Economy

Highlights Portfolio Strategy There are high odds that China’s real GDP deceleration will continue for the next decade, casting a shadow over the profit prospects of the S&P 1500 metals & mining index. A structural below benchmark allocation is warranted. Rising total mutual fund assets under management, improved trading revenue prospects, rising investor confidence along with a revival in IPO and M&A activity, all signal that it still pays to be overweight the S&P capital markets index. Recent Changes There are no changes in our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” - Charles Owen "Chuck" Prince III (ex-CEO of Citigroup) The SPX remains near all time highs and the invincible tech sector continues to lead the pack. Two weeks ago we showed that the market capitalization concentration of the top five stocks in the S&P 500 surpassed the late-1990s parallel (Chart 1), and Table 2 shows that late in the cycle a handful of stocks explain a sizable part of the broad market’s return.1 However, in terms of valuation overshoot the current forward P/E of these top five stocks is roughly half the late-1990s parabolic episode (Chart 2). Chart 1Vertigo Warning Chart 2Unlike The Late-1990s While the overall market does not fully resemble the excesses of the dot.com bubble era, at least not yet, there are elements that are eerily reminiscent of the late-1990s. Table 2Contribution To Late Cycle Rallies In The SPX Chart 3Correlation Breakdown Contrary to popular belief, during manias historical correlations break down and the forward multiple becomes positively correlated with the discount rate. So in the late 1990s, the fed funds rate and the 10-year yield jumped 200bps in a short time span and the SPX forward P/E soared 40% from roughly 18x to 25x (Chart 3) before collapsing to 14x soon thereafter. Simultaneously, the US dollar was roaring as real interest rates were 4%, but the NASDAQ 100 outperformed the emerging markets, another break in historical correlations. As Chuck Prince mused in 2007, there is a narrative in the equity market today that, “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance”. While the overall market does not fully resemble the excesses of the dot.com bubble era, at least not yet, there are elements that are eerily reminiscent of the late-1990s. We filtered for large cap stocks that are at all-time highs and have increased in value at a minimum 10x since 2010. Among the stocks that met these criteria, five really stand out, Apple, Tesla, Lam Research, Amd & Salesforce, and comprise our “ATLAS” index; the mania in these stocks will likely end in tears (Chart 4). Even their forward P/E ratio has gone exponential, hitting a 60 handle last year similar to top five SPX stocks in the late-1990s. Chart 4ATLAS: Holding The World On His Shoulders Currently, SPX profits are barely growing and the sole reason equities are higher is the massive injection of liquidity via the drubbing in interest rates and the restart of QE. From peak-to-trough the 10-year yield fell 175bps in nine months, and the Fed commenced expanding its balance sheet by $60bn/month since last September; yet profits have barely budged. Ultimately, profits have to show up and the news on this front remains grim. The current non-inflationary trend-growth backdrop is a “goldilocks” scenario especially for tech stocks that thrive during disinflationary periods. While stocks can go higher defying weak EPS fundamentals as they have yet to reach a fully euphoric state according to our Complacency-Anxiety Indicator (Chart 5), a sell-off in the bond market will likely cause some consternation in equities in general and tech stocks in particular similar to early- and late-2018. Chart 5Not Max Complacent Yet Other catalysts that can suddenly cause “the music to stop” are either the recent coronavirus becoming an epidemic or a geopolitical event that would result in a risk off backdrop. Ultimately, profits have to show up and the news on this front remains grim. Our mid-January “Three EPS Scenarios” analysis still suggests that the SPX is 9% overvalued.2 This week we are updating our capital markets view and adding a sixth long-term theme and a related investment implication to our mid-December 2019, Special Report titled, “Top US Sector Investment Ideas For The Next Decade”.3 Sixth Big Theme For The Decade And Investment Implications China’s ascendancy on the world scene was a mega driver of equity markets in the 2000s following its inclusion in the WTO. The commodity super-cycle captured investors’ imaginations and China’s insatiable appetite for commodities caused a massive bubble in the commodity complex in general and commodity-related equities in particular. Nevertheless, the Great Recession posed a severe threat to China and the authorities injected an extraordinary amount of stimulus into the economy (15% of GDP over two years). This succeeded in doubling real GDP growth, but only temporarily. The unintended consequence was an enormous debt binge fueled by cheap money. Moreover, this debt burden along with falling labor force growth and productivity forced the government to re-think its policies as they caused a steady down drift in real output growth. The sixth big theme for the 2020s is a sustained deceleration of Chinese real GDP growth to a range of 4% to 2% (Chart 6). Not only is the debt overhang weighing on real output growth, but Chinese leaders are adamant about transitioning the economy to developed market status, which is synonymous with higher consumption expenditures at the expense of gross fixed capital formation. Chart 6From Boom… Chart 7…To Bust In other words, China remains committed to weaning its economy off of investment and reconfiguring it toward consumption (Chart 7). This is a strategic plan but it is possible that the Chinese economy can achieve this transition in due time. While this will not happen overnight, the implication is steadily lower real GDP growth as is common among large, mature, developed market economies. China will remain one of the top commodity consumers in the world, as urbanization is ongoing, but the intensity of commodity consumption will continue to decelerate (Chart 8). At the margin, this change in consumption behavior will have knock on effects on the broad basic resources sector in general and the S&P 1500 metals & mining index in particular. Were this Chinese backdrop to pan out in the coming decade as we expect, it would sustain the relative underperformance of metals & mining equities as Chart 6 & 7 depict. Chart 8Commodity Consumption Deceleration Will… Chart 9…Continue To Weigh On Metals & Mining Profits Importantly, these commodity producers will have to adjust their still bloated cost structures to lower run rates which is de facto negative both for relative sales and profit growth (Chart 9). Tack on the large negative footprint mining extraction has on the environment, and if ESG investing (our fifth big theme for the decade4) also takes off, investors should avoid the S&P 1500 metals & mining index on a secular basis. Bottom Line: There are high odds that China’s real GDP deceleration will continue for the next decade, casting a shadow over the profit prospects of the S&P 1500 metals & mining index. A structural below benchmark allocation is warranted. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S15METL – NEM, FCX, NUE, RS, RGLD, STLD, CMC, ATI, CRS, CLF, CMP, X, KALU, WOR, MTRN, HCC, AKS, SXC, HAYN, CENX, TMST, ZEUS. Capital Markets Update Capital markets stocks have come out of hibernation recently and are on the cusp of breaking out – in a bullish fashion – of their 18-month trading range. A number of the indicators we track signal that an earnings-led outperformance period is in the cards for this financials sub-group and we reiterate our overweight stance. Sloshing liquidity has pushed investors out the risk spectrum and high yield bond option adjusted spreads are flirting with multi-year lows. Such a tame junk bond market backdrop coupled with easy financial conditions are conducive to rising M&A activity (Chart 10). Importantly, the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey paints an improving profit backdrop for investment banks. Not only are bankers willing extenders of credit, but demand for credit for the majority of loan categories that the Fed tracks is squarely in positive territory (top panel, Chart 11). Chart 10Subsiding Risks Are A Boon To Capital Markets Chart 11Positive Profit Catalysts This is likely a consequence of last year’s drubbing in the price of credit. M&A activity usually goes hand in hand with loan growth, underscoring that business combinations are on track to accelerate (third panel, Chart 10). This will revive a lucrative business line for capital markets firms. Total mutual fund assets are expanding at a brisk rate and hitting fresh all-time highs, signaling an uptick in risk appetite (third panel, Chart 11). Rising investor confidence will facilitate both new and secondary share issuance, an important source of fee generation for capital markets firms. Moreover, equity trading volumes have sprang back to life in recent weeks underscoring that the recent impressive Q4 earnings results will likely continue into Q1/2020 (bottom panel, Chart 10). Meanwhile, the three Fed rate cuts last year should work through the economy and at least stem further losses in the ISM manufacturing survey. The US/China trade détente will also lead to a stabilization in global growth. In fact, the V-shaped recovery in the global ZEW survey suggests that capital markets profits will likely outpace the broad market this year (second & bottom panels, Chart 11). Finally, the recent surge in the stock-to-bond ratio reflects a massive psychological shift, from last year’s recessionary fears to growing investor confidence that tail risks are abating (Chart 12). Still depressed valuations neither reflect the firming capital markets profit outlook nor the rising industry ROE (bottom panel, Chart 12). Adding it all up, accelerating total mutual fund assets under management, improved trading revenue prospects, rising investor confidence and a revival in IPO and M&A activity, all signal that it still pays to be overweight the S&P capital markets index.  Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P capital markets index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5CAPM – GS, CME, SPGI, MS, BLK, SCHW, ICE, MCO, BK, TROW, STT, MSCI, NTRS, AMP, MKTX, CBOE, NDAQ, RJF, ETFC, BEN, IVZ. Chart 12Valuation Re-Rating Looms     Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Three EPS Scenarios” dated January 13, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2     Ibid. 3     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “Top US Sector Investment Ideas For the Next Decade” dated December 16, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4     Ibid.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)

Special Report

Highlights Commercial rents have fallen in real terms, revealing that the commercial property price rally has been fueled exclusively by low rates. Limited upside for rents and an upward direction for future rates are two significant headwinds. However, commercial real estate is especially pro-cyclical and inflationary pressures need to work their way into the economy before the risk of a downturn becomes imminent. The good news is that the economy is less vulnerable to slipping commercial property prices. Large banks have shrunk their commercial property loan books and their composition has shifted towards safer categories of commercial loans. While the macroeconomic outlook remains somewhat neutral, CMBS’ risk/reward profile appears reasonably attractive relative to other US bond sectors. Feature Real estate was a bane for markets and the banking system in the last recession, and commercial properties have lately become an increasingly popular source of concern among investors. Average prices have grown by 90% over the past decade, rising well above their pre-Great Financial Crisis peaks. We have made the case that we are heading into the expansion’s last stretch. The study of economic cycles and our relentless quest to identify inflection points ahead of time become more timely as the bull market ages. To this end, current commercial property valuations deserve close scrutiny and we explore whether any underlying excesses could potentially disrupt financial stability or precipitate a recession in the US. We conclude that although commercial property prices have little hope of appreciating significantly from current levels, a reversal is not imminent until inflationary pressure forces rates higher. When prices eventually slip, the impact on the overall economy should be more attenuated than it was in the last recession, as the banking system has become less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate. While the fundamental macro outlook remains neutral, suggesting no imminent pressure on spreads, US bond investors can find relative value in non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS (vs. corporate bonds rated A or higher) and in agency CMBS (vs. agency residential mortgaged-backed securities). A Rate-Driven Rally Chart 1Commercial Rents Have Decoupled From Property Prices Like all financial assets, commercial property prices are derived from discounting future cash flows to their present value. Since the crisis, a low rate environment, supported by a sluggish inflation backdrop and continuously accommodative monetary policy, has depressed the valuation equation’s denominator. Meanwhile, strong economic fundamentals and demographic trends - such as urbanization and the millennials’ tendency to marry and purchase a home at a later age - have helped boost the numerator for commercial and multi-family residential properties in the past decade. However, with the exception of multi-family residential real estate - for which price appreciation has also been the strongest - real rents have fallen (Chart 1), revealing that low rates have propelled commercial properties’ price appreciation over the past decade. The combination of falling real rents and surging property prices has depressed commercial real estate cap rates1 to cyclical low levels, raising the question of a potential unwind. Mathematically, an increase in cap rates could result, on the one hand, from rent growth outpacing inflation growth, translating into an increase in real rents on the numerator. Alternatively, cap rates could rise from falling property prices, reducing the denominator. On a cyclical horizon, the latter outcome seems more likely than the former. Little Upside Left For Rents First, the fact that rents in real terms have decreased in spite of sluggish inflation is a bad omen for the outlook for future real rents. We have made the case that there is more inflationary pressure than meets the eye beneath the surface of the US economy. The combination of an already very tight labor market and a pickup in manufacturing activity point towards further wage growth. Inflation is a lagging indicator that has more scope to rise than roll-over at this stage of the cycle. All else equal, upward inflationary pressure will depress real rents further. Second, nominal rents themselves are also facing significant headwinds. Office buildings’ and retail shopping centers’ vacancies have barely recovered from the hit they took in the last recession, while new inventory is struggling to get absorbed by new demand (Chart 2). A strong labor market generally supports the demand for office spaces but a tight labor market limits its future upside. The latter, though, increases potential wage gains and consumers’ purchasing power, whose fundamentals are already strong. We have shown that US consumers’ increased savings rates and lower debt levels put them in a good position to spend their incremental income. Chart 2Post-Crisis Office And Shopping Center Vacancies Remain Elevated... Chart 3...As These Sectors Face Structural Disruptions However, both sectors are facing structural disruptions. Co-working has introduced a new player in the office segment – a sub-lessor who signs long-term leases on space it rents out in short-term chunks. If a sizable sub-lessor like WeWork were forced to shrink its footprint, a lot of office supply would come back on to the market, while demand is shrinking as businesses attempt to reduce the area each employee occupies. Brick-and-mortar retailers continue to be buffeted as e-commerce captures an increasing share of consumer spending, keeping downward pressure on retail rents (Chart 3). The picture looks slightly brighter in the industrial properties space, where vacancies have recovered to healthier levels, though low vacancies have failed to lift rents as demand for properties is being met by new inventory (Chart 4). The revival in global manufacturing activity that we are expecting to occur this year should support industrial property rents in the near term, but the advanced age of the cycle limits future upside. Chart 4A Brighter Picture For Industrial And Apartment Buildings... Chart 5...Thanks To Rising Renters Income Chart 6Over-Construction Of High-Tier Properties Multi-family residential housing is the only sector that has experienced steady real rent growth, fueled by a combination of rising rentership rates and rising household income amongst renters (Chart 5). Homebuilders’ focus on building higher-end units has led to an oversupply of more expensive properties, and their prices have already started to contract on a year-on-year basis (Chart 6). Multi-family residential properties rents should lose momentum as the alternative cost of owning homes falls, especially as homebuilders attempt to right-size their mix of properties to offer more lower-end supply. Exhausted Demand A commercial real estate rally fueled by perpetually falling rates is unsustainable. Although the market sees the potential for an additional rate cut, we think the Fed is done cutting. Labor market strength and a revival in global manufacturing activity argue that no further accommodation or insurance rate cuts are necessary. From current levels, the path of least resistance for rates is upwards (Chart 7). Strong demand from institutional investors has also contributed to fueling prices. Pension funds and insurance companies’ holdings of mortgages and agency-backed securities have nearly doubled since 2010 (Chart 8, first panel) and their allocation as a percentage of total assets is nearing pre-recession highs (Chart 8, second panel). These levels allow them little flexibility to sustain their demand impulse, as there is only so much they can allocate to real estate and other alternative investments. Chart 7Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Chart 8Saturated Demand From Institutional Investors... Demand from yield-hungry investors may also get exhausted if CMBS yields deflate to the point where they lose competitiveness relative to other income-producing investments. CMBS yields have broadly moved with other bond yields since the crisis, though US high-yield corporates have widened somewhat over the last few years, making them a slightly more appealing alternative to CMBS, all else equal (Chart 9). The steady downward pressure on multi-family cap rates since 2010 (Chart 10) reveals that the collateral underlying multi-family loans has become increasingly ambitiously priced, suggesting that losses given default on multi-family backed CMBS without agency backing may be rising, eroding prospective default-adjusted returns. Chart 9...And From Yield-Hungry Investors? Chart 10Cap Rates Have Reached Cyclical Lows New regulations also have the potential to retract a significant share of demand for commercial mortgages. The severe housing market deterioration during the Great Financial Crisis and the government intervention required to ensure Freddie Mac’s and Fannie Mae’s solvency led the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to place these two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) under conservatorship in 2014 and to cap their holdings of multi-family mortgages to US$ 100 billion for each GSE. A commercial real estate rally fueled by perpetually falling rates is unsustainable. Current holdings of multi-family residential loans far exceed the stated limits (Table 1). GSEs hold nearly half of all multi-family residential loans outstanding. The post-crisis growth in GSE-guaranteed loans is largely attributable to the exclusion from the cap of certain categories of loans such as green energy loans (Chart 11). The FHFA eliminated these exemptions last year, making the US$ 200 billion cap more binding and applicable to all multi-family loans without exception.2 The impact on mortgage originators and investors is yet to be seen but it would naturally follow that demand for multi-family mortgages to bundle into CMBS would decline if the GSEs are forced to take a step back from the space. Table 1Commercial Real Estate Loans By Holder ($US Mn) Chart 11Multi-Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding By Mortgage Holder Late-Cycle Dynamics Commercial mortgages are typically non-recourse (in case of default, the borrower can only recover the value of the collateralized property) making the loss given default a function of property prices. When times are good and property prices rise, borrowers can easily refinance their loans. The opposite holds in bad times. Therefore, commercial real estate prices are especially pro-cyclical. In spite of the headwinds outlined above, a commercial property downturn does not seem imminent. In spite of the headwinds outlined above, a commercial property downturn does not seem imminent. First, the US economy still has momentum, is supported by highly accommodative monetary policy and should get a boost from a global growth revival. Absent any major exogenous shock to the global economy, we expect that a recession is at least eighteen months away. For as long as the economy keeps expanding, commercial real estate prices can remain elevated. Second, sources of financing remain abundant as the emergence of alternative lenders (Chart 12) has offset the banks’ tighter lending standards for commercial properties (Chart 13). The proliferation of non-bank lenders is typically a late-cycle indicator. Chart 12The Proliferation Of Alternative Lenders… However, when the economy starts contracting, a commercial real estate downturn could have an outsized impact on banks with significant exposure. In the late 1980s, the commercial property downturn induced a recession and the subprime mortgage bust gave rise to the Great Financial Crisis. Healthier Balance Sheets The good news for the economy today is that banks are less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate than they were back then. The good news for the economy today is that banks are less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate. Banks have decreased their overall exposure to commercial property loans to levels below their 2008 and 1989 peaks (Chart 14). It is worth noting, though, that smaller banks have taken an increasingly important role in the commercial property market as they now finance 65% of all commercial property loans. However, a stronger concentration in smaller banks represents a localized rather than systemic risk, as smaller banks tend to have a more concentrated geographic exposure. Conversely, large banks have significantly shrunk their commercial real estate loan books.3 Chart 14Large Banks Have Shrunk Their CRE Books... Chart 15...And Shifted Away From Speculative-Grade Loans Most importantly, the composition of the commercial property loan book has changed drastically since the Great Financial Crisis. Banks have significantly reduced their exposure to more speculative construction and development loans (Chart 15). Risk appetite typically increases in the latter stages of an expansion, yet construction loans remain at relatively depressed levels. The growth in commercial property loans since 2013 has entirely been explained by the rise in relatively less risky multi-family and non-residential non-farm loans. Investment Implications A commercial real estate downturn is probably not a 2020 event. Inflationary pressures need to make their presence felt across a wide swath of the economy before Fed hikes will give rates the scope to move sustainably higher. In the meantime, bond investors with a mandate to remain exposed to CMBS can reap the benefits of attractive risk/reward profiles relative to other segments of the US bond market. US Bond Strategy’s Excess Return Bond Map measures the number of standard deviations of spread widening a sector would need to experience, before losing 100 basis points relative to a duration-matched position in Treasuries4 (Chart 16). Sectors plotting near the top-right of the Map carry both high expected return and low risk. Sectors plotting near the bottom-left carry low expected return and high risk. Chart 16BCA US Bond Strategy’s Excess Return Bond Map Chart 17Tighter Standards And Decelerating Prices This valuation framework currently suggests that CMBS look reasonably attractive. Non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS’ expected return is more promising than Aaa-and Aa-rated corporate bonds and somewhat similar to the expected return on an A-rated corporate bond. Meanwhile, CMBS exhibit a lower risk of losing 100 bps. Similarly, Agency CMBS offer greater expected return than Conventional 30-year Agency-backed residential MBS, along with a similar risk of losses. Although relative valuations appear attractive, the fundamental outlook remains neutral for CMBS spreads, for now. Periods of tightening commercial real estate lending standards and weakening commercial loan demand have historically coincided with decelerating commercial real estate prices and widening CMBS spreads. The Fed’s Q3 2019 Senior Loan Officer Survey revealed only a small net tightening of lending standards and unchanged demand (Chart 17). Overall, the lack of inflationary pressure suggests that neither a commercial real estate downturn nor a meaningful widening of CMBS spreads is an imminent threat.   Jennifer Lacombe Senior Analyst JenniferL@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 A capitalization rate is the ratio of net operating income (rent) to price and measures the expected rate of return on a real estate investment. As such, a property’s price can also be derived by dividing its rent by its cap rate. 2 More information about GSE’s conservatorship can be found on the FHFA’s website (https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--Freddie-Conservatorships.aspx and https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/New-Multifamily-Caps-9132019.aspx). 3 An analysis of the largest banks’ earnings call we carried out last October also revealed that large banks were unanimously shrinking their commercial real estate books. For more details, please refer to US Investment Strategy Weekly Report from October 28, 2019, "What The Biggest Banks See", available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 For more details on the methodology behind our Excess Return Bond Map please see US Bond Strategy October 15, 2019 Weekly Report "A Perspective On Risk And Reward", available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Highlights The US election cycle is an understated risk to US equities – and the risk of a left-wing populist outperforming in the Democratic primary election is frontloaded in February. The US-Iran conflict is unresolved and remains market-relevant. Iraq is at the center of the conflict and oil supply disruption there or elsewhere in the region is a substantial risk. Even if war does not erupt, Iran has the potential to give President Trump’s foreign policy a black eye and thus could marginally impact the election dynamic. Feature Stocks have rallied mightily since our August report on Trump’s “tactical trade retreat,” but new headwinds face the market. In this report we call attention to four hurdles arising from US election uncertainty. Then we focus on the status of Iran and Iraq in the wake of this month’s hostilities, which brought the US and Iran to the brink of outright war. We maintain that the Iran risk is unresolved and will remain market-relevant in advance of the US election. Primarily due to the US Democratic primary election, we urge caution on US equities in the near term, along with our Global Investment Strategy, despite our cyclically bullish House View. Four Hurdles In The US Election Cycle The US election cycle is the chief political risk to the bull market this year – and geopolitical risks largely radiate from it. There are four immediate hurdles that financial markets are underestimating: Risks to Trump's re-election: Global investors have come around to our view since 2018 that Trump is slightly favored to win re-election (Chart 1). Bets on the related question of which party will hold the White House have flipped from Democratic to Republican (Chart 2). Everyone now recognizes that Trump will not be removed from office through impeachment. Chart 1Trump Re-election Odds Add To Risk-On Chart 2Republicans Now Favored For White House Yet, anecdotally, investors may be becoming complacent about Trump’s chances. He is not a shoo-in. Subjectively we have argued that his odds of victory are 55%. Our quantitative election model shows that Wisconsin has shifted to the Republican camp since November, but it places the odds of winning that state (and Pennsylvania) at less than 52% (Chart 3). This gives Trump 289 electoral votes, only 19 more than necessary. If both of these states tipped in the opposite direction then investors would be facing a major policy reversal in the United States. Chart 3Our US 2020 Election Model Shows Trump Win With 289 Electoral College Votes Chart 4The US Economy Is Still A Risk To Trump Trump’s low approval rating remains a liability – and in this sense impeachment is still relevant, in that it can either help or hurt his approval, or prompt him to seek distractions abroad that could deliver negative surprises. Moreover the US manufacturing sector and labor market are not out of the woods yet (Chart 4). In short, the election is still ten months away and a lot can happen between now and then. We see Trump as only slightly favored. Moreover other hurdles are more immediate than the benefits of policy continuity upon a Trump win. 2. Risks to Biden's nomination: Throughout last year we maintained that former Vice President Joe Biden was the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, albeit with very low conviction. In particular, after Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s poor showing in the third debate and subsequent heart attack, we expected Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren to consolidate the progressive vote and trigger a policy-induced selloff in US equities. This never occurred because Biden held firm, Sanders recovered, and Warren fell. The risk to equities from a left-wing populist Democratic nominee is frontloaded in February and March. Now, however, the risk to equities is back. The Democratic Party faces a last-ditch effort from its left or “progressive” wing and anti-establishment voters to oppose Biden. With the primary election now upon us – the Iowa Caucus is February 3 – national opinion polls show that Sanders is pushing up against Biden (Chart 5). It is less clear if Sanders is breaking through in the primary polling state-by-state, where multiple candidates remain competitive (Chart 6). But online gamblers are reasserting Biden over Sanders at just the moment when progressives are set to launch their biggest push (Chart 7). Meanwhile New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg is finally gaining some traction – and he eats away at Biden’s support from centrist voters. Everything is in flux, which warrants caution. Chart 5Biden Is The Frontrunner, But Sanders Is Challenger Chart 6Biden Not A Shoo-In For Early Democratic Primary States Biden is still favored to win the nomination, but he has not clinched it. The market faces volatility during the period when Democrats get “cold feet” about nominating another establishment candidate. Moreover the fundamental knock against Sanders – that he is not as “electable” as Biden – is debatable, judging by head-to-head polls against Trump (Chart 8). This means that a shift in momentum – for instance, if Biden lurches from disappointments in early states to underperformance in his bulwark of South Carolina – would have legs. Ultimately a “contested convention” is not impossible. This would be a negative surprise to market participants currently assuming that the world faces the relatively benign choice of two known quantities: an establishment Democrat or a continuation of Trump policies. Chart 7Betting Markets Overlooking Party 'Cold Feet' Over Biden Chart 8Electability Fears May Not Stop Sanders Rally Risks to the Republican Senate: Assuming Biden clinches the nomination, he has a 45% chance of winning the election – and in that case, his chance of bringing the Senate over to the Democrats is higher than investors realize. This is another risk that the market will awaken to later this year. Chart 9Democrats Underestimated In Senate The consensus holds that Republicans will hold the Senate, particularly with Republican senators in Maine and Iowa leading their Democratic challengers in polling. The problem is that for Democrats to unseat an incumbent president they will necessarily have generated strong turnout from key demographic groups: young people, suburbanites, women, and minorities. If that is the case, then the election will not be as tight as expected and Republicans will be less likely to hold the Senate. This would require rising unemployment or some other blow that fundamentally damages the Trump administration’s popular support in key swing states. At least until it becomes clear that the manufacturing sector is out of the woods, the Democrats should be seen as far more likely to take the Senate than the Republicans are to retake the House of Representatives – yet this goes against the consensus (Chart 9). Rising odds of a Senate victory would mean that even a “centrist” Democrat like Biden would have fewer political constraints in office – he would pose a greater threat of increasing taxes, minimum wages, and passing legislative regulation than the market currently expects. In short, Biden would be pulled to the left of the political spectrum by his party and expectations of an establishment Democrat posing a minimal threat to corporate profits would be greatly disappointed. Risks of Trump's second term: Finally, assuming the manufacturing sector rebounds and that Trump’s odds of re-election rise above 55%, market complacency becomes an even bigger concern for a long-term investor. For in his second term Trump would become virtually unshackled with regard to economic and financial constraints, since he cannot run for office again. He would still face the senate, the Supreme Court, and other constraints, but these would certainly not preclude a doubling down on trade war (or confrontations with nuclear-aspirants like Iran or North Korea). We have argued that Trump will not instigate a trade war with Europe, at least until the economy has clearly rebounded, and most likely not until his second term. But we fully expect chapter two of the trade war to begin in 2021 – and this could mean China, Europe, or even a two-front war. Re-election could go to Trump’s head and prompt him to overreach on the global stage. Hence we expect the relief rally on Trump’s re-election to be short-lived and would be looking to sell the news. But the S&P 500 faces more immediate hurdles anyway, and that is why we urge caution in the very near term. Iran is still a major geopolitical risk this year. Bottom Line: None of these hurdles are insurmountable, but the US election cycle is now an understated risk to the equity bull market. We agree with our Global Investment Strategy that it is prudent to shift to a neutral position tactically on US equities, especially for the February and March period when uncertainty rises over the Democratic Party primary. This does not change our view that the underlying global economy is improving, largely on China’s rebound, and that the cyclical outlook is positive. Don’t Bet On Regime Collapse In Iran (Yet) The January 8 Iranian attack on US bases in Iraq was intended to serve as a breather for Iranian leaders. It was meant to put on pause the rapid escalation in US-Iran tensions – allowing Iranian leaders to recover from the assassination of top military commander Qassem Suleimani – all the while appeasing the public through a public show of revenge. As fate would have it, however, the Iranian regime was granted no such respite. Days later, domestic unrest descended on the Islamic Republic as protesters returned to the streets across the country, criticizing the regime’s downing of a civilian airliner and re-stating their long-running complaints against the regime. Civil strife is not uncommon in Iran (Table 1). Economic inefficiencies, corruption, and discriminatory policies which serve to reward regime loyalists while suppressing the private sector are only some of the grievances faced by Iranians.1 Table 1Civil Strife Ongoing Problem In Iran Today’s strife is relevant, however, because it is fueled by US-imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions that have created an even bleaker economic reality. Iranian exports were down 37% in 2019 following an 18% decline the previous year. Oil exports fell to 129 thousand barrels per day in December 2019, down from an average 2.1 million barrels per day in 2017 (Chart 10). Households are facing the brunt, experiencing a 17% unemployment rate and a whopping 36% inflation rate (Chart 11). Chart 10US 'Maximum Pressure' Sanctions On Iranian Oil Exports Chart 11Iranian Households Bear Brunt Of Economic Shock The 2020-21 budget, released in December and described as a weapon of “resistance against US sanctions,” intends to plug the deficit using state bonds and state property sales (Chart 12). However Iran’s fiscal condition is shaky. The International Monetary Fund estimates a fiscal breakeven oil price of $194.6 per barrel for Iran, more than 3 times higher than current oil prices. Chart 12Iran’s Fiscal Condition Is Shaky Chart 13Iran Avoiding Devaluation Under Trump Chart 14Iranians Also Blame Their Government For Malaise The solution of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the populist hawk who led the government during the US’s previous round of sanctions, was to devalue the official exchange rate. The weaker rial raised local currency revenues for each barrel of exported oil and encouraged import substitution in other industries. However devaluation came at a steep political cost and sparked riots and protests. So far President Hassan Rouhani has eschewed this strategy, instead maintaining a stable official exchange rate, used as the reference for subsidized basic goods and medicine (Chart 13). Nevertheless, the unofficial market rate has weakened 68% since the beginning of 2018. It is no surprise then that Iranians all over the country are taking to the streets. The latest bout of unrest is significant in size, geographic reach, and in that protesters are calling on Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to step down as supreme leader. Despite US sanctions, Iranian protesters are partially blaming Khamenei and the government for the country’s malaise (Chart 14). Even prior to the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), Iranians were angry about economic mismanagement. Nevertheless, according to our checklist for an Iranian revolution, the regime is not yet at risk of collapse (Table 2). Although the street movement is picking up pace, it is not organized or unified. There is no alternative being offered against the all-powerful supreme leader, and the political elite are mostly united in preserving the current system. Table 2Iran Regime Stability Checklist The regime has two main options going forward: seek immediate economic relief through negotiations with the United States, or hunker down and wait to see whether President Trump is reelected and able to sustain his campaign of maximum pressure, and go from there. We fully expect the latter. Domestic dissent can still be suppressed for the time being. The parliamentary – or Majlis – elections scheduled for February 21 could in theory offer Iranians an opportunity to voice their discontent through the ballot box. However this democratic exercise conceals the known political reality that the supreme leader holds supreme authority, even in the selection of parliament or the president (Diagram 1). Thus the election result will not drive major policy change. Diagram 1Supreme Leader Controls Iran A case in point was the regime’s 2016 strategy in the parliamentary election. At that time, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council, responsible for screening potential candidates, rejected well-known reformist applicants (Chart 15). As a result, the reformists who were able to win seats were either lesser-known figures or unaligned with liberals in the reformist movement. Thus while the reformist presence in parliament nominally surged, these lawmakers were ineffective, reneging on campaign promises or collaborating with the conservative faction. The 2016 election serves as a blueprint for what to expect in the upcoming elections in February. The Guardian Council ruled that out of around 15,000 candidates, only 60 (relatively unknown) reformist candidates were qualified to run for the election.2 The elections will not change anything, but this means the grievances of the population will fester in the coming years, especially if the US does not change policies. This is where the medium-term risk to regime stability – namely through elite divisions – becomes apparent. The impending leadership succession is a major source of uncertainty. Supreme Leader Khamenei is the main barrier to political change. At 80 years old and reportedly suffering from poor health, a change in leadership is imminent. However, no one has been officially endorsed as his successor. This is an immense source of uncertainty in the coming years. There are several possibilities for the succession.3 A successor is appointed by the Assembly of Experts. Because we exclude Rouhani as a candidate for supreme leader, the potential candidates for Iran’s top position listed below ascribe to Khamanei’s hardline ideology: Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahim Raisi, head of judiciary and of the Imam Reza shrine since March 2019. Raisi is reportedly Khamenei’s favorite for succession. He is a hardliner who lost the May 2017 presidential election to Rouhani.4 Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, the conservative former head of the judiciary and current chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is responsible for resolving disputes among government branches. Larijani is also a member of the Guardian Council.5 Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi, hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader and senior member of the Assembly of Experts. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a military force with immense influence in the regime – may choose to rule itself. We assign a low likelihood of this occurring. The IRGC is more likely to ensure that Khamenei’s successor is someone who supports its hardline ideology and vision for Iran. Some moderate clerics are advocating a change in structure, whereby the position of supreme leader is abolished. This school of thought argues that political leaders should be selected based on popular election rather than appointment.6 We do not assign high odds to this scenario. Until the Assembly of Experts selects the successor, a three-member council made up of the Iranian president, the head of judiciary, and a theologian of the Guardian Council, will assume the functions of supreme leader. Such a “triumvirate” could last longer than expected, or could even be formally decided as an alternative to a new supreme leader. In the context of such extreme uncertainty for the regime’s leadership in the coming decade, it is highly unlikely that the current political leaders will engage in negotiations with President Trump until they are sure of his staying power (Chart 16). First, the Iranians will continue to refuse talks prior to the US election. They will seek to undermine the Trump administration, yet without crossing red lines on the nuclear program (one year till nuclear breakout) or militant activities (killing American citizens). Chart 15Iran’s Guardians Vet Election Candidates Second, if Trump wins, then the shift to negotiations may or may not come, but the subsequent diplomatic process will be prolonged. Trump will have to gain the full cooperation of Europe, Russia, and China – and any new US-Iran deal is an open question and will involve tensions flaring up more than once. Chart 16Iranians Opposed To Talks With Trump Third, even if the Democrats win, the regime will play “hard to get” and will not immediately return to status quo ante Trump, although eventually there could be a restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or something like it. This process could also involve saber-rattling despite the Democrats’ more dovish disposition toward Iran. Bottom Line: The US maximum pressure campaign is not aimed at regime change in Iran, but if it brings any political change it will be a shift in a more hawkish direction as the regime faces immense internal and external pressures and an uncertain succession in the coming years. Iran’s leaders will continue to suppress unrest and can probably succeed in the near term. The confrontation with the US discredits any political actors who advocate negotiations. The path toward reform and improved relations with the West is closed until after the US election at minimum. Since Iran will seek to undermine both President Trump and the US presence in the Middle East in the meantime, US-Iran tensions remain a market-relevant source of risk in 2020. Iraq Still Poses An Oil Supply Risk Chart 17Iraqis Suffering From Poor Governance Iraq is ground zero for the US-Iran showdown, since the two powers have eschewed direct military confrontation. Iraqis have also been suffering the consequences of an ill-functioning political system (Chart 17). Corruption has prevented the trickle down of oil revenues, resulting in endemic poverty and inequality (Chart 18). Yet unlike its neighbor, Iraq is not ruled by a supreme leader who controls a powerful armed forces to which anger can be directed. Instead, protesters have been blaming the deep seated influence of the Iranian regime, which often results in what Iraqis’ argue to be a prioritization of foreign – i.e. Iranian – objectives over national ones. The demonstrations were successful in forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and the passing of a new electoral law. However Iraq remains in a state of chaos as Iraqis have vowed to remain on the street until all their conditions are met, including the appointment of an acceptable prime minister and early elections. Chart 18Poverty, Inequality, Corruption Plague Iraq This batch of reforms has been challenging for politicians to execute. For one, there is a lack of clarity as to which political group holds the majority of seats in Iraq’s Council of Representatives. Both the Iran-backed al-Binaa bloc as well as the al-Islah coalition led by Muqtada al-Sadr claim this position (Chart 19). A list of candidates for the temporary position of prime minister until early elections are held, proposed by Binaa in December, was rejected by President Barham Salih on grounds that it did not include anyone who would possess the support of the demonstrators. Chart 19Iraqi Parliamentary Control Up For Grabs Iraqi protesters have consistently reiterated their desire for a sovereign state, free from both American and Iranian interference. However, this nationalistic call has been disrupted and overshadowed by the US-Iran conflict. Importantly, the protest movement has now lost its most influential backer within the Iraqi political system: Sadr of the Islah bloc. This year’s Iran tensions and the parliamentary resolution to eject US troops from Iraq have unified the warring Shia political blocs. Sadr has called on the Mahdi army – a notoriously anti-American force also known as the Peace Brigades – to re-assemble. On January 13, in what can only be interpreted as a rapprochement among the main Shia political factions, Sadr met with paramilitary leaders making up the Popular Mobilization Forces in the Iranian city of Qom. They discussed the creation of a “united resistance” and the need jointly to expel foreign troops. Sadr also called for a “million-man march” against US troops in Iraq.7 Sadr’s pivot to Iran has not gone down well in Iraq’s streets, where protesters are accusing him of putting aside national goals for his own personal aspirations. While the protest movement will keep going, it is now largely headless and competing with the unified priorities of the Shia parties. This state of affairs weakens the odds of a sovereign Iraq that curbs Iranian regional influence. The political class is more likely to turn a blind eye to the repression of protesters, which is likely to increase as the system notches up its crackdown on dissent. A return to the status quo ante in Iraq is also now more likely. A new government may be elected. It may include more technocratic politicians in a nod to the protestors, but the pro-Iranian faction has fortified its position as kingmaker. Meanwhile, Sadr has decided that reform should be postponed for a later day. Iraqis who have been camping out on the streets for nearly four months, risking their lives, are unlikely to be easily put down. Instead their frustrations will manifest in more aggressive forms, such as through violence and the sabotage of infrastructure. Saudi Arabia may or may not seek to interfere in Iraq to maintain the pressure on Iranian interests. If it does so, it risks escalating the situation and provoking retaliation from Iran. Iraqi efforts to force a US troop withdrawal will clash with US interests. President Trump wants to reduce commitments but does not want to risk anything remotely resembling a Saigon-style evacuation during an election year. As such, some form of sanctions against Iraq is possible. The US administration may pass up imposing sanctions on oil sales and instead target USD flows to Iraq’s central bank. Blocking or reducing access to Iraqi accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York – to which all revenues from Iraqi oil sales are directed – would debilitate the economy and amplify the risk to stability and hence oil flows. Washington’s decision whether to renew waivers allowing Iraq to import Iranian gas – set to expire mid-February – will signal whether the events earlier this year changed the US’s calculus. Iraq is extremely dependent on Iranian gas to generate power. A decision not to extend the waivers would cause greater friction between the Iraqi street and the ruling elite.8 Bottom Line: Baghdad is getting dragged deeper into chaos. Alignment with Iran, and delays in government formation and economic reform, will aggravate tensions between the street and the political class. Dissent may take on more violent forms going forward. Middle Eastern oil supply will remain vulnerable to instability and sabotage in Iraq and the broader Persian Gulf. Investment Conclusions In the very near term we expect US equities to encounter headwinds due to the over extension of the rally and immediate risks from the US election cycle. We also see global risk appetite suffering due to US uncertainty, as well as to fears about the new coronavirus. These may reach a crescendo in the wake of Chinese New Year travel season. However, China’s stimulative policy trajectory will ultimately be reinforced due to the economic threat from the outbreak. And China’s economy is showing signs of rebounding. This reinforces our constructive view on the global business cycle overall, on commodities, and on select emerging markets that produce oil or are undertaking structural reforms. The US-Iran conflict is ongoing and we expect it to continue injecting a risk premium into oil markets. The two sides are effectively playing Russian roulette.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The IRGC and bonyads – para-governmental organizations that provide funding for groups supporting the Islamic Republic – have access to subsidies, favorable contracts, and cheap loans. Together they run a considerable part of the economy. 2 Questions Loom In Iran As Reformist Factions Lose Hope In Elections," dated January 23, 2020, available at en.radiofarda.com. 3 In an interview with Fars news agency in June 2019, Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, a prominent member of the Assembly of Experts, mentioned that a committee of three members from the Assembly of Experts were working on a list of prospective supreme leaders, which they will present to the full AE when necessary. Please see "Is Iran’s Next Supreme Leader Already Chosen?," dated June 18, 2019, available at en.radiofarda.com. 4 Please see "Ebrahim Raisi: The Cleric Who Could End Iranian Hopes For Change," dated January 5, 2019, available at aljazeera.com. 5 Please see “A Right-Wing Loyalist, Sadeq Larijani, Gains More Power in Iran,” dated January 8, 2019, available at atlanticcouncil.org. 6 Mohsen Kadivar, an unorthodox cleric who was forced to flee Iran due to his political views, and is now an instructor at Duke University is a critic of the system of Velayet-e Faqih, or clerical rule. He claims that since the death of Khomeini, a majority of Iran’s religious scholars hold a “secretive belief” that supreme clerical rule should be abolished as it only leads to despotism. 7 In response to Sadr’s call for a “million man march”, Ayatollah al-Sistani repeated his warning against “those who seek to exploit the protests that call for reforms to achieve certain goals that will hurt the primary interests of the Iraqi people and are not in line with their true values.” 8 The last time Iran reduced electricity exports to Iraq resulted in mass protests in Iraq in July 2018. Thus if the sanction waivers are not renewed the cutoff of gas risks a greater clash between the Iraqi street and government, especially during the hot summer months.

Highlights Global growth is poised to accelerate this year, although the spread of the coronavirus could dampen spending in the very short term. History suggests that the likelihood of a recession rises when unemployment falls to very low levels. Three channels have been proposed to explain why that is: 1) Low unemployment can prompt households and businesses to overextend themselves, making the economy more fragile; 2) Faster wage growth stemming from a tight labor market can compress profit margins, leading to less capital spending and hiring; 3) Shrinking spare capacity can fuel inflation, forcing central banks to raise rates. The first channel is highly relevant for some smaller, developed economies where housing bubbles have formed and household debt has reached very high levels. However, it is not an immediate concern in the US, Japan, and most of the euro area. We would downplay the importance of the second channel, as faster wage growth is also likely to raise aggregate demand and incentivize firms to increase capital spending on labor-saving technologies. The third channel poses the greatest long-term risk, but is unlikely to be market-relevant this year. Investors should remain bullish on global equities over the next 12-to-18 months. A more prudent stance will be warranted starting in the second half of 2021. Global Equities: Sticking With Bullish Global equities are vulnerable to a short-term correction after having gained 16% since their August lows. Nevertheless, we continue to maintain a positive outlook on stocks for the next 12 months due to our expectation that global growth will gather steam over the course of the year. The latest data on global manufacturing activity has generally been supportive of our constructive thesis. The New York Fed Manufacturing PMI beat expectations, while the Philly Fed PMI jumped nearly 15 points to the highest level in eight months. The business outlook (six months ahead) component of the Philly Fed index rose to its best level since May 2018. European manufacturing should also improve this year. Growth expectations for Germany in the ZEW index surged in January, rising to the highest level since July 2015 (Chart 1). The Sentix and IFO indices have also moved higher. Encouragingly, euro area car registrations rose by 22% year-over-year in December. In the UK, business confidence in the CBI survey of manufacturers surged from -44 in Q3 of 2019 to +23 in Q4, the largest increase in the 62-year history of the survey. Fiscal stimulus and diminished risk of a disorderly Brexit should also bolster growth this year. Chart 1Some Green Shoots Emerging In The Euro Area Chart 2EM Asia Is Rebounding The manufacturing and trade data in Asia have been improving. Following last week’s better Chinese trade data, Korean exports recovered on a rate-of-change basis for a fourth month in a row. Japanese exports to China increased for the first time since last February. In Taiwan, industrial production increased by more than expected in December, as did export orders. Our EM Asia Economic Diffusion Index has risen to the highest level since October 2018 (Chart 2). Coronavirus: Nothing To Sneeze At? The outbreak of the coronavirus represents a potential short-term threat to the budding global economic recovery. Conceptually, outbreaks can affect the economy in two ways. One, they can reduce demand by curtailing spending on travel, entertainment, restaurants, or anything that requires close proximity to others. Two, they can reduce supply by causing people to avoid going to work. In practice, the first effect usually dominates the second. As a result, such outbreaks tend to have a deflationary impact. The Brookings Institution estimates that the 2003 SARS epidemic shaved about one percentage point from Chinese growth that year.1 The fact that this outbreak is happening during the Chinese New Year celebrations, when over 400 million people will be on the move, has the potential to exacerbate the transmission of the virus, and in the process, amplify the economic damage. That said, while it is from the same class of zoonotic viruses, early indications suggest that this particular strain is less lethal than SARS. In addition, the Chinese authorities have moved faster to address the risks than they did during the SARS outbreak. The government has effectively quarantined Wuhan, a city of 11 million people, where the virus appears to have originated. They have also sequenced the virus and shared the information with the global medical community. This has allowed the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to develop a test for the virus, which is likely to become available over the coming weeks. The Dark Side Of Low Unemployment Provided the coronavirus outbreak is contained, stronger global growth should continue to soak up lingering labor market slack. This raises the question of whether, at some point, declining unemployment could become counterproductive. The outbreak of the coronavirus represents a potential short-term threat to the budding global economic recovery. The unemployment rate in the OECD currently stands at 5.1%, below the low of 5.5% set in 2007 (Chart 3). In the US, the unemployment rate has dropped to a 50-year low. Chart 3Unemployment Rates Are Below Their Pre-Crisis Lows In Most Economies No one would deny that the decline in unemployment since the financial crisis has been a welcome development. However, it does carry one major risk: Historically, the likelihood of a recession has risen when unemployment has fallen to very low levels (Chart 4). Chart 4Recessions Become More Likely When The Labor Market Begins To Overheat Three channels have been proposed to explain this positive correlation: 1) Low unemployment can prompt households and businesses to overextend themselves, making the economy more fragile; 2) Faster wage growth stemming from a tight labor market can compress profit margins, leading to less capital spending and hiring; 3) Shrinking spare capacity can fuel inflation.  This can force central banks to raise rates, choking off growth. Let’s examine each in turn. Unemployment And Irrational Exuberance Chart 5Growing Housing Imbalances In Some Economies A strong economy promotes risk-taking. While some risk-taking is essential for capitalism, an excessive amount can lead to the buildup of imbalances, thereby setting the stage for an eventual downturn. In Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Scandinavian economies, the combination of low interest rates and strong economic growth has stoked debt-fueled housing bubbles (Chart 5, panel 3). As we discussed last week, higher interest rates in those economies could sow the seeds for economic distress.2 In most other countries, financial imbalances are not severe enough to trigger recessions. Chart 6 shows that the private-sector financial balance – the difference between what the private sector earns and spends – still stands at a healthy surplus of 3.4% of GDP in advanced economies. In 2007, the private-sector financial balance fell to 0.4% in advanced economies, reaching a deficit of 2% in the US. The private-sector balance also deteriorated sharply in the lead-up to the 2001 recession (Chart 7). Chart 6The Private Sector Spends Less Than It Earns In Most Economies Chart 7The Private-Sector Surplus Is Larger Than It Was Before The End Of Previous Expansions   In the US, the personal savings rate has risen to nearly 8%, much higher than one would expect based on the level of household net worth (Chart 8). Despite growing at around 2.5% in 2018/19, real personal consumption has increased at a slower pace than predicted by the level of consumer confidence. This suggests that households have maintained a fairly prudent disposition. Consistent with this, the ratio of household debt-to-disposable income has declined by 32 percentage points since 2008. Chart 8Households Are Saving More Than One Would Expect Granted, some credit categories have seen large increases (Chart 9). Student debt has risen to 9% of disposable income. Auto loans have moved back to their pre-recession highs. We would not worry too much about the former, as the vast majority of student debt is guaranteed by the government. Auto loans are more of a concern. However, it is important to keep in mind that the auto loan market is less than one-sixth as large as the mortgage market. Moreover, after loosening lending standards for vehicle loans between 2011 and 2016, banks have since tightened them. This adjustment appears to be largely complete. Lending standards did not tighten any further in the latest Senior Loan Officer Survey, while demand for auto loans rose at the fastest pace in two years. The share of auto loans falling into delinquency has been trending lower, which suggests that delinquency rates are peaking (Chart 10). Chart 9US Household Debt Levels Have Fallen, Despite Increases in Student And Auto Loans Chart 10Auto Loans: Monitoring Trends In Credit Standards And Delinquency Rates Lastly, we would point out that despite all the hoopla over the state of the auto market, auto loan asset-backed securities have performed well (Chart 11). While default rates have risen, lenders have generally set interest rates high enough to absorb incoming losses. Chart 11Securitized Auto Loans Have Performed Well Will Falling Profit Margins Derail The Expansion? Profit margins usually peak a few years before the onset of a recessions (Chart 12, top panel). This has led some to speculate that falling margins could usher in a recession by curbing companies’ willingness to hire workers and invest in new capacity. Chart 12A Peak In Profit Margins: An Ominous Sign? While it is an interesting theory, it does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Surveys of business sentiment clearly show that capital spending intentions are positively correlated with plans to raise wages (Chart 13, left panel). Far from cutting capital expenditures in response to rising wages, firms are more likely to boost capex if they are also planning to increase labor compensation.  Chart 13AFaster Wage Growth, Increased Hiring, And More Capex Go Hand In Hand (I) Chart 13BFaster Wage Growth, Increased Hiring, And More Capex Go Hand In Hand (II) One reason for this is that rising wages make automation more attractive. By definition, automation requires more capital spending. However, that is not the entire story because firms also tend to hire more workers during periods when wage growth is rising (Chart 13, right panel). This implies that a third factor – strong economic growth – is responsible for both accelerating wages and rising hiring intentions. The fact that real business sales are strongly correlated with both employment growth and nonresidential investment is evidence for this claim (Chart 12, bottom panel). Falling Margins: A Symptom Of A Problem The discussion above suggests that faster wage growth is unlikely to dissuade firms from either hiring more workers or boosting capital spending. Indeed, the opposite is probably true: Since workers normally spend more of every dollar of income than firms do, an increase in the share of national income flowing to workers will lift aggregate demand. So why do profit margins usually peak before recessions? The answer is that declining labor market slack tends to push up unit labor costs, forcing central banks to hike interest rates in an effort to stave off rising inflation. Thus, falling margins are just a symptom of an underlying problem: economic overheating. Don’t blame lower margins for recessions. Blame central banks. Inflation Is Not A Threat... Yet For now, unit labor cost inflation remains reasonably well contained in the major economies (Chart 14). However, there is little evidence to suggest that the historic relationship between labor market slack and wage growth has broken down (Chart 15). Barring a major surge in productivity growth, inflation is likely to accelerate eventually as companies try to pass on higher labor costs to their customers. Chart 14AUnit Labor Costs Are Well Behaved For Now (I) Chart 14BUnit Labor Costs Are Well Behaved For Now (II)       Chart 15Correlation Between Labor Market Slack And Wage Growth Remains Intact We do not know exactly when such a price-wage spiral will emerge. Inflation is a notoriously lagging indicator (Chart 16). Our best guess is that inflation could become a serious risk for investors in late 2021 or 2022. Thus, investors should remain overweight global equities for the next 12-to-18 months, but be prepared to turn more cautious in the second half of 2021.  Chart 16Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1   Jong-Wha Lee and Warwick J. McKibbin, “Globalization and Disease: The Case of SARS,” Brookings Institution, dated February 2004. 2  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Bond Yields: How High Is Too High?” dated January 17, 2020.   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades