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Highlights The yield advantage behind the dollar bull market since 2011 has completely evaporated. This has unhinged one of the final pillars of dollar support.  However, there is also a shifting paradigm in currency markets as nominal rates have hit zero –  the highest real rates can now be found in defensive currencies, where deflation is more pervasive. Most cyclical currencies are still sporting very negative real rates. In such a world, the most appropriate strategy is a barbell – overweighting the cheapest currencies, like the NOK and SEK, along with some defensives like the JPY. Trades at the crosses also make sense. We added a long CAD/NZD trade to our basket last week. Stick with it. Eventually, when a full-fledged dollar bear market becomes more apparent, the barbell strategy will have performed much better than a short DXY position. Feature Chart I-1Our Trading Model Is Bearish The Dollar Trading the foreign exchange markets can be complex and very humbling. That said, there are still some simple strategies that have consistently delivered excess returns over time. Regular readers of our bulletin are familiar with our framework based on three main vectors: the macroeconomic environment, valuation, and sentiment. Over time, a three-factor model based on these vectors has outperformed a buy-and-hold strategy for the majority of developed market currency pairs (Chart I-1).1 Within the model, an equal weight is assigned to all three factors, but the reality is that the most important variable to figure out is what the macro landscape will look like over a cyclical horizon. More often than not, the macro framework rather than valuation or sentiment is more important in timing turning points in currency markets. Over time, this can be a very potent source of alpha. Currencies, Inflation, And Real Rates Our starting point for figuring out the macro  environment is to go back to the four-quadrant chart splitting inflation and growth with the performance of currencies (Chart I-2). Two key observations stand out: Early on in any cycle, the dollar depreciates across most currencies. This is when growth is improving but inflation is still weak, allowing for very easy global monetary settings. As the cycle matures and deflationary pressures set in, a bullish dollar strategy is an absolute winner. In between an upcycle and a downturn, the performance of the dollar is more ambiguous. Trades at the crosses tend to do well in this environment. Chart I-2The Dollar, Fed, And Business Cycles The next step is to figure out which environment are we in today. An upturn is typically characterized by easy monetary settings and improving growth but weak inflation. This ensures the monetary impulse for growth remains at full throttle. The US dollar declines in this environment because the growth impulse is usually higher elsewhere, since the US has a lower manufacturing base. Early on in any cycle, the dollar depreciates across most currencies.  One way to figure out if we are early in the cycle is from the bond market. Early in the cycle, the cost of capital is well below the return on capital. This is the case for the US, where the NY Fed’s neutral rate estimate is well above the fed funds rate. Unsurprisingly, this correlates quite well with the yield curve, suggesting borrowing to invest makes sense. In the same vein, most economic leading indicators are perking up (Chart I-3). Given that inflation is not a problem today, the next key driver for currencies will be what happens to real growth. The yield advantage behind the dollar bull market since 2011 has completely evaporated. However, there is also a shifting paradigm in currency markets as nominal rates have hit zero – the highest real rates are now being found in defensive currencies (Chart I-4). For that to change, real rates have to rise in cyclical markets. The evidence so far is encouraging: Chart I-3Cost Of Capital Is Less Than Return On Capital Chart I-4Higher Real Rates In Switzerland And Japan   Relative PMIs outside the US are picking up faster than within the US (Chart I-5). In the euro zone, the improvement in the expectations component of the surveys are pointing to a very significant recovery in the PMIs in the months ahead (Chart I-6). China is stimulating aggressively. This is very potent fuel for domestic demand as well as global trade (Chart I-7).   Chart I-5Growth Is Outperforming Outside The US Chart I-6Eurozone Green Shoots Chart I-7China Green Shoots A pickup in real growth outside the US should improve bond yields in cyclical economies, encouraging flows into their capital markets. As we posited last week, an important component of these flows will also be into their equity markets, making the value-versus-growth debate very important for currencies.2 Coming back to our model, the main input into the macroeconomic component is real interest rate differentials. From this lens, the message so far is to remain long defensive currencies like the Swiss franc and Japanese yen that have the highest real rates. Measuring Value Chart I-8US Dollar Is Overvalued The macroeconomic component is only one of three factors – valuation and sentiment being equally important. Over the years, our team has compiled a swath of valuation models, which we follow quite closely. For the purposes of a simple framework, we stuck to purchasing power parity (PPP) when building out the valuation component. PPP is a very poor tool for managing currencies over the short term, but an excellent one at extremes. We have enhanced the computation to adjust for a few roadblocks that have proved crucial in adding value. Consumer price baskets tend to differ in composition from one country to the next. In order to get closer to an apples-to-apples comparison across countries, an adjustment is necessary. This includes creating a synthetic price basket that looks at a very similar basket of goods and services across countries. If, for example, shelter is 33% in the US CPI basket but 19% in the Swedish CPI basket, relative shelter prices will represent 26% of the combined price ratio. This allows for a uniform cross-sectional comparison, as opposed to using the national CPI weights. The US dollar is overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, British pound, and Norwegian krone.  The results show the US dollar as overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, British pound, and Norwegian krone. Commodity currencies are closer to fair value, and within the safe-haven complex, the Japanese yen is more attractive than the Swiss franc (Chart I-8). Using this valuation framework, long-term returns have been compelling. The bottom line is that while most cyclical currencies are still sporting very negative real rates, some are very undervalued from a cyclical perspective. This suggests the discount already accounts for negative real rates. Timing The Turning Point Turning points in foreign exchange markets tend to be most visible via capital flows. This makes the sentiment component of our model quite important. The nascent upturn in a few growth indicators is coinciding with an outperformance of value relative to growth and cyclicals versus defensive stocks. As we mentioned last week, it is an important signal to watch for currencies. Three ratios hold the key in determining when the dollar capitulates: The total return of US bonds versus gold, the USD/CNY exchange rate, and the gold-to-silver ratio (GSR). The  rationale for the three is as follows: As the Fed continues to increase the supply of bonds, the ratio of the US bond ETF (TLT)-to-gold (GLD) will be an important proxy for investor sentiment on the dollar. One of the functions of money is as a store of value, and gold remains a viable threat to dollar liabilities. Foreigners already have been stampeding out of US bond markets. A falling ratio will suggest domestic private investors are dumping their holdings in exchange for precious metals (Chart I-9). As geopolitical tensions between the US and China mount, the USD/CNY exchange rate will become the key arbiter between two dollars: one versus emerging markets and the other versus developed markets. So far, the USD/CNY is depreciating, suggesting dollar liquidity is providing a blanket cover over other ancillary issues. Finally, the gold-to-silver ratio correlates well with the dollar. Gold does well when there is financial stress in the system, forcing the Fed to undermine the value of the dollar through massive dollar supply injections. Silver does well when entities take advantage of cheap dollar funding to finance higher-return projects. It is a timely indicator about the liquidity-to-growth transmission mechanism (Chart I-10). Importantly, the new economy, technology, and clean energy industries are significant  buyers of silver . These industries are also cheaper outside the US, as we posited last week. Chart I-9Watch The Bond-To-Gold Ratio Chart I-10Watch The Gold-To-Silver Ratio In short, the huge directional indicator for the dollar bear market will be a crash in the GSR. This will act as both confirmation that the dollar bear market is full-fledged and that the tug-of-war between growth and liquidity is over. We have been highlighting this trade in recent months as one of our high-conviction calls. The sentiment component of our FX trading model uses a more traditional approach. As a momentum currency, signals like death crosses or bombed-out rates of change are potent. With the dollar in freefall, the signal is to keep selling. While it is true that speculators are already short, they were also long during most of the dollar bull market from 2011. Housekeeping Our currency strategy remains the barbell – overweighting the cheapest currencies like the NOK and SEK, along with some defensives like the JPY. Eventually, when a full-fledged dollar bear market becomes more apparent, the barbell strategy will have performed much better than an outright short DXY position. Our FX model, highlighted on the first page, suggests this will be the case. We have some trades at the crosses that are dollar-agnostic. These include short EUR/NOK, EUR/SEK and NZD/CAD. The macro landscape remains fraught with uncertainties, so we have some trades at the crosses that are dollar-agnostic. These include short EUR/NOK, EUR/SEK and NZD/CAD. Being long petrocurrencies versus the euro is also a nice carry trade. Finally, we were stopped out of our long cable position this week for a small profit of 2.4%. GBP has been one of our favorite contrarian trades, having booked 9.6% profits being long versus the yen last year. Volatility brings opportunity, and we will look to reestablish longs in the coming weeks.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report , "Introducing An FX Trading Model", dated April 24, 2020. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report , "Currencies And The Value-Vs Growth Debate", dated July 10, 2020. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mostly positive: Headline consumer price inflation increased from 0.1% to 0.6% year-on-year in June. Core inflation was unchanged at 1.2% year-on-year. The NFIB business optimism index increased from 94.4 in May to 100.6. The NY Empire State manufacturing index surged from -0.2 to 17.2 in July. Producer prices fell by 0.8% year-on-year in June. Initial jobless claims increased by 1300K for the week ended July 10th. The DXY index fell by 0.7% this week. Risk sentiment continues to improve with higher hopes for vaccine and the reopening of economies. The Fed’s Beige Book released this Wednesday shows that economic activities are recovering in a lot of districts though well below pre-COVID-19 levels. It is remarkable that retail sales surged, led by a rebound in vehicle sales and home improvement purchases. Report Links: DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 Cycles And The US Dollar - May 15, 2020 Capitulation? - April 3, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been improving: The ZEW economic sentiment index ticked up from 58.6 to 59.6 in July. Industrial production fell by 20.9% year-on-year in May, following a 28.7% contraction the previous month.  The trade balance surged from €1.6 billion to €8 billion in May. The euro appreciated by 1.1% against the US dollar this week. The ECB kept policy unchanged this week. As interest rate spreads between the core and periphery converge, the ECB’s work is done. We remain positive on the euro against the US dollar, though petrocurrencies and the British pound will likely outperform should our bet on high-beta currencies pan out. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: Industrial production plunged by 26.3% year-on-year in May, following a 25.9% contraction the previous month. Capacity utilization continued to fall by 11.6% year-on-year in May. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The BoJ maintained its interest rate at -0.1% on Tuesday and made no changes to its asset purchase program. While Governor Haruhiko Kuroda warned the outlook remains highly uncertain (including downgrading the economic forecast for 2020), he sounded conciliatory to the fact that fiscal policy might be needed to boost Japanese demand. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been mixed: The total trade surplus widened from £2.3 billion to £4.3 billion in May, boosted by a 6.6% jump in goods sales. Retail sales surged by 10.9% yearly in June. Both headline and core inflation increased to 0.6% and 1.4% year-on-year, respectively in June. The unemployment stayed flat at 3.9% in May. Average earnings fell by 0.3% year-on-year in the 3 months to May. However, industrial production fell by 20% year-on-year in May. The British pound was flat against the US dollar this week. The UK economy contracted by 19.1% in the three months to May, according to ONS data. GDP grew by 1.8% month-on-month in May alone, but this is still 25% below the February level. On the positive side, NIESR forecasts that the UK economy is likely to recover by 8-10% in the third quarter of 2020. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been positive: NAB business confidence increased from -20 to 1 in June. The business conditions index also jumped from -24 to -7. New home sales surged by 87.2% month-on-month in May. Employment increased by 210.8K in June, with an increase of 249K part-time jobs and a loss of 38.1K full-time jobs. The Australian dollar appreciated by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. The latest Labor Force Survey shows positive developments in recent months. While the unemployment rate ticked up slightly, both the underemployment rate and underutilisation rate declined by 1.4% and 1%, respectively in June. Moreover, the participation rate increased by 1.3% to 64%. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative:  Visitor arrivals plunged in May amid the global pandemic. ANZ monthly inflation gauge fell from 2.8% year-on-year to 2.4% year-on-year in June. Headline consumer price inflation slowed from 2.5% to 1.5% year-on-year in Q2. The New Zealand dollar fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. As we mentioned in last week’s report, the government’s effort to limit the spread of COVID-19 and curb immigration will hurt New Zealand’s labor market. The “Migration after COVID-19” released by NZIER this week also implied more restrictive immigration policy going forward. Stay short NZD/CAD. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been positive: In June, the unemployment rate declined from 13.7% to 12.3%. The participation rate also increased from 61.4% to 63.8%. Manufacturing sales surged by 10.7% month-on-month in May, following a 27.9% decline the previous month. The Canadian dollar appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. On Wednesday, the BoC kept its benchmark interest rate unchanged, as widely expected. BoC’s new Governor Tiff Macklem said that “it’s going to be a long climb out” and implied that interest rates are likely to stay unusually low for a long time. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been negative: Producer and import prices declined by 3.5% year-on-year in June, following a 4.5% contraction the previous month. Total sight deposit continued to increase from CHF 687 billion to CHF 688.6 billion for the week ended July 10th. The Swiss franc fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. In a speech this Tuesday, SNB Chairman Thomas Jordan said that the current policy in place since 2015 is unlikely to change anytime soon. He also acknowledged that the SNB had intervened in the FX market more strongly in recent months to ease upward pressure on the franc amid the global pandemic. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been mixed: Headline consumer prices increased by 1.4% year-on-year in June. Core inflation surged by 3.1% year-on-year in June, the highest since August 2016. Producer prices fell by 14.4% year-on-year in June, following a 17.5% contraction the previous month.  The trade deficit widened from NOK1.2 billion to NOK10.2 billion in June. Exports fell by 15.6% year-on-year while imports rose by 10%, with a surge in food and manufactured goods purchases. The Norwegian krone increased by 2% against the US dollar this week. While the Norwegian krone has rebounded by 22% since the March lows, it is still 7-10% cheaper compared with pre-COVID-19 levels. Our bias is that the Norwegian krone still has tremendous room to run towards its fair value. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Headline consumer price inflation rose to 0.7% year-on-year in June, from -0.4% in April. Food and non-alcoholic beverages inflation slowed from 3.9% year-on-year the previous month but remained high at 2.6% year-on-year in June. The Swedish krona jumped by 2% against the US dollar this week on the back of positive inflation data. A bit less than the Norwegian krone, the Swedish krona has increased by 13% since its March lows but is still far below the value prior to COVID-19. We maintain a positive stance towards both NOK and SEK. Our Nordic basket is now 11% in the money. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
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Special Report Dear Client, Next Monday, July 20, we will be hosting our quarterly webcast, one at 10am EST for our US and EMEA clients and one at 9pm for our Asia Pacific, Australia and New Zealand clients; our regular weekly publication will resume on Monday July 27, 2020. Kind Regards, Anastasios Highlights A Democratic sweep would not prevent the stock market from grinding higher over the 12 months after the election. With this year’s massive stimulus, this cyclical view is reinforced. Whether Biden governs as a centrist or a left-winger will depend not on Biden’s preferences but on whether Republicans have a majority in the Senate to constrain the Democratic Party. But the party that wins the White House is highly likely to win the Senate in this cycle. Investors should expect Biden to govern from the left. A Biden presidency would lead to negative surprises on regulation, taxes, health care, trade, energy, and tech. Democrats would remove the Senate filibuster. Yet the macro agenda is reflationary. A blue trifecta would dent S&P 500 profit margins and take a bite out of EPS in 2022. Small caps will also likely suffer at the margin versus mega caps. While select Tech Titans are exposed to a blue sweep regulatory shock, the broad technology sector will prove to be more resilient especially compared with banks and health care equities. Feature Online political betting markets are still not fully pricing our “Blue Wave” scenario for the US election this year. The odds are closer to 50%-55% than 35%. Hence the equity market, especially the NASDAQ, is complacent about rising political risks to US equity sectors (Chart 1). The immediate risk to the rally is not politics but the pandemic, namely the COVID-19 resurgence in the United States, which is causing governors of major states like Texas, California, and Florida to slow down the economic reopening. The US’s failure to limit the spread of the virus has not yet led to a spike in deaths in aggregate, but it is leading to a spike in major states like Texas and Florida (Chart 2). Deaths are ultimately what matter to politicians and financial markets, since governments will not shut down all of society for less-than-lethal ailments. Fear will weigh on consumer and business confidence, including fear of a deadly second wave this winter. Near-term risks to the equity rally are elevated. Chart 1Blue Wave Expected, Equities Unconcerned Chart 2COVID-19 Outbreak Still A Risk Beyond this risk, the driver of the cyclical rally is the gargantuan monetary and fiscal stimulus – and more is on the way. President Trump wants another $2 trillion coronavirus relief package, while House Democrats already passed a $3 trillion package to demonstrate their election platform that government should take a greater role in American life. Senate Republicans (and reportedly Vice President Mike Pence) want a smaller $1 trillion bill but will capitulate in the face of a growing outbreak and any financial turmoil. Congress is highly likely to pass a new relief bill before going on recess on August 10. If COVID-19 causes another swoon in financial markets and the economy, then this congressional timeline will accelerate. America’s total fiscal stimulus for 2020 is rapidly approaching 20% of GDP, or 7% of global GDP (Chart 3). Thus it is understandable that the market has not reacted negatively to an impending blue wave election. Bipartisan reflation is overwhelming the Democratic Party’s market-negative agenda of re-regulation, tax hikes, minimum wage hikes, energy curbs, price caps, and anti-trust probes. Moreover the Democrats’ agenda also includes social and infrastructure spending, cheap immigrant labor, and less hawkish trade policy ex-China, which are all reflationary. Chart 3US Stimulus Greater Than Global – And Rising In short, over the next year, the US is not lurching from massive stimulus to a mid-term election that imposes budget controls and “austerity,” as occurred in 2010, but rather from massive stimulus to a likely Democratic sweep that will be fiscally profligate (Charts 4A & 4B). After all, Democrats are openly flirting with modern monetary theory. Chart 4ADeficits Would Soar Under Democrats Chart 4BDemocrats Would Be Ultra-Dovish On Fiscal Debt monetization is the big change, regardless of the election, which makes investors cyclically bullish. China is also bound to provide massive fiscal-and-credit stimulus because its first recession since the 1970s is threatening the Communist Party’s source of legitimacy (Chart 5). The European Union is uniting under a banner of joint debt issuance to fend off deflation. Bottom Line: Near-term risks to the exuberant post-lockdown rally abound, but the cyclical view remains constructive due to the ultimate policymaker stimulus put. Chart 5China Loosens Credit And Fiscal Taps Pre-Election Volatility And Post-Election Equity Returns Volatility normally rises ahead of US elections and it could linger in the aftermath given extreme polarization and the risk of vote recounts, contested results, Supreme Court interventions, and refusals by either candidate to concede. This is a concern in the short run but not the long run. US equities will grind higher over the long run regardless of the election outcome. Stocks normally rise by 10% in the 12 months after a presidential election that yields single-party control, though the upside is smaller and the initial downside is bigger than is the case with a gridlocked government (Chart 6, top panel). In cases of gridlock – which is virtually assured if Trump wins – the equity pullback after the election is just as deep but tends to be later in coming. On average stocks rise by the same amount after 12 months in either case (Chart 6, bottom panel). Thus political risks are primarily relevant in their regional or sectoral effects, though investors should take note that a Democratic sweep probably limits next year’s upside. Chart 6Equities Have Less Upside Under Democratic Sweep There are two likely scenarios. The first is the risk that President Trump makes a historic comeback and wins re-election, with Republicans retaining the Senate. Subjectively we put Trump’s odds at 35% though our quantitative model suggests they could be as high as 44%. The second scenario is our base case that the Democratic Party wins the Senate as well as the White House. In this scenario, the Democrats will prove more left-wing and anti-corporate than the market currently expects. Bottom Line: A Democratic sweep would not prevent the stock market from grinding higher over the 12 months after the election. With this year’s massive stimulus, this cyclical view is reinforced. However, history shows that a clean sweep limits the market’s upside risk. And full Democratic rule entails major political risks that have a regional and sectoral character. Biden And The Blue Wave Our expectation of a blue sweep is not based only in polling – which is uniformly disastrous for Trump as we go to press – but in the surge in unemployment. The basis for investors to view Biden as a risk-on candidate is driven by the macro and market views outlined above, not political fundamentals. From the political point of view, Biden may prefer to govern as a centrist, but victory in the Senate would remove constraints on his party’s domestic agenda. He would move to the left. Indeed, a Democratic sweep would mark a paradigm shift in domestic economic policy that is negative for corporate profits and the capital share of national income. It would unleash pent-up ideological and generational forces in favor of redistributing wealth and restructuring the economy. Progressivism would have the tendency to overshoot and create negative surprises for investors (Chart 7). Unlike 2008-10, when Republicans were last out of power, Republicans this time would be divided over Trump and populism and would be unlikely to recuperate as quickly. Chart 7Democratic Party Would Focus On Inequality Biden would end up governing to the left of the Obama administration, promoting Big Government while restricting Big Business and re-regulating Wall Street banks. A sharp leftward turn would be in keeping with the trend in the Democratic Party and the generational shift in the electorate (Chart 8). Only if Republicans pull off a surprise and keep the Senate despite losing the White House (~10% chance) would Biden be forced to govern as a true centrist. Even then Biden would oversee a large re-regulation of the economy through executive powers alone (Chart 9).1 Chart 8Generational Shift Favors Wealth Redistribution Chart 9Biden Would Re-Regulate The Economy Additional reasons to expect a left-wing policy overshoot:  · Presidents tend to succeed in passing their initial legislative priority after an election. This is incontrovertible when they control both chambers of Congress, as Obama showed in 2009 and Trump showed in 2017.2 · Biden will have huge tailwinds. He will not be launching a new agenda so much as restoring a policy status quo in most cases (laws and agreements that Trump either revoked or refused to enforce). He will also benefit from majority popular opinion and support of the bureaucracy and media (Chart 10). · Biden and the Democrats will be even more determined not to “let a good crisis go to waste” after having witnessed the Obama administration’s frustrations the last time the party took over in a sweeping victory on the back of a national disaster. · Democrats will not hesitate to use the budget reconciliation process to pass their first priority legislation with a mere 51 votes in the Senate. This is how Trump passed the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA). This is also how progressive stalwart Howard Dean believed the party should have passed a public health insurance option in 2009. This means Biden will be capable of increasing the corporate tax rate higher than 28%, pass a minimum 15% tax rate for corporations, and raise the capital gains tax and individual taxes. Chart 10Popular Opinion Would Boost Biden Administration · Contrary to consensus, Democrats are likely to remove the filibuster in the Senate – enabling bills to pass with a simple majority rather than the 60/100 votes required to close off debate. Yes, some moderate Democrats have already spoken out against “going nuclear” and changing such a critical norm. But populism and polarization are the driving forces in US politics today and we would advise investors not to bet heavily on “norms.” If Republicans prove capable of obstructing major legislative initiatives in the Senate, then Democrats, remembering obstructionism in the Obama years, will go nuclear to enact their progressive agenda. This would mark a massive increase in uncertainty for investors on everything from taxes to wages to anti-trust laws. Bottom Line: Whether Biden governs as a centrist or a left-winger will depend not on Biden’s preferences but on whether Republicans have a majority in the Senate to constrain the Democratic Party. But the party that wins the White House is highly likely to win the Senate in this cycle. Investors should expect Biden to govern from the left. If Republicans are obstructionist, Democrats will remove the filibuster. Biden’s Legislative Priorities First, Biden would seek to restore and expand the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). The party has fixated on health care since 1992. Investors are complacent about Biden’s plan. A public health insurance option will be a major new progressive initiative that would undercut private health insurers over time (Chart 11). The bill will also impose caps on pharmaceutical prices and allow imports, reducing Big Pharma’s pricing power (Chart 12). Chart 11Health Insurers Will Be Undercut By Biden Public Option Investors are also complacent about taxation. Biden will pay for health care reform by partially repealing the Tax Cut and Jobs Act. He has proposed raising the corporate rate from 21% to 28%, but this could go higher and still fall well below the 35% that Trump inherited in 2017. Chart 12Big Pharma Faces Price Caps A rate above 28% would be a major negative surprise for financial markets and yet it is an obvious way for Democrats to raise much-needed revenue. Biden also intends to pass a 15% minimum tax that would hit large firms adept at paying lower effective taxes. Capital gains taxes and individual income taxes for high-earners could also rise by more than is expected (Table A1 in Appendix). Second, Biden will seek to offset the negative growth impact of falling stimulus and rising taxes by enacting large “Great Society” fiscal spending on infrastructure, the Green New Deal, education, and other non-defense discretionary spending (Table A2 in Appendix). Even defense spending will be largely kept flat due to rising geopolitical conflicts. As mentioned, this part of the agenda is reflationary, especially relative to a scenario in which fiscal largesse is normalized more rapidly by a Republican Senate. The redistribution effects would be marginally positive for household consumption, but marginally negative for corporate investment. On immigration, Biden will follow the Obama administration in pursuing a path to citizenship for “Dreamers” (illegal immigrants brought to the US as children) and taking executive action to allow more high-skilled workers and refugees, defer deportation of children and families, and reduce border security enforcement. There will be some constraints due to the risk of provoking another populist backlash, but comprehensive immigration reform is possible. This would be positive for potential GDP, agriculture, construction, and housing demand on the margin (Chart 13). On trade, Biden will have to steal some thunder back from Trump if he is to win the election and maintain the Rust Belt. He will concentrate his protectionist policy on China, while removing virtually all risk of a trade war with Europe, Mexico, or other partners. China may get a reprieve at first but Biden will ultimately prove hawkish (Chart 14). Investors are underrating the use of import duties to punish countries like China for carbon-intensive production. Chart 13Biden Lax Immigration Policy A Boon For Housing Biden will take a multilateral approach and restore international agreements that Trump revoked. Joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is not a massive change given that even Trump agreed to trade deals with Canada, Mexico, and Japan. But it is marginally positive for the US-friendly trade bloc while contributing to the US economic decoupling from China (Chart 15). Chart 14Watch Out, Biden Won’t Be Too Dovish On China In Office! Chart 15Biden Eliminates Risk Of Global Trade War Ex-China On foreign policy, Biden will face the ongoing US-China cold war. He will also seek to restore the Iranian nuclear deal of 2015. The removal of Iran risk is positive for European companies with a beachhead in Iran as well as for the euro more generally, since regional instability ultimately threatens the EMU with waves of refugees (Chart 16). Chart 16Biden Removes Tail-Risk Of Iran War Bottom Line: A Biden presidency will lead to negative surprises on regulation, taxes, health care, trade, energy, and tech. But Biden’s agenda is mostly reflationary in other respects. Blue Wave Equity Market And Sector Implications The most profound implication of a blue sweep of government is an SPX profit margin squeeze that will weigh heavily on EPS. Importantly, there are two clear avenues through which net profit margins will suffer: An increase in the corporate tax rate. A rise in labor’s share of national income. As a reminder these are two of the four primary profit margin drivers we discussed in detail in our “Peak Margins” Special Report last October (Chart 17). The other two are selling price inflation and generationally low interest rates. Odds are high that all four drivers are slated to dent S&P 500 margins. With regard to corporate tax rates, the mirror image of the one time fillip that SPX EPS enjoyed in 2018, owing to Trump’s 1.2% increase in fiscal thrust that year, is a drop in S&P 500 profits given that a Biden presidency will boost the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28% or higher. In early-December 2017 we posited that SPX EPS would jump 14% on the back of that fiscal easing package, which is very close to what actually materialized. Chart 18 compares S&P 500 EBIT growth with S&P 500 net profit growth. The 2018 delta hit a zenith of 16%. Chart 17Profit Margin Drivers Chart 18Spot Trump's Tax Cut Assuming a blue wave, the opposite would happen, i.e. net profit growth would suffer an 11% one-time contraction according to our calculations (Table 1). The bill would pass in 2021 and take effect in 2022. Importantly, Table 1 reveals that the hardest hit GICS1 sectors are real estate, tech and health care, and the ones faring the best are consumer staples, industrials and energy. Table 1What EPS Hit To Expect? Table 2S&P 600/S&P 500 Sector Comparison Table The second way SPX margins undergo a squeeze is via climbing labor costs. Labor costs have been increasing since 2008/09 (labor’s share of income shown inverted, second panel, Chart 17), coinciding with the apex of globalization (third panel, Chart 17). A Biden presidency would also more than double the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour for all workers over six years. These policies would take a bite out of corporate profits by knocking down profit margins. While S&P 500 EPS maybe recover back to trend near $162 in 2021, they would gap lower in 2022 which is not at all priced in sell side analysts’ EPS expectations of $186. A blue sweep would produce some other US equity sore spots. Small caps would suffer disproportionately compared with their large cap brethren as would banks, health care, and parts of tech (see below). Chart 19 shows that according to the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) survey, small and medium enterprise (SME) owners grew extremely concerned about higher taxes and red tape by the end of the Obama presidency. When President Trump got elected, he cut back these fears drastically. Today concerns about taxes and regulation are probing multi-decade lows, which implies that SMEs are not prepared for the regulatory shock that a Biden administration has in store for them (Chart 19). These small business concerns will resurface with a vengeance if there is a blue sweep this November. The implication is that at the margin small caps would underperform their large cap peers, especially given that small cap indexes sport 1.5x the financials sector market cap weight compared with the SPX (Table 2). Bottom Line: A blue trifecta would dent S&P 500 profit margins and take a bite out of EPS in 2022. Small caps will also likely suffer at the margin versus mega caps as they will have to vehemently contend with rising red tape and taxes. Chart 19Re-Regulation Will Weigh On Small Business Sentiment Historical Parallel Of Blue Sweeps And Select Sector Performance A more detailed discussion on banks, health care, and technology sectors is in order, as they are the likeliest candidates to be at the forefront of Biden’s regulatory, wage, and tax policies. There are two recent episodes when US presidential elections resulted in a blue sweep, namely in 1992 and 2008. Both times, Democrats took control of both chambers of Congress and the White House but eventually surrendered this trifecta two years later during the 1994 and 2010 mid-term elections.3 Charts 20 & 21highlight the S&P banks, S&P health care, and S&P IT sectors’ performance during the last two blue waves. In both cases, banks remained flat to down; health care equities went down sharply; while tech stocks had mixed results. Tech took off in 1993-1994, but remained flat in 2009-2010 (excluding the recovery rally off the recessionary trough). Armed with this general roadmap, we now dive deeper into each of these three sectors for a more detailed discussion. Chart 20Not Everyone Is A Fan... Chart 21...Of The Blue Sweeps Banks Face High Risk Of Re-Regulation There is little doubt that Biden will re-regulate Wall Street, especially after the recent COVID-19-related watering down of the Dodd-Frank Act. Big banks are popular scapegoats. In fact, Biden already moved to the left on bankruptcy reform by adopting Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren’s progressive proposal after a long drawn-out battle over this issue between them. Both of the earlier blue wave elections proved challenging for the banking sector. In addition, banks are already under pressure from the recent Fed stress tests. There are high odds that a number of banks will further cut or suspend dividend payments in coming quarters in line with the Fed’s guidance, especially if profits take a big hit, as we expect. Currently, the market is underestimating the Biden threat to the banking sector as a substantial divergence has materialized between the banks’ relative performance and the blue sweep probability series (Chart 22). As the election draws closer, a repricing in the banking sector is likely looming. Chart 22Mind The Divergence Health Care Stands To Lose The Most From A Blue Sweep The health care sector was the only sector we analyzed that clearly underperformed in both 1992 and 2008 blue waves. Health care reform will be Biden’s top priority, as outlined above. Biden will also go after pharma manufacturers. As a reminder, while Medicare has substantial bargaining power with hospitals and other drug providers due to the number of Americans enrolled, it has no leverage when it comes to pharma manufacturers leaving them free to set prices at will. Biden intends to end such practices, enabling Medicare to bargain for prices. He also wants to link the rise in drug prices to inflation and allow foreign imports. These actions will put a cap on pharma manufacturers’ pricing power. Importantly, the S&P pharmaceuticals index is the dominant player within the S&P health care universe comprising 29% of the entire health care sector. A direct hit to pharma earnings will be a hard pill to swallow, especially if the S&P biotech index (comprising 17% of the S&P health care market cap weight) is included that are similar to Big Pharma as they manufacture blockbuster drugs. In fact, as the American electorate is getting more interested in Biden’s campaign, the market is pricing in a tougher environment for US pharmaceuticals (Chart 23). Markets can rely on the fact that Biden has rejected a single-payer government health system (“Medicare For All”) – this policy position helped him beat Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders for the Democratic nomination. However, he is proposing a public insurance option, which will have the ability to absorb losses indefinitely and will have the insurance regulators at its side. Thus private health insurers will be undercut. Chart 23Beginning Of The End A public option is also seen even by promoters as a “Trojan Horse” that will increase the odds that Democrats will move toward a single-payer system in 2024 or thereafter. Thus the risk/reward ratio skews further to the downside for the S&P health care sector. Will Technology Escape Unscathed? In the wake of COVID-19, and facing geopolitical competition in cyber space, a Biden administration will also seek a much stronger regulatory handle on Big Tech. Social media companies are already buttering up to the Democrats to ensure that Biden maintains the Obama administration’s alliance with Silicon Valley and does not pursue extensive anti-monopoly and anti-trust investigations. Yet the tech sector cannot avoid heightened scrutiny due to its conspicuous gains in the midst of an economic bust – this is what normally prompts anti-trust actions (Chart 24). The Democrats will pursue probes into data privacy and excessive market concentration and will demand stricter patrolling of the ideological space in battles that will be adjudicated by the courts. Chart 24How Much Is Too Much? Should the monopolistic tech stocks – including FB and GOOGL, which are now classified under the GICS1 S&P communication services index – be forced to sell their crown jewel assets, then a hit to earnings is a given. The S&P technology sector plus FB & GOOGL commands more than one third on the SPX index, meaning that a dent in tech earnings will have negative ramifications for the entire market. In previous research, we drew a parallel with the chemicals industry and the regulatory shock that came in 1976 when the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) was introduced.The bill pushed chemical stocks off the cliff as investments in the index became dead money for a whole decade – until 1985 when chemicals finally troughed (Chart 25) In the near future, a similar shock might come as a result of privacy-related regulation. A series of anti-monopoly or anti-trust probes, whether by the US or the EU, would make investors cautious about their tech exposure. While the probes may not result in a break-up, the heightened uncertainty would dampen the allure of tech stocks. The pattern of anti-trust probes in US history is that a probe first causes a selloff in the stock of the company investigated; then another selloff occurs when it is clear that a break-up is a real option under consideration; then a buying opportunity emerges either when the company is cleared or when the long dissolution process is completed. Bottom Line: While select Tech Titans are exposed to a blue sweep regulatory shock, the broad technology sector will prove to be more resilient especially compared with banks and health care equities. Chart 25Will History Rhyme?     Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Arseniy Urazov Research Associate arseniyu@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1Biden Would Raise $4 Trillion In Revenue Over Ten YearsTable A2Biden Would Spend $6 Trillion In Programs Over Ten Years   Footnotes 1     Republicans have 13 Senate seats at risk this cycle while Democrats have only four. More conservatively, Republicans have nine at risk while Democrats have two. Opinion polling has Democrats leading in seven out of nine top races, and tied in the other two – including states like Kansas where Democrats should have zero chance. Most of these races are tight enough that they will hinge on whether the election is a referendum on Trump. If so, Democrats will likely win the net three seats they need to control the chamber. Most likely they will have a 51-49 majority if Biden wins, though a 52-48 balance is possible.   2     The Republican failure to repeal and replace Obamacare in 2017 but success in passing the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reflects the fact that political constraints are higher on taking away an entitlement than they are on giving benefits (tax cuts). 3    As noted above, however, investors today cannot be assured that Republicans will come roaring back in 2022 to impose constraints. Trump’s populism threatens to divide the party if he loses and delay its ability to regroup and recover.  
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Highlights The bull market in US-Iran tensions was never resolved, and now a series of suspicious explosions in Iran raises the possibility that tensions will re-escalate. Iran’s interest lies in waiting out Trump so that a Democratic victory in the US election can restore the US-Iran strategic détente agreed in 2015. However, both the Trump administration and US ally Israel are applying “maximum pressure” on Iran and could go on the offensive at a time when Trump’s odds of re-election are collapsing. Israel cannot engage in a full-fledged war with Iran alone but it would have American backing for pressure tactics through the duration of Trump’s term. A “wag the dog” scenario is not inconceivable because the US and Israel have long-term national security interests at stake while Iran is on the verge of economic collapse. Investors should prepare for near-term global equity volatility and safe-haven demand for a number of reasons but a major escalation in Iran would add to the list. Stay long Brent crude oil. Feature Since May 2018 we have argued that US-Iran tensions will remain market-relevant. We downgraded the odds of US air strikes from 40% in June 2019 to 20% in January of this year after Iran’s lackluster retaliation to the US assassination of its top military commander. Now things are heating up again due to a series of extremely suspicious explosions in Iran that may or may not be linked to Israel and the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic, oil price rout, and global recession have reinforced this bull market in US-Iran tensions by weakening and destabilizing the entire Shia Crescent, from Lebanon to Iran. They have also pushed President Trump dangerously close to “lame duck” status, which reduces the constraints on conflict with Iran for the remainder of his term. In this report we update our Iran view by looking at whether the Trump administration or Israel could attempt to “wag the dog,” i.e. provoke a conflict with Iran to boost Trump’s re-election odds or achieve some long-term strategic objectives while Trump is still in power. We have long held the view that Iran poses a market-relevant geopolitical risk and now the mysterious attacks in Iran suggest it could be materializing. Nothing is confirmed, but it is wise for investors to monitor these developments in case they escalate. Geopolitical incidents often cause buying opportunities but they can create substantial equity drawdowns first. Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East A string of mysterious explosions and fires at military and economic facilities have rocked Iran in recent days (Table 1). Table 1Iran Hit By A String Of Mysterious Attacks The most significant of these incidents is the July 2 explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility – Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility, which houses a new centrifuge assembly center.1 The fire resulted in a significant setback to the development and production of advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges used to enrich uranium – by up to two years. Iranian officials initially downplayed the incidents as unsuspicious accidents. However the Natanz explosion was too significant to cast off. Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA declared that the Natanz incident may be the work of foreign countries, “especially the Zionist regime [Israel] and the US,” and vowed Iranian retaliation if sabotage is proven to be the case. Similarly, the New York Times reported that an anonymous Middle Eastern intelligence official – rumored to be Mossad chief Yossi Cohen – called the incident the work of Israel.2 Israel’s response to these allegations has been oblique, but the accusation is not far-fetched. Israel has a successful history of halting the advancement of nuclear programs in the region. Mossad’s Operation Opera destroyed Iraq’s only known nuclear facility in 1981, and Operation Outside the Box bombed a suspected nuclear reactor at the Kibar site in Syria in 2007. Israeli intelligence has also previously been accused of targeting Iran’s missile program – with the assassination of four Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2012. Israel is also believed to be involved, with the US, in Operation Olympic Games, the Stuxnet cyber attacks that stunted Iran’s uranium enrichment program circa 2010. Iran’s ballistic missile program and alleged nuclear weapons ambitions remain Israel’s greatest long-term strategic threat in the region. More recently, Iran and Israel have been locked in a series of cyber-attacks. Israel claims to have foiled an Iranian attack on its water facilities in April which attempted a cyber break on water control systems. A May 9 cyberattack on Iranian shipping hub Shahid Rajaae – through which half of Iran’s maritime trade traverses – is seen as Israeli retaliation. Most recently, Israel’s Mossad revealed that it thwarted Iranian attempts to attack Israeli diplomatic missions in Europe. These attacks come as the US increases pressure on UN Security Council members to support the indefinite extension of the UN arms embargo against Iran, which is scheduled to expire on October 18.3 But other signatories to the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement – China, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France – argue that since the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), its threat to invoke a “snapback” provision of the deal to reimpose former UN sanctions on Iran is not legally valid. The other JCPA signatories remain committed to the deal, arguing for its necessity in order to continue IAEA inspections that prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. They are biding their time to see if Trump is re-elected before deciding anything. Iran has moved further from the JCPA’s requirements since announcing, on January 5, 2020, that it will no longer comply with restrictions to its nuclear program (Table 2). The risk is that unless controlled, this will eventually significantly reduce Iran’s “breakout time” – the time required to acquire enough fissile material for one bomb. The nuclear deal aimed to maintain at least a one-year breakout time, and this is generally understood to be the US’s “red line.” Table 2Iran No Longer Complying With 2015 Nuclear Deal Despite some non-compliance, Iran is still permitting IAEA inspectors to monitor and verify its nuclear activities. Yet the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution, requesting Iran’s cooperation in the investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials and sites.4 Chart 1Iran's Sphere Of Influence In Collapse As tensions with US and Israel escalate, Tehran has been keen to highlight its military capabilities. Revolutionary Guard Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza revealed the existence of onshore and offshore underground missile sites along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, holding advanced long-range missiles and new weapons, more capable of launching attacks against enemies. Escalating tensions raise the likelihood of retaliation as Iran reconsiders its “strategic patience” policy.5 Tehran had been playing the waiting game, especially since Trump’s decision to assassinate Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani in January. Iran has an interest in avoiding confrontation in the months ahead of the US election on November 3. Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia in September 2019 led to a boost in Trump’s approval rating. A major conflict today would cause a patriotic rally around the president at a time when he is beset with negative opinion over the coronavirus response and poor race relations. Iran has an interest in Joe Biden winning the presidency in November. Biden would likely restore the US-Iran deal, which would remove sanctions and allow Iran to open its economy. However, neither the Trump administration nor the Israeli government share that interest. The latest attacks raise the possibility that the US and/or Israel are going on the offensive. This could force Iran to retaliate. Iranian moderates are already suffering domestically. Iran’s hardline parliamentarians were never on board with the nuclear deal and criticized President Hassan Rouhani when President Trump pulled out of it in May 2018. This past weekend Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, an ally of Rouhani whose reputation also rests on the deal, was heckled as he addressed the parliament. As of February, parliament is mostly comprised of hardliners.6 Iran is also on shaky ground in the Shia Crescent. Lebanon and Iraq – the two countries most entrenched in Iran’s sphere of influence – have been experiencing civil unrest. Protesters in both countries initially took to the streets last fall in demonstration of anger over government corruption, the sectarian based political system, and poor economic conditions. The pandemic and recession have breathed new life into these movements. The Lebanese pound collapsed on the parallel market since October, and some groups have called for the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah (Chart 1). Meanwhile a June cabinet decision in Iraq to cap the amount and number of state salaries and pension payments collected – in attempt to buttress the country’s ailing finances – fueled outrage. Iraq’s Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is also in a tussle with Iran-backed paramilitary forces as he attempts to curb their influence and bring them under state control.7 Chart 2Iran Has Little To Lose Thus a timid stance by Iran in face of foreign attacks will not go down well. Instead, with oil production having collapsed, the economy in shambles, and its sphere of influence in turmoil, Tehran has little to lose in protecting what is left of its nuclear program and deterring American or Israeli aggression (Chart 2). With few options left, Iran is likely to move further away from its “strategic patience” in response to the uptick in “maximum pressure.” Bottom Line: Tensions are escalating between Tehran and Washington/Tel Aviv. Cyber attacks are likely to increase in the lead up to the expiration of the arms embargo on October 18 and US elections this fall. Iran may be forced to abandon its policy of “strategic patience” if its foes sabotage its nuclear capabilities. Expect the conflict to spillover to Iran’s proxies in the region – Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. So What? Massive monetary and fiscal stimulus and continued commitment from OPEC 2.0 on the supply side will keep oil prices moving higher this year. Barring a second COVID-19 wave, our Commodity & Energy Strategists expect oil markets to rebalance beginning in 3Q2020, with Brent prices averaging $40/bbl this year and $65/bbl in 2021 (Chart 3). We remain long Brent which is up 70.55% since initiation in March.   The escalation in tensions in the Persian Gulf is an upside risk to this assessment. That said, with major oil producers now operating significantly below capacity in compliance with the OPEC 2.0 production agreement, the net impact on oil prices will likely be muted and short-lived. Production can be increased to fill gaps. As demonstrated by the recent acts of sabotage in Iran and Israel, the increase in geopolitical tensions globally will manifest in cyberattacks, supporting cyber stocks. Our strategically long ISE Cyber Security Index relative to the S&P500 Info Tech sector trade is up 2% since initiation in April (Chart 4). Chart 3Oil Markets On The Way To Recovery Chart 4Buy Cybersecurity Stocks Finally, we should note that Iran is not the only geopolitical risk that could explode amid the US election cycle. China is the greater risk. But President Trump faces fewer financial and economic constraints in a conflict with Iran than he does in a conflict with China. A conflict with Iran could change the game ahead of the election at a time when Trump is beset with the coronavirus and social unrest. His opinion polling would benefit from a rally around the flag, as it did in September 2019. The risk for Trump is that this bump may not last long. Americans are less concerned about Iran than China and Russia and Trump himself has benefited from American weariness of Middle Eastern wars. All we can say for certain is that the US election is of critical strategic importance to several major and minor powers. Trump’s allies and enemies know that the next six months offer their best chance to take actions that either affect the election or exploit the current alignment of US foreign policy relative to a Democratic Party alignment. While China probably prefers Biden, it can deal with either ruling party. Whereas Israel has a unique opportunity to advance its objectives under Trump and Iran has a clear imperative to remove Trump from office.   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The damaged building was constructed in 2013 to be a site for the development of advanced centrifuges. Work there was stopped in 2015 as per requirements of the JCPA, but was restarted when the US withdrew from the deal in 2018. 2 Meanwhile a group of dissidents from within Iran’s military and security forces, calling themselves Homeland Cheetahs, claimed responsibility for the Natanz attack. However, it is possible that the claim was made with the intention to mislead. Please see Jiyar Gol, "Iran blasts: What is behind mysterious fires at key sites?" BBC News, July 6, 2020. 3 The draft US resolution bans Iran from supplying, selling, or transferring weapons after the October 18 expiration of the embargo. It bans UN member states from purchasing Iranian arms or permitting citizens to train or provide financial resources or assistance to Iran without Security Council approval. 4 This resolution, introduced by France, Germany, and the UK, refers to an undeclared uranium metal disc, potential fuel-cycle-related activities such as uranium processing and conversion, and suspected storage of nuclear material. Iran’s parliament responded by issuing a statement signed by 240 out of the 290 members which called the resolution excessive and requested that Iran halt voluntary implementation of additional protocol and change inspections 5 Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA published the following commentary in response to the Natanz explosion: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has so far tried to prevent intensifying crises and the formation of unpredictable conditions and situation … the crossing of red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran by hostile countries, especially the Zionist regime and the US, means that strategy … should be revised." 6 In addition, 120 out of the 290 parliamentarians signed and delivered a motion to the presiding board of the assembly, requesting that Rouhani be summoned for questioning. The presiding board may not issue the summons and is unlikely to result in Rouhani’s impeachment as Khamenei has requested unity amid high foreign tensions. It nonetheless reflects Rouhani’s weakened position ahead of next year’s elections. 7 Hisham al-Hashemi, an advisor to Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi who had advised the government on reducing the influence of Iran-backed militias in Iraq, was killed on July 6, days after receiving threatening telephone calls from militias.