Developed Countries

Watch Inflation Expectations How much longer can this go on? Global equities were up 6% in January alone (the 15th consecutive month of positive returns), and investors are increasingly asking how much further this bull market has to run. There are no signs we can see that suggest it will end imminently. Our watch-list of key recession indicators (decline in global PMIs, inverted yield curve, rise in credit spreads - Chart 1) is sending no warning signals. U.S. GDP growth was a little weaker than expected in Q4, at 2.6% QoQ annualized, but this was mainly due to inventories and strong imports: final private demand, a better guide to future growth, was strong at 4.3%. Fed NowCasts for Q1 growth point to 3.1-4.2%. The euro zone grew even faster than the U.S. last year, and even Japan probably saw 1.8% GDP growth. Corporate earnings expectations have accelerated sharply over just the past few weeks - particularly in the U.S. as a result of the tax cuts (Chart 2) - with analysts now expecting 16% EPS growth for the S&P 500 this year. BCA U.S. Equity Strategy service's earnings models suggest that this forecast may still be too cautious (Chart 3). Recommended Allocation Chart 1No Recession Signals Flashing Chart 2A Dramatic Rise In Earnings Forecasts... Chart 3...But Forecasts May Still Be Too Cautious While it is true that equity valuations are stretched, particularly in the U.S. (with BCA's Composite Valuation Index having just tipped into the "Extremely Overvalued" zone - Chart 4), valuations are not usually a good timing tool. Investor euphoria seems not yet to have reached the extremes that usually characterize a bull-market peak. The message we hear consistently from wealth managers is that their clients who missed last year's rally are now looking to get into risk assets. The American Association of Individual Investors' latest weekly survey shows 45% bulls to 24% bears - not especially optimistic by past standards (Chart 5). Flows into equity funds have started to accelerate, but have been weaker than bond flows over the past year (Chart 6). Chart 4U.S. Equities Now 'Extremely Overvalued' Chart 5Investors Are Not Particularly Bullish Chart 6Flows Into Equities Starting To Accelerate Chart 7Key: Inflation Expectations Getting to 2.5% We think the key to timing the top lies in inflation expectations. With the U.S. economy at full capacity and unemployment at 4.1%, well below the NAIRU of 4.6%, the Fed believes that a pick-up in inflation is just a matter of time - an analysis we agree with. The market has started to come round to this view too, with implied inflation rising by about 40 BPs over the past two months (Chart 7). The market has now priced in a 65% probability of the Fed's projected three rate hikes this year, and even a 27% probability of four. Inflation expectations hitting 2.5% (which would be compatible with the Fed's 2% PCE inflation target - CPI inflation is typically 50 BPs higher) could be the tipping-point. This is because it would remove the Fed put - with inflation expectations elevated, the Fed would no longer be able to back off from tightening in the event of a global risk-off event such as a stock-market correction or a slowdown in China. Such a rise in inflation expectations would also push the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield above 3%, which would increase the attraction of fixed income, and represent a threat to highly indebted borrowers, especially in emerging markets. This is how bull markets typically end: with the Fed having to raise rates to choke off inflation, and either making a policy mistake or tightening monetary policy enough to slow growth. But all this is probably quite a few months away. We expect to turn more defensive perhaps late this year, ahead of a recession that we have for some time now penciled in for the second half of 2019. Given how advanced the cycle is, conservative investors primarily concerned with capital preservation might look to dial down risk or hedge exposure now. But investors focused on quarterly performance should ride the bull market until some of the warning signals mentioned above begin to flash. For now, therefore, we continue to recommend an overweight in equities relative to bonds on the 12-month investment horizon, and mostly pro-risk and pro-cyclical tilts. Equities: We continue to prefer developed over emerging equities. EM will be hurt by the slowdown likely in China (where money supply and credit growth have fallen in response to the authorities' tighter policies - Chart 8), rising U.S. interest rates, sluggish productivity growth, and valuations that are no longer particularly cheap (Chart 9). Within DM, we are overweight euro zone and Japanese equities, which should benefit from their higher beta, more cyclical earnings, still accommodative monetary policy, and cheaper valuations than the U.S. Our sector bets are tilted to late-cycle value sectors such as financials, industrials and energy. Chart 8Tighter Monetary Conditions in China Chart 9EM No Longer Cheap Fixed Income: Rising inflation expectations should push the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield up to 3% this year, with German Bunds rising by a similar amount. We recommend an underweight on duration, and a preference for inflation-linked over nominal bonds, in these markets. In the U.K. and Australia, however, central banks are unlikely to tighten as quickly as futures markets have priced in and so we prefer their government bonds. While the expansion continues, spread product should continue to outperform in the fixed-income bucket. The default-adjusted spread on U.S. high-yield bonds remains over 200 BP and, though we see little further spread contraction, carry alone makes this attractive. Currencies: BCA was correct last year to predict a widening of interest-rate differentials between the U.S. and the euro zone, but wrong to conclude that this would lead to a stronger dollar (Chart 10). The drivers of currencies can undergo regime shifts, and it seems now that valuation (both the euro and yen are cheap compared to their purchasing power parity, 1.32 and 99 to the U.S. dollar respectively), current account surpluses (3.3% for the euro zone and 3.7% for Japan), and other factors have become more important. Tactically, the euro, in particular, looks very overbought. Speculative investors are very long euros, the ECB is likely to remain dovish relative to the Fed, and the strong euro could put some downward pressure on growth in the short-term. However, if the dollar were to rebound by 5% or so we would be likely to end our dollar bull call. Chart 10Rate Differentials No Longer Moving Currencies Chart 11Oil Supply To Increase In 2019 Commodities: Oil prices have risen on the back of strong global demand, OPEC discipline, and a lag in the response of U.S. shale oil producers. We forecast an average of $67 a barrel for Brent crude this year, with spikes to as high as $80 in the event of disruptions in producer countries such as Venezuela. However, with one-year forward crude prices around $62, shale producers (whose marginal costs average about $52 a barrel) are likely to pick up production soon. OPEC, too, should be happy with crude around $50-60. Our energy team forecasts a pick-up in supply next year (Chart 11), which should bring the crude price down to an average of $55 in 2019. Industrial commodities are a product of Chinese demand, global growth, and the U.S. dollar. These drivers look likely to be mixed over the coming months and so we remain neutral. Gold has risen, in the face of rising interest rates, because of the weak dollar - it remains an excellent hedge against inflation, recession, and geopolitical risks and so should be a modest part of any balanced portfolio. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights The German 10-year bund yield rising to 1%, or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3% would be a trigger to downgrade equities and upgrade bonds... ...especially as the blue sky expectations for global growth in H1 2018 will turn out to be overly-optimistic. On a 6-9 month horizon, upgrade Airlines to overweight. Downgrade Banks to underweight. Upgrade Germany (DAX) to neutral. Downgrade Italy (MIB) and Spain (IBEX) to underweight. Feature Where has the equity market cycle gone? Since 2012, the stock market's 6-month returns have generated an unprecedented consistency, with only a brief breakdown - at the end of 2015 - into negative territory (Chart of the Wesk and Chart I-2). Chart of the WeekSince 2012, The Equity Market ##br##Cycle Has Disappeared Chart I-2Much Less Cyclicality In Equities ##br##Than In Commodities The disappearance of the equity market cycle brings to mind the concept of the "Great Moderation", a term coined in 2002 to describe the big drop in business cycle volatility during the 1990s. In 2004, Ben Bernanke suggested that "improvements in monetary policy, though certainly not the only factor, probably were an important source of the Great Moderation." Today's Great Moderation 2.0 refers to the equity market cycle - or rather, its disappearance. And in finding a reason for the Great Moderation 2.0, Bernanke's attribution to monetary policy might be right on the money. Stick With TINA, Or Flirt With TIA? For many years, ultra-accommodative monetary policy has provided a consistent and substantial uplift to world stock market valuations. Since 2012, our preferred measure of equity market valuation - world stock market capitalisation to GDP - has almost doubled. This inexorable and relatively trouble-free rise has even spawned its own acronym: TINA - There Is No Alternative (to owning equities.) However, the uplift to stock market valuations has happened in a less obvious way than you might realise. Based on the excellent predictive power of stock market capitalisation to GDP, the prospective 10-year annualised return from world equities has collapsed from 9% in 2012 to 1.5% now (Chart I-3). Over the same period, the global 10-year bond yield has compressed from 3% to 1.5%. Hence, the collapse in prospective equity returns is not due to the decline in bond yields per se. It has happened mostly because the excess return offered by equities over bonds - the so-called 'equity risk premium' has compressed from 6% to zero (Chart I-4). Chart I-3World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies##br## A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return Chart I-4Prospective Equity Returns ##br##Have Become 'Bond Like' Ultra-accommodative monetary policy has caused the disappearance of the equity risk premium. The simple reason is that at low bond yields, the risk of owning bonds becomes similar to the risk of owning equities. Chart I-5Below A 2% Yield, 10-Year Bonds Have ##br##More Negative Skew Than Equities When bond yields approach their lower bound, bond prices have little upside but they have a lot of downside. This ratio of an investment's potential losses relative to its potential gains is the risk that most frightens investors,1 and is known as negative skew. At yields below 2%, bond returns become as negatively skewed as equity returns, or even more negatively skewed than equities (Chart I-5). As the risk of bonds increases to become 'equity-like', the prospective return from equities must compress to become 'bond-like'. Which is to say, equity valuations become substantially richer. All well and good - so long as the global 10-year bond yield stays low. Above a 2% yield, the negative skew on bond returns disappears, and equities once again require an excess prospective return over bonds. More colloquially, investors would dump TINA and start flirting with TIA (There Is an Alternative). In essence, a big threat to the Great Moderation 2.0 comes the global 10-year bond yield rising to 2% - broadly equivalent to the German 10-year bund yield rising to 1%, or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3%. Any moves towards these thresholds would be a trigger to downgrade equities and upgrade bonds - especially as we now explain why the blue sky expectations for global growth in H1 2018 will turn out to be overly-optimistic. The Equity Sector Cycle Is Alive And Well For the stock market in aggregate, the cycle has been moribund. But for equity sector relative performance, the cycle is very much alive and well. In The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles 2 we showed and explained the existence of mini-cycles in economic and financial variables. To summarise, a lag between the demand for credit and its supply necessarily creates mini-cycles in both the price of credit (the bond yield) and the quantity of credit (the global credit impulse). Thereby it also creates mini-cycles in GDP growth. The useful point is that these cycles are very regular with half-cycles averaging 6-8 months. Which makes their turning points and phases predictable. Given that the global credit impulse cycle has been in a mini-upswing phase since last May, it is highly likely to turn into a mini-downswing phase through the first half of 2018. The latest data point, showing a tick down, seems to corroborate such a turning point. From an equity sector perspective, Banks versus Healthcare has closely tracked the phases of the credit impulse mini-cycle (Chart I-6). In all five of the last five mini-downswings, Banks have underperformed Healthcare, and we would expect no difference in the next mini-downswing. Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, downgrade Banks to underweight. Unsurprisingly, exactly the same pattern applies to Basic Materials (and Energy) versus Healthcare (Chart I-7). Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, stay underweight Basic Materials and Energy versus Healthcare. Also unsurprisingly, the performance of European Airlines is a mirror-image of the oil price cycle, given that aviation fuel comprises the sector's main variable cost (Chart I-8). As an aside, this also somewhat insulates the European Airlines against a strengthening euro, given that this variable cost is priced in dollars. Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, upgrade European Airlines to overweight. Chart I-6Banks Vs. Healthcare Tracks The ##br##Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Chart I-7Materials Vs. Healthcare Tracks The##br## Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Chart I-8European Airlines Relative Performance Is A##br## Mirror-Image of The Oil Price Cycle Country Allocation Just Drops Out Of Sector Allocation Our core philosophy of investment reductionism teaches us that for most stock markets, the sector (and dominant company) skews swamp any effect that comes from the domestic economy. For example, the defining skew for Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX is their large overweighting to banks. So unsurprisingly, MIB and IBEX relative performance reduces to: will banks outperform the market? (Chart I-9 and Chart I-10). Chart I-9Italy = Long Banks Chart I-10Spain = Long Banks Therefore, the key consideration for European equity country allocation is always: how to allocate to the vital few equity sectors that feature most often in the skews: Banks, Healthcare, Energy and Materials. To reiterate, our 6-9 month recommendation is to underweight Banks, Materials And Energy versus Healthcare, and to overweight Airlines versus the market. Then to arrive at a country allocation, combine the cyclical view on the vital few sectors with the country sector skews shown in Box I-1. Even if you disagree with our sector views, the sector-based approach is the right way to pick European equity markets. If you agree with our sector views, the result is the following updated European equity market allocation: Box I-1: The Vital Few Sector Skews That Drive Country Relative Performance For major equity indexes in the euro area, the dominant sector skews that drive relative performance are as follows: Germany (DAX) is overweight Chemicals, underweight Banks. France (CAC) is underweight Banks and Basic Materials. Italy (MIB) is overweight Banks. Spain (IBEX) is overweight Banks. Netherlands (AEX) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Ireland (ISEQ) is overweight Airlines (Ryanair) which is, in effect, underweight Energy. And for major equity indexes outside the euro area: The U.K. (FTSE100) is effectively underweight the pound. Switzerland (SMI) is overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy. Sweden (OMX) is overweight Industrials. Denmark (OMX20) is overweight Healthcare and Industrials. Norway (OBX) is overweight Energy. The U.S. (S&P500) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Overweight: France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Neutral: Germany, Netherlands. Underweight: Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway. In terms of change, it means upgrading Germany (DAX) to neutral and downgrading Italy (MIB) and Spain (IBEX) to underweight. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities", January 28, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles", January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* There is a lot of optimism already priced into the South African rand, making it vulnerable to a countertrend reversal. Therefore, this week's recommended trade is to go long USD/ZAR with a profit-target of 6% and a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short S&P500/long Eurostoxx50 hit its stop-loss, while short Japanese energy and short palladium moved comfortably into profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights China's new exchange rate regime has significantly weakened the link between the U.S. dollar and the broad RMB trend, at the expense of a stronger (negative) relationship between CNY/USD and the dollar. Our metrics to gauge the impact of broad RMB movements on exports suggest that the recent rise is not yet a threat to China's economy. A further 5% depreciation in the U.S. dollar would cause a meaningful further increase, but not one large enough for our metrics to flash a warning sign. Several factors argue against the probability of an August 2015-style CNY/USD devaluation. Even if the PBOC were to do so, global investors would likely react very differently than they did in 2015, given the underlying strength of the global economy. Stay overweight Chinese investable stocks over the cyclical investment horizon, despite a likely dollar-driven retracement in CNY/USD over the coming months. Feature Chart 1A Sharp Rise In CNY/USD The Chinese Renminbi (RMB) has risen over 4% versus the U.S. dollar since mid-December, and global investors have begun to take notice (Chart 1). The sharp acceleration in the RMB has raised several questions in the minds of market participants: What is the likely economic impact of the rise, and how does this fit into the view that China's ongoing growth slowdown is likely to be benign and controlled? How will policymakers respond to the strength in the exchange rate? Is there a risk of a 2015-style depreciation that would roil global financial markets? In this week's report we offer our perspective on these issues, and provide investors with forecasts for the RMB assuming a 5% appreciation or depreciation of the U.S. dollar versus major currencies over the coming 6-12 months. While it is true that the broad RMB trend has risen non-trivially over the past year, we conclude that is too early to view this rise as a threat to the export sector. This supports our view of a benign, controlled economic slowdown in China, as well as a cyclical overweight stance towards Chinese equities. Putting Recent Exchange Rate Movements In Context In order to answer the questions noted above, it is important to examine recent exchange rate movements in the context of China's ongoing efforts to internationalize the RMB, as they have had a substantial impact on the relationship between the RMB and the U.S. dollar over the past few years. Beijing has been taking steps for years to promote the global use of the RMB, but these efforts came into sharp focus on August 11-12, 2015, when the PBOC devalued the currency versus the U.S. dollar (Chart 2). In addition to the devaluation, the PBOC changed the way that the daily fixing rate would be set, in a fashion that increased the sensitivity of the rate to market forces. The PBOC made these changes at the time that they did for two specific reasons: The IMF was in the process of deciding whether to include the RMB in the SDR basket, after having stated that a more market-based RMB rate was a precondition for inclusion. The policy to link the RMB to the U.S. dollar was causing significant appreciation of the former during a period of enormous dollar strength. Given the decision to alter the fixing rate mechanism, the PBOC decided to devalue the exchange rate by a modest amount in one, bundled policy change. The important point for investors is that the market turmoil that followed the August 2015 changes to the exchange rate overshadowed a much more consequential announcement on December 11, 2015 that precipitated a shift in the link between the RMB and the US dollar (USD) towards multiple currencies.1 At first blush, the "decision" made by the PBOC in December was trivial: they announced that the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) would publish an index for the RMB measured against a basket of foreign currencies. But the implication of the announcement was that the PBOC was shifting its focus from managing CNY/USD to managing the value of the RMB versus the currencies of many trading partners. Essentially, December 2015 marked the beginning of a new exchange rate policy in China. The effect of this new policy change can clearly be seen in the relationship between CNY/USD and the trade-weighted RMB versus the U.S. dollar (Chart 3). The chart highlights that the beta of J.P. Morgan's nominal trade-weighted RMB versus the Bloomberg U.S. Dollar Spot Index was strongly positive prior to 2016, whereas the beta of CNY/USD to the Dollar Index was weak. Following the PBOC's policy shift, these relationships traded places: the beta between CNY/USD and the dollar became much more negative, whereas the strength of the U.S. dollar / trade-weighted RMB link weakened considerably. Chart 2The August 2015 Deval Significantly##br## Impacted Global Markets Chart 3A New Exchange Rate Regime Began##br## In December 2015 Bottom Line: China's new exchange rate regime has significantly weakened the link between the U.S. dollar and the broad RMB trend, at the expense of a stronger (negative) relationship between CNY/USD and the broad dollar trend. The Economic Implications Of China's New Exchange Rate Policy Chart 4The Recent Rise In CNY/USD ##br##Has Been Dollar-Driven Given our discussion above, the recent strength of the CNY/USD exchange rate should not be surprising: Chart 4 highlights that its sharp rise is largely the mirror image of recent U.S. dollar weakness. Panel 2 illustrates another way of observing this effect; EUR/USD typically trades inversely to the broad dollar trend, and CNY/EUR has been little changed over the past six months. The key questions for investors are 1) how to assess what impact the broad RMB appreciation over the past year will have on Chinese export growth, and 2) what future dollar movements might imply for the broad RMB trend. We use two metrics to gauge the likely impact of broad exchange rate movements on export growth: a fair value assessment (Chart 5), and the rise of an export-weighted RMB index relative to its high and low points over the past few years, when the exchange rate was clearly negatively and positively contributing to monetary conditions (Chart 6). The charts highlight that the real effective RMB is currently cheap, and that a nominal export-weighted index is only marginally above the median value since 2015. Neither of these measures implies that the rise in the RMB has reached levels that would be restrictive for exports. Chart 7 shows that the annual growth rate of our export-weighted RMB index has been predicted quite well by that of the dollar index and the CNY/USD exchange rate over the past two years. Based on this regression, Chart 8 presents what is likely to occur to our export-weighted RMB index in a 5% appreciation & depreciation scenario. The chart shows that the impact of a 5% appreciation (which we expect) will be muted, whereas a 5% depreciation in the dollar would cause a meaningful further rise in the export-weighted RMB. Still, it would not be enough to push the index to a new high, nor would it cause the real effective RMB shown in Chart 5 to rise into expensive territory. Bottom Line: Our metrics to gauge the impact of broad RMB movements on exports suggest that the recent rise is not yet a threat to the export sector. A further 5% depreciation in the U.S. dollar would cause a meaningful further increase, but not one large enough for our metrics to flash a warning sign. Chart 5The RMB Is Cheap In REER Terms Chart 6Rising, But Not Yet Near Previous Highs Chart 7The Dollar and CNY/USD Explain ##br##The Broad RMB Trend Chart 8Further Dollar Depreciation Would Bite, ##br##But Not Disastrously So August 2015, Redux? Given that the PBOC's devaluation of the RMB in August 2015 roiled global financial markets, it seems natural to ask whether the Chinese central bank could cause another shock by again depreciating the CNY/USD exchange rate. In our view, the answer is no. First, there are several reasons why the PBOC is unlikely to intervene to limit a rise in CNY/USD barring material further strength: Trade frictions with the U.S. remain, and a stronger CNY/USD could reduce the likelihood that the Trump administration will levy across-the-board tariffs on Chinese imports The PBOC recently reduced the influence of the "counter-cyclical factor" that was included in the CNY/USD midpoint formula. Since the factor was introduced to lessen the impact of market forces on the yuan's reference rate, the PBOC would likely have refrained from making any changes to it if they were unduly worried about the upward impact of recent dollar declines on CNY/USD If the PBOC becomes uncomfortable with the extent of the RMB rise in trade or export-weighted terms, it could aim to lower the yuan versus other key trading partners, including the euro area. As noted above, CNY/EUR has recently remained flat during the euro's sharp recent upleg versus the dollar. We noted that the RMB is now cheap in real effective terms (Chart 5), unlike in August 2015 when the deviation from fair value was the highest that it had been since mid-2000. Chart 92015 Vs Today: A Completely Different ##br##Global Economic Backdrop Second, even if the PBOC were to depreciate the CNY/USD exchange rate over the coming months, we doubt that investors would react in the same way as they did to the initial devaluation. As we reviewed in a Weekly Report last October,2 the global economy was suffering from a synchronized slowdown, and the surprise decision caused global investors to speculate heavily that additional devaluations were likely. The current condition of the global economy is clearly quite different than that which prevailed in the summer of 2015. Global PMIs are the most synchronized that they have been since the earliest phase of the economic cycle (Chart 9), which suggests that a significant slowdown is not imminent. Even if the pace of growth becomes narrower or slows modestly, it is difficult to envision the same kind of panicked response absent a separate and highly impactful accompanying shock. Bottom Line: Several factors argue against the probability of an August 2015-style CNY/USD devaluation. Even if the PBOC were to do so, global investors would likely react very differently than they did in 2015, given the underlying strength of the global economy. Investment Strategy Implications Chart 10Export Impact Of The RMB Appreciation##br## Is Non-Trivial, But Manageable Over a 6-12 month time horizon, there are two investment strategy implications of our above discussion. First, our analysis suggests that investors should focus on the broad RMB trend rather than the CNY/USD exchange rate when determining the likely impact of currency fluctuations on China's growth picture. It is true that an export-weighted RMB index has risen by a greater amount over the past year than a typical trade-weighted RMB (or the CFETS RMB index) would suggest (Chart 10), but for now it is too early to conclude that this represents a threat to the export sector. This conclusion is consistent with our view that China's ongoing economic slowdown will be benign, and controlled in nature. Second, given the tight (negative) link between CNY/USD and the U.S. dollar, and our view that USD is more likely to appreciate than depreciate over the coming months, it is true that the US$ relative performance of Chinese equities may be somewhat negatively impacted by a retracement in CNY/USD. But as we noted when presenting our "decision tree" for Chinese stocks at the beginning of the year,3 the cyclical condition of China's business cycle is the dominant factor that investors should consider when judging the appropriate allocation to Chinese equities. As such, our focus on China's exchange rate remains on how it impacts the growth outlook, and our judgement on this question continues to support a favorable stance towards the equity market. Bottom Line: Stay overweight Chinese investable stocks over the cyclical investment horizon, despite a likely dollar-driven retracement in CNY/USD over the coming months. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/2988680/index.html 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part I): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Decision Tree For Chinese Stocks", dated January 4, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Even though our baseline scenario calls for four rate hikes out of the Fed this year - more than markets have priced in - gold will be supported by increasing inflation and inflation expectations, heightened geopolitical risks, and greater volatility in equity markets. Further out, we expect gold will provide a good hedge against a likely equity downturn, as the bull market turns into a bear market in 2H19. For now, keep gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. Energy: Overweight. After popping above $70 and $66/bbl last week, Brent and WTI prices retreated ~ $2.00/bbl on the back of a stronger USD and increased rig counts in the U.S. shales, particularly in the prolific Permian Basin, where 18 rigs were added. We continue to expect Brent and WTI prices to average $67 and $63/bbl this year. Base Metals: Neutral. Spot copper continues to trade on either side of $3.20/lb on the COMEX. We remain neutral, given our view upside risk - chiefly supply-side disruptions at the mine and refined levels - will be balanced on the downside by a stronger USD and a slowdown in China. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold will draw support from rising inflation and inflation expectations this year and next (see below). Ags/Softs: Underweight. NAFTA negotiations ended this week in Montreal with the U.S. rejecting proposals from Canada to advance the talks. However, the U.S. side stated it would seek "major breakthroughs" at the next round of negotiations in Mexico City beginning February 26, according to agriculture.com. Feature Gold Price Risks Skewed To The Upside Price risk in gold will remain skewed to the upside this year, even as our base case scenario calls for limited gains from here. Higher inflation and inflation expectations, which normally would be bullish for gold, will be countered by Fed policy-rate hikes, which will boost the USD and lift real rates in our base case (Chart of the Week). Inflation's Revival Would Support Gold ... Despite above-trend global growth last year, subdued inflation limited the Fed's willingness to proceed with interest rate normalization in earnest. However, we do not put this down to structural forces, and instead expect core inflation to be near its bottom.1 In fact, inflation's soft readings are typical of the expected 18-month lag between U.S. economic growth and a pick-up in inflation, and as our Global Investment Strategists point out, several key indicators including the ISM manufacturing index, the New York Fed's Inflation Gauge, as well as BCA's proprietary pipeline inflation index are already moving in this direction (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekInflation And U.S. Financial Variables Matter Chart 2Signs Of Life In U.S. Inflation Inflation tends to pick up once the unemployment rate falls below the 5% mark. With the latest unemployment reading coming in at 4.1%, the U.S. economy has reached the steep end of the Phillips Curve - a workhorse model used by the Fed, which depicts the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Indeed, BCA's Global Investment Strategists expect the U.S. unemployment rate to continue falling to a 49-year low of 3.5% by year-end. These further declines in the unemployment rate will push up wages, pressuring service inflation (Chart 3). At the same time, we expect the lagged impact of the weak USD will begin to show up in goods price inflation, along with higher energy prices. While some components of the Fed's preferred inflation gauge may face a slowdown in price pressure - most notably rent - this will likely be mitigated by accelerating prices in other components, such as health care, which we expect will return to its historic trend. In fact, U.S. inflation expectations - supported by higher energy prices and a strong December core CPI reading - have already started to increase (Chart 4). As our U.S. Bond Strategists point out, by the time core inflation returns to the Fed's target, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will be between 2.4% and 2.5%.3 Chart 3At The Steep End Of The Philips Curve Chart 4A Breakout In Inflation Expectations Thus the 2018 inflation outlook is showing signs that it is in the process of bottoming, and will soon begin its ascent. We expect core PCE inflation, the Fed's preferred gauge, to reach the central bank's 2% target by year-end. This pick-up in inflation and inflation expectations is positive for gold, which we've shown to be an attractive hedge against rising prices. However, inflation's comeback will likely embolden the Fed to proceed more aggressively with its hiking cycle. ... But A Hawkish Fed Counters Inflation ... While our modelling showcases an inverse relationship between real rates and gold prices, what is crucial to our outlook is our expectation of how the Fed will proceed with its interest rate normalization process this year. Given that gold's correlation with inflation is strengthened during periods of low real rates, the ideal condition for gold would be for the Fed to stay behind the inflation curve. But we are not expecting that just yet.4 Rather than waiting to see the "whites of inflation's eyes," our expectation is the Fed will tighten ahead of inflation. This has in fact already materialized with three hikes in 2017 amid muted inflation. Upward surprises in U.S. growth, coupled with an upward trend in inflation will keep the Fed on its normalization path with greater confidence. We expect four rate hikes in 2018 - above both market expectations and what is implied by the "dot plot". Net, the pre-emptive Fed rate hikes we expect will lead to higher real rates, and will limit gold's upside this year. ... As Does A Stronger Greenback An increase in U.S. real rates vis-à-vis other economies, as well as a shift in the composition of global growth to favor the U.S., will support the USD. In addition to higher real rates, this would also limit gold's upside in 2018. Stronger growth ex-U.S. last year weakened the USD. This year, we expect the U.S. economy to outperform. Financial conditions have eased in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world, while fiscal policy is expected to be comparatively more favorable in the U.S. The U.S. surprise index has reflected this shift in comparative growth, outperforming most regions (Chart 5).5 While the Euro has been exceptionally resilient, the fallout from a stronger currency will eventually begin to show up in slower growth. The EUR/USD cross has diverged from the spread in expected policy rates, leaving the euro looking expensive (Chart 6). Since the beginning of the year, spreads have widened in favor of the dollar, while the USD has weakened. Although we do not expect the ECB to hike until mid-2019, our expectation of four Fed rate hikes this year will support the greenback. This will push spreads back in line. Such decoupling is not the norm, and we expect a 5% appreciation in the dollar in broad trade weighted terms.6 Chart 5Economic Surprises Favor The U.S. Chart 6EUR Looks Expensive Still, The Fed Could Surprise, And Tilt Dovish Chart 7A Policy Change Would##BR##Tolerate Higher Inflation A risk to our base case outlook is a change in the Fed's monetary policy framework. Here we note an increasing number of statements advocating the exploration of an alternative policy framework have been emerging from the Fed. This line of attack observes the Fed's current 2% inflation target is unsatisfactory, as it is too close to the zero-lower bound on interest rates, thus constraining the Fed's ability to exercise expansionary monetary policy when rates are low.7 Alternative policy proposals include price-level targeting, as well as an increase in the inflation target. Additionally, former Fed Chair Bernanke recently proposed a temporary price level target be implemented during low-rate periods.8 The net effect of these alternatives would be a higher inflation rate - above the current 2% target (Chart 7). If the Fed were to adopt a new monetary policy framework, it will likely occur before the next recession - in order to allow it to better respond to economic weakness. While we do not expect a regime change this year, these discussions and an eventual shift, may make the Fed more dovish this year, and more likely to tolerate higher inflation in the future. This would be an upside risk to gold, as it would assume its role as a store-of-value against higher inflation. The net effect of such a policy change - were it to occur - would be higher inflation expectations, lower real rates, and a weaker USD, all of which would bid up the gold market. Bottom Line: The revival of U.S. inflation and inflation expectations will bolster gold. However, our expectation that the Fed will continue hiking ahead of a realized uptick in inflation, and more aggressively than is currently priced in the market, will increase real rates and limit gold's upside potential. A stronger USD on the back of higher real rates, as well as a shift in global growth in favor of the U.S., will work against gold this year. Geopolitical Risks: Understated In 2018 We expect geopolitical risks to support gold prices this year. Gold's safe-haven attributes will be highlighted by a combination of events spread across the calendar year, which we believe will put a floor under the metal's price (Chart 8).9 Political and economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated this year (Chart 9). Our Geopolitical Strategists see this year's gold-relevant risks stemming from two main factors: (1) U.S. political risks, and (2) Exogenous tail risks. The former is likely to be a more significant source of upside pressure. Chart 8Gold Outperforms During##BR##Geopolitical Crises Chart 9Elevated Policy Uncertainty##BR##Supports Gold U.S. Foreign Strategy Risks Will Keep Gold Bid U.S. political risks are rooted in President Trump's strategic decisions, and boil down to two mutually exclusive schemes ahead of the midterm elections: Domestic Strategy or Foreign Strategy (Table 1). Our Geopolitical strategists note: "... policymakers often play "two-level games," with the domestic arena influencing what is possible in the international one. As Donald Trump loses political capital on the domestic front, his options for affecting policy will become constrained. However, the U.S. constitution places almost no constraints on the president when it comes to foreign policy."10 Trump's propensity to take on a more aggressive stance in foreign policy - which would be boosted by an unfavorable outcome in the immigration bill - will set the stage for a volatile year, supporting gold via its ability to hedge against geopolitical risks (Chart 10). Table 1Trump's Two-Level Game Chart 10Trump Will Look To Revive His Political Capital In addition to the U.S. political risks, many low-probability high-impact risks will keep volatility elevated this year and could support gold as a strategic portfolio hedge in 2018. Most notable are the following: A meaningful slowdown in China would have a negative impact on the global economy, as well as increase the risk of a monetary policy mistake in the U.S. The Fed's monetary policy decision is important for EM growth, while EM growth contributes to U.S. inflation, this feedback system makes the expected slowdown in Chinese growth relevant to the U.S. monetary stance. If China slows more than expected, this would reduce the global demand for commodities and goods, diminishing U.S. inflation expectations, potentially forcing the Fed to reassess its rate hike pace. If no adjustments are made, the Fed risks overshooting the equilibrium interest rate, increasing the risk of an equity correction. A downward rate hike adjustment, would keep the USD and real rates at low levels. A global oil-supply disruption caused by a collapse of the Venezuelan economy would lead to a short-lived spike in oil prices (Chart 11). In low-spare-capacity environments - as we are in today - oil prices become more responsive to supply shocks. Based on our simulations, a 600k b/d drop in Venezuelan oil supply in 2018 could spike oil prices by ~$10/bbl, leading to higher cost-push inflation. Our modelling shows U.S. CPI is highly responsive to oil price variation. This spike in headline inflation would push gold prices higher. Chart 11Cost-Push Inflation Risk From Venezuela Collapse In addition to U.S.-Iran tensions, we see other potential catalysts to instability in the Middle East - mainly regarding a severe deterioration of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, and Iraqi-Kurdish clashes ahead of Iraqi elections. Lastly, Europe: Italian elections and Euro-skepticism are a longer-term risk; however, news around the Italian elections in March has the potential to fuel talk of a potential breakup, which could lift gold.11 Bottom Line: Increased tensions due to Trump's controversial foreign strategy (China and Iran), as well as exogenous tail risks throughout the year will keep risks elevated in 2018, supporting gold prices. In fact our geopolitical strategists believe risks are understated this year, increasing the utility of gold's ability to hedge against political turmoil. Gold Outperforms In Equity Bear Markets In addition to its ability to hedge against rising inflation and increased geopolitical risks, gold outperforms during equity downturns and amid market volatility.12 Specifically, during periods of negative equity returns, gold outperformed the S&P500 79% of the time, with an average excess return of 3.7%. Furthermore, gold outperforms equities 60% of the time in periods of rising VIX with an average excess monthly return of 1.6% in these periods, and only 30% of the time in decreasing VIX periods with an average monthly excess return of -1.8% (Chart 12).13 We expect the equity bull market to remain intact throughout 2018. An equity downturn is not expected before 2H19. Nevertheless, we expect volatility to increase this year as investors fret about the sustainability of the bull market, and amid heightened geopolitical tensions. Moreover, domestic U.S. developments - e.g., the evolution of Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation; a larger-than-expected Democrat win in the midterm elections or a Fed policy mistake - could affect investor sentiment and trigger a rise in volatility and a temporary sell-off in S&P 500. In our view, consumer confidence is a key contributor to the current equity bull market and currently stands at very elevated levels (Chart 13). Thus, any meaningful disappointment could derail this high-confidence environment. Chart 12Gold Outperforms Amid##BR##Volatility & Equity Downturns Chart 13High Confidence##BR##Environment At Risk Therefore, we believe the larger-than-expected tail risks and the monetary and political risks in the U.S. are not fully reflected in the gold market (Chart 14). The above risks assessment would suggest a fatter right tail in out-of-the-money gold options. Chart 14Rising Volatility Will Support Gold Chart 15Understated Geopolitical Risks This Year Bottom Line: While geopolitical risks were overstated in 2017, they are understated this year (Chart 15). Thus we do not expect a repeat of last year's low-VIX high-confidence environment. Rather gold will gain support from increased equity volatility this year. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report titled "The Impact of Robots on Inflation," dated January 25, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "Three Tantalizing Trades - Four Months On," dated January 19, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled "It's Still All About Inflation," dated January 16, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Go Long Gold As A Strategic Portfolio Hedge," dated May 4, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "Four Key Questions On The 2018 Global Growth Outlook," dated January 5, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "The Indefatigable Euro," dated January 26, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "Fed Officials See Benefits In Letting Inflation Run Above Target," dated January 19, 2018, available at Bloomberg.com. 8 Please see https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/10/12/temporary-price-level-targeting-an-alternative-framework-for-monetary-policy/ 9 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold," dated October 12, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report titled "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For a comprehensive analysis of this issue, please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled "Five Black Swans In 2018," dated December 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Go Long Gold As A Strategic Portfolio Hedge," dated May 4, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 13 Excess returns = (Gold - S&P 500) monthly returns. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017

Overweight In a welcome reversal of fortunes, the S&P energy services index caught a bid last month, lifted by rising oil prices, healthy earnings and bullish 2018 forecasts. We think this is just the beginning for the beleaguered sector. OPEC crude oil production remains firmly in contraction territory with the mantle being taken up by non-OPEC producers (second panel), the key customer group for the energy services index. However, the increases have not been enough to offset the declines and OECD oil stocks have fallen for the past year, a trend that has sparked the biggest revival in oil patch capex in the last five years (third panel). In the context of the valuation pounding the sector has taken during the oil downturn, the rebound has a very long runway. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ENRE- SLB, HAL, FTI, NOV, BHGE, HP.

Highlights The U.S.'s twin deficits do not explain the drop in the USD; Global growth is the biggest factor for the USD, and growth depends on China's economic reforms; The U.S. is turning more hawkish on China trade despite Beijing's reform-induced vulnerability; U.S. and Chinese political dynamics suggest upside risks in the former and downside in the latter; Go long DXY. Feature American policymakers scrambled to walk back Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin's "weak dollar" comments last week. Investors were left to wonder why Mnuchin broke with the long-held official position of favoring a strong dollar. Was it a "shot across the bow" of China, warning Beijing that the U.S. would engage in currency manipulation if it was not given concessions on trade? Or was it an admission that the U.S. would run large "twin deficits" - a budget deficit and a current account deficit - going forward? We don't have a good explanation for what Mnuchin said in Davos.1 But we can say with some conviction that the "twin deficit" explanation, which has been brought up in almost every client conversation so far this year, is wrong. Chart 1Twin Deficits: Why The Panic? Chart 2Because The Narrative Is Scary First, who says that the U.S. is about to widen its twin deficit (Chart 1)? The concern arises periodically in the marketplace but is often grossly off the mark in predicting the path of deficits or the dollar (Chart 2). We expect the budget deficit to hold steady in 2018, if not contract. Why? Because the fiscal deficit almost always contracts in the eight quarters before a recession, barring, in some cases, one or two quarters just before the recession hits (Chart 3). Unless investors have a high-conviction view that a recession is afoot in the next two quarters, they should ignore the dire predictions about the U.S. budget deficit. Chart 3The Deficit Is Not A Problem... Yet Chart 4Bond Market Not Sniffing Out Any Twin Deficit Crisis If the risk to the U.S. economy is to the upside, as we believe due to the tax cuts and unleashing of animal spirits, then deficits will come down regardless of additional tax or spending policy.2 In the long term, yes, the budget deficit will almost certainly expand due to entitlement spending, the impact of automatic stabilizers during a recession, and the loss of revenue from tax cuts. But long-term deficit concerns are the purview of the bond market, not currency traders. So what is the bond market telling us? Chart 4 shows that the yield curve tends to steepen as the twin deficit widens; both tend to occur during and after recessions. Today, however, the curve continues to flatten. Another fixed-income market indicator that tends to track budget deficits is the 30-year swap spread, which falls during recessions as budget deficits expand. But today the swap spread is not falling, it is increasing and doing so at the fastest pace since the 2008 recession (Chart 5). This may be a sign of resurgent animal spirits as banks throw caution - and concerns over Obama-era overregulation - to the wind. Credit demand is rising in the economy, which should increase both the velocity of money and growth. Concerns over the widening fiscal deficit are not being reflected in this indicator. Finally, our currency strategist, Mathieu Savary, has pointed out that a widening twin deficit only impacts developed economies' currencies about 50% of the time over 12 month periods. In other words, expansion of the twin deficit predicts currency moves about as well as flipping a coin. What really matters is how central banks respond to the causes and economic effects of the twin deficits. Protectionism, on the other hand, ought to be bullish for the dollar.3 As such, a potential trade war between China and the U.S. should not be the reason for the dollar's deepening doldrums. And while we are generally open to alarmism on trade protectionism - due to the fact that President Trump has few constitutional or political constraints holding him back on this issue - there is still not enough evidence to say whether the Trump administration will impose across-the-board tariffs on China. (See next section.) Could dollar weakness, conversely, be the result of a Plaza Accord 2.0 orchestrated between Chinese and American policymakers to depreciate the greenback in order to avert the need for protectionist policies? We doubt it. First, the U.S. and China economic dialogue has faltered. Second, the dollar would not have declined following the Plaza Accord had the Fed not aggressively cut rates from 1984 to 1985 by 423 basis points (Chart 6). And the Fed is obviously not cutting rates today, it is hiking them. Chart 5No Sign Of Deficit Here Chart 6The Fed Is More Important Than Politics... So, what matters for the U.S. dollar? Higher domestic inflation would matter as it would incentivize the Fed to tighten more than the market expects. Even here, however, recent history warrants caution on this view. Between 2004 and 2006, the Fed tightened 440 basis points and yet the dollar declined 11% from the start of the tightening cycle to its end (Chart 7). This is because the rest of the world's growth outpaced U.S. growth, particularly that of emerging markets, which grew at an annual 19%. We therefore come full circle to the single biggest issue on our forecasting horizon: Chinese policy. China is the most important variable for the U.S. dollar at the moment as it can single-handedly tip the global growth balance back towards the U.S., given its expected contribution to global growth (Chart 8). Chart 7...But Not More Important Than Global Growth Chart 8China Really Matters For Global Growth Our view is that Chinese policymakers are acting as an accelerant to BCA's House View that the Chinese economy will experience a benign slowdown. Risks are skewed towards the downside. We recently dedicated our monthly Crow's Nest Webcast solely to this issue and we highly encourage our clients to listen to it on replay.4 In today's weekly, we briefly assess where our Chinese view stands and then turn to U.S. politics. News Flash: Chimerica Has Been Dead Since 2012 Two critical aspects of our China view are coming together. The first is U.S. policy, which is becoming more aggressive after a year in which Trump showed restraint for the sake of North Korean negotiations.5 The second is China's renewed focus on domestic economic reforms.6 The "symbiotic" relationship between the U.S. and China is in decay, as we have argued since 2012.7 As China's economy grows, so grows its capacity for challenging the United States in the strategic sphere (Chart 9). Meanwhile the two economies have diverged markedly since U.S. households began to deleverage in 2008 (Chart 10). Chart 9China's Capabilities Are Growing Chart 10China No Longer Addicted To U.S. Demand The mainstream media is about to become more attuned to this reality now that the Trump administration has published a series of high-level reports declaring that U.S. strategy toward China is changing. Here are a few choice quotations: "China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea." (Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018) "Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department." (Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018) "[High-level bilateral dialogues] largely have been unsuccessful - not because of failures by U.S. policymakers, but because Chinese policymakers were not interested in moving toward a true market economy." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "The United States also will take all other steps necessary to rein in harmful state-led, mercantilist policies and practices pursued by China, even when they do not fall squarely within WTO disciplines." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "The United States ... is seeking fundamental changes to China's trade regime, including the overarching industrial policies that have continued to dominate China's state-led economy." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor." (President Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017) We expect to find echoes of this tough rhetoric in Trump's State of the Union Address on January 30, which will air as we go to press. Already commentators have declared that the U.S. is entering a "post-engagement" phase in the U.S.-China relationship.8 The U.S. and China will continue to engage. What is important is the Trump administration's shift toward more aggressive economic statecraft. Trump's view, made amply clear on the campaign trail, and now officially U.S. policy, holds that China is a mercantilist as well as a revisionist power and that it has initiated a trade war against the U.S. Thus the real policy change lies not in naming China a "strategic competitor" antithetical to U.S. values, but in declaring that normal "WTO consistent" remedies are no longer sufficient and the U.S. will have to resort to "all other steps necessary." The question is whether the U.S., in adopting unilateral measures, will pursue trade remedies on an item-by-item basis, as it has done so far, or break out of the mold and levy broader tariffs to try to achieve "fundamental changes" as quoted above. Trump's recent tariffs on solar panels and washing machines adhered closely to U.S. institutional procedures and penalized U.S. ally South Korea as well as China: if this is the trajectory that the U.S. intends to take, then markets can breathe a sigh of relief.9 The basic trade data show that the U.S. has continued to expand imports from China despite past incidents of presidents slapping on tariffs (Chart 11). Chart 11China And U.S.: Ships Passing In The Night However, the U.S. is likely to draw a harder line than that. The same data also show that the U.S. is not gaining much access to the Chinese market over time, while China has greatly diminished its exposure both to exports and to U.S. trade as a whole. Furthermore, the Trump administration is accusing China of trying to gain superior technology from the U.S. in a way that jeopardizes its security and sovereignty in the pursuit of a better strategic position. This is said to include coercion and corruption of U.S. firms in China, favoring the manufacturing sector by squeezing out competition, preferring domestic-sourced goods over foreign goods, and jeopardizing U.S. companies' intellectual property and network security. The key grievances are forced technology transfer, the "Made in China 2025" industrial strategy, "indigenous innovation" rules, and the new Cyber-Security Law.10 A test case for the U.S.'s harder line will be the ongoing investigation into China's intellectual property theft, which is due by August but is expected to elicit action by Trump sooner. Trump has a range of actions he can take either within or without the WTO. Going outside the WTO would give him greater flexibility, for instance, to impose a "fine," as he called it, for the cumulative "big damages" of China's intellectual property theft - but it would also enable China to claim that the U.S. itself is violating WTO trade rules.11 How will China respond to this turn in U.S. policy? It will continue to focus on rebooting its economic reforms. Reform is both necessary for its own interests, as we have outlined in the past, and expedient in that it enables China to try to deflect and delay U.S. pressure.12 This is not to say that China will not retaliate to particular U.S. moves, but simply that it will prefer to minimize conflict unless and until the Trump administration demonstrates via broad and sweeping trade measures that Beijing has no choice but to engage in open trade war. China's recent declarations that it will accelerate economic reforms aimed at trade and investment openness - particularly in financial services but also more generally - are geared toward allaying Washington. Xi Jinping's right-hand economist, Liu He, who is a key figure, made this clear at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he said that China's reform and opening up this year would "exceed international expectations." Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang made a similar point late last year, saying that the "Made in China 2025" program would not discriminate against foreign or private firms.13 Simultaneously, leading technocrats are calling attention to China's vulnerability as it attempts delicate financial reforms. Guo Shuqing of the China Banking Regulatory Commission has warned of "black swan" or "gray rhino" events as he continues with his financial regulatory crackdown, and he has been echoed by the vice-secretary general of the National Development and Reform Commission.14 These statements are prudent - as it is always risky for highly leveraged countries to tinker with financial tightening - and useful because Beijing wants to warn the U.S. against pushing too hard since it is both "making progress" and vulnerable to instability. We certainly expect the reforms to have a significant, adverse impact on China's economic growth this year. In the latest developments, the policy crackdown is spreading to local governments, where fiscal tightening could ensue (Chart 12). Local governments lack stable sources of revenue, have large hidden debts, face an intensifying debt repayment schedule over the next three years, and have recently begun to cancel infrastructure projects under central government scrutiny (in Inner Mongolia, Gansu, and other provinces, and reportedly even in Xi's favored province of Zhejiang). Furthermore, the reforms have involved a crackdown on shadow lending that has sent non-bank credit into a steep decline (Chart 13). While some market estimates suggest that bank loans could grow by 13%-15% in 2018, such estimates cut against the policy grain. Assuming that non-bank credit does not grow any faster in 2018 than it did in 2017 (9.7%), China can afford to let new bank loans grow at 9.7% and still keep its total social financing (TSF) at its five-year annual average growth rate of 14.5%. Policymakers will not be able to soften their line easily, as several key players are newly appointed and must establish their credibility from the outset. Chart 12Local Government Finances Under Scrutiny Chart 13Shadow Bank Crackdown To Weigh On Credit Growth Our view is that Trump will harden the line despite China's promises both of deeper internal reforms and greater opening up. But the timing is impossible to predict. The real fireworks may be reserved until closer to the U.S. midterm election, as campaigning heats up in the fall. That would be the time for Trump to try to rally his voters by means of a clash of economic nationalisms with China. Beyond the top U.S. grievances cited above, we would highlight the U.S. approach toward China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Preferential policies for SOEs are a structural issue that the U.S. is now criticizing. At the party congress in October, President Xi Jinping pledged not only to reform the SOEs but also to make them bigger and stronger. Hence there is a potential collision course. The precise implementation of China's reforms could determine whether the U.S. pursues the issue further. China's State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission has so far reaffirmed Xi's comments at the party congress but, in keeping with the subtlety of Xi's policies, has also suggested there may be room to intensify reforms. The combination of Trump's economic policies, and China's intensifying reforms, will result in the U.S. economy outperforming expectations relative to China while U.S. corporations will outperform their Chinese counterparts (Chart 14). China will experience higher volatility, both in general and in relation to the U.S., and Chinese companies that suffer from reforms will underperform U.S. companies that benefit most from tax cuts (Chart 15). This is ironic given the popular narrative that the U.S. is suffering from chaotic democratic politics while China's centralized authoritarian model reigns triumphant. Of course, we do think Xi has key capabilities to drive reforms further in his second term than in his first, so these U.S.-China divergences will continue for the next 6-to-12 months at least. China's slowdown and increase in equity volatility should create a policy response: more fiscal spending and credit expansion. The comparison of relative U.S. and Chinese credit impulses suggests that China extends more credit as relative volatility rises (Chart 16). Our view, however, is that China's credit impulse will continue disappointing this year as Beijing prioritizes reform over growth. The credit numbers in January are the next data set to watch, in addition to the aforementioned local government spending. Investors should brace for more uncertainty as the Lunar New Year approaches (Feb. 16). Chart 14U.S. Earnings Surprise Relative To China Chart 15Xi Adds Volatility Relative To Trump Bump Chart 16China's Credit Impulse Disappoints Bottom Line: The Trump administration has issued an ultimatum of sorts on trade. Yet China claims to be redoubling its efforts at reforming and opening up its economy - party to deflect the pressure. We are almost certain that Trump will take further punitive actions, but it is too soon to say when or if he will engage in sweeping measures that threaten to destabilize China and thus initiate a trade war. The political context heading into the U.S. midterm vote will be crucial. Is America Having A Macron Moment? It is unfortunate when one's forecast is challenged only weeks after it is conceived. But that appears to be happening to our view, articulated in late December, that investors should expect no significant legislation to come out of Congress following the passage of the tax cuts.15 Bad news for our forecast is perhaps good news for U.S. policy initiatives and the overall quality of U.S. governance. President Trump has softened his stance on immigration, stating that he would be willing to grant citizenship to roughly 1.8 million "Dreamers" - young adults who came to the U.S. as illegal immigrants.16 Clearing the immigration hurdle would mean that Congress can focus on passing a budget for FY2018 that would see both defense and discretionary spending levels significantly raised. It would also relegate the never-ending saga of the debt ceiling to the dustbin, at least for the duration of this political cycle. Trump also followed up his immigration proposal by sketching a $1.7 trillion infrastructure investment plan (albeit a vague one). Chart 17Bipartisanship = Steeper Bull Market? Could we be approaching a "Macron moment" in U.S. politics? A moment when the "silent majority" rises up and sends a message to politicians that it has had enough of polarizing extremes? Previous such moments have included President Reagan's collaboration with congressional Democrats and President Clinton's with Republicans, which underpinned that glorious stock market run between August 12, 1982 and March 24, 2000 (Chart 17). Both presidents passed significant economic and social reforms during that time. Chart 18Peak Partisanship? Chart 19Independents On The Rise Yes, polarization remains at extreme levels (Chart 18), but that could also mean that it is reaching its natural limits. Rather than dwell on the high levels of polarization, which are baked into the "expectations cake," we would point out that the percentage of Americans who identify as independents is now fast approaching the combined total who identify as either Republican or Democrat (Chart 19). Ominously for Republicans - who hold both the House and the Senate - midterm electoral sweeps have almost always occurred along with the share of independents crossing the 40% mark (Table 1). Table 1Sweep Elections Coincide With High Independent Affiliation Meanwhile, President Trump's conciliatory tone on immigration was met with howls of protest from conservative activists. This is despite the fact that his proposal essentially exchanges leniency for Dreamers for considerably tougher immigration laws in general, which would align the U.S. with its developed market peers.17 Conservative activists are, however, massively out of step with the rest of America. Polls show that immigration is not high on the list of priorities for most Americans, and that most Americans continue to believe both that immigration is a positive and that immigration intake should remain at current levels (Chart 20). Chart 20Americans Are Neither Anti-Immigrant Nor All That Concerned About Immigration Our gut call that President Trump was itching to move to the political middle appears to be correct.18 Whether this becomes investment relevant will ultimately depend on whether the Democrats reciprocate. If Democrats go by data, they will. The government shutdown imbroglio has cost them a double-digit lead in the generic congressional ballot (Chart 21). As a political strategy, the shutdown was a miserable failure. Furthermore, the 2016 election stands as clear evidence that "outrage" does not work. Clinton picked up almost a million more voters in California than President Obama yet failed to beat his performance where it mattered: the Midwest. If Democrats continue to run on a "resistance" platform in order to satisfy their activist base, they will fail to win the House. Chart 21Government Shutdown An 'Own Goal' For Dems Ironically, the best strategy for Democrats ahead of the midterm election is to cooperate with Trump. The swelling ranks of independent voters will reward them if they do so. That same strategy, however, will paradoxically boost Trump's chances in 2020. Bottom Line: The market is, of course, ideologically nihilist. But a move to the middle - which benefits everyone involved except House Republicans - would be positive for stocks and the economy. Key bellwethers going forward are how Democrats react to Trump's immigration proposal and whether Trump moves to the middle on trade deals, starting with NAFTA, whose sixth round of negotiations just ended inconclusively (although not negatively) in Montreal. Investment Implications From the perspective of global asset allocation, the most important issue today is Chinese economic and regulatory policy. Yes, U.S. inflation is important, but whether it moves the dollar - and therefore commodities and EM assets - will depend on the pace of the current Chinese slowdown. China is therefore the most "diagnostic variable" in 2018. If our House View that inflation is coming back in the U.S. is right and our Geopolitical Strategy view that risks to growth in China are to the downside is also right, then investors should go long the U.S. dollar and underweight EM and EM-leveraged assets. If, on the other hand, we are wrong, then investors should load up with EM risk assets to the hilt right now. It is that simple. For what it is worth, we are putting our moderate-conviction view to the test and opening a long DXY trade. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 But on a completely unrelated note we would like to remind our clients that, over the past 24 months, Mr. Mnuchin was the executive producer of How to Be Single, Midnight Special, Batman v. Superman: Dawn of Justice, Keanu, The Conjuring 2, Central Intelligence, The Legend of Tarzan, Lights Out, Suicide Squad, Sully, Storks, The Accountant, Rules Don't Apply, The Lego Batman Movie, Fist Fight, CHiPs, Going in Style, Unforgettable, King Arthur: Legend of the Sword, Wonder Woman, The House, Annabelle: Creation, The Lego Ninjago Movie, and The Disaster Artist. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, and Weekly Reports, "Trump and Trade," December 9, 2016, and "The Elusive Gains From Globalization," dated November 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Webcasts, Geopolitical Strategy Crow's Nest, "China: How Is Our View Working Out?" dated January 25, 2018. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2017 Report Card," dated December 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, and "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, and "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Daniel H. Rosen, "A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship," Rhodium Group, January 19, 2018, available at rhg.com. 9 In fact, in the case of washing machines, the U.S.-based GE Appliances stands to gain from the tariff and has been owned by China's Haier Electronics Group since 2016. 10 Several clients have asked us about China's Cyber-Security Law, which has been in the process of implementation since July 2017 and will go fully into effect by the end of 2018. The law is meant to give the Chinese government the option of exercising control over all networks in the country. State security agencies are deeply involved in its enforcement and oversight. Foreign business interests fear that the law's new obligations will be onerous and potentially damaging - including potential violations of corporate security over intellectual property, source code, supply chain details, and data storage and transmission. 11 Please see Stephen E. Becker, Nancy Fischer, and Sahar Hafeez, "Update on US Investigation of China's IP Practices," Lexology, January 8, 2018, available at www.lexology.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech," dated October 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Wang has served as the top interlocutor with the U.S. in the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue. 14 Please see "China eyes black swans, gray rhinos as 2018 growth seen slowing to 6.5-6.8 percent: media," Reuters, January 28, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. "Gray rhinos," coined by author Michele Wucker, refer to high-probability, high-impact risks, whereas the proverbial "black swan" is a low-probability, high-impact risk. These terms have both been making the rounds more frequently in Chinese policymaking circles since last year. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 What is fascinating about Trump's statement is that he cited the 1.8 million figure. There are actually only about 800,000 people who officially participated in President Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. But estimates suggest that another 1,000,000 young adults are in the U.S. illegally, yet did not register. Trump has come under criticism from conservative, anti-immigration groups for essentially moving the goalposts beyond what even the Democrats had wanted. 17 Canada, for example, has a purely merit-based immigration system that is considerably tough on family reunification. (Reunification has even been suspended because of a large backlog.) In Europe, family reunification laws are extremely strict. Even spouses are not automatically allowed residency status in several major European countries unless they fulfill various conditions. 18 Please see footnote 2 above.

Highlights A potential rise in U.S. inflation and China's growth slowdown represent formidable headwinds to EM risk assets. A manifestation of these tectonic macro shifts will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices. These two will dent the EM risk asset rally. Strong DM growth will not offset the impact of a slower Chinese economy on EMs and commodities. A new fixed-income trade: bet on a steeper swap curve in Mexico relative to Canada. Feature The global macro landscape in 2018 will be shaped by the two tectonic shifts: U.S. fiscal stimulus amid vigorous growth, and policy tightening in China amid lingering credit and money excesses. The former will grease the wheels of the already robust U.S. economy, generating a whiff of inflation and fueling a further selloff in the U.S. bond market. China's tightening will in turn weigh on commodities prices and curtail the emerging market (EM) economic recovery. A manifestation of these tectonic macro shifts will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices producing formidable headwinds to EM risk assets. As such, we are reiterating our recommendation to underweight EM risk assets versus their DM peers. As to the absolute performance, we believe EM risk assets are close to a major market top. A Whiff Of U.S. Inflation Strong U.S. growth could in fact be damaging to EM financial markets, as it will likely augment U.S. consumer price inflation. Investors are currently extremely sanguine on U.S. inflationary pressures. An upside surprise to inflation will lift U.S. interest rate expectations further, supporting the greenback and hurting EM carry trades. There is some evidence that U.S. inflation is about to pick up: The New York Federal Reserve underlying inflation gauge is rising, signaling higher inflation ahead (Chart I-1). The nascent revival in the MZM (money of zero maturity) impulse presages a trough in inflation (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Fed Price Pressure Gauge Signifies Higher Inflation Chart I-2U.S. Money Growth And CPI The weak U.S. dollar will also help augment inflation in America. U.S. import prices from emerging Asia and Mexico have been rising - even before the latest carnage in the U.S. dollar (Chart I-3). This will filter through into higher domestic price pressures. Chart I-3U.S. Import Prices Are Rising In brief, fiscal stimulus amid buoyant growth as well as overwhelming optimism among consumers and businesses is creating fertile ground for companies to raise prices. This will amplify corporate profit growth but will also lead to higher inflation. We are not making a case that U.S. inflation is about to surge. Our thesis is that market participants are very complacent on inflation. The money market is pricing in only 96 basis points in rate hikes in 2018-'19. In the meantime, the term premium in the U.S. yield curve is extremely depressed. Therefore, even modest inflation surprises will likely produce an additional meaningful selloff in U.S./DM bond markets. Will global share prices rise in response to strong corporate profit growth, or sell off in the face of higher U.S. inflation? Our hunch is that share prices will suffer as rising bond yields cause multiples to shrink. Rising bond yields will overpower the profit growth impact on share prices. The basis is that multiples are disproportionately and inversely linked to percentage change interest rates but are proportionately and positively linked to EPS.1 At still-low yields, a 50-basis-point rise in bond yields constitutes a sizable percentage change in the bond yield, likely leading to a meaningful P/E de-rating. Current sky-high bullish sentiment towards equities combined with elevated valuations and overbought conditions will mean that even a modest rise in inflation readings will likely trigger equity market jitters. EMs will underperform DMs amid such a selloff, as the former has benefited much more than the latter from low interest rates. Bottom Line: U.S. fiscal stimulus is arriving at a time when final demand is robust, the labor market is tight and business and consumer confidence is buoyant. This will encourage companies to raise prices, resulting in a whiff of U.S. inflation. The latter will rattle markets in the months ahead. China: Tightening Amid Credit/Money Excesses Inflation in China has already been steadily rising (Chart I-4). Interest rates adjusted for inflation remain low. Rising inflation along with still-lingering credit and money excesses necessitates policy tightening. We have written extensively about China's ongoing tightening trifecta - liquidity tightening, increased regulatory oversight and clampdown as well as an anti-corruption crackdown in the financial industry.2 Regulatory tightening in particular could inflict a particular bite as it outright constrains banks' ability to originate credit. This tightening has already led to record low broad money growth, and credit growth is downshifting too (Chart I-5). The cumulative impact of this tightening will play out in the months ahead, weighing further on money and credit growth and ultimately on final demand. Chart I-4China: Inflation Is In Steady Uptrend Chart I-5China: Broad Money And Credit Growth On the fiscal front, local government spending has languished in recent months (Chart I-6, top panel) and general (central plus local) government spending growth has been lackluster (Chart I-6, bottom panel). In 2017, local government annual spending amounted to RMB 19 trillion, or 22% of nominal GDP. Central government expenditures are about 6-fold smaller. Local governments rely on land sales to replenish their coffers, but timid money growth points to weaker land sales ahead (Chart I-7). In the meantime, their annual borrowing is restricted by the central government. Overall, this will constrain local government expenditures in 2018. Chart I-6China: Government Expenditures Chart I-7China: Land Sales To Slump The combined credit and fiscal spending impulse heralds a relapse in mainland imports of goods and commodities (Chart I-8). This constitutes a major threat to commodities prices, and consequently to EM. A pertinent question is whether financial markets will react to rising U.S. inflation or a slowdown in Chinese growth. Clearly, one could argue that strong U.S. growth would offset a mainland growth slump, resulting in a stable global macro environment. However, financial markets are an emotional discounting mechanism, and they do not always follow rational thinking. For example, in the first half of 2008 - just a few months ahead of the Global Financial Crisis - global financial markets were preoccupied with mounting global inflation due to strong growth in EM/China. At the time, oil and many other commodities prices were literally surging, and U.S. bond yields were climbing (Chart I-9). Global financial markets were not concerned with the ongoing U.S. recession, shrinking bank loans and deflating house prices. Chart I-8China's Impact On Rest Of The World Chart I-92008: An Inflation Scare Just ##br##Before Deflationary Bust In retrospect, financial markets traded on the theme of rising global inflation in the first half of 2008 even though the U.S. was already in a recession, and was heading into the most severe deflationary bust of the past 80 years. Similarly, the financial markets today could trade on the U.S. inflation theme for a couple months, even though China will be slowing. Bottom Line: China's policy tightening is particularly dangerous because it is occurring amid substantial and still-lingering credit, money and property market excesses. Won't Strong DM Growth Support China And Other EMs? Our investment stance on EM has been and remains negative, despite our positive view on U.S. and European growth. The key rationale for this stance is that EMs are much more leveraged to China than to the U.S. and Europe. Hence, our view assumes de-synchronization of growth between EM and DM. In our opinion, an EM slowdown will be largely due to China's deceleration and the latter's impact on commodities prices and non-commodity economies in Asia via trade. South America, Russia, South Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia are commodities producers, and as such are sensitive to fluctuations in commodities prices. The rest of Asia - Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines - are still exposed to the mainland economy as the latter is their largest export destination. Thus out of the EM sphere, China's dynamics will have a limited impact on only Mexico, India, and Turkey. However, Mexico is at risk of a NAFTA abrogation, while Turkey is at risk of runaway inflation and monetary profligacy. India on the other hand has its own problems and its bourse is unlikely to do well, given it is overbought and expensive. Furthermore, while we are bullish on the growth outlook in central European economies, they are too small to matter from an EM benchmark perspective. It might be useful to contemplate the late 1990s macro dynamics when major decoupling occurred between DM and EM. The booming economies of the U.S. and Europe did not prevent recurring crises in EM in the second half of the 1990s. Chart I-10 illustrates that U.S. and European imports growth was surging at that time, but EM stocks and currencies collapsed. What's more, despite the economic boom in DM during that period - U.S. and euro area real GDP growth rates averaged 4.2% and 2.6%, respectively, between 1996 and 1998 - commodities prices were in a bear market (Chart I-11). Chart I-10EM Crises In 1997-98: U.S. And ##br##Europe's Imports Were Booming Chart I-11Booming DM GDP And ##br##Falling Commodities Prices One might suspect that EM crises in the second half of the 1990s occurred because booming DM growth led to rising U.S. bond yields. However, Chart I-12 portrays that U.S. bond yields actually fell in 1997 and 1998 due to the deflationary shock stemming from the EM turmoil. Chart I-12EM Crises Occurred Amid ##br##Falling U.S. Bond Yields By and large, the 1997-98 EM crises occurred despite buoyant DM growth and falling DM bond yields. Nowadays, advanced economies carry much smaller weight in global trade and GDP than they did 20 years ago. Furthermore, EMs are much less dependent on exporting to DMs than they were two decades ago. In addition, China was not an economic powerhouse 20 years ago like it is today, and it did not buy as much from the rest of EMs as it does today. Presently, China holds the key to the EM outlook, and the link is through Chinese imports of goods and commodities. As China's credit and fiscal spending impulse suggests, mainland imports are likely to slow, weighing on commodities prices (refer to Chart I-8 on page 6). To be sure, we are not suggesting that EMs are facing crises similar to what transpired in 1997-98. The point of this comparison is to highlight that robust DM growth in of itself is not sufficient to head off an EM downturn if the latter faces a negative shock from China. With respect to DM growth benefiting China itself, it is critical to realize that China's exports to the U.S. and EU together account for only 6.6% of Chinese GDP (Chart I-13). By far, the largest component of the mainland economy is capital spending, constituting 42% of GDP. Construction and infrastructure are an integral part of capital expenditures, and they are very sensitive to money/credit cycles. Finally, from a global trade perspective, China and the rest of EM account for 46% of global imports, while the U.S. and EU account for 20% and 15%, respectively (Chart I-14). Hence, the total import bill of EM including China is larger than that of the U.S.'s and EU's imports combined. This entails that the pace of global trade growth is set to moderate if EM/China domestic demand decelerates. Chart I-13What Drives Chinese Economy: ##br##Capex Not Exports To DM Chart I-14Important Of EM/China In Global Trade Bottom Line: Strong DM growth will not offset the impact of a slower Chinese economy on EMs and commodities. Investment Conclusions A manifestation of the above-discussed tectonic macro shifts - a rise in U.S. inflation and China's slowdown - will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices. These two macro shifts will produce a perfect storm for EM risk assets. As a harbinger of a forthcoming selloff in EM exchange rates and DM commodities currencies (AUD, NZD and CAD), their implied volatility measures are already picking up (Chart I-15). As to a China/Asia slowdown, Korean, Taiwanese and Singaporean manufacturing output volume growth rates have already relapsed (Chart I-16). Their exports and corporate profits still appear robust because of rising prices. This certifies that there are inflationary pressures, even in Asia. Chart I-15Currency VOLs Are Rising Chart I-16Asian Manufacturing Output Volume All in all, we maintain a negative stance on EM risk assets in absolute terms and recommend underweighting them versus their DM peers. Within the EM universe, our equity market overweights are Taiwan, India, Korean technology, Thailand, Russia, central Europe and Chile. Our underweights are South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Peru and Malaysia. Among currencies, our favorite shorts are the TRY, the ZAR, the MYR and the BRL. For investors who prefers relative EM currency trades, we recommend the following longs for crosses: RUB, TWD, THB, CNY and INR. For fixed-income trades, please refer to our open position table on page 18. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Mexico: Bet On A Steeper Swap Curve Relative To Canada For Mexican financial markets, the key uncertainty at the moment is the outcome of the ongoing NAFTA negotiations. Mexico's macro backdrop argues for considerable central bank easing, as inflation is about to roll over and domestic demand is extremely weak. However, if the U.S. pulls out of NAFTA - the odds of which are considerable, as our Geopolitical Strategy team has argued3 - the peso will sell off and interest rates are likely to rise. How should investors position themselves in Mexican fixed-income markets given this binominal outcome from the NAFTA negotiations and uncertainty over its timing? One way is to position for a swap curve steepening in Mexico, and hedge it by betting on a swap curve flattening in Canada by entering the following pair trades (Chart II-1): Chart II-1Mexico, Canada And Their ##br##Relative Swap Curve Receive 6-month and pay 10-year swap rates in Mexico Pay 6-month and receive 10-year swap rates in Canada In A Scenario Where The U.S. Withdraws From NAFTA: The Mexican swap curve would invert due to short-term rates going up more than long-term rates. In Canada, potential risks from NAFTA abrogation and tightening monetary policy amid frothy property markets and high household debt will cap upside in its long-term interest rates. With its long-term bond swap rates at par with those in the U.S., it seems as though the Canadian fixed income market is underpricing the risk of potential growth disappointments beyond the near run. In essence, should the U.S. withdraw from NAFTA, the loss realized on the Mexican steepener leg would partially be offset by the potential gain on the Canadian flattener leg. In A Scenario Where The U.S. Does Not Withdraw From NAFTA: The Mexican swap curve would start steepening. The rationale is that domestic dynamics suggest inflation has peaked and Banxico should begin its easing cycle soon. Monetary and fiscal policies have been extremely restrictive in Mexico, and considerable monetary easing is justified going forward: A significant part of the rise in inflation in 2017 was caused by peso depreciation in 2016. Last year's peso rally suggests that inflation should start to roll over soon (Chart II-2). Besides, one-off effects on inflation - such as the gasoline subsidy removal that took place at the end of 2016 - will subside as the base effect it has caused fades. In brief, the consumer inflation rate will rapidly decline, justifying substantial monetary easing. Banxico's 425 basis points in rate hikes since the end of 2015 are still filtering through the economy. The persistent slowdown in money and credit growth will continue to weigh on domestic demand for the time being. Notably, retail sales volume and gross fixed capital formation are both contracting while domestic vehicles sales are shrinking sharply (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Mexico: Inflation Is Set To Drop Chart II-3Mexico: Consumer And Business ##br##Spending Are Extremely Weak Due to currently high inflation, real wage growth remains weak. This will continue to weigh on consumer spending (Chart II-4). Fiscal policy has been tightening. Fiscal expenditures, excluding interest payments, are contracting in nominal terms (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Mexico: Real Wage Growth Is Very Timid Chart II-5Mexico: Fiscal Policy Is Super Tight Canada is currently on the opposite side of the business cycle spectrum relative to Mexico. The Canadian economy is very strong, being led by domestic demand. Real consumer spending is growing at its fastest pace in nearly 10 years, while the unemployment rate is at 40-year lows. Moreover, a record proportion of Canadian firms are having difficulty meeting demand because of capacity constraints and a tight labor market (Chart II-6, top and middle panel). Chart II-6Canadian Economy Is ##br##Above Full-Employment As such, the output gap is positive and growing, which has historically led to rising inflation (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Robust growth and rising inflation will force the Bank of Canada to hike rates further. In the meantime, real estate and consumer credit in Canada are overextended, leaving the Canadian consumer at risk from much higher interest rates. The threat that monetary tightening will hurt domestic demand in the future will cap the swap curve in Canada relative to Mexico. On the whole, in the scenario where the U.S. remains in NAFTA, the potential for swap curve steepening in Canada is less than in Mexico. Investment Recommendations We have been recommending that investors maintain a neutral stance across all asset classes in Mexico and wait for clarity on NAFTA negotiations before going overweight the country's currency, fixed-income markets and possibly equities relative to their EM peers. In the face of lingering NAFTA uncertainty, fixed-income investors should contemplate the following relative trade: Receive 6-month and pay 10-year swap rates in Mexico / pay 6-month and receive 10-year swap rates in Canada. Overall, this trade is exposed to minimal losses in the scenario where the U.S. withdraws from NAFTA but is exposed to considerable gains where the U.S. remains in NAFTA, making the overall risk/reward attractive. Provided the NAFTA negotiations could drag till year-end, this trade offers a reasonable risk-reward for traders. It offers a profitable opportunity to profit from Mexico's swap curve steepening, while limiting downside in case NAFTA is terminated before year-end. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 This is due to the fact that interest rates are in the denominator of the Gordon Growth model while EPS/dividends are in the numerator. 2 Please refer to Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Questions For Emerging Markets," dated November 29, 2017, the link is available on page 19. 3 Please refer to the Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, titled "Nafta - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, the link is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Neutral Prior to our midsummer upgrade to neutral, our key concern for the S&P chemicals index was that perennial overcapacity would put a ceiling on margin improvement. Since then surging global demand growth has driven producer prices sky high (second panel), in line with our expectations. More surprising is the newly-found industry discipline which has thus far refrained from splurging on new capacity (third panel), likely assisted by a wave of consolidation in the space. The upshot is that our productivity proxy has perked up to its highest level in nearly a decade, as have sell-side earnings expectations. While it remains too early for us to turn bullish, the outlook has certainly brightened for chemicals; maintain a neutral stance. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CHEM - APD, ARG, CF, DOW, EMN, ECL, DD, FMC, IFF, LYB, MON, MOS, PPG, PX, SHW.

Highlights Duration Checklist: Our Duration Checklists continue to point to a bearish backdrop for global bond yields. A continued below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance is warranted. There is not enough of a difference between the U.S. & European portions of the Checklist to suggest a big imminent move in the U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread is in the cards. UST-Bund Spread: A big cyclical turn in the Treasury-Bund spread is coming, but not before the ECB begins to seriously signal an end to its asset purchases and the Fed delivers a few more rate hikes. There will be better levels to move to a long Treasury/short Bund position by the summer. Feature Chart of the WeekUST-Bund Gap Still##BR##Reflects Policy Differences With the 10-year yield on both U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds hitting new cyclical highs on an intraday basis yesterday (2.72% and 0.70%, respectively), it is clear that the backdrop for global government bond markets is still bearish. The yield differential between the two markets remains quite wide, however, with the cyclical European economic performance rapidly catching up to that in the U.S. This is raising the odds that European Central Bank (ECB) will have to soon begin signaling a move to a less accommodative policy stance that will raise European bond yields further away from historically low levels. The continued strength of the Euro versus the U.S. dollar is a sign that investors are already expecting a big compression in U.S. bond yields versus European equivalents (Chart of the Week). Should investors position now for an eventual tightening of the Treasury-Bund spread? Or is it possible that the spread widens even further, thus providing a better entry point to profit from a spread tightening move? In this Weekly Report, we investigate the drivers of the Treasury-Bund spread to provide some clues as to its future direction. Our conclusion is that, from a medium-term strategic perspective, a narrowing of the Treasury-Bund spread is highly probable, but there is still potential for widening in the next few months. Checking In On Our Duration Checklist: Still Bearish, But With No Big Signal For U.S.-German Spreads In early 2017, we introduced a list of indicators to monitor in order to determine if our strategic below-benchmark duration stance on U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds should be maintained.1 This list, which we dubbed our "Duration Checklist", contained elements focused on economic growth, inflation, central bank policy biases, investor risk appetite and bond market technicals. The vast majority of indicators in the Checklist have accurately pointed to a cyclical backdrop for rising yields throughout the past year, despite the surprising drop in global inflation witnessed in 2017 (Table 1). Table 1The Message From Our Duration Checklist Is Still Bearish For Both USTs & Bunds With bond yields hitting fresh cyclical highs this week, it is a good time to provide another update of our Duration Checklist to see how conditions have changed since our last update in September. Specifically, we are looking for any differences in the individual U.S. and European components of the Checklist that can inform our view on the UST-Bund spread. Global growth momentum is accelerating to the upside. The global leading economic indicator (LEI) continues to climb steadily higher, even with global growth already in a solid uptrend (Chart 2). The global ZEW index, measuring investor sentiment towards growth in the major developed economies, has started to accelerate. The Citigroup Global Data Surprise index is at the highest level since 2004 (!), while our global credit impulse indicator has picked up sharply - both of which should keep global bond yields under upward pressure. We are giving a "check" to all these elements of our Duration Checklist, indicating that a defensive stance on overall duration exposure should be maintained. The only indicator in the "global" section of our Duration Checklist that is not pointing to higher bond yields is our global LEI diffusion index, which has fallen to just below the 50 line. This suggests a potential narrowing of the breadth of the current global upturn, which warrants an "x" in the Checklist. Domestic economic growth in both the U.S. and Euro Area remains solid. Manufacturing PMIs in both the U.S. (the ISM index) and Europe remain high and are rising, as is consumer and business confidence on both sides of the Atlantic (Charts 3 & 4). Corporate profit growth is solid both in the U.S. and Europe, with our models suggesting that earnings should expand at a double-digit pace again in 2018. All these indicators earn a "check" in our Duration Checklist. Chart 2Majority Of Global Growth Indicators##BR##Still Pointing To Higher Yields Chart 3U.S. Growth##BR##Remains Solid Chart 4A Booming European##BR##Economy Is Bearish For Bunds Inflation signals are mixed both in the U.S. and Europe. This remains the portion of our Checklist that has the greatest number of conflicting signals. While the rapid rise in oil prices over the past several months is putting upward pressure on headline U.S. inflation (Chart 5), the equally fast increase in the EUR/USD exchange rate is helping offset much of that increase in the Euro Area (Chart 6). Unemployment is below the OECD's estimate of the full employment NAIRU rate in the U.S., yet both Average Hourly Earnings growth and the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker are decelerating. Unemployment in the Euro Area is now back to the OECD'S NAIRU level for the first time since the Great Recession, but wage inflation has only risen modestly. Chart 5U.S. Inflation Still Subdued,##BR##Despite Higher Oil & Low Unemployment Chart 6A Puzzling Lack Of##BR##Euro Area Core Inflation For the U.S. inflation side of our Checklist, we are giving a "ü" to the accelerating oil price (in U.S. dollar terms) and the unemployment gap, but an "x" to decelerating wage inflation. In the Euro Area, we give a "check" to the unemployment gap and a weak "check" to wage inflation which is in a mild uptrend. The stable momentum in the Euro-denominated Brent oil price earns an "x" in the Checklist, however. Both the Fed and ECB Are Looking To Tighten Monetary Policy. The Fed remains in a tightening cycle and with U.S. growth strong, core inflation bottoming out and the labor market still tight, there is no reason why the Fed should not deliver on its projected three rate hikes in 2018. The ECB just reduced the size of its monthly asset purchases in response to the robust Euro Area economic growth and modest pickup in inflation. The latest comments from various ECB officials suggests that, if core inflation rebounds after the recent unusual dip, then additional moves to less accommodative monetary policy (tapering first, rate hikes later) should be expected. So for both the U.S. and Europe, we place a "check" in this portion of the Duration Checklist. Investors risk appetite remains strong. The surge in global stock markets seen so far in 2018 has definitely played a role in the backup in global bond yields, as investors have been allocating out of fixed income into equities. Within our Duration Checklist framework, a bearish signal for bonds occurs if the percentage deviation of equity indices from their 200-day moving average is positive but is not yet at 10% - a stretched level that has typically preceded significant equity corrections. The S&P 500 index is now 14% above its 200-day average, and thus earns an "x" in that element of the Duration Checklist. The other parts of the U.S. side of the Checklist - tight corporate bond spreads and a low level of the VIX volatility index - both warrant a "check" as an indication of intense investor risk appetite that lessens the appeal of government bonds (Chart 7). In the Euro Area, the Stoxx 600 index is only 4% above its 200-day moving average, but with tight credit spreads and a low level of the VStoxx volatility index (Chart 8). All these elements earn a "check" in our Duration Checklist. Chart 7High Risk Appetite In the U.S.,##BR##But Risk Assets Look Stretched Chart 8Still A Pro-Risk Bias##BR##Among Euro Area Investors Bond market momentum is not overly stretched, although short positioning is an issue. In the U.S., the 10-year Treasury yield is only 35bps above its 200-day moving average, well below the 90-100bps levels seen at previous yield peaks (Chart 9). Price momentum for the 10-year is right on the zero line, suggesting no stretched extreme that would precede a reversal. Both of those indicators earn a "check" in the Checklist. Positioning is a problem in the U.S., however, with the CFTC data on Treasury futures showing a net short position on the 10-year contract among speculators. From the point of view of our Duration Checklist, a big net short is a bullish signal for bonds from a contrarian perspective. Thus, positioning warrants an "x" in the U.S. side of the Checklist. In Europe, the 10-year Bund yield is now 22bps above its 200-day moving average. This is below the previous peaks around the 50bps level. Price momentum is also hovering just above the zero line and is no impediment to a move higher in yields (Chart 10). Both of these pieces of the Duration Checklist score a "check". Note that due to a lack of available data, we do not include a positioning component on the European side of the Checklist. Chart 9USTs Not Oversold,##BR##But Positioning Getting Stretched Chart 10Bunds Not Yet At##BR##Oversold Extremes The net conclusion from our Duration Checklist is that the majority of indicators continue to point to upward pressure on U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields. Thus, a below-benchmark duration stance is still warranted for both markets. There are only a few potentially bullish signals in the Checklist. The overshoot in U.S. equity markets and the large net short position in Treasury futures are both sending a more positive signal for Treasuries, while the more stable momentum in the Euro denominated oil price is also a positive for Bunds. None of those is enough to prompt a change in our recommended below-benchmark duration stance. At the same time, there is not enough of a difference between the U.S. and European sides of the Checklist to provide a signal for the future direction of the Treasury-Bund spread. For that, we must dig a bit deeper into the drivers of that spread, which we cover in the next section. Bottom Line: Our Duration Checklists continue to point to a bearish backdrop for global bond yields. A continued below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance is warranted. There is not enough of a difference between the U.S. & European portions of the Checklist to suggest a big imminent move in the U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread is in the cards. How To Play The Treasury-Bund Spread - Tactically Wider, Structurally Narrower The Treasury-Bund spread, like most cross-country bond yield spreads, is driven mostly by economic growth and inflation differentials. In the past, the U.S. and European economic cycles have rarely been in sync, which creates gaps in growth, inflation and monetary policy between the two regions. This usually leads to the Fed and ECB (and the Bundesbank before it) rarely having interest rates at similar levels, or moving at a similar pace, thus creating large cyclical swings in the Treasury-Bund spread. At the moment, however, the 200bp gap between 10-year Treasuries and German Bunds mostly reflects the 4.6 percentage point gap between the unemployment rates in the U.S. and Europe. The spread has been far less correlated to the difference in inflation rates between the two economies. Reported headline inflation in the U.S. is only 30bps above the same measure in Europe, with core inflation only 60bps higher in the U.S. (Chart 11). The latter may be more critical for the future direction of the Treasury-Bund spread, however. The dip in Euro Area core inflation back below the 1% level at the end of 2017 was a surprise given the strength of European growth last year, with real GDP reaching a well-above potential pace of 2.8%. Core inflation must rise from the current 0.9% level for the ECB to consider any move to a tighter monetary policy stance, as this would give the central bank confidence that its 2% inflation target would be reached in the medium-term. The markets seem to be pricing in a recovery of Euro Area core inflation in the coming months. Our Euro Area months-to-hike indicator, which measures the number of months until the first full 25bp rate hike is priced into the EUR Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve, is now down to 17 months. As the interest rate markets have pulled forward the date of the next ECB rate hike to June 2019, the currency markets have followed suit with the euro rallying to a 3-year high last week (Chart 12). Chart 11Big Gaps Between Yields & Unemployment,##BR##Small Gaps In Inflation Chart 12Markets Are Acting Like##BR##Core Inflation Will Rebound In Europe A rebound in Euro Area core inflation is the first step towards seeing a convergence of the Treasury-Bund spread. The key is how the ECB responds to that move. Looking across the full spectrum of maturities, the moves in the yield gap between U.S. Treasuries and German government bonds have historically occurred alongside changes in relative inflation expectations (Chart 13). This makes sense, as to the extent that inflation expectations were climbing at a faster rate in the U.S. than in Europe, the market would price in a higher future Fed funds rate relative to European policy rates and, thus, widen the Treasury-Bund spread (and vice versa). That correlation between relative inflation expectations and the Treasury-Bund spread has broken down in recent years. The specific timing of that breakdown can be traced back to the August 2014 speech given by Mario Draghi at the Fed's Jackson Hole conference, marked by the vertical line in Chart 13. In that speech, Draghi introduced the idea that the ECB could begin buying government bonds to fight deflation pressures in Europe. That sent a powerful signal to the markets not to expect any movement in European policy rates for some time - the typical response seen in recent years to an announcement by a central bank that it was ramping up asset purchases. If Euro Area core inflation begins to rise in the coming months, the ECB's "forward guidance" can start to work in reverse. The ECB will be forced to signal further reductions in its asset purchases, likely all the way to zero in a full taper scenario. Markets will then begin to price in both higher inflation expectations and ECB rate hikes, resulting in a normalization of the Treasury-Bund spread through higher Bund yields. Until that inflation upturn happens in Europe, however, it will be difficult to get much of a tightening of the Treasury-Bund spread. In Chart 14, we present the spread versus the difference between policy rates in the U.S. and Europe (top panel), the ratio of the U.S. and Euro Area unemployment rates (middle panel), and the gap between U.S. and European headline inflation (bottom panel). At the moment, the Treasury-Bund spread is being held at an elevated level by the relative unemployment rates, with the spread looking wide versus the inflation differential. The much lower U.S. unemployment rate, which is driving the Fed to continue slowly hiking interest rates while the ECB keeps policy rates near zero, is preventing any meaningful decline in the Treasury-Bund spread. Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Has Divorced##BR##From Inflation During ECB QE Chart 14UST-Bund Spread Reflects Policy##BR##& Unemployment Differentials We have combined these three variables into a simple econometric model to explain the Treasury-Bund spread (Chart 15). We also added the size of the balance sheets of the Fed and ECB as separate variables, to account for the impact of bond purchases from each central bank. This model shows that a) the predicted value of the spread continues to steadily rise and b) the current spread is below one standard deviation away from that predicted value - a level equal to 237bps on the spread. That implies that there is still room for Treasury yields to climb higher versus Bunds before the spread becomes "too wide". Additional spread widening will be much harder to come by in the near-term, however. The gap between data surprise indices between the U.S. and Euro Area - which correlates well to the momentum in the Treasury-Bund spread - is relatively stretched, at a time when U.S. bond managers are already very underweight duration exposure (Chart 16). Yet with the forward curves already pricing in some mild tightening over the next year (top panel), betting on Treasury-Bund spread widening is a positive carry trade. One final point in favor of a wider Treasury-Bund spread is that the spread momentum is not yet close to the extremes seen in previous cycles (Chart 17). The big cyclical peaks in the spread typically occur when spreads are 50bps above the 200-day moving average, which is well above current levels. Chart 15Our New Model Suggests##BR##UST-Bund Spread Not Overstretched Chart 16Relative Data Surprises & UST##BR##Positioning May Limit Additional Spread Widening Chart 17UST-Bund Spread Momentum##BR##Not Yet At Stretched Extremes Our conclusion after looking at all these indicators is that the major cyclical peak in the Treasury-Bund spread is not yet on the immediate horizon, but is likely to unfold later this year - after one final move higher in Treasury yields versus Bunds. Bottom Line: A big cyclical turn in the Treasury-Bund spread is coming, but not before the ECB begins to seriously signal an end to its asset purchases and the Fed delivers a few more rate hikes. There will be better levels to move to a long Treasury/short Bund position by the summer. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasuries & German Bunds", dated February 15th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Corporate Bonds & Inflation: The perception of accommodative monetary policy is the sole support for corporate bond performance. But this support will fade as inflationary pressures mount. Our first trigger to reduce exposure to corporate bonds will be when the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate returns to a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. Corporate Debt & Buybacks: New tax legislation incentivizes firms to carry less debt in an optimal capital structure, but this is not likely to alter the current cyclical path of corporate sector re-leveraging. Share buybacks are also once again rising, an unambiguous negative for corporate balance sheet health. MBS: Absent a major monetary policy miscommunication that causes Treasury yields to spike dramatically, extension risk is not likely to be a significant driver of Agency MBS excess returns. We estimate that a monthly increase in yields exceeding 72 bps is required before extension risk becomes material. Feature Chart 1Watch This Space Inflation drives everything in the current environment. If the market comes to expect that inflation will return to the Fed's target, then Treasury yields have further upside. A relapse in inflation would likewise cause yields to fall. Elsewhere, with corporate balance sheets already in disrepair, accommodative monetary policy remains the sole support for spread product excess returns. Once inflation rises this support will also vanish, bringing an end to the credit cycle. With that in mind there is one chart we are tracking more closely than any other. It is the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate and it has moved up significantly in recent months, from a mid-2017 low of 1.66% to its most recent reading of 2.11% (Chart 1). In last week's report we discussed why the 10-year breakeven rate will likely converge to a range between 2.4% and 2.5% before the end of the cycle, applying 29 bps to 39 bps of additional upward pressure to the nominal 10-year Treasury yield.1 This week, we focus on why this chart is so important for our spread product call. Specifically, we explain why a return of the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate to its fair value range between 2.4% and 2.5% will also likely trigger a reduction in our recommended allocation to corporate bonds. Trigger Warning: TIPS Breakevens & The Credit Cycle The range of 2.4% to 2.5% for the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate represents where it has traded in prior periods when inflation is well anchored around the Fed's target. When it is below this range the assumption is that the Fed must respond dovishly whenever credit spreads widen or financial conditions tighten more generally.2 Why? Because when inflation is low the Fed needs the recovery to continue. It cannot allow tighter financial conditions to derail economic growth. Market participants know that this "Fed put" is in place and this makes it very difficult for spreads to gap meaningfully wider. For some context, let's consider the most recent period of significant spread widening between 2014 and 2016 (Chart 2). The initial catalyst for the sell-off was certainly the collapse in commodity prices and defaults in the energy sector, but why was the poor performance so broad based across the entire corporate bond universe? It is because the market assumed that the Fed would not respond dovishly to what was purely a commodity price shock. Notice that our 24-month Fed Funds Discounter, the number of rate hikes the market expects during the next two years, held steady at an elevated level throughout the entire period of spread widening (Chart 2, top panel). It was not until after the Fed capitulated in early 2016, and the discounter fell, that spreads started to recover. We therefore conclude that in order to see another significant sell-off in spread product we need to re-create the conditions that prevailed between 2014 and 2016. Specifically, we need a sense in the market that the Fed will not respond dovishly even if financial conditions tighten. The most likely catalyst for such a shift in market psychology is if inflation pressures are higher. The Fed would be less concerned about maintaining strong growth, and more concerned about containing inflation. Our sense is that a return to the range of 2.4% to 2.5% on the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will be the earliest signal of such a shift. Chart 2Wider Spreads Need A Hawkish Fed Chart 3Inflation Not Yet A Constraint The Empirical Evidence The link we have drawn between inflation and the end of the credit cycle is not pure theory. The historical record also shows that corporate bond excess returns are highest when inflationary pressures are lowest, and vice-versa. The readings from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' Price Pressures Measure (PPM) and from core PCE inflation have proven to be particularly useful in this regard (Chart 3).3 Table 1 shows that a level of 15% on the PPM has been a key threshold between positive and negative corporate bond excess returns. Monthly corporate bond excess returns have averaged +24 bps when the PPM is below 15%, but have averaged -5 bps when the PPM is between 15% and 30%. A PPM between 30% and 50% has historically been met with average monthly corporate bond excess returns of -17 bps. The PPM is currently at 7%, still supportive of our overweight allocation to corporate bonds. Table 2 repeats the exercise from Table 1, but this time for year-over-year core PCE inflation. The best periods for corporate bond performance have been when core PCE inflation is below 1.5%. In those periods monthly excess returns have averaged +25 bps. An inflation rate between 1.5% and 2% has led to more balanced corporate bond performance, with average monthly excess returns coming in at zero. Core PCE above 2% typically sends a negative signal for corporate bonds, with average monthly excess returns coming in at -13 bps when core PCE inflation is between 2% and 2.5%. Data released yesterday show that year-over-year core PCE inflation just ticked above 1.5% in December. It is therefore just starting to signal that the environment for corporate bond outperformance is becoming less favorable. Table 1Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Under Different Ranges ##br##Of Price Pressures Measure** (January 1990 To Present) Table 2Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Under Different Ranges##br## Of Year-Over-Year Core** PCE (December 1993 To Present) Bottom Line: The perception of accommodative monetary policy is the sole support for corporate bond performance. But this support will fade as inflationary pressures mount. Our first trigger to reduce exposure to corporate bonds will be when the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate returns to a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. Corporate Debt, Buybacks & Tax Reform The preceding section takes for granted that corporate balance sheets are highly levered. Therefore, spreads will start to widen once inflationary pressures mount and monetary policy turns more restrictive. However, if firms suddenly started paying down debt and shoring up their balance sheets, then a significant enough improvement in corporate health could challenge our conclusions. On that note, the recently passed U.S. tax package does include a few incentives for firms to carry less debt in the capital structure: Lower corporate tax rates reduce the tax benefit from debt financing. Limiting the corporate interest tax deduction to 30% of earnings accomplishes the same thing. The ability to repatriate off-shore cash might also incentivize firms to pay off debt they had taken out to finance previous dividend and buyback programs. It is definitely conceivable that the first two provisions might incentivize less corporate debt issuance in the long run, but we doubt they will alter the cyclical picture. Chart 4 shows that the ratio of non-financial corporate debt to sales only tends to peak once the economy enters recession. In other words, firms in aggregate do not pay down debt unless prompted by slowing demand. As for repatriation, it is also possible that some firms might use repatriated cash to pay down debt, but we also doubt this effect will be large enough to alter the cyclical re-leveraging of the corporate sector. The temptation to use repatriated cash to boost share buybacks even further might be too great for firms to resist, and in fact we already see evidence of surging buyback announcements since the tax bill was introduced (Chart 5). Share buybacks obviously pose a significant risk to corporate bonds because they reduce the equity cushion in corporate capital structures. And in fact, aggregate share buybacks do tend to peak just prior to turns in the credit cycle. However, buyback activity is not a very reliable indicator of when the credit cycle is about to turn. Simply because it peaks at a different level in each cycle. Chart 4The History Of Corporate Leverage Chart 5Cue The Buyback Surge? The more reliable correlation is that periods when buybacks are declining have tended to coincide with periods of corporate bond underperformance (Chart 5, panel 2). This is most likely because tighter lending standards cause both corporate spreads to widen and buyback activity to decline, as banks make debt financing less available. This explains why the most recent decline in buyback activity did not coincide with corporate bond underperformance, because bank lending standards remained supportive and were not the driving force behind the reduction in buybacks (Chart 5, bottom panel). Bottom Line: New tax legislation incentivizes firms to carry less debt in an optimal capital structure, but this is not likely to alter the current cyclical path of corporate sector releveraging. Share buybacks are also once again rising, an unambiguous negative for corporate balance sheet health. Extension Risk In MBS Once the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate reaches our trigger range of 2.4% to 2.5%, one of the beneficiaries of the reduction in our allocation to corporate bonds will likely be Agency MBS. These securities have become much more attractive relative to investment grade corporate bonds during the past year, as corporate bond option-adjusted spreads (OAS) narrowed and MBS OAS widened a tad (Chart 6). In fact, the OAS differential between a conventional 30-year Agency MBS and an investment grade corporate bond is only 19 bps away from its all-time high (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 6An Attractive Option For De-Risking Last year's widening in MBS OAS is most likely due to the market pricing-in the run-off of the mortgages on the Fed's balance sheet. Now that the schedule for MBS run-off is well known, we think it is probably already reflected in current spreads. That is, we think current MBS OAS present an attractive opportunity to shift some allocation out of corporate bonds and into MBS, in the context of de-risking a U.S. fixed income portfolio. As was stated above, we think it is still a bit too soon to take risk off the table, but that will change once inflationary pressures are more pronounced. Another reason why we view Agency MBS as attractive is that the risk of future spread widening appears to be low. Mortgage refinancings, the main driver of MBS spread widening, should stay low as long as we remain in a rising rate environment. Further, with so much burn-out already in existing mortgage pools, even a decline in mortgage rates is not likely to cause a surge in refi activity (Chart 6, bottom panel). This leaves duration extension as the main risk for excess MBS returns. The opposite of refinancing risk, extension risk in MBS comes from the fact that the duration of these negatively convex securities rises when yields rise, thus leading to greater losses in a rising rate environment. A typical positively convex bond will see its duration decline as yields rise, damping the negative impact of rising rates. How worried do we need to be about the impact of extension risk on excess MBS returns? To answer this question we performed a regression of monthly excess MBS returns (relative to duration-matched Treasury securities) on three factors: The monthly change in duration-equivalent Treasury yields. The squared monthly change in duration-equivalent Treasury yields. The monthly change in OAS. As is shown in Table 3, the first factor is positively related to MBS returns. This is because it proxies for refinancing risk. Lower yields lead to more refinancing and wider MBS spreads, while higher yields lead to less refinancing and tighter MBS spreads. The squared yield factor is included as a proxy for extension risk, and it enters the model with a negative coefficient. For example, a small increase in yields is positive for MBS returns since it leads to less refi activity, but a large increase in yields eventually becomes negative for returns once it causes MBS duration to extend. The change in OAS is also a significant driver of MBS returns, but is un-correlated with the change in yields and so operates independently from the factors that drive refinancing and extension risk. The main message from our excess return model is illustrated in Chart 7. If we assume that the OAS remains flat, then the relationship between monthly excess MBS returns (relative to Treasuries) and the monthly change in Treasury yields can be illustrated with the following quadratic equation: Table 3Model Of Monthly Excess (%) Returns For Conventional ##br##30-Year Agency MBS (2000 - Present) Chart 7Model Of Monthly Excess (%) Returns For Conventional ##br##30-Year Agency MBS (2000 - Present) The chart shows that, all else equal, a monthly change in the duration-matched Treasury yield between -35 bps and +72 bps is consistent with positive excess MBS returns relative to Treasuries. It is only when the monthly change in yields exceeds +72 bps on the upside, or -32 bps on the downside, that negative convexity starts to bite. As is shown in Chart 8, monthly changes in Treasury yields of this magnitude - especially spikes of more than 72 bps - are quite rare. Chart 8Extension Risk Rarely Bites Bottom Line: Absent a major monetary policy miscommunication that causes Treasury yields to spike dramatically, extension risk is not likely to be a significant driver of Agency MBS excess returns. We estimate that a monthly increase in yields exceeding 72 bps is required before extension risk becomes material. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Long And Short Of It", dated January 23, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Wider credit spreads, a stronger dollar, a rising VIX and falling equity prices all signal tighter financial conditions. 3 For further details on the Price Pressures Measure please see: https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2015/11/06/introducing-the-st-louis-fed-price-pressures-measure/ Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification