Developed Countries
Underweight U.S. airline stocks hit a patch of turbulence this week when Southwest, usually known for being the price disrupter amongst airline peers, dropped their Q1 revenue guidance "primarily due to the competitive fare environment". We have been flagging a looming price war since United Airlines announced a significant and prolonged capacity expansion plan earlier this year, underpinning our preference to avoid the S&P airlines index. In fact, airfares have been losing share of the customer's wallet for more than a year now and the downtrend is accelerating (second panel). This is further evidenced by airlines' eroded ability to pass through higher jet fuel prices, which have historically been the marginal price setter (third panel). The upshot of declining revenues and rising costs is stalling margins (bottom panel); investors would be wise to skip this flight and stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, AAL, UAL, ALK.
Overweight The S&P containers & packaging index has been underperforming since the beginning of the year as the spiking input costs of last year materialized in soft Q4 earnings, compounded by fears over a trade war. However, those costs have fallen substantially since the end of the year (second panel) and gross margins should eventually return to normal; trade fears have moderated. In the longer term, we think the focus should remain on the drivers of demand, namely global growth (a key BCA theme for this year). Both volumes and prices have maintained a steady uptrend (third panel) and the sell side has taken notice as relative forward EPS are climbing at the fastest pace in a decade (bottom panel). Combined with the index's weak performance YTD, a sizeable buying opportunity is taking shape; stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CONP - IP, WRK, BLL, PKG, SEE, AVY.
Highlights Two big distortions in the euro area economy arose because Germany depressed its wages for a decade, and then Italy failed to fix its broken banks for a decade... ...but both distortions are now correcting. Long-term property investors in Europe should seek out undervalued gems on the Greek islands, Portuguese Atlantic coast, Italy and German second-tier cities. Steer clear of Scandinavia, France and central London. Stay overweight a basket of German real estate stocks. Maintain a long basket of German consumer services versus a short basket of exporters comprising autos, chemicals and industrials. Feature In Germany and Italy, real house prices are at the same level today as they were in 1995 (Chart of the Week). Germany and Italy share another similarity. Through the past two decades, they have delivered their workers the same subpar real wage growth (Chart I-2). Chart of the WeekThe Mirror Image Journeys Of German ##br##And Italian House Prices Chart I-2The Mirror Image Journeys Of ##br##German And Italian Wages However, while the point-to-point growth rates for both house prices and wages look identical, the journeys that Germany and Italy have travelled have been mirror images of one another. Germany's journey has been a decline followed by rapid ascent; Italy's journey has been a rapid ascent followed by decline. These mirror image journeys encapsulate the two big distortions within the euro area economy. The Euro Area's Two Big Distortions The euro area's first distortion arose from Germany's labour market reforms at the start of the millennium. Germany's labour reforms were putatively to boost productivity. In fact, the reforms' main impact was to depress German wages for a decade. The consequent boost in competitiveness caused symmetrical distortions: a bubble in German exports, and an anti-bubble in German household incomes. Before Germany joined the euro, such a distortion would have been impossible. An appreciating deutschemark would have arbitraged away any rise in export competitiveness. But an exchange rate appreciation could no longer happen once Germany was sharing its currency with other economies that were not replicating Germany's wage depression strategy. Hence, German household incomes - and house prices - have been one of Europe's biggest losers in the single currency era. Conversely, Germany's export-oriented companies - and their shareholders - have been amongst the biggest winners (Chart I-3). Just consider, the Siemens dividend is up almost one thousand percent! The euro area's second distortion arose because Italy failed to fix its broken banks for a decade. After a financial crisis such as in 2008, the golden rule is to nurse the financial system back to health as quickly as possible. Which is precisely what all the major economies did. All the major economies, that is, apart from Italy (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Distortion 1: Germany Depressed##br## Its Wages For A Decade Chart I-4Distortion 2: Italy Failed To Fix Its ##br##Broken Banks For A Decade Italy procrastinated because its government is more indebted than other sovereigns and because its dysfunctional banks did not cause an acute domestic crisis. Nevertheless, Italy's reluctance to fix its banks is the central reason for its decade-long economic stagnation, and declining real house prices. The good news is that the euro area's two big distortions are now correcting. Germany is allowing its wages to adjust rapidly upwards. Meanwhile, in the space of just a year, Italy has raised almost €50 billion in equity capital for its banks. Italian bank solvency and loan quality have improved sharply. This raises an interesting question: do the German and Italian housing markets now offer compelling long-term investment opportunities? European Housing Markets: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly Property investments offer income via rents. Over time, these rents should increase in real terms. Items such as a litre of milk or a London commuter train journey do not increase in quality. If anything, the London commuter train journey has decreased in quality! By contrast, accommodation does increase in quality. For example, kitchens and bathrooms, home security, and heating and cooling systems should all get better over time. In essence, the quality of accommodation benefits from productivity improvements, so real rents rise. Of course, such improvements require investment expenditure. But a property investor requires a return on this investment. Therefore, property income - even after expenses - should and does increase in real terms. What about capital values? In the long term, we would expect capital values to have some connection to rising real rents. So if real house prices have not increased over several decades, then it signals a very likely undervaluation. Conversely, if real house prices have increased an implausibly large amount over several decades, then it raises a red flag for a likely overvaluation (Chart I-5, Chart I-6, and Chart I-7). Chart I-5German Real House Prices Are No Higher Than In 1995 Chart I-6Scandinavian Real House Prices Have Trebled Since 1995 Chart I-7Italy, Portugal And Greece Offer Good Opportunities For Property Investors On this evidence, we expect the long-term returns from the housing markets in France, Netherlands, Belgium and Finland to be bad. More worrying, we expect the long-term returns from the housing markets in Sweden and Norway to be ugly. Real house prices have more than trebled since 1995. For this, blame the central banks. In recent years, Sweden's Riksbank and the Norges Bank have had to shadow the ECB's ultra-loose policy to prevent a sharp appreciation of their currencies. The trouble is that ultra-low and negative interest rates have been absurdly inappropriate for the booming Scandinavian economies. So the ECB's policy may indeed have generated credit-fuelled bubbles... albeit in Sweden and Norway. Chart I-8London House Prices Have Rolled Over We are also reluctant to own London property. London house prices have rolled over, and headwinds persist (Chart I-8). Theresa May wants to drag the U.K. out of the EU single market and customs union, which cannot be a good thing for London. On the other hand, if parliament forces May to soften her Brexit stance, it could fracture a precarious truce between hard and soft Brexiters in her cabinet and topple the government. Thereby, it could pave the way for a Jeremy Corbyn led Labour government and the spectre of a high-end 'land value' tax. So where are long-term returns likely to be good? We repeat that where house prices have shown no real increase from 25 years ago, it bodes very well for the long-term investment opportunity. This describes the situation for the housing markets in Germany, Italy, Portugal and Greece. To summarise, if you are looking for a long-term investment property in Europe, steer clear of Scandinavia, France and central London. And seek out undervalued gems on the Greek islands, Portuguese Atlantic coast, Italy and German second-tier cities. What Is The Related Opportunity In Equity Markets? Real estate holding and development companies and REITS are the equity market plays on real estate. The trouble is that the stocks are too few and too small for a meaningful investment in Greece, Italy and Portugal. However, in Germany, stay overweight the basket of real estate stocks which we first introduced a few years ago. The basket has outperformed by 50%, but the outperformance isn't over. In Germany, the catch-up of house prices is closely connected to the catch-up of household incomes. As Germany continues to reduce its export-dependence and rebalance its economy towards domestic demand, the catch-up has further to run. Chart I-9German Consumer Services Will ##br##Outperform Consumer Goods It is possible to play this structural theme in the equity market via an overweight in consumer services versus consumer goods. Consumer services tend to have more domestic exposure compared to the consumer goods sector which is dominated by autos. Understandably, during the era of German export-dominance, the German consumer services sector strongly underperformed consumer goods. But in recent years, as the German economy has rebalanced, the tables have turned. German consumer services have been outperforming German consumer goods (Chart I-9). We expect this trend to persist. Our preferred expression is to maintain a long basket of German consumer services versus a short basket of exporters comprising autos, chemicals and industrials. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommendation is a commodity pair-trade: short nickel / long lead. The pair trade's 65-day fractal dimension is at the lower bound which has signalled several reversals in recent years. Set a profit target of 8% with a symmetrical stop-loss. We are also pleased to report that all of the four other open trades are comfortably in profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Underweight Last week we downgraded the S&P consumer discretionary index to a below benchmark allocation on the back of three key factors: a rising fed funds rate, quantitative tightening and higher prices at the pump. One of the charts we published, and are reprinting today, caught the attention of our good friend, who I refer to as the "smartest man in California", and he suggested a few of interesting tweaks to drive a point home. First, he recommended to switch the fed funds rate to the shadow fed funds rate, or the Wu-Xia model, in order to better capture the fact that the Fed was still easing monetary policy below the zero line post December, 2008 and until December, 2015 via QE (top panel). Second, if we were to exclude AMZN from the day the S&P included it in the SPX and the S&P 500 consumer discretionary index (November 21st, 2005), then the chart would highlight that the vast majority of consumer discretionary stocks are actually following the typical historical relationship with the Fed's tightening cycle (top panel). Finally, while AMZN has a heavy weight in the broad consumer discretionary index (21%), its earnings weight is quite low (1.5%). Thus, overall consumer discretionary profits are indeed following the Fed's historical tightening path (second panel). Bottom line: We reiterate our underweight stance in the S&P consumer discretionary sector. Category: Consumer Discretionar
Highlights Fed preview: The Fed will hike rates again this week, and may signal a faster pace of future hikes given signs that U.S. inflation is starting to accelerate. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance and stay underweight U.S. Treasuries in global hedged bond portfolios. Oversold U.S. Treasuries: While most indicators of positioning and momentum for U.S. Treasuries show a deeply oversold market, an analysis of past such episodes shows that it can take 4-6 months before bond yields correct an oversold condition in the absence of slowing growth or inflation - with yields potentially hitting new highs in the interim. ECB Tapering: The ECB strongly believes that the "stock effect" of its asset purchases matters more for European bond yields than the "flow effect". This suggests that the odds of a European "Taper Tantrum" later this year are low, although bond yields there are still headed higher. Feature Chart of the WeekThis Time Is Different? Global bond markets have calmed down after the big surge that started the year. The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield has traded in a relatively narrow 2.80-2.95% range since the VIX spike in early February, despite a string of weaker-than-expected U.S. economic data prints that has triggered sharp downgrades to Q1/2018 U.S. GDP growth forecasts. At the same time, 10-year benchmark yields for other major government bond markets (Germany, France, U.K., Canada) have been drifting lower, but remain above levels that began the year. In the case of U.S. Treasuries, the overall level of yields is being held up by the steady climb at the short-end of the yield curve. Recent hawkish comments from new Fed Chairman Jay Powell and long-time Fed dove Lael Brainard have raised expectations for a rate hike at this week's FOMC meeting, which is now priced as a certainty. The 2-year Treasury yield has climbed to a 10-year high of 2.3%, which is helping keep a floor underneath longer-term Treasury yields despite positioning indicators showing that traders and bond managers already have significantly reduced duration exposure (Chart of the Week). The other factor that is likely holding up global bond yields is the incremental move by the European Central Bank (ECB) towards a tapering of its asset purchases. The market has already repriced both future interest rate expectations and the term premia embedded in European government bond yields, although recent comments from ECB officials suggest that they believe that there will not be a "Taper Tantrum 2.0" in Europe similar to the Treasury market sell-off in 2013. This week, we tackle those two critical issues for bond markets head-on: the implications of large short positions in the U.S. Treasury market versus the ECB taper impact on global bond yields. Our conclusion is that the impact of both is likely overestimated by investors. How To Think About A Technically Oversold Treasury Market The Fed will deliver another rate hike this week. That outcome has already been fully discounted by the market, which should not be considered surprising given the current U.S. economic backdrop: Inflation: Underlying inflation has clearly bottomed out and has begun to accelerate, with the 3-month annualized growth rate of core CPI inflation now up over 3% (Chart 2). That trend should continue in the next several months: our model for CPI Shelter inflation is calling for a pickup (2nd panel), core goods inflation is showing signs of responding to the weakening U.S. dollar (3rd panel), and the big plunge in U.S. wireless phone prices that severely dampened inflation in 2017 is about to wash out of the year-over-year CPI data and boost core services inflation (bottom panel). Growth: Despite some recent signs of softening momentum in the Q1 data, the underlying trend in U.S. growth remains upbeat. Labor demand is accelerating and our payrolls growth model suggests further gains are coming (Chart 3). Corporate profit growth remains solid and the impact of the Trump tax cuts will only boost earnings momentum and business confidence. Leading economic indicators are also accelerating and suggest that any loss of growth momentum in Q1 - which seems to be an annual occurrence despite the seasonal adjustment of data - will be short-lived (bottom panel). Chart 2U.S. Inflation Is Starting To Perk Up Chart 3No Reason For Any Dovish Fed Surprises Financial Conditions: U.S. equity prices have recovered much of the losses suffered during the February VIX-driven correction, while corporate credit spreads remain narrow from a historical perspective (Chart 4). Add in the weaker U.S. dollar - the impact of which is already boosting import prices and potentially following through into the shorter-term inflation expectations of households (bottom panel) - and overall financial conditions remain highly accommodative. Against this positive backdrop, the Fed can feel confident that its growth and inflation forecasts for 2018 will be achieved, and that inflation expectations can continue to climb back to levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target. There is even a chance that the Fed could accelerate its planned pace of rate hikes (Chart 5), particularly if there is an upgrade to the FOMC growth and inflation projections, which will be updated for this week's meeting. Chart 4U.S. Financial Conditions##BR##Remain Accommodative Chart 5All Eyes On##BR##The Dots This Week Yet for all the positive economic, bond-bearish news, one fact stands out - the U.S. Treasury market is deeply oversold from a technical perspective. This should, in theory, limit the ability for bond yields to continue rising and could set up a short-covering bond rally if there is a more meaningful and prolonged slowing of economic growth or inflation. The technical indicators that we regularly monitor for the U.S. Treasury market are all at or near the extremes of the ranges observed since 2000 (Chart 6). Chart 6U.S. Treasuries Are Very Oversold The 10-year Treasury yield is 43bps above its 200-day moving average The 26-week total return of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Treasury index is -4.3% The J.P. Morgan client survey of bond managers and traders showed the largest underweight duration positioning since the mid-2000s, although there has been some recent reduction of those positions The Market Vane index of sentiment for Treasuries is now at 49, near the bottom of the range since 2000 The CFTC data on positioning in 10-year Treasury futures shows a large net short of -8%, scaled by open interest Given this degree of investor negativity toward U.S. Treasuries, some pullback in yields seems inevitable. However, a look back at past episodes where Treasuries were this oversold shows that the timing of such a pullback is highly variable - anywhere from one month to seven months. The determining factor is the growth and inflation backdrop in the U.S. To show this, we did a simple study using two series from our list of Treasury technical indicators. Specifically, we looked at "oversold episodes" since 2000 where the Market Vane Treasury sentiment index dipped below 50 and where the 10-year Treasury yield was trading at least 30bps above its 200-day moving average. We then defined the end of the oversold episode as simply the point when the 10-year Treasury yield fell back below its 200-day moving average. We then looked at the duration (in days), and change in bond yields, for each oversold episode. There were eleven such episodes since the year 2000, not counting the current one which has not yet ended. In Table 1, we list them ranked by the number of days it took to complete each episode as we defined it. The longest correction of an oversold Treasury market since 2000 took place between July 2003 and February 2004, where 203 days passed before the 10-year yield dipped back below its 200-day moving average. The shortest correction was in May 2000, where only 28 days were needed. Table 1A Look At Prior Episodes Of An Oversold U.S. Treasury Market To determine what the U.S. economic backdrop was during each episode, we then simply asked if economic growth was rising or falling, or if inflation was stable/rising or falling, using the ISM Manufacturing index and core PCE inflation as the relevant data series. The answers to those questions are found in the final two columns of Table 1. All the positioning and economic indicators used in our historical study, shaded for the oversold episodes, are shown in Charts 7, 8 and 9. Chart 7U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2000-2005 Chart 8U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2006-2011 Chart 9U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2011 To Today The simplest conclusion that we reached from our study is that the shortest corrections of an oversold Treasury market occurred, unsurprisingly, during the two episodes where both growth and inflation were slowing, with an average length of each episode of 42 days. The four episodes where growth and inflation were both rising had a more variable performance, lasting anywhere from 98 days to 203 days, averaging 156 days per episode. The five episodes where growth was slowing but inflation was stable or rising were also of varying length, averaging 140 days. In other words, it has taken around five months, on average, to correct an oversold Treasury market when inflation was stable or rising, and about 1.5 months when inflation was falling. In the current environment, where the ISM Manufacturing index is in an uptrend and core PCE inflation is rising, we should expect a longer period of time before the Treasury market corrects its oversold condition. If we mark the start of the current episode on February 20th of this year, using the definition described above, then the 10-year Treasury yield may return to its 200-day moving average of 2.4% by August (five months from now). A word of warning for traders and investors looking to play for that move by flipping to a long duration position now, though - the primary trend of the market, defined by that 200-day moving average, is currently rising. It was also rising during the two longest oversold correction episodes 2003-04 and 2013-14. The 10-year Treasury yield only declined -14bps and -17bps, respectively, over those entire episodes. During the 2013-14 episode, also a period similar to today when growth and inflation were both rising, yields actually climbed to new cyclical highs before finally peaking. In other words, betting on a reversal of an oversold bond market without any deterioration in growth and inflation dynamics may generate only modest returns over a lengthy period, and with substantial mark-to-market volatility in the meantime. In the current cycle, with leading indicators for U.S. growth and inflation accelerating and the Fed becoming more hawkish, we recommend maintaining below-benchmark duration positions in the U.S. rather than positioning now for a short-covering rally. Bottom Line: The Fed will hike rates again this week, and may signal a faster pace of future hikes given signs that U.S. inflation is starting to accelerate. While most indicators of positioning and momentum for U.S. Treasuries show a deeply oversold market, an analysis of past such episodes shows that it can take 4-6 months before bond yields correct an oversold condition in the absence of a slowing of economic growth or inflation - with yields potentially hitting new highs in the interim. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance and stay underweight U.S. Treasuries in global hedged bond portfolios. The ECB Is Betting On A Tantrum-Free Taper Several key ECB officials have been giving speeches over the past week, spelling out a consistent message to the markets on the future of euro area monetary policy. Most notably, ECB President Mario Draghi and ECB Chief Economist Peter Praet gave speeches last week at a conference in Frankfurt. Both of them used nearly identical language to highlight how the ECB's main policy tool going forward will no longer be net asset purchases, but instead will be interest rates and forward guidance on changes to rates.1 This echoes the message sent after the ECB's policy meeting earlier this month, when the commitment to increase the pace of asset purchases was dropped from the ECB policy statement. Both Draghi and Praet repeated the ECB's official stance on the end of asset purchases, which requires a "sustained adjustment" in the path of inflation. This was described by Draghi as: Specifically, a sustained adjustment requires three conditions to be in place. [...] The first is convergence: headline inflation has to be on course to reach our aim over a meaningful definition of the medium term. The second is confidence: we need to be sure that this upward adjustment in inflation has a sufficiently high probability of being realized. The third condition is resilience: the adjustment in inflation has to be self-sustained even without additional net asset purchases. Draghi then went on to add these comments on the sequencing of rate hikes after the asset purchases are completed, with our emphasis added: [...] when progress towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation is judged to be sufficient, net purchases will come to an end. At that point, next to our forward guidance, appropriate financial conditions will be maintained by our reinvestment policy. [...] as regards the evolution of our policy rates beyond the end of our net purchases, we will maintain the sequencing that is currently set out in our forward guidance, namely our pledge to keep key interest rates at their current levels "well past" the end of net purchases. This time-based element of our guidance is already vital today, in particular to ensure that our policy stimulus is not weakened by premature expectations of a first rate rise, and so financial conditions remain consistent with inflation convergence. That last line can be roughly translated from policymaker-speak as "we want to avoid a Fed-style Taper Tantrum when we stop buying euro area government bonds." Chart 10An Orderly Repricing Of ECB Expectations Praet made similar comments in his speech, discussing how the first rate hike after the end of asset purchases must only take place once there is a "durable convergence" of euro area inflation with the ECB target of just below 2% on headline inflation. So far, the markets have been heeding the ECB's communication and policy guidance. The timing of the ECB's first full 25bp rate hike, taken from our "months-to-hike" indicator, shows that the market does not expect the ECB to adjust rates until November of 2019 (Chart 10). At the same time, the market is only slowly repricing the term premium on longer-dated euro area government bonds, which would be expected if the ECB were to take its time in fully tapering its asset purchases. With realized euro area inflation, and market-based inflation expectations, still well short of the ECB's target, the market appears to be "correctly" following the ECB's guidance on the timetable for future policy moves. This is keeping euro area bond yields at low levels and dampening interest rate volatility. There may be another factor at work holding down bond yields, however. In a speech given at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum in New York last month - an event attended by numerous academic and Wall Street economists, as well as several current FOMC members - ECB Executive Board Member Benoit Coeure discussed the importance of the "stock" effect of central bank asset purchases compared to the "flow" effect.2 Or as Coeure described it: [...] the "stock effect" - that is, the persistence of the effects of the stock of bonds held by the central bank on its balance sheet under a commitment of reinvestment. If the effects of purchases dissipate quickly, a shorter purchase horizon could lead to term premia rising even as interest rate expectations remain well anchored by forward guidance. Financial conditions would then tighten. But if the effectiveness of asset purchases rises with the stock of assets already acquired - if there is some "crossover point" where the stock effect becomes more important than the continued flow of purchases - then a reduced pace of purchases would not unduly decompress the term premium. This brings up an interesting point about the ECB's policy strategy as it prepares to taper its asset purchase program. If the ECB can effectively communicate that it will continue to reinvest the maturing bonds on its balance sheet after the new asset purchases have stopped, then the market will not price in a bigger term premium on longer-dated bonds since the ECB will continue to own a huge share of the stock of euro area government debt. The stock effect will dominate the diminishing flow effect. Coeure noted in his speech that the experience of the U.S. in 2013, when Ben Bernanke surprised markets with talk that the Fed was planning on cutting back its asset purchases, is different than Europe today. The biggest reason is that the ECB owns a far bigger share of the European bond market than the Fed did at that time. That is because the ECB asset purchases since its bond buying program began in 2015 have dwarfed the net issuance of euro area government debt (Chart 11). At no point during the Fed's quantitative easing (QE) era did the central bank ever buy more U.S. Treasuries than the U.S. government was issuing. According to the logic of Benoit Coeure, the smaller Fed "footprint" in the Treasury market relative to the ECB's ownership share of euro area government bonds (Chart 12) should mean that the Treasury term premium will be more volatile than that for German bunds (and other euro area debt). That is because a greater share of Treasury issuance must be sold to private investors who are more price-sensitive than central banks. In other words, the flow effect dominates the stock effect. Chart 11ECB & BoJ Have Been Absorbing##BR##All Net Government Bond Issuance Chart 12The 'Stock Effect' Of QE##BR##Should Be Bigger In Europe & Japan In Chart 13, we try and visually prove Coeure's thesis. The chart plots the gap between central bank asset purchases and net government bond issuance (the blue solid line proxying the "flow effect", using IMF data) for the U.S., euro area and Japan versus our estimates of the term premium (the black dotted line). The correlation appears to be very strong for the euro area and Japan during the era of asset purchases for those central banks, perhaps due to the "stock effect" dominating the "flow effect". This differs from the experience seen in the U.S. during the Fed QE era, when there was no stable relationship between the term premium and the amount of Treasuries the Fed was purchasing relative to net issuance. Looking ahead, there are important implications of this "stock vs. flow" argument for the future direction of euro area (and Japanese) bond yields, both in absolute terms and relative to U.S. Treasuries. In Chart 13, we also added BCA's forecasts for net government bond issuance over the next two years relative to our projections for the pace of asset purchases from the ECB and BoJ (both new purchases and reinvestments), and the Fed's own projections for the runoff of Treasuries from its balance sheet. Our estimates show that there will still be no new government bond issuance for the private sector to absorb in the euro area and Japan in 2018 and 2019, even with the ECB expected to fully taper new buying to zero by the end of this year and the BoJ dramatically cutting back its pace of buying. This contrasts to the U.S., where the private sector will be forced to absorb an extra US$1 trillion (!) of Treasuries this year and next, thanks to the huge Trump fiscal stimulus and the diminished buying by the Fed. U.S. private investors may require a higher yield (i.e. term premium) to absorb that additional debt, especially if inflation expectations are rising and the Fed is hiking interest rates at the same time. The implication is that the spread between Treasuries and euro area debt (and Japanese bonds, for that matter) could stay stubbornly wide - at least until there is more decisive evidence that the U.S. economy is in a cyclical slowdown that would put the Fed rate hiking cycle on hold (Chart 14). Chart 13The 'Flow Effect' Of##BR##QE Does Still Matter Chart 14The 'Stock Effect' Could Keep The##BR##UST-Bund Spread Wider For Longer From the point of view of euro area debt, however, the existence of a "stock effect" means that those investors expecting a Taper Tantrum 2.0 will likely be disappointed in the size of any upward move in euro area bond yields this year. Bottom Line: The ECB strongly believes that the "stock effect" of its asset purchases (how much they already own) matters more for European bond yields than the "flow effect" (how much they are buying). This suggests that the odds of a European "Taper Tantrum" later this year are low, although bond yields there are still headed higher. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 The Draghi speech can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180314_1.en.html, while the Praet speech can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180314_2.en.html 2 Coeure's speech can be found at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180223.en.html Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Overweight Railroad stocks have recently seen a spike in forward EPS which has eliminated the valuation premium and now the rails are trading on par with the SPX on a forward P/E basis (second panel). The track is now clear and more gains are in store for relative share prices in the coming quarters. Industry operating metrics point to a profit resurgence this year. Importantly, our rails profit margin proxy (pricing power versus employment additions) has recently reaccelerated both because selling prices are expanding at a healthy clip and due to labor restraint (third panel). Demand for rail hauling remains upbeat and our rail diffusion indicator has surged to a level last seen in 2009, signaling that there is a broad based firming in rail carload shipments (bottom panel), particularly the ever-important coal and intermodal segments. Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the broad S&P transportation index, and especially the heavyweight S&P railroads sub-index; please see yesterday's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU.
Highlights Economy: Some of the economic data that feed into GDP have weakened during the past two months, but the fundamental drivers of economic growth remain strong. We continue to expect GDP growth close to 3% in 2018. Markets & Inflation: Bond yields fell during the past few weeks, but so far there is no suggestion that the bond bear market has been derailed. Expect yields to rise in the coming weeks, driven by higher inflation. State & Local Governments: State & local governments still have work to do to repair their fiscal situations. While this process will lead to continued improvement in municipal bond credit quality, it also means that state & local government spending will not provide a significant boost to economic growth. Money Markets: LIBOR/OIS spread widening does not reflect a re-assessment of credit risk in the financial system, but it does present an opportunity for U.S. investors to increase their returns by investing in foreign bonds. Feature Chart 1Growth Scare 2018? A consensus appears to have formed around the outlook for U.S. economic growth. The expectation is that growth, which was already on a solid footing in late-2017, will kick into an even higher gear this year on the back of more stimulative fiscal policy. In fact, Bloomberg consensus forecasts already called for 2018 U.S. GDP growth of 2.3% last October and have ramped up to 2.78% since then. We think it's safe to say that both investors and the Fed have bought into this view, and this makes it concerning that some data have challenged the prevailing narrative in recent weeks. Specifically, a series of disappointing data releases have caused the Atlanta Fed's GDP tracking estimate for first quarter growth to fall to 1.8% (Chart 1). A month ago this same model was calling for growth of 5.4%! Growth Scare 2018? First, we should note that while the Atlanta Fed's GDP tracking estimate for Q1 has declined, as of last Friday, the New York Fed's similar estimate remains at 2.73% (Chart 1). Further, our simple estimate for U.S. GDP growth derived from labor market data shows that growth is tracking close to 3% so far this year.1 Both our simple measure and the New York Fed's model suggest that U.S. growth is running significantly above its 2.2% average since 2010, while the Atlanta Fed's 1.8% estimate suggests it has fallen below its average post-crisis pace. The weakness in the Atlanta Fed model appears to be driven by some hard data - retail sales, durable goods orders and building permits - that have weakened during the past couple months. In general, we note that these measures are still growing more quickly than they were last year, and that the fundamental factors underpinning each component of growth remain strong. We consider each component of growth in turn. Consumer Spending The biggest reason to be pessimistic about consumer spending growth in the first quarter is that core retail sales have been weak for three months in a row.2 Core retail sales contracted in December and January, and increased by only 0.1% in February. However, taking a step back we see that retail sales accelerated sharply between September and November 2017. Even after the recent weakness, the year-over-year growth rate in core retail sales is still above levels observed throughout most of 2016 and 2017 (Chart 2). But more importantly, the fundamentals underpinning consumer spending remain strong and have not corrected at all during the past three months. Disposable income growth is trending higher and recently received a boost from tax cuts. Employment growth has also been strong - averaging +190k during the past 12 months - despite an already tight labor market. These factors have led to a rising trend in our real consumer spending model (Chart 2, panel 2). Finally, while the savings rate is already low and unlikely to fall further, it is also unlikely to rise significantly while consumer sentiment is elevated. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index hit 102 in March, its highest reading since 2004 (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2Consumer Spending Chart 3Nonresidential Investment Non-Residential Investment Much like with retail sales, new orders for core durable goods have also contracted in each of the past two months, but the year-over-year growth rate is still high compared to the past few years. Meanwhile, our composite indicator of new orders surveys suggests that the recent decline will quickly reverse (Chart 3). Inventories have also been a drag on GDP growth in recent quarters but, according to our model, should increase going forward (Chart 3, bottom panel). Residential Investment The Atlanta Fed model expects residential investment to contribute negatively to GDP growth in the first quarter. This is largely due to the fact that single family building permits declined in January and February. But once again, so far there is no indication that this downtrend will persist. First, housing inventories continue to contract (Chart 4). Inventories typically increase prior to meaningful downturns in residential investment. Second, while higher mortgage rates have certainly dented housing affordability, homes are still much more affordable than prior to the financial crisis, and so far higher rates have not caused mortgage applications to roll over (Chart 4, panel 2). Household formation, the driver of demand for residential investment, is still in a multi-year uptrend and will continue to rise as long as income growth remains strong (Chart 4, panel 3). Fundamentally, it is difficult to see how residential investment can fall meaningfully when household formation is rising and home inventories are already low. Homebuilders appear to agree with this sentiment and are reporting levels of confidence near all-time highs (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4Residential Investment Chart 5Net Exports Net Exports The Atlanta Fed's model projects that net exports will subtract 0.55% from GDP growth in Q1. This is driven mainly by February's sharp deterioration in the trade balance (Chart 5). While net exports are not the most important driver of U.S. growth, this is one area where that could see more downside in the long-run, depending on how much of the government's anti-trade rhetoric turns into law. In the short-run, dollar depreciation should provide at least some positive offset (Chart 5, bottom panel). Financial Conditions Financial conditions are another important driver of economic growth. A few months ago both the BCA Boom/Bust Indicator and the Financial Conditions component of our Fed Monitor were calling for a sharp acceleration in U.S. GDP. This is no longer the case, and the indicators are now consistent with stable or slightly higher GDP growth (Chart 6). However, we should also note that the Financial Conditions component of our Fed Monitor has not actually tightened. It has merely leveled-off at extremely easy levels (Chart 6, bottom panel). Since it is the change in financial conditions that impacts GDP, the leveling-off is consistent with relatively stable GDP growth. Chart 6Financial Conditions Government Spending In a prior report we noted that the combination of tax cuts and the recent spending bill will add 0.8% to GDP this year and 1.3% in 2019. This is a sharp swing from the -0.5% fiscal impulse that was expected prior to the legislative changes.3 Federal government spending will certainly contribute positively to GDP growth this year. But we expect much less of a growth boost (if any at all) from state & local governments. This is discussed further in the section titled "State & Local Governments Still Cautious" below. Bottom Line: Some of the economic data that feed into GDP have weakened during the past two months, but the fundamental drivers of economic growth remain strong. We continue to expect GDP growth close to 3% in 2018. Bond Market Still Taking Cues From Inflation While the outlook for economic growth is always important, recently bond markets have been more driven by inflation, a topic where there is much less consensus in the investment community. Most recently, the 10-year Treasury has fallen 5 basis points since March 9th, with 4 bps of that decline concentrated in the inflation component. The 10-year real yield has fallen by only a single basis point. As we explained in a recent report, the first stage of the cyclical bond bear market is being driven by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations.4 The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 2.08% and we think it will eventually settle into a range between 2.3% and 2.5%. The decline in the TIPS breakeven rate of the past few weeks is partly explained by a drop in oil prices, but we note that broader commodity indexes have not rolled over (Chart 7). This suggests that weakness in the oil price is not evidence of a broader demand shock and should prove transitory. But even more importantly, the actual inflation data are starting to rebound. Last week's CPI release showed that the 12-month rate of change in core CPI ticked up slightly to 1.85%, but also that the annualized 3-month rate of change jumped sharply above 3% (Chart 8). Further, shelter - the largest component of core inflation - had been trending lower during the past couple years, but leading indicators now suggest a reversal. The rental vacancy rate fell in the fourth quarter of last year for the first time since Q2 2016 (Chart 8, panel 3), and the rate of appreciation in home prices has accelerated (Chart 8, bottom panel). The biggest near-term risk to the bond bear market is that investor over-optimism with regards to the growth outlook leads to a period of negative data surprises. We have previously noted a strong correlation between whether the economic surprise index is above or below zero and whether bond yields rose or fell during the preceding month.5 We also created a model to get a sense of the surprise index's average pace of mean reversion (Chart 9). At the moment, our model forecasts that the surprise index will be close to +20 one month from now. So for now there is no imminent signal that the bond bear market will be derailed, but we will closely monitor data surprises to see if that message changes. Chart 7Breakevens Still Trending Higher Chart 8Inflation Coming Back Chart 9Data Surprises Are Mean Reverting Bottom Line: Bond yields fell during the past few weeks, but so far there is no suggestion that the bond bear market has been derailed. Expect yields to rise in the coming weeks, driven by higher inflation. State & Local Governments Still Cautious As was stated earlier, state & local governments are unlikely to follow the example of the federal government when it comes to spending. In fact, state governments have once again started to raise taxes and reduce budgets. Data for the 2018 fiscal year are shown in Chart 10, and the message is that states have enacted significant revenue increases compared to prior years, and more states are once again raising taxes than are cutting taxes. Further, the National Association of State Budget Officers has noted that of the states that have already announced their 2019 budgets, most have called for another year of slow spending growth and a few states are actually penciling-in declines in general fund spending.6 This should not be too surprising, even nine years into the economic recovery state & local governments are still barely bringing in enough revenue to cover their interest expenses (Chart 11), though they have made considerable progress re-building rainy day fund balances (Chart 12). As for the implications for municipal bond investors, as long as governments maintain focus on improving their fiscal situations than the outlook for credit quality will continue to improve. Our Municipal Health Monitor is still deep in "improving health" territory, a signal that is consistent with ratings upgrades outpacing downgrades for the time being (Chart 13). Chart 10State & Local Government Spending Chart 11Not Much Revenue Buffer Chart 12Rainy Day Funds Rebuilt Chart 13Muni Credit Quality Is Strong Bottom Line: State & local governments still have work to do to repair their fiscal situations. While this process will lead to continued improvement in municipal bond credit quality, it also means that state & local government spending will not provide a significant boost to economic growth. Wider LIBOR/OIS Spread An Opportunity For U.S. Investors Chart 14LIBOR / OIS Spread Widening Explained One trend that has caught investors' attention in recent weeks is the impressive widening in the spread between LIBOR (the cost of unsecured U.S. dollar financing for banks) and the overnight index swap (OIS) rate (the purest measure of the market's fed funds rate expectations). Traditionally, we think of the LIBOR/OIS spread as a measure of credit risk in the financial system. This is because LIBOR is an unsecured agreement between two banks, therefore in theory, it embeds some risk that the counterparty bank will default. But it's important to note that the LIBOR/OIS spread can also rise for idiosyncratic reasons related to the supply and demand for U.S. dollars. For example, when U.S. dollars are scarce, investors are willing to pay more to acquire them and this pressures the USD LIBOR rate higher relative to the OIS rate. In a completely efficient market, competition would then entice counterparties to offer lower LIBOR rates until they eventually only reflect the perceived credit risk of the banking system. However, there is a strong case to be made that strict post-crisis regulations, by making it costly for banks to hold low-margin assets on their balance sheets, have made the market less efficient at arbitraging movements in the LIBOR/OIS spread. This appears to be what is going on at the moment. In recent weeks a confluence of idiosyncratic events have led to both a lower supply and higher demand for U.S. dollars. First, the U.S. government raised the debt ceiling until 2019. The Treasury department is therefore using this breathing room to re-build its cash balance. It accomplishes this by issuing T-bills. As more T-bills are issued U.S. dollars are drained from the market, putting upward pressure on LIBOR. Notice that the spread between the 3-month T-bill rate and the 3-month OIS rate is widening in concert with the LIBOR/OIS spread (Chart 14). Second, companies' new ability to repatriate cash that had been held overseas has a similar impact on LIBOR. That overseas cash had been a source of demand in money markets, but it is now being re-deployed in the form of increased dividends or share buybacks (Chart 14, bottom panel). This is akin to draining U.S. dollars out of the market. Third, the Fed continues to shrink its balance sheet. As this process plays out the Treasury will have to ramp up its issuance, some of which will come in the form of T-bills that will drain even more U.S. dollars out of the market. Going forward, the Treasury department will eventually re-build its cash balance to a level it deems acceptable. This will cause T-bill issuance to taper off, though it will still remain quite strong due to rising deficits and the run-off of the Fed's balance sheet. Similarly, the one-time effect of corporate repatriation will ease over time, though companies may also be less enticed to hold overseas cash balances in the future. All in all, we would expect the widening in LIBOR/OIS to ease in the coming months, but it may take a very long time before it returns to its prior lows, if it gets there at all. A large enough easing of bank capital requirements would likely cause the LIBOR/OIS spread to return to its recent lows, but this does not appear to be an imminent risk. Then, to complicate matters even further, we also have to reckon with the fact that LIBOR is being phased out during the next few years. In fact, the Fed will start publishing its Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) next month. The SOFR rate will eventually replace LIBOR as the U.S. dollar benchmark for financial contracts, and over time more and more instruments will be tied to SOFR and fewer will be tied to LIBOR. We also would not rule out the possibility that SOFR replaces the fed funds rate as the Fed's target policy rate at some point down the road. The Implication For U.S. Investors Chart 15An Opportunity For U.S. Investors A wider LIBOR/OIS spread has one very important implication for U.S. investors. U.S. investors can take advantage of the scarcity of U.S. dollars in the financial system by swapping their dollars for foreign currencies over short time horizons. In other words, a U.S. fixed income investor can invest in a 10-year foreign government bond, and then increase the received yield by hedging the currency risk. For example, a U.S. investor can receive a yield of 3.3% on a 10-year German bund if they hedge the currency risk on a 3-month horizon. This is a greater yield than they would earn on a 10-year U.S. Treasury note. Without the wider LIBOR/OIS spread the hedged yield would not be nearly as high. If we assume the LIBOR/OIS spread is zero, then the hedged yield on a 10-year German bund falls to 2.80%. Chart 15 shows that as the return from currency hedging increases, U.S. investors earn more from hedged positions in foreign bonds than in domestic bonds. A wider LIBOR/OIS spread gives U.S. investors an extra incentive to put on these global trades. Bottom Line: LIBOR/OIS spread widening does not reflect a re-assessment of credit risk in the financial system, but it does present an opportunity for U.S. investors to increase their returns by investing in foreign bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 For further details on this estimate please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Brainard Gives The Green Light", dated March 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Core retail sales exclude building materials, auto dealers and gas stations. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 http://budgetblog.nasbo.org/budgetblogs/blogs/brian-sigritz/2018/01/12/governors-begin-releasing-fiscal-2019-budget-propo?CLK=7543618f-810a-4ac4-90e2-01a4b310c649 Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification