more bullets in their arsenals. Stay long the dollar and position for gradually higher government bond yields. Global equities are highly vulnerable to a near-term correction, owing to a more hawkish Fed and growing U.S. election uncertainty. Once the dust has settled, European and Japanese stocks will outperform their U.S. peers. Feature Spare Capacity Is Dwindling A persistent shortfall of aggregate demand has been the defining feature of the global economic landscape ever since the financial crisis erupted. This chronic lack of spending has kept inflation below target in most developed economies, forcing central banks to adopt ever more radical easing policies. That is starting to change. Spare capacity continues to decline, allowing once dormant supply-side constraints to reimpose themselves. In this week's report, we take stock of where we are in this process. Mind The (Output) Gap The simplest measure of spare capacity is the so-called output gap, which estimates the difference between what economies are actually producing and what they are capable of producing without putting undue upward pressure on inflation. According to the IMF, the output gap for advanced economies has narrowed from a high of 3.8% of GDP in 2009 to 0.8% at present. The OECD's measure shows a similar decline (Chart 1). Chart 1AOutput Gaps Have Narrowed Chart 1BOutput Gaps Have Narrowed The IMF reckons that the output gap has nearly closed in the U.S. and the U.K. The Fund estimates that Japan's output gap currently stands at 1.5% of GDP. The OECD also sees the U.K. output gap as being fully closed. However, it calculates a smaller output gap for Japan but a larger output gap for the U.S. than the IMF does. Both institutions peg the euro area's output gap at around 1%-to- 1.5%. Not surprisingly, there is a fair bit of variation within continental Europe. The output gap in Germany has fully disappeared, but still stands at 2%-to-3% of GDP in Italy and Spain. Naturally, one should take these numbers with a grain of salt. Output gaps are notoriously difficult to calculate and are subject to large revisions. The OECD, for example, tends to rely on statistical approaches to estimate output gaps.1 These typically involve employing tools such as the so-called "Hodrick-Prescott filter" to smooth out historical GDP data and then treating the resulting trendline as an estimate for potential GDP. Such methods have their uses, but they can go badly awry in situations where GDP is slow to return to its "true" underlying trend. This is a particular worry in the current environment, considering that recoveries following burst asset bubbles tend to be lethargic even in the best of times. The fact that fiscal policy has been fairly tight and monetary policy has been constrained by the zero lower bound has further dampened the recovery. With that in mind, rather than relying on purely statistical techniques, it is useful to measure spare capacity directly. We do this by gauging the extent to which the existing factors of production - labor and capital - are being effectively deployed across the major developed economies. As we argue below, this approach suggests that slack may be modestly higher in Japan than what the IMF and the OECD calculate, and more meaningfully understated in peripheral Europe. The Message From Headline Unemployment Rates Unemployment has been falling in almost all major developed economies (Chart 2). In the U.S. and the U.K., the jobless rate is back to pre-crisis levels. In Germany and Japan, it is below where it was before the Great Recession. As such, it is unlikely that unemployment can decline much in these economies. Chart 2AUnemployment Rates Have Declined Chart 2BUnemployment Rates Have Declined In contrast, while unemployment rates in peripheral Europe have been trending lower over the past three years, they are still quite high by historical standards. There is some debate over whether they can fall much further. The OECD, for example, contends that Spain is already close to full employment, even though the country's unemployment rate still stands at nearly 20%. We find this implausible. The OECD essentially takes a moving average to calculate structural unemployment rates in various economies. As noted above, this can be highly misleading in circumstances where the forces pushing an economy towards full employment are impaired. In general, this suggests that both the IMF and the OECD estimates of labor market slack in the euro area are too low. This is consistent with a recent ECB research paper, which calculated that the euro area's output gap was 6% of GDP in 2015, a far cry from the European Commission's estimate of 1.1%.2 Disguised Unemployment The unemployment rate is probably the single best measure of labor market slack. However, it can understate the true amount of spare capacity during periods when many people have stopped looking for work, or when those who are employed are not working as much or as intensively as they would like. The nature of this additional labor market slack differs from region to region. In the U.S., it has mainly manifested itself in lower labor force participation rates; whereas in Europe - perhaps in keeping with the more egalitarian nature of European society - it has mainly taken the form of fewer hours worked and a higher incidence of involuntary part-time employment. Chart 3 shows that labor force participation rates among prime-age workers (those between the ages of 25-and-54) in Europe are generally higher now than they were before the financial crisis. In contrast, the share of workers who have part-time jobs but desire full-time employment remains elevated across most of continental Europe (Chart 4). The average annual number of hours worked per employee has also declined in most European economies (Chart 5). Chart 3ALabor Force Participation Rate ##br##Has Risen In Europe, But Fallen In The U.S. Chart 3BLabor Force Participation Rate ##br##Has Risen In Europe, But Fallen In The U.S. Chart 4AEurope: Higher Incidence Of ##br##Involuntary Part-Time Employment Chart 4BEurope: Higher Incidence ##br##Of Involuntary Part-Time Employment In the U.S., the prime-age labor force participation rate is still 1.9 points lower than it was in 2007. Part of this is cyclical. As long as the labor market continues to improve, participation rates among prime-age workers should continue to recover. That's the good news. The bad news is that ongoing structural forces are likely to prevent the participation rate from returning back to its pre-crisis levels. Chart 6 shows that labor force participation rates among U.S. prime-aged males has been trending lower since the 1960s. The decline has been particularly acute among less-educated workers. Why this has happened remains a source of intense debate. Conservative commentators have argued that cultural shifts have reduced the social pressure on men to maintain gainful employment. Liberal commentators have contended that falling real wages at the lower end of the skill distribution have reduced the incentive to work. Whatever the reason, it will be difficult to boost labor participation substantially from current levels. At present, 11% of U.S. prime-aged nonparticipants report wanting a job, only modestly higher than before the recession (Chart 7). It is possible that some fraction of those who do not want to work will change their minds - indeed, this year has seen a modest inflow of "disabled" people back into the labor force. Realistically, however, this is unlikely to boost labor participation by more than one percentage point. Chart 5Hours Worked ##br##In Europe Have Declined Chart 6U.S.: The Less Educated ##br##Are Shunning The Labor Force Chart 7U.S.: Fewer Potential Workers ##br##On The Sidelines Chart 8Japan's Underutilized Labor Force The incidence of involuntary part-time employment in Japan has returned to where it was prior to the Great Recession. However, in absolute terms, it remains quite high - in fact, nearly as high as in Europe. Japanese full-time employees may also not be as productively engaged as they could be. As evidence, note that output-per-hour in Japan is 37% lower than in the U.S. and 33% lower than in Germany (Chart 8). From this we conclude that there is somewhat more labor market slack in Japan than the headline unemployment rate suggests. Industrial Capacity Utilization Goods-producing sectors typically account for less than a third of GDP in most advanced economies. Nevertheless, because the demand for goods tends to be more volatile than the demand for services, fluctuations in industrial production often account for the bulk of the changes in output gaps. As Chart 9 shows, after a brisk recovery following the financial crisis, the U.S. industrial capacity utilization rate has been trending lower for the past two years. It currently stands at 75.4%, 5.6 percentage points lower than at its pre-recession peak. The Institute for Supply Management's semi-annual capacity utilization survey also suggests that many U.S. manufacturing businesses are operating substantially below potential (Chart 10). Much of the deterioration in U.S. industrial utilization reflects the effects of the energy bust and a stronger dollar. Business capex has decelerated sharply as a consequence of these forces, falling by over two-thirds in the case of energy capex. This should cut into excess capacity. Chart 9U.S.: Industrial Capacity ##br##Utilization Remains Low Chart 10U.S.: Less Slack In Services ##br##Than Manufacturing The dearth of new investment elsewhere in the world should also help prop up utilization rates (Chart 11). Industrial utilization is close to its historic average in Europe. Unlike in the case of labor markets, there is not a lot of regional variation in capacity utilization rates across the euro area. If anything, Italian spare capacity is actually closer to its pre-recession level than Germany's. Chart 11AEurope: Idle Industrial Capacity Is Shrinking Chart 11BEurope: Idle Industrial Capacity Is Shrinking Chart 12Excess Capacity Has Declined In Japan Capacity utilization has also returned to its long-term trend in Japan. Encouragingly, the Tankan Factor Utilization Index has risen to its highest level since the early 1990s (Chart 12). Nevertheless, the strong yen is starting to put pressure on Japan's industrial sector. This suggests that further monetary easing from the BoJ will be necessary. Economic And Investment Implications Our analysis suggests that spare capacity has narrowed substantially within the developed world, although for some countries not quite as much as output gap estimates from the IMF and the OECD indicate (particularly in the case of peripheral Europe). Unfortunately, most of the decline in spare capacity is attributable to lackluster supply, rather than faster demand growth (Chart 13). Interestingly, a cyclically-induced withdrawal of workers from the labor market has only played a modest role in explaining the slowdown in potential GDP growth and the resulting decline in output gaps. Instead, most of the deceleration in potential GDP growth stems from lower productivity gains. Chart 13AWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Chart 13BWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Some of the decline in productivity growth reflects cyclical factors, especially weak business investment. However, as we have discussed in past reports, much of it reflects structural forces such as declining educational achievement and a shift in focus of internet innovation away from business productivity applications towards consumer services such as social media.3 Looking out, narrowing output gaps will put upward pressure on inflation. We are long Japanese and German inflation protection via the CPI swap market. Governor Kuroda has made it clear that he wants Japanese inflation to rise above 2% to make up for the fact that inflation has perpetually undershot the BoJ's target. The Bundesbank may not want higher inflation, but the ECB's need to reflate Southern Europe all but guarantees such an outcome. As spare capacity continues to dwindle, forward guidance will become a more effective tool for central banks. The essence of forward guidance is the commitment to keeping monetary policy ultra loose even when the economy begins to overheat. If people believe that the central bank will keep the punch bowl filled, this could cause long-term inflation expectations to rise, leading to lower real yields and increased spending today. Such a commitment is likely to be regarded as more credible if people expect it to be carried out over the next few years, rather than at some distant point in the future. The Bank of Japan has already moved in that direction with its pledge to engineer an inflation overshoot by keeping the 10-year JGB yield anchored at zero. Chart 14China: On The Mend, Cyclically The U.S. has the smallest output gap, but the highest neutral interest rate, among the major developed economies. This week's FOMC statement strongly hinted at a December rate hike. As we discussed two weeks ago, in addition to one hike this year, we expect the FOMC to hike rates twice next year.4 This should cause the real broad trade-weighted dollar to appreciate by 10% over the next 12 months. A stronger dollar will mitigate some of the upward pressure on U.S. bond yields. Nevertheless, as slack continues to erode and inflation shifts higher, Treasury yields, along with bond yields elsewhere, should continue trending higher. Global equities are currently highly vulnerable to a near-term correction, owing to a more hawkish Fed and growing U.S. election uncertainty. We are currently short the NASDAQ 100 futures as a hedge, a trade that has gained 3.1% since we initiated it. Once the dust has settled, European and Japanese stocks will outperform their U.S. peers. This is partly because U.S. stocks are relatively expensive, but it is also because an ascending dollar will hurt U.S. multinationals. Investors should overweight Japanese and European stocks on a currency-hedged basis within the developed market universe. The outlook for emerging markets is mixed. On the one hand, the recent uptick in Chinese growth - as evidenced by this week's better-than-expected PMI data (Chart 14) - should provide some support to commodity prices and EM assets. On the other hand, a stronger dollar will weigh on commodities, while making it more onerous for some emerging market companies to refinance their dollar-denominated loans. Higher U.S. rates could also reduce the global pool of dollar liquidity, making it difficult for some emerging markets to finance their current account deficits. On balance, a modestly underweight stance towards EM assets is warranted. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 The IMF uses a more ad hoc approach. Desk economists have significant leeway in how they estimate output gaps for their respective economies. Most economists rely on statistical models and production function calculations, intermixed with educated guesswork. 2 Marek Jarocinski, and Michele Lenza, "How Large Is The Output Gap In The Euro Area," ECB Research Bulletin 2016, July 1, 2016. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Slower Potential Growth: Causes And Consequences," dated May 29, 2015; and Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends* Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
The relative performance of media stocks over the past few months would seem to foretell of a downturn in cash flow prospects. However, the opposite is true. The latest consumer spending data showed that outlays on media products and services are accelerating, both in absolute terms and relative to total consumption. In turn, that is driving up media pricing power, to growth rates not seen in more than a decade. Media pricing power often leads relative sales growth expectations, pointing to a re-rating ahead. Importantly, media productivity is also on the upswing, as proxied by sales-to-employment, which leads momentum in relative forward profit estimates. The implication is that the budding recovery in the share price ratio is likely to gain traction. Stay overweight.
Financial stocks have risen in sympathy with the back up in global bond yields, but that likely represents position squaring more so than a sustained shift into the sector. Financial profits will continue to be challenged by a downturn in the credit cycle, both in terms of quality and loan creation, given the negative global credit impulse and flattening yield curve (shown inverted and advanced, bottom panel). Importantly, productivity is waning. Financial sector employment is probing new highs, reflecting a more onerous cost structure required to meet regulatory obligations. Employment is now growing faster than sales (third panel), a reliable indication of flagging productivity. The implication is that financial sector profits will continue to lag those of the broad market. We continue to view cheap financial sector valuations as a trap, and recommend below benchmark positions.
Special Report Highlights Lesson 1: Don't fear the end of the debt super cycle. Lesson 2: The ECB will ultimately target the long-term bond yield. Lesson 3: Financials will structurally underperform. Lesson 4: Personal Products (Beauty) will structurally outperform. Feature Striking similarities exist between the post debt super cycle economies in the euro area and Japan. Feature ChartPersonal Products Will Outperform Structurally... Financials Will Not In many regards, the euro area looks remarkably like Japan with a 17 year lag. Line up the 2007 peak in the euro area credit boom with the 1990 peak in the Japan credit boom - and the subsequent evolutions of many economic and financial metrics also line up almost perfectly: for example, the policy interest rate; the 10-year bond yield; inflation; and nominal GDP (Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5). Chart 2Striking Similarities Between The Euro Area... Chart 3...And Japan, Advanced By 17 Years Chart I-4Striking Similarities Between The Euro Area... Chart I-5...And Japan, Advanced By 17 Years This is very useful because if the euro area continues in Japan's footsteps, Japan's experience can teach us several important lessons about the euro area economy and financial markets out to the year 2034. Lesson 1: Don't Fear The End Of The Debt Super Cycle Does the euro area economy have "lost decades" ahead of it? Not exactly. Japan's so-called lost decades describe its stagnant nominal GDP since the mid-1990s. But this emphasis on nominal income is misleading (Chart I-6). The average citizen's standard of living does not depend on nominal GDP or even on real GDP. What truly matters is real GDP per head combined with the absence of extreme income inequality. Real incomes must grow and the growth must be reasonably distributed across society. On both counts, the euro area can be encouraged by Japan's experience. Since the late 1990s, Japan's real GDP per head has averaged close to 1% growth a year, broadly in line with the expected real productivity growth in a developed economy. This is exactly the real growth rate to be expected when there is no artificial and unsustainable tailwind from credit expansion. It is an economy's natural state of growth when the debt super cycle comes to an end, as it did in Japan more than 20 years ago.1 And it is good growth because it comes entirely from productivity improvements. Mankind's persistent ability to learn, experiment, and innovate produces more and/or better output from a fixed set of inputs. Furthermore, unlike other major economies, income inequality in Japan has not increased through the past 20 years and remains amongst the lowest in the developed world (Chart I-7). Again, this is not surprising. It is credit expansions that inflate bubbles in financial assets and exacerbate income and wealth inequalities. Therefore, unlike bad growth fuelled by credit booms, real growth that comes from productivity improvements is sustainable and unpolarising. The first lesson from Japan is that the euro area can expect structural growth in real GDP per head of around 1% a year. Chart I-6What ##br##"Lost Decades"? Chart I-7Income Inequality In Japan ##br##Has Not Increased Lesson 2: The ECB Will Ultimately Target The Long-Term Bond Yield One objection to Lesson 1 is that in a highly indebted economy, nominal GDP growth does matter. As debt is a nominal amount, it is nominal incomes that determine the ability to service and repay the high level of debt. So given a free choice, policymakers would prefer to have inflation at 2% or 4% rather than at -1%; and nominal GDP growth at 3% or 5% rather than zero. Unfortunately, policymakers do not have this free choice. Contrary to what central bankers promise, inflation and nominal GDP growth cannot be dialled up or down at will to hit a point-target. As we explained in The Case Against Helicopters,2 inflation is a notoriously non-linear phenomenon which is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control. As a reminder, look at the standard identity of monetary economics: MV = PT M is the broad money supply, V is its velocity of circulation, P is the price level and T is the volume of transactions. PT is effectively nominal GDP. The big problem is that both the broad money supply M and its velocity V - whose product determines nominal GDP - are highly non-linear. M is non-linear because the commercial banking system money multiplier - the ratio of loans to reserves - is non-linear (Chart I-8). At a tipping point of inflation, the onus suddenly flips from lending as little as possible to lending as much as possible. Chart I-8The Money Multiplier Is Non-Linear Admittedly, the central bank (in cahoots with the government) could by-pass the commercial banking system to control the money supply M directly. But it can do nothing to change the extreme non-linearity of the other driver of nominal GDP, the velocity of money V. Again, at a tipping point of inflation, the onus suddenly flips to spending money - both newly created and pre-existing balances - as fast as possible. At which point, nominal GDP growth and inflation suddenly and uncontrollably phase-shift from ice to fire with little in between. Therefore in the highly indebted euro area economy with near-zero inflation, the prudent course of action is not to risk uncontrolled inflation with so-called "helicopter money". Instead, the second lesson from Japan is to expect the ECB ultimately to emulate the BoJ and target the long-term bond yield. But which bond yield? Most likely, it would be the euro area synthetic 10-year yield, which the ECB already calculates and publishes, or a close proxy. In combination with the ECB's (as yet unused) OMT program - whose mere presence limits individual sovereign yield spreads - expect euro area government bond yields to remain structurally well anchored. Lesson 3: Financials Will Structurally Underperform Japanese financial sector profits today stand at less than half their level in 1990. For euro area financial sector profits, the concerning thing is that their evolution is tracking the Japanese experience with a 17 year lag. If euro area financial profits continue to follow in Japan's footsteps, expect no sustained growth over the next 17 years (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Euro Area Financial Profits May Experience No Sustained Growth In a post debt super cycle world, banks lose the lifeblood of their business: credit creation. And this becomes a multi-decade headwind to financial sector profit growth and share price performance. Euro area financials face two other headwinds similar to those in post debt super cycle Japan. As explained in Lesson 2, high indebtedness makes the economy hyper-sensitive to rising bond yields. The upshot is that the interest rate term-structure, which drives banks' net lending margins, cannot sustainably steepen. Also, just like Japan's 'zombie' banks, many European banks will take a long time to fully recognise the extent of their non-performing loans. The consequent squeeze on new lending combined with a requirement for additional capital further weighs down banks' return on equity. So the third lesson from Japan is that euro area financials is not a sector to buy and hold for the long term. Rather, it is a sector to play for periodic strong countertrend rallies. Now is not the time for such a play. Lesson 4: Personal Products (Beauty) Will Structurally Outperform Over the past 20 years, Japan's nominal GDP has gone sideways. But over this same period, the sales of skin cosmetics and beauty products have almost tripled (Chart I-10). This has helped the personal products sector to outperform very strongly. While Japanese financial profits have halved since 1990, Japanese personal products profits have quintupled (Feature Chart). Once again, the useful thing is that euro area personal product profits are uncannily tracking the Japanese experience with a 17 year lag. If euro area personal product profits continue to follow in Japan's footsteps, expect them to almost triple over the next 17 years (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Beauty Sales Have Boomed In Japan Chart I-11Euro Area Personal Products Profits Might Triple The very strong growth in beauty sales and profits in Japan is an extended example of the phenomenon known as the lipstick effect. Our Special Report Buy Beauty: The Lipstick Effect Stays Put3 provides the detail. But in a nutshell, the demand for beauty products and cosmetics - epitomised by lipstick - experiences a surge when the economic environment feels harsh. For many people, the post debt super cycle world of 1% real income growth with high indebtedness and no more bingeing on credit does feel like an extended hangover - at least compared to the spendthrift era that preceded it. Hence, it creates the ideal backdrop for an extended play of the lipstick effect, as witnessed in Japan. The fourth lesson from Japan is that euro area personal products is a sector to buy and hold for the long term. Expect profits to trend up at around 6% a year, and the sector to strongly outperform the broader market. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Admittedly, after the debt super cycle ended in Japan, government levering was needed to counter the impact of aggressive de-levering in the private sector. But in the euro area, this will not be needed to the same extent as the de-levering in the private sector is not as aggressive. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'The Case Against Helicopters' published on May 5, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Buy Beauty: The Lipstick Effect Stays Put' published on April 14, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model This week's recommended trade is to go short French banks versus the CAC40. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Chile's economy is headed for recession. Facing strong external and domestic headwinds, any policy stimulus will be too late to prevent the impending contraction in economic activity. Investors should receive 3-year interest swaps and stay short CLP / long USD. South Africa's cyclical and structural outlook remains bleak. Banks have been selling foreign assets and repatriating capital which has helped the rand to appreciate. However, as this capital repatriation tapers, the rand will enter a renewed bear market. Stay short the rand versus the U.S. dollar and long MXN / short ZAR. Feature Chile: Stimulus Will Arrive Too Late To Prevent Recession Chart I-1Chile: From Stagflation To Recession? The stagflationary environment in Chile over the past two years - a combination of sluggish growth and high inflation - will give way to outright recession (Chart I-1). As economic activity downshifts further, we are doubtful that policymakers will be able to push through stimulus measures in time, and of sufficient size, to stave off recession. On the fiscal front, the government is unlikely to preemptively engage in a significant spending push. The deceleration in economic activity will soon translate into lower fiscal revenue at a time when the fiscal deficit is already quite wide, at 2.8% of GDP. Furthermore, a renewed fall in copper prices (more on this below) means mining revenue will also be weaker than currently expected, inflicting substantial damage on the government's budget. Meanwhile, monetary policy is unlikely to become stimulative in the near term. Having concluded a two-year battle to tame sticky core inflation, the central bank is unlikely cut interest rates too fast. Besides, as the current term of Central Bank President Rodrigo Vergara ends in December, chances of a new rate cut cycle before he is replaced are low. On the whole, the lack of imminent policy stimulus means economic growth is set to fall much further. Investors can profit by receiving 3-year swap rates (Chart I-2). Although the central bank will be late to cut rates, long-term interest rates will fall because Chilean growth is facing strong headwinds on several fronts: Copper prices have failed to rally amid the reflation trade of the past nine months, and are set to drop to new lows as Chinese property construction and demand for industrial metals contracts anew (Chart I-3). As a result, copper exports will continue to act as a serious drag on Chilean growth (Chart I-4). Chart I-2Receive 3-Year Interest ##br##Rate Swaps In Chile Chart I-3China's Industrial Metals ##br##Demand To Contract Chart I-4Exports Will Remain ##br##A Drag On Growth Capital expenditures will contract, partially due to very downbeat business confidence owing to the uncertain political environment created by the government's reforms agenda since 2014 (Chart I-5, top panel). As discussed in detail in our December 2014 Special Report on Chile,1 from a big-picture perspective, these reforms have shifted the structure of the economy toward higher government expenditures at the expense of the private sector. This has severely eroded business confidence. In addition, the downturn in the housing market will gain momentum, further depressing activity (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Meanwhile, employment growth has been weak and income growth has been decelerating steadily - and we foresee further downside ahead (Chart I-6). Importantly, the economy's credit impulse is now turning negative (Chart I-7). Higher delinquencies in turn will force banks to curtail lending going forward. Chart I-5Chile: Capex To Remain Weak Chart I-6Chile: Labor Market Will Weaken Further Chart I-7Negative Credit Impulse##br## Will Weigh On Growth Finally, narrow (M1) money supply growth, a very good leading indicator for economic activity, is now decelerating sharply (Chart I-8). Consistently, our marginal propensity to consume proxy points to weak spending and lower consumer price inflation (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Chile: Narrow Money Growth, ##br##Economic Activity And Inflation Chart I-9Consumption Is Set ##br##To Decelerate Further The economy has developed considerable downward momentum. Any policy stimulus is likely to come too late to prevent the economy from falling into recession. Therefore, local interest rates in Chile are headed to new lows. An economic recession and lower copper prices are clearly bearish for the Chilean peso, and we maintain that its 8.5% rally this year versus the U.S. dollar will be followed by new lows (Chart I-10). Turning to equities, lower interest rates will help only marginally as equity valuations are not cheap (Chart I-11). Moreover, as Chilean banks account for 20% of the MSCI market cap and, while they are better run and more conservative than many others in the EM, they are not immune to a decelerating credit and business cycle. Besides, this bourse's Latin American consumer plays will also likely disappoint. As such, dedicated EM investors should stay neutral on Chilean stocks relative to the EM equity benchmark (Chart I-12). Chart I-10Chilean Peso Valuation Chart I-11Chilean Equities Are At Fair Value Chart I-12Chilean Equities: Stay ##br##Neutral Relative To EM Benchmark Lastly, as highlighted in our recent in-depth Special Report on EM corporate credit,2 credit investors should stay long Chilean and Russian corporate debt versus China. Chilean corporate credit will likely outperform Chinese corporate credit, as the latter is more frothy - overbought and expensive. Bottom Line: The Chilean economy is heading into recession, and policymakers will be late with stimulus to prevent it. Fixed-income investors should receive 3-year interest rate swaps. Dedicated EM equity investors should maintain a neutral stance on the Chilean bourse versus the EM equity benchmark. Stay short CLP / long USD. Santiago E. Gomez Associate Vice President santiago@bcaresearch.com South Africa: Flows Versus Fundamentals Chart II-1Improving Trade Has Helped The ZAR The South African rand has rallied since the start of the year on the back of an improving trade balance (Chart II-1) and strong capital inflows. However, it is facing a key technical resistance level, as are many other EM assets. We expect these resistance levels to hold for EM risk assets in general and the South African rand in particular. The underlying reasons behind our outlook center around our expectations of a stronger U.S. dollar, rising U.S. and G7 bond yields and a relapse in commodities prices. This is in addition to a lack of cyclical recovery and poor structural fundamentals in South Africa. A well-known explanation as to how South Africa has been able to finance its wide current account deficit is that there have been strong foreign portfolio inflows stemming from the global search for yield. What is less known is that South African banks have in the past year been selling foreign assets and repatriating capital back into South Africa (Chart II-2). Over the past 12 months, this repatriation of capital has amounted to US$ 6.5 billion, which effectively allowed the country to fund 50% of its current account deficit. While there is no doubt that this repatriation of capital has aided the rally in the rand and domestic bonds, it remains to be seen whether these flows will continue. Our suspicion is that with South African banks' holdings of foreign bonds dropping from US$ 18 billion in December 2015 to US$ 12 billion at the end of June 2016, and G7 bond yields rising, the speed of capital repatriation will likely slow. In the meantime, fundamentals in South Africa remain weak: The household sector, which accounts for 60% of GDP, has been sluggish. Private consumption growth has been anemic and credit growth to households has been falling rapidly (Chart II-3). Chart II-2South Africa: Banks Have Been ##br##Repatriating Capital Enormously Chart II-3South African ##br##Consumption Is Anemic The corporate sector is not painting a reassuring picture either. South African firms are not investing; real gross fixed capital formation is contracting (Chart II-4, top panel) and business confidence is at an all-time low (Chart II-4, bottom panel). The ongoing dynamic of persistently high wage growth - despite negative productivity growth - only reinforces the gloomy outlook as it creates downward pressure on corporate profit margins, or upward pressure on inflation (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Contracting Capex And ##br##Record-Low Business Confidence Chart II-5Toxic Structural Dynamics: Contracting ##br##Productivity And High Wage Growth Along with renewed weakness in the rand, higher wage growth will raise interest rate expectations. The fixed-income market is currently discounting no policy rate hikes during the next 12 months making it vulnerable to potential depreciation in the rand. In addition to a poor economic backdrop, uncertainty regarding economic policy is considerable. Chart II-6South Africa's Central ##br##Bank's Liquidity Injections First, fiscal policy will not be market friendly. The poor performance of the ANC in the last municipal elections shows the ANC is clearly losing support from the population. This will lead President Zuma and ANC to adopt even more populist policies. This is bearish for both the fiscal accounts and the structural growth outlook. As such, this will cap the upside in the rand and put a floor under domestic bond yields. Second, the central bank will not defend the exchange rate if the latter comes under selling pressure anew. In fact, monetary policy remains somewhat unorthodox. Specifically, the Reserve Bank of South Africa continues to inject liquidity into the system to cap interbank rates (Chart II-6). This will facilitate ZAR depreciation. Investment Conclusions Stay short the rand versus the U.S. dollar. Three weeks ago we also initiated a long MXN / short ZAR trade, and this trade remains intact as the MXN is oversold and the ZAR is overbought. Dedicated EM equity investors should maintain a neutral allocation to South African stocks. On the back of a fragile and deteriorating consumer sector, we recommend staying short general retailer stocks. Their share prices seem to be breaking down despite the rebound in the rand and a drop in domestic bond yields (Chart II-7). Policy uncertainty and pressure for populist policies is still an overarching issue for South Africa, especially compared to Russia. As such we suggest fixed income investors continue to underweight South African sovereign credit within the EM sovereign credit universe (Chart II-8), and maintain the relative trade of being long South African CDS / short Russian CDS. Chart II-7Stay Short South ##br##African General Retailers Chart II-8Stay Underweight South ##br##African Credit And Short Rand Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy & Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled, "Chile: A New Economic Model?," dated December 3, 2014 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "EM Corporate Health Is Flashing Red," dated September 14, 2016. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations