Developed Countries
Overweight Amidst a slew of weak retail earnings reports in Q2, HD surprised with a positive result as it benefited from a surge in remodeling activity. Existing home prices are pushing against highs, which benefits home improvement retailers (HIR) in two ways. First, high prices drive a shift toward renovation versus buying a new home as the latter becomes relatively more expensive. Second, existing owners can use their higher home equity as a source of funds for a renovation. Net, existing home prices and HIR sales move in lockstep (second panel). At the same time as sales are pressing upward, the HIRs are delivering productivity gains (third panel). This should amplify the operating leverage of a surge in same-store sales, driving margins higher. Relative valuations are lagging the solid operating performance (bottom panel). In fact, HIR stocks have not been this cheap since the GFC. This looks like an excellent buying opportunity; stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW.
Highlights Washington must establish a "credible threat" if it is to convince Pyongyang that negotiations offer the superior outcome; The process of establishing such a credible threat is volatile; U.S. Treasurys, along with Swiss and Japanese government bonds have been consistent safe haven assets; The risk of a U.S. attack against North Korea is a red herring, while the crisis itself is not; We suggest that investors hedge the risk with an equally-weighted basket of Swiss bonds and gold. Feature Brinkmanship between Pyongyang and Washington, D.C. has roiled markets over the past week. The uptick in rhetoric has not come as a surprise. Since last year, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has stressed that souring Sino-American relations were the premier geopolitical risk to investors and that China's periphery, especially the Korean peninsula, would be the "decisive" factor for markets.1 North Korea's nuclear ambitions - which could be snuffed out immediately by a concerted and coordinated effort by China and the U.S. - are a derivative of the broader U.S.-China dynamic. The U.S. is unlikely to use military force to resolve its standoff with North Korea. There are long-standing constraints to war, ones that all of the interested parties know only too well from their experience in the Korean War of 1950-53. The first of these is that war is likely to bring a high death toll: Pyongyang can inflict massive civilian casualties in Seoul with a conventional artillery barrage; U.S. troops and Japanese troops and civilians would also likely suffer. Second, China is unlikely to remain neutral, given its behavior in the 1950s, its persistent strategic interest in the peninsula, and its huge increase in military strength relative to both the past and to the United States. However, the process by which the U.S. establishes a "credible threat" of military action is volatile.2 Such a credible threat is necessary if Washington is to convince Pyongyang that negotiations offer a superior outcome to the belligerent status quo. Viewed from this perspective - which is informed by game theory -President Donald Trump has not committed any grave mistakes so far, but has rather shrewdly manipulated the world's perception that he is mentally unhinged in order to enhance his negotiating leverage. It is unclear how long it will take Trump to convince North Korea that the threat of a U.S. preemptive strike is "credible." As such, it is unclear how long the current standoff will persist. From an investor perspective, it will be difficult to gauge whether the brinkmanship and military posturing are part of this "territorial threat display" or evidence of real preparations for an actual attack. As such, further volatility is likely. The ongoing crisis in North Korea is neither the first nor the last geopolitical crisis the world will face in today's era of paradigm shifts.3 We have long identified East Asia as the cauldron of investment-relevant geopolitical risks.4 This is a dynamic produced by the multipolar global context and the geopolitical disequilibrium in the Sino-American relationship. For now, investors have been able to ignore the rising global tensions (Chart 1) due to the ample liquidity emanating from central banks, but the day of reckoning is nigh (Chart 2). Chart 1Multipolarity Increases Conflict Frequency Chart 2Day Of Reckoning? Q&A On North Korea Back on April 19, we wrote a Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," which argued that North Korea had at last become a market-relevant geopolitical risk after decades of limited impact (Chart 3).5 Chart 3North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long Looking to the next steps, we introduced the "arc of diplomacy," a framework comparable to the U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations from 2010-15 (Chart 4). We predicted that the U.S. would ultimately ramp up threats for the purpose of achieving a diplomatic solution. The U.S. was constrained and would only go to war if an act of war were committed, or appeared imminent.6 Chart 4Arc Of Diplomacy: Tensions Ramp Up As Nuclear Negotiations Begin This assessment is now playing out. But not all clients are convinced of our logic, as we have found in our travels throughout Asia Pacific and elsewhere this month. Below we offer a short Q&A based on questions we have received from clients: Q: Diplomacy has already been tried, so why won't the U.S. attack? A: The U.S. public has less appetite for war, especially a preemptive strike, in the wake of the Iraq War, and has not suffered a 9/11 or Pearl Harbor-type catalyst. The U.S. will exhaust diplomatic options before joining a catastrophic second Korean War. And the diplomatic options are far from exhausted. The latest round of sanctions are tighter and more serious than past ones, but still leave categories untouched (like fuel supplies to the North) and are still very hard to enforce (like cutting illegal North Korean labor remittances). Enforcement is always difficult, and the U.S. is currently attempting to ensure that its allies enforce the sanctions strictly, not to mention its rivals (i.e. Russia and China). While we do not think China will ever impose crippling sanctions, we do think it can tighten them up considerably, which could be enough to change the North's behavior. Q: Why doesn't China just take North Korea out? A: China is a formal political, military, and ideological ally of North Korea, and has a strategic interest in maintaining a buffer space on the Korean peninsula - which it defended at enormous human cost in the Korean War. This interest remains in place. China is far more likely to aid and abet a nuclear-armed ally in North Korea than it is to endorse (much less participate in) regime change. The fallout from a new war, such as North Korean refugees flooding into China, is extremely undesirable for China, though it could handle the problem ruthlessly. China would also prefer not to have to occupy a collapsing North, which would be an extensive and dangerous entanglement. Therefore, expect China to twist Pyongyang's arm but not to break its legs. On a more topical note, China is consumed with domestic politics ahead of the nineteenth National Party Congress. It is perhaps more likely to take action after the congress in October-November. Q: Will U.S. allies cooperate with Trump? Why not bandwagon with China to gain economic benefit? A: South Korea is the best litmus test for whether Trump is causing U.S. allies to drift. The new South Korean President Moon Jae-In, who is politically left-of-center, has played his cards very carefully and started out on good footing with President Trump. A disagreement appears to be a likely consequence of Moon's agenda, which calls for extensive engagement with the North and a review of the U.S. THAAD missile defense deployment in Korea. So far, however, Moon is reaffirming the alliance, in his own way, and Trump has not (yet) expressed misgivings about him. If this changes significantly - as in, South Korea joining with China to give North Korea significant economic aid in defiance of U.S. sanctions efforts - then it would be a sign of division among the allies that would benefit North Korea and could even increase the risk of the U.S. taking unilateral action. The odds of that are still low, however. We have been short the Korean won versus the Thai baht since March 1, and the trade is up 6.03%. We also expect greater volatility and higher prices of credit default swaps to plague South Korea while the crisis continues over the coming months. We are closing our long Korean consumer stocks trade versus Taiwanese exporters for a loss of 4.24%. Q: What is Japan's role in the current crisis? What is the impact on Japan? A: Japan is one of the few countries whose relations with the U.S. have benefited under the Trump administration. The Japanese are in lock-step so far in reacting to North Korea. The government has been sounding louder alarms about North Korea for the past year, including by conducting evacuation drills in the case of attack. Japan has long been within range of North Korea's missiles, but its successes in nuclear miniaturization pose a much greater threat. Not only does North Korea pose a legitimate security risk, but Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also stands to benefit at least marginally in terms of popular support and support for his controversial constitutional revision. This will, in turn, feed into the region's insecurities. Yen strength as a result of the crisis, however, would be a headwind to Japan's economic growth. Thus Abe has a tightrope to walk. We expect him to take actions to ensure the economy continues to reflate. Q: Is Trump rational? How do we know he won't push the nuclear button? A: Ultimately this is unknowable. It also involves one's philosophical outlook. Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong both committed atrocities by the tens of millions but did not use nuclear weapons. Nikita Khrushchev practically wrote the playbook that North Korea's Kim dynasty has used in making its belligerent nuclear threats. Yet Khrushchev ultimately agreed to détente. Kim Jong Un makes Trump look calm. The combination of Kim and Trump is worrisome; but so was the combination of Eisenhower and Khrushchev, one believing nuclear weapons should be used if needed, the other threatening wildly to use them. It may be the case that the threat of an atrocity, or (in Kim's case) of total annihilation, is enough to keep decisions restrained. As we go to press, Kim has ostensibly suspended his plan to fire missiles around Guam and U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that they would not attack unless attacked. Stairway To (Safe) Haven Revisited In expectation of increased frequency of geopolitical risks, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has produced two quantitative analyses of safe haven assets over the past two years. The first, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," unequivocally crowned gold as the ultimate safe haven (Table 1), while showing that the USD is not much of a defense against geopolitical events (Chart 5).7 Table 1Safe-Haven Demand Rises During Crises Table 1Safe-Haven Demand Rises During Crises As such, investors should fade the narrative that the failure of the USD to appreciate amidst the latest North Korean imbroglio is a sign of some structural weakness. The greenback continues to underperform due to weak inflation in the U.S., a fleeting condition that our macro-economist colleagues expect to reverse. Mathieu Savary, BCA's currency strategist, believes that more upside exists for the USD regardless of the geopolitical outcome: Chart 5Gold Loves Geopolitical Crises Chart 6DXY Is Cheap... Chart 7...But The Euro Is Not First, the dollar is currently trading at its deepest discount to the BCA Foreign Exchange Service augmented interest rate parity model since 2010 (Chart 6). The euro, which accounts for 58% of the DXY index, is its mirror image, being now overvalued by two sigma, the most since 2010 (Chart 7). Second, bullish euro bets will dissipate as Europe's economic outperformance versus the U.S. fades. Financial conditions have massively eased in the U.S., while they have tightened in Europe, resulting in the biggest upswing on euro area growth relative to the U.S. in over two years (Chart 8). Such an economic outperformance by the U.S. should lead to a strengthening greenback (Chart 9).8 Chart 8Easing Versus Tightening FCI Chart 9PMIs Point To USD Rally Our second attempt to quantify safe-haven assets, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," concluded that U.S. Treasurys, Swiss bonds, and Japanese bonds are the best performers in times of crisis.9 We considered 65 assets10 (Table 2) with five different methodologies and back-tested them empirically within the context of 25 financial and geopolitical events since January 1988. Some of these assets have been proven to perform as safe havens by previous academic research, some are commonly utilized in investment strategies, and others could provide alternatives (see Box 1 for further details). Table 2Scrutinizing The World For Safe Havens This report demystifies four key issues related to safe havens: Part I identifies what qualifies as a safe-haven asset. Unsurprisingly, the best performers are U.S. Treasurys along with Swiss and Japanese bonds due to their currency effects. Part II examines if safe havens change over time. We find that gold and Treasurys have changed places as safe havens, and that JGBs and Swiss bonds have a long history as portfolio protectors. Part III breaks down safe havens through an event analysis. We look at the country of origin, the nature of the crisis, and whether the risk is a "black swan" or "red herring" - two classifications of events that BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has established - all of which have an impact on their performance. But red herrings or black swans are only defined after the fact, thus requiring geopolitical analysis or market timing indicators to be able to act on them. Part IV demonstrates that timing plays a crucial part when investing in safe havens as their performance is coincident with that of equities. Box 1 Safe Havens - A Literature Review In a previous Geopolitical Strategy Special Report published in November 2015, it was established that shifts in economic and political regimes alter investors' preferences for safe-haven assets, and that Swiss bonds and U.S. 10-year Treasurys were at the top of that list.11 Also, statistical methods were used to demonstrate that gold had acted as a safe haven from the 1970s to the early 90s, but has since lost its status due in part to a new era of looming deflationary risks. Li and Lucey (2013) have identified a pattern in precious metals, through a series of quarterly rolling regressions testing the significance of the 1st, 5th and 10th percentile movements in U.S. equity movements against safe-haven assets, catching extreme negative events. For instance, the 1st percentile captures the very worst corrections that have occurred, the one that represent the bottom 1% of the equity performances. The 5th and 10th percentiles represent the 5% and 10% lowest returns for equities, respectively. The authors demonstrated that silver, platinum and palladium act as safe havens when gold does not.12 Similarly, Bauer and McDermott (2013) examined the 1st, 5th and 10th percentile movements in U.S. equity movements and proved that both gold and U.S. Treasurys can serve as safe havens, but that gold has the best record in times of extreme financial stress.13 Baele et al. (2015) concentrated on flight-to-safety episodes, which they characterized as events in which the VIX, TED spreads and a basket of CHF, JPY, and USD all increased drastically.14 They found that during flight-to-safety episodes, large cap stocks outperform small caps, precious metal and gold prices (measured in dollars) increase slightly, while bond returns exceed those of the equity market by 2.5-4 percentage points. Baur and Glover (2012) provide further evidence that gold can no longer be utilized as a safe haven due to increased speculation and hedging. Their main finding is that gold cannot be both an investment and a safe-haven asset. That is, gold can only be effective as a safe haven if the periods prior to the event had not generated significant investment demand for gold.15 Using high-frequency exchange rate data, Ranaldo and Soederlind (2010) conclude that the CHF, EUR and JPY have significant safe-haven characteristics, but not the GBP.16 The strongest safe havens are identified as the CHF and JPY, but the returns are partly reversed after a day of safe-haven protection. They also find that the nature of the crisis has a significant effect on safe-haven properties. For instance, a financial crisis and a natural disaster produced drastically different outcomes for the yen. Part I - Safety In Numbers Our first step in identifying safe-haven assets was to review each asset's performance against equities in times of crisis. As such, we conducted a series of threshold regressions to generate a list of true safe-haven assets - assets that have a statistically significant positive performance in times of turmoil. Our method is explained as follows: Step 1 - Percentile Dummies: Following methods from Li and Lucey (2013) and Bauer and McDermott (2013), we created dummy variables for the 1st, 5th and 10th percentile of the S&P 500 daily total returns since 1988. We then multiplied each of these dummies by their corresponding stock returns (see Box 1 for further detail). Step 2 - Regressions: Using the 64 potential safe-haven assets, we ran a series of regressions both in USD and the local currency, testing each asset's returns explained by the three percentile dummies.17 Step 3 - Identifying Safe Havens: We then quantified strong safe-havens as assets having significant coefficients for all three return thresholds (1st, 5th and 10th percentile of the S&P 500 daily total returns). Results - Seek Refuge In Currencies And Government Bonds: Our quantitative results are mainly consistent with what others have found in the past: the Japanese yen and most G10 government bonds are safe havens. Table 3 shows the safe-haven assets that generated negative coefficients versus equities for all three threshold percentiles. Table 3Seeking Protection Against Corrections In our threshold regressions expressed in USD terms, we found that the Japanese yen, Quality Stocks,18 and Japanese, Swiss and U.S. bonds acted as strong safe havens. Currencies play a crucial part in the performance of safe havens. In fact, in local-currency terms, a series of G10 government bonds (U.S., Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.) proved to be the most useful safe havens. In sum, true or strong safe havens are government bonds that have currencies that add to positive returns during times of crisis. Unsurprisingly, this select group of strong safe-haven assets is comprised of U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds. Quality Stocks did provide positive and statistically significant results, but the returns were very low - for this reason, we excluded them from our basket of strong safe havens. While gold, the Swiss franc, and the U.S. dollar did generate positive returns during times of crisis, they failed to generate statistically significant results at all three thresholds. Bottom Line: Based on our econometric work, most G10 government bonds can act as safe havens. But due to strong currency effects, our models favor what are already commonly known as safe havens: U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds. Simply put, the difference between this select group and other G10 bonds is that their currencies rise or are stable during turmoil, while the currencies of the other G10 bonds do not. Part II - Are Safe Havens Like Fine Wines? U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds were not always the top assets providing protection against the downside in equities, however. To determine whether safe-haven properties change, we examined the evolution of the relationship between safe havens and U.S. equity markets over time with the following model: Step 1 - Rolling Regressions: Considering the results obtained in Part I, we restricted our sample to G10 governments in USD and local-currency terms, Quality Stocks, gold, JPY, EUR, and USD for this statistical procedure. We put these remaining assets, both in USD and local-currency terms, through a series of 1-year rolling regressions.19 Step 2 - Identifying Trends: Each regression generated a coefficient that explained the relationship between equities and safe havens (B1). We created a new time series by collecting the coefficients for each data point and smoothing them using a five-year moving average, thus depicting a long-term pattern in the evolution of safe havens. Results - A Regime Shift In Gold And Treasurys: Our findings show that safe-haven assets fall in and out of favor through time (Charts 10A, B & C). Most striking are the changes in U.S. Treasurys and gold. Only after 2000 did Treasurys start providing a good hedge for equity corrections. The contrary is true for gold - it acted as one of the most secure investments during corrections until that time, but has since become correlated with S&P 500 total returns. That said, gold's coefficient has been falling closer to zero lately, illustrating that it could soon resurface as a proper safe haven, especially if deflation risks begin to dissipate. Given that this is precisely the conclusion stated by our colleague Peter Berezin - BCA's Chief Global Strategist - and our own political analysis, we suspect that gold may be resurrected as a safe haven very soon.20 Chart 10ASafe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Chart 10BSafe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Chart 10CSafe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Another important finding is that the currency effect plays a key role during recent risk-off periods (Charts 11A & B). The best protector currencies are the ones that are negatively correlated with equity returns. According to our results, the CHF and the JPY have generally been risk-off currencies, while the USD has only been one since 2007, switching places with the euro. This reinforces the case for U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds, which are supported by risk-off currencies. Chart 11ACurrencies Are Difference Makers Chart 11BCurrencies Are Difference Makers Bottom Line: Safe havens change over time. Gold fell out of favor due to global deflationary dynamics. With inflation on the horizon, we will keep monitoring the relationship between gold and equities for a possible return of the yellow metal as a safe haven. Since the July 4 North Korean ICBM test, for example, gold has rallied 4.8%. Part III - Red Herrings And Black Swans Since 1988, we identified 25 economic and (geo)political events that generated instant panic or acute uncertainty in the media and financial markets.21 We analyzed the short-term reactions of the safe-haven assets, both in USD and local-currency terms. This methodology allowed for the deconstruction of the impact of the events by the following factors: Country of origin of the crisis, the nature of the crisis, and whether the event was a "red herring" or a "black swan." Generally speaking, a red herring event is a crisis of some sort with little lasting financial impact. A black swan, on the other hand, is an event that has a very low probability of occurring but has a pronounced market impact if it does. Quantitatively, our definition of a black swan is an event that produces an immediate negative response in the S&P 500 below -1%, while creating a rise in either U.S., Japanese, or Swiss government bonds above 0% (Table 4). Of course, determining which event is a red herring or a black swan is only obvious post-facto and thus requires thorough geopolitical analysis. Table 4Understanding The Crises Results - Red Herrings And Black Swans Matter: Our event analysis solidifies our findings with regards to U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds, but also builds a case for some European bonds as well as gold during black swan events. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Fade The Red Herrings: Out of the sixteen geopolitical events, ten were identified as red herrings, in which safe havens underperformed the equity market. This, then, suggests that it is not always beneficial to buy safe-haven assets when tensions are rising. What is interpreted as a major geopolitical crisis - say, Ukraine in 2014 or Greece in 2015 - often ends up being a "red herring." Geopolitical Risk = Gold: Geopolitical black swan events, on the other hand, have a significant, negative impact on the market. During these events, gold emerges as the strongest hedge against a downturn in equities. U.S. Treasurys And The Swiss Franc Provide A Baseline: Under all black swan events considered - geopolitical and non-geopolitical - U.S. Treasurys and the Swiss franc had the strongest performance, generating positive returns on the day of the stock market crash in 85% of the cases. G10 Government Bonds Will Also Do: German, Dutch, Swiss and Swedish government bonds also provided protection during black swan events in local and common-currency terms, albeit to a lesser extent. U.S. And Swiss Bonds Outperform During Financial Episodes: During black swan financial crises, Swiss and U.S. government bonds stand out as the best safe havens due to their capacity to generate positive returns both in USD and local-currency terms in eight out of the nine examined crashes. Other findings that are interesting, yet less robust due to a limited sample size, include: When the crisis originated on U.S. soil, U.S. Treasurys and the dollar performed relatively poorly compared to other safe-haven assets. This is a somewhat surprising finding, as most investors believe that U.S. assets rally even at a time of U.S.-based crises, such as the 2011 budget crisis. We show that they may perform well, but in USD, non-U.S. based assets do better. When the crisis originated in Europe, European bonds performed very well both in USD and local-currency terms. When the crisis originated in Europe, Swiss and U.K. government bonds performed poorly in USD terms, but offered strong protection in local-currency terms. When the crisis originated in Russia, precious metals acted as a poor hedge. Bottom Line: It is crucial to gain an understanding of the nature of any potential crisis. Red herrings should always be faded, not hedged against, as they produce poor results in safe-haven assets. U.S. Treasurys, Swiss and Japanese government bonds have been very consistent safe-haven assets during previous periods of acute risk. Part IV: Timing Is Everything As a final step in our quantitative approach, we put our results through numerous timing exercises to test how the assets would perform in real time. Based on our Risk Asset Spectrum (Diagram 1), which summarizes our findings, one could argue that investing in times of crisis simply boils down to buying an equal-weighted basket of U.S. Treasurys, Swiss, and Japanese government bonds. Although this is technically true, such a strategy would require perfect foresight, unparalleled timing, or dumb luck - since black swan events are, by definition, very difficult to predict. Diagram 1Risk Asset Spectrum Proof Of The Ultimate Safe Haven: The first experiment we conducted was to illustrate how powerful safe havens can be when timed perfectly in a trading strategy. We started off by comparing two baskets. The first was a benchmark portfolio comprised of 60% U.S. equities and 40% U.S. bonds. The other contained the same two assets, but with 100% allocated to a basket comprised of U.S. Treasurys, Swiss, and Japanese government bonds during times of negative returns for equities. Of course, this strategy is not realistic and would be impossible to implement, since the trading rule depends on future events. But as Chart 12 shows, if one were able to predict every single period of negative returns for global equities and hold safe-haven assets instead, the trading rule would outperform almost 10-fold. Chart 12Safe Havens Work Wonders With Perfect Information... One-Month Lag Is Already Too Late: Repeating the same exercise, but with a one-month lag in the execution, produces drastically different results. More specifically, whenever the previous month's equity return is negative (t=0), the portfolio allocates 100% to a single safe-haven asset for the current month (t=1), otherwise it keeps the allocation identical to that of the benchmark. The rationale for using such a simple rule is that average investors are generally late in identifying a crisis and only react once they have validation that the market is in a correction. Chart 13 shows that being late by one month changes the performance of the safe haven basket from astronomically outperforming the benchmark to underperforming it. Chart 13... But Timing Is Everything Reaction Is Key: As a final timing exercise, we analyzed the reaction function of our assets to see how quickly they react after the correction in equities begins (Chart 14). Unsurprisingly, the top assets that we identified start appreciating as soon as the crisis hits (t=0). Gold is, on average, the quickest asset to react from investors seeking refuge. Swiss bonds come in as a close second, almost mirroring gold during the first few days of the correction. But both assets start to flatten out and even roll over after a few days. Japanese bonds react slightly later than gold and Swiss bonds, but keep increasing for a longer period of time and start plateauing around the 30th day after the crisis. U.S. Treasurys and Quality Stocks, on the other hand, remain rather flat and constant over the short term. These results attest to the importance of timing the crisis using the best safe-haven assets. Chart 14Safe Havens React Instantly Bottom Line: Timing plays a crucial part in investing in safe-haven assets, as their performance is coincident to that of equities. Investment Implications: Is Pyongyang A Red Herring Or A Black Swan? The results of our quantitative analysis are clear: hedging geopolitical risk depends on whether it is persistent or fleeting. So, is Pyongyang a red herring or a black swan? From our geopolitical analysis we make three key conclusions: The U.S. is not likely to preemptively attack North Korea; However, the U.S. has an interest in signaling that it may conduct precisely such an attack; Brinkmanship could last for a long time. Even if the risk of a U.S. attack against North Korea itself is a red herring, the crisis itself is not. In fact, between now and when a negotiated solution emerges, investors may face several new crises, which may include limited military attacks or skirmishes. While markets have faded such North Korean provocations in the past, the current context is clearly different. As such, we would suggest that investors hedge the risk with an equally-weighted basket of Swiss bonds and gold. Even though a "buy and hold" strategy with such a "Doomsday Basket" will likely underperform the market if tensions with North Korea subside, we are betting that it may take time for the U.S. and North Korea to get to the negotiating table. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com David Boucher, Associate Vice President Quantitative Strategist davidb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 6, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. We upgraded North Korea to the status of a genuine market-relevant risk in "North Korea: A Red Herring No More?" in Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threat'," dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2017 available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0," dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. In particular, we argued, "the current saber-rattling is carefully orchestrated. But North Korea can no longer be consigned to the realm of satire. The very fact that the U.S. administration is adopting greater pressure tactics makes this year a heightened risk period. Investors should be especially wary of any missile tests that reveal North Korean long-range capabilities to be substantially better than is known to be the case today." Then, on May 13 and July 4, North Korea conducted its first ICBM launches; the UN Security Council agreed to a new round of even tighter economic sanctions on August 5; and the U.S. and North Korea engaged in an alarming war of words. 6 Specifically, we wrote: "Diplomacy is the only real option. And in fact it is already taking shape. The theatrics of the past few weeks mark the opening gestures. And theatrics are a crucial part of any foreign policy. The international context is looking remarkably similar to the lead-up to the new round of Iranian negotiations in 2012. The United States pounded the war drums and built up the potential for war before coordinating a large, multilateral sanctions-regime and then engaging in talks with real willingness to compromise." 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen," dated August 11, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 10 Forty-one assets were denominated in USD only, while G10 bonds, Credit Suisse Swiss Real Estate Fund, and European 600 real estate were used both in local-currency terms and USD, for a total of 65 assets. 11 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Sile Li and Brian M. Lucey, "What precious metals act as safe havens, and when? Some U.S. evidence," Applied Economic Letters, 2013. 13 Dirk G. Bauer and Thomas K.J. McDermott, "Financial Turmoil and Safe Haven Assets," 2013. 14 Lieven Baele, Geer Bekaert, Koen Inghelbrecht and Min Wei, "Flights to Safety," National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 230, 2015. 15 Dirk G. Baur and Kristoffer J. Glover, "The Destruction of Safe Haven Asset?,"2012. 16 Angelo Ranaldo and Paul Soederlind, "Safe Haven Currencies," Review of Finance, Vol. 10, pp. 385-407, 2010. 18 Quality stocks are defensive equity plays with high, steady earnings with an elevated return on investments. They are estimated by Deutsche Bank's Factor Index Equity Quality Excess Return in USD. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Throwing The Baby (Globalization) Out With The Bath Water (Deflation)," dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Secular Bottom In Inflation," dated July 28, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 21 Since we were interested in the immediate, often unexpected, response to the event, we did not include economic recessions in our event analysis.
Highlights A number forward-looking indicators for EM corporate profits point to a major deceleration in the next several months, and potentially a contraction early next year. The most reliable forward-looking indicators for EM EPS have been EM/China narrow and broad money growth and they herald a bearish outlook for EM EPS. We continue deciphering the differences between China's various money and credit aggregates. Irrespective of which money measure we use, and regardless of their past track record, all of them are currently extremely weak and point to a major and imminent slump in China's growth in the next six to 12 months. We recommend shifting the underweight EM corporate and sovereign credit position versus U.S. high-yield to underweight versus U.S. investment-grade corporate credit. Feature Chart I-1Asian Exports And EM EPS The recovery in EM earnings per share (EPS) has been instrumental to the EM stock rally this year. As such, the equity strategy at the moment hinges on the outlook for corporate profits. In this report, we revisit coincident and leading indicators for EM profits. At the moment, EM corporate profit growth still appears robust, though several forward-looking indicators point to a major deceleration in the next several months, and potentially a contraction early next year. Korean and Taiwanese exports can be used as proxy for global trade. The latest data for July reveal that the sum of Taiwanese exports and Korean total exports excluding vessels has rolled over (Chart I-1). Historically, the U.S. dollar values of both economies' exports have correlated with EM EPS, and Chart I-1 entails that EM EPS growth will roll over very soon. The reason why we exclude vessel exports in the case of Korea is because vessel shipments are one-off occurrences and when they take place, they distort export growth. This was the case in the last several months - vessel (shipbuilding) exports surged by 75% from a year ago, distorting the annual growth rate of total exports. Overall, Korea's and Taiwan's overseas shipments in the past three months have averaged about 10%, which is lower than the mid-teen growth rates recorded earlier this year. In China, export growth is close to 9% in the past three months, and it is also rolling over. On a similar note, Korea's and Taiwanese shipments-to-inventory ratios lead EM EPS cycles, and they are presently sending a downbeat message (Chart I-2). China's import growth has relapsed, as suggested by both Chinese trade data and their counterparties export data to China (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Asia's Shipment-To-Inventory Ratios And EM EPS Chart I-3Exports To China And Chinese Imports The recovery in Chinese imports has been responsible for a considerable part of the recovery in global trade. Importantly, Chinese import cycles correlate very well with EM EPS growth (Chart I-4). The key pillar of our view remains that Chinese imports will contract going forward, which will depress both advanced and developing countries' shipments to China. Exports to China are much more important for EM than DM economies, and deteriorating sales to China will weigh considerably on EM profits and currencies. The most reliable forward-looking indicators for EM EPS have been EM/China narrow and broad money growth. Chart I-5A and Chart I-5B demonstrate that both EM narrow (M1) growth and China's broad money impulse (the second derivative) - herald a major slump in EM EPS. This is the main reason behind our negative stance on EM share prices and other risk assets. Chart I-4Chinese Imports And EM EPS Chart I-5AChina Broad Money Impulse And EM EPS Chart I-5BEM Narrow Money And EM EPS Both narrow and broad money growth in China have already relapsed, and it is a matter of time until economic growth and imports downshift enough to produce a major selloff in EM risk assets. We discuss China's monetary aggregates in the section below. Finally, if Chinese imports and commodities prices relapse, any reasonable strength in DM domestic demand will not be sufficient to preclude a meaningful EM slowdown. The basis is that exports to the U.S. and EU only make up 7% of GDP for China, 8% for Korea and 11% for Taiwan. While exports to China account for 10% of Korean GDP and 15% of Taiwanese GDP. The same holds true for most East Asian countries. With the exceptions of India and Turkey, non-Asian EM countries are primarily commodities producers. These two have their own idiosyncratic problems. Most of our analysis is not applicable to smaller central European economies that are leveraged to the EU business cycle. That said, neither Turkey, India, nor central European markets have large enough financial markets to make a difference in the EM benchmarks. The above is the primary reason behind our bearish view on EM growth and profits. That said, there are a few other interesting considerations regarding EM corporate profits dynamics. First, EM share prices lead EM EPS by six to nine months. Therefore, to be bullish on EM stocks, it is not sufficient to expect EM EPS growth to be robust over the next three months. Rather, to be bullish on EM stocks at the current juncture, one should have a bullish view on EM EPS by the end of this year and into the early part of 2018. Consistently, we believe that EM EPS growth will decelerate materially by the end of this year and shrink in the early part of 2018. Second, the top-line shrinkage in 2015 and the consequent recovery for EM exporters has been mostly driven by prices rather than volumes. Chart I-6A illustrate that Korean, Taiwanese and Chinese manufacturing production growth is rather muted. Chart I-6ACorporate Pricing Power Chart I-6BAsian Manufacturing Production Price fluctuations affect profits much more than output volume changes. Therefore, if global tradable goods prices deflate - at the moment they have rolled over (Chart I-6B) - EM EPS will contract materially. Third, in EM excluding China, Korea and Taiwan, there has been little economic recovery, as evidenced by Chart I-7. Along the same lines, the latest (July) manufacturing PMI for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan has dropped below the crucial 50 line (Chart I-7, bottom panel). This and the majority of other economic aggregates we use are equity market-cap weighted averages, so they are relevant to investors. This corroborates the fact that outside China, Korea and Taiwan there has been little genuine growth improvement in EM domestic demand - despite the decent recovery in global trade. This challenges the prevailing widespread consensus of a synchronized global economic recovery/expansion. This is also consistent with the fact that the overwhelming EM profit recovery has occurred in technology and resource sectors while domestic sectors have not seen much of corporate earnings recovery (Chart I-8). Chart I-7EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##No Strong Recovery Chart I-8EM Sectors' EPS: Exporters ##br##Have Outperformed Domestic Finally, bottom-up equity analysts have recently downgraded their EPS estimates for listed EM companies (Chart I-9). Typically, analysts alter their forecasts simultaneously with swings in share prices. Hence, the latest decoupling is puzzling. Chart I-9EM EPS And Analysts' Net Revisions Notably, EM net EPS revisions have failed to move into positive territory in the past 7 years. This entails that analysts' expectations have been chronically high in recent years, and/or that companies have failed to deliver profits that match these projections. Bottom Line: The EM EPS outlook is downbeat, and listed companies profits will likely contract early next year. Deciphering China's Money Puzzle Based on our assessment of multiple measures, our conclusion with respect to Chinese broad money growth is as follows: Irrespective of which measure we use, and regardless of their individual past track records, all Chinese monetary growth aggregates are currently weak (Chart 10), and point to a major and imminent slump in China's growth in the next six to 12 months. In recent weeks, we have been working to understand differences among various measures of money growth in China. Our motivation is because neither M2 nor total social financing and fiscal spending - variables that we relied on last year - did a good job of forecasting the duration and magnitude of China's economic and profit revival in the past 12 months. In our July 26 report,1 we introduced the concept of broad money calculated using commercial banks' assets. We called it credit-money. This week, we discuss a different broad money calculation based on commercial banks' liabilities, and refer to it as deposit-money. Deposit-money is an aggregate of non-financial companies' time and demand deposits, household deposits, transferable and other deposits, other liabilities, bonds issued and liabilities to non-depository financial corporations. This measure is broader than official broad money (M2) because the latter includes only non-financial companies' time and demand deposits, household deposits and some of liabilities to non-depository financial corporations. In brief, our deposit-money calculation is more comprehensive than the official broad money figures (M2). In turn, banks' credit-money is the sum of commercial banks' claims on companies, households, non-bank financial institutions and all levels of government, as well as banks' foreign assets. Also, we deduct government deposits at the central bank (see July 26 Emerging Markets Strategy report1 for more details). Chart I-10 illustrates the differences between credit-money, deposit-money, total social financing and M2. Based on our calculations, deposit-money grew faster in 2015-'16 than both M2 and total social financing. Yet its current and ongoing slowdown is as bad as that of credit-money or M2. Chart I-10Dichotomy Among Various Money And Credit Aggregates In China The reason why M2 growth has lagged behind deposit-money growth since the middle of 2015 until now is the fact that the latter's components that are not included in the official M2 measure have outpaced M2 growth by a wide margin since late 2015. The main components of deposit-money are shown in Chart I-11. This is one of the main reasons why we missed the latest China-play rally - we relied on the official measure of money and credit published by the PBoC that has been much tamer than the broader money and credit, as banks have originated credit and hence money in a way that official monetary aggregates have not captured. In addition, banks' credit-money and deposit-money measures should theoretically be identical, but this has not been the case in China in recent years. Deposit-money is larger and it may well be more comprehensive than credit-money (Chart I-12). Chart I-11China: Components Of Deposit-Money Aggregate Chart I-12The Outstanding Stock And Flow Of Money Understanding these discrepancies is an ongoing work-in-progress for us, and we will be refining these measures going forward. For now, we would say that these differences are probably due to banks' efforts to misrepresent/hide their assets and liabilities to meet the regulatory ratios and avoid penalties, as well as maximize short-term profits. All that said, the gaps between M2 and deposit-money has recently narrowed: both deposit-money and M2 growth and their impulses are at all-time lows (Chart I-13). Furthermore, we expect deposit-money to slow further because of the lagged impact of higher interest rates and regulatory tightening that is intended to curb commercial banks' ability to originate more money via shadow banking activities. Finally, as can be seen from Chart I-14A, Chart I-14B and Chart I-15, deposit-money's impulse - its second derivative - leads many cyclical economic variables such as nominal GDP, producer prices, freight index, and imports. Chart I-13China: Two Measures Of Broad Money Chart I-14ADeposit-Money Leads Real Business Cycle Chart I-14BDeposit-Money Leads Real Business Cycle There are several other data points from China's real economy that portend developing weakness. Specifically, car sales growth has almost ground to a halt, real estate floor space sold and started are decelerating (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Deposit-Money Leads Metals Prices And Construction Chart I-16China: More Signs Of Slowdown Bottom Line: Regardless of which money measure we use, and regardless of their past track record, all of them are currently weak and point to a major and imminent slump in China's growth in the next six to 12 months. This gives us confidence in reiterating our negative view on China plays (including commodities) and EM. Credit Markets Strategy We have been recommending a strategy of shorting/underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit versus U.S. high-yield (HY) credit and this strategy has shown strong performance, producing 15% gains with low volatility since August 2011 (Chart I-17). However, today we recommend shifting the underweight EM corporate and sovereign credit position from U.S. HY to U.S. investment grade (IG) corporate credit. The primary reason is that credit spreads are extremely tight and odds favor credit spreads widening in both U.S. and EM. Chart I-18 shows that when U.S. TIPS yields rise U.S. IG usually outperforms U.S. HY on an excess return basis. We expect U.S. Treasurys and TIPS yields to grind higher in the near term because U.S. growth and inflation are much stronger than the bond market is currently pricing in. Chart I-17Book Gains On This Strategy Chart I-18Higher U.S. Bond (TIPS) Yields Warrant Rotation Rising U.S. bond yields also warrants EM credit underperformance versus U.S. IG because the EM credit benchmark is riskier than U.S. IG. While the two segments have similar durations, the duration times spread measure of risk is greater for EM credit. Furthermore, U.S. HY spreads have narrowed versus both EM sovereign and corporate spreads since early 2016 (Chart I-19, top panel). Hence, there is little value favoring the former versus EM credit. In contrast, U.S. IG spreads versus both EM sovereign and corporate credit are appealing historically (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Therefore, there is a valuation aspect to this strategy change. Relative spread differences have historically correlated quite well with the subsequent 12-month return. Given where relative spreads are, the subsequent 12-month return for investing in U.S. IG relative EM credit is positive (Chart I-20, top panel) but it is negative for investing in U.S. HY versus EM credit (Chart I-20, bottom panel). Chart I-19EM Credit Offers Value Relative ##br##To U.S. HY But Not Versus U.S. IG Chart I-20Projected Returns Of EM Credit ##br##To Both U.S. IG And HY As to the rationale of favoring U.S. credit to EM credit, this is consistent with our theme that the growth outlook, corporate leverage, and health of the banking system are in much better shape in the U.S. than in EM. Bottom Line: Book profits on the short EM sovereign and corporate credit / long U.S. HY credit position. Institute a new position: short EM sovereign and corporate credit / long U.S. IG corporate credit. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Follow The Money, Not The Crowd", dated July 26, 2017, link available on page 18. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
U.S. equities, despite some geopolitically-imposed wobbles last week, remain very near all-time highs. Still, the trajectory for the S&P 500 is upward. A multiple expansion phase explains the bulk of equity returns in this bull market; now it is time for profits to shine (second panel). Three key factors drive our sanguine profit view: first, financials and energy will command a larger slice of the earnings pie, a backdrop not yet discounted in sell-side analysts' estimates (please see Table 2 from the July 24th Weekly Report). Second, irrespective of where the U.S. dollar heads in the coming months, SPX earnings will benefit from positive FX translation gains in Q3 and Q4. Finally, ramping sales and the accompanying operating leverage will drive profits higher; muted wage inflation should amplify near-term operating leverage (third panel). Our optimistic profit view is shared by the sell-side, who forecast record profit margins in the coming 12 months (bottom panel). Nevertheless, a straight line higher seems like an unlikely scenario for equity markets and investors may be wise to take advantage of extremely low pricing of risk insurance. Still, we would be buyers of any significant dips and remain comfortable with our overall early-cyclical portfolio exposure, while simultaneously maintaining a bit of defense in the form of our overweight consumer staples and underweight tech positions.
Highlights Duration: An environment characterized by strong global growth and a weak dollar is very bearish for U.S. bonds. According to our model, fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.6%. Stay at below-benchmark duration. The Fed & The Dollar: A weak dollar eases financial conditions and supports higher core goods inflation. All else equal, this will strengthen the Fed's hawkish resolve in the near term. However, a rebound in core services (excluding shelter and medical care) inflation will be necessary for core inflation to reach the Fed's target on a sustained basis. USD Sovereigns: USD-denominated sovereigns are not attractive compared to domestic Baa-rated U.S. credit. At the country level, Finland, Mexico and Colombia offer the most attractive spreads and Finnish debt offers the best risk/reward trade-off. Feature Please note there will be no U.S. Bond Strategy report next week. Our regular publishing schedule will resume on August 29, 2017. Chart 1Firm Growth, Despite Weaker $ Escalating tension between the U.S. and North Korea captured the market's attention during the past week, causing investors to ignore what in our view is a more important economic development: Global growth has managed to stay firm even in the face of significant dollar depreciation. Not only does this break the pattern of the past few years when periods of substantial dollar weakness were associated with slowing global growth (Chart 1), but in our view it sends a very bearish signal for U.S. bonds. Above all else, a weak dollar amidst strong global growth suggests that the breadth of the economic recovery is improving. This intuition is confirmed by the fact that our Global Manufacturing PMI Diffusion Index, which measures the net percentage of countries with PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line, is fast approaching 90% (Chart 2). Not only that, but PMIs from the four most important economic blocs are all showing signs of strength. Both the Eurozone and Japanese PMIs are holding firm at high levels, while the U.S. and Chinese PMIs have recently reversed their year-to-date downtrends (Chart 2, bottom two panels). Why is the breadth of the global recovery important? Precisely because a more synchronized recovery prevents the dollar from appreciating too quickly. All else equal, a stronger dollar causes investors to reduce their forecasts for future U.S. growth and inflation. This implies a slower expected pace of rate hikes and lower Treasury yields. Conversely, a weaker dollar causes investors to revise up their growth and inflation forecasts, leading to a quicker expected pace of rate hikes and higher yields. To capture the importance of both global growth and the exchange rate we turn to our 2-factor Treasury model (Chart 3). This is a simple model of the 10-year Treasury yield based on the Global PMI and bullish sentiment toward the dollar. A stronger Global PMI pressures the model's fair value higher, as does increasingly bearish dollar sentiment. Chart 2Synchronized Global Growth Chart 310-Year Treasury Yield Fair Value At present, the model pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.6%, meaning the current 10-year Treasury yield of 2.22% is 38 bps below fair value. This is the most expensive Treasuries have appeared on our model since the immediate aftermath of last year's Brexit vote. Political Uncertainty & Flights To Quality While our 2-factor model does a good job, there is one important driver of Treasury yields it does not capture. That is the tendency for political events to drive a flight to safety into Treasuries (Chart 4). Typically, if it is possible to identify a purely politically-driven flight to safety - one that is unlikely to exert a meaningful economic impact during the next 6-12 months - then the correct strategy is to heed our model's message and position for higher yields. This strategy worked out perfectly following the Brexit vote, and we anticipate it will work again this time around. Chart 4Policy Uncertainty Is A Driver Of Bond Yields With regards to the catalyst for last week's flight to safety, our Geopolitical Strategy service wrote in a recent Special Report1 that a pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korea is extremely unlikely. The theatrics of the past week demonstrate only that the U.S. needs to establish a "credible threat" if it wants to eventually open a new round of negotiations over North Korea - not unlike the Iranian nuclear negotiations of the past decade. Looking further down the road, if those talks eventually fail then the potential for military conflict is high. We therefore conclude that there is not much potential for U.S. / North Korean tensions to exert a meaningful economic impact during the next 6-12 months, and view the recent bond rally as an opportunity to position for sharply higher yields in the near-term. Bottom Line: An environment characterized by strong global growth and a weak dollar is very bearish for U.S. bonds. According to our model, fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.6%. Stay at below-benchmark duration. How The Fed Views A Weaker Dollar Financial Conditions Chart 5Weak $ Eases Financial Conditions The Fed views the 7% year-to-date depreciation of the dollar as a significant easing of financial conditions. In fact, most broad indicators of financial conditions have eased this year, even though the Fed has lifted rates by 75 bps since December (Chart 5). In the Fed's framework, this means that the pace of rate hikes might need to increase in order to tighten financial conditions as much as desired. New York Fed President William Dudley summed up this approach in a 2015 speech:2 All else equal, if financial conditions tighten sharply, then we are likely to proceed more slowly. In contrast, if financial conditions were not to tighten at all or only very little, then - assuming the economic outlook hadn't changed significantly - we would likely have to move more quickly. In the end, we will adjust the policy stance to support financial market conditions that we deem are most consistent with our employment and inflation objectives. Of course, all else is not equal. Core inflation has disappointed so far this year and our current assessment of monetary policy is that while the Fed will take action to start shrinking its balance sheet next month, rate hikes are on hold until inflation turns higher. We remain optimistic that inflation will show sufficient strength in time for the Fed to lift rates in December.3 Inflation Chart 6Weak $ = Higher Inflation A weaker dollar also increases the Fed's confidence that inflation will head higher. Although so far we have not seen much evidence that this is occurring. Last Friday's July CPI report showed that core CPI rose only 0.1% month-over-month, while the year-over-year growth rate held flat at 1.7%. However, evidence is mounting that core inflation will soon put in a bottom. Our CPI diffusion index bounced back into positive territory in July (Chart 6) and our PCE diffusion index is at its highest level since last October.4 Both of these measures have excellent track records capturing the near-term swings in core inflation. The year-to-date weakness in the dollar has led to a surge in import prices. Stronger import prices will soon translate into higher core goods inflation (Chart 6, panels 2 and 3). Unfortunately, any increase in core goods inflation is unlikely to be sustained beyond the next 12 months. If the year-to-date dollar weakness starts to reverse, as our currency strategists anticipate,5 then import prices will decline anew. Eventually, this will translate into a deceleration in core goods inflation. For core inflation to sustainably reach the Fed's target, improvement in the lagging core services (excluding shelter and medical care) component will be required. Historically, this component is the most tightly linked to wage growth (Chart 6, bottom panel). A Rising Wage Growth Environment Two related methods do an excellent job predicting the direction of wage growth on a cyclical horizon. First, wages accelerate when the unemployment rate is falling, and second, wages accelerate when the prime-age (25-54) employment-to-population ratio is increasing. The top two panels of Chart 7 show the relationship between wage growth and the unemployment rate. The shaded regions in both panels correspond to periods when the unemployment rate is falling. As can be seen, wage growth always rises during these periods. That being the case, we calculate that non-farm employment needs to grow by more than 125k per month (on average) for the unemployment rate to continue its downtrend, assuming the labor force participation rate remains flat. Chart 7A Rising Wage Environment Of course it is not guaranteed that the labor force participation rate will stay flat. In a recent report we discussed the risk that a large cyclical increase in the participation rate might cause the unemployment rate to rise even as the economy continues to recover.6 This is why we also look at the shaded regions in the bottom two panels of Chart 7 and see that wages always rise during periods when the prime-age employment-to-population ratio is rising. By looking at the employment-to-population ratio instead of the unemployment rate we do not need to make an assumption about the trend in labor force participation. Using this method, we calculate that monthly employment growth must exceed 140k (on average) for the prime-age employment-to-population ratio to keep increasing. Non-farm payroll growth has averaged 184k per month so far in 2017 and averaged 187k per month in 2016. In other words, the U.S. jobs machine is running at a fairly steady pace, well above the thresholds we see as necessary for the recovery in wage growth to continue. Bottom Line: A weak dollar eases financial conditions and supports higher core goods inflation. All else equal, this will strengthen the Fed's hawkish resolve in the near term. However, a rebound in core services (excluding shelter and medical care) inflation will be necessary for core inflation to reach the Fed's target on a sustained basis. Sovereigns Not Buying The Weak Dollar USD-denominated sovereign bonds should benefit from a falling dollar. A weaker U.S. dollar makes the debt obligation cheaper in the issuing nation's local currency. However, the USD Sovereign index has actually underperformed the duration-matched Baa U.S. Credit index during the past six months, despite a depreciating U.S. currency (Chart 8). The duration-matched Baa-rated U.S. Credit index is the closest comparable we can find for the Sovereign index. It matches the Sovereign index in terms of duration and average credit rating, although historically it also delivers less excess return volatility (Chart 8, bottom panel). The two main factors we consider when deciding whether to add USD-denominated sovereigns to our portfolio at the expense of domestic U.S. credit are relative valuation and the outlook for the dollar. Historically, spread differential has been an important driver of relative returns. Attractive starting valuations even allowed sovereigns to outperform credit in 2014 and 2015 despite the dollar's surge. But at the moment, relative value is skewed heavily in favor of domestic U.S. credit (Chart 8, panel 1). Chart 8Sovereigns Too Expensive Added to that, with U.S. growth likely to remain strong and U.S. inflation poised to rebound, we think there is a high likelihood that the Fed will deliver more rate hikes than are currently priced in. This will make it difficult for the dollar to decline further from current levels. Taken together, poor relative valuation and a bullish outlook for the dollar lead us to continue underweighting USD-denominated sovereigns in our portfolio. The Sovereign Index: Country Breakdown Even though the overall index is unappealing, opportunities might still exist at the country level. Chart 9 shows a risk/reward picture for each country in the Bloomberg Barclays Sovereign index. The upper panels show the option-adjusted spread for each country relative to its duration and credit rating. The lower panels show a risk-adjusted spread on the y-axis. This risk-adjusted spread is the excess spread that remains after we adjust for differences in credit rating and duration using a cross-sectional model. What sticks out immediately is that Finland, Colombia and Mexico all offer compelling spreads after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration. The outlook for each country's currency versus the U.S. dollar is obviously also important. And in fact, the lower-right panel of Chart 9 shows that exchange rate volatility is positively correlated with the risk-adjusted spreads from our cross-sectional model. This implies that the extra compensation available in Mexican and Colombian sovereigns is probably compensation for assuming highly volatile currency risk. By this measure, Finland looks even more attractive given the euro's slightly lower volatility. Chart 9USD Sovereign Index: Country Breakdown Bottom Line: USD-denominated sovereigns are not attractive compared to domestic Baa-rated U.S. credit. Remain underweight. At the country level, Finland, Mexico and Colombia offer the most attractive spreads and Finnish debt offers the best risk/reward trade-off. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire", dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/dud150605 3 For further details on our outlook for the near-term path of monetary policy please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "On Hold, But Not For Long", dated August 8, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For a chart of the PCE diffusion index please see page 11 of U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "On Hold, But Not For Long", dated August 8, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen", dated August 11, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy We reiterate our recent overweight calls in banks/financials and energy. Chemicals/materials and telecom services no longer deserve a below benchmark allocation. Pharma/health care and utilities are now in the underweight column. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature Equities poked higher early last week on the eve of a robust earnings season as quarterly EPS vaulted to all-time highs (Chart 1), only to give up those gains and then some as North Korea jitters spoiled the party and ignited a mini selloff later in the week. While geopolitical uncertainty is dominating the news flow and an escalation is possible, we doubt North Korea tensions in isolation can significantly derail the stock market. With regard to the SPX's future return composition, our view remains intact that the onus falls on earnings to do the heavy lifting. In other words, the multiple expansion phase has mostly run its course, and explains the bulk of the board market's return since the 2011 trough (Chart 2). Now it is time for profits to shine. Chart 1Earnings-Led Advance Chart 2EPS Has To Do The Heavy Lifting Low double-digit EPS growth is likely in calendar 2018. Three key factors drive our sanguine profit view. First, as we posited three weeks ago, financials and energy will command a larger slice of the earnings pie, a backdrop not yet discounted in sell-side analysts' estimates (please see Table 2 from the July 24th Weekly Report). Second, irrespective of where the U.S. dollar heads in the coming months, SPX earnings will benefit from positive FX translation gains in Q3 and Q4. Finally, as the corporate sector flexes its operating leverage muscle, even modest sales growth will go a long way in terms of profit growth generation. Operating profit margins are poised to expand especially given muted wage inflation (Chart 3). Nevertheless, lack of profit validation is a key risk to our bullish S&P 500 thesis. Considering the post-GFC period, global growth scares (and resulting anemic earnings follow through) were the primary catalysts for the 2010, 2011 and late-2015/early-2016 equity corrections. The SPX fell 16%, 19% and 14% in each of those episodes, respectively. As a reminder, early in 2010 the Fed's QE ended and the ECB was scrambling to contain the government debt crisis as the Eurozone and the IMF bailed out Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In 2011, recession fears gripped the world economy, when then ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet tightened monetary policy twice in the euro area, while in the U.S. QE2 ended (Chart 4) and the debt ceiling fiasco spiraled out of control in the late-summer. More recently, a global manufacturing recession took hold in late-2015/early-2016 and the commodity drubbing re-concentrated investor's minds. Chart 3Margin Expansion Phase Chart 4Liquidity Removal = Market Turmoil A persistent flare up in geopolitical risk (i.e. in addition to the possible escalation of North Korea tensions) may lead consumers and CEOs alike to pull in their horns and short circuit the synchronized global economic recovery. Putting this risk in perspective is instructive. Table 2 documents the historical precedent of geopolitical crises since the mid-1950s, the maximum SPX drawdowns, and bid up of safe haven assets courtesy of our Geopolitical Strategy Service.1 Under such a backdrop, low-double digit EPS growth would be at risk, also causing some equity market consternation. Table 2Safe-Haven Demand Rises During Crises Table 2Safe-Haven Demand Rises During Crises, Continued Importantly, the Chinese Congress is quickly approaching in October and the dual tightening in Chinese monetary conditions (rising currency and interest rates) is unnerving. A related Chinese/EM relapse represents a risk to our bullish overall equity market thesis. Commodity producers/sectors would suffer a setback, jeopardizing the broad-based earnings recovery. Chart 5Mini Capex Upcycle Second, lack of tax reform is another risk we are closely monitoring that could put our upbeat SPX view offside. Lack of traction on this front as the year draws to a close will likely sabotage business confidence and put capex plans on the backburner anew. Moreover, this would shatter the confidence of small and medium businesses, especially given their greatest bugbears: high taxes and big government. Finally, repatriation tax holiday blues would cast a double dark shadow primarily over the tech and health care sectors: not only would shareholder-friendly activities like dividends and buybacks get postponed, but so would capex plans (Chart 5). One final risk worth monitoring is the handoff of liquidity to growth. Historically, there has been significant turmoil every time the Fed has removed balance sheet accommodation in the post-GFC era. We are in uncharted territory and the unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet, likely to be announced next month, may have unintended consequences. Unlike QE and QE2 ending, this time around the ECB is also on the cusp of removing balance sheet liquidity, at the margin. Chart 6A shows that the equity market may come under pressure if history at least rhymes. While we doubt that a larger than 10% correction is in the cards -- in line with the historical S&P 500 average drawdown during geopolitical crises (middle panel, Chart 6B)2 -- and our strategy will be to "buy the dip", the time to purchase portfolio insurance is now when the S&P 500 is near all-time highs, especially given the seasonally-weak and accident-prone months of September and October. Chart 6ADay Of Reckoning? Chart 6BAsset Class Returns During Crises We are comfortable with our overall early-cyclical portfolio exposure, while simultaneously maintaining a bit of defense in the form of our overweight consumer staples and underweight tech positions. This week we are recapping and reiterating all the major portfolio moves we have made since early May. Banking On Faster Growth Bank profit growth is supported by three main pillars: the quantity, price and quality of credit. All three are set to improve. Solid house price inflation and a tight labor market should ensure that consumer credit growth also firms (Chart 7A), pointing to the potential for a broad-based bank balance sheet expansion. Our U.S. bank loan growth model suggests that banks could enjoy the largest upswing in credit growth of the past 30 years (Chart 7B). Soaring consumer and business confidence, rising corporate profits and a potential capital spending revival are the key model drivers. BCA's view is that a better economy and rising inflation will materialize in the back half of the year, and serve as a catalyst to higher interest rates and a steeper yield curve. Banks profit from overall rising interest rates in two ways: reinvesting at higher yields and assets repricing at a faster pace than deposits. Thus, a steepening yield curve would signal that bank profit estimates should experience a re-rating, provided the yield lift at the long end of the curve was gradual and did not choke off growth via a sudden spike (Chart 7A). Chart 7ABanks Flexing Their Muscle Chart 7BBCA Bank Loans & Leases Growth Model In terms of credit quality, non-performing loans and charge-offs are sinking from already low levels. It would take a significant deterioration in the labor market to warn that credit quality was about to become a profit drag. Importantly, the reserve coverage ratio has climbed to near 100%, as non-current loans have fallen faster than banks have released reserves. Historically, credit quality improvement has been positively correlated with rising valuations (Chart 7A). Finally, even a modest easing in the regulatory backdrop along with a more shareholder friendly outlook now that the banks aced the Fed's stress test should help unlock excellent value in bank equities. Bottom Line: We reiterate our overweight stance in the S&P banks index that also lifted the S&P financials sector to overweight. Buy Energy Stocks Chart 8Energy EPS Model Says Buy Energy equities are down roughly 20% year-to-date versus the broad market, driven by rising U.S. shale oil production, inventory accumulation, and investor doubts about whether all nations will comply with OPEC's mandated production cuts. There are tentative signs that this relative performance bear phase is drawing to a close. Three main drivers support our modestly sanguine view of energy stocks. First, the long term inverse correlation between the U.S. dollar and the commodity complex has been reestablished; global growth suggests that a tightening interest rate cycle is brewing which should be supportive to energy stocks (top panel, Chart 8). Second, the steepest drilling upcycle in recent memory is showing signs of fatigue with Baker Hughes reporting flattening growth in domestic oil rig count; At least a modest deceleration in shale oil production is likely (Chart 8). Finally, our S&P energy sector Valuation Indicator has gravitated back to the neutral zone. Technicals are also washed out with our Technical Indicator breaching one standard deviation below its historical mean, a level that typically heralds a reversal. Recent anecdotes that the sell-side is throwing in the towel on their bullish oil forecasts for the remainder of the year are also contrarily positive. Bottom Line: Our newly introduced S&P energy sector relative EPS model encapsulates this cautiously optimistic industry backdrop (Chart 8), and gave us comfort to lift the S&P energy sector to a modest overweight position. DeREITing Chart 9Lighten Up On REITs REITs have marked time year-to-date, but recently operating conditions have downshifted a notch. Three key drivers argue for lightening up exposure on this newly formed S&P GICS1 sector. First, REITs had been unable to materially benefit from the 50bps fall in the 10-year Treasury yield from the mid-December peak to the mid-June trough. As the economy recovers from the first half lull, Treasury yields will resume their advance. This is a net negative for the fixed income proxy real estate sector (Chart 9). Second, real estate occupancy rates have crested and generationally high supply additions in the apartment space are all but certain to push vacancies higher still. The implication is that rental inflation will remain under intense downward pressure (Chart 9). Finally, according to the Fed's latest Senior Loan Officer Survey, bankers are less willing to extend CRE credit. If banks continue to close the credit taps, CRE prices will suffer a setback. Bottom Line: We reiterate our downgrade of the niche S&P real estate sector to a benchmark allocation. Positive Chemical Reaction? Chart 10Chemicals Are No Longer Toxic In the summer of 2014 we went underweight the S&P chemicals index, anticipating an earnings underperformance phase, driven by weak revenues as chemicals manufacturers were furiously adding capacity to benefit from lower domestic feedstocks. This view has largely panned out, and now three factors underpin our more neutral bias: synchronized global growth, receding global capacity and improving domestic operating conditions. The global manufacturing PMI has recently reaccelerated and jumped to a six year high. Similarly, the U.S. ISM manufacturing survey also vaulted higher. Synchronized global growth suggests that final demand is on the upswing and should bode well for chemical top- and bottom-line growth (Chart 10). This has driven a relative weakening of the U.S. dollar, much to the benefit of U.S. chemical producers, whose exports appear to be displacing German exports. Global chemicals M&A supports our expectation of demand-driven pricing power gains. We think the benefits of consolidation are twofold: First, reduced revenues of the past decade have left the industry with outsized cost structures; consolidation should sweep that away under the guise of synergy, driving margins higher. Second, industry overcapacity has historically impaired profitability due to soaring overhead and more competitive pricing; greater scale should impose greater capital discipline. Finally, domestic operating conditions have taken a turn for the better. This improving domestic final demand backdrop is reflected in higher resource utilization rates and solid pricing power gains have staying power (Chart 10). Bottom Line: Tentative evidence suggests that the bear market in chemicals producers is over. We reiterate our recent upgrade to neutral. Given that chemicals stocks comprise over 73% of the broad materials index, this bump also moved the S&P materials sector to a benchmark allocation. Utilities: Blackout Warning Chart 11Utilities Get Short Circuited While chemicals and materials are beneficiaries of an upgrading in global economic expectations, utilities sit at the opposite end of the table (global manufacturing PMI shown inverted, top panel, Chart 11), and therefore warrant a downgrade to a below benchmark allocation. Now that the Fed is ready to start unwinding its balance sheet, the ECB is preparing the waters for QE tapering and a slew of CBs are on the cusp of a new tightening interest rate cycle, there are high odds that still overvalued fixed income proxies will continue to suffer. Synchronized global growth and coordinated tightening in monetary policy spells trouble for bonds. Our sister publication U.S. Bond Strategy expects a bond selloff for the remainder of the year. Given that utilities essentially trade as a proxy for bonds, this macro backdrop leaves them vulnerable to a significant underperformance phase (Treasury yield shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 11). Importantly, the stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio and utilities sector relative performance also has a tight inverse correlation (S/B shown inverted, second panel, Chart 11). The implication is that downside risks remain acute. Without the support of continued declines in bond yields, or of indiscriminate capital flight from all riskier assets, utilities advances depend on improving fundamentals. The news on the domestic operating front is grim. Contracting natural gas prices, the marginal price setter for the industry, suggest that recent utilities pricing power gains are running on empty. Tack on waning productivity, with labor additions handily outpacing electricity production, and the ingredients for a margin squeeze are in place. Bottom Line: We reiterate our recent downgrade to underweight. Pharma: Tough Pill To Swallow Chart 12Pharma Relapse Pharma stock profits have moved in lockstep with consumer spending on pharmaceuticals and both have roughly doubled over the past decade. However, relative pharma consumer outlays have crested recently, causing a significant pharma profit underperformance (Chart 12). If our cautious drug pricing power thesis pans out as we portrayed in the July 31st Weekly Report, then pharma earnings will suffer and exert downward pressure on relative share prices (Chart 12). Industry balance sheet deterioration represents another warning signal. Net debt/EBITDA is skyrocketing at a time when the broad non-financial corporate (NFC) sector has been in balance sheet rebuilding mode (bottom panel). While this metric does not suggest that pharma stocks are in deep financial trouble, the deterioration in finances is undeniable, and, at the margin, a rising interest rate backdrop will likely slow down debt issuance for equity retirement and dividend payout purposes. Bottom Line: We recently trimmed the S&P pharmaceuticals index to underweight, which also took the S&P health care index to underweight. Telecom Services: Signs Of Life Chart 13Telecom: Climbing Out Of Deflation2 Investors have shunned telecom services stocks vehemently year-to-date (YTD) on the back of an abysmal profit showing. We had been fortunate enough to underweight this niche sector since late January, adding alpha to our portfolio. Nevertheless, we did not want to overstay our welcome and recently booked profits of 12% and lifted the S&P telecom services sector to the neutral column. Our Cyclical Macro Indicator has arrested its fall giving us comfort that at least a lateral move in relative share prices is likely in coming months (Chart 13). The steep recalibration of cost structures to the new pricing reality is buttressing our CMI, offsetting the sector's plummeting share of the consumer's wallet (Chart 13). Encouragingly, selling prices cannot contract at 10% per annum indefinitely, and on a three month-rate of change basis, pricing power has staged a V-shaped recovery (Chart 13). Anecdotally, Verizon's first full quarter post the new pricing plans was solid and suggests that the peak deflationary impulse is likely behind the industry. Impressive labor cost discipline along with even a modest pricing power rebound signal that a grinding higher margin backdrop is likely in the coming months, in line with our margin proxy reading. This will also stabilize relative profitability. In sum, the bearish S&P telecom services narrative is more than discounted in ultra-depressed relative valuations on cyclically quashed profit estimates. Green shoots on the industry's pricing power front and impressive management focus on cost structures argue against being bearish this niche sector. Bottom Line: We reiterate the recent bump to neutral in the S&P telecom services sector. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Ibid. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Highlights The GOP can bolster its case for re-election in 2018 by passing tax cuts and rolling back regulation. With U.S. equity valuations stretched, prolonged uncertainty in Northeast Asia may be a catalyst for a pullback. The global economic outlook is brightening and will be a tailwind for U.S. economic growth and equities. Rising wage pressure will be another headwind for EPS growth in 2018, although wages appear quite benign at the moment. Wages are not always a good leading indicator for the inflation cycle. Indeed, sometimes upturns in wage growth lags that of consumer prices. Feature Safe haven assets caught a bid last week while risk assets sold off as investors weighed geopolitical tensions in Northeast Asia and more uncertainty over fiscal policy in Washington. Last week's U.S. economic data highlighted the disconnect between a tighter labor market and a lack of wage pressures. Meanwhile, the data suggest that growth outside the U.S. is accelerating. Nonetheless, history shows that investors should be patient while waiting for an upturn in inflation. Next Up: Tax Cuts The GOP will deliver on tax cuts this year despite disarray at the White House and an incompetent Congress, but fiscal stimulus may fail to live up to its hype. Furthermore, a fiscal lift from infrastructure spending is unlikely anytime soon. Republicans need a win ahead of the 2018 mid-term elections and they have already laid the groundwork for tax reform via the budget reconciliation process. Moreover, cutting taxes is easier to justify politically than removing an entitlement program (i.e. Obamacare). Tax rates probably will not be lowered by as much as originally promised because conservative Republicans in the House will demand "revenue offsets" to pay for tax cuts. Internal GOP battles over how to fund tax cuts could spill over into some tension regarding raising the debt ceiling. However, it is in neither political party's interests to create another "fiscal cliff" out of thin air. The GOP needs Democratic votes to pass this legislation in the Senate and the Democratic leadership has indicated it is willing to support it. At what price? House Minority leader Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority leader Chuck Schumer may link the debt ceiling and spending bill to tax reform, and push for the tax cuts to extend to the middle class and to be revenue neutral. There is a chance that both parties will agree to temporarily eliminate the debt ceiling, perhaps beyond the 2018 mid-term elections. In any event, we expect a last minute resolution to both the U.S. debt ceiling and the potential government shutdown in September. Thus, there should be no lasting impact on financial markets from the debt ceiling debate. Turning to government regulation, the NFIB survey shows that small businesses are pleased with the Trump administration's attack on red tape. President Trump has made progress on slowing regulation and is on track to enact one-tenth the amount of economically significant regulation1 passed by the Obama administration (Chart 1). By this metric, Trump is even more frugal than Reagan. Trump and the GOP-held Congress have rolled back Obama-era rules and delayed others. Still, regulatory change is slow to impact the economy and it may take years for the regulatory rollback to provide any meaningful lift to growth. Accordingly, the "Trump Put"2 is still in place. U.S. politics will remain a mess for much of the year, delaying any progress on populist economic policies that would have buoyed U.S. nominal GDP growth and given the Fed a reason to hike interest rates more aggressively (Chart 2). Chart 1Trump Has Had Success In Slowing Regulation Chart 2The Trump Put Bottom Line: Trump will not be impeached until after the 2018 mid-term election, and only then if the Democrats manage to take control of the House. The GOP can bolster its case for re-election in 2018 by passing tax cuts and rolling back regulation. The intensifying Mueller investigation and White House incompetence will only fuel the "Trump Put", which has been positive for U.S. equities, neutral for Treasuries, and bad for the dollar, all else equal. A significant uptick in inflation could overwhelm the "Trump Put" and spark a dollar rally. As such, investors should focus on inflation prospects rather than on White House politics. Fire And Fury Investors are on high alert and with the Q2 earnings season over, may look beyond the positive news on corporate profits for direction. Our colleagues in the BCA Geopolitical Strategy service have long maintained that Northeast Asia is ripe for economic/political risk.3 The underlying driver of uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula is the Sino-American rivalry. China is an emerging "great power" that threatens the global dominance of the U.S. and its allies. The immediate consequence is mounting friction in China's periphery. That is why Taiwan, the South China Sea, and North Korea, are all heating up. North Korea's regime is highly unpredictable as evidenced by events in the past few weeks. In that sense, it is more significant than the other "proxy battles" between the U.S. and China. In essence, North Korea is no longer merely an object of satire. A new round of negotiations over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs is about to begin. The potential for a military conflict is high unless diplomacy succeeds in convincing North Korea to freeze its weapons programs. The events on the Korean peninsula are unfolding as we expected they would. North Korea has a history of rational action. It wants a nuclear deterrent and a peace treaty, but not a regime change. The U.S. has forsworn regime change as an intention and China has recommitted to new sanctions. South Korea is pro-engagement. Moreover, we are seeing the U.S. establish a credible military as part of the "arc of diplomacy," comparable to U.S.-Iran relations 2010-15. Bottom Line: We do not expect a pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korea, as the constraints to conflict are extremely high and not all diplomatic options have been exhausted. Nonetheless, with U.S. equity valuations stretched, prolonged uncertainty in the region may be a catalyst for a pullback. A Rosy Global Picture The global economic outlook is brightening and will be a tailwind for U.S. economic growth and equities. Global real GDP estimates continue to move higher, a welcome departure from years past when estimates slid relentlessly lower (Chart 3). Since the start of 2017, global GDP estimates for this year have increased from 2.8% to 3%, while 2018 forecasts have accelerated from 2.7% to 2.9%. This upward trajectory has occurred despite a recalibration by many major central banks away from accommodative policies. Aggressive central bank actions or escalating tensions in Northeast Asia, or both, may halt the improving growth forecasts. Falling oil prices would also challenge a quickening of global growth, but our view is that oil prices will move higher in the coming months.4 Chart 3Global Growth Estimates Accelerating Despite Stalled U.S. Growth Global leading indicators are on the upswing (Chart 4). The BCA Global Leading Indicator Index (excluding the U.S.) in July 2017 was the strongest since 2010 when it slowed after a sharp rebound from the global financial crisis. The increase in growth still has room to run. Admittedly, the LEI's diffusion index has dipped below 50%. It would be a warning sign for global growth if the diffusion index does not soon turn up. Nominal global GDP growth is speeding up, boosted by improving consumer and business confidence, rising capital spending and declining policy uncertainty (Chart 5). The global economic surprise index is also climbing, which provides additional support. Investors may be concerned that the global PMIs have peaked (Chart 6), but they remain at levels consistent with above-trend GDP growth and we see no reason why they should drop below 50. Chart 4LEIs Pointing Higher Chart 5Supports For Global Growth In Place Chart 6Global Economic Activity Brightening Industrial production (IP) overseas is expanding nearly twice as fast as in the U.S. (Chart 5). This suggests that U.S. economic activity will be pulled up by foreign demand. A stronger dollar (as much as a 10% appreciation in the next year) may dampen U.S. exports and earnings, but this will be more a problem for 2018 than 2017. Bottom Line: Improving economic activity outside the U.S. is a tailwind for both U.S. economic growth and profits of U.S. firms with significant business abroad. Solid foreign demand will help the economy hit the Fed's GDP target and also support additional, but gradual, tightening by the central bank. Stay overweight U.S. equities and remain short duration. Waiting For Wages Rising wage pressure will be another headwind for EPS growth in 2018, although wages appear quite benign at the moment. Both primary and secondary indicators point to a tighter U.S. labor market. The July jobs report (released in early August) was yet another sign that the slack in the jobs market is vanishing.5 Data released last week on job openings (JOLTS) and the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) further supported this trend, and indicated that the labor market may tighten even more. Job openings rose to a new all-time high along with BCA's quit rate less layoffs indicator (Chart 7). The hire rate remained at a cycle peak. The NFIB data was equally impressive, with hiring plans and job openings surging in July. Small businesses are also finding it increasingly difficult to find quality labor. (Chart 7, panel 4) The strength in the labor market has not yet translated into accelerating wages, but patience is required. The July NFIB survey noted that "while a tight job market may point to higher wages and rising consumer spending down the road, which is also good for small businesses, the current expansion efforts by small business owners are being choked by their difficulties in hiring and keeping workers." The NFIB's compensation plans (Chart 7) provided quantitative support for the group's qualitative assessment. However, the latest readings on labor compensation from the Q2 productivity report, the tepid July average hourly earnings data and the Atlanta Fed wage tracker suggest that the labor market is still not tight enough to generate much wage pressure (Chart 8). Chart 7Widespread Evidence That##BR##Labor Market Is Tightening Chart 8Not Much Wage##BR##Pressure Yet Inflation And Long-Expansion Dynamics That said, wages are not always a good leading indicator for the inflation cycle. Indeed, sometimes upturns in wage growth lag that of consumer prices. In previous research we split U.S. post-1950 economic cycles into three sets based on the length of the expansion phase: short (about 2 years), medium (4-6 years) and long (8-10 years). What distinguishes short from medium and long expansions is the speed at which the most cyclical parts of the economy accelerated, and the time it took unemployment to reach a full employment level. Long expansions were characterized by a drawn-out rise in the cyclical parts of the economy and a very slow return to full employment, similar to what has occurred since the Great Recession. Chart 9 compares the current cycle to the average of two of the long cycles (the 1980s and the 1990s). We excluded the long-running 1960s expansion because the Fed delayed far too long and fell well behind the inflation curve. We define the 'late cycle' phase to be the time period from when the economy first reached full employment to the subsequent recession (shaded portions in Chart 9). The average late-cycle phase for these two expansions lasted almost four years, highlighting that reaching full employment does not necessarily mean that a recession is imminent. Inflation pressures are slower to emerge in 'slow burn' recoveries, allowing the Fed to proceed slowly. The Fed waited an average of 25 months to tighten policy after reaching full employment in these two long expansions, in part because core CPI inflation was roughly flat. The result was an extended late-cycle phase that was very rewarding for equity investors because the economy and earnings continued to grow. Of course, inflation eventually did turn higher, signaling the beginning of the end for the expansion and equity bull phase. In Chart 10, we compare the core PCE inflation rate in the current cycle with the average of the previous two long expansion episodes (the inflection point for inflation in the previous cycles are aligned with June 2017 for comparison purposes). The other panels in the chart highlight that, in the 1980s and 1990s, wage growth gave no warning that an inflation upturn was imminent. Indeed, wages were a lagging indicator of consumer price inflation. Chart 9Labor Market, Inflation And Stocks##BR##In The Long 80's & 90's Expansions Chart 10In The 80's & 90's Wage Growth##BR##Gave No Early Warning On On Inflation Market commentators often assume that inflation is driven exclusively by "cost push" effects, such that the direction of causation runs from wage pressure to price pressure. However, causation runs in the other direction as well. Households see rising prices and then demand better wages to compensate for the added cost of living. Chart 11Leading Indicators Of Inflation##BR##In "Slow Burn" Recoveries This is not to say that we should totally disregard wage information. But it does suggest that we must keep an eye on a wider set of data. Indicators that provided some leading information for inflation in the previous two long cycles are shown in Chart 11. To this list we would also add the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressure index, which is not shown in Chart 11 because it does not have enough history. All of these indicators have moved higher over the past 18 months, after bottoming at extremely low levels in 2015 and early 2016. However, they have all pulled back to some extent in recent months. This year's pipeline inflation "soft patch" continued into July, according to last week's release of the Producer Price Index. The easing in cost pressures at the producer level has been broadly based (i.e. one cannot blame special factors). These indicators suggest that consumer price inflation, according to either the CPI or the PCE, will struggle to rise in the next few months. The July CPI report revealed another tepid 0.1% monthly rise in the core price index, while the year-over-year rate remained at 1.7%. Rising prices for health care goods and services were offset by price declines for new and used cars. The diffusion index for the CPI moved up to the zero line in July, indicating that disinflation was a little less broadly based in the month. Bottom Line: Our base case is that core PCE inflation edges higher in the coming months, which will be enough for the FOMC to justify a rate hike in December. We also expect that inflation will be high enough in 2018 for the Fed to hike rates by more than is discounted in the bond market. Nonetheless, the warning signs of an inflation upturn are mixed at best. It would flatter our stocks-over-bonds recommendation if we are wrong on the inflation outlook, but our short duration stance would not be profitable in this case. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of Office of Management and Budget (OMB): https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain and https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How Long Can The Trump Put Last" dated June 14, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire, dated April 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "KSA's Tactics Advance OPEC' 2.0's Agenda," dated August 10, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stay The Course" dated August 7, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The rise in the yen sparked by the verbal confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea is creating an opportunity to buy USD/JPY. The DXY is set to stabilize and may even rebound, removing a key support for the yen. The U.S. economy is showing signs of strength, and the bond market is expensive, a backup in yields is likely. Rising U.S. bond yields should be poisonous for the yen Until higher bond yields cause an acute selloff in risks assets, an opportunity to buy USD/JPY is in place for investors. Feature After benefiting from the U.S. dollar's generalized weakness, the yen has received a renewed fillip thanks to the rising tensions between North Korea and the U.S. If the U.S. were indeed to unleash "fire and fury" on North Korea, safe-haven currencies like the yen or Swiss franc would obviously shine. While the verbal saber-rattling will inevitably continue, our colleagues Marko Papic and Matt Gertken - head and Asia specialist respectively of our Geopolitical Strategy service - expect neither the U.S. nor North Korea to go to war. Historically, North Korea has behaved rationally, and it only wants to use the nuclear deterrent as a bargaining chip. Meanwhile, the U.S does not want to invest the time, energy, and money required to enact a regime change in that country. Additionally, China is already imposing sanctions on Pyongyang, and Moon Jae-in, South Korea's new president, wants to appease its northern neighbor. With cooler heads ultimately likely to prevail, will the yen rally peter off, or should investors position themselves for additional USD/JPY weakness? We are inclined to buy USD/JPY at current levels. DXY: Little Downside, Potential Upside Most of the weakness in USD/JPY since July 10 has been a reflection of the 3.7% decline in the DXY between that time and August 2nd. However, the dollar downside is now quite limited and could even reverse, at least temporarily. The dollar is currently trading at its deepest discount since 2010 to our augmented interest rate parity model, based on real interest rate differentials - both at the long and short-end of the curve - as well as global credit spreads and commodity prices (Chart I-1). Crucially, the euro, which accounts for 58% of the dollar index, is its mirror image, being now overvalued by two sigma, the most since 2010 (Chart I-2). Confirming these valuations, investors have now fully purged their long bets on the USD, and are most net-long the euro since 2013. Chart I-1DXY Is Cheap... Chart I-2...But The Euro Is Not Valuations are only an indication of relative upside and downside; the macro economy dictates the directionality. While U.S. financial conditions have eased this year, they have tightened in Europe, resulting in the biggest brake on euro area growth relative to the U.S. in more than two years (Chart I-3). This is why euro area stocks have eradicated their 2017 outperformance against the S&P 500, why PMIs across Europe have begun disappointing, and why the euro area economic surprise index has rolled over - especially when compared to that of the U.S. The improvement in U.S. economic activity generated by easing financial conditions also has implications for the dollar. As Chart I-4 illustrates, the gap between the U.S. ISM manufacturing index and global PMIs has historically led the DXY by six months or so. This gap currently points to a sharp appreciation in the dollar. Chart I-3Easing Versus Tightening FCI Chart I-4PMIs Point To USD Rally If the dollar were indeed to stop falling, let alone appreciate, this would represent a hurdle for the yen to overcome, especially as the outlook for U.S. bond yields is pointing up. Bottom Line: Before North Korea grabbed the headlines, the USD/JPY selloff was powered by a weakening dollar. However, the dollar has limited downside from here. It is trading at a discount to intermediate-term models, while macroeconomic momentum is moving away from the euro area and toward the U.S. - a key consequence of the tightening in European financial conditions vis-à-vis the U.S. Additionally, the strong outperformance of the U.S. ISM relative to the rest of the world highlights that the dollar may even be on the cusp of experiencing significant upside. The Key To A Falling Yen: Treasury Yields Upside An end to the fall in the USD is important to end the downside in USD/JPY. However, rising Treasury yields are the necessary ingredient to actually see a rally in this pair. We are optimistic that U.S. bond yields can rise from current levels. The U.S. job market remains very strong. The JOLTS data this week was unequivocal on that subject. Not only are there now 6.2 million job openings in the U.S., but the ratio of unemployed to openings has hit its lowest level since the BLS began publishing the data, suggesting there is now a limited supply of labor relative to demand. Additionally, the number of unfilled jobs is nearly 30% greater than it was at its 2007 peak, pointing to an increasingly tighter labor market. We could therefore see an acceleration in wage growth going into the remainder of this business cycle, even if structural factors like the "gig-economy", the increasing role of robotics, or even the now-maligned "Amazon" effect limit how high wage growth ultimately rises. The Philips curve, when estimated using the employment cost index and the level of non-employment among prime-age workers, still holds (Chart I-5). Thus, a tight labor market in conjunction with continued job-creation north of 100,000 a month should put upward pressure on wages. Even when it comes to average hourly earnings, glimmers of hope are emerging. Our diffusion index of hourly wages based on the industries covered by the BLS cratered when wage growth slowed over the past year. However, it has hit historical lows and is beginning to rebound - a sign that average hourly earnings should also reaccelerate (Chart I-6). Chart I-5The Philips Curve Still Works Chart I-6Even AHE Are Set To Re-Accelerate The job market is not the only source of optimism, as U.S. capex should continue to be accretive to growth. Despite vanishing hopes of aggressive deregulation, the NFIB small business survey picked up this month. Even more importantly, various capex intention surveys as well as the CEO confidence index point to continued expansion of corporate investment (Chart I-7). Healthy profit growth is providing both the necessary signal and the source of funds to engage in this capex. This will continue to lift the economy. This is essential to our bond and our yen views, as it points to higher U.S. inflation. In itself, economic activity is not enough to generate higher prices. However, when this happens as aggregate capacity utilization in the economy is becoming tight, inflation emerges. As Chart I-8 shows, today, our composite capacity utilization indicator - based on both labor market conditions and the traditional capacity utilization measure published by the Federal Reserve - is in "no-slack" territory, a condition historically marked by bouts of inflation. Chart I-7U.S. Capex To Boost Growth Further Chart I-8No Slack Plus Growth Equals Inflation The recent increase to a three-year high in the "Reported Price Changes" component of the NFIB survey corroborates this picture, also pointing to an acceleration in core inflation (Chart I-9). But to us, the most telling sign that inflation will soon re-emerge is the behavior of the U.S. velocity of money. For the past 20 years, changes in velocity - as measured by the ratio of nominal GDP to the money of zero maturity - have lead gyrations in core inflation, reflecting increasing transaction demand for money. Today, the increase in velocity over the past nine months points to a rebound in core inflation by year-end (Chart I-10). Chart I-9The Pricing Behavior Of Small Businesses ##br##Points To An Inflation Pick Up Chart I-10Reaching Escape ##br##Velocity Expecting higher inflation is not the same thing as expecting higher interest rates and bond yields. However, we believe this time, higher inflation will result in higher yields. First, the Fed wants to push interest rates higher. Fed Chairwoman Janet Yellen and her acolytes have been very clear about this, with the "dot plot" anticipating rates to rise to 2.9% by the end of 2019. While the Fed's preference and reality can be at odds, this is currently not the case. Our Fed monitor continues to be in the "tighter-policy-needed" zone. While it is undeniable that it is doing so by only a small margin, higher inflation - as we expect - would only push this indicator higher. Moreover, the diffusion index of the components of the Fed monitor is already pointing toward an improvement in this policy gauge (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Fed Monitor Will Pick Up Second, the Fed may have increased rates, and the spread between U.S. policy rates and the rest of the world may have widened, but the dollar has weakened this year. This counterintuitive result highlights that the Fed's effort has had little impact in tightening liquidity conditions. In fact, as we have mentioned, because of the lower dollar and higher asset prices, financial conditions have eased, suggesting liquidity remains plentiful. As such, like in 1987 or 1994, this is only likely to re-invigorate the Fed in its confidence that it can hike rates further, as liquidity conditions remain massively accommodative. Third, beyond the Fed's reaction function, what also matters are investors' expectations. At the time of writing, investors only expect 45 basis points of rate hikes over the upcoming 24 months, which is a reasonable expectation only if inflation does not move back toward the Fed's 2% target. However, our work clearly points toward higher inflation by year end. In a fight between the Fed's "dot plot" and the OIS curve, right now, we would take the side of the Fed. Fourth, it is not just 2-year interest rate expectations that seems mispriced, based on our view on U.S. growth, inflation, and the Fed. U.S. Treasury yields are also trading at a 36 basis points discount to the fair-value model developed by our U.S. Bond Strategy sister service (Chart I-12). Continued good news on the job front and an uptick in inflation would likely do great harm to Treasury holders. Finally, the oversold extreme experienced by the U.S. bond market in the wake of the Trump victory has been purged. While we are not at an oversold extreme, our Composite Technical Indicator never punched much into overbought territory during the Fed tightening cycle from 2004 to 2006 (Chart I-13). Moreover, with no more stale shorts, an upswing in U.S. economic and inflation surprises should help put upward pressure on U.S. bond yields. Confirming the intuition laid out above, the copper-to-gold ratio, a measure of growth expectations relative to reflation, has now broken out - despite the North Korean risks. In the past, such a development signaled higher yields (Chart I-14). With this in mind, let's turn to the yen itself. Chart I-12U.S. Bonds Are##br## Too Expensive Chart I-13Stale Shorts Have Been Purged, ##br##But Overbought Conditions Are Unlikely Chart I-14Where The Copper-To-Gold Ratio Goes, ##br## So Do Bond Yields Bottom Line: The U.S. economy looks healthy. The labor market is strong, and capex continues to offer upside. Because capacity utilization is tight and money velocity is accelerating, inflation should begin surprising to the upside through the remainder of 2017. With the market pricing barely two more hikes over the course of the next 24 months and U.S. bonds trading richly, such an economic backdrop should result in higher U.S. bond yields. Yen At Risk, Even If Volatility Rises JGB yields have historically displayed a low beta to global bond yields. As a result, when global bond yields rise, the yen tends to weaken. USD/JPY is particularly sensitive to yield upswings driven by actions in the Treasury market. This contention is even truer now than it has been. The Bank of Japan is targeting a fixed yield curve slope and does not want to see JGB yields rise much above 10 basis points. With the paucity of inflation experienced by Japan - core-core inflation is in a downtrend, ticking in at zero, courtesy of tightening financial conditions on the back of a stronger yen - this policy remains firmly in place. Emerging signs of weakness in Japan highlight that the BoJ is likely to remain wedded to this policy, even as Shinzo Abe's popularity hits a low for his current premiership. The recent fall in the leading indicator diffusion index suggests that industrial production - which has been a bright spot - is likely to roll over in the coming months (Chart I-15). This means the improvement in capacity utilization will end, entrenching already strong deflationary pressures in Japan. This only reinforces the easing bias of the BoJ, and truncates any downside for Japanese bond prices. Chart I-15The Coming Japanese IP Slowdown In short, while JGB yields might still experience some downside when global yields fall, they will continue to capture none of the potential upside. This makes the yen even more vulnerable to higher Treasury yields than it was before. Hence, based on our view on U.S. inflation and yields, USD/JPY is an attractive buy at current levels. But what if the rise in U.S. bond yields causes a correction in risk assets, especially EM ones? Again, monetary policy differences and the trend in yields will dominate. As Chart I-16 illustrates, USD/JPY has a much stronger correlation with dynamics in the bond markets than it has with EM equity prices. Chart I-16Yen: More Like Bonds Than Anything Else Chart I-17USD/JPY Falls Only When EM Selloffs Are So Acute That They Cause Bond Rallies Moreover, as the experience of the past three years illustrates, only once EM selloffs become particularly acute does USD/JPY weaken (Chart I-17). Essentially, the EM selloff has to be so severe that it threatens the Fed's ability to tighten policy, and therefore causes U.S. bond yields to fall. It is very possible that a rise in Treasury yields will ultimately generate this outcome, but in the meantime the rise in U.S. bond yields should create a tradeable opportunity to buy USD/JPY. Bottom Line: With Japan still in the thralls of deflation and the BoJ committed to fight it, JGB yields have minimal upside. Therefore, higher Treasury yields are likely to do what they do best: cause USD/JPY to rally. This might ultimately lead to a selloff in EM stocks, but in the meanwhile, a playable USD/JPY rally is likely to emerge. Thus, we are opening a long USD/JPY trade this week. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The U.S. labor market continues to strengthen, with the JOLTS Survey's Job Openings and Hires both ticking up. The NFIB Survey also shows signs of strength as the Business Optimism Index steadied at lofty levels, coming in at 105.2. Unit labor costs disappointed, but this supports U.S. equities. Nonfarm productivity also outperformed, pointing to improving living standards. U.S. data has turned around, with data surprises improving relative to the euro area. These dynamics are likely to prompt a resumption of the greenback's bull market. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Euro area data has been mixed: German current account underperformed, with both exports and imports contracting on a monthly rate, and underperforming expectations. The trade balance, however, outperformed; German industrial production failed to meet expectations, even contracting on a monthly basis; Italian industrial production outperformed both on a monthly and yearly rate, but remains well below capacity European data has begun to show the pain inflicted by tightening financial conditions. Relative to the U.S., the economic surprise index has rolled over. If this trend continues, EUR/USD will struggle to appreciate more this year, and may even weaken if U.S. inflation can improve. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data has been negative in Japan: Labor cash earnings yearly growth went from 0.6% in May to a contraction of 0.4% in June, underperforming expectations. Machinery orders yearly growth fell down sharply, contracting at a 5.2% rate and underperforming expectations. The Japanese economy continues to show signs of weakness, which means that the Bank of Japan will not let 10-year JGB yields rise above 10 basis points. In an environment of rising U.S. bond yields this will cause the yen to fall. However the question remains: Could a selloff in EM prompted by a rising dollar help the yen? This should not be the case, at least for now, as the yen is much more correlated with U.S. bond yields than it is with EM stock prices. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: BRC like-for-like retail sales yearly growth came in at 0.9%, outperforming expectations. However, the RICS Hosing Price Balance - a crucial bellweather for the British economy - came in at 1%, dramatically underperforming expectations. Also, the trade balance underperformed expectations, falling to a 12 billion pounds deficit for the month of June as exports sagged. As we mentioned on our previous report, we expect the pound to suffer in the short term, as the high inflation produced by the fall in the pound following the Brexit vote is starting to weigh on consumers. Furthermore, house prices are also suffering, and could soon dip into negative territory. All of these factors will keep the BoE off its hawkish rhetoric for longer than priced by the markets. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD gains are reversing as the U.S. dollar rebounds from a crucial support level. This has also occurred due to mixed Chinese and Australian data: Chinese trade balance beat expectations, however, both exports and imports underperformed; Chinese inflation underperformed expectations; Australian Westpac Consumer Confidence fell to -1.2% from 0.4% in August; This is largely in line with our view that the rally in AUD was would only create a better shorting opportunity. Underlying structural and fundamental issues will remain a headwind for the AUD for the remainder of the year. Iron ore inventories in China are also at an all-time high, which paints a dim picture for Australian mining and exports going forward. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 On Wednesday, the RBNZ left their Official Cash Rate unchanged at 1.75%. Overall, the bank signaled that it will continue its accommodative monetary policy for "a considerable period of time". Furthermore the RBNZ's outlook for inflation, specifically tradables inflation, remains weak. Finally, the bank also showed concern for the rise in the kiwi, stating that "A lower New Zealand Dollar is needed to increase tradables inflation and help deliver more balanced growth". Overall, we continue to be positive on the kiwi against the AUD. While the outlook for tradable-goods inflation might be poor, this is a variable determined by the global industrial cycle.. Being a metal producer, Australia is much more exposed to these dynamics than New Zealand, a food producer. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Data continues to look positive for Canada: Housing Starts increased by 222,300, beating expectations; Building permits also increased at a monthly pace of 2.5%, also beating expectations. CAD has experienced some downside as the stretched long positioning that emerged in the wake of the BoC's newfound hawkishness are being corrected. While we expect the CAD to outperform other commodity currencies, based on rate differentials and oil outperformance, USD/CAD should is likely to trend higher as U.S. inflation bottoms. EUR/CAD should trend lower by the end of this year as euro positioning reverts. As a mirror image, CAD/SEK may appreciate based on the same dynamics. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Last week we highlighted the possibility of a correction in EUR/CHF, given that it had reached highly overbought levels. This prediction turned out to be accurate, as EUR/CHF fell by almost 2% this week, as tensions between North Korea and the United States continue to escalate. Meanwhile on the economic front, Switzerland continues to show a tepid recovery: Headline inflation went from 0.2% in June to 0.3% in July, just in line with expectations. The unemployment rate continues to be very low at 3.2%, also coming in according to expectations. Inflation, house prices and various economic indicators are all ticking up, however, the economic recovery is still too weak to cause a major shift in monetary policy. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The krone has fallen this week against the U.S. dollar, even as oil prices have remained relatively flat. This highlights a key theme we have mentioned before: USD/NOK is more sensitive to rate differentials than it is to oil prices. We expect these rate differentials to continue to widen, as the Norwegian economy remains weak, and inflation will likely remain below the Norges Bank target in the coming years. On the other hand, U.S. yields are set to rise, as a tight labor market will eventually lift wages higher and thus increase rate expectations. Meanwhile EUR/NOK, which is much more sensitive to oil prices than USD/NOK, will keep going down, as inventory drawdowns caused by the OPEC cuts should continue pushing up Brent prices. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Data in Sweden was mixed: New Orders Manufacturing yearly growth fell from 7.3% to 4.4%. Industrial production yearly growth increased from 7.5% in May to 8.5% in June, outperforming expectations. The Swedish economy continues to exhibit signs of strong inflationary pressures. Overall we continue to be bullish on the krona, particularly against the euro, as the exit of Stefan Ingves at the end of this year should give way for a more hawkish governor, who would respond to the strength in the economy with a more hawkish stance. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017Xx Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades
Leisure product stocks have taken a beating this summer to nearly their lowest level since the GFC (top panel). The slide followed a tough Q2 earnings season that saw the industry miss top line and margin estimates. Unsurprisingly, forward earnings estimates have fallen off a cliff (second panel). We think there is cause to remain optimistic. Consumer spending on toys and games has been firmly in expansion mode since the '09 trough and industry sales have been growing steadily for the past four years (third panel). The result has been leisure gaining a growing slice of the retail pie (fourth panel). The collapse in forward earnings has caused a valuation spike (bottom panel). If higher outlays translate into increasing EPS as we expect, then a playable recovery rally is likely, similar to early 2015. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5LEPR - MAT, HAS.