Euro Area

Highlights The following four investment themes are likely to play out over the next couple of years: The yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts will narrow, one way or the other. The 10% undervaluation of the trade-weighted euro - as assessed by the ECB itself - will eventually correct. As the euro area's structural over-competitiveness gradually adjusts, euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos. Swedish real estate and Swedish real estate equities, which are both very richly valued, will underperform. Feature What connects last Sunday's dysfunctional G7 Summit with this week's ECB policy meeting? The answer is the euro area's €450 billion export surplus. Specifically, the €300 billion export surplus in Germany which equals 8% of its GDP - an export surplus that is squarely in President Trump's cross-hairs (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekECB Policy Has Driven Up Germany's Export Surplus The interesting thing is that the euro area hasn't always run an export surplus. Before 2012, the euro area's trade with the rest of the world was more or less in balance. Even Germany's export surplus was half of its current size. To put it in Trumpian terms, fewer Mercedes were "rolling down New York's Fifth Avenue." What caused the imbalance to surge in recent years? Was it punitive tariffs or restrictive trade practices in Germany? No, the answer is much simpler than that. ECB Policy Has Driven Up Germany's Export Surplus The export surplus in the euro area and in Germany is just a mirror-image of the euro exchange rate (Chart I-2). As the euro became undervalued, it made euro area exports more competitive and foreign imports into the euro area less competitive. This assessment of euro area over-competitiveness comes straight from the horse's mouth. The ECB's own indicators show that the euro area remains over-competitive by around 10%, meaning the euro is still undervalued by about 10%.1 In turn, the euro's substantial undervaluation is a near perfect function of the yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts (Chart I-3). It follows that the ultimate cause of the euro area's glaring imbalance is ECB policy itself - specifically, the extreme experiment with bond buying and negative interest rates. Chart I-2ECB Policy Has Driven Up The ##br##Euro Area's Export Surplus Chart I-3The ECB's Expansive Monetary Policy Is ##br##Responsible For The Euro's Undervaluation As Germany's former Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, explained: "When ECB chief Mario Draghi embarked on the expansive monetary policy, I told him he would drive up Germany's export surplus... I promised then not to publicly criticise this policy. But then I don't want to be criticised for the consequences of this policy." The ECB counters that it targets neither the euro exchange rate nor the trade balance; it sets policy to achieve its mandate for price stability. It argues that it is further from its mandate for price stability compared with the Federal Reserve because, ostensibly, the euro area is at a different point in the economic cycle compared with the U.S. This requires the ECB to set an ultra-accommodative policy compared with other central banks. The undervalued euro and trade surplus are the unavoidable spill-overs of this relative monetary policy. ECB Spill-Overs Felt Far And Wide However, one important reason that euro area inflation is underperforming U.S. inflation has nothing to do with the economic cycle. Rather, it is because the official measures of inflation in the euro area and the U.S. are defined differently (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). The euro area's Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) omits the consumption costs of owner-occupied housing, whereas the U.S. consumer price basket includes them at a very substantial 25% weight. Homeowners will testify that the cost of maintaining their homes constitutes one of their largest expenses, and that these costs tend to rise faster than other prices. Using the U.S. as a guide, we estimate that a euro area inflation measure that correctly included home maintenance costs would be running higher than HICP inflation by an average of 0.5 percentage points a year (Chart I-6). Chart I-4Euro Area Inflation##br## Is Underperforming... Chart I-5...Because Euro Area Inflation Omits ##br##Owner-Occupied Housing Costs Chart I-6Including Owner-Occupied Housing ##br##Costs Adds 0.5% To Inflation Just because the statisticians do not measure owner-occupied housing costs in the euro area HICP, it doesn't mean that homeowners do not feel these costs. In Germany, measured inflation is now running at 2.3%, so the true inflation that households feel is running closer to 3%. Meanwhile, interest rates on savings accounts are stuck near zero, which means that German savers are seeing the real value of their savings erode by 3% every year. As Der Spiegel magazine put it to ECB Chief Economist, Peter Praet: "Can you understand why so many Germans regard the ECB as the greatest threat to their personal wealth?" Spill-overs from the ECB's ultra-accommodative policy have also been felt across the Baltic Sea. The Riksbank and the Norges Bank have had to shadow the ECB to prevent a sharp appreciation of their currencies versus the euro. The trouble is that ultra-low and negative interest rates have been absurdly inappropriate for the booming Scandinavian economies. So ECB policy may have generated spill-over housing bubbles in Sweden and Norway (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7ECB Spill-Overs Felt In Scandinavia Chart I-8Scandinavian Real Estate Appears Richly Valued Hence, a seemingly innocuous 'definitional' difference between the consumer price baskets in the euro area vis-à-vis the U.S. explains: the bulk of the shortfall in euro area inflation; the ECB's justification for ultra-accommodation; the undervalued euro; the euro area's €450 billion trade surplus; deeply negative real interest rates in Germany; and putative housing bubbles in Sweden and Norway. The main argument we hear in the ECB's defence is that the central bank is at the mercy of its treaty. If the treaty demands ultra-accommodation then the ECB must deliver it. But this argument is wrong. The ECB treaty only asks that the central bank delivers "price stability", leaving the ECB with substantial flexibility in how it precisely defines price stability. With this in mind, the ECB - and other central banks - should use this definitional flexibility to minimize differences with other central banks. Because in a world of integrated capital markets, the spill-overs from seemingly innocuous definitional differences are felt far and wide, resulting in political backlashes and economic imbalances. Imbalances Must Correct In The Long Run Ultimately though, economic imbalances must correct, and the corrective mechanism is economic, financial, or political feedback loops, or some combination of these. On this basis, we reiterate four investment themes that are likely to play out over the next couple of years: The yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts will narrow, one way or the other. The 10% undervaluation of the trade-weighted euro - as assessed by the ECB itself - will eventually correct. As the euro area's structural over-competitiveness gradually adjusts, euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos (Chart I-9). Chart I-9As The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters Swedish real estate and Swedish real estate equities, which are both very richly valued, will underperform. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/balance_of_payments_and_external/hci/html/index.en.html The ECB uses three metrics to assess the euro area's competitiveness versus its major trading partners: GDP deflators, CPIs, and unit labour costs. The average of the three metrics suggests that the euro is undervalued by around 10%.The assessment of euro undervaluation assumes that the major euro area economies entered the monetary union at a broadly correct level of competitiveness against each other and against their other major trading partners. This assumption seems valid, given that the net external position of these economies were all in equilibrium at the onset of monetary union. Fractal Trading Model We are pleased to report that our long SEK/GBP currency position hit its profit target of 3% and is now closed. This week we note that the relative performance of two classically cyclical sectors, oil and gas versus financials, is technically stretched and at a 65-day fractal dimension which has accurately predicted the last two major reversals. Hence, our recommended trade is short euro area oil and gas versus euro area financials. Set a profit target of 6% with a symmetric stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Contagion risk from Italy to its European peers presents a buying opportunity; Italian policymakers are constrained by the bond market and avoiding brinkmanship; In a game of chicken between Berlin and Rome, Chancellor Angela Merkel is behind the wheel of a 2.5-ton SUV; Italy's ultimate constraint is its bifurcated economic system - staying in the EU helps manage this problem; Underweight Italian bonds in a global portfolio and short Italian bonds versus their Spanish equivalents. Feature Chart 1Is Contagion Warranted? On May 31, Italy formed the second overtly populist government in the Euro Area. The first was the short-lived SYRIZA government in Greece, which lasted from January to September 2015. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and his colorful finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, Athens took Greece to the brink of Euro Area exit in the summer of 2015. Ultimately, Greek politicians blinked, folded, and re-ran the January election in September, transforming SYRIZA from an overtly euroskeptic party to a europhile party in just eight months. Investors are concerned that "this time will be different." We disagree. To use a poker analogy, Italian policymakers are better positioned to "bluff" their European counterparts as their chip stack is larger. But they are still holding a bad hand, and other players at the table still hold big stacks. The recent turbulence in Italian bond markets has spilled over into other Mediterranean countries (Chart 1). This contagion is unwarranted, as there has been much improvement across the region over the past few years, both politically and economically. As for Italy itself, it is positive that populists have come to power today, for several reasons. First, it will force them to actually run the country, a sobering process that often tempers anti-establishment zeal, as it did in Greece. Second, they will run the country at a time when popular support for the Euro Area and EU remains strong enough to deter an overt attempt to exit those institutions. Third, Italy remains massively constrained by material forces outside of their control, which will force compromises in negotiations with Brussels and fellow EU member states. There Will Be No Contagion From Italy Markets overreacted to the political risks emanating from Italy in recent weeks. Fundamentally, Italy's peripheral peers have emerged stronger from the Euro Area crisis. Since the onset of the Euro Area crisis, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain - the hardest-hit economies in 2010 - have seen their unit labor costs contract by an average of 8.7%. Over the same period, the rest of the Euro Area inflated its labor cost structure by around 10.9% (Chart 2). Italy remains saddled with a rigid, under-educated, and rather unproductive workforce that has seen no adjustment in labor costs.1 Meanwhile, its Mediterranean peers have practically closed their once-enormous unit labor-cost gap with Germany. Furthermore, all southern European countries now run primary surpluses, reducing the need for external funding (Chart 3). It is fair that the market should apply a fiscal premium to Italy, given the new government's plans to blow out the budget deficit. But no such fiscal plan is in the works in the rest of the Mediterranean. The cyclically-adjusted primary balance - for Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece - has gone from a deficit of 4.4% during the height of the debt crisis, to a surplus of 1.4% today. One can argue about whether such fiscal austerity was really necessary. The advantage, however, is that the improvement in structural budget balances has diminished the need for additional austerity measures and could also provide greater fiscal space during the next recession. Finally, household balance sheets have been on the mend for some time. Consumer debt levels as a percentage of disposable income in Spain, Portugal, and Ireland - the epicenter of the original Euro Area debt crisis - have now dipped below U.S. levels. In the case of Italy, importantly, the household sector was never over-indebted to begin with (Chart 4). Chart 2Italy Has Had No Labor-Cost Adjustment Chart 3Mediterranean Austerity Is Over Chart 4No Household Credit Bubble In Italy On the political front, Italians are clearly more euroskeptic than their Euro Area peers (Chart 5). Although only 30% of Italians oppose the common currency, in line with Greece, this is still considerably higher than in Spain and Portugal (Chart 6). Italians also feel less "European" than the Spanish or the Portuguese - i.e., they identify more exclusively with their unique nationality. Again this is in line with Greek sentiment (Chart 7). Italians were not always this way: in the early 1990s, they felt the most European. Chart 5Italy Lags In Support For The Euro... Chart 6...But Only 30% Of Italians Want Out Chart 7Italians Are Feeling More Italian In Portugal and Spain, parties across the political spectrum have responded to improving political and economic fundamentals. In Spain, the mildly euroskeptic Podemos is polling below its June 2016 election result. Its leadership has also abandoned any ambiguity on its support of the common currency, although it still campaigned in 2016 on restructuring Spain's foreign debt. The leading party in the Spanish polls is the centrist Ciudadanos (Chart 8), led by 38-year old Albert Rivera. Much like French President Emmanuel Macron, Rivera has a background in finance - he worked as a legal counsel at La Caixa - and presents a centrist vision for Europe, favoring more integration. The rise of Ciudadanos is important as Spain could have new elections soon. Conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy resigned following a vote of no-confidence engineered by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) leader Pedro Sánchez. However, PSOE only holds 84 seats of the 350-seat parliament. As such, it is unclear how the Socialist minority government will govern, particularly with the budget vote coming in early fall. But investors should welcome, not fear, early elections in Spain. With Ciudadanos set to join a governing coalition, it is clear that Spain's commitments to the Rajoy structural reforms will remain in place while no discussions of Spanish exit from European institutions is on any investment-relevant horizon. In Portugal, the minority government of Prime Minister António Costa has overseen a brisk economic recovery. Costa's center-left Socialist Party has received support in parliament from the far-left, euroskeptic Left Bloc, plus the Communists and Greens. Despite the involvement of the Left Bloc, the minority government has not initiated any euroskeptic policy. The latest polling suggests that Costa could win a majority in 2019. An election has to be held by October of that year, thus potentially strengthening the pro-European credentials of the Portuguese government (Chart 9). Finally, in Greece, the once overtly euroskeptic SYRIZA is polling well below their 2015 levels of support. Ardently europhile and centrist New Democracy (ND) is set to win the next election - which must be held by October 2019 - if polling remains stable (Chart 10). The fascist and euroskeptic Golden Dawn remains a feature of Greek politics, but has a support rate under 10%, as it has over the past decade. In fact, the rising player in Greek politics is the centrist and europhile Movement for Change, an alliance that includes the vestiges of the center-left PASOK, which polls around 10%. Chart 8There Is No Populism In Spain... Chart 9...Or Portugal... Chart 10...And Surprisingly None In Greece Bottom Line: Italy stands alone in the Mediterranean as a laggard on both economic and political fundamentals. Contagion risk from Italy to the rest of its European peers should be faded by investors. It represents a buying opportunity every time it manifests itself. What Car Is Italy Driving In This Game Of Chicken? The new ruling coalition in Rome has a democratic mandate for a confrontation with Brussels over fiscal spending. The coalition consists of the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the League (Lega), formerly known as the "Northern League." In his inaugural speech to the Italian Parliament, Prime Minister Guiseppe Conte emphasized that the mandate of the new coalition includes "reducing the public debt ... by increasing our wealth, not with austerity."2 So, the gloves are off! Not really. Almost immediately, Conte pointed out that "we are optimistic about the outcome of these discussions and confident of our negotiating power, because we are facing a situation in which Italy's interests... coincide with the general interests of Europe, with the aim of preventing its possible decline. Europe is our home." PM Conte subsequently focused in his speech on increasing social welfare payments to the poor, conditional on vocational training and job reintegration. Talk of a "flat tax" was replaced with an eponymous concept that is anything but a "flat tax."3 And there was no mention of overturning unpopular pension reforms, but merely "intervening in favor of retirees who do not have sufficient income to live in dignity."4 We may be reading too much into one speech. However, the time for brinkmanship is at the beginning of a government's mandate. And Conte's opening salvo suggests that the M5S-Lega coalition has already punted on three of its most populist promises: wholesale change to retirement reforms, a flat tax of 15%, and universal basic income. The back-of-the-envelope cost of these three proposals is €100bn, which would easily blow out Italy's budget deficit by 5% of GDP, putting the total at 7%. There was also no mention of issuing government IOUs that would create a sort of "parallel currency" in the country. Conte's relatively tame speech represents one of three concessions that Rome has made before it even engaged Brussels in brinkmanship. The two others were to replace the original economy minister designate - euroskeptic Paulo Savona - and to form a government in the first place. The latter is particularly telling. Polls have shown that the two populist parties would have an even stronger hand if they waited until the fall to re-run the election (Chart 11). In particular, Lega has seen its support rise by 9% since the election. It is politically illogical to form a governing coalition with less political capital when a new election would strengthen the hand of both populist parties. So why the concessions? Because Italian policymakers are not interested in brinkmanship. The populist campaign rhetoric and hints of euroskepticism were an act. And perhaps the act would have continued, but the bond market reaction was so quick and jarring (Chart 12) - including the largest day-to-day selloff since 1993 (Chart 13) - that it has disciplined Italy's policymakers almost immediately. Chart 11Lega Gave Up A Lot By Forming A Coalition Chart 12Bond Vigilantes Are... Chart 13...A Massive Constraint On Rome This is instructive for investors. In 2015, Greece decided to play the game of brinkmanship with Europe and ultimately lost. Our high-conviction view at the time was that Athens would back off from brinkmanship because it was massively constrained.5 Not only would an exit from the Euro Area mean a government default and the redenomination of all household saving into "monopoly money," but the level of euroskepticism in Greece was not high enough to support such a high-risk strategy. At the time, we pointed out that most investors - and practically all pundits - were wrong when they argued that brinkmanship between Greece and Brussels was "unpredictable." This conventional view was supported by an incorrect reading of game theory, particularly the "game of chicken." Game theory teaches us that a game of chicken is the most dangerous game because it can create an equilibrium in which all rational actors have an incentive to stick to their guns - to "keep driving" in the parlance of the game - despite the risks.6 In Diagram 1, we can see that continuing to drive carries the most risks, but it also carries the most reward, provided that your opponent swerves. Since all actors in a game of chicken assume the rationality of their opponents, they also expect them to eventually swerve. When this does not happen, the bottom-right quadrant emerges, one of chaos and deeply negative payouts for everyone involved in the crash. The problem with this analysis is that - as with most game theory - its parsimony belies deep complexity that often varies due to a number of factors. The first such factor is replayability. The decisions of Italian policymakers will be informed by the outcomes of the 2015 Greek episode, which did not go well for Athens. Another factor that obviously varies the payout matrix is the relative strength of each player; or, to stick with the analogy, the type of vehicle driven by each actor. Greece and its Euro Area peers were not driving the same car. The classic game of chicken only produces the payouts from Diagram 1 if all participants are driving the same vehicle. However, if Angela Merkel is behind the wheel of a Mercedes-Benz G-Class SUV, while Greek PM Alexis Tsipras is riding a tricycle, then the payouts are going to be much different in the case of a crash. In that case, the payouts should approximate something closer to Diagram 2. Diagram 1Regular Game Of Chicken Diagram 2Greece Versus Euro Area In 2015 So the crucial question for investors is what vehicle are Italian policymakers driving? We do not doubt that it is an actual car, unlike Tsipras's tricycle. But it is more likely to be a finely-crafted Italian sportscar, adept at hugging the twists and turns of Rome's policy, rather than an SUV capable of colliding with Merkel's ominous truck. Why doesn't Rome have more capability than Greece? Because of time horizons. An Italian exit from the Euro Area would undoubtedly shake the foundations of the common currency and the European integrationist project. But Rome actually has to exit in order to shake those foundations. As we have learned with Brexit, such an "exit" scenario could take months, if not years. In the process of trying to exit, the Italian banking system would become insolvent, turning household savings and retirements into linguini. This would occur immediately and would exert economic, financial, and - most importantly - political pressure on Italian policymakers instantaneously. Our colleague Dhaval Joshi, BCA's Chief European Strategist, has argued that a 4% Italian bond yield is the "line in the sand" regarding the survival of Italy's banks.7 As Dhaval points out, investors start to get nervous about a bank's solvency when equity capital no longer covers net non-performing loans (NPLs). Based on this rule, the largest Italian banks now have €165 billion of equity capital against €130 billion of net NPLs, implying excess capital of €35 billion (Chart 14). Although the net NPL figure has improved much from the peak in 2015, it remains large. It follows that there would be fresh doubts about Italian banks' mark-to-market solvency if their bond valuations sustained a drop of just a tenth from the recent peak. Dhaval estimates that this equates to the 10-year BTP yield breaching and remaining above 4% (Chart 15). Chart 14Italian Banks' Equity Capital ##br##Exceeds Net NPLs By Euro 35 Bn Chart 15Italian Banks' Solvency Would Be In ##br##Question If The 10-Year BTP Yield Breached 4% Additionally, while Italian support for the common currency is relatively low, there is still a majority of around 60% that support the euro. This is similar to the level of support for the euro in Greece in 2015. We would suspect that the support for the currency would rise - and that populist parties would decline in popularity - if Italian policymakers set off a bond market riot that caused the insolvency of Italian banks. Does this mean that the bond market is a permanent constraint on Italian exit from the Euro Area? No. At some point in the future, after a deep recession that raises unemployment levels substantively, popular support for the common currency could tank precipitously. But we are far from that point. In fact, Italy has enjoyed a relatively robust recovery over the past 18 months. As such, any economic crisis today will be blamed on the populist policymakers themselves, yet another reason for them to moderate and seek the path of calm negotiations with the EU. Bottom Line: With regards to any potential "game of chicken" negotiations with the rest of Europe, Italian policymakers are not riding a tricycle like their Greek counterparts were in 2015. Italians are behind the wheel of a finely-crafted, titanium-chassis, Italian roadster. Unfortunately, Chancellor Angela Merkel is still in a Mercedes SUV that weighs 2.5 tons. This is a high-conviction view based on the actions of Italian policymakers over the past month. Despite an improvement in polling, populists have backed off from calling for a new election (which would have been perfectly logical) and that would have been advantageous to them and have abandoned some of the most controversial - and expensive - platforms of their coalition agreement. Unlike their peers in Greece, Italian populists have proven to have little stomach for actual confrontation. The Ultimate Constraint: Risorgimento In a report published back in 2016, we argued that Italy's original sin was its unification in 1861.8 Risorgimento brought together the North and South in a political and economic union that made little sense. The North had developed a market economy during the Middle Ages (and gave the West its Renaissance!), while the South had remained under feudalism well into the early twentieth century. Given the limited resources, governance, and technology of the mid-nineteenth century, the scope, ambition, and yes, folly of uniting Italy were probably several orders of magnitude greater than the effort to forge a common currency union in Europe in the twenty-first century. To this day, Italy remains an economically bifurcated country. Map 1 shows that the four wealthiest and most-productive regions of Europe, outside of capital cities, are the German Rhineland, Bavaria, the Netherlands, and Northern Italy. Meanwhile, the Italian South - or Mezzogiorno - is as undeveloped as Greece and Eastern Europe. Map 1Core Europe Extends Well Into Northern Italy The units of analysis in Map 1 are the so-called EU "nomenclature of territorial units for statistics" (NUTS).9 These regions matter because Brussels uses them to determine how much "structural funding" - essentially development aid - each country receives from the EU. The EU "regional and cohesion" funding - totaling €351.8 billion for the 2014-2020 budget period - is not distributed based on the aggregate wealth of each country, since that would favor the new entrants into the union. The EU's discerning eye when it comes to distributing development funds is not accidental. It is a product of decades of lobbying by Italy (and Spain) to prevent a shift of structural funding to Eastern European member states. From Rome's perspective, the real European development project is not in Poland or Greece, but in the Mezzogiorno. Chart 16Italy Shares The Burden Of The Mezzogiorno With The EU To this day, Italy and Spain receive the second and third largest amount of EU development aid (Chart 16). Despite contributing, in gross terms, 13% to the EU's total revenues, Italy's net contribution per person is smaller than those of the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Austria (Chart 17). Given that Italy is a wealthy EU state, its net budget contribution of approximately €3 billion, 0.2% of GDP, essentially means that it gets the benefits of EU membership for free. Chart 17Italy Gets To Join The Club For Free And EU membership comes with many benefits. Membership in the Euro Area - combined with sharing the same "lender of last resort" with Germany, the European Central Bank - allows Italy to finance its budget deficits at low interest rates and to issue government debt in the world's second largest reserve currency (Chart 18). These financial benefits are even greater than the rebate it gets from Europe. Access to cheap financing allows Italy to carry the costs of Mezzogiorno on its own. Chart 18The Big Difference Between 2011 & Today It is somewhat ironic that Lega is today preaching populism and euroskepticism. In the early 1990s, its main target of angst was not the EU and Brussels, but Italy's South and profligate Rome, which funneled the North's taxes to the South. This early iteration of the party was quite pro-EU, as it saw Italy's North as genuinely European and worthy of membership in EU institutions. Some of its politicians and voters hoped that Northern Italy could meld into the EU, leaving the Mezzogiorno to fend for itself. Hence there is no deep, ideological euroskepticism in Lega's DNA. The party's evolution also illustrates how opportunistic and pragmatic Italian policymakers can be. The reality is that if Italy were to act on its threat of "exit," it would undoubtedly become far worse off economically. Not only would Northern Italy have to support the Mezzogiorno alone, but any structural reforms that could lift productivity and education in the South would become far less likely as anti-establishment forces took hold. Bottom Line: Our high-conviction view is now the same as it was in 2016. Italy is "bluffing." Leaving the EU or the Euro Area makes no sense given its economic bifurcation, which is the result of Risorgimento. Both policymakers and voters understand this. The real intention in the game of chicken between Brussels and Rome is to see an easing of austerity. We expect that Italian policymakers will ultimately succeed in getting leniency from Brussels on allowing deficit-widening fiscal stimulus, but the stimulus will be much smaller than their original plans that spooked the bond market laid out. To European and Italian politicians, Italy's economic bifurcation is well understood. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, specifically referred to it when he said, "Italians have to take care of the poor regions of Italy." He was later forced to apologize for his comments, with leaders of M5S and Lega faking outrage. But given that the ideological roots of Lega are precisely in the same intellectual vein as Juncker's comments, investors should understand that politicians in Rome are well aware of their fundamental constraints. Juncker's comments were a dog whistle to Rome. The actual message was: we know you are bluffing. Investment Implications Our analysis suggests that the path of least resistance for the M5S-Lega coalition is to negotiate some austerity relief from the EU Commission, but to definitively pivot away from talk of "exit" from European institutions. PM Conte has reaffirmed that exiting the euro is off the table and that it was never on the table to begin with. The new economy minister, Giovanni Tria, followed this up with a comment that "the position of this government is clear and unanimous... there are no discussions taking place about any proposal to leave the euro." Meanwhile, Lega leader and new Italian interior minister Matteo Salvini has focused his early efforts and commentary on the party's promise to check illegal immigration to Italy. This will be a policy upon which Lega will test its populist credentials, not a fight with Brussels. Is the worst of the crisis therefore "over"? Is it time to buy Italian assets? Not yet. Both Italian bonds and equities rallied throughout 2017. Italian equities, for example, have a higher Shiller P/E ratio than both Spanish and Portuguese stocks (Chart 19). As such, a sell-off was long overdue. Chart 19Why Did Italian Equities Rally So Much? Chart 20Italy's Binary Future Furthermore, we do not expect Rome's negotiations with Brussels to proceed smoothly. It is very likely that the bond market will have to continue to play the role of disciplinarian. The government debt-to-GDP ratio could quickly become unsustainable if the current primary budget balance is thrown into a deficit (Chart 20). According to the IMF and BCA Research calculations, Italian long-term debt dynamics are stable even with real interest rates rising to 2% - from just 0.5% today - and real GDP growth remaining at a muted 1%. But this stability requires the country to continue to run a primary budget surplus of around 2% of GDP (Chart 21). Conversely, running a persistent primary deficit of 2% would result in an explosive increase in Italy's debt dynamics. Even if that stimulus produces real GDP growth of 3%, the "bond vigilantes" could protest the surge in debt and drive real interest rates to 3.5% or higher. As such, the country's fiscal space will ultimately be determined by the bond market. Rome can afford to lower its primary budget surplus, but only so far as the bond market does not riot. Our colleague Dhaval Joshi believes that the math behind an Italian fiscal stimulus would make sense if it provides enough of a sustainable boost to economic growth without blowing out the budget deficit.10 We suspect that the bond market will eventually agree, but only if Brussels and Berlin bless the ultimate fiscal package as well. While investors wait to see the outcome of Rome-Brussels budget talks, which will likely last well into Q4, we prefer to play Mediterranean politics by shorting Italian government bonds versus their Spanish equivalents. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy initiated such a trade on December 16, 2016, which has produced a total return of 5.8%. The original logic for the trade was based on an assessment that Italy's medium-term growth potential, sovereign-debt fundamentals, and political stability were all much worse than those of Spain (Chart 22). These differences were not reflected in relative bond prices. Chart 21Three Factors Will Influence Italy's Debt Trajectory Chart 22Spain Trumps Italy On All Fronts Ongoing political turmoil in Italy has justified sticking with the trade. Looking ahead, there is potential for additional spread widening between Italy and Spain in the coming months. Spain is enjoying better economic growth; the deficit outlook will invariably worsen for Italy with the new coalition government; and Spanish support for the euro and establishment policymakers remains far higher and more buoyant than in Italy. All these factors justify a wider risk premium for Italian debt over Spanish bonds (Chart 23). Chart 23Stay Short 5-Year Italy Vs. 5-Year Spain Chart 24Stay Underweight Italian Debt One final critical point - the timing of any budget related uncertainty could not be worse for Italy. Economic growth is slowing and leading indicators say that this trend will continue, which suggests that Italian government bonds should continue to underperform global peers (Chart 24). Our Global Fixed Income Strategy team has argued that government debt in the European "periphery" should be treated more like corporate credit rather than sovereign debt.11 Faster economic growth leads to fewer worries about debt sustainability and increased risk-taking behavior by investors, both of which lead to reduced credit risk premiums and eventually, stronger growth. In other words, think of Italian BTPs as a BBB-rated corporate bond rather than a "risk-free" Euro Area government bond. So as long as the Italian economy continues to lose momentum, an underweight stance on Italian government bonds is justified. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio," dated June 21, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Repubblica, "Il discorso di Conte in Senato, la versione integrale," dated June 6, 2018, available at repubblica.it. 3 Conte's exact quote was "the objective is the 'flat tax,' that is a tax reform characterized by the introduction of rates that are fixed, with a system of deductions that can guarantee that the tax code remains progressive." This is our own translation from Italian and therefore we may be missing something. However, a "flat tax" that has a number of different rates and that remains progressive is, by definition, not a flat tax. 4 In fact, the speech could be read with an eye towards some genuine supply-side reforms, particularly in bringing the country's youth into the labor force, improving governance, reforming the judiciary, cracking down on corruption and privileges of the political class, and generally de-bureaucratizing Italy. If successful, these would all be welcome reforms. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "After Greece," July 8, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 The game derives its name from a test of manhood by which two drivers drive towards each other on a collision course, preferably behind the wheel of a 1950s American muscle car. Whoever swerves loses. Whoever keeps driving, wins and gets the girl. 7 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Italy's 'Line In The Sand,'" dated May 31, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 The acronym stands for Nomenclature des Unités Statistiques. 10 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Special Report, "Italy Vs. Brussel: Who's Right?" dated May 24, 2018, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Is It Partly Sunny Or Mostly Cloudy?" dated May 22, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 there have been five major episodes where U.S. dollar moves were not uniform across all currencies. These episodes share common features: a rallying broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar, desynchronized global growth and falling commodity prices. The above conditions will likely be met in the coming months, producing a period of global currency divergence. Commodity and EM currencies will weaken the most against the U.S. dollar, then against the yen, and finally depreciating the least against the euro. Feature It is often assumed that the dollar behaves like a monolith. However, this is not always the case: some currencies do manage to occasionally buck the dollar's general trend (Chart 1). Interestingly, the yen is most often the currency that manages to avoid the broad dollar's general directionality. Chart 1Episodes Of Currency Divergence ##br##Versus the Dollar Our view has been and remains that the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar still has meaningful upside this year, and that the EM currency complex will be under heavy selling pressure in the coming months. That said, it is worth asking whether all other currencies will share the same fate against a rising broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar, or whether some could diverge from the general dollar trend. This is essentially akin to trying to understand the pecking order of currencies outside the USD. To address these challenges, we believe it is important to understand how global growth will evolve, how relative growth dynamics among regions will shift, and how commodity prices will perform over the coming six to 12 months. When The Dollar Wears Many Masks There have been five major periods of currency divergence versus the U.S. dollar. These have lasted anywhere from one to three years (Table 1). Table 1Summary Of Currency Divergence Episodes Interestingly, they share some common features, heeding important insights for global investors. These features are as follows: 1) Common feature #1: A Rising Broad Trade-Weighted Dollar With the exception of the 2005-2007 episode, all other episodes where some currencies diverged from the general trend in the USD occurred when the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar was in a bull market. 2) Common feature #2: Desynchronized Global Growth All episodes of divergence in the FX market occurred when global growth was desynchronized. This underscores the importance of growth as a key driver of FX movements. During the 1991-1993 period, the yen was able to buck the dollar's strength (Chart 2) even though Japanese growth was falling quite fast relative to the U.S. Explaining this seeming inconsistency was the policy conducted by the Bank of Japan at the time. The BoJ was cutting rates, from 6% in 1991 to below 2% in 1993, but it was not doing so fast enough to alleviate budding deflationary pressures. As a result, Japanese real interest rates did not fall. This caused real rate differentials to move firmly in favor of the yen. In the final months of 1991, Japanese 2-year and 10-year real rate spreads versus the U.S. were 50 basis points and -75 basis points respectively, but by June 1993, these spreads became 145 basis points and 115 basis points. In the 1995-1996 episode, all the economic blocks experienced a slowdown in growth relative to the U.S. While this time the yen plunged versus the dollar, commodity currencies managed to appreciate against the dollar. This was because commodity prices rose during this timeframe, creating a positive terms-of-trade tailwind that lifted these currencies (Chart 3). Chart 2Episode 1: The Yen Diverges Chart 3Commodity Currencies Diverge In 1997 and 1998, the euro was the currency that managed to remain stable versus the U.S dollar, while the yen and commodity currencies sagged meaningfully (Chart 4).The euro was able to defy the gravity of a strong dollar because the euro area's relative growth differential versus the U.S. remained stable. Essentially, in the late '90s, as the euro area periphery was enjoying the full dividend of convergence toward the living standards of core Europe, European domestic demand was left unaffected by the Asian crisis. Meanwhile, commodity producers and Japan - two groups with much deeper links with EM economies - were experiencing deeper repercussions from the EM economic contraction. The 2005-2007 period of de-synchronized currency action against the dollar is somewhat of an outlier (Chart 5). First, this particular episode of currency divergence materialized in an environment where the dollar was weak. Chart 4Episode 3: The Euro Diverges Chart 5Episode 4: The Yen Diverges Again Second, the outlier was the yen, which managed to depreciate against the dollar while all other currencies were strengthening against the greenback. Chart 6Episode 5: The Euro Diverges again Third, while Japanese growth was below that of the U.S. it was not falling versus the U.S. However, this still caused Japan to be the odd man out in terms of growth performance, as other economic blocs delivered better growth than the U.S. Moreover, Japan was not experiencing the same growth dividend from China's miraculous boom as emerging Asian or commodity producers were. Adding fuel to the fire was the endemic implementation of carry trades. The low FX and rate volatility of that era was an invitation to engage in this kind of strategy.1 But Japan's deflation, along with its sub-par economic performance when compared to non-U.S. economies, re-assured investors that the BoJ would keep rates at rock-bottom levels for the foreseeable future. This was an invitation to investors to sell the yen to fund these carry trades in EM and commodity currencies as well as the euro. Finally, during the 2012-2013 episode the euro area was the global growth laggard. However, the euro was the currency that was able to strengthen against the dollar, defying the greenback's broad appreciation (Chart 6). It is true that euro area domestic demand growth was slightly improving versus the U.S. More importantly though, this was the time period that followed European Central Bank President Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" speech. These soothing words caused the break-up risk premia across euro area member states to collapse, lifting the euro in the process. 3) Common feature #3: Commodity Prices Were Falling In three out of five episodes, commodity prices were falling, which is consistent with the fact that four out of the five episodes were periods of broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar strength. The only exceptions were the 1995-1996 and 2005-2007 episodes, where commodities rallied. The latter period was further marked by a weak broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar. Bottom Line: Looking back at history, there have been five episodes where some major currencies diverged from the U.S. dollar's broad trend. In the majority of these episodes, the broad trade-weighted U.S dollar was rising, global growth was desynchronized, and commodity prices were falling. When Is The Next Episode On The Air? The aforementioned three common features can be thought of as pre-conditions for some currency divergence to transpire. So, when can investors expect the next episode to hit the proverbial airwaves? In our view, this scenario is most likely to materialize over the coming six to 12 months. Our main macro themes have been and remain2 that the global macro landscape over the coming months will be shaped by two tectonic shifts: on the one hand, America's fiscal stimulus will sustain robust U.S. growth, and on the other hand, the continued slowdown in money and credit in China will culminate in a relapse in capital spending. The Chinese leg of the scenario will depress commodity prices and consequently emerging market economies; meanwhile, thanks to considerable fiscal stimulus, easy financial conditions and relative economic insularity, U.S. growth will remain steady, leaving it as the global growth outperformer. These dynamics are bullish for the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar: The U.S. economy is growing robustly despite rising interest rates. In fact, interest rate-sensitive sectors are showing no signs of slowing down, confirming the resilience of the economy at this stage of the cycle. Both the housing market and commercial lending standards are not flagging growth risks (Chart 7). Chart 8 demonstrates that BCA's broad money measure (M3) for China leads import volumes and industrial metals prices by about six months. Based on the indicator's track record, odds are that industrial commodity prices will fall meaningfully over the coming months. Chart 7U.S. Economy Is Weathering##br## Rising Interest Rates Chart 8China's Money/Credit Is Bearish ##br##For Industrial Metals While oil prices could hold out for longer due to supply dynamics and geopolitics, positioning remains extremely elevated. As such, we are not ruling out a meaningful pullback in crude as traders head for the exits - all in the context of slowing global demand. Bottom Line: Pieces are falling in place to create the conditions necessary for some currency decoupling: global growth is set to become desynchronized, and commodity prices are likely to weaken - all in the context of a rising broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar. A Reverse Currency Pecking Order Slowing global trade as well as a growth deceleration in China's capital spending and demand for commodities will have the biggest repercussions for commodity and EM Asian currencies (Chart 9). This leaves the euro and the yen as the two most likely candidates to potentially diverge from the broad U.S. dollar in this coming episode. In our view, we think the yen could win this title. First, while the euro area economy is less leveraged to a slowdown in China/EM than Japan, it is still extremely vulnerable. Investors are still very long the euro, and therefore are vulnerable to negative surprises. Euro area industrial production could be the impulse to continue generating underwhelming economic numbers, as it is very much leveraged to China (Chart 10), mainly due to Germany's own deep trade links with EM and China. Notably, the German IFO index for business expectations in German manufacturing - a good leading indicator for global trade - is pointing to a further slowdown in global exports (Chart 11, top panel). Furthermore, German manufacturing new orders from non-euro area countries are starting to roll over, suggesting German exports will weaken imminently (Chart 11, middle panel). Lastly, the Swiss KOF leading indicator has come in below 100 (Chart 11, bottom pane Chart 9EM Asia & Commodity Currencies To Remain Weak Chart 10When China Decelerates, So Does Europe Chart 11Global Trade Is Slowing Down Second, it seems that historically the yen has a greater ability to rally than the euro when commodity prices are falling or when the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is in a bull market, highlighting the counter-cyclical nature of the Japanese currency. This happened in the early to mid-'90s and in 2008 (Chart 12). The only exception was in 1998, when the euro was able to rally amid a selloff in commodity prices and a strengthening dollar because domestic growth was so resilient. Today, euro area domestic growth is healthier than it was in 2012-2013, but it is still much weaker than is the case in the U.S., especially as the latter is receiving a shot in the arm thanks to a large dose of late-cycle stimulus. Chart 12The Yen Has Counter Cyclical Attributes Chart 13Euro Long Positioning Is Higher Than For The Yen As such, we believe the euro has more downside than the yen against the U.S. dollar in this coming episode. Furthermore, speculators remain too long the euro versus the yen (Chart 13). Third, the yen is a crucial funding currency in global carry trades, while the euro has not been used by traders for this purpose over the past 18 months.3 As such, a selloff in EM and commodity currencies, which is our base case, could spur a rush to the exits for short yen positions, while the euro is not likely to benefit from a similar short squeeze. Additionally, Japan sports a large positive net international investment position of US$3.1 trillion, while Europe's stands at -US$0.6 trillion. Consequently, Japanese investors have proportionally more funds held abroad than European investors to repatriate home in the event of an upsurge in global/EM market volatility, adding a further impetus for the yen to buck the dollar trend. One of the best currency valuation metrics is the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs, because it takes into account both wages and productivity. Unfortunately, this data set does not exist for all countries. On this metric, the U.S. dollar is not expensive (Chart 14, top panel). Adding credence to our view that the yen will be more resilient than the euro this year, according to the unit labor costs-based measures, the JPY appears to be cheap in trade-weighted terms and relative to the EUR (Chart 14, bottom panel). Chart 14The Yen Is Cheaper Than the Euro,##br## Dollar Is Fairly Valued Chart 15The Korean Won##br## Is Expensive Chart 16Commodity Currencies ##br##Are Not Cheap The Korean won - the only emerging Asian currency for which this measure is available - seems to be expensive (Chart 15). Chart 16 demonstrates that commodity currencies including those of Australia, New Zealand and Chile are on the expensive side, while the Canadian dollar and the Colombian peso are fairly valued. Bottom Line: Putting all the pieces together, our reverse pecking order for global investors from the weakest to strongest currency against the U.S. dollar is as follows: commodity currencies, non-commodities EM currencies (primarily Asian), the euro, and the yen. Investment Conclusions We recommend the following strategy to best navigate the coming global currency divergence episode over the coming six to 12 months: Global asset allocators should underweight the following currencies, from most to least, in the following order: First, the extremely vulnerable commodity currencies (BRL, IDR, ZAR, CLP, COP, AUD, NZD, NOK, and CAD); second, the EM Asian currencies (KRW, MYR, SGD, TWD, and PHP); third, the euro; and lastly, the yen. Currency traders stand to benefit the most in this coming episode by going short commodity and EM Asian currencies versus the U.S. dollar. That said, Japanese and European investors also stand to benefit by selling or underweighting commodity and EM currencies. The yen and the euro will depreciate significantly less than commodity and EM currencies, with the yen potentially ending flat versus the U.S. dollar. To capture these dynamics we suggest a new currency trade: long JPY / short SGD. The rationale behind this trade is that the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) manages the Singapore dollar against a basket of currencies of its major trading partners. Consequently, if as we anticipate the Japanese yen strengthens versus all other currencies with the exception of the greenback, the MAS will likely have to depreciate the Singapore dollar versus the yen. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers", dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Two Tectonic Macro Shifts", dated January 31, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Euro: Risk On Or Risk Off?", dated November 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights One of Europe's major success stories is the structural and broad-based increase in female labour participation rates. The trend is set to continue for the next decade. Stay overweight the Personal Products sector as a long-term position. Italy's decade-long stagnation is not a deep-seated structural malaise. It is a protracted cyclical downturn resulting from a banking system that was never repaired after the 2008 financial crisis combined with wholly inappropriate fiscal austerity. We expect Italy's new government to push back against the EU's misguided fiscal rules and correct this decade-long error. Buy exposure to Italian real estate as a new long-term position either directly or through Italy's small real estate equity sector. Feature Some analysts persist on comparing economic performances on the basis of real GDP per head of total population. But the total population includes children and the elderly who cannot contribute to economic output. Therefore, a correct assessment of economic performance should look at real GDP per head of working-age population. Chart I-1AWomen Are Powering The European Economy... Chart I-1B ...Less So In The U.S. Admittedly, as the retirement age rises, the definition of 'working-age' will gradually change, but the general principle still holds: only count in the denominator those who can contribute to economic output. GDP per head of working-age population can grow in several ways. One way is to get more output or better output from each hour worked through improvements in efficiency and/or quality. As this improvement is theoretically limitless, it is the main source of productivity gains in the long run. A second way is for each worker to work more hours. But given the physical and legal constraints on productive working time, there is only limited scope to increase output in this way. How Women Are Powering The European Economy There is one other way to increase GDP per head of working-age population: increase the percentage of the working age population that is in the labour force.1 In other words, structurally increase the labour participation rate. If this participation rate is already high - as it is for men - then there is little scope to increase it much further. But if the participation rate is low - as it is for European women - then there is considerable scope to increase it. This brings us to one of Europe's major, and largely untold, success stories - the structural and broad-based increase in female participation rates (Chart I-1-Chart I-5). Over the past twenty years, the EU28 female participation rate has risen from 57% to 68%, with an especially large contribution from the socially conservative southern countries. In Spain, female participation has surged from 47% to 70%. In Italy, it has shot up from 42% to 56% and has clear scope to rise much further. Chart I-2Italy: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-3Spain: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-4Germany: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-5France: Labour Force Participation Rate What is driving this structural trend? Two things. First, the employment sectors that are growing structurally - healthcare, social care, and education - tend to employ more women than men. Second, European countries have legislated a raft of policies encouraging women to join and remain in the labour force: generous paid maternity leave and subsidised childcare. The trend is for further improvements, with the focus now on improving paternity leave. Sharing parental and family responsibilities between mothers and fathers allows more women to enter and stay in the labour force.2 For the ultimate end-point in the trend, look to the Scandinavian countries which started such policies in the early 1970s. In Sweden, labour force participation for women and men is almost identical: 81% versus 84%. If the EU eventually adopts the Scandinavian model, it would mean another 20 million European women in employment and contributing to economic output (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Another 20 Million European Women ##br##Could Join The Labour Force Dispelling Two Myths: The Euro Area And Italy Having established that economic performances should be compared on the basis of GDP per head of working age population, we can now dispel two common myths. The first myth is that the U.S. generates superior productivity growth than the euro area. It is true that the U.S. has been better at getting more output from each hour worked, so on this measure, the U.S. does win. Against this, the euro area has been much better at getting more of its working-age population - albeit mostly women - into employment. So on this measure, the euro area wins (Chart of the Week). The net result is that, over the past twenty years, the U.S and the euro area have generated exactly the same growth in real GDP per working-age population (Chart I-7). Of course, the euro area's structural improvement in female participation rates cannot continue forever, but it can certainly continue for another decade or so, and this is generally the longest time horizon that most investors care about. Chart I-7The Euro Area And The U.S.: Identical Growth In Real GDP Per Head Of Working-Age Population The second myth concerns the subject du jour: Italy. Many people claim that Italy's economic stagnation is due to deep-seated structural problems which differentiate it from other major economies. The problem with this narrative is that from the mid-1990s until 2008 the growth in Italy's real GDP per head of working age population was little different to that in Germany, France or the U.S. (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Italy Performed In Line With Other Major Economies Until 2008 Italy's economic stagnation only started after the 2008 global financial crisis. After a financial crisis which cripples the banking system, there are two golden rules: unleash fiscal stimulus; and repair the banking system as quickly as possible. The U.S. and U.K. followed the golden rules perfectly and immediately; Ireland followed a couple of years later; Spain waited until 2013. But in each case, the economies rebounded very strongly as the fiscal stimulus kicked in and the banks recuperated. Italy neither unleashed fiscal stimulus, nor repaired its banks - so its economy has stagnated for a decade. Moreover, if output stagnates for a decade, it follows arithmetically that productivity growth will also look poor. In a back-to-front argument, critics have pounced on this as evidence of excessive 'red tape' and 'structural problems'. But this is a misdiagnosis of the malaise. To reiterate, Italy's real GDP per working-age population was growing very respectably before 2008. Italy's misfortune is that its indebtedness has an unusual profile: more public debt than private debt. France and Spain (and other major euro area economies) have the usual profile: less public debt than private debt. So the EU's fiscal rules - which can see only public debt and are blind to private debt - have severely and unfairly constrained Italy's ability to respond to financial crises. While every other major economy followed the golden rules to recover from the 2008 crisis, Italy could neither unleash fiscal stimulus to kick start the economy nor recapitalise its dysfunctional banking system. We expect Italy's new government to push back against the EU's misguided fiscal rules and correct this decade-long error. Two Structural Investment Conclusions This week's two investment conclusions are both long term, and require a buy and hold mentality. The first conclusion reiterates a structural position: overweight the Personal Products sector. This is based on our expectation that, in Europe, female participation rates will continue their structural uptrend; while in the U.S. we expect female participation rates to continue outperforming male participation rates. Therefore the sales and profits of the Personal Products sector, in which female spending dominates, will benefit from a multi-year tailwind, at least relative to other sectors. And the extent of this tailwind is not fully discounted in valuations. The second conclusion is a new long-term recommendation: buy exposure to Italian real estate. This is based on our assessment that Italy's decade-long stagnation is not a deep-seated structural malaise. Instead, it is a protracted cyclical downturn resulting from a banking system that was never repaired after the 2008 financial crisis combined with wholly inappropriate fiscal austerity. Removing these shackles will allow a long-term recovery, just as it did for Spain in 2013. If we are right, the best multi-year buy and hold play is Italian real estate which has been in a decade-long bear market (Chart I-9). For those that cannot directly invest in property, Italy has a small real estate equity sector which faithfully tracks the long term profile of real estate prices (Chart I-10), and whose main component is Beni Stabili. The caveat is that the stock has a market cap of just €2 billion; the appeal is that it offers a juicy dividend yield of 4.5%. Chart I-9Italian Real Estate Has Suffered ##br##A Decade-Long Bear Market Chart I-10Italian Real Estate Equities##br## Track Real Estate Prices Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 And in employment. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Female Participation: Another Mega-Trend" published on April 6, 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* This week, we note that the 130-day fractal dimension for platinum versus nickel is close to its lower bound, a level which has consistently predicted a tradeable countertrend move over the following 130 days. Hence, this week's trade is long platinum/short nickel on a 130 horizon before expiry. The profit target is 14% with a symmetric stop-loss. Our two other open trades, long SEK/GBP and long PLN/USD, are both in profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Will A Rising U.S. Dollar Alter The Fed's Tightening Plans? U.S. economic growth appears to be accelerating, the labor market continues to tighten, core inflation is approaching the Fed's target and wage growth is grinding higher. A much higher dollar is needed to seriously derail any of those trends. Will The Italian Turmoil Alter The ECB's Tapering Plans? The ECB has been vocal about separating a decision to taper its asset purchases from any subsequent decision to hike interest rates. Delaying the taper would not have a meaningful impact on boosting euro area economic growth, but keeping policy rates stable for longer would help support the recovery at a time of increasing divergence of inflation rates within the euro area. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Year Of Living Dangerously The latter half of May was a wild wide for global financial markets, which had finally shown signs of healing after the VIX shock from earlier in the year. The cause this time was Italian political turmoil as the populist 5-Star Movement/League coalition attempted to form a government full of fiscal largesse, sprinkled with a hint of euroskepticism. Investors got spooked into thinking that a 2011-style euro "redenomination" (i.e. breakup) risk premium might once again need to be priced into Peripheral government bond yields. The rout in Italian BTPs felt like a classic sovereign debt crisis, emerging markets style. There were even reports of Italian banks providing no price quotes for Italian debt on electronic trading platforms - the 21st Century version of dealers "not answering their phones" during a crisis. All that was missing was an IMF delegation heading to Rome with checkbook in hand. The announcement late last week that the coalition would get another shot at forming a government, rather than throwing Italy into fresh elections that could turn into a referendum on euro membership, restored order to Italian financial markets. The meltdown in Italian yields was almost as rapid as the melt-up, with the 2-year BTP yield ending last week around 1%, almost two full percentage points lower than the peak in yields seen just a few days earlier, but still much higher than the sub-zero yields seen as recently as May 15th. We made a timely decision to cut our recommended stance on Italian debt to underweight two weeks and we are maintaining that call despite the respite from the political turmoil.1 (NOTE: we are putting out a joint Special Report next week with our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy on June 13th, a day later than our usual Tuesday publishing slot, which will discuss the political outlook for Peripheral Europe and what it potentially means for their bond markets). Our more pessimistic view on Italian bonds was based on our assessment that Italian growth was slowing and would continue to do so. For a country like Italy with a large debt stock and structurally low growth, cyclical downturns always lead to increased worries about debt sustainability. Coming at a time when the ECB is looking to begin the long process of exiting its hyper-easy policies, the growth and monetary backdrop was also becoming more challenging for Italian government bonds. The same thing can be said for the rest of the world. The rapid coordinated acceleration in global growth seen in 2017 has clearly peaked, as has the pace of central bank asset purchases that helped support that recovery through low bond yields (Chart of the Week). The growth convergence has turned into a divergence between growth in the still-strong U.S. and most other major economies. This poses a new threat to financial markets - a rising U.S. dollar - which, combined with some cooling of global growth, is already triggering underperformance of emerging market assets. So after the tumultuous market price action of the past few weeks, we think the most critical potential impact on the direction of bond yields, and our recommended below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance, can be boiled down to two big questions. Will A Rising U.S. Dollar Alter The Fed's Tightening Plans? NO. The U.S. economy continues to exhibit impressive resilience of late, even as the rest of the world has seen some softening in growth. The Payrolls report for May released last Friday showed another sturdy gain of 223,000 jobs, with upward revisions of 15,000 to the prior two months. This pushed the unemployment rate to 3.8% - the lowest level since April 2000 - while boosting the annual growth in Average Hourly Earnings up to 2.7% (Chart 2). The overall employment/population ratio also inched higher. Both wage growth and the employment/population ratio are well below the peaks seen in the past two business cycles, even with similarly low levels of unemployment. During those cycles, the Fed was forced to raise the funds rate to restrictive levels to cool growth to rein in overshooting inflation. The real fed funds rate was consistently above equilibrium measures like the Williams-Laubach "r-star" (bottom panel), which eventually crimped growth and led to a recession in both cases. In the current cycle, wage inflation is struggling to reach 3% and core PCE inflation at 1.8% has still not returned back to the Fed's 2% target. There is no need for the Fed to push harder on the brakes by raising rates faster than inflation is accelerating and pushing the real rate above r-star. If a growing economy continues to absorb labor market slack, however, the Fed could be chasing a higher level of r-star to prevent inflation from continuing to accelerate (bottom panel). Looking ahead, it does look like the Fed will continue to play a bit of catch-up to an accelerating U.S. economy. Leading economic indicators (both from the OECD and Conference Board), as well as our forward-looking models for employment and capital spending, all point to faster growth in the next couple of quarters (Chart 3). This will only support the case for the Fed to continue with its current rate "measured" pace of one rate hike per quarter over the next year. Chart 2Labor Market Tightening##BR##Leads To Fed Tightening Chart 3U.S. Growth Still##BR##In Good Shape With the U.S. dollar now reconnecting to the widening interest rate differentials between the U.S. and other major economies, there is a risk that the implied tightening of monetary conditions from a higher greenback could limit the need for the Fed to continue with its rate hike plans. Yet at the moment, the trade-weighted dollar is still not accelerating on a year-over-year basis, in contrast to the +15% appreciation seen during the 2014/15 dollar bull run (Chart 4). At the peak of that episode, net exports were a drag on real GDP growth of -1% and headline CPI inflation hit 0% (aided by collapsing oil prices). While an appreciation of that magnitude is unlikely, it would still take a much larger increase in the dollar to meaningfully dent growth in a way that could cause the Fed to pause on the rate hikes. A bigger dollar rally could also raise financial instability, primarily by hitting emerging markets where currency weakness versus the dollar would trigger tighter monetary policy and slower growth. That is certainly a risk for the Fed to consider. Yet given the underlying strength of the U.S. economy today, the Fed would only react to any turmoil in emerging markets if it meaningfully impacted U.S. financial markets, but not before then. While the Fed is still likely to continue on its rate hike path over the rest of 2018, the market has largely discounted that outcome - even after the late May decline in U.S. interest rates on the back of Italy-fueled risk-aversion (Chart 5). The market is still not completely priced to the Fed's interest rate projections over the next year, however, which does raise the potential for a return to the +3% level on the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield that was seen before the Italy crisis flared up. However, our colleagues at our sister publication, BCA U.S. Bond Strategy, continue to point out the risks to a continued near-term period of declining (or at least, consolidating) Treasury yields given persistent short positioning in the Treasury market at a time of slowing data surprises (Chart 6). We remain bearish on Treasuries over a strategic horizon, however. Chart 4USD Rally Not Yet##BR##Enough To Impact The U.S. Chart 5Market Still Priced Close To##BR##The Fed's Interest Rate Projections Chart 6UST Yields Likely To##BR##Consolidate In The Near-Term Bottom Line: U.S. economic growth appears to be accelerating, the labor market continues to tighten, core inflation is approaching the Fed's target and wage growth is grinding higher. A much higher dollar is needed to seriously derail any of those trends. Will The Italian Turmoil Alter The ECB's Tapering Plans? PROBABLY NOT. The latest volatility in European financial markets stemming from the Italy crisis came at a difficult time for the ECB. The central bank has been incrementally preparing the market for an eventual tapering of its asset purchase program after it expires in September. Yet the slowdown in euro area growth in the first quarter of the year, amid sluggish readings on inflation, has raised some doubt that the ECB would even be able to announce any sort of withdrawal of monetary stimulus. Chart 7Market Buying Into The ECB's##BR##'Low Rates For Longer' Message It is now a consensus expectation that the ECB will taper its net new asset purchases fully to zero by the end of 2018. What has moved, however, is the market's expectation for the timing of the first rate hike by the ECB. That has now been pushed out to April 2020 after the Italy turbulence (Chart 7). The ECB has been consistently signaling to the markets that it views the two decisions - tapering and rate hikes - as separate choices to make. In other words, tapering does not mean that rate hikes will come soon afterward. So far, the market appears to be listening to the ECB's signals by moving out the timing of any rate hike to nearly two full years from today. Given the magnitude of the slide in euro area growth seen in the first few months of 2018 (2nd panel), that may be taken as a sign that the market thinks the slump can continue. This also is consistent with the market believing the ECB's views on seeing through any impact on euro area inflation from changes in oil prices and the euro. The annual growth of the Brent oil price, in euro terms, has climbed to nearly 50% over the past few months (3rd panel). There has always been a strong correlation of that growth rate to overall headline euro area inflation, as evidenced by the early read on May CPI inflation released last week that came in at 1.9%. Yet core CPI inflation in the euro area is still only 1.1%, well below the ECB's inflation target of "just below" 2%. Market-based inflation expectations are still below the level as well, with the 5-year euro CPI swap, 5-years forward now sitting at 1.7%. So the market pricing is consistent with an ECB that will be very slow to begin raising interest rates. That would also be consistent with the behavior of the ECB when it comes to its past tightening cycles. In Chart 8, we show diffusion indices at a country level for euro area industrial production growth (as a proxy for economic growth), headline inflation and core inflation. These show the percentage of all euro area countries that are seeing accelerating growth or inflation versus those countries seeing slowing growth and inflation. A higher diffusion index means that any acceleration in growth or inflation is broad-based, and vice versa. Chart 8ECB Rate Hikes Happen During Broad-Based Inflation Upturns As can be seen in the chart, the ECB's past tightening cycles since the beginning of the euro in 1998 have all occurred when the diffusion indices for inflation have risen into the 60-80% zone. In other words, the ECB is more aggressive on lifting rates when a large majority of countries in the euro zone is seeing accelerating inflation. During those same tightening cycles, however, the diffusion indices for growth have been decelerating, suggesting less broad-based economic strength. The implication from this analysis is that the ECB cares more about inflation than growth when making its monetary policy decisions. The ECB's reputation for sometimes making overly hawkish policy mistakes, like in 2010-11, is well deserved. Looking ahead, the current readings on the diffusion indices for both growth and, more importantly, inflation are all quite depressed. This suggest that the slowing growth seen in the overall euro area data so far in 2018 has been broad-based, while the increase in the overall euro area inflation data has not been broad-based. This can be seen when looking at the some of the individual country data for the major core euro area countries (Chart 9) and Peripheral countries (Chart 10). For example, Netherlands and Portugal stand out as having inflation trends that are much weaker than the other countries. Yet the more divergent trends in euro area inflation does not mean that the ECB will decide to defer any decision to taper, however. The ECB will have to make that decision at either the June or July meetings, with the current program set to end in September. Absent a significant drop in euro area inflation, the ECB is still likely to signal a full taper by the end of the year. Yet even if they did extend the current program into 2019, at the same pace of 30 billion euros per month, this would likely not have a meaningful impact on the level of euro area bond yields. We have found that is the growth rate of those purchases, and not the absolute level, that is most correlated to the level of euro area bond yields (Chart 11). Even if the current program were to be extended to March 2019, to be followed by a tapering of net purchases to zero by September 2019, then the annual growth rate of the ECB's balance sheet (driven by the asset purchases) would remain mired below 10% - a far slower pace compared to the peak years of ECB bond buying. Chart 9Growth Convergence,##BR##Inflation Divergence In Core Europe... Chart 10And In##BR##Peripheral Europe Chart 11Extending ECB Bond Purchases##BR##Into 2019 Would Have Limited Impact In other words, an extension of the asset purchases would not drive euro area bond yields any lower, and would entail operational constraints on country sizes, etc. The ECB will have better success at driving down yields by keeping policy rates lower for longer, as it is signaling it will do. Bottom Line: The ECB has been vocal about separating a decision to taper its asset purchases from any subsequent decision to hike interest rates. Delaying the taper would not have a meaningful impact on boosting euro area economic growth, but keeping policy rates stable for longer would help support the recovery at a time of increasing divergence of inflation rates within the euro area. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Is It Partly Sunny Or Mostly Cloudy?", dated May 22nd 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Recommended Allocation A Series Of Unfortunate Events Markets have taken a series of hits in recent months - sharp drops in emerging market currencies, a political crisis in Italy, and the ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China - not to mention a slowdown in cyclical growth. But risk assets have been remarkably resilient: the U.S. stock market is in the middle of its year-to-date range, and U.S. small cap stocks (more attuned to domestic conditions) are at record highs (Chart 1). The uncertainty is set to continue for a while. But, with global growth likely to settle at an above-trend pace, fiscal and monetary policy still accommodative, and earnings continuing to grow strongly, the recent resilience says to us that risk assets are likely to grind higher and to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. A major underlying cause of the recent volatility has been the growing disparity between growth in the U.S. and in the rest of the world (Chart 2). This is partly due to the strength of the euro and yen last year, which is now dampening activity in these regions, but the slowdown in Chinese industrial growth and a higher oil price may also be having a disproportionate effect on growth outside the U.S. This growth disparity has widened interest rate differentials, which have again become the major driver of currencies, pushing up the U.S. dollar (Chart 3). Chart 1Small Cap Stocks At A Record High Chart 2Disparity Between The U.S. And The Rest... Chart 3...Means Dollar Has Further To Rise In combination with rising U.S. interest rates (the 10-year Treasury yield rose above 3% last month, before correcting a little), dollar appreciation is a threat for emerging markets. EM assets have long shown a consistently strong inverse correlation with the dollar (Chart 4). We expect the EM sell-off to continue. Further Fed hikes and rising inflation expectations in the U.S. (relative to the euro area and Japan) will increase interest-rate differentials and push the dollar up further: we forecast 1.12 for euro/dollar. Investors are still far from capitulating on EM assets after several years of large purchases (Chart 5). Many EM central banks are being forced to raise rates to defend their currencies, which will dent growth. Some may even be forced into reintroducing capital controls. Several emerging economies besides Argentina and Turkey remain vulnerable, having worryingly high amounts of foreign currency debt (Chart 6). Chart 4Strong Dollar Is Bad For Em Assets Chart 5Em Is Still A Consensus Favorite Chart 6Worrying Levels Of FX Debt Chart 7Not Surprising That Italians Are Fed Up Geopolitics is likely to remain a drag on markets for a while, too. Italy remains the biggest threat. The discontent of the Italian population is unsurprising given the country's stagnation since it joined the euro (Chart 7). The probable coalition government of the Lega and Five Star Movement would introduce aggressive fiscal stimulus, putting it in confrontation with the EU's budgetary rules. But BCA's geopolitical strategists see little risk of Italy exiting the euro in the next two years (though 10 years might be a different story).1 Political gyrations may continue for some months, particularly if the new government persists with its plan to blow the fiscal deficit out to 7% of GDP, but the sell-off in short-term Italian bonds looks to be overdone. Developments in trade tariffs, Iran and North Korea could also weigh on markets in coming months. But ultimately economic fundamentals almost always outweigh geopolitical risk. Global growth is slowing, but to an above-trend pace. Fiscal policy is particularly stimulative this year, with 17 of the 33 OECD countries undertaking large fiscal easing, and a further 11 some easing. The overall cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance in OECD countries is forecast to ease by 0.5% of GDP this year and 0.4% next (Chart 8). Monetary policy remains accommodative almost everywhere. The FOMC, in its May statement, by adding the word "symmetric" to describe its 2% inflation objective, was clearly emphasizing that it sees no need to accelerate the pace of rate hikes, despite the recent pickup in core PCE inflation. We expect the Fed to continue to raise rates once a quarter, meaning that monetary policy will not become restrictive until around Q1 next year. With inflation expectations not yet fully normalized (Chart 9), the Fed could still exercise its "put option" by holding for a quarter or two if global risk were to rise significantly. Italy's problems also make it more likely that the ECB will stay easier for longer, and the probability is rising of its deciding to extend asset purchases into next year. Chart 8Fiscal Stimulus (Almost) Everywhere Chart 9Inflation Expectations Have Further To Rise With the consensus already forecasting global GDP to grow 3.4% this year, and U.S. earnings by 22%, there is no obvious catalyst for risk assets to rebound sharply (Chart 10). However, we find it inconceivable that equity markets will not be higher in 12 months' time - and will not have outperformed bonds over that time - if the macro environment plays out as we expect. We, therefore, continue to recommend an overweight on equities and underweight on fixed income, but might start to turn more defensive around the end of the year if the signs are in place that the recession we expect in 2020 is still on the cards. Equities: For the reasons described above, we remain cautious on EM equities. Within EM, our preference would be for markets such as China, Korea and India, which are likely to be less affected by investors' concerns about current account deficits and foreign-currency denominated debt. In DM, our preference remains for late-cyclical sectors, especially energy, financials and industrials. We mainly view regional and country selection as a derivative of the sector call: this supports our preference for euro zone and Japanese stocks over those in the U.S. and U.K. Fixed Income: A combination of quarterly Fed rate hikes, a further normalization of inflation expectations, and moderate rises in the real rate and term premium are likely to push the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield up to 3.5% by year-end (Chart 11). We, therefore, remain underweight duration and prefer TIPs to nominal bonds. We keep our overweights on spread product within the fixed-income bucket, since it should continue to outperform for another couple of quarters. U.S. high-yield spreads are likely to remain steady, giving an attractive carry even after accounting for defaults; investment grade spreads might start to recover, given that the sell-off of quality bonds by companies repatriating short-term investments held offshore ($35 Bn from the 20 largest U.S. companies in Q1) is now mostly over (Chart 12). Chart 10Can Growth Beat These Expectations? Chart 11Treasury Yield To Rise To 3.5% Chart 12Selective Spread Product Remains Attractive Currencies: Interest-rate differentials, as described above, are likely to push the dollar up further, especially against the euro. This should continue until the effect of a strong dollar/weak euro starts to rebalance growth surprises back to the euro area, perhaps around the end of the year. We see less chance of dollar appreciation against the yen (which is still undervalued against its PPP value of 98, and may benefit from its safe-haven status) and against the Canadian dollar (given the Bank of Canada's hawkish stance). Commodities: Industrial commodities are likely to continue to struggle against headwinds from the appreciating dollar, and the continuing moderate slowdown in China (Chart 13). The oil price has become a tougher call recently, with talk that OPEC may agree later this month to bring back as much as 1 million barrels/day in production, but Venezuelan and Iranian supply likely to exit the market. BCA's energy strategists now forecast WTI and Brent to average $70 and $78 in 2H18, and $67/$72 in 2019, but expect higher volatility in the price over coming months (Chart 14).2 Chart 13Continuing Signs Of China Slowdown Chart 14Forecasting Oil Is Getting Harder Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Italy, Spain, Trade Wars... Oh My!," dated 30 May 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output: Volatility Set To Rise ... Again," dated 31 May 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights Italy is a live drama. However, both Italy and Brussels have constraints that should lead to a compromise on fiscal stimulus. Italy will not leave the euro in the foreseeable future, and the European Central Bank has little incentive not to continue accepting Italian bonds. With the recent capitulation in the Italian bond market, the euro could experience a brief respite, potentially rallying toward 1.18 to 1.19. However, for the euro to endure a more durable bottom, global bond yields need to stop falling. Until then, EUR/USD could move toward 1.12. Falling bond yields imply more downside for EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF as well. NOK/SEK is not yet a buy. The trend in gold prices can be used to gauge where the fed funds rate stands vis-à-vis r-star. Feature In July 64AD, the Great Fire of Rome erupted, causing untold damage to the great imperial capital. Various Roman sources suggest that Emperor Nero started the fire to clear land in order to build himself a new palace, the Domus Aurea.1 This fire was a calamity, and was followed by a period of economic tumult and currency debasement. However, Rome recovered, the empire conquered more nations, and ultimately survived another 412 years. We have held a bearish view on the euro for 2018, expressed by recommending investors buy DXY and sell EUR/CAD, EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF. However, this view is underpinned by economic divergences and a softening in global growth. Our negative bias on the euro has greatly benefited from the fire that has engulfed Italian politics and bond markets. Taking stock of this week's political theatre, does it still make sense to be short the euro, and by extension long the dollar? As we foresee more downside in global bond yields, we think yes. However, while Italy is currently burning, it is not at risk of causing a collapse of the euro area. Pricing an end to the "empire" is thus an inappropriate reason to stay short the euro. The Italian Job Italy has once again become a trouble spot for investors. The M5S / Lega Nord coalition's manifesto proposes blowing out the fiscal deficit to above 7% of GDP by instituting a flat tax regime, increasing spending and undoing pension reforms instigated by the Monti government in 2012. In response to these developments, president Mattarella has removed the proposed finance minister, Paolo Savona, arguing he was too anti-euro and that abandoning the euro area was unconstitutional. He went on to nominate Carlo Cottarelli, nicknamed "Mr. Scissors," as a caretaker prime minister tasked with leading a technocratic government until new elections are implemented. However, the coalition rightfully argued that this move was executed under a false pretext, as its current policy proposal does not include leaving the euro area. Even before the drama had fully blossomed, Italy on Monday had been put on downgrade watch by Moody's. In light of the political developments, investors then worried that a new election would result in Italy potentially exiting the euro area. Italian 2-year yields spiked to a spread of 350 basis points against German Schatz. This implied a perceived probability of 11% that Italy will choose to exit the euro area over the course of the next two years. Another possible outcome discounted by investors was that the European Central Bank would stop accepting BTPs as repo collaterals, or stop buying them in its Asset Purchase Program. Chart I-1Italian Support For The Euro##br## Is Low But Well Above 50% Which of these two risks is more likely to materialize? We think the current implied probability of Italy electing to leave the euro over the coming two years is very low. Italians exhibit the lowest support toward the euro of any eurozone member state. However, a majority of Italians, 59% of them, still support the common currency (Chart I-1). In response to this constraint, the very nimble Five Star Movement, while still hell-bent on fiscal profligacy, has already greatly downplayed its Euroscepticism. While Lega Nord still has more Eurosceptic inclinations, it has not put leaving the euro area at the core of its coalition agreement with M5S. BCA has a great degree of confidence in this view, but it is important to not be dogmatic. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service recommends investors closely follow the statements of these two parties over the course of the summer. The second risk is more real. The fiscal proposal of the coalition would blow the Italian budget deficit from 2.3% to more than 7% of GDP. Ratings agencies are already putting Italy on downgrade watch. Italy has a credit rating of Baa2, and only bonds with ratings of Baa3 or better are eligible at the ECB. It is possible that the central bank, in coordination with Brussels, exerts the same kind of pressure as it did in August 2011 when Jean Claude Trichet and Mario Draghi wrote a letter to Silvio Berlusconi demanding his resignation in exchange for financial market support for Italy. Despite this risk, we expect Italy to ultimately play ball and not blow up the deficit to 7% of GDP - simply because of economic constraints. These constraints are also likely to create an additional limit on the willingness and capacity of Italy to leave the euro area. The arguments we made in a joint Special Report with BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service titled "Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio," published in June 2017, remain valid: Italy will feel the pain from its transgressions before it can implement them.2 This is happening today as we write. Essentially, Italy's problem is rooted in the poor health of its banking system. Italian banks have capital in the order of EUR165 billion and NPLs of EUR130 billion, leaving EUR35 billion in excess capital. However, Italian commercial banks hold approximately EUR350 billion in BTPs. Thus, any decline in BTP value of 10% or more would render the Italian banking system insolvent (Chart I-2). Since suggesting abandoning the euro or conducting policy that exclude Italian debt from the ECB's window would cause a greater than 10% fall in BTP prices, this would kill off credit issuance in Italy as the banking sector would not have the wherewithal to extend new loans. This would prompt a large collapse in the credit impulse, and thus GDP growth (Chart I-3). The ensuing painful recession would cause Italians to backtrack on their intentions to leave the euro area. If Italy's credit rating and its access to the ECB is the reason for the collapse in BTP prices, the same dynamics will also force the Italian government to adopt a more realistic fiscal policy. This is why we do not believe the current M5S/Lega Nord government will be able to blow up the budget by as much as it currently wants. Chart I-2The Italian Constraints Lies##br## In The Banking Sector Chart I-3Credit Trends Explain##br## Italian Growth There are, however, incentives for Brussels to be more lenient on Italy. Italy is not Greece. The Troika had room to play hardball with Greece. Greek debt was EUR346 billion, or 10% of Germany's GDP (the perceived ultimate backer). The same cannot be said about Italy. Rome's debt stands at EUR2383 billion or 70% of Germany's GDP. In other words, as J. Paul Getty once said, "If you owe the bank $100, that's your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem." Italy is the EU's problem. Chart I-4If You Owe The Bank 442 Billion, ##br##That's The Bank's Problem This problem is most evident in the Target 2 of the Bank of Italy. The Italian national central bank owes EUR442 billion to the Eurosystem, the most of any nation (Chart I-4). Claims on Italy can also be found on the balance sheets of commercial banks across Europe. French, Spanish, German, and Dutch commercial banks have Italian exposure of EUR426 billion, with EUR310 billion held by French banks alone. Italy's problems are definitely Europe's problem. A collapse of Italy could therefore impair the entire European banking sector. This means that the EU and the ECB have a strong built-in incentive to be lenient toward Italy. As a result, we expect that Brussels will be forced to accept a larger Italian deficit than 3% of GDP, as it did at the turn of the millennium when France and Germany were also in violation of the Stability and Growth Pact. The ECB could also make a conditional exception in terms of accepting Italian bonds. So What? The Italian situation remains fluid. While an election this summer, as early as July 29th, has been touted, efforts to form a government are still taking place. No matter what happens, the constraints on both Italy and the European institutions suggest that both sides of the table will have to come to a compromise regarding Italian public spending. The EU will have to tolerate a greater than 3% of GDP deficit, and the Five Star Movement, with whoever it coalesces, will not be able to blow up the budget deficit above 7% of GDP. Investors have made a mistake by pricing in an Italian exit. Hence, Italian 2-year yields could experience downside in the coming week. In fact, the daily move in Italian 2-year yields on Tuesday was the largest on record, despite what are still very low levels of interest rates by historical standards (Chart I-5). This suggests that May 29th represented a day of capitulation in the Italian bond market, at least on a short-term basis. As a result, the very oversold euro, which has declined more or less without a pause for the past 29 trading days, could stage a relief rally as investors re-evaluate the Italian risks (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Capitulation In The BTP Market Chart I-6The Euro Short-Term Rebound Can Continue This begs a crucial question: Is it time to bail on our various short bets on the euro as well as our long bet on the DXY? While a temporary resolution in Italy could easily prompt a euro rally toward 1.18-1.19, many issues that have prompted us to implement these views have yet to fully play out. For example, the euro's fair value, as implied by real short rate differentials, the slope of the euro area yield curve relative to the U.S. and growth differentials between the rest of the world and the U.S. - as captured by the price of copper relative to the price of lumber - still pegs an equilibrium for EUR/USD at 1.12 (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Euro Has Yet To Purge Its Previous Excesses Additionally, while traders have capitulated on Italian bonds, investors have yet to capitulate on the euro. Speculators are still very long, and investor sentiment is still not consistent with a bottom (Chart I-8). Additionally, the trend in relative inflation still points toward a weaker euro, as it portends to an easing of European monetary policy relative to the U.S. (Chart I-9). The tension in Italy and the widening spreads in innocent Spain could play toward the ECB adjusting its forward guidance toward no hike for longer than is currently priced into the EONIA curve. Chart I-8No Capitulation Here Chart I-9Inflation Dynamics Point To A Lower EUR/USD However, the most important question right now for the euro is the direction of bond yields. Much will depend on the performance of bonds over the course of the coming months. Bottom Line: Italy is a political landmine, and the recent drama has weighed on the euro, causing EUR/USD to depreciate much faster than we anticipated. However, markets are currently embedding too-large a risk premium of an Italian exit. Both Italy and the EU will not stay as intransigent as they currently pretend, suggesting the market action will force a political compromise on the thorny question of deficits. As a result, while a rally in coming weeks of EUR/USD toward 1.18-1.19 is a very probable scenario, we anticipate the euro's weakness to end closer to 1.12 than currently recorded levels. All About Bond Yields BCA believes that bond yields are globally on a cyclical upswing, being lifted by the fact that global central banks are slowly but surely exiting the emergency stimulus measures put in place directly after the great financial crisis. Moreover, we also expect inflation to slowly come back, especially in the U.S. and Canada, also justifying higher yields. In response to these forces, BCA's three factor bond model, based on global manufacturing PMIs, the U.S. employment-to-population ratio and the dollar's bullish sentiment, suggests the fair value of 10-year Treasurys is at 3.3%, 46 basis points above current yields. However, markets do not move in a straight line. The bond market is especially prone to reversals as interest rates are a key determinant of the cost of capital. Thus, higher yields slow global economic activity, diminishing the reason why yields increased in the first place, creating a stop-and-go pattern. This time is no exception. In fact, Ryan Swift has been arguing in BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service that after their sharp up-move from 2.04% to 3.11%, bond yields have downside on a short-term basis.3 A few factors explain why bond yields could experience a bit more downside in the coming months: Bond aggregates have been oversold (Chart I-10), with their 100-day rate of change hitting levels associated with a subsequent rebound in prices. This rebound is underway and doesn't look to have yet been fully played out. Chart I-10Bonds Were Too Oversold To Keep Falling In A Straight Line Positioning remains too skewed. Speculators are still very short Treasurys, and duration surveys conducted by J.P. Morgan Chase suggest there is still more room to surprise investors, prompting them to lighten their short-duration calls (Chart I-11). The changes in 10-year U.S. yields are very correlated with the U.S. surprise index. However, this economic indicator is highly mean-reverting. The increase in investors' expectations suggests there is room for disappointment on the economic front for market participants. Ryan's autoregressive model for economic surprises, which captures the mean-reverting behavior of this series, suggests that surprises will deteriorate further in the coming weeks (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Still No Capitulation In ##br##Bond Positioning Chart I-12Economic Surprise Index U.S. Surprise ##br##Index Can Mean-Revert Further Global growth continues to show signs of deterioration, as the diffusion index of our global leading economic indicators highlights that only 24% of the world's major economies are experiencing expanding LEIs (Chart I-13). Moreover, the deliquescence of EM carry trades funded in yen also points toward additional deceleration in global industrial activity, and export volumes growth out of Asia continues to slow (Chart I-13, bottom panels). Here, the recent performance of gold is most revealing. The yellow metal is a good gauge of global liquidity conditions, and it tends to perform well when bond yields, especially real rates, weaken. However, despite a fall in real yields in recent weeks, and despite the rising geopolitical risks associated with Italy and the re-emergence of trade wars, gold prices are softer than expected. This implies that bond yields have not yet fallen enough to put a floor under global growth. So why does the absolute trend in Treasury yields matter for EUR/USD? Simply because since 2008, EUR/USD has performed very poorly when bond yields have declined, displaying an average annualized rate of return of -6.3% as well as a median return of -9.7%, and weakening two-thirds of the time (Table I-1). This essentially confirms our previous analysis showing that generally, the euro is a rather pro-cyclical currency. This also suggests that even if the euro could experience a temporary rally in response to a re-pricing of Italian exit risk, it will be hard for the common currency to rally durably so long as bond yields have downside. Chart I-13Global Growth Is Slowing Signs##br## Of Soft Global Growth Table I-1Bond Rallies And The Currency Market Table I-1 also shows that the yen has experienced large upside in a falling yield environment, and most importantly has risen in all instances against the USD. As a result, we remain comfortable with our January 12, 2018 recommendation to sell EUR/JPY.4 Not only does EUR/JPY weaken 83% of the time when bond yields fall, but as Chart I-14 shows, relative positioning in EUR/JPY has more room to deteriorate, as previous excesses on the long side tend to be followed by periods of excessive short positioning. Moreover, as the bottom panel illustrates, a reversal in the performance of momentum stocks also comes hand in hand with a weak EUR/JPY. Chart I-15 also highlights that rising dollar funding costs tend to lead to a weaker EUR/JPY. Chart I-14EUR/JPY Is Still Vulnerable Chart I-15Funding Pressure Point To A Weaker EUR/JPY Table I-1 further shows that despite our positive long-term view on EUR/CHF, if we believe that yields could correct further, it is intellectually coherent to be short EUR/CHF on a tactical basis, as the pair has also fallen in 83% of the occurrences of bond market rallies. We are thus sticking with this short-term trade. Chart I-16CAD Benefits From A Valuation Cushion Table I-1 however, is more mixed for our short EUR/CAD bet. EUR/CAD rallies on half the instances where bond yields weaken, and generates an average annualized gain of 1%. Yields are therefore an unreliable gauge of this cross's trend. Instead, we continue to favor the CAD over the EUR on the basis of relative monetary policy dynamics and valuations. The Canadian economy has no slack, core inflation is at 1.9%, and the Bank of Canada just re-opened the door to hiking rates this year - essentially a mirror image to the euro area. Also, while EUR/USD is overvalued by 4.9% based on our preferred model, USD/CAD is overvalued by 14% based on our model using oil and relative rate expectations (Chart I-16). We are therefore sticking with this position, even though we are likely to experience volatility after a straight move down from 1.61 to 1.5. Yesterday's announcement that the White House is imposing tariffs on steel and aluminium on Canada and the EU is likely to be a crucial contributor to this episode of volatility. Finally Table I-1 shows that our negative view on commodity currencies is the correct one to hold in the current context, especially regarding the AUD, which within this group suffers by the greatest extent when yields fall. Additionally, this analysis confirms our assessment regarding NOK/SEK. We were long this pair, and continue to foresee upside for the Norwegian krone relative to the Swedish krona on a cyclical basis. However, we closed this trade as NOK/SEK was getting very overbought. Adding another justification for this tactical decision, a falling yield environment has been associated with this cross weakening in 83% of cases and depreciating on average by a 4.9% annualized rate - or 5.7% if we take the median fall. We will therefore wait to see a stabilization in bond yields before re-opening our NOK/SEK trade. Bottom Line: The rebound in bond prices expected by our U.S. bond strategist has further to run, as the global economy is experiencing a soft patch and U.S. economic surprises have additional downside. This suggests that EUR/USD is likely to depreciate more, prompting us to stick with our 1.12 target for now. EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF possess ample downside as well. While commodity currencies all weaken when bond yields decline, the AUD declines most often, and by the greatest extent. NOK/SEK can correct further before resuming its uptrend; only once bond yields stabilize will we buy this cross again. Gold, The Fed And R-star Following last week's report where we discussed the interaction of the dollar, the fed funds rate, and r-star,5 we received a few questions regarding the implication of this analysis for the gold market. While the message of this analysis was very clear for the dollar - the dollar weakens when the Fed increases rates and the fed funds rate is below the r-star, but strengthens significantly when the Fed lifts rates above r-star - the implications for gold of the interaction between rates and r-star is much murkier. Table I-2 shows the returns of gold, as well as the batting averages of the results, under the four states explored last week. We use medians instead of means, as average returns have been distorted by a few outliers. Table I-2Gold And The Interaction Between ##br##Rates And R* This table highlights that the best environment to hold gold has been the same environment that was harshest to the dollar: a rising fed funds rate, but one that stands below the neutral rate. Essentially, this suggests that in this environment, despite the efforts of the Fed to tighten monetary conditions, global liquidity remains plentiful, which fuels both global growth and gold prices. In this context, gold rallies 76% of the time by a median annualized rate of 14.4%. Chart I-17Gold As A Gauge For R* Perplexingly, there is no clear implications in the other states. When the fed funds rate rises and stands above the neutral rate, gold falls by a median annualized rate of 1.3%, but this only works 55% of the time. This probably reflects the fact that when the real fed funds rate rises in this environment, while in and of itself this should hurt gold, the growing incidence of accidents in global financial markets and the global economy helps gold, undoing the damage created by tighter monetary policy. When the fed funds rate is falling, gold's annualized returns are mixed, but most importantly the distribution of returns is no better than random. So while this analysis does not provide a clear signal for gold next year, it does help us generate a useful inference. If the Fed is indeed soon set to lift interest rates above the neutral rate, as the Laubach-Williams measure of r-star implies, the violent rally that gold experienced in 2017 should taper off. If gold were to continue to rally vigorously, maintaining its strong trend despite higher rates (Chart I-17), this would imply that the fed funds rate is still below r-star. As a corollary, the business cycle would have greater upside, the dollar greater downside, and EM assets should prove more resilient than we anticipate. Bottom Line: Where we stand in the interest rate cycle is less useful for calling the gold market than it is for calling the dollar. While a rising fed funds rate that stands below the neutral rate creates a very supportive environment for gold, other combinations are more opaque. However, this can help generate useful insights on the equilibrium rate. If faced with higher interest rates, gold remains on the strong upward trend it experienced in 2017, this would mean that U.S. policy is still accommodative as the fed funds rate would still be below r-star. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Tacitus, the main source describing the fire, was unsure of the veracity of these allegations. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, titled "Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio", dated June 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Pulling Back And Looking Ahead", dated May 22, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, and the Weekly Report, titled "The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now", dated February 16, 2018, both available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "This Time Is NOT Different", dated May 25 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was generally weak this week: Q1 GDP growth was revised down to an annualized pace of 2.2%, profit growth was weak; Core personal consumption expenditure grew at a 2.3% quarterly pace, underperforming expectations of 2.5%; Core PCE inflation came in line with expectations at 1.8%. The March number was revised down to 1.8% as well from 1.9% previously; However, the U.S. labor market continues to tighten, with both continuing and initial jobless claims falling more than expected. Washington is ramping up its hawkish stance on trade, implementing its steel and aluminum tariffs on the EU, Canada, as well as Mexico. The U.S. is nonetheless likely to fare better than the rest of the G-10 in the current soft patch for global growth as it is a less cyclical economy. Furthermore, with the dollar recoupling with rate differentials, Fed hikes will serve as an important tailwind for the greenback for the rest of this year. Report Links: This Time Is NOT Different - May 25, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Amidst the surfeit of political angst across Italy and Spain, some positive economic data have contributed to some relief to the euro's persistent decline this month. German headline and harmonized inflation surprised to the upside, both coming in at 2.2%; German unemployment declined to 5.2%; German retail sales increased by 2.3% on a monthly pace; Spanish harmonized inflation came in at 2.1%, beating expectations; Euro area headline and core inflation came in at 1.9% and 1.1%, respectively, an improvement over previous figures; Unemployment also declined to 8.5% from 8.6%, but came in higher than the expected 8.4%. In addition to abating political anxiety in Italy, ECB Executive Board Member Sabine Lautenschläger, noted that "all the conditions for inflation to kick in are in place". While these factors provided a relief for the euro, it is likely that interest rate differentials, waning global growth, and a labor market replete with slack will keep the upside in the euro capped for the remainder of this year. The longer-run outlook, however, is bullish, as the common currency remains cheap across several valuation metrics. Report Links: This Time Is NOT Different - May 25, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Retail trade yearly growth came in above expectations, coming in at 1.6%. It also increased from 1% last month. However, large retailer's sales growth surprised negatively, coming in at -0.8%. Moreover, the jobs/applicants ratio also underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.59. Finally, the consumer confidence index also surprised to the downside, coming in at 43.8. USD/JPY has fallen by roughly 1%, as political risks originating from Italy have helped safe heaven assets like the yen. Overall, we continue to be bullish on this cross on a tactical basis, given that we expect a slowdown in global growth to accentuate the current risk off environment. However the BoJ will likely intervene if the yen keeps going up, which makes a bearish stance on the yen appropriate on a cyc lical basis. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now - February 16, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been negative Total Business Investment yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming it at 2%. Nationwide Housing Prices yearly growth also surprised negatively, coming in at 2.4%. Finally, mortgage approvals also surprised to the downside, coming in at 62.455 thousand. GBP/USD has fallen by roughly 0.6% this week. As of this week, we have reached the target of our tactical short GBP/USD trade with a tk% gain. While the rally in the dollar could certainly continue, pushing cable lower in the process, it is more prudent to adopt a more neutral stance toward this cross, given that it has depreciated by more than 7% since its highs on mid-April. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Do Not Get Flat-Footed By Politics- March 30, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was on the weak side: Building permits contracted by 5% in monthly terms, and only increased by 1.9% in yearly terms, much less than the previous 15.6% and the expected 4.1%; Private sector credit grew by 0.4% in monthly terms, in line with expectations; Private capital expenditure also grew by only 0.4%, a weaker result than the expected 0.7%. After a meaningful fall, AUD/USD has been relatively flat for the last month. Markets seem to be fully aware of the slack currently hampering the Australian economy. The Australian interest rates futures curve continues to flatten, pricing in a lower probability of any hikes. Furthermore, U.S. trade protectionism is becoming more aggressive, which may pose a further threat to the AUD as Australian growth is highly levered to global trade. We remain bearish on this antipodean currency in both the short and the long term. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD/USD has rallied by roughly 1% this week. Overall, we are negative on the NZD versus the U.S. dollar, given that pro-cyclical currencies like the kiwi tend to suffer in periods of heightened volatility and increasing risks. Continued trade tensions, as well as slowing global growth and political risks emanating from Italy will likely perpetuate the current environment going forward, hurting the kiwi in the process. That being said we are positive on this currency against the Australian dollar, as Australia's economy is much more sensitive to the Chinese industrial cycle than New Zealand's. Therefore a slowdown in emerging markets should weigh more heavily on the AUD than on the NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Canadian data was disappointing this week: Industrial product price increased by 0.5% in monthly terms in April; The Raw Material Price Index increased 0.7%; The current account decreased to CAD-19.5 billion in Q1 of 2018; Quarterly GDP growth came in at 1.3%, disappointing expectations. On Wednesday, the CAD was buoyed by the BoC's hawkish monetary policy statement. According to the statement, the Governing Council will now take a "gradual" approach to policy adjustments, as opposed to the "cautious" one noted in previous statements. In addition, the reference to continued monetary accommodation and labor market slack was also removed. However, the White House announced on Thursday the imposition of tariffs on Canadian exports, which erased most of Wednesday's gain. While this adds substantial risk to the view, the outlook for trade negotiations is still murky, and could surprise on the upside. The CAD still remains cheap on key valuation metrics, with an economy exhibiting less slack than other G-10 counterparts. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 More Than Just Trade Wars - April 6, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: The trade balance outperformed expectations, coming in at 2,289 million. This measure also came in above last month figure. However, the KOF leading indicator underperformed expectations, coming in at 100. It also decreased substantially from last month's reading. Finally, yearly GDP growth also surprised negatively, coming in at 2.2%. EUR/CHF has depreciated by roughly 1.5% this week. Overall, this cross should continue to depreciate given that we expect the current period of risk aversion to persist. Even if Italian political risks start to subside, investors will still have to worry about trade tensions, slowing global growth, and the deleterious impact of lower bond yields on this cross. This should help safe-haven assets like the franc outperform. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 The SNB Doesn't Want Switzerland To Become Japan - March 23, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive: Retail sales growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.5%. Moreover the Norges Bank credit indicator came in line with expectations, at 6.3%. USD/NOK has rallied by nearly 1.2% this week, as the rise in the dollar coupled with lower oil prices, have resulted in a toxic combination for the krone. Overall, we are positive on the krone relative to other commodity currencies. The krone has a large NIIP and current account surplus which makes it more resilient to terms of trade shocks. Moreover, oil should outperform other commodities given that it is more levered to DM growth than to the Chinese industrial cycle and given that the supply backdrop for crude is more favorable. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden has improved: Retail sales beat expectations, growing at a 0.6% monthly pace and a 3.6% annual pace; GDP growth accelerated to 3.3% in Q1 of 2018, higher than the 2.9% growth recorded last year; The trade balance declined by SEK6.5 billion in May; Consumer confidence also suffered slightly to 98.5 from 101. The SEK has strengthened substantially against the euro since its multi-year lows this month. Political woes subsided the euro, while rosy data from Sweden lifted the krona. Against the dollar, the SEK has weakened in recent weeks, due to the greenback's recent surge. We expect the SEK to remain strong against the euro for the remainder of this year, owing to cheap valuations and resurging inflationary pressures. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Dear Client, I will be visiting clients next week. Instead of our Weekly Report, we will be sending you a Special Report written by my colleagues Matt Gertken and Ray Park. The report addresses the North Korean situation and argues that a positive, if not perfect, diplomatic solution will result from U.S.-North Korean negotiations. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The U.S. can withstand further rate hikes. Neither economic nor financial imbalances are especially elevated, while fiscal stimulus will offset much of the sting from tighter monetary policy. Unfortunately, America's resilience to higher rates does not extend to the rest of the world. A stronger dollar is undermining emerging markets, which are already under pressure from slower Chinese growth and the looming prospect of trade wars. The crisis in Italy will further restrain the ECB from withdrawing monetary support. Investors focused on capital preservation should remain underweight Italian bonds. More speculatively-minded investors could consider opening a long position in BTPs versus bunds, but not before the Italian 10-year yield has reached 4%. EUR/USD came within a whisker of our 1.15 target this week. We will book profits on our long DXY trade recommendation if the dollar index reaches 96. A defensive posture is appropriate for now, but risk assets should recover later this year as the global economy finds its footing. This could set the scene for a blow-off rally in stocks. Feature Gauging The Pain Threshold From Higher Rates Chart 1Market Expectations Slightly Below Fed Dots After the recent turbulence, the market is pricing in 100 basis points of Fed rate hikes between now and the end of 2020 (Chart 1). Such a pace of rate hikes would be quite slow by historic standards. In past tightening cycles, the Fed would typically raise rates by about 50 basis points per quarter. Investors expect the real fed funds rate to peak at around 1%, well below the historic average of 3%-to-5%. Underlying these expectations is the presumption that the neutral rate of interest - the rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation - is quite low, and that the Fed will not have to raise rates much above neutral to cool the economy. According to the April FOMC minutes, "a few" participants thought that the fed funds rate was already close to its equilibrium level. There are many reasons to think that R-star has fallen over time, but in practice, the margin of error around estimates of the neutral rate is huge. Thus, rather than getting bogged down over technical issues, investors would be well served by taking a more practical approach and asking what they should be on the lookout for to determine whether interest rates have moved into restrictive territory. The State Of The U.S. Housing Market Housing has historically been the most important interest rate-sensitive sector, so much so that Ed Leamer entitled his 2007 Jackson Hole symposium paper "Housing Is The Business Cycle."1 Given the recent runup in mortgage yields, it is not too surprising that the latest data on U.S. housing has been on the weak side (Chart 2). Mortgage applications for purchase have come off their highs. Housing starts, building permits, and new and existing home sales all declined in April. Homebuilder sentiment improved a tad, but this was due to an increase in the current sales component; future sales expectations were flat on the month. The share of respondents who indicated that now was a good time to buy a home in the latest University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey declined to 69% in May, continuing its slide from a peak of 83% in December 2014. Still, we would not fret too much about the state of the U.S. housing market (Chart 3). Construction activity has been slow to increase this cycle, which has pushed vacancies to ultra-low levels. Home prices have been rising briskly, but are still 13% below their 2006 peak once adjusted for inflation. On both a price-to-rent and price-to-income basis, home prices do not appear overly stretched. Mortgage servicing costs, expressed as a share of disposable income, are near all-time lows. The homeownership rate has also been trending higher, thanks to faster household formation and an improving labor market. Chart 2U.S. Housing: Higher Mortgage##br## Rates Are A Headwind... Chart 3...But Don't##br## Fret Yet Household Debt Is Not Yet At Worrying Levels Lenders also remain circumspect (Chart 4). Mortgage debt has barely grown as a share of disposable income throughout the recovery, and is still 31 percentage points below 2007 levels. The average FICO score for new mortgages stands at a healthy 761, well above pre-recession standards. The Urban Institute Housing Credit Availability Index, which measures the percentage of home purchase loans that are likely to default over the next 90 days, is nowhere close to dangerous levels. This is particularly the case for private-label mortgages, whose default risk has hovered at just over 2% during the past few years, down from a peak of 22% in 2006. A dwindling share of loan originations since the financial crisis has involved adjustable rate mortgages (Chart 5). This has made the housing market more resilient to Fed rate hikes. Other parts of the household credit arena look more menacing, but not so much that they threaten to short-circuit the economy. Banks have been tightening lending standards on auto loans since Q2 of 2016 and credit card loans since the second quarter of last year. This should help moderate the increase in default rates that has been observed in those categories (Chart 6). Chart 4Mortgage Debt Is Not ##br##A Cause For Concern Chart 5Housing Market: More Resilient To ##br##Rate Hikes Than It Used To Be Chart 6Lenders Are More ##br##Circumspect These Days Student debt has continued to trend higher, but the vast majority of these loans is backstopped by the government. While the Treasury's own finances are on an unsustainable trajectory, this is more of a long-term concern than a short-term problem. If anything, fiscal stimulus over the next two years will allow the Fed to raise rates more than it could otherwise without endangering the economy. Corporate Borrowing: High But Not Extreme Like a river, market liquidity tends to flow along the path of least resistance, rather than towards those who happen to be the most thirsty. While the household sector was piling on debt during the 2001-2007 boom, the U.S. corporate sector was still recovering from the hangover produced by the capex boom in the late 1990s. A decade later, corporate balance sheets were in good shape. Spurred on by ultra-low interest rates, corporate debt levels began to rise. Today, the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP is near a record high. Valuations for corporate assets have reached lofty levels. In inflation-adjusted terms, commercial real estate prices are 4% above their pre-recession peak (Chart 7). U.S. equities also trade at a historically elevated multiple to earnings, sales, and book value (Chart 8). There are bright spots, however (Chart 9). Thanks to lofty corporate profits, the ratio of corporate debt-to-EBITDA is in the middle of its post-1990 range based on national accounts data. Interest payments-to-EBIT are near historic lows. Corporate bonds now represent 60% of total corporate liabilities. Bonds tend to have much longer maturities than bank loans, which provides a buffer against default risk. Although the picture is not as benign if one performs a bottom-up analysis of publicly-listed companies, the overall message is that the U.S. corporate sector can handle higher rates. Corporate stresses will eventually rise, but it will likely take a recession for this to happen, which we don't expect until 2020. Chart 7Commercial Real Estate Prices: ##br##Above Pre-Recession Levels Chart 8U.S. Equities##br## Are Overvalued Chart 9Corporate Debt Is High,##br## But So Are Profits Cyclical Spending Still Subdued The discussion above suggests that U.S. interest rate-sensitive sectors can withstand further rate hikes. This conclusion is buttressed by the observation that the cyclical sectors of the economy - the ones that tend to weaken the most during recessions - have yet to reach levels that make them vulnerable to a sharp retrenchment. Chart 10 shows that the sum of business capital spending, residential and commercial construction, and consumer discretionary goods purchases is still well below levels that have preceded past recessions. Along the same lines, the private sector financial balance - the difference between what the private sector earns and what it spends - is currently in surplus to the tune of 2.2% of GDP. This compares to deficits of 5.4% of GDP in 2000 and 3.8% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 11). Further monetary tightening, to the extent that it prevents any brewing imbalances in the real economy and financial markets from worsening, may be just what the doctor ordered. Chart 10Cyclical Spending Still Below Levels##br## Preceding Past Recessions Chart 11U.S. Private Sector Financial##br## Balance Is Healthy The Sneeze Felt Around The World The U.S. is not an island unto itself. Even if a bit outdated, the old adage which says that when the U.S. sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold, still rings true. As such, focusing on the neutral rate only as it pertains to the U.S. is a bit too parochial. There may be a lower "shadow" neutral rate which, if breached, causes pain outside the U.S. before it causes pain in the U.S. itself. Emerging markets are particularly sensitive to changes in U.S. financial conditions. About 80% of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in dollars. A stronger dollar and higher U.S. interest rates make it more difficult for EM borrowers to service their debts. While EM foreign-currency debt has declined as a share of total debt outstanding, this is only because the past decade has seen a boom in local debt issuance (Chart 12). As a share of GDP, exports, and international reserves, U.S. dollar debt is at levels not seen in over 15 years (Chart 13). Most emerging markets entered 2018 with strong growth momentum. Recent tracking estimates point to some deceleration in GDP growth, but nothing too alarming (Chart 14). That could begin to change. EM financial conditions have started to tighten, which is likely to weigh on activity. BCA's Emerging Market and Geopolitical Strategy teams have flagged the prospect of policy-inducing tightening in China. Trade tensions also seem to be escalating again following President Trump's decision this week to curb Chinese investment in the U.S., impose a 25% tariff on $50 billion of Chinese imports, and slap tariffs on foreign steel. All this could put an additional dent in global growth. While this publication does not expect a full-blown EM crisis, a period of EM underperformance over the next few months is likely. Chart 12EM Borrowers Like Local Credit, ##br##But Don't Dislike Foreign-Currency Debt Chart 13EM Dollar##br## Debt Is High Chart 14EM Growth Decelerating,##br## But Not Dramatically... Yet Italy: If You Are Gonna Do The Time, You Might As Well Do The Crime Even if emerging markets avoid another major crisis, one can always count on Europe to try to fill the void. The Italian 10-year bond yield is up over 100 basis points since the middle of April. Assuming a fiscal multiplier of one, a standard Taylor Rule equation says that Italy would need 2% of GDP in fiscal stimulus per year to offset the tightening in financial conditions brought upon by the recent increase in borrowing costs.2 That is 20% of GDP in stimulus over the next decade to pay for a fiscal package that has yet to be implemented by a government that does not yet (and may never) exist. At this point, investors are basically punishing Italy for a crime – defaulting and possibly jettisoning the euro – it has yet to commit. If you are going to get reprimanded for something you have not done, you have more incentive to do it. The market realizes this, which is why it is locked in a vicious circle where rising yields make default more likely, leading to even higher yields (Chart 15). The fact that GDP per capita in Italy is no higher now than when the country adopted the euro in 1999, and Italian public support for euro area membership is lower than elsewhere, has only added fuel to investor concerns (Chart 16). Chart 15When A Lender Of Last Resort Is Absent, Multiple Equilibria Are Possible Chart 16Italy: Neither Divine Nor A Comedy As we go to press, rumours are swirling that the Five Star Movement and Lega may be able to form a government after agreeing to appoint a less euroskeptic finance minister than the one the Italian President previously rejected. Regardless of whether this happens, investors are likely to remain on edge. Support for Lega has risen by seven percent since voters went to the polls in March. Populism is here to stay. All this suggests that the brewing crisis in Italy will not blow over easily. Investors focused on capital preservation should remain underweight Italian bonds. More speculatively-minded investors should consider opening a long position in BTPs versus bunds, but not before the Italian 10-year yield reaches 4%. At that point, the risk-reward trade-off from owning Italian debt would be too good to ignore. Until the Italian bond market reaches a capitulation point, the euro will remain under pressure. The Italian sovereign debt market is the biggest in Europe and the fourth largest in the world after the U.S., Japan, and China. If foreign investors continue to shun Italian debt, that will reduce capital inflows into the euro area. This means less demand for the common currency. Investment Conclusions The softening of global growth this year, along with tensions in emerging markets and Italy, have lit a fire under the dollar. Our long DXY trade is up 10.7% inclusive of carry. We continue to think that the path of least resistance for the dollar is up, but we will be looking to book gains on our trade recommendation once the dollar index reaches 96. That's roughly 2% above current levels. Slower global growth is bad news for cyclical equities. European and Japanese equities have a greater tilt towards cyclical sectors, so it is likely that their stock markets will underperform the U.S. over the next few months. This is particularly the case for Europe, where banks have come under pressure due to slower domestic growth, rising bond yields in Italy and Spain, and heightened exposure to emerging markets. For now, our MacroQuant model, which is designed to capture short-term movements in the stock market, is recommending a somewhat below-benchmark allocation to equities. Looking further out, our 12-month cyclical view on stocks remains modestly constructive, reflecting our expectation that the next major recession in developed markets is still two years away. Keep in mind that even the EM crisis in the 1990s did not plunge the U.S. into recession. On the contrary, the crisis restrained the Fed from raising rates too quickly. The resulting dose of liquidity led to a massive blow-off rally in equities, which took the S&P 500 up 68% between October 1998 and March 2000. European stocks did even better during that period, outperforming their U.S. peers by 40% in local-currency terms. We may be heading for a similar sequence of events. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Edward E. Leamer, "Housing Is The Business Cycle," Proceedings, Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, (2007). 2 The original Taylor Rule introduced by John Taylor in 1992 assigns a coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap. Thus, a one hundred basis-point rise in interest rates would be necessary to offset a 2% of GDP increase in output. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The 10-year Italian BTP yield at 4% yield marks a 'line in the sand' at which the current drama could escalate into something considerably worse. The global 6-month credit impulse is now indisputably in a mini-downswing phase. Stay underweight in the classically cyclical sectors: banks, basic materials and industrials. Prefer France's CAC over Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX. The equity market's range-bound pattern can continue, as long as the line in the sand isn't breached. It is a good time to own a small portfolio of high-quality 30-year government bonds. It was a spectacular week for our fractal trades with four positions hitting their profit targets: long Poland/short Italy; short energy/long basic materials; short Spanish Bonos/long German bunds; and long AUD/NOK. Feature Italian politics have blindsided almost everybody, us included. Few anticipated that the unlikely bedfellows 5S and Lega would try and form a 'government of change'. In March we wrote: "The Italian election result is not an investment game changer. The one exception would be if 5S and Lega joined forces to govern, as it could throw EU integration into reverse. But the likelihood of this unholy alliance seems very low." Even fewer anticipated that Italy's President, Sergio Mattarella, would then scupper this government of change by vetoing the proposed Finance Minister. This has cast a new pall of uncertainty over Italian politics and Italian public support for EU rules and institutions. The 10-Year BTP Yield At 4% Marks A 'Line In The Sand' The market's response has been to fear the worst: shoot first, ask questions later. The danger is that this sets off a negative feedback loop. Higher bond yields weaken Italy's still-fragile banks; which threatens Italy's economic recovery; ahead of a possible new election, this increases the support for parties and policies that push back against EU rules; which further lifts bond yields; and then in a vicious circle until the fear of the worst becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy... Chart of the WeekItalian Banks' Solvency Would Be In Question If The 10-Year BTP Yield Breached 4% The Italian BTP versus German bund yield spread is effectively a fear gauge for Italy's future in the euro (Chart I-2). As these fears increase, and Italian bond prices decline, it erodes the value of Italian banks' €350 billion portfolio of BTPs and weakens the banks' balance sheets. Chart I-2The BTP-Bund Yield Spread Is A Fear ##br## Gauge For Italy's Future In The Euro As a rule of thumb, investors start to get nervous about a bank's solvency when equity capital no longer covers net non-performing loans (NPLs). On this rule, the largest Italian banks now have €165 billion of equity capital against €130 billion of net NPLs, implying excess capital of €35 billion (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds Net NPLs By Euro 35 Bn It follows that there would be fresh doubts about Italian banks' mark-to-market solvency if their bond valuations sustained a drop of just a tenth from the recent peak. We estimate this equates to the 10-year BTP yield breaching and remaining above 4%.1 Hence, the 10-year BTP yield at 4% marks a 'line in the sand' at which the current drama could escalate into something considerably worse (Chart of the Week). To short-circuit the negative feedback loop, the financial markets would need to sense a discernible shift in Italian support for its populist parties; or an explicit de-escalation in the populist pushback against the EU. The question is: could this happen quickly enough? Global Growth Is In A Mini-Downswing The market's concerns about Italy come at a time when global growth has in any case been losing momentum. This is one development that did not blindside us, and has unfolded exactly as predicted. In January we wrote: "Global growth experiences remarkably consistent - and therefore predictable - 'mini-cycles', with half-cycle lengths averaging 8 months. As the current mini-upswing started in May 2017 we can infer that it is likely to end at some point in early 2018. So one surprise could be that global growth will lose steam in the first half of 2018 rather than in the second half - contrary to what the consensus is expecting." The theory underlying these mini-cycles is an economic model called the Cobweb Theorem.2 When bond yields rise, interest rate sensitive sectors in the economy feel a headwind, but with a delay. Similarly, when bond yields decline, interest rate sensitive sectors feel a tailwind, but again with a delay. The delay occurs because credit demand leads credit supply by several months (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Turning Points In The Bond Yield Lead Turning Points In The Credit Impulse As credit demand leads credit supply, the turning point in the price of credit (the bond yield) always leads the quantity of credit supplied (the credit impulse). The result is a perpetual mini-cycle oscillation in both economic variables. And because the quantity of credit supplied is a marginal driver of economic activity, this also creates mini-cycles in economic activity. These mini-cycles are remarkably regular with half-cycle lengths averaging around eight months, and the regularity creates predictability. Moreover, as most investors are unaware of these cycles, the next turning point is not discounted in financial market prices - providing a compelling investment opportunity for those who do recognise the predictability. The global 6-month credit impulse is now indisputably in a mini-downswing phase, and exactly as predicted in January, the majority of economically sensitive sectors have underperformed. The glaring anomaly is oil, whose supply-side dynamics have dominated price action (Chart I-5). Given oil's major impact on headline inflation, inflation expectations, and on central bank reaction functions, the global bond yield has also disconnected from the mini-cycle - until now. Chart I-5Oil Is The Glaring Anomaly Mini-downswings last six to eight months and the usual release valve is a decline in bond yields. So one concern is that the apparent disconnect between decelerating global activity and slow-to-react bond yields could extend the current mini-downswing phase beyond the summer. How To Invest Right Now From an equity market perspective, the relative performance of the classically cyclical sectors - banks, basic materials and industrials - very closely tracks the phases of the global credit impulse mini-cycle (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). For example, in all five of the last five mini-downswings, banks have underperformed healthcare, and we are seeing exactly the same in the current mini-cycle. Chart I-6In A Mini-Downswing##br## Banks Underperform Chart I-7In A Mini-Downswing ##br##Basic Materials Underperform For the next few months at least, it is appropriate to stick with underweights in the classically cyclical sectors: banks, basic materials and industrials. This strategy has worked extremely well since we initiated it at the start of the year, and it should continue to do so. Sector strategy necessarily impacts stock market allocation. Our core philosophy of investment reductionism teaches us that for most stock markets, the sector (and dominant company) skews swamp any effect that comes from the domestic economy. The defining skew for Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX is their large overweighting to banks (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Irrespective of the political uncertainties, our sector allocation establishes our near-term caution on these two markets. Prefer France's CAC over Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX. Chart I-8Italy's MIB = Long Banks Chart I-9Spain's IBEX = Long Banks For bonds, the implication is that yields can move only slightly higher before stronger headwinds to risk-assets and/or the global economy provide a natural cap and a tradeable reversal in yields. Hence, it is a good time to own a portfolio of high-quality 30-year government bonds. Regarding currencies, the recent developments in Italy have hurt our 50:50 combined long position in EUR/USD and SEK/USD; but this has been countered by gains in our short position in EUR/JPY. We have no tactical conviction on any of these crosses, but we will maintain this medium term currency portfolio unless the Italian 10-year BTP yield breaches the 4% line in the sand. Finally, the hardest call to make is on the direction of equity market. This is because a mini-downswing in global growth creates a headwind to earnings expectations; conversely, if bond yields are capped, this will provide some support to equity market valuations. On balance, this suggests that the year-to-date pattern of a range-bound equity market is set to continue. The caveat is that if Italy's line in the sand is breached, it would warrant a substantial de-risking. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Assuming that the average maturity of Italian banks' BTPs is around 5 years. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' published on January 11 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* It was a spectacular week for our fractal trades with four positions hitting their profit targets: long Poland/short Italy; short energy/long basic materials; short Spanish Bonos/long German bunds; and long AUD/NOK. This week, we note that the 65-day fractal dimension of the Polish zloty / U.S. dollar (or inverse) is approaching its lower limit. Go long PLN/USD with a profit target of 3.5% and symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

As interest rates rise, investors are looking for the leveraged pressure points in the global economy to identify the sectors most likely to show strain. We previously identified the U.S. corporate bond market as a definite candidate. This month we look at European corporates. European corporations are still well behind the U.S. in the leveraging cycle. Relative trends in corporate financial health have generally favored European credit quality relative to U.S. issuers. Below the surface, balance sheet repair in the Eurozone has been concentrated in domestic issuers; financial trends among foreign issuers have resembled those in the U.S. market. Foreign issuers are much more vulnerable to higher interest rates and an economic downturn. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to fall to levels that will spark a raft of downgrades for foreign firms issuing into the Eurozone market, in the event that interest rates rise and a recession follows. Investors should concentrate their European corporate bond portfolios in domestic securities. That said, trends in financial health are unlikely to be the key driver of corporate bond relative returns this year. More important will be the end of the ECB's asset purchase program. We recommend an underweight position in Eurozone IG and HY relative to Eurozone government bonds, and relative to U.S. corporates. Risk assets remain on a collision course with monetary policy, which is the main reason why the "return of vol" is a key theme in the BCA 2018 Outlook. In the U.S., rising inflation is expected to limit the FOMC's ability to cushion soft patches in the economic data or negative shocks from abroad. We expect that ECB tapering will add to market stress, especially now that Eurozone breakup risks are again a concern. We also believe that geopolitics will remain a major source of uncertainty and volatility. All this comes at a time when corporate bond spreads offer only a thin buffer against bad news. On a positive note, we remain upbeat on the earnings outlook in the major countries. The U.S. recession that we foresaw in 2019 has been delayed into 2020 by fiscal stimulus. The longer runway for earnings to grow keeps us nervously overweight corporate bonds, at least in the U.S. That said, corporates are no more than a carry trade now that the lows in spreads are in place for the cycle. We are keeping a close eye on a number of indicators that will help us to time the next downgrade to our global corporate bond allocation. Profitability is just one, albeit important, aspect of the financial backdrop. What about the broader trend in financial health? Does the trend justify wider spreads even if the economy and profits hold up over the next year? We reviewed U.S. corporate financial health in the March 2018 monthly Bank Credit Analyst, using our bottom-up sample of companies. We also stress-tested these companies for higher interest rates and a medium-sized recession. We concluded that the U.S. corporate sector's heavy accumulation of debt in this expansion will result in rampant downgrade activity during the next economic downturn. As interest rates rise, investors are looking for the leveraged pressure points in the global economy to identify the sectors most likely to show strain. The U.S. corporate bond market is a definite candidate. This month we extend the analysis to the European corporate sector. The European Corporate Health Monitor The bottom-up version of the Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is a complement to our top-down CHM, which uses macro data from the ECB to construct an index of six financial ratios for the non-financial corporate sector. While useful as an indicator of the overall trend in corporate financial health, it does not shed light on underlying trends across credit quality, countries and sectors. It also fails to distinguish between domestic versus foreign issuers in the Eurozone market. A number of features of the European market limit the bottom-up analysis to some extent relative to what we are able to do for the U.S.: the Eurozone market is significantly smaller and company data typically do not have as much history; foreign issuers comprise almost 50% of the market, a much higher percentage than in the U.S.; and the Financial sector features more prominently in the Eurozone index, but we exclude it because our CHM methodology does not lend itself well to this sector. We analyzed only domestic issuers in our study of U.S. corporate health. However, we decided to include foreign issuers in our Eurozone analysis in order to maximize the sample size. Moreover, it is appropriate for some bond investors to consider the whole picture, given that important benchmarks such as Barclay's corporate indexes include both foreign and domestic issuers. The relative composition of domestic versus foreign, investment-grade versus high-yield, and industrial sectors in our sample are comparable with the weights used in the Barclay's index. The CHM is calculated using the median value for each of six financial ratios (Table II-1). We then standardize1 the median values for the six ratios and aggregate them into a composite index using a simple average. The result is an index that fluctuates between +/- 2 standard deviations. A rising index indicates deteriorating health, while a downtrend signals improving health. We defined it this way in order to facilitate comparison with trends in corporate spreads. Table II-1Definitions Of Ratios That Go Into The CHMs One has to be careful in interpreting our Eurozone Monitor. The bottom-up version only dates back to 2005. Thus, while both the level and change in the U.S. CHM provide important information regarding balance sheet health, for the Eurozone Monitor we focus more on the change. Whether it is a little above or below the zero line is less important than the trend. Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Chart II-1 compares the top-down and bottom-up Eurozone CHMs for the entire non-financial corporate sector.2 The levels are different, although the broad trends are similar. Key differences that help to explain the divergence include the following: the top-down CHM defines leverage to be total debt as a percent of the market value of equity, while our bottom-up CHM defines it to be total debt as a percent of the book value of the company. The second panel of Chart II-1 highlights that the two measures of leverage have diverged significantly since 2012; the top-down CHM defines profit margins as total cash flow as a percent of sales. For data-availability reasons, our bottom-up version uses operating income/total sales; and most importantly, the top-down CHM uses ECB data, which includes only companies that are domiciled in the Eurozone. Thus, it excludes foreign issuers that make up a large part of our company sample and the Barclay's index. When we recalculate the bottom-up CHM using only domestic investment-grade issuers, the result is much closer to the top-down version (Chart II-2). Both CHMs have been in 'improving health' territory since the end of the Great Financial Crisis. The erosion in the profitability components during this period was offset by declining leverage, rising liquidity and improving interest coverage for domestic issuers. Chart II-1Top-Down Vs. Bottom-Up Chart II-2Top-Down Vs. Domestic Bottom-Up It has been a different story for foreign IG issuers (Chart II-3). These firms have historically enjoyed a higher return on capital, operating margins, interest coverage, debt coverage and liquidity. Nonetheless, heavy debt accumulation has undermined their interest- and debt-coverage ratios in absolute terms and relative to their domestic peers until very recently. In other words, while domestic issuers have made an effort to clean up their balance sheets since the Great Recession, financial trends among foreign issuers look more like the trends observed in the U.S. No doubt, this is in part due to U.S. companies issuing Euro-denominated debt, but there are many other foreign issuers in our sample as well. Some analysts prefer total debt/total assets to the leverage measure we use in constructing our CHMs. However, the picture is much the same; leverage among IG domestic and foreign firms has diverged dramatically since 2010 (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign IG Chart II-4Diverging Leverage Trends Over the past year or so there has been some reversal in the post-Lehman trends; domestic health has stabilized, while that of foreign issuers has improved. Leverage among foreign companies has leveled off, while margins and the liquidity ratio have bounced. The results for high-yield (HY) issuers must be taken with a grain of salt because of the small sample size. Chart II-5 highlights that the HY CHM is improving for both domestic and foreign issuers. Impressively, leverage is declining for both the domestic and foreign components. The return on capital, interest coverage, and debt coverage have also improved, although only for foreign issuers. Chart II-5Bottom-Up: Domestic Vs. Foreign HY Corporate Sensitivity The bottom line is that, while there have been some relative shifts below the surface, the European corporate sector's finances are generally in good shape in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. This is particularly the case for domestic issuers that have yet to catch the equity buyback bug. However, less accommodative monetary policy and rising borrowing rates have focused investor attention on corporate sector vulnerability. Downgrade risk will mushroom if corporate borrowing rates continue rising and, especially, if the economy contracts. If there is a recession in Europe in the next few years it will likely be as a result of a downturn in the U.S. We expect a traditional end to the U.S. business cycle; the Fed overdoes the rate hike cycle, sending the economy into a tailspin. The U.S. downturn would spill over to the rest of the world and could drag the Eurozone into a mild contraction. We estimated the change in the interest coverage ratio for the companies in our bottom-up European sample for a 100 basis-point rise in interest rates across the corporate curve, taking into consideration the maturity distribution of the debt (i.e. the coupons reset only for the bonds, notes and loans that mature in the next three years). We make the simplifying assumptions that all debt and loans maturing in the next three years are rolled over, but that companies do not take on net new obligations. We also assume that EBIT is unchanged in order to isolate the impact of higher interest rates. The 'x' in Chart II-6 denotes the result of the interest rate shock only. The 'o' combines the interest rate shock with a recession scenario, in which EBIT contracts by 15%. The interest coverage ratio declines sharply when rates rise by 100 basis points, but the ratio moves to a new post-2000 low only for foreign issuers. The ratio for domestic issuers falls back to the range that existed between 2009 and 2013. The median interest coverage ratio drops further when we combine this with a 15% earnings contraction in the recession scenario. Again, the outcome is far worse for foreign than it is for domestic issuers. Chart II-7 presents a shock to the median debt coverage ratio. Since debt coverage (cash flow divided by total debt) does not include interest payments, we show only the recession scenario result that reflects the decline in profits. Once again, foreign issuers appear to be far more exposed to an economic downturn than their domestic brethren. Chart II-6Interest Coverage Shocks Chart II-7Debt Coverage Shock Indeed, the results for foreign issuers are qualitatively similar to the shocks we previous published for our bottom-up sample of IG corporates in the U.S. (Chart II-8 and Chart II-9). In both cases, higher interest rates and contracting earnings will take the interest coverage and debt coverage ratios into uncharted territory. Chart II-8U.S. Interest Coverage Shocks Chart II-9U.S. Debt Coverage Shock Conclusions European corporations are still well behind the U.S. in the leveraging cycle. Relative trends in corporate financial health have generally favored European credit quality relative to U.S. issuers, where balance sheet activity has focused on lifting shareholder value since the last recession. Below the surface, balance sheet repair in the Eurozone has been concentrated in domestic issuers; financial trends among foreign issuers have resembled those in the U.S. market. There has been a small convergence of financial health between Eurozone domestic and foreign issuers over the past year or so, but the latter are still much more vulnerable to higher interest rates and an economic downturn. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to fall to levels that will spark a raft of downgrades for foreign firms issuing into the Eurozone market, in the event that interest rates rise and a recession follows. Investors should concentrate their European corporate bond portfolios in domestic securities. That said, trends in financial health are unlikely to be the key driver of corporate bond returns relative to European government bonds or to U.S. corporates this year. More important will be the end of the ECB's asset purchase program later in 2018. We expect spreads to widen as this important liquidity tailwind fades. For the moment, our Global Fixed Income Strategy service recommends an underweight position in Eurozone IG and HY relative to Eurozone government bonds, and relative to U.S. corporates. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 Standardizing involves taking the deviation of the series from the 18 quarter moving average and dividing by the standard deviation of the series. 2 Note that a rising CHM indicates deteriorating health to facilitate comparison with quality spreads.