Valuations
Highlights Global High-Yield: The widening of US Caa-rated high-yield spreads is narrowly focused in Energy-related companies. The conditions for a spillover into the broader junk bond market (tight monetary policy, tightening lending standards & deteriorating corporate health) are not currently in place. Stay overweight high-yield in both the US and euro area, where Caa-rated spreads have also widened. Australia: A sluggish economy and soggy inflation, with little evidence of an imminent turnaround, imply that the Reserve Bank of Australia may not be done with its rate cutting cycle. Maintain an overweight stance on Australian sovereign debt relative to global benchmarks. Feature There’s Nothing To “Caa” Here The clouds of pessimism on global growth, and financial markets, continue to slowly dissipate. The global manufacturing PMI has clearly bottomed, our rising global leading economic indicator is signaling more upside for the first half of 2020, equity markets worldwide are grinding higher, volatility is subdued, while corporate credit spreads in the US and Europe remain generally tight. Yet within the corporate bond market, a peculiar dynamic has emerged. We do not see a reason to extrapolate the weakness in lower-rated US junk bonds into a broader macro issue for the corporate bond market, and the US economy. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) for the overall Bloomberg Barclays US high-yield (HY) index now sits at 376bps. While this spread is relatively narrow from a longer-term perspective, investors may have become more discerning about credit risk. Lower-rated HY has dramatically underperformed higher-rated HY debt of late, with the US Caa-rated OAS now sitting at 985bps compared to Ba-rated spreads of 196bps (Chart of the Week). The divergence across credit tiers is unprecedented, in that Caa spreads are widening while Ba spreads are narrowing – typically, spreads move in tandem directionally, both in bull and bear markets for US junk bonds. The widening of US Caa-rated junk bond spreads has started to raise concerns that this is a “canary in the coal mine” signaling future financial stress among US corporate borrowers. Yet the same dynamic is occurring in euro area HY, with Caa-rated and Ba-rated spreads tracking the US on an almost tick-for-tick basis. In a report published yesterday, our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy investigated the history of Caa spread widenings dating back to 1996.1 They noted that Caa spread widening has typically been a good predictor of one-year-ahead negative excess returns for the overall US junk bond index. However, there has never been a period like today where Caa spreads have widened while overall HY spreads have remained stable. Chart of the WeekSome Odd Divergences In Global Credit We do not see a reason to extrapolate the weakness in lower-rated US junk bonds into a broader macro issue for the corporate bond market, and the US economy, for two main reasons: Chart 2Lower Energy Prices Hurt Lower Rated US HY 1) The widening is focused on Energy related debt The widening of US Caa-rated spreads in 2019 has occurred alongside a parallel increase in the spreads of Energy-related companies in the US junk bond universe (Chart 2). A similar trend played out during the 2014/15 HY bear phase, which was triggered by the collapse of world oil prices that ravaged the US shale oil industry which dominated the lower-rated tiers of the junk bond market. In 2019, oil prices have declined, although not as dramatically, and HY Energy spreads have widened but to nowhere near the levels seen five years ago. More importantly, non-Energy junk spreads remain very subdued and stable, unlike the case in 2014/15 (bottom panel). When looking at the 2019 year-to-date excess returns for the Bloomberg Barclays US HY index, it is clear that the overall negative returns for the Caa-rated bucket have been driven by the lagging performance of Energy names (Chart 3). The rest of the market has generally been delivering solid excess returns. Chart 3Contribution To 2019 YTD US HY Excess Returns* 2) The widening has not been confirmed by signals from other reliable credit cycle indicators We believe that, from a top-down macro perspective, corporate credit performance in the US is influenced by three main factors: the state of US corporate health, the stance of the Fed’s monetary policy and the trend in lending standards for US banks. We have dubbed this our “Credit Checklist”, and we present a version of that checklist for US high-yield in Chart 4. Chart 4Conditions Not In Place For A Broad US HY Selloff Our “bottom-up” US HY Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) aggregates, for a sample set of US HY issuers, published financial ratios that are typically used to determine the creditworthiness of borrowers – measures like interest coverage, operating margins and leverage. The US HY CHM is currently at a “neutral” reading (2nd panel), unlike past periods where Caa-rated spreads widened sharply: during the early 2000s telecom bust, the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices. The readings for the three components of our US HY Credit Checklist are all at neutral levels, suggesting that there is no fundamental underpinning at the moment for a sustained increase in US HY spreads. Yet another reason why the latest widening of Caa-rated spreads looks unusual. Turning to measures of the stance of US monetary policy, we look at both the slope of the US Treasury curve (2-year vs 10-year) and the gap between the real fed funds rate and the New York Fed’s estimate of the neutral “r-star” rate. Prior to the early 2000s and 2008 blowout in Caa spreads, the Fed had pushed the real funds rate into restrictive territory above r-star, and the Treasury curve subsequently inverted. That was not the case during the 2014/15 Caa widening, as the Fed was only beginning to transition away from its QE/zero-rate era at that time. Currently, the real funds rate is right at r-star, and the Treasury curve is very flat but not inverted, indicating a broadly neutral monetary policy stance. Finally, we look at data from the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey to evaluate lending standards for US banks. On that front, the latest reading on standards for commercial and industrial loans showed a very modest tightening in the third quarter of 2019, but the overall level remains broadly neutral – unlike the sharp tightening of conditions seen in the early 2000s and 2008 (and the modest tightening in 2014/15). The readings for the three components of our US HY Credit Checklist are all at neutral levels, suggesting that there is no fundamental underpinning at the moment for a sustained increase in US HY spreads. Yet another reason why the latest widening of Caa-rated spreads looks unusual, rather than a sign of future stress in US credit markets. We even see a similar dynamic at work in the euro area. In Chart 5, we present a Credit Checklist for euro area HY, using the same indicators that go into our US HY Credit Checklist. The readings here are even more positive for corporate credit performance than in the US. Our euro area bottom-up HY CHM is showing no deterioration of euro area corporate health, the real ECB policy rate is well below the estimate of r-star, the German yield curve is not inverted and the ECB’s survey of euro area bank lending standards showed a modest easing in the third quarter. Just like in the US, the fundamental backdrop does not argue for a sustained period of euro area HY spread widening, making the latest move higher in euro area Caa spreads as unusual as the move in US Caa. We cannot even blame lower oil prices for the spread widening, as Energy represents only a tiny fraction of the euro area HY market, compared to the large weighting of Energy borrowers in the US junk bond universe. Chart 5Conditions Not In Place For A Broad European HY Selloff We suspect that the correlation between US and euro area HY spreads, by credit tier, has more to do with the increased correlation of trading within global credit markets. Or perhaps it is a sign of investors staying cautious and staying up in quality, even within the riskier HY market. Whatever the reason, we see little fundamental reason to expect the widening of Caa-rated spreads to leak into the broader high-yield market. In fact, if oil prices begin to move higher again, as our commodity strategists are expecting for 2020, that might create a tactical buying opportunity in Caa-rated junk bonds in both the US and euro area. In the meantime, we see no reason to change our recommended overweight stance on US and euro area HY corporate bonds, even with the widening of lower-rated spreads. Bottom Line: The recent widening of US Caa-rated high-yield spreads is narrowly focused in Energy-related companies. The conditions for a spillover into the broader junk bond market (tight monetary policy, tightening lending standards & deteriorating corporate health) are not currently in place. Stay overweight high-yield in both the US and euro area, where Caa-rated spreads have also widened. Australia: The RBA May Not Be Done Yet The rally in Australian government bonds has been driven by the dovish policy response from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to weak economic growth and tepid inflation – a backdrop that is showing little sign of reversing quickly. We have maintained a recommended overweight investment stance on Australian government bonds since December 19, 2017. Since then, the yield on Bloomberg Barclays Australian Treasury index has declined by -140bps, sharply outperforming bonds in the other developed markets and ending Australia’s long-time status as a “high-yielding” developed economy bond market (Chart 6). The rally in Australian government bonds has been driven by the dovish policy response from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to weak economic growth and tepid inflation – a backdrop that is showing little sign of reversing quickly. The central bank has already cut interest rates by 75bps this year, taking the Cash Rate down to a record low of 0.75%. At the November 5th monetary policy meeting, the RBA held off on additional easing but still delivered what was perceived by the market to be a dovish surprise, emphasizing persistently below-target inflation and potential downside risks stemming from the housing market. The door was kept wide open for further rate cuts, if necessary. RBA Governor Philip Lowe has even discussed the possibility that the RBA may have to cut rates to the zero bound and start buying assets via quantitative easing to try and restore inflation back to the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% target band. Chart 6Australian Bonds Have Outperformed Sharply The RBA’s dovishness is justified, given sluggish economic growth and tepid inflation. Real GDP growth slowed sharply in the first half of 2019 to a meager 1.4% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 7). Consumer sentiment and business confidence remain depressed, having both declined since the start of the year. The former is being hit by weak house prices and sub-par income growth, while the latter is suffering under the weight of weaker demand from Australia’s most important trade partner, China. In addition, persistent drought conditions in much of the country have pushed up food prices and brought down incomes related to the farming sector. Chart 7Sluggish Australian Domestic Demand Chart 8From Boom To Bust In Australian Housing A bellwether for the Australian economy, the housing market, has not fared much better (Chart 8). Building approvals for new dwelling units have fallen almost 20% since September of last year, while house prices in the major cities have been contracting since the fourth quarter of 2017. Responding to easy financial conditions in Australia and the rest of the world, the standard variable mortgage rate has now fallen to a 60-year low. It remains to be seen how quickly the housing market will turn around and when that, in turn, will lift dwelling investment, but the RBA cuts in 2019 should give a bit of a lift to Australian housing in 2020. As in other developed markets, trade uncertainty and fears of a recession have made Australian firms more hesitant to invest. Real private business investment is now falling in year-over-year terms, even with the boost to the terms of trade (and corporate profits) from the increase in prices for Australia’s most important commodities seen in 2019 (Chart 9). That impact may be starting to fade, however. The price for iron ore – a major Australian commodity export – has already fallen 28% from the 2019 peak. In addition, Chinese iron ore imports from Australia are contracting in year-over-terms, even with Chinese growth starting to show signs of stabilization in response to stimulus measures implemented earlier this year. Those is an ominous signal for Australian growth, given the massive swing in net exports seen this year. Chart 9Terms Of Trade Turning Negative For Australian Capex Chart 10An Unsustainable Lift From Net Exports Driven by the persistent depreciation of the Australian dollar, and supportive terms of trade, the Australian trade balance has reached its highest value as a percent of nominal GDP (3.7%) since 1959, when quarterly data began (Chart 10). The surge has come almost entirely from the export side, occurring alongside the boost to commodity prices that was concentrated in iron ore, and looks both unsustainable and unrepeatable on a rate-of-change basis. Slowing Australian economic momentum has also impacted the labor market. Employment growth is slowing and the unemployment rate has ticked up to 5.3% from a cyclical low of 5% in February 2019 (Chart 11). The so-called “underemployment rate”, is a much higher 8.5%, indicating that there is still ample slack in the Australian labor market as workers are working fewer hours than they wish (and are hence, “underemployed”). The underemployment rate is negatively correlated to wage growth, suggesting that the modest upturn in the latter seen since the end of 2016 is likely to cool off (bottom panel). Chart 11Some Softening In The Australian Labor Market Chart 12Australian Inflation Remains Subdued The RBA has already warned that wage growth expectations may have become anchored at a lower level given the anemic growth over the past several years. That mirrors the trend seen in overall price inflation. Headline CPI inflation was only 1.6% in the third quarter of 2019, as was the “trimmed mean” CPI inflation rate that is favored by the RBA. Both are below the bottom end of the RBA’s target range of 2-3%, as are survey-based expectations of short-term inflation (Chart 12). The previously mentioned drought conditions have put some upward pressure on overall inflation via grocery food prices, but that is expected to be transitory. With depressed house prices and ongoing issues with spare capacity in the labor market, longer-term market-based inflation expectations, captured by the 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap rate, have dipped below the 2% level. The combination of weakening growth and soggy inflation poses a problem for the RBA, as it tries to use monetary policy tools to reverse those trends at a time when Australian banks have seen an unprecedented level of scrutiny of their lending practices. Australian banks have been under the harsh political spotlight after the government’s Royal Commission on misconduct in the financial industry released its findings back in February of this year. Many banks were exposed for serious violations, including money laundering and “improperly” selling financial products to households. Several top bank executives lost their jobs as a result, with the overall industry duly chastised and humbled. Australian banks remain well capitalized, following the path of most developed market banks in response to the Basel III reforms, while non-performing loans remain modest. Yet the risk moving forward is that Australian banks become more prudent in their lending practices after the public “flogging” they received this year, which may impair the transmission mechanism from low RBA policy rates to increased loan growth - and, eventually, faster economic activity. Already, private credit growth has slowed sharply, with the sharpest declines coming for housing and business lending (Chart 13). Investment implications for Australian bonds In the case of Australia, however, the underlying economy and inflation trends still point to a possibility that the RBA will have to ease again sometime in the next few months – a move that is unlikely to be matched in the other major developed markets. This likely means that Australian government bonds can continue to outperform in 2020. Despite signs that the global economy is starting to bottom out after the 2019 downturn, the momentum in Australian economic growth and inflation remains tepid. This suggests that Australian sovereign debt is likely to continue outperforming global peers on a relative basis over the next 6-12 months. Our RBA Monitor continues to signal that more interest rate cuts from the RBA are needed. Yet the Australian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve now discounts only 19bps of rate cuts over the next year (Chart 14). This mirrors the trend seen in other developed interest rate markets, as investors have shifted to pricing out the dovish policy expectations as global growth starts to improve. Chart 13Weakening Loan Demand, But No Credit Crunch Chart 14Stay Overweight Australian Government Bonds In the case of Australia, however, the underlying economy and inflation trends still point to a possibility that the RBA will have to ease again sometime in the next few months – a move that is unlikely to be matched in the other major developed markets. This likely means that Australian government bonds can continue to outperform in 2020. We advise staying strategically overweight Australian government bonds in global fixed income portfolios. Bottom Line: A sluggish economy and soggy inflation, with little evidence of an imminent turnaround, imply that the Reserve Bank of Australia may not be done with its rate cutting cycle. Maintain an overweight stance on Australian sovereign debt relative to global benchmarks. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Duration: Incoming data are consistent with our view that global growth is at an inflection point, and will improve during the next few months. As this plays out and recessionary fears fade into the background, we expect the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield to settle near 2.5%, 57 bps above its current level. High-Yield: Caa-rated debt has underperformed the duration-matched Treasury index so far this year, despite strong performance for junk bonds overall. We document that weak Caa returns often precede negative returns for the overall junk index. High-Yield: We show several ways in which this year’s Caa underperformance is unique compared to prior episodes. All in all, we conclude that we should not take too strong a signal from the recent Caa spread widening. Remain overweight high-yield in US bond portfolios. The Way Back To 2.5% Chart 1Target 2.5% Worries about a looming US recession peaked in late August when the 2/10 Treasury curve inverted and the 10-year yield hit 1.47%. Since then, some better economic data and the prospect of a “phase 1” US/China trade deal have lifted yields and un-inverted the curve. But the bond market is not yet sending the all-clear. Once recession fears completely fade into the background, we would expect the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield to settle near 2.5%. This is the FOMC’s median estimate of the longer-run fed funds rate, and also where the 5-year/5-year forward yield peaked during the last two global growth upturns (Chart 1). We expect that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield will reach 2.5% in the first half of 2020, but global growth needs to rebound for that to happen. At present, we detect some positive signals from our preferred global growth indicators. The Global Manufacturing PMI troughed at 49.3 in July and came in at 49.8 in October (Chart 1, bottom panel). Then last week, Flash PMI data showed further gains in November for the US, Eurozone and Japan (Chart 2). Only the UK saw its manufacturing PMI drop in November, and it accounts for a mere 2% of the global index. There is no Flash PMI estimate for China. We detect some positive signals from our preferred global growth indicators. More signs of economic optimism are found in regional manufacturing PMIs, which continue to diverge positively from the national number (Chart 3). November data have already been released for New York, Philadelphia, Kansas City and Dallas. All four surveys point to a stronger national print. Chart 2A Bottom In Global PMIs Chart 3Regional PMIs Hooking Up Other data released last week include the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Indicator, which held flat at just above zero in year-over-year terms (Chart 4). The Leading Index is at a key inflection point. A rebound from here would be consistent with the 2015/16 episode (our base case expectation), while a dip into negative territory would sound some alarm bells. Chart 4Keep A Close Eye On Jobless Claims October existing home sales and housing starts came out last week (Chart 4, panels 2 & 3). Both series continue to rebound sharply from the depressed levels seen earlier in the year. This should not be too surprising, given this year’s large drop in mortgage rates. It will be more interesting to see what happens to the housing data as bond yields move higher and the stimulus from low rates fades. We have previously argued that the housing market will provide important clues about where bond yields will peak for the cycle. It will be critical to monitor the housing data as bond yields move higher in 2020.1 One note of caution comes from initial jobless claims, which printed at 227k in each of the past two weeks, slightly above recent levels (Chart 4, bottom panel). Claims remain roughly flat on a 6-month basis, consistent with continued economic recovery. However, a sustained increase would send an important warning sign about the labor market. We will be watching claims closely during the next few weeks. Bottom Line: Incoming data are consistent with our view that global growth is at an inflection point, and will improve during the next few months. As this plays out and recessionary fears fade into the background, we expect the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield to settle near 2.5%, 57 bps above its current level. The Puzzling Underperformance Of Caa-Rated Junk Bonds Chart 5The Puzzling Case Of Caa-Rated Junk Bonds Overall high-yield returns have been solid in 2019, but oddly, the lowest-rated junk bonds have not participated in the rally. So far this year, Ba and B-rated junk bonds have bested duration-matched Treasuries by 786 bps and 717 bps, respectively. But Caa-rated bonds have underperformed the duration-matched Treasury index by 87 bps (Chart 5). We usually think of the Caa-rated credit tier as being “higher beta” than the Ba and B tiers. That is, it should perform best in “risk on” environments, and worst in “risk off” environments. With that in mind, this year’s Caa underperformance is puzzling, and raises two important questions that we attempt to answer in this report. Is Caa underperformance a warning sign for the overall junk sector? Can we identify the reasons for this year’s Caa underperformance? And if so, do they suggest a buying opportunity? A Caa-nary In The Coal Mine? To assess whether this year’s Caa underperformance might be a warning sign for overall junk bond excess returns, we ran a few tests using historical data. First, we looked at calendar year excess returns going back to 1996 (Table 1). We then tested the performance of a couple trading rules to see whether Caa performance is a bellwether for the overall index. For the first test, we identified calendar years when junk index excess returns were positive but Caa was the worst performing credit tier. Four years fit this criteria: 1999, 2005, 2014 and 2019. Of the three years other than 2019, two (1999 and 2014) were followed by negative junk index excess returns the next year. Table 1Junk Excess Returns By Calendar Year We also posited that one difference between the Caa and Ba/B credit tiers might be that Caa-rated firms tend to be smaller. We therefore identified calendar years when junk index excess returns were positive but when small cap equities underperformed large cap equities. We identified eight such years. Of the seven years other than 2019, five were followed by negative junk index excess returns the next year. Both rules appear to give a good warning sign for the overall junk index. What if we combine them? We identify three years when junk index excess returns were positive, but Caa was the worst performing credit tier and small cap equities lagged large caps: 1999, 2014 and 2019. Both 1999 and 2014 were followed by negative junk index excess returns the next year. So far the evidence of Caa underperformance being a warning sign for the overall index is quite compelling. But let’s look more closely at the periods flagged by our trading rules. It is only this year that we have seen a large divergence in terms of direction between Caa spreads and overall junk index spreads. Recall that we identified 2019, 2014, 2005 and 1999 as the four years when overall junk index excess returns were positive, but when the Caa credit tier was the worst performer. If we look at the direction of junk spreads in those periods, we see that the direction of Caa spreads tracked the overall index very closely throughout 2014, 2005 and 1999. It is only this year that we have seen a large divergence in terms of direction between Caa spreads and overall junk index spreads (Chart 6). This divergence is odd, and it suggests that this year is unique compared to the other periods identified in our analysis (more on this below). Chart 62019 Is Unique Another reason to doubt the potential relevance of our calendar year analysis is that the decision to use calendar years is arbitrary, and it severely limits our sample size. We therefore run the same analysis using rolling 12-month periods. The results are presented in Table 2. Table 2Predictive Power Of Caa Returns: Rolling 12-Month Periods From December 1996 To October 2019 First, note the baseline result that there are 178 12-month periods of positive junk index excess returns in our sample. Of those 178 periods, 31% were followed by negative excess returns during the subsequent 12 months. If we apply our “Caa Return” filter and look only at 12-month periods when junk index excess returns were positive but Caa was the worst performing credit tier, our 178 examples fall to just 22. Of those 22 episodes, half were followed by negative junk index excess returns during the subsequent 12 months. Our “Small Cap/Large Cap Equity” filter provides a similar 51% hit rate with a larger sample size of 78. In this analysis we also test a “Caa Spread” filter where we scan for 12-month periods when junk index excess returns were positive, but when Caa spreads widened despite tightening in the overall index spread. We identify only 16 such periods, 56% of which were followed by negative index excess returns. We also looked at what happens when we combine two or more of our filters. Using our “Caa Return” and “Small Cap / Large Cap Equity” filters together, we identify only 18 episodes, 61% of which were followed by negative junk index excess returns during the next 12 months. If we take all three of our filters together, we find only 5 episodes, 4 of which preceded a period of negative junk excess returns. Please recall that the most recent 12-month period meets the criteria of all three of our filters. As was the case with our Table 1 results, an important caveat to this analysis is that of the 5 episodes identified by all three of our filters, the direction of Caa spreads never diverged from the direction of the overall index spread. In fact, we could find no historical period other than this year when Caa spreads diverged in direction from the overall index spread for so long. We conclude that Caa underperformance can provide advance notice of negative junk index excess returns, but also that the current period is so unique that it requires further analysis. Can We Explain The Divergence Between Caa Spreads And The Overall Index? As mentioned above, the current period of sharply widening Caa spreads alongside a rangebound overall index spread is unique historically. This not only raises questions about the relevance of the historical analysis we just presented, but also cries out for an explanation. Fortunately, several things appear to explain the odd behavior of Caa spreads. First, changes in index duration. Junk index duration fell dramatically in 2019, but the decline was much larger for Ba and B rated credits than for the Caa tier. If we control for changes in index duration by looking at 12-month breakeven spreads instead of the average index option-adjusted spread, we see that the spread divergence looks much less dramatic (Chart 7). Controlling for changes in index duration by looking at 12-month breakeven spreads instead of the average index OAS, we see that the spread divergence looks much less dramatic. Second, it’s possible that credit quality has deteriorated more for the lowest-rated credits than for the rest of the junk index. That would explain the spread divergence. However, this appears to not be the case. Our bottom-up sample of high-yield firms shows that debt-to-assets and interest coverage look similar compared to history for both the median high-yield firm and the worst 10% of firms (Chart 8). Chart 7A Duration Story Chart 8Credit Quality Is Not The Culprit Finally, we consider the sector composition of the different credit tiers. We look at year-to-date sector contributions to each credit tier’s excess returns and find that the difference between Caa and the rest of the index is concentrated in the Energy and Communications sectors (Chart 9). Caa-rated Communications firms underperformed the Ba and B credit tiers because of two Caa-rated firms – Frontier Communications Corp and Intelsat – that ran into problems. As for Energy, we note that the Caa tier has much more exposure to the Oil Field Services sub-sector than the other credit tiers. This sub-sector captures many of the shale players, who have struggled with falling oil prices. Notice that this year’s decline in the WTI oil price tracks Caa spread widening very closely (Chart 10). Chart 9Contribution To Year-To-Date Excess Returns* (%) Chart 10Blame Energy The Appendix at the end of this report provides a sector decomposition of the different junk credit tiers. Specifically, it presents three tables. One showing the sector weights in each credit tier. A second showing year-to-date excess returns for each sector by credit tier. A third showing the contribution from each sector to each credit tier’s year-to-date excess returns. Investment Conclusions Overall, we are hesitant to make too much of the recent Caa underperformance. Yes, we find compelling evidence that Caa underperformance can be a bellwether for negative high-yield excess returns. However, the behavior of Caa spreads in 2019 doesn’t resemble the prior periods in our analysis very closely. Specifically, the Caa spread doesn’t tend to diverge from the overall index spread in terms of direction, as it has this year. We are also able to identify two compelling reasons for this year’s divergence between Caa spreads and the overall index. The first is the change in relative index duration, and the second is stress in the shale oil sector due to a falling oil price. Spreads should adjust to changes in duration over time, and the stress in the shale sector should ease if oil prices rise as our commodity strategists expect.2 Given the uniqueness of the current period, and our base case outlook for a rebound in global growth, we are inclined to view Caa bonds (and junk bonds more generally) as an attractive buying opportunity in the current environment. But we will keep an eye on the performance of Caa bonds during the next few months. If global growth recovers and the oil price rises, but Caa continues to lag the overall index, then it may compel us to change our view. Appendix Table 3Sector Weights Within High-Yield Corporate Bond Credit Tiers* (%) Table 4Sector Year-To-Date Excess Return* By High-Yield Credit Tier (%) Table 5Sector Contribution To Year-To-Date Excess Return* For Each High-Yield Credit Tier (%) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Position For Modest Curve Steepening”, dated October 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Our commodity strategists forecast an average price of $63/bbl for WTI crude oil in 2020. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade”, dated November 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Dear Client, In addition to this short weekly report, you will also receive our 2020 outlook, published by the Bank Credit Analyst. Next week, I will be on the road visiting clients in South Africa. I hope to report my discussions and findings the following week. Best regards, Chester Ntonifor Highlights According to a simple attractiveness framework, the most desirable currencies are the Norwegian krone, the Swedish krona, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the New Zealand dollar and the British pound. Take profits soon on our long GBP/JPY position. Feature In this report, we use a simple framework for ranking G10 currencies. First, we consider the macroeconomic environment using as proxies a country’s basic balance and external vulnerability. Next, we look at valuation metrics, surveying a variety of both short-term and longer-term models. Finally, we consider positioning, to gauge if our view is mainstream or out of consensus. Below are our results. Basic Balance Chart I-1Basic Balance We consider the basic balance to be one of the most important concepts in determining the attractiveness of a currency. In a nutshell, it captures the ebb and flow of demand for a country’s domestic assets. Persistent basic balance surpluses are usually associated with an appreciating currency and vice versa. The euro area sports the best basic balance surplus in the G10 universe, followed by Norway and then Australia (Chart I-1). In simple terms, this means there is constant strong underlying demand for these currencies - either for domestic goods and services, or for investment into portfolio assets. The UK and the US rank the worst in terms of basic balances, driven by Brexit uncertainty and the ebbing of tax reform benefits in the US. We will explore balance of payments dynamics within all of the G10 countries in detail next week. External Debt A currency is sometimes only as vulnerable as its external liabilities. In an absolute sense, external debt as a share of GDP is highest in the UK, euro area, and Switzerland (Chart I-2). However, what matters most times for vulnerability are net external assets rather than gross liabilities. On this measure, Japan, Switzerland, and Norway are the most attractive countries, while the US and Australia rank the worst (Chart I-3). Chart I-2External Vulnerability Chart I-3US Is Least Attractive Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Chart I-4PPP Model Various models have shown PPP to be a very poor tool for managing currencies, but an excellent one at extremes. However, there is a roadblock that comes from measurement issues, since consumer price baskets tend to differ in composition from one country to the next. In order to get closer to an apples-to-apples comparison across countries, two adjustments are necessary. First, categorizing the consumer price index (CPI) into five major groups. In most cases, this breakdown captures 90% of the national CPI basket. This includes food, restaurants and hotels (1), shelter (2), health care (3), culture and recreation (4), and energy and transportation (5). The second adjustment is to run two regressions with the exchange rate as the dependent variable. The first regression (call it REG1) uses the relative price ratios of the five groups as independent variables. This allows us to observe the most influential price ratios that help explain variations in the exchange rate. The second regression (call it REG2) uses a weighted average combination of the five groups to form a synthetic relative price ratio. If, for example, shelter is 33% in the US CPI basket, but 19% in the Swedish CPI basket, relative shelter prices will represent 26% of the combined price ratio. This allows for a uniform cross-sectional comparison, as opposed to using the national CPI weights. The US dollar is overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, Japanese yen, and Norwegian krone. The results show the US dollar as overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, Japanese yen, and Norwegian krone. Commodity currencies are closer to fair value, and within the safe-haven complex, the Japanese yen is more attractive than the Swiss franc. The euro is less undervalued than implied by the overvaluation in the DXY index (Chart I-4). Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM) Back in 2016, we developed a set of currency indicators to help global portfolio managers increase their Sharpe ratio in managing currency exposure. The idea was quite simple: For every developed world country, there were three key variables that influenced the near-term path of its exchange rate versus the US dollar. Our intermediate-term timing models are not sending any strong signals at the moment. Interest Rate Differentials: Under the lens of interest rate parity, if one country is expected to have lower interest rates versus another, the incumbent’s currency will fall today so as to gradually appreciate in the future and nullify the interest rate advantage. Chart I-5Intermediate-Term Model Inflation Differentials: Assuming no transactional costs, the price of sandals cannot be relatively high and rising in Mumbai versus Auckland. Either the Indian rupee needs to fall, the kiwi rise, or a combination of the two has to occur to equalize prices across borders. Risk Factor: Exchange rates are not government bonds in that few treasury departments and central banks can guarantee a par value on them. Ergo, the ebb and flow of risk aversion will have an impact on the Norwegian krone as well as the yen. For the most part, our models have worked like a charm. On a risk-adjusted return basis, a dynamic hedging strategy based on our ITTMs has outperformed all static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies since 2001. These results give us confidence to continue running these models as a sanity check for our ever-shifting currency biases. That said, our intermediate-term timing models are not sending any strong signals at the moment. The Swedish krona, Norwegian krone, and New Zealand dollar are the most attractive currencies, while the British pound and Swiss franc are the least attractive (Chart I-5). Long-Term Fair Value Model Chart I-6Long-Term Model Our long-term FX models are also part of a set of technical tools we use to help us navigate FX markets. Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials, and proxies for global risk aversion. These models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G10 and emerging market FX markets. The models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their main purpose is to provide information on the longevity of a currency cycle, depending on where we are in the economic cycle. Our long-term FX models are not sending any strong signals right now, with the US dollar at fair value. The cheapest currencies are the yen, the Norwegian krone, and Swedish krona (Chart I-6). The priciest currencies are the South African rand and the Saudi riyal. Real Interest Rates One defining feature of the currency landscape is that pretty much across the G10 countries, we have negative real rates (Chart I-7). Within the G10 universe, the US and New Zealand dollars are the highest-yielding currencies, while the British pound and Swedish krona are the least attractive. Chart I-7Real Rates Speculative Positioning Being long Treasurys and the dollar has been a consensus trade for many years now (Chart I-8). According to CFTC data, this has been expressed mostly through the aussie and kiwi, although our bias is that the Swedish krona and Norwegian krone have been the real victims. Chart I-8Positioning That said, flow data highlights just how precarious being long US dollars is right now. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive, but the momentum of these flows is clearly rolling over. This is being more than offset by official net outflows. As interest rate differentials have started moving against the US, so has foreign investor appetite for Treasury bonds. Concluding Thoughts Should the nascent pickup in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, it will go a long way in further eroding the US’ yield advantage. More specifically, the currencies that have borne the brunt of the manufacturing slowdown should also experience the quickest reversals. For example, yields in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan have risen by much more than those in the US since the bottom. The most attractive currencies are the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the British pound and New Zealand dollar. This is the message being sent by an aggregate of our ranking model. The most attractive currencies are the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the British pound and New Zealand dollar (Chart I-9). Take profits soon on our long GBP/JPY position. Chart I-9Favor Norway, Japan and Sweden Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mixed: Retail sales grew by 0.3% year-on-year in October. Industrial production contracted by 0.8% month-on-month in October. On the housing market front, building permits and housing starts both increased by 5% and 3.8% month-on-month in October. However, MBA mortgage applications contracted by 2.2% for the week ended November 15th. The NY Empire State Manufacturing index fell to 2.9 from 4 in November. The Philly Fed manufacturing index, on the other hand, soared to 10.4 from 5.6 in November. The DXY index depreciated by 0.3% this week. The FOMC minutes released this Wednesday showed that the Fed now sees little need to further reduce rates. Last week, we did a reassessment of global growth and the USD, and entered a limit sell for the DXY index at 100. Report Links: Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4UR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The seasonally-adjusted trade balance fell to €18.3 billion in September. The current account surplus slightly narrowed by €0.3 billion to €28.2 billion. Headline and core inflation were both unchanged at 1.1% and 0.7% year-on-year respectively in October. Consumer confidence improved from -7.6 in October to -7.2 in November. EUR/USD increased by 0.5% this week. The improvement in soft data confirms that the economy is in a bottoming process in the euro area. The fact that the largest economy, Germany, skirted a recession last week also boosted investor confidence. We continue to remain overweight the euro. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: Exports decreased by 9.2% year-on-year in October. Imports slumped by 14.8% year-on-year. The total trade balance shifted to a surplus of ¥17.3 billion. The industry activity index increased by 1.5% month-on-month in September. USD/JPY fell by 0.2% this week. While global growth is set to improve given a possible trade détente and easy monetary policy worldwide, uncertainties continue to loom. The US Senate unanimously passed legislation on the "Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act," adding more difficulties to finalize the Phase I trade deal. Global trade uncertainty is positive for safe-haven demand. Report Links: Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: The Rightmove house price index increased by 0.3% year-on-year in November. Public sector net borrowing increased by £3 billion to £10.5 billion in October. The British pound continues to appreciate by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. With Brexit being less of a threat, the pound is poised to rise through next year. We are long GBP/JPY in our portfolio and it is in the money at 6.1%. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been soft: The Westpac leading index fell by 0.1% month-on-month in October, following a slight decline the previous month. AUD/USD has been more or less flat this week. In the monetary policy minutes released this week, the RBA expressed their expectations for stronger growth at 2.75% in 2020 and around 3% in 2021, supported by accommodative monetary policy, infrastructure spending, stabilizing house prices, and strong steel-intensive activities in China. The minutes also presented an argument against lower interest rates: while lower interest rates can support the economy through the usual transmission channels, they could be negative for savers and confidence. That said, the RBA is "prepared to ease monetary policy further if needed." Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: Both output and input components of the producer price index have increased in Q3: the output component grew by 1% quarter-on-quarter and input component by 0.9% quarter-on-quarter. NZD/USD increased by 0.7% this week. Both growth and inflation in New Zealand are showing signs that the economy is in a bottoming process. We are positive on the kiwi against the US dollar while we remain short against the Australian dollar and Swedish Krona. Report Links: Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: Manufacturing shipments fell by 0.2% month-on-month in September. Both headline and core inflation were unchanged at 1.9% year-on-year in October. ADP employment showed a loss of 22.6K jobs in October. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. While a possible trade détente between US and China and rising oil prices could put a floor under the loonie, the pipeline constraints in Canada have dampened the correlation between the oil prices and the loonie. This will limit the upside potential for the Canadian dollar. Report Links: Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: The trade surplus narrowed to CHF 3.5 billion in October from CHF 4.1 billion the previous month, due primarily to growth in imports, which grew by 1.9 billion month-on-month. Exports also increased by 1.3 billion month-on-month. Import demand remains firm for chemical products. Industrial production grew by 8% year-on-year in Q3. USD/CHF increased by 0.2% this week. The trade balance still remains at a high level in Switzerland, which is bullish for the franc. Moreover, global uncertainties could underpin the safe-haven franc. Report Links: Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been positive: The trade balance shifted to a surplus of NOK 5.9 billion in October, after a deficit of NOK 1.4 billion in September. However, this is compared to a surplus of NOK 32.6 billion in the same month last year. On a year-on-year basis, exports slumped by 27%, caused by a decrease in exports of mineral fuels and chemical products. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week, supported by the oil price recovery. On Wednesday, the EIA posted an increase of crude oil inventories by 1.4 million barrels from the previous week, lower than expectations. WTI crude oil prices thus surged by 4% on the news. Going forward, we remain overweight energy prices and the Norwegian krone. Report Links: Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Capacity utilization increased to 0.5% in Q3, up from 0.1% in the previous quarter. The Swedish krona increased by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. The Swedish krona has depreciated by 23% against the USD since its 2018 peak. A global growth revival is likely to give a boost to the krona from a valuation perspective. Report Links: Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights Analysis on the Chinese property market is available below. In the Philippines, domestic demand is set to accelerate at the hands of the government’s fiscal boost. The current account deficit will widen and the peso and local bonds will likely sell-off. This warrants an underweight stance in this interest rate-sensitive bourse. A new trade: Pay 2-year swap rates. The outlook for China’s property market and construction activity is downbeat. Financial market plays leveraged to mainland construction activity remain at risk. The Philippines: The Cycle Is Turning The relative performance of Philippine equities against the EM benchmark is moving inversely to the direction of relative (Philippines minus EM) local bond yields (Chart I-1). When local Philippine bond yields drop versus those of other EMs, this bourse outperforms, and vice versa. Likewise, Philippine share prices in absolute terms exhibit a negative relationship with local bond yields (Chart I-2). The rationale behind this high sensitivity in share prices to local interest rates is the large presence of banks and property stocks in the Philippines' bourse. Banks account for 20% and real estate stocks another 21% of the local stock exchange. These sectors benefit in a falling interest rate environment and suffer during periods of rising rates. Chart I-1Philippines Vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Bond Yields Chart I-2Philippine Stocks Are Inversely Correlated To Domestic Bond Yields Our underweight position in Philippine equities has not played out because the economy has slowed much more than we had expected, which has also coincided with collapsing US Treasury bond yields. Consequently, Philippine local bond yields have plummeted, supporting the stock market’s absolute and relative performance. Chart I-3Philippine Growth Slowed Due To A Slump In Government Spending Chart I-4Negative Fiscal & Credit Impulse Stabilized The Current Account Deficit The growth rate of the Philippines has decelerated markedly due to sharp slowdowns in both government spending and bank loan growth (Chart I-3). In fact, the combined bank loan and fiscal spending impulse has plunged, leading to a major slowdown in domestic demand, which in turn has stabilized the current account (Chart I-4). The latter effect has supported the currency and allowed the central bank to cut rates. A budget deadlock on a number of items delayed the approval of the 2019 budget, causing government spending to plunge in the first half of 2019. In short, it was unintended fiscal tightening that has wrong-footed our view on the direction of the macro cycle, and consequently Philippine financial markets. Government spending has been instrumental in driving fixed capital formation since President Rodrigo Duterte came to power in May 2016. Philippine local bond yields have plummeted, supporting the stock market’s absolute and relative performance. Going forward, the macro cycle is set to reverse: Chart I-5Philippines: Signs Of A Growth Rebound Government expenditure will rise substantially – infrastructure spending in particular – lifting imports. The 2019 budget was approved back in April, and the House of Representatives has given the green light to extend the shelf-life of the current 2019 budget. Moreover, the fiscal 2020 budget, now approved by Duterte, entails 12% nominal growth in government expenditures in general and 14% growth in capital/infrastructure spending in particular. Duterte will oversee 100 flagship infrastructure projects estimated to cost 4.3 trillion Philippine pesos, or 24% of GDP. More than half of these projects are either ongoing or will commence construction in the next six to eight months. The larger infrastructure expenditure will encourage bank lending. Overall, domestic demand will revive considerably, causing the current account deficit to widen. Importantly, the expected fiscal boost will come on top of already strong consumer spending. The marginal propensity to spend among households and companies is already improving, confirming domestic growth acceleration (Chart I-5, top panel). In particular, both vehicle and machinery sales are recovering (Chart I-5, middle panel). Narrow and broad money impulses have bottomed (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Stronger imports amid still-depressed exports due to sluggish global demand will lead to a widening of the current account deficit. We expect the peso to resume its depreciation. Renewed currency weakness and a domestic demand revival will put a floor under inflation. The central bank is headed by Governor Benjamin Diokno, the former Budget Secretary and an associate of populist President Duterte. The odds are that the central bank will not hike interest rates in the face of a rising current account deficit and modestly rising inflation. This will reinforce currency depreciation. Finally, domestic bond yields are set to rise. A widening fiscal deficit has historically coincided with higher domestic bond yields (Chart I-6). Odds are it will not be different this time. Besides, Philippine banks have been relentlessly purchasing government bonds because credit demand from companies has been sluggish (Chart I-7). As private credit demand begins to recover and banks accelerate their loan origination, they will become net sellers – or will at least ease their pace of government bond purchases – pushing yields higher. Chart I-6Rising Fiscal Deficit Is Bad News For Bonds Chart I-7Philippine Commercial Banks Have Been Purchasing Government Bonds En Masse Bottom Line: Unintended fiscal tightening has slowed domestic demand, narrowed the current account deficit, supported the currency and induced a drop in local bond yields. This has allowed the Philippines’ interest rate-sensitive bourse to outperform the overall EM equity index. Going forward, the macro cycle is set to reverse. This cycle is about to reverse due to strong fiscal expansion: Domestic demand and imports will grow briskly, and the current account deficit will widen considerably. Widening twin deficits will lead to material currency depreciation and higher domestic bond yields. Investment Recommendations Continue shorting the Philippine peso versus the US dollar. 2-year swap rates are 48 basis points below the policy rate (Chart I-8). The market will price out rate cuts as the business cycle recovers and the currency depreciates. We recommend a new trade: pay 2-year swap rates. Dedicated EM fixed-income investors should underweight the Philippines in their EM domestic currency bonds and sovereign credit portfolios. Chart I-8The Market Is Expecting Rate Cuts Chart I-9Philippine Equity Market Is Not Cheap Does an upcoming growth revival warrant an overweight stance in Philippine stocks within an EM equity portfolio? As shown in Charts I-1 and I-2, this equity market is more sensitive to interest rates than growth. The growth deceleration did not prevent this stock market from outperforming its EM peers. Hence, higher local bond yields amid renewed currency depreciation will likely lead to a period of underperformance. Finally, Philippine stocks are not cheap in absolute terms or relative to the EM benchmark (Chart I-9). Hence, they will not respond well to rising interest rates. Chart I-10Philippine Property Stocks Will Suffer As Interest Rates Rise Within this bourse, underweight/short property stocks. These stocks are the most vulnerable to rising bond yields (Chart I-10). The key risks to our strategy are lower global bond yields and continuous flows of foreign capital into EM assets in general, and local bonds in particular. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com China: Making Sense Of The Property Market Real estate activity in general, and property construction volumes in particular, are critical to our thesis of an ongoing growth slowdown in China. The basis is that construction volumes on the mainland have a considerable impact on industrial activity both within and outside China. On the structural front, housing demand is facing major headwinds: Genuine pent-up demand for housing has diminished. Most Chinese households already own at least one property. Based on a recent survey conducted by The Economic Daily,1 nearly 97% of households surveyed own at least one residential property. Last year’s China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), conducted by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics of China, showed about 68% of new homes sold in China’s urban areas in the first quarter of 2018 were purchased for the purpose of investment. In addition, the living area per capita in China’s urban areas has risen to 40 square meters as of the end of last year – larger than in South Korea and Japan. Other structural impediments include low affordability, slowing rural-to-urban migration, demographic changes and the promotion of the housing rental market. The government has been repeatedly stressing that China will not use the property market as a short-term economic growth-booster this time. The authorities will also continue to prevent speculative housing demand. Between late 2015 and 2017, the People's Bank of China undertook outright monetization of excess housing inventories via the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) program. So far, even though the Chinese economy has already slowed considerably, the government has not injected much stimulus into the property market. On the contrary, the government has drastically reduced the number of slum-reconstruction units as well as its PSL injection this year. This year, the government has also started a new long-term project of renovating residential buildings built in 2000 or earlier. The projects involved include adding parking lots, elevators, fiber cable installments, electricity/gas line improvements, and so on. This renovation program will likely delay property purchases from those owners who were considering purchasing new properties instead of living in the older residential buildings. Chart II-1Property Sales In China: A Sustainable Recovery? From a cyclical perspective (6-12 months), falling home prices and relatively tight financing for property developers will likely prevent a recovery in construction activity: First, Chart II-1 shows there has recently been a pickup in residential property sales. Our research reveals that this has been the result of aggressive promotion strategies – price reductions – implemented by many real estate developers. Among the promotions being offered by many developers are “buy one property, get the second one at half price,” “buy a house and get a car for free,” or “buy a house and get free furniture and decorations.” Local governments have been “discouraging” outright property price declines. Yet, it seems they have allowed implicit price reductions to take place. In cases where outright price cuts cannot be avoided, the authorities try to limit them. Earlier this month, the government of Maanshan, a third-tier city in the Anhui province, released a rule instructing property developers not to lower prices by more than 10%. The outlook for China’s property market and construction activity is downbeat. As a result, official statistics on new housing prices do not truly reflect price pressures in the marketplace. Official statistics show new housing prices are rising at 9% since last year. Nevertheless, many 1st- and 2nd- tier cities are showing price declines in their secondhand residential property markets (Chart II-2). Chart II-2China: Secondary Market Property Prices Are Weak Chart II-3Chinese Property Developers: Massive Pre-Sold Homes, But Lack Of Funding To Complete Construction All in all, it seems that falling home prices have begun to spread from 1st tier cities to some 2nd- and 3rd-tier cities. The number of cities reporting declines in residential home prices is on the rise. Second, in theory, falling property prices should discourage new starts and new construction. Falling prices signal that supply is exceeding demand, with producers typically responding by curtailing output. This holds true for any industry. However, the intricacies of property developers in China may be different. Chart II-4Building Construction Data Is A Broader Measure Than Commodity Buildings Specifically, property developers have been pre-selling aggressively since 2017 while slowing their completion process due to lack of financing (Chart II-3). Such financial constraints arose due to their rapid expansion in the past 10 years. Having already incurred enormous amounts of leverage, they have resorted to pre-sales as another source of funding. Property developers are currently under pressure to deliver those units that were pre sold about two years ago. Will they be able to secure new funding and ramp up construction? Or will they default or delay delivery of houses? It may well be different for each developer. The ones with strong balance sheets and access to financing will build and deliver. The weakest ones will default, while the average ones will likely delay delivery. Hence, it is difficult to gauge construction trends in the next six months in the residential property market. Even so, it is unlikely to be very strong given the industry is highly fragmented, and many small and medium and even some large developers are financially weak. Finally, there is a large gap between the two construction activity datasets – both published by the National Bureau of Statistics. These datasets are referred to as “commodity buildings” and “building construction” (Chart II-4). “Commodity buildings” – i.e., those developed by real estate developers (the equivalent of homebuilders in the US), are only a subset of “building construction.” The “building construction” dataset is more comprehensive. It includes not only “commodity buildings” but also buildings built by non-real estate developers. For example, companies, universities, and various organizations that can construct both residential and non-residential buildings for their own use. Both datasets include residential and non-residential buildings. From a cyclical perspective (6-12 months), falling home prices and relatively tight financing for property developers will likely prevent a recovery in construction activity. Chart II-5 illustrates that “building construction” floor area started, under construction and completed are all shrinking. They are much weaker than floor area started, under construction and completed of “commodity buildings.” Chart II-5Building Construction Is In Recession Chart II-6Falling Construction-Related Commodities Prices Reflect The Weakness In China Construction Activity The take-away from these datasets is as follows: Construction activity in China goes beyond property developers and “commodity buildings” statistics do not always paint the complete picture. Companies and organizations have dramatically curtailed their construction activity. Combined with tight financing conditions for real estate developers, this heralds a downbeat outlook for construction activity. Bottom Line: While short-term fluctuations in construction activity are impossible to gauge in China, the cyclical outlook remains negative. The current round of stimulus has avoided the property market, and real estate bubble excesses have not yet been wrung out. This is why we remain negative on China’s construction outlook and continue to recommend underweighting property developers relative to both the A-share and investable equity indexes. Falling steel, iron ore and industrial commodities prices confirm that construction activity in China remains weak (Chart II-6). Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Economic Daily, administratively managed by the Ministry of Communication, is one of the most influential and authoritative newspapers in China. It is an official outlet for the government to publicize its economic policies. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights Stock markets are set to produce low single digit returns in 2020. Favour stocks over bonds and cash, especially where bond yields are zero or negative – specifically, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. Underweight zero and negative yielding high-quality bonds versus higher yielding bonds – for example, underweight Swiss bonds versus US T-bonds. Favour lower yielding currencies because the central bank loses the ability to depress its own currency. For 2020, our preferred expression of this is long SEK/USD. The biggest risk in 2020 is if the global bond yield were to rise towards 2.5 percent exposing the fragility of risk-asset prices to higher bond yields. The $400 trillion global risk-asset edifice dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy by five to one. Fractal trade: Short Ireland (ISEQ 20) versus Europe (Stoxx Europe 600). Feature For all the talk of economic growth driving stock markets, the big story through 2018-19 has been bond yields driving stock markets. This is true in Europe as well as more broadly – and it is very easy to demonstrate by decomposing the stock market price into its two components: the underlying profits (earnings per share) and the valuation multiple paid for those profits (Chart of the Week). Chart of the Week2018 And 2019 Were All About Valuations. What About 2020? 2018 And 2019 Were All About Valuations Contrast 2018-19 with 2017. In 2017, the stock market’s stellar return came almost entirely from growth – profits surged while the multiple drifted sideways. But in 2018 and 2019, the story was all about valuation multiples – profits drifted sideways while the multiple plunged in 2018, and then symmetrically surged in 2019 (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Decomposing Stock Market Performance... Chart I-3...Into Valuation And Profits The cause of the stock market multiple contraction and re-expansion was the dramatic swing in bond yields. This is hardly surprising given that the prospective return on bonds drives the prospective return on competing long-duration assets, like equities and real-estate. Higher bond yields require a higher prospective return on equities, meaning a lower valuation multiple, while lower bond yields require a higher valuation multiple. In driving the swing in bond yields, the principal player was the Federal Reserve. Again, this is hardly surprising given that the ECB and BoJ are stuck on the side lines with monetary policy already locked at ‘maximum accommodative’, while the Fed can still move the lever in both directions. The cause of the stock market multiple contraction and re-expansion was the dramatic swing in bond yields. Through 2018-2019, the 10-year T-bond yield took a round trip from around 2 percent to 3.3 percent and then down again to around 2 percent where it stands today. This explains the mirror-image round trip in the stock market’s multiple: from 16 down to 13 and then back up again to 16 where it stands today (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Round Trip In The T-Bond Yield Explains The Round Trip In The Stock Market's Valuation Admittedly, the Fed’s dramatic pivot was influenced by the trade war, and the perceived threat to global growth. But two other considerations loomed large: the persistent undershoot of inflation versus its 2 percent target; and the fragility of risk-asset valuations – and thereby financial conditions – to higher bond yields. Bear in mind that the value of global risk-assets at over $400 trillion now dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy by a factor of five to one. So the main danger is not that economic imbalances and fragilities will drag down the financial markets; the main danger is that financial market imbalances and fragilities will drag down the economy – as we painfully felt in 2000, 2007, and 2011. The Valuation And Growth Outlook In 2020 The two key investment questions for 2020 are: What will happen to bond yields, and what will happen to stock market profits? Starting with bond yields, most of the major central banks are, to repeat, out of play. Leaving the Fed as the principal player. But at the last press conference, Jay Powell, made it crystal clear that the Fed is also out of play for the time being, at least when it comes to raising rates. “We've just touched 2 percent core inflation, and then we've fallen back. So, I think we would need to see a really significant move up in inflation that's persistent before we even consider raising rates to address inflation concerns.” Reinforcing this, Powell also hinted at introducing a potential ‘tolerance band’ around the 2 percent inflation target – perhaps 1.5-2.5 percent – before the central bank would need to react. “We're also, as part of our review, looking at potential innovations… changes to the framework that would be more supportive of achieving inflation on a symmetric 2 percent basis over time… these changes to monetary policy frameworks don't happen really quickly (but)… I think we'll wrap it up around the middle of next year. I've some confidence in that.” What about profits – could 2020 be a repeat of the 2017 stellar growth story? No, there are two reasons why it will be very difficult to repeat the 2017 story on profits. The two reasons come from the two components of profits: sales and profit margins. Unlike in 2017, global sales will not start 2020 at the very depressed levels from which they can play a very strong catch-up. The first reason is that, unlike in 2017, global sales will not start 2020 at the very depressed levels from which they can play a very strong catch-up (Chart I-5). Significantly, the recession in global sales through 2015-16 was comparable to that suffered in 2008-09. The 2015-16 recession just hasn’t been well documented because it was essentially an emerging markets recession rather than the developed market recession of 2008-09. Chart I-5Global Sales Are Not Depressed The second reason is that today’s profit margins are still close to their structural and cyclical peak; whereas at the start of 2017, they were at a cyclical low (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Profit Margins Are Elevated Hence, the two components of profits – sales and profit margins – will start 2020 at elevated levels. The upshot is that profits can grow in 2020, but the growth will be pedestrian at best. Let’s summarise some of the key investment messages for 2020. High quality bond yields that are near the lower bound of -1 percent cannot go much lower, but those yields in the region of 2 percent cannot go significantly higher. It follows that fixed-income investors should underweight zero and negative yielding bonds versus higher yielding bonds – for example, underweight Swiss bonds versus US T-bonds. In a negative growth shock, T-bonds can still offer substantial capital gains but Swiss bonds cannot. For currencies, it is the opposite message. Favour lower yielding currencies because the central bank loses the ability to depress its own currency. For 2020, our preferred expression of this is long SEK/USD. Stock markets are set to produce low single digit returns. This is uninspiring, but in a world of low prospective returns from all major asset-classes, favour stocks over bonds and cash. This is especially true in those regions and countries where bond yields are zero or negative – specifically, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. Today’s profit margins are still close to their structural and cyclical peak The biggest risk to this view is if the global bond yield were to rise towards 2.5 percent exposing the fragility of the risk-asset edifice to higher bond yields. To repeat, the value of global risk-assets, at over $400 trillion, dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy. So the biggest risk comes from the valuation of global financial markets, it does not come from the global economy. More About Price To Sales Having completed our 20 paragraphs on 2020, we would like to follow up on the analysis in last week’s report: Are European Stocks Attractive? To recap, we found that price to sales is the stock market valuation metric that has the best predictive power for prospective returns – because unlike other metrics such as assets, profits, and cash flow, sales are quantifiable, unambiguous, and undistorted by profit margins. In last week’s report our prospective return forecasts were based on price to sales data sourced from Thomson Reuters. To which, several clients asked if the analysis would be the same using the price to sales data sourced from MSCI (Chart I-7). The answer is broadly yes. Chart I-8-Chart I-10 illustrate that: Chart I-7Despite The US, Germany, And Japan Trading On Different Valuations... Chart I-8...The Prospective Return From The US Is Low Single Digit... Chart I-9...The Prospective Return From Germany Is Low Single Digit... Chart I-10...The Prospective Return From Japan Is Low Single Digit... First, despite vastly different stock market valuations in Germany, Japan, and the US, the implied prospective 10-year annualised returns are almost identical. Second, the implied prospective returns from the MSCI calculated price to sales are slightly lower than from the Thomson Reuters data, because current MSCI valuations are closer to the dot com bubble peak. Third, this just reinforces the point that stock market valuations are very fragile to higher bond yields, as already discussed in our preceding 20 paragraphs on 2020. Fractal Trading System* This week we note that the strong outperformance of the Irish stock market is vulnerable to a correction based on its broken 65-day fractal structure. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short Ireland (ISEQ 20) versus Europe (Stoxx Europe 600). Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 4 percent. In other trades, we are pleased to report that long gold versus nickel achieved its 11 percent profit target and is now closed. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Duration: The bond market’s bearish trend remains intact, but suffered a hiccup last week as some economic data disappointed. Our sense is that the worst of the global growth slowdown is over, but a rebound in our preferred global growth indicators – Global Manufacturing PMI, US ISM Manufacturing PMI and CRB Raw Industrials index – is necessary to push bond yields higher. We expect that such a rebound will transpire in the coming months. The Credit Cycle & Inflation: Low inflation expectations will keep monetary policy accommodative for the next 6-12 months. This justifies a positive outlook for spread product excess returns. Eventually, inflation will return and force the Fed to adopt a more restrictive stance. This will lead to the end of the credit cycle. We will get more defensive on spread product when long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates move above 2.3%. Municipal Bonds: The main issues facing municipal bonds are long-run in nature, mostly related to underfunded state & local government pensions. These concerns are propping up yield ratios at the long-end of the muni curve, but aren’t likely to cause a wave of ratings downgrades until revenue growth slows during the next downturn. For the time being, investors can grab an attractive after-tax yield premium in long-maturity munis. Hiccups Judging by the bond market, recession fears appear to have peaked in late August. Since then, the Treasury index has lost 2.1% versus a position in cash and the 2/10 yield curve is 23 bps steeper (Chart 1). Curve steepening has also occurred via the real yield curve, while the breakeven inflation curve is moderately flatter, consistent with our expectations.1 However, this bearish bond market trend suffered a set-back last week. The 10-year yield fell 10 bps, back down to 1.84%, and the 2-year yield fell 7 bps to 1.61%. The move was driven by an increase in skepticism about the US and China’s “phase 1” trade deal and some mixed economic data. Both industrial production growth and capacity utilization remain well above their 2016 lows, consistent with stronger PMIs. October’s Industrial Production report was the worst of last week’s data releases. Production declined 0.8% on the month and capacity utilization fell from 77.5% to 76.7% (Chart 2). The data were significantly influenced by the General Motors strike, but the index still fell 0.5% with motor vehicles and parts stripped out. In our prior discussions of the divergence between “hard” and “soft” economic data, we pointed to relatively strong industrial production as a reason to expect a snapback in depressed manufacturing PMIs.2 This month’s weak print challenges that view, though both industrial production growth and capacity utilization remain well above their 2016 lows, consistent with stronger PMIs. The New York Fed’s Manufacturing PMI also came in roughly flat last week, and continues to point to a rebound in the national index (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 1Bumps On The Road ##br##To Higher Yields Chart 2Disappointing Data, But Well ##br##Above 2016 Lows October’s retail sales were also released last week, and we continue to observe a wide divergence between strong consumer spending growth and falling consumer confidence (Chart 3). As with the divergence between industrial production and the manufacturing PMI, we suspect that negative sentiment about the US/China trade war has unduly depressed consumer and business sentiment. Sentiment should rebound if trade tensions ease in the coming months, as we expect. Finally, we note that the CRB Raw Industrials index remains downbeat (Chart 4). We should continue to view the recent increase in bond yields as tenuous until it is confirmed by a rebound in this global growth bellwether. Chart 3Retail Sales Still Strong Chart 4Waiting On The CRB Index To Rebound Bottom Line: The bond market’s bearish trend remains intact, but suffered a hiccup last week as some economic data disappointed. Our sense is that the worst of the global growth slowdown is over, but a rebound in our preferred global growth indicators – Global Manufacturing PMI, US ISM Manufacturing PMI and CRB Raw Industrials index – is necessary to push bond yields higher. We expect that such a rebound will transpire in the coming months. Inflation Will End The Cycle … But Not Anytime Soon As global growth improves during the next few months and recession fears fade into the background, discussion will once again turn toward questions about how much longer the credit cycle can run, and what will ultimately bring it to an end. On the first question, we find the slope of the yield curve to be an excellent indicator of the age of the cycle. Specifically, we like to split each cycle into three phases based on the slope of the 3-year/10-year yield curve: 3 Phase 1 starts at the end of the last recession and ends when the 3/10 slope flattens to below 50 bps. Phase 2 encompasses the period when the slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps. Phase 3 begins when the 3/10 slope inverts and ends at the start of the next recession. We expect Phase 2 to persist for some time given that inflation expectations remain downbeat. Table 1 shows that corporate bond excess returns are highest in Phase 1, when the yield curve is steep and spreads are tightening quickly. Excess returns tend to remain positive in Phase 2, but are much lower. Excess returns don’t usually turn negative until after the yield curve inverts and we enter Phase 3. Table 1Corporate Bond Performance During The Three Phases Of The Yield Curve Cycle Though some segments of the yield curve inverted in August, we do not think that the cycle has transitioned into Phase 3. The inversion was quite brief, and the measure we employ in our analysis – the monthly average of daily closing values of the 3-year/10-year slope – never broke below zero. The 3-year/10-year slope is currently +23 bps. We expect the current Phase 2 environment to persist for some time, and consequently, corporate bonds will deliver small positive excess returns relative to Treasuries. The reason why we expect Phase 2 to persist for some time is that inflation expectations remain downbeat (Chart 5). Both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are well below the 2.3%-2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed’s target. This means that the Fed has every incentive to maintain an accommodative monetary policy until inflation expectations are re-anchored. An accommodative policy stance will prevent the yield curve from inverting for any sustained period of time. Chart 5The Re-Anchoring Process Will Take Time The upshot is that a re-anchoring of TIPS breakeven inflation rates will be an important signal for us to get more defensive on corporate credit. When the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates move above 2.3%, the Fed will have less incentive to maintain an accommodative stance. The pace of tightening will likely quicken, leading to a sustained curve inversion and a transition into Phase 3 of the cycle. How Long Until Inflation Expectations Are Re-Anchored? Given our framework for thinking about the age of the cycle, the big question for our corporate credit call is: How long until inflation expectations are re-anchored? We have previously demonstrated that inflation expectations adapt to changes in the actual inflation data, and that this adaptive process occurs very slowly.4 Note that our Adaptive Expectations Model puts fair value for the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate at 1.9%. This is above the current rate of 1.63%, but still well below our 2.3%-2.5% target range (Chart 5, bottom panel). The gradual nature of the adaptive process means that actual core inflation will probably have to overshoot the Fed’s 2% target for a period of time before long-dated expectations are firmly re-anchored. With that in mind, we are still a long way away from inflation posing a problem for the credit cycle. Core CPI and core PCE inflation are running at year-over-year rates of 2.3% and 1.7%, respectively, both slightly below levels consistent with the Fed’s target (Chart 6).5 Trimmed mean measures are slightly higher and less volatile. They currently suggest that core inflation will remain in a slow and steady uptrend going forward. Any durable increase in core inflation will likely occur via the Core Services (ex. shelter and medical care) component. Looking at the main components of core inflation, we see some reason to expect consumer price acceleration to cool in the coming months. Recent inflation gains have come mostly via the Core Goods component (Chart 7). This component tracks non-oil import prices with a long lag, and import prices have already rolled over. Meanwhile, shelter is the largest component of core inflation and we expect it will remain well supported in the coming months. The National Multifamily Housing Council’s Apartment Market Tightness Index has been in “net tightening” territory for two consecutive quarters (Chart 7, bottom panel). An above-50% reading from this index tends to coincide with rising shelter inflation. Chart 6Expect Core Inflation To Rise Slowly Chart 7A Closer Look At The Core CPI Components Ultimately, any durable increase in core inflation will likely occur via the Core Services (ex. shelter and medical care) component. This component has been relatively stable during the past few months (Chart 7, panel 3). Another interesting dynamic to monitor when assessing how long it will take for inflation to return is the labor share of national income. Chart 8 shows that the wage acceleration seen during the past few years has come mostly at the expense of corporate profit margins, and has not yet been significantly passed through to higher consumer prices. This is typical late-cycle behavior, and at some point firms will need to start raising prices in order to protect margins. Chart 8Where Will The Labor Share Peak? If we use the past few cycles as a guide, we see that the labor share of income peaked at above 70%. If this is an accurate road-map for the current cycle, then it means that firms can stomach quite a bit more margin compression, and it could be a long time before inflation pressures emerge. However, some recent research suggests that the labor share of income might peak at a lower level this cycle than in the past.6 This research documents that many industries are increasingly dominated by a small number of “superstar firms”. These firms have greater pricing power and might be able to sustain higher profit margins indefinitely. This would mean that inflationary pressures could re-emerge at a lower labor share of national income than in previous cycles. Bottom Line: Low inflation expectations will keep monetary policy accommodative for the next 6-12 months. This justifies a positive outlook for spread product excess returns. Eventually, inflation will return and force the Fed to adopt a more restrictive stance. This will lead to the end of the credit cycle. We will get more defensive on spread product when long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates move above 2.3%. Strong Revenue Growth Supports Munis We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to municipal bonds due to attractive yield ratios, particularly for long maturities, and steady state & local government revenue growth. Chart 9 shows that Aaa Municipal / Treasury yield ratios were quite low earlier this year, but have increased significantly during the past few months. Yield ratios are above average pre-crisis levels for maturities of 10-years and greater. Against that back-drop of attractive valuations, credit quality trends are also supportive. Municipal bond ratings upgrades are outpacing downgrades (Chart 10), and history suggests that will continue until state & local government revenue growth slows. On that front, the three main sources of state & local government revenue are all growing at strong rates, a trend that should continue as long as the economic recovery is maintained. Municipal bond ratings upgrades are outpacing downgrades, and history suggests that will continue until state & local government revenue growth slows. Of course, many state & local governments face long-run credit constraints, mostly related to underfunded pension obligations. This is almost certainly the reason why yield ratios for long-maturity bonds are so attractive. Crucially, these long-run issues will not be exposed until revenue growth slows during the next economic downturn, and investors have an opportunity to capture the attractive yield premium in the meantime. Chart 9Great Value At The Long End Chart 10Revenue Growth Will Remain Strong State governments have also made progress shoring up their balance sheets during the past few years. The National Association of State Budget Officers calculates that the overall state & local government total balance has returned back to 2006 levels, while rainy day funds have been built up considerably (Chart 11). Chart 11States Are Growing Rainy Day Funds Bottom Line: The main issues facing municipal bonds are long-run in nature, mostly related to underfunded state & local government pensions. These concerns are propping up yield ratios at the long-end of the muni curve, but aren’t likely to cause a wave of ratings downgrades until revenue growth slows during the next downturn. For the time being, investors can grab an attractive after-tax yield premium in long-maturity munis. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Position For Modest Curve Steepening”, dated October 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Crisis Of Confidence”, dated October 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For more details on our analysis of the phases of the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For US Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 The Fed targets 2% PCE inflation, which is historically consistent with CPI inflation between 2.4% and 2.5%. 6 https://economics.mit.edu/files/12979 Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Dear Client, Instead of our regular weekly report next Monday, this Friday November 22, you will receive our flagship publication “The Bank Credit Analyst” with our annual investment outlook. Our regular publication service will resume on December 2 with our high-conviction calls for 2020. Kind regards, Anastasios Avgeriou Highlights Portfolio Strategy Weakening supply/demand dynamics, pricing pressures, macro headwinds and pricey valuations are all warning that REITs are headed south. Global capex blues and the ongoing manufacturing recession, the resilient US dollar and weak operating metrics all confirm that an underweight stance is still warranted in the S&P communications equipment index. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 made fresh all-time highs again last week, as investors focused on hopes of a US/China trade deal and continued to ignore negative data/news at their own peril. Domestically, unemployment insurance claims jumped to the highest level since June, and none of the major market and industry groups showed a gain in output on a month-over-month basis in October according to the latest Fed industrial production release. Internationally, Korean exports remain in the doldrums, Chinese data releases were weak across the board, and the mighty US dollar is making multi-decade highs versus a slew of EM currencies. Chart 1Disquieting Gap All of this begs the question is global growth going to recover and aid the equity market grow into its lofty valuation? Our indicators suggest that a definitive earnings trough is now pushed out to Q2/2020. Thus, equity market caution is still warranted. Given all the recent equity market euphoria, we feel more and more like “the lone calf standing on the desolate, dangerous, wolf-patrolled prairie of contrary opinion” as – arguably the greatest trader of all time – Jesse Livermore mused roughly a century ago. Share buybacks have been a key pillar underpinning stocks since the GFC averaging roughly $500bn/annum since 2010. But, last year equity retirement jumped to nearly $1tn/annum. That is clearly unsustainable, warning that there is a disconnect between the S&P 500 and already steeply decelerating share buybacks. Our equity retirement estimate for next year is a return to the 10-year average, signaling that the market may hit a significant air pocket (top panel, Chart 1). Another perplexing recent phenomenon has been the lack of buying on margin that typically confirms SPX breakouts. While this episode may be similar to the 2015/16 episode, if margin debt does not recover soon it will exert downward pull on the broad market (bottom panel, Chart 1). Turning over to earnings, revenues, margins and the forward multiple is instructive. Turning over to earnings, revenues, margins and the forward multiple is instructive. Chart 2 highlights the S&P 500 earnings growth surprise factor. In more detail, this IBES/Refinitiv data show how accurate the sell side analysts’ 12-month forward EPS forecasts have been over time: a reading above zero implies the analyst community was too timid, while a fall below zero signals analysts were too optimistic. Chart 2Unhinged From The EPS Accuracy Signal Equity market momentum moves with the ebb and flow of this factor and given the still downbeat message both from our SPX profit model (please refer to our recent webcast slides) and our simple liquidity indicator (please see Chart 4 from last week’s publication), we doubt 10% profit growth is even plausible for 2020. On the margin front, all four key profit margin drivers are on the brink of turning from tailwinds to headwinds as we recently highlighted in our “Peak Margins?” Special Report. Revenue growth is also at risk of a standstill. Domestic producer prices are deflating, and the ISM prices paid index has been clobbered. German, Japanese, Korean and Chinese wholesale prices are contracting and the OECD’s composite PPI measure is also sinking, suggesting that final demand is anemic at best. Under such a dire global pricing backdrop, it will be challenging for SPX sales to sustain their positive momentum, especially if the greenback remains well bid (Chart 3). Chart 3Top Line Growth Troubles Forward multiples have slingshot higher despite a near 40bps increase in the 10-year yield since Labor Day. When the discount rate rises the multiple should come in and vice versa. Thus, we would lean against the recent spike in the S&P 500 forward P/E (10-year yield shown inverted, Chart 4). This week we are updating our negative views on a niche high-yielding sector and a tech subgroup. Finally, while sifting through market internals, we recently stumbled upon the GICS2 S&P consumer services index. Digging deeper into services was revealing. This relative share price ratio has gapped down of late. One of the reasons is that the services component of the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) data is decelerating (PCE services shown advanced, middle panel, Chart 5). The ISM non-manufacturing survey is also an excellent leading indicator of the S&P consumer services index, and warns that things will likely get worse before they get better (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 4Lofty Valuations Chart 5Market Internals Signal: Sit This One Out This week we are updating our negative views on a niche high-yielding sector and a tech subgroup. Getting Real With Real Estate We would refrain from chasing high yielding real estate stocks higher, and would rather avoid them altogether at the current juncture. Similar to utilities, REITs have come to the forefront lately as they have populated the top return sector ranks. However, real estate stocks, which have split out of the financials sector, are a niche GICS1 sector with a mere 3% market capitalization weight in the SPX, and have not driven the S&P 500 to all-time highs. Instead, tech stocks have, owing to their 23% market capitalization weight, as we have shown in recent research.1 Importantly, several key factors continue to signal that investors should shed public market real estate exposure. Namely, weakening supply/demand dynamics, pricing pressures, macro headwinds and still pricey valuations (primarily rock bottom cap rates) are all firing warning shots. The commercial real estate (CRE) sector is a bubble candidate that exemplifies this cycle’s excesses. As we have highlighted in the past, CRE prices sit at roughly two standard deviations above both the historical time trend and the previous cycle’s peak (not shown).2 Worryingly, CRE demand is waning. Not only our proprietary real estate demand indicator has sunk recently, but also the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey revealed that demand for CRE loans remains feeble (third & bottom panels, Chart 6). Simultaneously, fewer bankers are willing to extend CRE credit according to the same quarterly Fed survey (Chart 7). This tightening backdrop is weighing on CRE credit growth and CRE prices (second panel, Chart 6). In fact, absent credit growth providing the necessary fuel to sustain the CRE price inflation frenzy, there are rising odds that investors pull the plug on REITs (top panel, Chart 7). Chart 6Demand Ails Chart 7Time To... Already, occupancy rates have crested and there are increasing anecdotes of credit quality deterioration. As a result, CRE rents are also failing to keep up with inflation which eats into relative cash flow growth prospects (Chart 8). The supply side build up tilts this delicate balance further into deficit. Non-residential construction shows no signs of abating, with multi-family housing starts still running at an historically high rate of roughly 400K/annum (Chart 9). Such relentless overbuilding sows the seeds of the eventual felling in CRE prices and rents, which should also dent the S&P real estate sector. Chart 8...Lighten Up On Real Estate Chart 9Supply Build Up Is Deflationary Meanwhile, interest rate related headwinds will also weigh on this high-yielding sector in coming quarters, especially if the selloff in the bond market gains steam as BCA’s fixed income strategists continue to expect. While in the 2000s REITs were positively correlated with the 10-year Treasury yield, since 2010 this relationship has flipped and is now a tight inverse correlation (Chart 10). Chart 10Rising Yields = Sell REITs Finally, our proprietary Valuation Indicator (VI) has enjoyed an impressive run since the 2017 trough and despite the recent relative selloff remains in overvalued territory. Our Technical Indicator (TI) hit a wall of late near one standard deviation above the historical mean and has only partially unwound the overbought reading since the early 2018 bottom. If our thesis pans out, we expect heightened selling pressure to weigh further on our VI and TI (Chart 11). Chart 11Still Too Pricey Bottom Line: We reiterate our underweight rating in the S&P real estate sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5RLST – AMT, PLD, CCI, SPG, EQIX, WELL, PSA, EQR, AVB, SBAC, O, DLR, WY, VTR, ESS, BXP, CBRE, ARE, PEAK, MAA, UDR, EXR, DRE, HST, REG, VNO, IRM, FRT, KIM, AIV, SLG, MAC . Lost Signal The communications equipment rally stalled early in the summer and has since morphed into a bear market. We are sticking with our underweight recommendation, especially given a darkening profit outlook for this niche tech sub-group. Bellwether CSCO’s latest guidance was weak and confirmed that this capex-laden tech sub-index is in for a rough ride. Worryingly, CSCO’s key enterprise segment has no pulse. Historically, this data series has been positively correlated with telecom carrier capital outlays and the current message is grim (second panel, Chart 12). Tack on the ongoing manufacturing recession with CEOs canceling/postponing capital spending plans and the outlook dims further for the revenue prospects of communications equipment vendors (third & bottom panels, Chart 12). Chart 12Heed The CSCO Warning Adding insult to injury, the US/China trade war is further complicating the picture. The ongoing tariffs have exacerbated the global growth slowdown and global capex plans have come under intense scrutiny. The IFO’s World Economic Outlook capex intentions survey has plunged, warning that global exports of telecom gear have ample downside (Chart 13). Chart 13Global Capex Blues Chart 14US Dollar The Deflator The greenback’s resilience is also sapping business purchasing power, especially in the emerging markets, denting final-demand. Therefore, the US dollar’s appreciation robs communications equipment manufacturers’ pricing power, makes their goods more expensive in the global market place, and as a consequence forces market share losses on them (Chart 14). The greenback’s resilience is also sapping business purchasing power, especially in the emerging markets, denting final-demand. The implication of weakening pricing power is that profits will likely underwhelm. Currently, the sell-side is penciling in roughly 10% EPS growth for the S&P communications equipment index over and above the SPX in the next twelve months. This is a tall order and we would lean against such extreme analyst optimism (bottom panel, Chart 15). Operating metrics are quickly losing steam, another harbinger of profit ails for this tech sub-group. In more detail, our productivity proxy has taken a steep turn for the worse and industry executives have also put investment projects on hold (middle panel, Chart 15). Moreover, the communication equipment new orders-to-inventories ratio is contracting and industry resource utilization is probing multi-year lows, according to the Fed’s latest industrial production release. Under such a backdrop, relative top line growth is on track to level off and likely flirt with the contraction zone (Chart 16). Chart 15Operating Metric... Chart 16...Dysphoria Netting it all out, global capex blues, the resilient US dollar and weak operating metrics all confirm that an underweight stance is still warranted in the S&P communications equipment index. Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P communications equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5COMM – CSCO, JNPR, MSI, ANET, FFIV. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Deciphering Sector Returns” dated August 30, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “10 Most FAQs From The Road” dated April 8, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)